DRSTI-SRSTI VĀDA IN THE VEDĀNTA-SIDDHĀNTA-MUKTĀVALĪ

In the previous chapter we have seen how Srsti-Drsti vāda in the Absolutistic philosophy of Kevalādvaita Vedānta presents an apparently Realistic trend in solving the riddle of the world existence in consonance with the belief in Advaita. It recognises the objective empirical (Phenomenal) reality of the world in all its aspects, and thus would appeal to many from the common-sense point of view.

On the other hand Drsti-Srṣṭi vāda, the rival theory puts forth an Idealistic explanation regarding the world of appearance; and denounces its empirical reality. Of course, Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi vāda as well as Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda are both just vedāntic theories meant to establish the unreality of the phenomenal world and thus uphold the Advaita-vāda of Vedānta; yet the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda can be said to have presented a more logical solution, if we keep in mind that the Kevalādvaita philosophy admits the reality of just one non-dual pure sentiency—the Absolute principle. We shall examine this in the course of this chapter.

It may be noted that the actual development towards what is known as the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda took place during
the post-śaṅkara period. In the works before Śaṅkara, we find scattered glimpses of Idealism, or not a very systematic exposition of it, which nevertheless could be said to lead steadily towards Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda. This, we have examined in the previous chapters. The present chapter deals with the post-śaṅkara development and the establishment of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda as presented in the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī.

We have already stated that after śaṅkara, it was Manḍana Misra who initiated a subjectivistic trend in regarding the jīva as the locus of Avidyā, and this was strengthened by Vācaśpati Misra. Since the Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda emphasizes Brahman as the locus of Avidyā, there is left no role for the jīva to play, so far as the creation of the world is concerned. And as Brahman is the creator of the world, it is not possible to eradicate the empirical reality of the phenomenal world. On the other hand, Manḍana Misra and Vācaśpati Misra both consider the jīva as the locus of Avidyā and thus the jīva tends to assume the role of the creator! Now, in regarding the jīva as the creator, there arise many complications. In other words, it invites the problem of oneness and manyness
of the jīva, as well as of Avidyā. If the jīva is one, and it is the creator of the world, when the jīva gets liberated, the world also should simultaneously vanish with its liberation. But this something which we never experience in the phenomenal world. On the contrary we see that when one jīva is liberated, the world still remains there with many other jīvas. This compels one to think in terms of the manyness of the jīvas. Now, if there is one Avidyā common amongst many jīvas, a common world experience becomes possible. But at the same time the problem regarding liberation remains unsolved as mentioned above. On the other hand, if many jīvas possessing many Avidyās are accepted, then the problem about one common world experience remains unsolved.

The Śaṅkaraites have applied themselves to the explanation of such problems as we have already seen in the previous chapter. Even risking repetition, we may present here a bird's eye view of the jīvāsrita Avidyā vāda as it helps us to march ahead towards Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda.
In order to give a rational explanation of the problem of bondage and liberation, the Jīvāsrita Avidyā vāda is put forth with variations, such as Anekajīvāsrita-Eka-Avidyā-vāda, Aneka Jīvāsrita-Aneka-Avidyā-vāda, Eka Jīvāsrita-Eka-Avidyā-vāda. Besides, these variations are meant to solve the problem of a common world experience.

According to the Anekajīvāsrita-Eka-Avidyā-vāda, a common world experience becomes possible, as there is one common Avidyā. But this view has to face the difficulty that when one jīva is emancipated, at that very moment all the jīvas should be emancipated, as the Avidyā located in each and every jīva has been eradicated.

In order to avoid this difficulty, another view was formulated, according to which Aneka Avidyās reside in Aneka jīvas!

Vācaspati Misra holds the view that Avidyā is not one but many, and each jīva has its own Avidyā located in it.¹ In holding this view, there arises no problem of the

¹ See - Bhāmati on the Br.Sū.Śā.Bhā.I.4-3.
destruction of the mundane world and the emancipation of all the jīvas. But as Appaya Dīkṣita has explained, the Avidyās jointly give rise to the phenomenal world and Brahman remains a witness. When the Avidyā of one jīva is destroyed, the world is destroyed but simultaneously another world is brought about by the Avidyās of the remaining jīvas. This is explained by the analogy of threads and cloth.¹

After Maṇḍana Miśra and Vācaspāti Miśra, it was Prakāśānanda, who was the pioneer in propounding Eka Jīvāsrita-Eka-Avidyā-vāda, which represents the last stage of development of jīvāsrita-Avidyā-vāda. This we shall examine at some length later, while dealing with the Drśti-Sṛṣṭi-vāda in the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī.

The Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī, written in the sixteenth century-A.D. by Prakāśānanda presents the Drśti-Sṛṣṭi-vāda in its full bloom. It would not be out of place to state that in the early Vedāntic works we find only scattered Idealistic thoughts, and the actual

¹. S.L.S. Chapter-I, p.133.
term 'Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi' is also not used. It is true that in the yoga-vāsiṣṭha, we find the term, but we cannot arrive at its specific meaning or interpretation from the expressions used in that work. The actual establishment of Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda occurred in the latter half of the sixteenth century.¹

Before we start examining Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda as expounded in the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī, it would be essential to make it clear that we shall examine the term etymologically as well as metaphysically in the next chapter, after

¹."Prakāśānanda's doctrine of Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi is apparently unknown to the earlier Vedāntic works and even the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, a work of early sixteenth century, does not seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Prakāśānanda may thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century."

getting a proper idea of what Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda signifies.

At the outset, we may see how Prakāśānanda tries to reject the unapprehended existence (Ajñāta Stattā) of the world, in what way he logically refutes the validity of the means of knowledge and the theory of causation, how he emphasizes the highest Vedāntic position of the non-duality or oneness of the jīva (Eka jīva vāda), which all together constitute the doctrine, viz. Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda-in the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī.

Locus of Avidyā

Since Prakāśānanda holds that there is nothing existing other than the attributeless, immutable, eternal and Absolute Ultimate Reality viz. Brahman, everything apart from Brahman must be regarded as unreal, so he firmly refuses to accept any compromising stand meant to explain the position of the world; God, jīvas, etc. Hence the problem of the locus of Avidyā is immaterial for him. Nevertheless, he has presented the views of the Śaṅkaraśātras about the locus of Avidyā.
Some Saṅkaraites, keeping in mind the system of bondage and liberation try to propound Anekajīvāsrita-Aneka Avidyā vāda. They hold that the jīva is the locus of Avidyā, while Brahman is its object. Moreover, the jīvas are many, otherwise the system of bondage and liberation would not be possible. The jīva, which attains the knowledge of Brahman through hearing etc. gets liberation, while the rest of the jīvas still remain in bondage. Hence, many Avidyās are hypostatised. Otherwise, if one Avidyā be recognised, the whole phenomenal world established by perception etc. should not be experienced when the Avidyā is destroyed by true knowledge. And it is also not possible to hold that yet no one has obtained true knowledge, for in

1. वात्मकमन्तान्त जीव: क्षुद्रे स चाज्ञानस्यांश्च न तु विषय:।
   विषयात्वपि तु ब्रह्मण एव। स च मीनोष्कौन्य: यथास्वत्तुपपति:।

V.S.N. 9-5.

- I have been much benefitted by the translation of Venis Arthur. I have used it at some places.
that case, no one would try to get liberation through "hearing" etc, thinking that these were performed by ancient sages like Vyāsa, Viśāṁtha etc. and still they did not attain liberation.¹

In the context of worldly experience, a question is posed, "On the base of the means of knowledge, viz. perception etc. why should not the duality of the world be regarded real?" Then it is stated, "If the trustworthiness of perception etc. is proved by any other means then the fault of Infinite Regress (Anavasthā) would be itself unavoidable, and if it is proved by itself only, then also there would be a suspicion of fault".²

1. यथा तु र्वणाश्यामवासाहान्तिन् ज्ञात्मक विश्वासात्मक सङ्क्षेप प्रायोगिक महत्वहीनजः किं यथा ज्ञान साक्षी कथ्यते ज्ञानान्तरहस्य कृत्यात्मक निरुज्जाय प्रत्यक्षाविशिष्टात्मक ज्ञात्मकन्तुप्रस्तुतः। न ज्ञानस्ता कार्ले कस्मापान्तं न ज्ञातिः साम्यतेषु प्राचीनतत् सम्प्रथ साइंटिफिक शास्त्रावलोक्तः क्षणवसिष्टावेणि ज्ञात्मकन्तुप्रमाणितानां आंनौलयते सम्प्रथास्ति-वस्तुविषयविदानीयतायं ज्ञानोत्सवः सम्प्रथास्ति-पर्यावरणक्लेन अवश्याप्राप्तिमाहिमानि।

- V.S.M. pp.5-6.

2. प्रत्यक्षाविदिप्रमाणानां प्रमावं पुलो यदि।
कविता सूङ्दरतत्त्व स्ततुत्तथेदौष्ट्यशः।। 8 ।।
- V.S.M. p-7.
How is the trustworthiness of perception proved?

Does perception make its object the things of practical dealings or the things which can never be proved unreal?

In accepting the first alternative, it could be applied to the imaginary things also, as they also serve practical dealings. Now, the second alternative is also not possible, nor it is proved by another as this involves the fault of Infinite Regress.

Moreover, the scriptures themselves declare the untrustworthiness of the means of knowledge and show the unreality of the world.

Further, the plural (māyābhīḥ) statement of the scripture, "Due to Māyās, Indra imagines various forms" establishes the plurality of Avidyā, and that these Avidyās reside in the jīvas making Brahman their object.¹

The above mentioned view is held by some Śaṅkaraites. Some other Śaṅkaraites emphasize the view that Avidyā resides in the Ātman making it its object.

¹ "... एते मायाविद्वान् पुरुषम् दैवेदः " हति मायामिति
कुलकल्पसूत्रसृष्टि जीवाध्यायिणि तत्तत्वविवर्णकार्यंज्ञानानीति ..."

