After examining the features that constitute the Drsti-Srsti vāda, we shall now see what is meant by the term "Drsti-Srsti" and how it can be said to be the culmination of the Vedantic thought. Besides, in this chapter we are going to examine the arguments put forth by the Realists in opposition to the Drsti-Srsti vāda and how ingeniously Drsti-Srsti vāda answers them.

But before we enter into details, it would not be out of place to review the main aspects of the Drsti-Srsti vāda, as emphasized in the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī by Prakāśānanda, so that it could be easy to understand the theory more clearly.

(1) Drsti-Srsti vāda forcefully negates the unapprehended existence (Ajñāta Sattā) of the world. It asserts that the creation (Srsti) takes place only when it is seen. In other words, Drsti-itself plays the role of Srsti. There is no creation apart from Drsti.
(2) Considering the world as illusory (pratibhāsika), Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda puts it on the same footing as a dream.

(3) According to the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda, in deep sleep (Susupti), the world (Prapañca) is merged or disappears and on waking up from deep sleep, a completely new prapanca arises. But due to non-discrimination one is not able to distinguish between the two.

(4) Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda holds that there is only one sentiency, which due to Avidyā (Nescience) becomes the Jīva and imagines itself variously in the form of God, the world, the jīvas etc. Thus, it shows its preference for Ekajīva vāda.

(5) The theory of causation is absolutely rejected by the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda. Only in order to avoid an awkward silence, it considers Avidyā or Māyā as the material (Upādāna) cause of the world. As a matter of fact, nothing is ever born, but due to Avidyā things seem to be existing, but this is merely an illusion! Thus, Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda ultimately ends in Acośmism (Ajātivāda), and presents the culmination of the Vedāntic thought.
This gives a bird's eye view regarding Drsti-Srasti vāda as propounded in the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī.

We have already stated that before the sixteenth century A.D., nowhere do we get a systematic exposition of Drsti-Srasti vāda. It was Prakāśānanda who discussed the Drsti-Srasti vāda in all its aspects for the first time in the Vedānta Siddhānta-Muktāvalī. After that, we find this theory mentioned as an established theory by Madhusūdana Sarasvati, Appaya Dikṣita and others.

In the Advaitaśiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvati, we find the pros and cons of the Drsti-Srasti vāda. But, before we peep into these details, it is necessary to make it clear as to what is meant by the term "Drsti-Srasti".

The term 'Drsti-Srasti'

Usually, the term "Drsti" stands for visual knowledge while creation is meant by the term "Srasti".*

* 

श्रव्ण: - बुद्धि: (ध्य + पाव + किसना) वसीम।
शाक्तकल्पम - भक्तीय: काण्ड: -
पू ७५
श्रव्ण: - निम्नमति: (सूत्र + किसना)
शाक्तकल्पम - फ-का: काण्ड: - पू. ८०७
1६६१ मार्कोलाल कारसीदास।
The above mentioned is the etymological meaning of the term "Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi". But, here we are not much concerned with its etymological meaning. So the question arises as to what the philosophical term "Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi" stands for. We find the term defined in the Advaitasiddhi, in the Siddhāntalesasamgraha; in the Vedānta Siddhāntadarsa etc. As mentioned in the Advaitasiddhi, the term "Drṣṭi" stands for consciousness conditioned by, or reflected on the mode (vṛtti) of Avidyā. Hence, it is the mode of Avidyā that projects the illusory creation (Sṛṣṭi). Avidyā by its very nature is misleading. It conceals the real nature of a thing and projects it wrongly. Brahman, the Ultimate Spiritual Reality is all pervading. But due to Avidyā it imagines itself as the jīva and being the jīva, it imagines various forms. So, Avidyā is the very root of the creation. We may say that consciousness reflected on the mode of Avidyā takes the form of the things. That is to say, in

1. वृत्तपतिकृत्यपैवृृष्टिशुद्धार्थः

Ad.Si.p.535

- Srṣtri N.S. Ananta Krishna (Ed) Advaitasiddhi
the illusion of the snake, the mode of Avidyā is transformed into the snake, snakeness and its misconception. Thus, consciousness reflected on the mode of Avidyā itself acts as Srstī. So Drstī itself is Srstī. There is no Srstī existing independently of its Drstī.

In the SiddhāntalesaSūngrāha, the term "Drstī-Srstī" is explained in two ways.

(1) Sṛṣṭi is created simultaneously with Drṣṭi.¹ That is to say, creation takes place at the very moment of perception.

(2) Drṣṭi itself is Srṣṭi.² Here, Drṣṭi and Srṣṭi are considered identical.

In the Vedānta Siddhāntādarsa also we find these two types of Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda mentioned.³ So far as the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda regards Sṛṣṭi as identical with Drṣṭi, we can say

1. अयमकेशाश्रष्टि समस्या विभृज्ञशिष्टस्तिति - दृष्टिस्रृष्टिकाहः ।
   - S.L.S.Ch.II p.355

2. बन्यस्तु दृष्टिर्वेद विभृज्ञेन्द्रित: ।
   - S.L.S. Ch.II p.355

3. दृष्टिर्वेद मैलस्त्रृष्टिकेशाश्चिष्टस्तिति , तथा ।
   दृष्टिानन्दज्ञप्रज्ञस्तु दृष्टिस्रृष्टिस्तितान्वादे ॥ ॥ ॥
   - वेदान्तसिद्धांतचारी - पूरोश्च संस्कार्म ॥ ॥ ॥
   - काशाम्
that it comes very close to the 'Sahopalabhaniyama' of the Yogacāra Buddhism (Vijñānavāda), except that the Vijñānavāda does not recognise one universal consciousness as the Ultimate Principle or one Jīva.

