IDEALISTIC THOUGHT IN THE GAUDAPĀDAKĀRIKĀ

In the history of early Advaita vedānta, the place of Gauḍapāda is unforgettable, for he in his Gauḍapāda-kārikā has put forth Monistic as well as Idealistic views. Since our topic deals with the concept of the unreality of the world, we would like to examine the views of Gauḍapāda, who clearly negates the reality of the worldly phenomena. We have seen in the previous chapter, that the concept of the unreality of the world was not known to the early Upaniṣadic period. It was vijnānavāda School of Buddhism, which systematically put forth the concept of the unreality of the external world. Influenced by Buddhistic Idealism, Gauḍapāda emphasized the unreality of the world. Unfortunately, many difficulties have to be faced in ascertaining Gauḍapāda's identity as well as his date.

Identity and Date:

Much has been discussed and written about the identity and date of Gauḍapāda, so not entering into full details, we shall present it briefly. Tradition considers Gauḍapāda to be the 'grand preceptor' of Śaṅkarācārya. On the other
hand, Walleser's opinion is very striking. According to him, there was no one like Ācārya Gauḍapāḍa. The Gauḍapāḍakārikā is not the work of any Ācārya named Gauḍapāḍa. But the tenets of Advaita Vedānta as known in the Gauḍa country are found arranged systematically in the form of the Gauḍapāḍakārikā.

This view is not accepted by many. According to Prof. L. D. Barnett the name Gauḍapāḍa is parallel to Dramādācārya; and the term 'pāḍa' is honorific.¹

We can get some help in determining the date of Gauḍapāḍa from Buddhist writers. Bhāvaviveka (500 - 500 A.D.), Śanatarakṣita (705 - 762 A.D.) and Kālisa seem to be aware of Gauḍapāḍa.² So Gauḍapāḍa must be placed before them round about 500 A.D. This is disputed by many as there could be a common source for these texts. And tradition cannot be wholly ignored. Besides, there is a great resemblance of ideas as well as of terminology between the G.K., and the Yogavāsiṣṭha. Both of them seem to be influences by Buddhistic Idealism. There is also a big question mark about priority.

² Bhattacharya Vidhushekhar (Ed.) The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāḍa. Introduction - lxxv (1943) University of Calcutta.
which is the earlier work, the Yv. or the G.K. Thus it is very difficult to decide the actual date of Gauḍapāda.

The Gauḍapādakārikā:

The Gauḍapādakārikā is based on the shortest but one of the most important Upaniṣads, viz. the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. It contains four chapters—namely, (1) Āgama, (2) Vaitathya, (3) Advaita and (4) Alātaśanti Prakāraṇa, having respectively 29, 38, 48 and 100 kārikās. There are different views about the interrelation of the four Prakāraṇas. According to tradition, these four Prakāraṇas are interrelated with each other. But Prof. Vidhushekhār Bhattacharya has tried to refute this view. He holds that the G.K. is not a single work, and the four Prakāraṇas are not interrelated with each other. They are independent, but put together in the form of one work. ¹

Gauḍapāda is one amongst those, who has denounced the objective existence of the world. As we have stated before, under Buddhistic influence Gauḍapāda has rejected the reality of the external world. He has emphasized Acosmism

(Ajātivāda) from the ultimate standpoint. Very logically he has stated, "A thing which does not exist in the beginning and in the end, does not exist in the middle also. This entire phenomenal conglomeration is not real, though it is considered to be real."¹

**Idealistic Views Expressed in the Gaudapādakārikā:**

The main purport of this chapter is to examine the Idealistic views put forth in the G.K. So we shall concentrate on the points, directly concerned with our topic.