V.S.M. p.8.
First it is asked whether both the jīva and Brahman are meant by the term Ātman, or only the jīva is known as Ātman and Brahman is signified by another term. Now, if the first alternative is accepted, then it is favourable, as Ātman becomes the object of Avidyā. It may be objected that being an object of Avidyā, the Ātman would not shine forth for it would be concealed by Avidyā, as the pot concealed by the darkness is not seen. The answer to this objection is that the Ātman becomes the object of Avidyā with respect of its non-duality and bliss only. Its virtue of consciousness (caitanya) never becomes the object of Avidyā, otherwise Avidyā itself could not be proved. Moreover, the differentiation of the Absolute into its parts viz. bliss etc. is falsely imagined, as the ignorant people imagine that only consciousness shines forth and not bliss. Hence, the locus and object of Avidyā are identical. Avidyā is a kind of darkness, as

1. नन्दु अत्मानं ज्ञानविभागत्वेक्ष्य तस्य मानं तमसाः बुक्तवात् ,

V.S.M. p-9.
darkness makes the locus its object, so in the case of Avidyā also.¹

Now, if Brahman and the jīva (Atman) are different, then their difference would be either natural or conditional. If the first alternative is accepted, Brahman would be non-sentient, for the self is sentient, and the scripture declaring "Vijnānaṁ ānandaṁ Brahma" would be contradicted. Furthermore, it (Brahman) would not be the object of Avidyā—for whatever is unintelligent is Avidyā and to assume that Avidyā invests itself is idle. And it would follow that the self, as being different from Brahman would abandon its self-hood to become like earthen pots etc. (in other words, non-sentient). In accepting the second alternative, does this limitation consist in the difference being an effect produced by the limiting condition as its cause, or in the difference being made known through the limiting condition, or is it some other kind of dependence on the limiting condition? It must be premised that Avidyā is the only limiting condition possible with regard to the

¹ अविद्या स्वात्मक्षुच्यितविभाव स्वात्मक्षु यतं।
यथा बाह्यं तमी दृष्टं तथा कैंतं तत्तथा॥

V.S.M. p.10
difference between jīva and Brahman; for the effects of Avidyā as being occasional (not permanent) cannot be the conditions determining the difference between the jīva and Brahman. Amongst the above mentioned alternatives, the first one is not admitted, for since Avidyā has been proved to have existed in the undifferenced self even before the difference between the jīva and Brahman was brought about, the differentiation is unnecessary, nor is Avidyā admitted as an independent entity. The second alternative is also not admissible: for Avidyā being non-sentient can make known nothing. Nor is the third alternative possible: for the kinds of dependence commonly recognised are three viz. the production of an effect from a cause, the attachment of an attribute to a substrate,

1. जीवालम्बदन्त्य उपाधिर्घ्रंजनेश्व वक्तायम् «: व्याख्या
कवाक्तिक्षण जीवालविमाणानुपाकान्त्वात्।

V.S.M. p-12.

2. वत्र नाप:; भेदोत्तः: पूव्यावै केवल ज्ञात्मन्यज्ञानसिद्धांड्यनेपण्डणात्
स्तम्भ्यज्ञानद्रेणिवाराहु।

V.S.M. p-12.

3. न दक्तिनियः; व्याख्यान्य ज्ञात्क्षण पारस्कत्वानुपपदेः।

V.S.M. p-12.
the cognitional relation between something made known and that which makes it known. Here, none of these kinds of dependence is possible with regard to Avidyā, so dependence on a limiting condition cannot determine the difference between the jīva and Brahman.\textsuperscript{1}

Nor can it be urged that the difference between the jīva and Brahman is dependent on Avidyā, like the relation which exists between Avidyā and the self, for with regard to relation the restrictive rule is that relation is dependence on the things related, and difference is not relation. Hence, Avidyā resides in the Ātman which is devoid of differentiation into the jīva and Brahman, and makes it its object. Thus, the self has been proved to be

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] नापि तृतीयः ; तन्न्त्रवच हि नित्या लोके जन्म्यत्वेन आक्ष्यत्वेन मास्यत्वेन व | तत्र फलस्मयापि पुकारस्याज्ञानिनिफलस्य पृढ़ते सम्मध्यतु तन्न्त्रत्वानुपूर्वः।
\end{itemize}

the object of Avidyā.¹

The above mentioned jīvāśrita-Avidyā-vāda and
Brahmāśrita Avidyā vāda are related to the rival theories,
respectively.

Brahmāśrita Avidyā vāda are related to the rival theories,
respectively.

Here, a curiosity may arise to know the view of
Prakāśānanda about the locus of Avidyā. But for Prakāśā-
nanda, only one sentiency exists, which due to Avidyā
assumes the state of jīva and imagines itself variously in
the form of the world, God, the jīva etc. so, as soon as
the sentiency is conditioned by Avidyā, it is called the
jīva.

As there is only one sentiency, naturally there is
only one Avidyā, due to which this complex network of
the phenomenal world is imagined.

¹. न चाज्ञानात्मकस्व-चतुर्ब्रह्मको वज्ञानत्वात् असत्यमेवेत्यति वाच्यम्।
सम्बन्धयो च सम्बन्धितात्त्वनिर्वचनम्, मैत्रस्य च तथत्त्वाभावात्।
तस्माज्ञोविज्ञाविभा गृह्य-कामात्मानमाभिक्रियात् तथव विश्वयोजितोऽर्थोऽनः
तथाज्ञाविषयमयात्मम्: सिद्धम्।

Eka-jīva Eka-Avidyā-vāda

We have already stated that in order to make the system of bondage and liberation tenable, some of the Saṅkaraite recognize manyness of the jīvas as well as of Avidyā.

On the other hand, Prakāśānanda seems to be of the view that as there is only one jīva, there is only one Avidyā. It is stated in the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī, "There is no evidence either worldly or vedic for Avidyā. If it is imagined through its effects, then it is better to hold Avidyā as one according to the law of parsimony".¹

Avidyā is neither established by the veda nor by perception etc. The earlier portion of the veda is concerned with action, while the later portion asserts the reality of Absolute - Existence - Consciousness - Bliss, i.e. Brahman. If Avidyā is proved by perception, there would remain no controversy! So, as there is unrelated, passive, ever blissful and satisfied Being only, recognition of Avidyā is the only acceptable alternative.

¹ V.S.M.p-14.
for explaining the production of the inexplicable world, which is a complex net-work of joys and pains. Now, is this hypostatised Avidyā one or many? It is better to recognise one Avidyā possessing manifold powers as the fault of sleep though one is seen to produce manifold effects in a dream.  

This one Avidyā is the limiting condition (upādhi) of the one jīva. This is the view of the Ekajīvavādins, who quote a statement from the scripture in their support: "Ajām ekām lohita - sükla - krṣṇām bahvih prajāh srjānānām sarūpāh, ajo hy eko jujamāno 'nusete jahāty enam bhuktā- bhogām ajōnyaḥ". - Śve-Up-IV-5.

We have here the word 'aja' which shows that Avidyā, from which the world is produced is unborn. The term

1. तस्यातत्स्कृतंस्तुक्षीमस्य सदा खान्तःकृप्त स्वासुक्त्योक्तविव- हृदु:तत्साधुत्क्रम:त्तनंतुपपपत्त्यः स्तवं कलप्त्य इत्येव वार्ष्य गत्वन्तरामवात् । तथा च कल्प्यानस्त्यानामंक्षरक्र वैति बिवादि एकस्यापि निद्राभोमास्नेत्रविविक्षायक्षकत्वस्य स्वम्भे दुष्ट्वात्स्ततःक्षरक्र निद्राभोमास्नेत्रविविक्षाय बिवादि बिवादि निद्राभोमास्नेत्रविविक्षाय बिवादि बिवादि निद्राभोमास्नेत्रविविक्षाय बिवादि बिवादि निद्राभोमास्नेत्रविविक्षाय बिवादि बिवादि निद्राभोमास्नेत्र

'Ekāṁ' negates the plurality. Further, the word 'Aja' also negates the origination of the jīva, which is conditioned by Avidyā. And the term 'Eka' negates the plurality of the jīva.

The doubt as to how the jīva could be one when its plurality is experienced in the phenomenal world, is set aside by the term 'hi' signifying that the unity of the jīva is well known in the Upaniṣads, and is proved by argument also.¹

Now, in this context a doubt may arise that if there is only one jīva, how would the system of bondage and liberation be possible, as the whole phenomenal world would come to an end along with the liberation of the one jīva. Such a doubt is set aside by stating that inasmuch as many internal organs are admitted, the so called fault

¹. ननु जीवगतनैकत्वं लोकेनुमूनः तत्सत्यमैकत्वप्रक्ष्याश्चात्मामेदस्योपनिषत्खिद्भुव्यन्य युक्तिसिद्धत्वं च प्रसिद्धार्थैः हिश्वक्षेत - हति ।

V.S.M.p-17.
would not arise. In short, it is not possible to talk in terms of 'all' in the presence of the Ekajīvavādin, who recognises only 'one' jīva. Even though the plurality of jīvas is experienced, this should be considered possible as in a dream. ¹

Here, a further doubt arises: As in a dream, the perceiver of the dream is considered to be real, and all else as imagined, so in the waking state also one is real and all the rest are imagined. But which jīva should be considered real amongst all the jīvas.

The answer to this is that this experience (of many jīvas) is based on the illusion that the body is the self. ² If it is argued that the plurality of the jīvas is inferred from the different activities of various bodies, then the answer is that diverse activities are possible inspite of there being one jīva as in the case of the "Kāyavyūha" (manifestation of different bodies) of the yogin.