In short, Drsti-Srāti vāda is an Idealistic theory, which shows the relation of perception and creation. That is to say, it asserts that there is no creation (Srāti) apart from its Drsti. Existence is perception itself. (We can compare this concept with Berkeley's "Esse est percipi").

* Since 'Sahopalabhaniyama' of the Yogacāra Buddhism emphasizes that the knowledge of the object (jñāna) and the object to be known (jñeya) are identical, it comes very near to the Drsti-Srāti vāda.

See:

- Raval C.V. - Philosophy of Śrī Saṅkarācārya
  (in Gujarati), Ch.III.p.219 First edition -
  (1974) University Grant Nirmana Board.
It would not be wrong to state that the Vedāntic thought has acquired subtlety in the form of the Drāti-Srāti vāda. But that does not mean that before the actual establishment of the theory this subtlety was utterly lacking in Vedāntic thought. In earlier Vedāntic works we positively get scattered glimmerings of the Idealistic thought, which ultimately resulted in Drāti-Srāti vāda in the sixteenth century A.D.

We may now proceed to examine how Drāti-Srāti vāda is defended in the Advaitasiddhi against the attacks of the Realists.

Defence of Drāti-Srāti vāda

In the Advaitasiddhi, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has prepared a safe ground for the Drāti-Srāti vāda while rejecting the arguments of the Realists with full force.

The very first attack of the opponent is on the term "Drāti-Srāti". Since the Srāti-Drāti vāda holds that there is Srāti, and so it is seen, it comes in direct opposition to the Drāti-Srāti vāda, which emphasizes that there is no
Srṣṭi other than Dṛṣṭi. Srṣṭi exists only when it is seen.

So, the first question is asked, "what is meant by the term 'Dṛṣṭi-Srṣṭi'?

(1) Is Dṛṣṭi itself Srṣṭi?

Here, is Dṛṣṭi meant to be of the form of vṛtti, psychosis or is it of the form of "caitanya"? Neither of these alternatives is acceptable, as in the former case, even Brahman, which is the object of the final vṛtti would be 'Dṛṣṭi-Srṣṭi', while in the second case, there would be the contingency of Srṣṭi existing at all times.¹

(2) Or does it signify negation of Srṣṭi apart from Dṛṣṭi?

In this second alternative, there would be the untenability of the usage as distinct viz. 'created by caitra, seen by me'.²

(3) Or does it signify the negation of the thing to be created apart from Dṛṣṭi?

This also could not be accepted, for there would be

¹. दृष्टेऽपि दृष्टईऽपि - वापि दृष्टिसपा, कृत्ययोक्ता वा, कृत्यसप्तका।
   पुनः च दृष्टिसपातिग्राणाऽपि दृष्टिगुणयायापि। दृष्टिपैै ते विद्यापि
   दृष्ट्यायापि। — Ad.Si.p.533.

². दृष्टिसपातिकुलस्ययमाबो - न दृष्टीऽपि, दृष्टीं कृष्टीं तया
   दृष्ट्यहति वैस्तवायणं व्यवहारार्थानम्। — Ad.Si.p.533.
contradiction of our experience viz. 'The jar is known but not the knowledge.'

(4) Or does it mean that Srsti is created by the causal assemblage of Drsti?

This alternative is also not admissible, for in this case jar is non-different from its perception on account of its being produced by the same causal complex and there would be the fault just mentioned.

(5) Or does it mean that Srsti is simultaneous with Drsti?

This also is not tenable, for in the case of jar, etc. produced simultaneously with verbal knowledge, etc. it would be a case of providing what is already produced and there would be the contingency elsewhere of the two being different things as in the case of jar and sābda-jñāna.

1. दृष्टिप्रतिरूपेण सूक्ष्मात्माय वा - न तृतीयः
   'तत् जातिः प्रतिविवाहस्वरूपसः'
   -Ad.Si.p.533

2. दृष्टिसम्पर्कीजन्यत्वः वा - न च कृतः
   एक्षाग्रिः श्रीनर्तवेति
   घटादृष्टिस्मृतिभिन्नत्वसत्वादृश्याद्विवाहः
   -Ad.Si.p.533

3. दृष्टिसंप्रीत्यमद्यनाममुर्भिः - न फः
   शाब्दविज्ञानस्मानात्त्वन-घटादृश्यसंसाकात्
   तद्वन्ययः विनिर्देशार्जितः
   -Ad.Si.p.533
(6) Or does it mean that Srsti has the same existence as Drsti?

No, for this would be tenable even if both were real and so would be a case of 'Siddha Sadhana'.

(7) Or does it signify that it is different from 'Sat and 'asat'?

This alternative is also not acceptable, for this is itself of the form of 'mithyatva', and it is not proper to put it forth in order just to prove that very thing only.

(8) Or does it signify that it is different from 'Sat' and 'asat' being something outside the three-fold existence? viz. Paramarthika, Vyavaharika and Pratibhasika.

No, since illusory existence (pratibhasika sattā) is included in the three-fold existence, it is not possible for the world of this type to be beyond the scope of three-

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1. जृत्तिक्षण नस्तहाक्षृत्तिक्षणः - न सत्यः, उपस्तव्याचैः प्रत्यथेः।

- Ad.Si.p.533.

2. सकलचिन्हाकलप्तचिन्हाकलप्त्व च - न सत्यमः, विषय नियत्तचिन्हाकलप्त्व चतुष्पदमन्यथाधर्मपदमः।

- Ad.Si.p.533.
fold existence in the Drsti-Srṣṭī view.¹

(9) Or does it signify the absence of unapprehended existence (Ajñāta Sattā)?