**Resemblance between the Waking State & The Dreaming State:**

To suggest the unreality of a thing, it is always compared with the dream. In the second, viz. Vaśṭhāya prakaraṇa of the G.K., the author has presented his Idealistic view about the world by comparing the waking state with the dreaming state. Gaudapāda has put forth logical reasons to prove the unreality of the dreaming state as well as of the waking state. All the objects, which we perceive during the dreaming state are experienced in the body, even though there is no ample space for them. In the dreaming state, both

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¹. बाध्यावन्ते च यत्नाधिर्विवैमानिसपि तथा।
   कित्वष्ट्रे: शून्यस्वं सन्तोषविलया हव तस्मिनः॥
Time and Space are not regulated properly, if we view them from the point of view of the waking state. The dreamer goes to another country in a very short period of time, which is something impossible and on waking up from the dreaming state, the dreamer does not find himself in the country he saw during the dreaming state. The author quotes in support of the śruti that there is the absence of the objects of the dream.¹ In several respects the world of the waking state resembles the dream-world. The only difference prevailing between them is that, in the dream things are experienced internally, while in the waking state things are perceived externally. Rightly speaking, the objects of the waking as well as of the dreaming state are imagined by the mind only. During the dreaming state, the objects imagined by one with an introvert citta are mithyā(false), and whatever is seen by one with an extrovert citta, though appearing as real is also mithyā.² The same is the case with the objects of the waking state.

¹ Br. Up. IV 3-10.
² G.K. II-9.
Now a question may arise that if the objects are merely imagined, then what is it that is responsible for their appearance. We can find an answer viz. the Ātman imagines the entire conglomeration through own Māyā. All the external as well as internal objects are simply the imagination of the Ātman. The only difference is that, while the objects imagined within exist till the mind keeps on imagining, while the objects of the external word exist relatively. Their existence is 'dvayakālika'. That is to say, external objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (viz. before they are perceived, and when the begin to be perceived). Or they exist in relation to others which also are imagined. In other words, external objects exist till we perceive them. That is to say, they exist relatively. A flower exists till we perceive it; on the other hand, we

1. क्योंकि यह वास्तविकता नहीं है?
   उसे दूसरी दिशा में भी नहीं है?
   - G.K. II. 12.

2. इसलिए वह वास्तविक नहीं है?
   वह भी दूसरे वस्तुओं से संबंधित है?
   यानी दो दौरों की दौरी, दो दौरों की दौरी?
   - Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the G.K. II. 14. p. 200
   Ten Principal Upaniṣads (1972) Motilal Banarasidass.

3. Dasgupta S.N. - Indian Idealism. Ch.VI, P.150,
   Reprinted (1962), Cambridge.
perceive it till it exists. Some believe that the term 'dvaya' signifies that both the mind and sense organs operate in the act of perception of the objects. Thus objects of both the dreaming state and the waking state are the result of the mind's constructive imagination. As the rope is imagined as a snake due to an illusion, so the Ātman is imagined differently due to Māyā. It is said that at first the Jīva is imagined by the Ātman and then these subjective as well as objective things are imagined. ¹ In the second and the third prakaraṇas of the G.K. it is variously stated that the self, māyā and the mind are responsible for the manifestation of this phenomenal world.²

Thus comparing the world with a magical illusion, the dream and the gandharvanagara, Gauḍapāda concludes the Vai-tathya Prakaraṇa emphasizing his Monistic and Absolutistic

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1. जीव इत्यते पूङ्खे ततो मायानुथानित्यात् ।
बाह्यनाथाच्यांनां क्षेत्र क्षेत्र िविष्टत्वा स्मृति: ॥

   - G.K. II. 16.

2. See G.K. II-12,
मायया मिलै हृद्वान्तनायक्ष्यार्ज कर्षकम् ॥

   - G.K. III-19(ab)
मना उपसमर्द् हृद्यतिथिचुत्स्वराचराय ॥
मनवी हवयतानाय ऽैव नैवापतम्ये ॥

view.\(^1\) He has presented the criterion of the Ultimate Reality, viz. "There is no suppression, nor is there origination, no one is in bondage, no one is desirous of emancipation. This is the Highest truth.\(^2\)