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1. एकाधिवादिन प्रति स्वरूपस्य निक्षमगुमुनक्ते तथा पि कथो जीवा अनुस्वरूप न हि चैते । फातेति स्वप्नवधो ध्यायति ।
   V.S.M. p-20.

2. तथा च देहात्मप्रमाणातिकृतेऽजीवेनातत्त्वं हि स्वप्नम् ।
   V.S.M.-23
In short, the plurality of the jīva is experienced only due to the wrong conception of the body as the self. As a matter of fact, there is one self in its own nature eternal, absolute, intelligent, free, made known in the Upanisad only. This self, associating itself with Avidyā becomes jīva and falsely surmises the bodies of gods, men, etc., for whose enjoyment it creates, as means, the 'egg of Brahman' and the fourteen worlds. Of these bodies one is a god, another is a man. There is Hiranyagarbha the creator of all things, viṣṇu the preserver, and Rudra who destroys the world at the pralaya or final resolution. These three have the Rajas, Sattva and Tamas respectively as their limiting conditions, to which all their powers are due. Then again there is the individual man who thinks within himself "Iam the son of Brahman; having served the Gods in pūjā etc. and acquired "hearing" and the other prescribed means, I shall gain emancipation". In all these forms the self, though really Īśvara is deceived in the waking state. Again, the self having put an 'end to the world of waking consciousness as described
above, and aided by the defects of sleep, surmises in dreams a world precisely similar to that of waking, falsely imagining thus: Vasiṣṭha and other sages won emancipation, when through their bodies and sense-organs they had experienced the results of their actions, other men are bound; I too am bound, miserable in the bonds of transmigration, I shall obtain emancipation." Then again the self puts an end to this dream and enters on the waking state, or that of dreamless sleep in which there is an end to all such false imaginings. Hence, there is only one Absolute, self-luminous and blissful self, which is known as the transmigrant jīva due to its associate Avidyā. There is no other transmigrant jīva other than this one; this has been clearly proved.¹

Here, it can be clearly seen that the Ekajīvavāda plainly puts the phenomenal world on the same footing as the dreaming state, and rejects outright the existence of the many jīvas. It thus tries to remain faithful to the Kevalādvaitavedānta, which forcefully puts forth Brahman as the only Ultimate Reality. Since only one sentiency viz. Brahman is all pervading, how could there be another thing?

We find Ekajīvavāda discussed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in the Siddhāntabindu and in the Ādvaitasiddhi. In the

¹. See next page.
1. एक एव नित्यशुद्धिमुक्ती स्वभाव उपनिषद-मात्र गम्यो वस्तुतः दिः।

स स्वाज्ञानम् राजस्तहुः जीवभावं लक्ष्यं दैवतिश्चरुक्तवर्षशिवलेखं परिचर्या तं उपकरणात्तेति ब्रह्मदिवेक्षुरुक्तवर्षे तेस्व तेस्व दैवति: कृष्णदेवः
कृष्णमुखः: कृष्णदिवेक्षुरुक्तवर्षे: सवेतान्त्रुक्तवर्षे: कृष्णदिवेक्षुरुक्तवर्षे: पालकः
कृष्णदेवः: सवेतान्त्रुक्तवर्षे: राधृ: प्रलये:। तेषामुपायः: सतत्वा दिगुणाः:
लक्ष्याश्रयाः सत्यं सामस्ये:। अह पुनः: कृष्ण क्रामानुसारलेखा
परिवर्तनम् का राजस्तहुः नुक्तवर्षशिवलेखं स्वभावं राजस्तहुः सम्पाद्यं पोषां
सामस्यासमिति स्रूरिक्षिपुष्ट प्रान्ते फलति जगारे:। पुनर्विहारः काजागरं
पुष्कं सुपलंक्तत्त्वं सज्जर्निक्रीणो राष्ट्र:। दैवनेश्वरे पुष्कं अविहर्त्य
तेजेदानिन्द्राय प्रथमं मुक्तवा वसिष्ठायं मुक्तं कन्ये बद्धं क्षमिपि
कृष्णक बद्धं: दु:स्व संसारी मुक्ति भविष्यामीति च कल्पिन्ति: पुनः स्वामी
वसिष्ठायं भीरे गरे मुक्तवर्षे कालमिनविद्विषित्य प्राप्तेऽति:। एवं
सति एक श्रवणं परिपूर्णाः: स्वर्यमेधाशास्त्र: श्चाज्ञानवशास्त्रीः
संसारीख्यादिविश्वादिभिमूर्तिः सत्त्वति। न तदन्तः: कृष्णतु संसाते
सम्प्रदायमितुमणि शक्यं छति: सिद्धस्यः।

-V.S.M. pp. 23-24
Siddhāntabindu he has stated, "According to the Ekajīvavāda the jīva itself, due to ignorance becomes the material (Upādāna) as well as the efficient (Nimitta) cause of the world.¹ And this one, the only jīva, gets liberation on performing 'hearing' etc. based on the instruction of the teacher and the scripture etc. which are also imagined by itself only.² All the other jīvas are unreal appearances imagined by this only jīva. Since rightly speaking there is absence of many jīvas, the liberation of Śūka and others

1. अरिम्ब्ल्ष्ल पश्च जो एव स्ल्हा ज्ञानवस्फलगुण दार्श निर्मिति च

   - Si-Bi.p.49

2. एकत्त्वेऽ च स्वत्वल्लभगुर्णा स्वा धम्मविविधवाणमनाविद्धस्यायंदत्तमः
   सत्तात्त्वी च सति मौशाः

   - Si-Bi.p.50
is stated only as an epology.¹ If Śuka is considered that particular jīva, then by virtue to its liberation, the whole world imagined by it should have been dissolved at that very moment of liberation, as elephant, horse, etc. imagined in the dreaming state are dissolved the very moment the person wakes up. So Śuka cannot be considered the main jīva, and the liberation of Śuka is mentioned only as epology.²

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1. .... कथ्यते जीवस्य भावतु । तथा व शुकवामेवाद्योऽनेक्सः युक्तः तत्प्राप्तसंवैः कैले न तु वस्तुस्थितिः।

- Abhayankar's Commentary on Śi.Bi.p.50.

2. पर्व च योजेवाको मुखो जीवः स यदि शुकः स्वा चरिः तत्स्य पौशो तत्कथितत्स्य शरीरस्य प्रपञ्चस्य विलयः स्वातः । यथा स्वयं कित्तिकां गजा ज्ञातोऽवस्य शनिबार्षिक स्वप्नाद्वृज्याग्नि विलयः म्याति तद्भवः । तत्स्य हैदराबद्ध जगद्ध युक्तः । का: स मुख्य शक्ति जीवः शुकः नैवत्वायं कल्पनोयामिति शुकः मुक्तः हति व्यवहारः कैलसर्वज्ञवा द एव ।

- Abhayankar's Commentary on Śi.Bi.p.50.
In the AdvaitaSiddhi also we find Ekajīvavāda discussed at some length. But in order to avoid repetition, we do not ponder longer over this here. *

Since the Ekajīvavāda treats the phenomenal dealings just like a dream, that is to say, as illusory (Prātibhāsīka), it can be said to be identical with Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda. As we have stated, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī does not recognise any difference between the Ekajīvavāda and the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda regarding them as identical. 1 But it seems that the Ekajīvavāda is one of the aspects of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda. Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda is a theory, which emphasizes that nothing exists


1. ब्रजन्मर्तिविभिन्ना वेतन्त्या जीव हृति वा व्यासानां तुपशिंिि्रुः शृङ्ख्ळ चैतन्यपि स्वरः: ब्रजनायुन्तिः ब जीव हृति वा मुख्ये वैदान्तिन्द्राद्वत रक्षोधातयः। हमदेव च दृष्टिभृत्यास्याद्वालकते।

- Si.Bि.p.49
independently apart from its perception. While the Ekajī-
vavāda is its metaphysical aspect upholding the highest 
vedāntic position that nothing exists except the non-dual 
sentiency viz. Brahma. Brahman is the only Ultimate 
Principle, which by virtue of Avidyā becomes jīva and 
imagines God, other jīvas and the world. Hence, the seeming 
plurality of jīvas and the world is nothing but an illusion!
Of course, Drṣṭi-Śrṣṭi vāda may comprehend the Ekajīvavāda, 
but that does not necessarily make them totally identical 
theories.

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that according to the 
Ekajīvavāda the jīva itself becomes the material (Upādāna) 
cause of the world. In this context, in the commentary on 
the Siddhāntalesāsaṅgraha, it is stated, "The Absolute self 
becoming jīva due to Avidyā, even without limitation 
(Avaccheda) and reflection (Pratibimba) imagines itself 
to be God. And thus becoming God it imagines the creation 
of the world consisting of sky etc. from itself only. It 
gradually imagines man etc. Thus, Brahma which has become 
the jīva is the material cause because it imagines the entire
phenomena in itself only. This is the view of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vādins.¹

It would not be out of place to mention that Sadananda in his Advaita Brahma Siddhi has stated that Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda is based on Avacchedavāda whereas Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda is associated with pratibimbavāda.² But here we would not like

1. परिपूर्ण सज्जनानं कालिकं वचै कार्यमुक्तिकारणमं विनाशादि प्राकृति विद्वान्

2. किं वाचै कार्यमुक्तिकारणसंग्रहं ज्ञातेन कार्यमुक्तिसंग्रहः

1. Kṛṣṇanandatīrtha's Commentary on S.L.S.p-71 (1916),

The Chawkambha Sanskrit Series.

to touch this point, as it would drag us away in another direction.

In short, we can consider the Ekajīvavāda as one of the facets of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda. Nevertheless, among the Vedāntins those who recognise Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda, would necessarily resort to Ekajīvavāda in order to maintain their doctrine of non-duality and also to explain the worldly phenomena.

Rejection of Ajñāta Sattā (Unapprehended existence).