This alternative is not possible for this would hold good of utterly non-existent (tuccha) things also.²

(10) Or does it signify existence, which can be known only?

No, for in the case of happiness etc. it would be equivalent to proving what is already proved and in other cases there would be the contingency of Drsti and Srṣṭī being two different things like happiness and its knowledge.³

1. त्रिविष्कर्त्त्रगतिः क्रेयां व वाच्योऽवलोकितं क्योऽन्नतप:।
   त्रिविष्कर्त्त्रप्रेमभी प्रातिभाविकस्त्रवल्लभायन्तानिविन् कृष्टिःकृष्टिःप्रवृत्त:।
   तद्वति जगति तद्ववस्थायान्तः।
   - Ad.Si.p.533

2. ज्ञातविश्लेषायां वा = न नवं: तु सच्चार्थवा ॥
   - Ad.Si.p.533

3. ज्ञातविश्लेषायां वा = न दयं: हुलिवषी सिद्धतानातः, तदवन्नयताः-नाराज्जेति ॥
   - Ad.Si.p.533
The above mentioned arguments are refuted by the Idealist: What is meant is Existence which is a thing that is known only, it being based on its being occasioned by a fault; or absence of existence that is not known, or existence which is a thing that is known only, being produced by Drṣṭi of the substrate of what is known (pratipannopādhi), or existence that can be only known while not being capable of being known by any other seer. Thus the fault of 'Siddhasādhana' in respect of the aspect of happiness etc, or the contingency of its being a different object will not arise. (According to Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda, happiness etc. belonging to another person is not known, but is imagined in oneself only as belonging to another).

1. दौपण्युक्तत्वनिबन्धनस्य ज्ञातिक्षत्त्वमात्रातिक्षत्वाभावस्य वा, प्रतिपन्नपाविद्विजन्यज्ञातिक्षत्त्वमात्र वा, हृद्देशराविवेकये सति ज्ञातिक्षत्त्वमात्र वा विविकितत्त्वात् । तथाच न हुसायशेष रिःक्षकायनु, तद्वदन्त्राद्वान्तार्वा ।

2. दृष्टसंविश्वासाते पुरुषान्तरोयुक्तिः न जायले, किंतु पुरुषान्तरोयत्वेन स्वरसिंहस्त कल्प्त हति भावः ।

- Ad. si-pp.533-534
- Gaudabrahmanandi commentary, p.534

Advaitasiddhi (1982) Parimal publications
Another objection put forth by the Realist is that, Drsti-Srsti vāda would come into conflict with the statement of the ancient, viz. "Jīva Īśo Visuddhā cit tathā jīvēsāyor-bhidā / Avidyā tacchitor yogah śāḍasmākam anādayah //" - (Jīva, God, pure consciousness, the difference of jīva and God, Avidyā, and its relation with consciousness these six are beginningless) as also with the texts of the Brahma-sūtra, Śāṅkarabhaṣya and Vivaraṇa and the like, which recognise the enduring nature of the world on the strength of the fact of recognition, etc. as against the Buddhist.

In answer to this it is stated that Drsti-Srsti is accepted only in respect of Srsti other than what is beginningless; and permanence is accepted in its nature as the cause. By this much only, refutation of the Buddhist theory of momentariness is possible and there is no contradiction of the basic texts, on the contrary we find Drsti-Srsti justified at a number of places in the basic texts.

1. कामसंसारात्मकत्वस्वूर्द्धतिविभाषय एव द्वितीयस्मितस्सूत्रस्त्रांकरादुः, कारणात्मना स्वायत्तस्वन्तस्त्रांकरात्मन । ताबौय बौद्धाध्याय्यत्वमात्राराज्यं-पपि पूजः स्त्रांकरात्मन । प्रत्यय तरैणा बहुशो द्वितीयस्मितस्त्रांकरात्मकिं ।

- Ad. Sūp.534
As Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda asserts that Drṣṭi itself is Sṛṣṭi, and strongly negates the theory of causation, another objection of the Realist is that if things are constituted of just knowledge, and are not produced by their respective causes, the injunction of "jyotiṣṭoma" etc for heaven etc in the veda and the injunction of "hearing" etc for the realisation of Brahma, and also the statements regarding the sky etc being the causes of air etc, would all not be proper.

In answer to this it is stated, that such statements could be justified like the statement instructing us about causality pertaining to a dream. And even then upaniṣadic sentences and their critique would not come to be fully on par with a dream-statement and its explanation, for their difference is tenable by virtue of the sublation and non-sublation of their objects.

It may be argued that if Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi is accepted, it would no longer be necessary to indulge in the activity of eating for one's satisfaction, or in the activity of using articulate sounds for communication, and this activity of ours would then be contradicted.
The answer to this is that this charge is set aside by looking upon this behaviour as possible like dream-behaviour.

As the Drsti-Srsti vāda negates the unapprehended existence (Ajñāta sattā) of things, the Realist in this context argues that since jar etc would be non-existent before their knowledge, the systematic ordering that each knowledge has its object would not be possible. Moreover, like silver etc, the substratum also viz. the 'this' element (of the mother of pearl) would also be non-existent before the knowledge 'this is silver', and so the 'Tatāstha laksāna' of superimposition, viz. being produced by the causes, viz contact of the sense organs and the like or its 'Svarūpa laksāna' viz. the appearance of a true thing (consciousness limited by 'this') as mixed up with a false thing would not be possible.