**Acosmism - (Ajātivāda):**

Acosmism can be said to be the acme of Advaita vedānta as propounded by Gaudapāda. It is the central doctrine emphasized in the G.K. According to Gaudapāda, nothing is ever born, but because of māyā, the phenomenal world appears to spring forth. Gaudapāda has compared Ātman with Mahākāśa. Giving the example of ghatākāśa, he has explained how individual souls are imagined.\(^3\) Because of the different pots, the Mahākāśa appears in the form of ghatākāsas. Similarly Ātman appears in the form of individual souls through māyā. Because of different ghatas, different ghatākāsas

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1. स्वप्नमात्रे यादुर्वृट्ट्वन्ध्र्यतंपर्यः ्यतः
   तथा विभिन्न पृष्ठपत्रकेनुन्यस्यते।
   - G.K. II. 31.

2. नि निरूपो न चोत्परित्य बद्दो न च गहवः।
   न मुनिने से मुक्तः हत्येषा परस्पतः।
   - G.K. II. 32.

3. बाल्म आजा स्युज्जीवधातापाशिचित्तिदितः।
   घटादिवब्रच स्वप्नातिजविभवन्यस्य।
   - G.K. III. 3.
appear and when these ghatas are destroyed, the different ghatākūśas seem to be merged in the Mahākāśa. Similarly, the Self is imagined as different Jīvas being conditioned or limited by the different conglomerations of the limb etc. called bodies. When these conglomerations are destroyed, these different Jīvas are merged in the Ātman. As ghatākāśa is neither a modification nor a part of the Mahākāśa, so the Jīva is neither a modification nor a part of the Ātman. As dirt, smoke etc. appearing in one ghatākāśa do not appear in other ghatākāsas, similarly the happiness or the grief of one individual soul does not appear in other individual souls. All the conglomerations are imagined through māyā like a dream. There is no essence in their empirical existence. They appear as real because of māyā.

3. शेषाला: स्वप्नवत्‌वे वात्ममायाकिनिता: ।

- G.K. III - 10 (ab)
In the Vedas we find passages describing creation,\(^1\) and also passages saying that the ultimate Reality undergoes no change whatsoever. But as a matter of fact, the creation of the world in different ways is stated as a means to the attainment of the ultimate Truth. Though a distinction between the Ātman and the Jīvas is stated, in fact there is no distinction. In order to help the people of lower intellect to attain the Supreme Truth, a distinction is stated from their point of view; so that through upāsanā they could gradually realise the Ultimate Truth that there is no distinction at all! The Śruti passages describing the creation of the world are from the empirical point of view. They are stepping stones leading to the attainment of the Ultimate Truth.

All the same, it is stated very emphatically in the Śruti that in reality there is no origination at all!

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1. See Tāt. Up. 3-1. 
Br. Up. II - 1-10 etc.

2. पूलिनिविष्टकुलिहार्योऽसुभिष्टयो चौरितान्यः।
उपायः शौंकवल्लराय नाशित कैता: कथाचन।

Because of māyā this phenomenal appearance is created. ¹

In the Brhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad it is said that Indra through māyā takes various forms. The Vājasaneyi Samhitā states that 'Though unborn he is variously born through māyā'.

It is stated in the Br. Up. that there is no plurality here. The śrutī has condemned Sāṁbhūti (origination), and the cause of birth is also denied. ² The birth of an existent thing could be possible only through māyā. There could not be the birth of the ātman which is immortal, for whatever is born, certainly perishes. ³ And that which is non-existent could not be originated either through illusion or in reality. The son of a barren woman is not born either in illusion or in reality. ⁴ As in a dream, because of māyā, the mind projects appearance, so in the waking state also.

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1. नेह नानैति वामायावदिन्नो मायाभिसिद्धामिः ।
   क्षायानां वृहया मायया जायो हुसः ॥

2. सम्भूस्यवावदिज्ञ सम्भवः प्रतिष्ठ चति ।
   कोन्येऽन्त जानेयदिति कारणः प्रतिष्ठ चति ॥
   - G.K. III. 25.