Usually we feel that the things which we perceive, do not merge into nothingness after our perception. The garden, the buildings which we visit do not disappear after our visit. To a layman, it seems absurd to consider that things vanish after their perception.

Strikingly enough, the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda strongly negates the unapprehended existence - (Ajñāta Sattā) of this phenomenal world; and tries to emphasize that the things disappear when we do not perceive them. It may be mentioned that Śaṅkara and his followers generally accept
the empirical existence (Vyāvahārika Sattā) of the world. Besides, the Mādhyamika Buddhists recognise the Ultimate existence (Pārmāarthika Sattā) as well as the empirical existence (Sānvṛti Satya). And the Yogācārins (Viññānavādins) also, though from a different angle, recognise three types of natures (trisvabhava) namely, the Ultimate (Pariniṣpanna), the dependent (Paratantra), and the illusory (Parikalpa).

What is meant by this is only that generally the objective existence of the world is not denounced. Though it is negated from the ultimate point of view, it is accepted for practical dealings.

Now, amongst the Śaṅkaraites, Prakāśānanda is the only exception who has boldly enough denied the objective existence of the world. *

* "Prakāśānanda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedānta from a purely Sensationalistic view point of idealism and denied the objective existence of any stuff. The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception." - Dasgupta S.N. - History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, Ch.XI, p.221 (1975), Motilal Banarasidass.
In the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvali it is stated,

"Orthodox Śaṅkaraites admit three types of existence viz.

(1) the ultimate existence (pārmārthika)

(2) the empirical existence (vyāvahārika)

(3) the illusory existence (pratibhāsika).

Amongst these, Brahman has ultimate existence; while the world of appearance has empirical existence. Orthodox Śaṅkaraites believe that the world exists until the dawn of knowledge. When the Ultimate Reality is realised, then only it is negated as unreal (mithyā). On the other hand, dream, snake appearing in the rope, silver appearing in the mother of pearl have illusory existence, as they are sublated at once.

It is interesting to know that early Vedāntic works namely the Gaudapādaśāriṣṭa, the Vivekācūḍāmaṇi etc. do not specifically state that the world does not have unapprehended existence even though they compare the world with a dream. Nevertheless, in the Yogavāsiṣṭha we get a

1. यद एव विविष ज्ञेयाचक्षुरप्रत्यक्षगुणसङ्गतिः क्रान्तिः।

- V.S.M. p-25.
hint from a verse which seems to indicate negation of the unapprehended existence that, "All things have Avidyā as their source; bubble like they spring up for a moment and are refunded into the great ocean of knowledge."

So, perhaps following the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, Prakāśānanda admits only two types of existence namely the ultimate and the illusory, and thus simply negates the empirical existence of the world. In other words, according to Prakāśānanda, things exist only when they are perceived. That is to say, the phenomenal world has only illusory existence just like a dream.

In this context, it might be argued that if Ajñāta Sattā of the world is rejected, then a man, gone out of the house would become very miserable and would die weeping, knowing that his house, son, beasts, etc. do not exist when

1. विषायनयोंदा ग्रंथद्विः प्राणपुस्युप गच्छन्ति जानेकंजलि सक्षा ||

- Yv. VI-(A), 127-20.
they are not perceived. So before self-realisation, the world is not sublated.

Prakāśānanda very logically asserts that the world has got only illusory existence, and so it does not exist when not perceived. A question is posed before the holders of three types of existence, "Is duality real or unreal? If it is unreal, then how could it be three-fold?"

Does an object exist even when not perceived by maintaining that duality is either real or is what is technically termed inexplicable?

The first alternative will not hold, for an absolutely real duality must be rejected on the rejection of the trustworthiness of perception, inference and other sources of evidence.

1. कन्या गृहानिगीतस्य पुनर्ज्ञानक्षणं ज्ञाताव्यथस्ततद्वाहिनि स्वेदेन शैशास्त्रिनिना द्वैयमानस्य संक्रमेये परणामद्वृतः।

2. सत्त्वाऽण वदन्तु वांशु प्रक्ष्णो त्रायोऽत्रायुन पति।
   सत्त्वे केवलाद्वयं वा नस्ततये विचिन्त्युः:।
If the last alternative be adopted, it may be asked whether this merely apparent existence was observed in any instance prior or not? If not observed, how in the absence of an instance confirmatory of the inference, is the merely apparent existence of the world, beginning with the subtle element sky to be proved. If it be replied that the snake, which erroneously appears in place of the rope seem at night, is a well-known instance, among others, of a merely apparent object, then it being premised that the existence of the world beginning with sky is precisely similar to the existence of the snake; the question remains to be discussed whether the objective world exists even when not perceived, or only so long as perceived. If the unapprehended existence be surmised for the world, the example (the existence of the snake) and the case in point (the existence of the world) do not sufficiently correspond, because of the dissimilarity.¹

That is to say, here the analogy of the snake, presented to show the inexplicable existence of the world consisting of sky etc. is not proper but contradictory.

¹. See next page.
1. किं वृद्ध पारस्परिकांक्रिया वज्ञातसत्त्वस्वास्थ्य, उत्पादनिवृत्तीययुग का

नाम, प्रत्यक्षताकिद्रामाण्यनिररूप्ति निराकारतातु। कल्पने

वनिवृत्तीय प्रथम: कवितिनसिद्ध न वा हु न के। तर्क हृद्धाति:—

साधारण कयामकाण्डेसनिर्युक्तस्वास्थ्ययुग, सिस्त रज्जुसर्परिक—

मितितैतु। तर्क हृद्धाति तत्र यात्रु हृद्ध सत्त्व ताइनायुक्ताचाती: प्रप्त—वस्यति

स्वीकारनीय किमहृद्धसत्त्व किं वा प्राचीनिकैक युगशत्तमापि

सत्त्वाचाती: कल्पने तथा कयामका दृष्टान्तो साधारणनिप्रे

सामाजिकोपसाधिक्तेन निरीक्षातु।

On the contrary the snake appearing in the place of the rope indicates its illusory (pratibhāsika) existence!

Nor would the man gone out of the house die weeping because of being certain of their non-existence, for he is not convinced of their non-existence so long as no evidence subversive of his belief in their existence is forthcoming, and, further because it is shown that all experience is like that of the dream.¹

Nor is there a difference between the dreaming state and the waking state, for in neither case, while the error lasts, is any sublation admitted. Nor is there any inconsequence in holding that there is a sublation of error on the application of evidence, for none would say that, when the error has been removed, there can be any further

¹ न च गुडानिधित्वात् स्वाक्षरत्वात्स्वाभावादिवशेषं रूपकारस्यकृत्यवेदनः।

बावजूद पृथिवी मृत्युक्सृष्टं, कमाविनिःथ्या नहं कारारात्

स्वपनकवित्ववकारस्योपपारिपक्षत्वाच।।

dealings with the erroneously surmised object.¹

Besides, there is no contradiction with the view of

the holders of three-fold existence, as they have recog-
nised the empirical existence of things only for the satis-
faction of the ignorant people without abandoning the

illusory existence of duality. Though 'Prapâñca' is

illusory, there is no contradiction in their speaking of

its empirical existence due to intermediate differences as

it is recognised by the ignorant people.²

1. न च तत्र बाधीः कृतिति वेषम्यतः ; प्रमावस्थायं कुतापि बाधि- नानाधीकाराच। प्रमाणपूर्वकं बाधापर्यं न कर्येऽगृहयः ; तदानि प्रतिकृत्त प्रसर्वालं प्रयुगममात्।

- V.S.M. p.28.

2. न च त्रिविधसहत्तवा मुपगमविरौधः ; सर्वेऽय क्रस्य प्रातिविद्यतव- महात्मनं तैः प्रान्ति निर्बिद्यमारस्य कृत्वानात् प्रातिशिस्वत्वपि पूय-यस्य प्राणादिविद्यवाष्ट्रार्थेः यथामाणाक्रं व्याकारिक- सत्त्वानिवानविरौधः।

- V.S.M. p.28.
Now, in our daily life the unapprehended existence of the world is experienced. Everyday we experience the very same world. If the unapprehended existence of the world is rejected, then what about the experience of the man who recognises the same world after waking up from the dreaming state?¹

This doubt is set at nought by stating the analogy that in dim light, ten people simultaneously running away on account of the illusion of a snake, know from each other's statements that they all had experienced the same (illusory) snake. In this case, each had a different experience of the illusory snake, as no one is able to experience the illusion of another person. But due to non-discrimination all knew that each one had experienced the same snake.²

Similarly, the Prapañca which is experienced after waking up from the deep sleep is absolutely different from the previously experienced Prapañca! But due to non-discrimination one feels that it is the very same Prapañca.³

¹ See next page.
² See next page.
³ See next page.
1. तथापि काव्यस्तुत्योन स्वपागमे सुप्रभृद्धस्य स यवायं पुष्प-व हति प्रत्यभिज्ञाने का गतिरिति वै ।

   - V.S.M. p-29.

2. एफस्स्याधैं रक्ष्योऽवथानंतरविभिन्या दशानां सुमत्स्मृद्धि मण्डलार्थानां परस्पर संवाहक एवं यह रमणः सर्वेदनुष्टु पदि प्रत्यभिज्ञाया या सदैवति सन्तोषत्त्वाम्। तत्र हि स्वस्त्त्रपतिद्वः सर्वे: पृथक् पृथक्योगेन नुभूती विषयः। कर्मभासिऋद्यान्यथा शालुम-शक्तं तु कन्युभ्रस्त्या ज्ञातासा। विवेककाफळ तु तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञान-मेक एव रमणः सर्वेदनुष्टु हति।


3. एवं जागृक्ष्याविं प्रत्यक्षतुष्य सुगुणित विभवा युनसत्याय योंद्रव पृष्ठतुष्य: ए प्रवाहान्तरस्व विभयोक्रोति प्रत्यभिज्ञाने त्वविवेककाफळ।

Moreover, there is no lack of testimony about the dissolution of Prapanca during deep sleep. The scripture asserts the absence of Prapanca in deep sleep.¹

Here, one may be confused since the world consisting of earth, water etc. is obviously different from the illusory snake. How could a very big stone, hitting the head of a man be considered illusory, as it causes severe pain? Objects, fulfilling our practical usages could not be just compared with illusory things. The 'difference' between them is that the world is perceived by the sense organs, while the illusory things are perceived due to Avidya. Moreover, illusory things do not exist before their actual perception, on the other hand the world seems to be existing even when not perceived! Hence, one has to admit the unapprehended existence of the phenomenal world.