1. .... स्वप्नकार्यारण्यावशोष्कवाक्यकुलपते । न वै वेदंतवाक्ष्यत
तत्स्मृतसाभ्यां ष्ठ स्वप्नवाक्ष्य नेर्मस्तुल्यतापितः । विभवायावाक्ष्यावर्गे
विशेषीपते । को च व - तुष्क्यः मौजीं प्रमुखस्तुल्यः श्रवदारी च
प्रवृत्तेयोङ्गेत स्वक्षियाव्याधत हति । निरासु । स्वप्नमूलावाक्यकुलपते ।

Ad. Si.-p.534
For this objection, the Drsti-Srṣṭi vādin's answer is that this 'Pratikarmavyavasthā' and the 'Tatāstha laksana' of Superimposition are meant for people with lower intellect. And the Svarūpa laksana has nothing in it that is contradictory to the Drsti-Srṣṭi view. It is not that consciousness limited by the 'this' aspect, is not a thing; and it is not that a false form which does not appear as mixed up with it.

In this very context the Realist again raises a doubt that at the time of the knowledge 'this is silver', nacreness etc. would be absent, so this contradicts the theory put forth that superimposition is the effect of its ignorance and so on.

This doubt is set at nought by saying that though nacreness may be absent at the time of the knowledge 'this is silver', yet there is nothing to contradict the existence

1. प्रतिकृतियंवस्त्रया शुमयो गादित्रैतज्जन्त्यज्ञवचारणा च व्यास्तस्थलायण स्य च मन्दाचिकारिस्वर्णवत्तवादु। सत्यस्य वस्त्र निद्ध्यस्यस्य इवेचारमास हति स्वस्थलायण तु हृद्ध्वृक्षप्रभोऽविशेषस्य, न हि कर्मशापं च ह मृत्यु न वस्त्रु न िवेचारमास तैन वह न सम्बदत्तवादः।

- Ad, Si, p.534
of its ignorance.

Further, it may be argued that 'This is silver', 'This is not silver'—these knowledges have different objects and so they cannot possibly be related as sublated–sublator.

This argument can be refuted by saying that though the two knowledges may have different objects, since the objects are similar in form, the relation of sublated–sublator is possible, as in the case of the sublated 1 sublator of the dreaming state.

It may be argued that if even the sublation of silver etc. is Drsti–Srsti, the unreality of silver etc cannot be proved by it.

This is refuted by saying that having 'not a lower' degree of existence is what accounts for its being the sublater and not having a higher grade of reality. So as the empirical is sublated by the empirical, there is no contradiction if the illusory is sublated by the illusory.

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1. 'पिन्नविषयकर्त्वेपि विभाषितोः सारापथ्यत् स्वप्नबाध्यभाषक्योपितं बाध्यभाषकमाप्वोपयेत्।'
   - Ad–Si, p. 534

2. See next page
Now, according to the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda, the prapañca is merged during deep sleep, and a completely new prapañca is created while waking up from it. In this context, the opponent argues that since in deep sleep and dissolution etc., the division of the jīva and Brahman is not known, it would be absent; so at the time of every deep sleep and dissolution the soul would come to be released and it would have to be accepted that it returns again to the mundane existence.

The answer to this objection is that: since the division of the jīva and Brahman is beginningless, it is not accepted as Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi. It is not true to say that since in the case of a sleeping person even the impressions are absent, it is not proper for him to awake again. This

2. previous page footnote.

Ad. Si. p.534
cannot be true for the impressions are present in their causal form. (And this form is not Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi, for the jīva cannot know the subtle state in the form of impression in deep sleep and dissolution). Since liberation is of the nature of Brahman, it is not something other than consciousness and so unlike the liberation in a dream it would not come within the range of Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi.

Another objection of the opponent is against the definition of the term 'Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi'. It is argued that Drṣṭi of the form of just consciousness is not Sṛṣṭi, but Drṣṭi of the form of consciousness qualified by psychosis, or Drṣṭi of the form of Psychosis should be regarded as Sṛṣṭi and in its case also another Drṣṭi would be its

1. तस्य च रूपस्य न हृदिष्ट्युप्तिः, असंभवः, न हि पुलये सुधुप्तो वा संस्कारसपादपापवस्या जीवेन जार्हुशक्ति।

- Gauḍabrahmānandī commentary, p. 535

1. जीवकार्यिनः गाधिस्तादित्चेव हृदिष्ट्युप्तिस्पर्च्छ भूयतस्यस्यो कार्यात्।

- Ad. Si. pp. 534-535
Sṛṣṭi and so there would be the fault of Infinite Regress.

In reply to this it is stated that this argument is not proper. It is true that if consciousness alone be regarded as Drṣṭi, āra etc having the same grade of reality should be regarded as ever lasting. But what the term Drṣṭi signifies is consciousness having psychosis as its adjunct. Even in respect of vṛtti (mode), the Psychosis or mode itself having its own nature would be the adjunct of consciousness; and so there would not be the fault of Infinite Regress. This also refutes the argument that if there is the non-existence of defect, ignorance, adṛṣṭa, body, Sense-organs etc, there would be no illusion and therefore if they also are accepted as Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi, there would be the fault of Infinite Regress. Like dream-illusion the empirical illusion would be possible independently of body, sense-organs etc, that is to say, even in their absence. The argument noticed in presence and

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1. चातन्यात्मकपरं पृष्ठन्ति पृष्ठ: किंतु वृत्तिविशिष्टकेतन्यस्तपा वा, पृष्ठतपा वा, पृष्ठन्: पृष्ठ: हति वा चयः ; तथा च तस्या कष्ट्यन्त्यं पृष्ठितविश्वस्तस्य हति....

- Ad. Si. p.535
absence is as in a dream.