3. जात्वस्य चिन्ति तुलौऽमुहः ।

4. अर्थेऽ मायया जन्य तत्करो नैव युत्योऽ ।
   वनव्यापृच्छे न तत्करे मायया वापि जायते ॥
   - G.K. III. 28.
the mind through māyā projects these external appearances, and appears variously. This world of appearance is only an illusion. Whatever appears, is created by the mind only. When the mind vibrates, the appearance is projected. On the other hand, when the mind becomes non-mind that is to say, stops vibrating or imagining, the appearance vanishes. Concluding the third prakaraṇa, Gaudapāda states, "No individual souls is ever born, nor is there any possibility of it. This is the highest truth, where nothing is born."¹

In the fourth prakaraṇa viz. Alātadānti prakaraṇa, Gaudapāda has put forth the doctrine of non-origination (Ajātivāda), refuting the theory of causation, which we would like to examine separately.

Refutation of Causation:

While refuting the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṁkhya system as well as the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system, Gaudapāda has strongly emphasized that in no way origination is possible.

Now, the Satkāryavādin holds that the effect pre-
exists in the cause in a subtle form. Against this, Gaudapāda argues that what is already existent, cannot be born. On the other hand, the Asatkāryavādin believes that the effect is not pre-existent in the cause. It is completely a new thing, that is produced. Gaudapāda has refuted this theory also. That which is non-existent, cannot come to exist in any way. The followers of both these theories dispute with each other. It is very clear that an object which is existent cannot be born; and on the other hand what is non-existent, just like a barren's son, cannot be born in any way. Disputing with each other, the holders of these theories establish non-origination: That which is immortal, does not become mortal; On the other hand, what is mortal does not become immortal, because change of nature is impossible.

Gaudapāda, with the help of logical arguments

1. अत्यस्त जातिविविधत्वमिव वादितः केवलिन चि।
   अवस्थाय धीरा विवन्धः परस्परः ||
   - G.K. IV - 3.

2. पूर्णं न जायो विविधमूलं नैव जायते।
   विवन्धः द्वयं: हृदेवम्भोजिति स्थाययति ते ||
   - G.K. IV - 4.

negates these theories. As stated above, the Satkāryavādaṁ holds that the effect pre-exists in the cause in a latent form. The cause is non-different from the effect that is produced. But if the cause is produced, then how can it be 'aja' (non-born)? It cannot remain eternal and yet be produced. ¹ Gaṇḍapāda again argues that if the effect is identical with the cause, then the effect also becomes 'aja', and how could the cause be eternal when it is identical with the effect? ² Śaṅkara (?) in his commentary on the G.K., states that this is not possible. One can not cook half a hen and yet have the other half for laying eggs!³


2. कारणारण्यन्यात्वक स्वभावः कार्यमयं यदि । जायमानादिप वै कार्यार्थकारणं तैबं च ध्रुवम् ॥
   - G.K. IV - 12.

*There is a great doubt prevailing whether Ādi Śaṅkara has written the commentary on the G.K.

3. न ति कुञ्जहृया एकदेशः पच्चते एकदेशः प्रयत्नाय कल्पः ॥

Śaṅkara's Com. on the G.K. IV-12- P. 231

Ten Principal Upaniṣads. (1970) Motilal Banarasidass
On the other hand, according to Asatkāryavādin, the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. Gauḍapāda argues while rejecting this theory that, that which is non-existent cannot be produced. A barren woman's son is not born. And if one maintains that an object is born from what is born, then there would be the fault of anavasthā (Infinite Regress), and it would be impossible to determine the ultimate cause. If it is said that the cause precedes the effect and the effect precedes the cause, then by the bijānkuranyāya it would impossible to determine whether the cause precedes the effect or the effect precedes the cause. Those who believe that the effect produces the cause, as the cause produces the effect, for them, production would be just like the birth of a father from the son. For causation, they must decide the order of the cause and the effect; for if they be simultaneous, they could not be related with each other just like