1. न व सुभुष्णो प्रपान्चं सकलं प्रमाणं मावः, न हि ईश्वर उद्भवित: परिलोकः।
   विभौ अविनाशितः, न तु तत्त्वधृतियमार्हं ततोऽयः प्रविठ्यः तद्
   प्रश्येदिति हुत्त्वा सुभुष्णो निक्षीलोपार्य वदत्त्वा तत् सर्वप्रपान्चं वाभवस्य
   परित्वत्तवः।

In answer to this objection it is stated that as a matter of fact, the sense organs are not the causes of the knowledge of the world. If the reason is asked, then a counter question could be asked whether the sense organs are instruments of valid knowledge or of just knowledge which is common to both valid knowledge and false knowledge or of false knowledge only.  

Here, none of the alternatives is acceptable. The sense organs are not the causes of valid knowledge, as the truth of the knowledge effected through the sense organs would have to be proved by ascertaining that the object of this knowledge was something different from what is known by false knowledge. And its being a different object from the object of false knowledge would have to be determined by its being an object of valid knowledge. So the fault of mutual dependence would arise. And the fact that it is

1. इन्द्रियार्थसङ्गल्ल: प्राच-चेतान प्रत्यक्षारणात्वाद्। कुत्ते हति चैव तत्र वकाव्य विमिन्द्रयादि: प्रामाणित्तात्रे कारणादि किं वा प्रामाण- 

- V.S.M. p-32.
the object of valid knowledge does not prove that the object known by it really exists for the knowledge. "This silver is unreal" has an unreal thing for its object.  

Moreover, since it must be held that the sense organs as sources of knowledge must have for their objects things which are not known, it follows that sense organs can have as their only object the substratum of all things viz. Brahman, for the world being non-sentient could not be something that is 'not known'. (The whole world of objects being non-intelligent (jada i.e. Avidyā) when considered

1. नाथ: ; हिन्दुचित्रज्ञानप्राप्तां प्रामाणययो वृत्तार्थिविभाज्यत्वेन साधनों प्रामाणयया वृत्तार्थिविभाज्यते च प्रामाणिविभाज्यत्वैतत्ययो नामाकार । न च प्रामाणिविभाज्यत्वमाध्यत्तम्भेतेवदुष्पि ; मिष्यार्थ रज्जगतिः प्रामाणिविभाज्यत्वमाध्यत्यस्यापि विशयोक्तरणां द्...  

- V.S.M. p-33.

2. किंच हिन्दुचित्रायां प्रामाण्यत्वेन क्रजल प्रामाणिवयन्त्रेव क्रजलव्यक्तिविश्लुग्नोत्रेऽविभाज्यते प्राप्तस् । प्रामाण्यस्य सर्वस्य ज्ञातैचै ज्ञातत्वमापनात् ।

- V.S.M. p-33.
apart from self, intelligence, the substrate), it cannot be what is termed 'ajñāta' (unknown, i.e. invested by Avidyā), for the objects are Avidyā itself, and Avidyā could only invest or make unknown intelligence and not itself).

Accordingly, since the fact of being the locus of the world can apply satisfactorily to the self only, it would have to declare that the sense organs as sources of knowledge have the self within as their object, and such a declaration is not possible, for attributeless self cannot be an object for the sense organs. The scripture also announces this. Nor can it be said that this śrutī passage declares that the sense organs have the world as their object. For while the passage re-states the instrumentality

1. तथाचार्यसानन्तरस्यवते प्रत्येकान्तरेण प्रत्येकात्मविभागाणी-
   निष्काश्यमिश्राणान्तरात्मविभागाणी-
   प्रत्येकात्मानान्तरात्मविभागाणीनां
   तत्स्मिन्निवैधिकक्षुः।

   - V.S.M. p-34.

2. तथा श्रुतिः "न सन्देशति तत्तत्त्वस्य न च प्रत्येक्य न पञ्चति
   कस्मिन्नैर्हर्कि" (Kath. Up. II-6-9) "परावर्त साति
   यत्तेण व यत्तें लाभप्राप्तः पञ्चति पञ्चति नानाग्राहः" (Kath. Up. II.4-1)

   - V.S.M.p-34
is commonly regarded as proved by a method of conjoint presence and absence which is really false, as (the presence and absence of) sense organs in dream (is purely imaginary). The real meaning of the passage lies in showing that the self is not an object for the sense-organs. Thus, the second alternative is refuted by showing that the sense-organs cannot be instruments of true knowledge.  

The third alternative also will not hold for Avidyā alone is the cause of false knowledge. And in the case of the dreaming state it happens that though no sense organs act, the presence and absence of the sense organs is seen.

1. न चानयेव अत्यादित्र्ग्याणाः पुण्य-विशंकत्वं दक्षिणितय वाच्येण; 
व्यवहार्याणां कर्मसिद्धांस्य नः ज्ञानकारणत्वातुवा तत्त्वसप्त छः इह भविष्यतं तत्त्वाति। सैन प्रमाणसाधारणान्त- 
कारणतत्वस्य निरुपित्युपशक्तिवाति।

- V.S.m. p.34
Thus, to meet the expectation of a cause for all effects such as earthen pots etc., Avidya alone is to be accepted as their cause. But the acceptance of special causes for each of these effects by those who desire these effects can be proved to be precisely similar to the acceptance during the dreaming state.¹

Hence, everything else other than Brahman in the form of jñāna-jñeya are the effects of Avidya, and their existence has been proved to be apprehensional only.²

Thus, in the exposition of Drsti-Srsti vāda it is repeatedly stated that this manifold phenomena exists only

¹. ततो प्रातिरिकं कुलकार्यार्थं ज्ञानं ज्ञयर्थं तत्सत्त्विचिकित्सेय ।
   हति प्रातिरिकश्चत्तर्व संस्योषितेऽशिरस् ।
   - V.S.M., p-35.

². न; मयमय समस्यां विषाणाध्यौगतिवयत्र स्त्रयौव्रक्तवतु ।
   ज्ञानं प्रतति-नवन्ययतिरिस्कृतं स्त्रयं-नवयतिरिक्तुपपति ।
   तव घटादिकालाखः कारणाभित्ताः कारणत्तेन विचकोप- संस्याः ।
   तदर्थ्यं तत्कारणविशेषोपाध्यायं तु तथेऽव स्त्रयं-
   वदेपपक्ति ।
   - V.S.M., p-35.
when perceived, it is imagined by Avidyā like the snake and the silver appearing in the rope and in the mother of pearl respectively, and like Gandharvanagara and a dream. ¹

In short, the sole intent of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda is to reject the unapprehended existence of the phenomenal world, and to assert that it exists only when it is perceived!

\textbf{Drṣṭi-itself is Sṛṣṭi}

By denying the unapprehended existence of the worldly phenomena, Prakāśānanda simply shows that the world exists simultaneously with its perception.

Now, we shall examine how he emphasizes that there is no creation (Sṛṣṭi) apart from its perception (Drṣṭi). In other words, Drṣṭi itself is Sṛṣṭi. This resembles the theory of 'Sahopalambhaniyama' of the Yogācāra Buddhism, which asserts that both jñāna and jñeya are cognised simultaneously.

1. कौण्ड विभागार्थक्षतस्य जग्गः प्रकोपितसम्बलीयोऽव सत्त्वपुज्ञित्वम् ;
वेश्युस्मातुस्मिकी जग्ग्वर्तामगंगरक्षणप्रपाप्यः तथा दस्ति है ।

- V. S. M. p-40.
The jñeya has no existence apart from the jñāna, and so is of the nature of consciousness.

Perception, inference and the scripture are not able to establish the 'difference' between the object and the knowledge of the object (jñāna-jñeya). We may now see how Prakāśānanda has established this view.

**Perception**

Perception is considered the most direct means of valid knowledge. Through perception we all become aware of the things around us. Usually, we believe that we perceive things that are different from its knowledge or awareness. Realists hold that the phenomenal world exists independently of its awareness, for which they consider perception as an appropriate means.

But this view is refuted by Prakāśānanda as follows.

Is the perception, "This is a pot" able to distinguish the pot as different from itself or is it so distinguished by some other perception? If that very perception declares the 'difference' then is this perception self-known or known or known through some other perception?¹

¹ See next page.
If self-known, and if the view be adopted that a determinate knowledge - \((\text{Viśiṣṭha-jñāna})\) is effected through a knowledge of the attribute portion - then, although in this case the difference is known as the attribute of the object made known by the perception itself, it follows that the perception is self-originated in that it makes known an attribute, viz. the 'difference' and this is the fault of self-dependence. ¹

See previous page.