It may be further argued that if Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi itself is Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi, jar etc. would cease to be Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi.

Such an argument is set aside by stating that even if the knowledge is the object to be known, the object of the knowledge does not cease to be something known, similarly even if Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi is Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi, jar etc can be Drṣṭi-

It could be further argued: There would be contradiction of the recognition of oneness if what was apprehended earlier is not now present; but this is not an illusion, for there is no sublating knowledge as there is in the case of lamp etc. regarding its different modifications, the flame being produced every moment. And if even then it is regarded as an illusion, then jar etc. also should be regarded as

1. ैतन्त्र्यमात्रत्वः दृष्टिः यथा तद्वपातस्वात्त्वम् स एव।
   तथापि बुद्धिष्ठेषु फल्ग्न्येऽव दृष्टिस्वानवधृत्यः।
   लक्षणमथव: श्वसतुः स दृष्टिस्वानवधृत्यः।
   अ: एव दौष्ट्रा: ज्ञानवाचृतानि भवायानामर्थां
   न कः इति तैत्तिकायः दृष्टिस्वानवधृत्यः कस्यस्यस्य-नियत्तिः।
   व्याक्तिविवास्यविविहारान्नामप्रज्ञापणप्रशीतः।
   अन्यथ्यात्मकार्यस्वतां च तदः।

2. ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेतवः प्रत्येकान्त्यां विज्ञानस्यात्मकान्त्यां पवित्रान्त्यां दृष्टिस्वानवधृत्यान्त्यां प्रकाशावेदीयम् दृष्टिस्वानवधृत्यः।
   अन्यथादेशितादिक्षरां च तदः।

- Ad. Si. p. 535
- Ad. Si. p. 535
different in each moment, as also the self (Ātman) in every moment.

This argument is set aside by saying that the unreality of the world is determined by the Śruti passage "Here, there is nothing like many..." so that the prapañca is of the nature of just an illusion like rajju-sarpa, which is sublated as being existent at a time other than when it appears. So the recognition of things other than the self of different times is an illusion. The apprehension of 'one' in respect of Ātman and the recognition of 'oneness' in jar etc, as conditioned by one time is not an illusion; for there is no sublation of the non-difference of the self, and of the jar etc, conditioned by one time. But the recognition of non-difference of jar as perceived by one man and another man at the same time is an illusion, for the appearance is different. Ten persons in slight darkness may have the illusion of the snake in respect of the same rope at the same time and start running. Because of the mutual agreement in regard to this experience, if they have the feeling or recognition that the same snake has been experienced by all, it is an illusion; for what is
established by the illusion of one cannot be known by another. Similarly the jar perceived by one and the same person at two different periods of time could not be one and the same.

In this context, again it may be asked as to how there could be the illusion of non-difference, when its cause-similarity or the like is not at all there in any one.

The answer to this is that like the illusion of non-difference in a dream, there is the possibility of similarity etc., as established by Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi.

1. "श्रेष्ठ नामे \ त्याकृतिः प्रयो-यस्य मिथ्या तथ्यस्य नुतन राज्यसाधिकः प्रतिमात्मा चावरी रत्नेऽव प्रतिमायात्माति रिज्ञाकालस्त्वये वायकुमः, अर्थम् भावाकलावधेः च घटानीवेक्ष्णपुर्वालमिष्टा न प्रान्तिः। वात्स्यायने-स्मृतीरिक्षकालवधेः घटानीवेक्ष्णपुर्वालमिष्टा न प्रान्तिः। एकाला-वर्णनम्बदायात्मये चालिद वायकामायात्। पुरुषानार गुरोपाय घटोपाय चव्यकलावधेः घटानीवेक्ष्णपुर्वालमिष्टा न प्रान्तिः। यथा एक्स्यायर रजनी वन्द्या वत्तायात्मिनः चालिद। युग्मर गुरोपाय परायात्मायात्। परस्परवालेक हप सम्पूर्ण वर्ति पुर्वालमिष्टा नः, अवन्तृत्तिः वस्यायन्येन ज्ञातुपकालात्।

- Ad. Si. p. 535

2. स्मृतिइतिकहा वृत्तिस्मृतिस्मृतानां न विकारत्।

- Ad. Si. p. 535
It should not be said that in that case non-difference alone should be produced, as this is something welcome, for the restriction is in respect of a produced things only that they must be grasped ones. Moreover, there is no absence of the deciding factor as to where a known thing is produced and where it is not produced; for Māyā is admitted as having diverse powers.

Now, it may be objected that on the basis of the illustration "This is that Devadatta", it is not proper to take the sentence "Tattvamasi" as meant to state oneness by 'Jahadajahadlaksanā'.

The answer to this objection is that as the time and place on the two occasions are different, so Devadatta also is different, so jahad-ajahad lakṣanā cannot, as a matter of fact, operate here. Still where "Dharmabheda" is not grasped because of sublation or contradiction, but only

1. न च चः एव ध्वस्तप्रामिति - वाच्य; एवाद्यः, रज्जुस्पर्शितमुद्ध्रणस्येव गुरवस्या नियमात्। नवं कालिकायोऽव्याप्तिनिर्देश्य नियमकारावः; पाययाया विभवेत्रन्निर्दिशक्तः चाब्रुण्यसत्।

- Ad. Sī. p. 535
"Dharmayabheda" is grapsed, there 'Jahad-ajahad-laksanā' is possible; and so the illustration. "This is that Devadatta" is justified. It is not proper to say that even non-difference is Drsti-Srsti, so its knowledge cannot serve as a sublating factor. This is so because non-difference of Ātman is the very nature of Ātman and so is not Drstisrsti, and a thing can serve as a sublator by virtue of having a grade of reality that is not less.