2. कैवोरादि कर्तवें देयावादी हेतुः फलस्य च ।
   तथा जम्म परेषतः पुत्राज्जन्म पितस्या ॥
the two horns of an animal.¹ There is no kind of relationship between the horns of an animal, which are different from each other, and simultaneously existent. If the cause and the effect produce each other, then it would be difficult to ascertain which is the cause and which the effect. Gaudapāda states that thus nothing is produced because there is lack of potency in the cause to produce the effect, absence of knowledge and also incompatibility of order. Thus the theory of non-origination is fully acceptable.² Nothing is ever produced either from itself or from another. Nothing either existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent is born.³

After refuting the Sāmkhya and the Nyāyavaiśeṣika theory of causation, Gaudapāda refutes the vijñānavāda also.

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1. भद्राण्येतः क्रमश्च मर्यादातः क्रमश्चम ॥
   क्रमश्चमपेक्षा हेतुस्मृत्यो विभागाभवु ॥
   - G.K. IV - 16.

2. क्षतिक्षण सान्त ज्ञाना क्रमस्पतिः पुनः ॥
   वेचे हि स्वेष्या वृद्धिवर्त्त दोषीपिता ॥
   - G.K. IV - 19.

3. क्षतिक्षणसान्त ज्ञाना क्रमस्पतिः पुनः ॥
   वेचे हि स्वेष्या वृद्धिवर्त्त दोषीपिता ॥
   - G.K. IV - 22.
According to the vijñānavādins this phenomenal appearance is created by the mind. All the seeming external objects are nothing but the creation of the mind only. After employing the argument of the vijñānavādin to refute the reality of the external world, Gauḍapāda seems to refute the vijñānavāda also. He states that neither the mind nor the cittadrṣṭa (what is perceptible by the mind) is ever produced.

He who tries to see its origination, tries to see footprints in the sky. It cannot be said that the Samsāra which is: beginningless has an end, nor can it be said that liberation has a beginning but has no end! Thus, what does not exist in the beginning and in the end, does not exist in the present also. Whatever we perceive at present, is only an imagination of the mind. Because of common experience and perception, all these conglomerations appear as real. Gauḍapāda gives the example of the Māyāhastin. The Māyāhastin does not exist at all,

1. तद्भवान् जायो चिं चिंचूर्णं न जायो ।
   तत्त्व पहानिः ते जाति रूपुस्व पहानिः ते पदृः ॥


3. तथेऽव चिंचूर्णाय न्यतनस्मातः ॥
   - G. K. IV-36.
But because of the influence of magic, it seems to be existing. Similarly because of seeming practical utility and perception we believe that all these seeming objects exist. As a matter of fact, nothing is ever born. Thus non-origination is the Ultimate Truth according to Gauḍapāda.

The example of the fire-brand (alāta-cakṣa) explains non-origination. As a moving fire-brand appears to be straight, crooked or circular, so the vibrating mind appears as perceiver and the perceptible.¹ When the fire-brand stops moving, its straight, crooked, circular appearances are no longer there. Similarly when the mind stops vibrating, these two-fold appearances do not appear.² Appearances of the moving fire-brand are not produced either from the fire-brand or from another thing, and when it stops moving, they do not enter either in the fire-brand or in any other thing. This is true of the phenomenal appearances which seem to arise through the vibration of the mind.³ The objects are not created from the mind; nor is the mind created from

1. See G.K. IV - 47.
the objects. Thus the wise are initiated into the doctrine of non-origination. \(^1\) Whatever appears, is a mere illusion. As long as the obsession of causation remains, the world appears, when one gets over it, this world of appearance disappears. \(^2\) All this appearance seems to be there because of nescience (Sāṃvṛti). The object existing from the empirical point of view (Kalpita-Sāṃvṛtyā), does not exist from the ultimate point of view. That which is true according to other schools of philosophy, is not true ultimately. \(^3\) Everything is without origination. All these conglomerations are said to be born only relatively; and not as the ultimate reality. All this is Māyā only; and Māyā also does not exist. \(^4\) Whatever exists as empirical reality is only an imagination. All this seeming duality is just the vibration of the citta. As a matter of fact, the citta is objectless (Nirviśaya). \(^5\)