1. प्रत्येकमिति कै तत्र पदांयमिति यत्प्रत्येकादिके वसमानं गतस्य यस्य विषयवस्त्रृत्तः प्रत्येकारं वा। स्वामेव स्वविषयपैद्य गृहणार्थमिति प्रत्येकमिति कै ततिर्क स्वप्रकारं परप्रकारं वा।

¹ - V.S.M. p. 41

1. तत्रापि स्वविष्यविशेषणत्वेन वैस्य मानैपि विशिष्टज्ञानस्य विशेषणांजन्यक्षणादेव स्वेतेव मेधलाभविशेषणविषयण खयं जन्मत हति प्राप्तं तथा चात्मकः।

¹ - V.S.M. pp. 41-42
Now, if it is held that the difference of pot and knowledge is known as the subject portion (ghata jñānayor bhedah), then the intercourse of the sense organs with both the subject and attribute portions would be the only cause of this determinate perception. So in this situation the difference must be stated to be existing before the origination of its knowledge. And when the difference itself is non-existent before the origination of knowledge, how would it become the object of the knowledge? ¹

And since a second perception cannot make known a self-known perception, it cannot make known a difference which has as its counter-entity a self-known perception. ²

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1. विशीर्ष्यत्वेन भेदस्य माने विशीर्ष्यविशीर्ष्येऽल्लोकक्षणसारमार्यते विशीर्ष्यज्ञानकारणानि मिति पदवी ज्ञानोत्तर्तेः पूर्वे भेदोऽस्तीति वाच्यं तथा च तस्य ज्ञानस्य वर्गं स पैदौ विषयं: स्यां: स्यौत्तपै: पूर्व: स्यस्यैवामावात्/.......

- V.S.M. p-43.

2. .... ज्ञानान्तरस्य च स्वस्यकाश्चानाविषयत्वेन तत्प्रतियोगिकभेदवादिविषयकत्वात्।

- V.S.M. p-43.
If it is argued that perception in other than present time is known by another cognition, then the self-luminous virtue is made to depend on present time which would be its limiting condition. If it is held that in the present time, the very nature of knowledge is self-luminous, then this would hold good of the knowledge of past and future also, as there is no difference in their being knowledge. 1

Nor is a change in the nature of knowledge possible according to the change in time, for a pot perceived as a pot never becomes a non-pot. It may be argued that merely by the fact of its own existence (i.e. without being perceived), the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot), with which difference the sense organs were in contact, produced the perception in which the difference was declared. But such a view is a bare statement, for in the absence of evidence, the mere fact of

1. कत्तिपानस्य ज्ञात्वा परपुरुषो स्तं वक्तिन्कालोपरिधिः स्मुष्य । वक्तिन्झालो ज्ञात्वा राजस्वपावेः स्मुष्याशिति कैर । न । अति न गृहस्योर्षी तथार्थापिेः।

- V.S.M. p.43.
existence of the difference is not proved.

Nor can the view that knowledge is made known through another knowledge also establish the difference of knowledge and its object (e.g. pot). In this case, it should be decided whether or not the knowledge of the difference was preceded by the knowledge of the reciprocally different counter entity and locus. If not, then how could it make known the difference? For no body is conscious of a difference which is devoid of locus and counter entity. Everyone experiences that 'this' is different from 'that'. On the other hand, if it is admitted that the knowledge of difference was preceded by a knowledge of the reciprocally different counter entity and locus, then the fault of Infinite Regress would be unavoidable; And if it is held that the knowledge of the reciprocal difference was brought about by this same second knowledge, then the fault of

1. नाहि प्रति कुछ चिन्तन हि स्वात् ।
हि-ह्रस्वस्निक्षणबोधस्य मैदव्य सचावामाध्येन
प्रभाणसचावामाध्येन स्वर्णप्राप्नन्तःसकातक्षम्भित्यंपि
प्रक्ष्यामां प्रभाणा माकैन सचावामस्यायहिष्ठे: ।
- V.S.M. p-44.
self-dependence would be there. Hence, it is proved that perception grasps just the thing and knows nothing of the difference (of thing perceived and the perception).  

Inference

Inference also does not establish the difference between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. If it is argued that Inference proves the difference as follows:

(1) Pratijñā: The thing under discussion differs from the perception which makes it known.

1. बसु ताहि पर्युपस्खाजन्यपं प्रत्येकतान्तरण ज्ञानवर्णस्य प्रृत्यक्ष:।
   सोप्य ज्ञानयतियोग्यांक्षामुख्योऽनेति विवेकिययस्।
   न कैर कर्म वेद विबषयकूलाः त न नि: निर्णय प्रत्ययतियनन्तर वा वेद कथितप्रत्ययति।
   कथसार्धिन्त हस्यस्मात्। ज्ञानयतियोग्यांक्षामुख्यश्च त ज्ञानिकालप्रत्येकतान्तराः वैण्णनावस्य।
   तैनेव ज्ञानयतियोग्यां कथितप्रत्ययति।
   तस्मादहस्यमत्रस्मां हि प्रत्येकः
   न मेक्कात्र ज्ञातान्तिसति सिद्धः।

- V.S.M. pp.44-45
(2) **Hetu** : Because this thing is the substrate of attributes which are opposed to the attributes of the perception which makes this thing known.

(3) **Udaharana** : Whatever is the substrate of attributes which are opposed to the attributes of some other thing is different from that other thing : viz. a piece of cloth is different from a pot.

(4) **Upanaya** : The thing under discussion is similar to the piece of cloth.

(5) **Nigamana** : Therefore, the perceived object is different from the perception of the object. 

The above mentioned syllogism is rejected. For since the opposition is to be known through the difference, it follows that while the difference is unproved, the opposition is also unproved; hence that this thing is the substrate of attributes which are opposed to the attributes.

1. जस्तू तद्भन्दुपानाः प्रेमीः। तथा भवे विप्राः विभागः।
स्वविभागः प्रेमीः, तद्भन्दुपानाः।
यो यद्विवर्तः
चर्या: स ततः मिलीः। यथा घटात्तपसङ्गाः
तस्मात् नेव।

- V.S.M. pp.45-46.
of the perception which makes this thing known is invalid. And because as long as the Sādhyā is unsupported, so long the universal concomitance is unproved. Nor can the difference between a pot and a piece of cloth be proved by any evidence so as to support the Sādhyā. And if in the absence of perception, recourse is had to a second inference to prove it, the fault of Infinite Regress will continue to haunt the argument.¹

Thus, inference also cannot prove the difference between jñāna-jñeya.

**Verbal Testimony**

The scriptures repeatedly emphasize non-duality, so the question of their establishing the difference does not arise at all.²

1. चैत्यः विरोधस्य नैविरुपायत्वेन मूर्तिःसिद्ध विरोधाभासः। तदिराधिकारप्रमाणस्य शयनः शर्माप्यत्वसिद्धेऽ। नौ च शास्त्राद्वयविद् कैविन्याग्निसिद्धान्तनाराणात्मस्य शर्मायते।

2. वागमतात्त्वत्तत्सरुप्ययोगे परिवर्तन सय मूर्तिप्रकर्षयोऽशक्तिमाप्यशक्तम्।

-V.S.M.p-46

-V.S.M.p-47
It may be argued that, in teaching the emanation of the world from Brahman, the scriptures also teach that all products are different from Brahman: for if not different, their emanation from Brahman could not be mentioned.  

This argument is set aside by stating that since every vedic passage bearing on creation is devoted to the refutation of those other causes of the world viz. Pradhāna etc. assumed by other thinkers, by showing that just as in such cases as that of earth and the earthen pot, it is impossible to explain what the difference is between earth, the cause, and the pot, the effect, so too it is not possible to explain what the difference is between Brahman, the cause, and the whole world which is an effect from Brahman, it follows that every such passage finds its real meaning only in giving the knowledge  

1. नन्दु ब्रजपण्यः सन्ताशस्तु मृदित्व प्रतिपक्षम ब्रजनाम: कार्यवातस्य ततो निवननिन्त्रा प्रस्त्रापद्यति। वर्षदे ततो जन्मीव न स्वायतिति केषु। - V.S.M. p-47.
of Brahman, the one without a second. Otherwise, if the Veda were devoted to teaching difference, the prohibition with regard to duality would be purposeless. ¹

Further, passages dealing with creation do not directly teach 'difference'; for since no word bearing the sense of difference occurs in such passages, these cannot declare a meaning which the words composing them do not bear, because it is only what is meant by the words that a sentence can directly make known, either by showing syntactical relation between the words or by conveying the simple notion of identity (of subject and predicate in the sentence). And an inference (from Vedic) passages

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¹ वृद्धिवाच्यस्य सर्वस्य ग्राह्यात् किरियाप्रियकरकाणात्तर-निरालगणपर्यय मृकुवादी कारणात् काल्याणेय रूपान-निरस्त्राय ब्रह्मण: कारणात् काल्याणात्स्य सर्वस्य भैला-निर-पणनाराधिकारयास्यामान्ये वात्स्ययार्ते। वनस्पतिः पेदपर्वें तन्निर्माणोपनक्ष: स्यात्।

- V.S.M. p-47.
bearing on creation of the world to the difference between Brahman and the world is inadmissible as contradictory of (such) prohibitive passages.  

Thus, Prakāśānanda emphasizes that neither perception, nor any of the other means of valid knowledge is able to establish the "difference".