It may be further argued that even direct realisation is Drsti-Srsti and so is not produced by the means of knowledge and hence in the absence of knowledge, liberation should not be possible.

This argument is refuted by stating that even because its object is not sublated, the said knowledge is possible;

1. यापि चन्द्रकम्पीयिदौपि बाधिते जहजहलक्षणापि न गुण्यम्; तथापि यदा चम्पान्ति बाधा=न गृहीत: , किंतु चम्पियेद एव, तदा चौविधिस्वादे: जहजहलक्षणासंपूर्ण दृष्टान्त हृदयपपति: । न बाधिस्यापि श्रृणुस्तृत्तित्वेन तप्तानस्य बाणक्षणयोगः; श्रीमात्सस्य-त्वरिष्टित्वेन श्रुणुस्तृत्तित्वामाावात्, क्यूरुपाक्षक्षमाश्रितं श्रीपपपदुः ।

- Ad.Si.pp.535-536
and this remains intact even if it be Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi. Moreover, this does not contradict the Śruti—"The sky is firm, earth is firm, these mountains are permanent (firm), this entire world is firm." Even those who regard things as non-eternal, have no explain the term 'Dhruva' differently (not as eternal, but as lasting, possessing long life); it is better to explain it as conveying non-discontinuity of continuum till the end of the Kalpa. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the expression "Dhruvo rājā": The Śruti — "Thus only from this self emerge all vital airs, all worlds, all vedas, all elements, all these selves" — which says that the creation of vital airs etc. is from the jīva, which wakes up after sleeping, is an authoritative statement supporting Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi.  

1. न च चुवानाौऽुवा पुर्व्विकी घुवः: पर्श्वा हमें घुवें विष्मिमिद्
जग 'दि त्या क्ष्याविदिकौ:।...

— Ad.Śi. p. 536

2. कुप्तिः कुप्तिः एवमेवा स्मादात्मन: सर्वे प्राणा: सर्वे लोकाः
सर्वे वेद: सवारिणा प्राणानि सर्वे स्त रात्मानि चुवच्चर्नती त्रुति: 
कुप्तिः कुप्तिः जोवात् प्राणात्प्राप्तेऽप्रतिपाद्यवकृ प्रमणानाम्।

— Ad.Śi. p. 536
Here, it is noteworthy that the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivādins quote the Śrutī passage (Br. Up. II. 1.20) in support of their theory that after waking up from deep sleep, new prapañca is created from the jīva. From its previous context (Atha yača sūupto bhavati) it seems that after deep sleep, the jīva creates the whole prapañca. Moreover, it shows that after the absolute absence of everything mundane, a completely new prapañca is created. Here, it would not be out of place to state that according to Śaṅkara, no role is performed by the jīva in the act of creation. In the commentary upon the Br. Up.II. 1.20, Śaṅkara has clearly stated that creation is strictly from the supreme self, for there is no capacity in the jīva regarding the knowledge of creation, sustenance and destruction. So we can see that Śaṅkara’s way of presentation indicates his inclination towards Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda, as no role is

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1. तामाय एवप्रतीतायद्वारस्य: हति परमात्मने एव धृष्टिरिति।
क्षिप्रिणा: सृष्टिसिद्धान्तानहुस्मस्यवाहां चावौचा।

- Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Br. Up. II. 1.20
- Taken from Ten principal Upaniṣads with Śaṅkarabhāṣya, p. 735.
Reprint (1978) Motilal Banarasidass
assigned to the jīva with regard to creation etc. but rather the supreme self is believed to be the creator of the world. On the other hand, the Drṣṭi-Śrṣṭivādins quote this passage in support of the theory. Of course! we can not state with certitude that this passage is the very root of the Drṣṭi-Śrṣṭi-vāda; nevertheless, we can consider it as an expression, which must have finally resulted in the Drṣṭi-Śrṣṭivāda.

The Drṣṭi-Śrṣṭi vāda asserts that all vital airs, worlds etc. emerge from the jīva after deep sleep. In this connection, an objection may be raised by the opponent that the vital airs etc. are existent in the state of deep sleep, so it is not necessary to create them again.

In answer to this it is stated that the śruti clearly says that everything of the nature of effect is dissolved in sleep. This does not contradict the śruti affirming the existence of 'Nādīs' in sleep. Here, as a matter of fact,

1. "न तु विक्रिययमिति ततोः त्यदिर्मक्ष्यकत्तपस्ये ' विलययहिता हुष्णुता
   सकलायुप्त-वंतायाब्याय अति। न च हुष्णुता 'हिता नाम नास्य
   हिति नानासत्त्वप्रतिष्ठानप्रक्षामविरौपः...

- Ad.Si. p.536
the gradual process of sleep is described. The arteries called 'Hitā' go from the heart to the 'puritat'; moving through them the soul sleeps in 'puritat'. This Sruti speaks of the existence of arteries in order to show the gradual stages in the period immediately preceding sleep and not also at the time of sleep for this would contradict another Sruti Statement that there is nothing else.

It is further argued that the Sruti sentence 'Yatra esa etat supto bhud ya esa vijñānamayaḥ purusaḥ kva esa tadābhut kuta etadāgata' refers to Brahman which is the abode of the sleeping one and so 'Ātman' should signify Brahman and hence the creation of the vital airs etc. should be the function of Brahman and not of the jīva who rises from sleep; otherwise the statement of production of threads from the spider, sparks from the fire, etc. and the statement about the creation of the world would be flame in meaning, for in the theory of Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi there is not the production of threads etc. from the spider etc., nor the creation of the world.