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3. यौंशित कल्पकल्पत्या परमार्थैं नास्त्यथार् ॥
   परतन्त्राभिस्वै त्यानन्तरत्मिः परमार्थः ॥
   – G.K. IV – 73.
4. धम्म य द्य जायन्ति जायन्ति ते न तत्तत्वः ॥
   जन्म मायोपमेवैषयोऽसा व माया न विषयः ॥
   – G.K. IV – 58.
5. विच्छेदित्वा वेदोऽवाच ग्रहिताभास्वदुःथमः ॥
   निर्विशयं निर्यत्मकं वै न कीर्तितमु ॥
that which is known as cit, and called the Ātman in Ṣaṁ-
nisads. When the mind becomes non-mind, when it ceases to
vibrate, at that time it is known as cit. To be strictly
logical, it is not even true to uphold 'ajāti' or to say
that the Highest Reality is 'ajā (unborn). (Thus the author
denies even 'ajāti' as the Ultimate Truth, because the real
nature of Ātman cannot be ascertained by any empirical means).
The term 'aja' is used to refute those for whom origination
is true. There is no scope for any terminology to describe
the Ultimate Truth. Thus the author denies 'ajāti' also as
a proper description of the Ultimate Truth. Gauḍapāda has
attempted to put forth Brahman as non-dual. Brahman, the
Ultimate Truth is non-dual, without beginning, middle and
end. All this seeming duality in unborn. The Absolute is
unborn, changeless (same) and fearless.

Thus the doctrine of non-origination (Acosmism) is
put forth repeatedly by Gauḍapāda. The author has variously
—that is to say, by refuting the theory of causation,
presenting the analogy of the fire-brand (Alātacakra) and

1. अय: कत्यत्वमेकः परमार्थः नाप्यत।
पत्तिप्रत्यक्षत्वः सूक्तमावते तु एव।

- G.K. IV - 74.
so on emphasized Acosmism.

Now, a question may naturally arise, that if non-origination is the Ultimate Truth, how could this world of appearance be seen before us. We can find an answer to this from the Gaudapādakārikā. As we have stated before, under the great spell of subjective Idealism of Buddhism, Gaudapāda has emphasized the Mind's wondrous constructive power. So now, we shall see how the mind plays an active part in viewing the world of appearance.

The Mind's Constructive Role:

Gaudapāda is never tired of reiterating that the objects of perception are unreal. The value of the empirical world is not more that that of the world of the dreaming state. As the dreaming world is imagined by the mind, so the empirical world is also imagined by the mind. All the objects that appear are but the vibrations of the mind (cittaspanditam), and hence unreal.¹ When the mind vibrates, the objects appear before us, on the other hand, when the mind stops vibrating, that is to say, when the mind becomes non-mind.

¹ See G.K. IV - 36.
this duality does not appear at all.\(^1\) It is stated in the Advaita Prakaraṇa that as in the dreaming state the mind vibrates in the form of illusive duality due to māyā, so in the waking state also the mind vibrates in the form of illusive duality.\(^2\) This duality consisting of mutable as well as immutable objects, is nothing else but an appearance (drṣṭya) of the mind.\(^3\)

In short, the Mind is considered as having a great role in the world-construction. Through the maxim of positive and negative assertion (anvaya-vyatireka), we can say that if the mind vibrates, the world of appearance springs forth before us, on the other hand when the mind stops vibrating, the world is merged away.