It may be argued that as the knowledge is not possible without an object different from itself, it follows that knowledge (jñāna) makes a thing different from itself its object. Moreover, objectless knowledge is not possible, nor is it experienced. It is knowledge accompanied by its object and that is experienced, otherwise objectless knowledge would be experienced, for apart from an object

1. किंच मृद्धवाक्यं न ताक्तात्मा दृष्टेऽपि प्रतिपाद्यति ; 
   नेक्षाचलसदायां पदार्थाय। वाक्यार्थात्वादवच्चात् पदार्थस्येव 
   संस्कृतवै षष्ठिताय च परमीतात्वपत्वै च वाक्यप्रतिपाद्यच्चात् । 
   कल्पनायास्त्र निषेष्वाक्यविरोधेन सुचारुतः ।

cognised, there is nothing to determine the cognition. This view is rejected by stating that there is absence of impossibility of the knowledge without its object.¹

Scrutinising this argument, Prakāśānanda says: Is it meant that the production of knowledge is impossible or the persistence of knowledge is impossible or that secondary knowledge (awareness of knowledge) is impossible without the object being different? The first alternative is not acceptable as knowledge in its essential nature is not a product at all. And if it is believed to be a product, then as its production is possible through the means of knowledge or through their counterfeits; an

¹.  न च ज्ञानप्रेम व्यावहारिकवितिक्रियाकी नूपपन, ज्ञानप्रेम व्यावहारिक, न च विषयस्य प्रेम ज्ञान समस्तिः प्रेम दुर्मनव; सविष्यज्ञस्य मात्रात् अन्य प्रपथ्यासुर, ज्ञान अन्य स्थिरता कृत्व भक्ति।
ज्ञाने विषयवितिक्रियाव्यवस्थास्याभावमुदिविविव, क्षयवितिक्रियान ज्ञान नूपपयत्त्वं वाच्यम्।

object would not be necessary to produce it. And it is not
the rule that knowledge is produced by an object.¹

Nor is the second alternative tenable, as the object
to be known is not the locus of the knowledge. If the
object is believed to be the locus of the knowledge, then
it would not remain an object, (but would become the
knower). It might be argued that there is impossibility
of the awareness of knowledge, in the absence of an object
to be known, since knowledge of knowledge is dependent on
the knowledge of an object. But this is not proper, for
since knowledge is self-luminous, it does not require the
aid of anything for its "Vyāvahāra". If this is not
recognised, then the fault of Infinite Regress could not
be avoided, and as a result, knowledge would not be

¹ तथापि तत्त्वेण ज्ञानस्य क्षेत्रतिर्गणेत्तत्त्त्वत्तुपपति; स्थित्तत्त्वपर्यं
शेषत्तुपपक्षः नावः, ज्ञानस्य सारात्मा उत्पत्त्वमावतः, मावे
वा प्रमाणतदामाहामयायेव तत्त्त्वादात्सम्भवे विषयानपेक्षणात्
ज्ञानस्य सर्वेऽ विषयजन्यत्स्वे नियमानवात् हृ ।

- V.S.M.p. 49
established and the world would be merely blank darkness.
If it is believed that an 'unknown' knowledge testifies
to the reality of the object that is known, then in the
absence of evidence knowledge would become an absolutely
non-existing entity like the horns of a man.¹

It may be granted that knowledge needs a second
knowledge to make its known, yet it may be asked as to why
an object is needed, for only knowledge of the object is
necessary. Against this, it might be asked by the opponent:
since the necessity of cognition in general (apart from
some object cognised), is not here postulated it follows

¹. ज्ञानविषयकान्त विषयज्ञानशोभनलयैन केठि विना ज्ञेष्मुपपरिरस्तिविति चतु २ न, ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपास्वात्मकान्त विषयपहारायेव
स्वात्मिकसंप्रदेशेत्र । परमन्यत् ज्ञानत्तरकिन्तु
तस्यायन्नासि स्वायन्नासाध्यसंस्त्वयः ज्ञानसिद्धो जगवन्य-प्रसहनात्तु, व्यायमयस्य ज्ञस्विष्णवसाधकाये प्रमाणागामवैन
नरुमण्युन्यय वरुणसत्त्वाकैः।

that there is a necessity for a cognition as determined by some cognised object, and hence the demand for an object is inevitable. But this argument is not tenable, for cognition is self-differenced, as are the categories of generality (Sāmānyā) etc. recognised by the other Schools of Philosophy.¹

Again it might be argued that the very fact of cognition leads us to infer the existence of some object, because of the universally established concomitance of cognition and cognised object. Such an argument is put aside as follows: Such universal concomitance cannot be proved because cognition and cognised object cannot exist together in the same locus; since their spatial positions

¹ वर्तनी वा ज्ञान्य स्मरण यथौ ज्ञानान्तर पैदान तथापि विभवापैदानाः कुतः विभवाज्ञानस्यवैवैद्यानात्। ज्ञानामान्यस्यतैद्याः स्वविभवावृवृज्ञानादिकाराः विभवापैदांप्यवस्मम्पाकृः तवृचायः। ज्ञानस्य सकं एव व्यापुक्त्वच्छं परस्परायत्वात्भवत।

- V.S.M. p-50.
are distinct. Moreover, their temporal co-existence cannot be proved, since cognition of a past and future object is a matter of common experience.¹

In short, the difference between the knowledge and the object to be known cannot be proved.² The whole

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2. Prakāśāṇanda has given some stanzas which clearly emphasize the non-difference between jñāna and jñeya:

- V.S.M.p-51.

- V.S.M.p-51.
world is stationed in the self only, it exists only when perceived and arises, persists and perishes again and again.¹

It is stated that there is no duality over and above the existence of the self. This whole world of appearance is seen and heard when the self is seen and heard. Here, the analogy of 'raju' is presented, that when raju is known, all its appearances like garland, stick etc. are known. Similarly, when the self is known, everything is known,²

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¹ जगत्स्य स्त्रिपत्यां सत्त्वकम् ।
उपाय स्तितिमार्खाय विनाशत् मुद्रितः ॥ २२ ॥

- V.S.M.p-52.

² ज्ञातसातिरिक्त्याः देशवचयो वाप्रवातः ज्ञातसातिरिक्त्याः सहे वै हृष्टेः ज्ञाति ।
यथा रज्जुस्वलः हृष्टेः तत्राभ्यासान ।
दशस्याऽमेव अस्मै हृष्टेः ज्ञाति तत् ज्ञातसातिरिक्त्याः सहे हृष्टेः फलतः तनानुपपन्नयेन् ॥

- V.S.M.p-164.
Now, to a layman, a question certainly occurs,

"If everything is the self, then who is the seer of the duality?" But in the realm of non-duality, such a question has no scope. When everything is the self, the question of its seer does not arise at all. It can only be stated that through induction (Prāptāprāptavigeka) Drśti alone could be the material modification (Pariṇāma), for no perceptible thing other than it is existent.¹

Further, it is impossible that this vision or product, as included within the self, should be a parināma of self, since a thing is not a parināma of itself, and because the parināma view is vitiated by the alternative assumptions of whole or a part of self undergoing parināma. Nor may it be argued that the same fault attaches to the vivarta view, for the meaning of Vivarta is not understood. A vivarta is no reality existing apart from its substrate in regard to which the above mentioned alternatives may find place.

¹ Prāptāprāptavigeka duśṭeśvar parināmaḥ sukta vasanti kṣatraśyāma-vatāt ।

- V.S.M.p-167.
but what is termed a Vivarta is nothing but the substrate itself, which through some defect appears under a different form.¹

Now, we shall see how Prakāśānanda rejects even Vivartavāda from the ultimate standpoint. While demolishing the theory of causation, he propounds the acme of Vedāntic thought viz. Ajātivāda.

**Rejection of the theory of Causation**

Since nothing exists except the non-dual sentience viz. Brahman, there is no use of talking about the theory of causation. In the chapter, namely - "Idealistic thought in the Gauḍapādakārikā" we have seen that Gauḍapāda

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1. .... वृद्धः पालस्माय वात्सः मत्वराणामत्वनुपपेकः।
   न हि स्वयं स्वयं परिणामः, कात्स्येपेदेशशिक्षकण परिणाम-
   पदातुपपेकः। ननु बिद्वैस्मौथर्य दोषः समान हृति केवलु न, ना
   विकारवादपरिज्ञानात्। न हृदयघंटानस्वस्पांतिरिक्ते विनयी
   नाम विकिद्वस्य यदायक्य कात्स्येपेदेशशिक्षकारः स्यात्।
   किन्तुकिद्विक्षणयेव दौष्टशास्त्रविलेकणाकारिण मासमान विकां
   हत्युञ्जते।

- V.S.M.p-168.
has forcefully rejected the theory of causation and has established Acosmism - (Ajātivāda). On the other hand, Śaṅkara and most of his followers have admitted the theory of causation, though only from the empirical standpoint.

In our daily life we see that a particular effect is produced from a particular cause. For example, a pot is produced from clay. Here, the pot is the effect and clay is the cause. It is seen that a pot is always produced from clay and not from milk. Hence, a specific order is maintained in the theory of causation. Thus, from our empirical experience we assume that there must be some cause of the world. It is noteworthy that each system of thought recognises a cause of the world in its own way. The Vaiśeṣika system considers atoms as the cause of the world. While the Vedāntic thought regards Brahman as the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. Brahman is the very cause, from which everything has emerged. This concept may lead towards the theory of transformation (Pariṇāmavāda), but it is
noteworthy that the Kevalādvaita philosophy accepts the theory of appearance (Vivartavāda). But from the ultimate standpoint, even Vivartavāda is not recognised. The Smṛti declares that the theory of appearance is taught only to people with a lower intellect.¹

We have seen that most of the Śaṅkaraites regard Brahman as the cause of the world, while Prakāśananda asserts Avidyā (Māyā) as the material cause of the world, and that is only to avoid an awkward silence, for Idealism does not allow the theory of causation to enter into its realm.

In the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī this problem is put forth in an interesting manner. We may now come to this.

Since it is maintained that all the things have Avidyā for their cause, it is asked, whether the causal

1. बालानु प्रति विकलपत्वर्ण: सकलं जगत् ।

-V.S.M.p-172.
relation is recognised as real or not. If not, then the causality of Avidyā could not be affirmed. If it is recognised then the method of conjoint presence and absence would alone be the means of knowledge, for no other method could be applied to the causal relation. In this case, it would not be proper to maintain the causality of Avidyā, having rejected the causality of clay, threads—etc., which has been proved by inductive methods.