This argument is refuted by saying that here the word "yatra" signifies time and so there is no reference to
Brahman. In the next sentence, there is the use of two words, "Kva esa tadabhut". If "yatra" were to signify Brahman or place, the question "kva" regarding place would be unnecessary; and if time were not mentioned earlier, the late reference 'tadā' would be out of place. The Bhāsyakāra and others have explained it in this way, keeping in view the dull student. The statement regarding the production of threads from the spider etc. is made keeping in view the well known theory of causation established by worldly illusion.

The creation of the world is in view of the manifestation of the different perceptions or knowledges. What is meant is that whatever he sees, he at the same time creates.

1. यज्ञस्य कालस्तूपेन यज्ञुध्वनि प्रलम्बि निणेशाभावातुः । न च देवत्वैः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
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अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
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अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
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अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
अवस्थापिक्ष्यमात्रं कालस्तूपेन वैत्यत्र विनिर्माणाविरागः
It should not be argued that if the jīva along with Avidyā is the cause, the diversity of the world would not be possible. This is not proper, for Avidyā which is the constituent cause of the world has diverse powers. Besides, other arguments in support have been given in the Siddhāntabindu and Vedāntakalpalatikā etc.

In the Siddhāntabindu as well as in the Vedāntakalpalatikā, Madhusūdana sarasvatī has put forth Avidyā as the constituent cause of the world. We are not going to plunge into further discussion of this as it would lead us astray from our topic].

1. स्तव्यकारस्यादेहानि तत्तत्त्वस्यविकाराकारां
2. विभवविद्वेषस्याविकारायामे

- Ad. Si. p. 537

2. अविद्याभावायात्मकः प्रपणो हृदयादारः

- Si. bi. p. 93

Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
So, the entire assemblage of duality of the nature of jñāna-jñeya, apart from Brahman, is just a production of Avidyā. It has illusory existence. It is proved that like rope-snake, the world is not existent when it is not cognised; since it is the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi of the one who is awake, and the Sruti speaks of its dissolution in sleep.

We may state here regarding the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭivāda, as mentioned in the Advaitasiddhi that though the theory strictly adheres to the Kevalādvaita Vedāntic thought, it seems to be failing in satisfying the mundane mind; as it puts each and every practical dealing on a par with the dream. Every now and then, when contradictions with the worldly phenomena are put forth as objections, the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi vādin seems to give an evasive answer comparing everything with a dream. Of course, the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi vādin speaks only from the pedestal of the ultimate standpoint while regarding everything simply as an illusion. Outright

1. तस्मात् क्रान्तिरितलं कृतसं क्षणार्वणां ज्ञनैः प्राप्तं कालां सत्यसंप्रदायिकं प्रातीतिकं सत्यं सर्वस्य विभावति । रज्जुपूर्वविद्यां नाजारित विद्यमानं । प्रकृतिप्रसन्नात्मकसूत्रमुत्तमम् । च लयस्यः ।

- Ad.Si.p.537
rejection of the empirical existence has invited much criticism, and has not allowed the doctrine to be acceptable without reluctance, though it could be said to be the most logical outcome of the Kevalādvaita view.

Besides Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Appaya Dīkṣīta has also given a brief presentation of the Drstī-Śrātvāda in the Siddhāntalesasāmgraha; which we shall state here avoiding repetition as far as possible.

In Kṛṣṇānandatīrtha's commentary on the passage regarding the Drstī-Śrātvāda it is stated that the early teachers have propounded the Drstī-Śrātvāda following the Śruti which speaks of the origination and dissolution of the entire world in the waking state and state of deep sleep respectively. This Śruti is meant for those, who are desirous of Brahma-knowledge, such persons being those who see no difference even in the waking condition from the dream, as they have minds thoroughly purified by virtue of the fullest grace of God attained by diverse pursuits


The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
Explaining the absence of the unapprehended existence (Ajñāta Sattā) it is stated that a thing does not exist before it is actually apprehended. Moreover, it mentions that the experience of the elephant etc., even in the waking state is not one produced by the organ of vision, on the contrary like the dream experience; it is of the nature of just 'witness'.

Now, as the whole waking world is held to be an imagined one by the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivādin, it may be doubted as to who imagines it - whether the unconditioned self or the self conditioned by ignorance. But neither of the two

1. ये त्वाधिकारिणां बुद्धिविष्कणं तुष्टान्ताधिकारिणिरतिष्ठति परमेवर्त-प्रसादत्वं नित्तांतात्त्वांकुतं न करण सत्िो जागृति: प्रक्ष्ठीय्यस्यथः न पश्चात्, तात् प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः। प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः। प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः। प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः। प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः। प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः। प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः। प्रक्ष्ठीया राज्यानिश्चित्य प्रङ्क्ष्ठि जग्न प्राणपापवस्थाः।

- Kṛṣṇaṇandatīrthā's commentary on the S.L.S.Ch.II, p.350

2. आज्ञातामकृत्योपि न वाच्यां विहितं... 

- S.L.S.Ch.II; p. 350

3. तिल्ल स्वप्नानुप्रवृक्त्या वैविश्वासिताःस्य हत्य्यथः।

- Kṛṣṇaṇandatīrthā's commentary on the S.L.S.Ch.II; p.350
alternatives is acceptable. For in the first case the unconditioned self requiring no means would be present even in the state of liberation as the imaginer; and so the world would continue and there would be no difference from the mundane state. In the second case, ignorance also being something that is to be imagined; its imaginer should be said to be present even before its imagination.