Here, we can say that though Gauḍapāda has not actually used the term 'Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi', somehow, his Idealism is very close to the 'Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda' inasmuch as he has stated that this appearing world is a result of the vibration of the mind. Of course, it can be said that

\(^1\) यद्यपि इस्मृतिमावेत् हें भौविपल्लवे \(\text{II}\) - G.K. III - 31(cd).
\(^2\) See G.K. III - 29.
\(^3\) फौद्धस्मिन्द हें यत्किचिक्कु घनरावरु \(\text{I}\) - G.K. III - 31(ab)
the author is not precise in explaining his view as to who imagines this phenomenal world. Whether the Ātman or the Jīva? In the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, it is stated that at first the Jīva is imagined and then these various objects are imagined. Here, it is not clear whether the Ātman imagines the Jīva and then it itself imagines this seeming duality or at first the Jīva is imagined and then it imagines this seeming duality. It is also not clear whether he is referring to the individual souls severally. In which case there would be as many worlds as there are Jīvas. So one cannot get a specific and clear idea whether this world of appearance is an imagination of the cosmic mind or of the individual mind. In the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha it is stated that this world of appearance is imagined by the cosmic mind and also by the individual mind. Thus the seed of the 'Drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda' which was slightly present at least in the expressions of the upaniṣadīc period, can be said to have sprouted forth in the G.K., awaiting further development.

1. See G.K. II - 16.
2. See - Yv. VI (a) 67 - 13.
Conclusion:

We may conclude here that somehow Gaudapāda goes ahead in the direction of Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivāda. The G.K. runs parallel to the Drṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda in declaring the empirical world as unreal as the dreaming world. Gaudapāda has employed the similes of svapna, māyā, māyāhastin and gandharvanagara to establish the unreality of the world of appearance.

The factor responsible for such an Idealistic development in the Gaudapādakārikā seems to be the influence of Buddhistic Idealism. One can clearly find much similarity between Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika Philosophy and the views in the Laṅkāvatāra on the one hand, and the views put forth in the G.K. on the other hand.¹ Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya has quoted passages and stanzas from Buddhist works to show how much Gaudapāda is indebted to Buddhism. (As a matter of fact, he and even Dasgupta are apt to regard Gaudapāda as a Buddhist.

According to Dr. Mahadevan, "Gaudapāda lived and taught in an age when Mahāyāna was having a great hold on

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¹ Laṅkāvatāra - III -96. - G.K. IV - 72.
M.K. XXI - 13 ab. - G.K. IV - 22 ab
the minds of people...Gauḍapāda adopted the logical method
of expounding the vedānta, as also the Buddha modes of
expression and argumentation.1 Under the Buddhistic influe-
ce, Gauḍapāda has used Buddhistic terminology in the
Alātasānti Prakaraṇa.2

It would not be out of place to state that though
Gauḍapāda is greatly influenced by the Buddhistic Idealism,
he has not completely surrendered to it. He has even refu-
ted the vijñānavāda, for he does not accept a continuum of
consciousness as the Ultimate Reality. He has put forth the
concept of Brahman according to the upaniṣads, and his view
is firmly rooted in the upaniṣads. He can be said to have
explained and justified non-duality under the influence of
subjectivism of the Vijñānavāda as well as the philosophy
of the Mādhyamikas. It has been stated, "His Absolutism
is blended with the relativism and Phenomenalism of Nāgā-
rjuna and subjectivism of the Vijñānavāda."3

   Ch.X, P.248, 3rd Edition (1960), University of Madras.
2. চেয়ে, অধ্যায়, প্রাতিষ্ঠ, ব্যক্তি, বিদ্যাশালী, বুদ্ধরোগ, লৌকিক, লৌকিক, লৌকিক, প্রতিযোগিতা, বিপক্ষ, ভাস্কর, ভাস্কর, ভাস্কর, ভাস্কর, ভাস্কর, ভাস্কর.
   Vol.II, Ch.VI, P.454 (1956) Sinha Publishing House,
   Calcutta.

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In conclusion, it would be proper to quote the view of Dr. Radhakrishnan, "The Karika of Gaudapada is an attempt to combine in one whole the negative logic of the Madhyamikas with the positive idealism of the Upaniṣads."\(^1\) Hence, we can consider the G.K. as a subtle combination of subjective Idealism and Monistic Idealism.

1. Dr. Radhakrishnan, 'Indian Philosophy'.