Another doubt is put forth as to whether Avidyā is the sole cause, independent of all others, or Avidyā accompanied by others viz. God etc. is the cause. The

\[1\text{. न्यायविद्यायोगिनि:पावना: धार्मिकारणमाधृश्मवकृत्यः भा. । न च नैद्विद्यायोजित्तथमपि भवसं न वस्त्र कैला कार्यान्त्यवासवात्स्याय यथायथविद्यतिरिक्तप्रसरत्र प्रमाणम् । तत्र पुराणविरास्मात्। तथा च नैद्विद्यतिरिक्तविदिते मुष्ठ दिकारणात्वमपि यवविद्यानांत्यवेदविन्यासम्।}

- V.S.M.p-36.
first alternative is not possible, for variety in the
effects is impossible in the absence of variety in the
cause. Moreover, Avidyā which is non-sentient, cannot
produce the effect without being monitored by someone
who is sentient.¹ Nor is the second alternative acceptable
for the holders of the view that Avidyā is the cause will
have to regard God etc. as the cause also to account for
the variety in the world, so there is no use of considering
Avidyā as the cause, for according to the law of Parsimony,
the effects could be established by "Adrṣṭa" etc.²

1. .... कारणवैचिक्यामाध्यून कार्यवैचिक्यानुपप्ति:।
ि वैतत्त्विखिन्तनमन्तरेण जड़स्तै: कार्यवैरित्वानुपप्त्येः।

- V.S.M. p-37.

2. विशिष्टकारणविविधित्वायनुपप्तस्वरूपः कारणत्वस्वावर्जः
ि वकी व्यत्चालाकारः एव विचित्रकार्याम्पतोऽजीभानेन
कारणत्वाभिमित्तात्र किंवते।

- V.S.M. p-37.
Moreover, the trustworthiness of perception and the other means of human knowledge, and the earlier portion of the Veda as the means of obtaining sons, cattle, paradise would have to be accepted. If it is denied then which view could be adopted in opposition of the Veda and human experience? Hence, "Avidyā is the sole cause" is a rash statement.¹

The above mentioned arguments are refuted as follows:

"As an existent thing is not produced, similarly, a non-existent thing also is not produced. The bare fact of production proves that the product is the work of Māyā."²

1. तथा च पुत्र्यज्ञानेनीौक्षिक्य प्रमाणस्य पूर्वकाण्ठस्य च पुनर्ज्ञानेनीौक्षिक्य प्रति वागादे: साधनतालोकपर्य प्रामाण्य समस्ति महति। वन्यथा लोकविविधत: कर्म पत्तावल्पेत्। तस्मादविषयाभावकरणेन जगदिति साःसमात्मः। — V.S.M.p.37-38

2. यथा स्तो जनिनेवाचकोऽपि जनिनः च। जन्यत्वप्रवृत्त जन्यत्व पार्थिवत्वसमर्विष्णु || १६ || — V.S.M.p-38.
Now, is an effect something real or unreal? Not something real, for this is opposed to the purely monistic teaching of the Sruti in such passages as 'one only without a second'. Nor can an effect be proved to be something real.

To explain: previous to its production is an effect existent, or non-existent? If non-existent, then the horn of a have ought to be produced through the agency of the cause, for it is alike non-existent. If the effect was something previously existent, then causal agency is not necessary, for the effect existed previous to the exercise of this function, and the nature of the effect is thus overthrown.¹

¹ फिरिंदे कायये सत्यसत्यं वा । नामः, एक्षेत्रा ऋषिरमित्युः
क्षमात्रपूण्यतिर्मविरोपणातु, अपप्रेतः। तथाहि विद्यते: पूवः कायये सच्चात् । क्षत्त्वु । तविः श्रवणि वाचमपि कारणव्यायारज्जातिः।
क्षत्त्वाविषेषात्। सच्चात् के कारणव्यायैण पूविवमिष तस्म कल्लात् कालवृत्तम्याधातच्च।

If it is argued that it is merely the manifestation of the thing that is brought about through the causal agency, then it is replied that even on this assumption there is no getting rid of the evil fate, whichever of the alternatives be assumed. Grant then (it may be said) that an effect is something inexplicable either as existent or non-existent. Then as an answer it is stated that it is fitting to maintain, as the only cause, Avidyā—inexplicable, beginningless, and of the same nature as its effects, for it is impossible that entity should be the cause of non-entity, and common experience vouches for this impossibility. ¹

Nor can it be said that a variety of effects is impossible, for there is presumptive evidence for Avidyā as a unity possessing manifold powers. ²

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1. जम्ब्यक्षितात्त कारणायापाराभत्त इति है | न |
   तथापि सत्यमात्यािक्षित्याप्रवासानपत्याथू | कबू कहि
   सददिक राणग्रामनिविक्तोत्तम कार्यस | यथे देनहि कारणानुपातानथा-
   निविक्तोत्तम कारणाप्रक्षितम | सत्यमात्यािक्षित्यानपत्याथू:
   लीफ तथा दक्षत हू |
   - V.S.M.p-39

2. न च कार्यविचित्त्यानुपातिः, विनिविक्तािक स्यासान स्या कामनाधिक्यात्मकाः
Nor is the authoritativeness of the earlier portion of the Veda impossible, for the real aim of this portion is to teach Brahman indirectly by teaching that certain means bring about certain results through the performance of which the intellect is purified, or through which one becomes possessed with the desire to practice the means, of attaining the knowledge of Brahman. And because the authoritativeness of the Veda is in respect of its purport viz. Brahman alone.¹

Hence, it is rightly said that the Avidyā is the cause of things.²

Now, a doubt may arise regarding the cause of the world, as the scriptural passages declare both Brahman as well as Avidyā as the cause of the world.³

But the Śruti passages describing Brahman and Avidyā as the cause would not be contradicted, for "Brahman is not the cause of the world, but the world is produced through Avidyā regarding Brahman. Brahman is regarded as the cause inasmuch as it is substratum".⁴

¹. See next page.
². See next page.
³. See next page.
⁴. See next page.
1. न च पूर्वकारणस्य प्रामाण्यानुपालितः। तस्य अपि साध्यशाक्त–
भावुकं सत्त्वशक्तिकरणं प्रटतिविवरणं वा प्रलयेत् तात्पर्यति
तात्पर्यायं शुद्धत्व प्रामाण्यान् ॥

- V.S.M. pp. 39-40

2. तस्मादविषयायोऽनित्यं भावात् हुष्टूकः ॥

- V.S.M. p-40.

3. Sruti statements describing Brahman as the cause
of the world:

ब्रह्म सोम्यायणं बक्षितः
कों ता ह्यानि स्वाति बायति
सत्त्वात् शत्त्वायत्वां बायातः सम्बूः

- Sruti statements describing Avidyā as the cause
of the world:

इद्रो माराष्ट्रे: पुरास्म ह्यते
मार्यान् तु प्रकृति विदितात्

- Rg. Veda. IV. 47-48

- Sve. Up. IV-10.

4. यथाज्ञानजनज्ञमेव बलापो कारणात्
विचित्रानत्मकात्रेण कारणं र्वत श्रीयते ॥ ॥

As Brahman is immutable (kūṭastha), and virtually different from cause effect, it cannot be considered as the cause of the world. So beginningless and inexplicable Avidyā is the cause (of the world) and not Brahman.¹

It is very clearly stated that the scripture has secondarily or figuratively declared Brahman as the cause in the sense that it is the substratum of all. Even Avidyā is not meant to be the cause of the world. It is mentioned only as the factor responsible for illusion. So rightly speaking the theory of causation lies outside the scope of Vedānta, and the theory of appearance is the only teaching of the Upaniṣads.²

1. .... अण्णिन्यकेत्रीय अविभेद कारणं
          न इति, तस्य कूटस्य कार्यकारणोद्भिद्ध शर्तवात्.....

2. न चाशाचार्य संप्रेक्षार्थ पुल्या विवेचित्तम् ।
       तत् अभावित्तात्मात्राश्चतेऽकात्तः कार्यकारणवादस्य
       वैदान्तबिधिभूततः स्ववृद्धिपर्य विवृत्ताय वैदान्तवाक्ष्वात् ।
       - V.S.M.p-117.
Hence, if it is asked as to what is the cause of the world, then only to avoid an awkward silence, Ajñāna is stated to be the cause of the world.¹

Thus, the theory of causation remains totally expelled from the realm of Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi vāda. We may say that so far as it negates the theory of causation, Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi vāda supports Acosmism (Ajātivāda) established by Gauḍapāda, and this reveals the highest Vedāntic position.* Potter says: "His (Prakāśānanda's) position represents the logical resting place of Advaita Vivartavāda in Ajātivāda and Solipsism......"²

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¹ Potter Karl.H. - Presuppositions of India's Philosophy - Ch.XI, p.246, (1965), Prentice Hall Of India (Private Ltd), New Delhi.
In the context of solipsism we would like to quote the statement of Umeshchandra Das. "The theory of Drsti-Srsti propounds that one Jiva is absolute in essence. His egotism is illusory, thanks indeed to the suicidal yet self-centered concept of the theory. The charge of solipsism does not here hold good. That charge would be warmly welcomed by the Ekajivavādins or Drsti-Srsti-vādins."

But as the author of the Siddhāntalakṣaṇasamgraha has said, all the theories of the Saṅkaraites have the sole purpose of maintaining and establishing the Sole Reality of pure Consciousness, the Srsti-Drsti-vāda or the Drsti-Srсти vāda are but attempts to give an explanation of the world-phenomena and our empirical experiences even when nothing else exists other than Brahman. Even if Drsti-Srsti vāda may appear to be allied to solipsism, it is not final doctrine of the Advaita-vedāntin, which is beyond all empirical proof and verbal usage; and has therefore to be differently communicated.

Concluding this chapter we may say that in the vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvalī, Prakāśānanda has propounded the Drśti-Srśti vāda which has opened a new vista in the history of vedāntic thought. It tries to solve the riddle of world-existence in its own way. This theory can give rise to many questions which may seem difficult to solve. Yet it would not be wrong to repeat that it puts forth the highest vedāntic position very logically.