As a solution to such an objection, it is stated by some that every preceding soul conditioned by ignorance is the imaginer of each succeeding ignorance; and as there is no beginning of this chain of imaginers and imagined objects, there would not creep in the fault of Infinite Regress. An objection may be raised that since Avidyā is accepted as beginningless it cannot be something imagined like nacre-silver, for otherwise the division

1. नूं, द्विधेश्वरीष्टिवतमात्रं कृष्णस्य जागृतष्पवस्य कल्पितायपणमैः कल्पः - निरपरिवर्तास्मात् वा, अविषमपितलो वा ।

- S.L.S. Ch. II, p. 351
of things into these having a beginning and these are beginningless would not be tenable. But this argument is not proper.

In a dream, temples etc. are imagined as previously established, and some things are imagined as originating; so also in the waking state somethings are imagined as having a beginning and others differently, and this justifies the division of things into these having a beginning and these that are beginningless. This also explains the division of cause-effect. It may be noted that

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1. कृपया प्रस्तुत कृतिकोष विचारपूर्वक उत्तरार्थातीतिकल्पः। विनिर्खणप्राची कल्पकल्पनाप्रवाहस्य नानवस्थायोः। न च वाचिष्ठया कार्तिकेयोपाध्यायां च चित्तमहत्त्व न गुज्ये, वन्य्या साहनादिविष्णुपरिश्रिति वा च चः।

- S.L.S.Ch.II, pp. 351-252

See
Mehta N. D. 'Siddhāntabhedā', p. 64;
Sujña Gokulji Zala vedānta prīte esay- (1994)

2. यथा साधन-कल्प्यां गौरुरादि किंचन्द्रु पूर्वसिद्धचैन कल्प्योऽ, किंचन्द्राधानीपुर्वाप्णातुर्व, सर्व-अत्यत्कं प्रस्तुत कल्प्यां - यां चित्रचैन कल्प्योऽ, किंचन्द्रनिष्ठोत्ति तात्का साहनादिविष्णुपरिश्रिति वा चः।

- S.L.S.Ch.II, p. 352
other thinkers of this school regard eternal things like jīva, God, Avidyā as beyond the scope of Drsti-Sṛṣṭivāda. The unreality of these, excluding Cit (Consciousness) can be proved on other grounds.

It may be further asked as to who is the imaginer of the creation of the elements viz. Sky etc; and their order, which can be known only from the scripture. If it is said that no one is the imaginer, then what is the basis of the Śruti stating the creation of the elements from the self. The answer to this is that through the method of superimposition and negation the attributeless Brahman can be known.

Thus, the statements regarding creation etc. are not meant to instruct us in regard to creation etc, but are meant only to give us knowledge of the Absolute Brahman devoid of any diversity.

1. नन्देशपि एकत्रित्य वियन्या विस्तेत्तकस्मादेः: कः कल्पः 'ूः। न कौशिकः। कुमालम्भा तत् क सम्पूर्णः वात्सनः वाकः सम्पूर्णः। हल्याधिधिः 'ूः।... कथ्यारोपवासागराः निष्पुष्ट-चक्र-प्रतिभाच्यातीति... ।

- S.L.S. Ch.II, p. 353
The above exposition of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivāda reveals the facets of the theory already established in the Vedāntasiddhānta Muktāvalī by Prakāśānanda. Of course, it openly states that the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivāda is grasped by those with absolutely purified intellect. Such a statement plainly puts the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivāda on the zenith of the Vedāntic thought.

No doubt, the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivāda is a unique solution to the riddle of the world, though it seems to be contradicted by our practical life and behaviour. This is especially so in the case of people engrossed in the reality of the mundane world, who cannot think of regarding the world as being like a dream.

It may be objected that the dreaming state is a result of the memories of the waking state. So it is possible to consider dream objects as unreal, but things perceived in the waking state cannot be unreal.

But this charge could be put aside by stating that the dreaming state is not based on the memories resulting from the waking state. In a dream, we experience the things
never experienced before. Besides, dream objects never come in contact with empirical sense-organs, which remain inoperative in sleep, and yet we imagine that we perceive through our sense-organs. This could be true of the waking state also.

In short, what is intended by this is to show that like the dreaming experience, the waking experience is also "Sāksirūpa". Moreover, the motive behind this comparison is to show the illusory character of the phenomenal world, taking the extreme view, and that is why this theory remains far away from the scope of the common-intellect. As a matter of fact, it is the only theory which can be said to be the very culmination of Vedāntic thought.

The one pervading sentiency conditioned by Avidyā-vṛtti is the agent of numerous creations. As Umeshchandra Das puts it: "Sometimes it assumes the form of a fragrant flower and sometimes the smell of that flower. Sometimes

* In the Gaṇāpatādakārika, Gaṇāpatāda has emphasized this fact, and has emphasized the similar characteristics of the waking state as well as of the dreaming state.
it turns into a melodious tune and sometimes the musician himself..... At times it plays the part of a thief and at times the part of a judge punishing the thief. The Sun, the moon and various other planets and stars- all are part and parcel of it. How wonderful is its operation! Thus the theory of Drsti-Srati presents before us a view which is undoubtedly novel."

Thus, Drsti-Srati-vada prefers only one sentiency conditioned by Avidya-known as the jīva, which is the creator of the world. This may seem to resemble monotheistic Idealism which recognises only one God as the creator of the world. But there is this difference that in Drsti-Srati-vada, the only jīva is not regarded as God, who on the contrary is an imaginary construct along with other jīvas and things.

Hence, Drsti-Srati-vada can be said to be an unparalleled theory which has been described as the culmination of Vedāntic Idealism.

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1. Das Umeshchandra ; Problems and justifications of the theory of Drsti-Srati".