The small states have traditionally been facing serious problems of security and survival. Certain incidents in recent years in the post World War II era have demonstrated, if anything, the acuteness of their problems. The difficulties became still more acute if they lack adequate resources to defend themselves against threats, both internal and external. The small states generally face two types of security problems. The first arises when some internal elements seek to destabilize and topple a legitimately established regime through unconstitutional means. The second emanates from an externally inspired and directed threat to its territorial integrity. In both the cases, the concerned state faces serious hazard to its security and survival because it finds itself helpless in responding to such threats adequately.

Emphasis on these two aspects may, however, be treated as a narrow definition of national security. It ignores certain other significant aspects from which dangers to the security may arise. These aspects include geopolitical environment, the economy and the society. An all-comprehensive security must mean mobilizing all forms of powers at the command of the states, including ideology, commerce and communications. In order to magnify the leverage a small state must exert all diplomatic capabilities to the fullest measure. In this connection all the circumference of great
powers activities which in a way form the philosophical foundations of its security, must be viewed in a total context. The ultimate criterion for foreign policy is survival not victory. Because of its pervasive nature, the debate over strategies for national survival cannot be confined to the corridors of powers nor to the military planning only.

In view of the above, this study proposes to examine the foreign policy of Singapore in terms of security in its totality, bearing in mind the linkages between the internal as well as external factors. The present study intends to take the year 1968 as starting point for the analysis of Singapore's security for mainly two reasons: First, the announcement of British government to withdraw its forces "east of Suez" created an unprecedented security hazard for Singapore; secondly, besides the security problem, Singapore for the first time had to come out of its shell and to protect itself (on and off the shore) for its survival.

In 1968, decision of the Labour government in Britain to withdraw its forces by 1971 posed a serious security problem not only in military terms but also in economic terms inasmuch as it had rendered virtually a sort of mass unemployment of Singapore workers employed in the British military establishments. The Singapore government's immediate reaction to this decision was to delay the time schedule for British withdrawal. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew himself endeavoured to persuade the British to slow down the pace of
withdrawal so that Singapore had a breathing space necessary for it to prepare for learning the economic and military impact of the British reduced military presence. Singapore also suggested some possible alternative defence arrangements. These later assumed the form of Five Power's Defence Arrangement (The participants included Singapore, Malaysia, Britain, Australia and New Zealand).

Again, in the beginning of the 1970s, it was clear that the international system was changing and by the end of the decade a new configuration of power balance was emerging. The bipolar world was yielding place to sort of new multipolar world. China had begun to emerge from the self-imposed isolation of the cultural Revolution. British withdrawal of "East of Suez" was an accomplished fact. Western Europe and Japan acquired new status as global economic powers. Sino-US relations had shown clear signs of improvement. Simultaneously Detente began to be seriously thought of Sino-Soviet conflict had assumed new and more threatening dimension. Whereas the US had given clear signs of disengagement from South-east Asia, the Soviet Union was in the process of expanding its penetration there.

The fall of neutralist government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Phnom Penh, the extension of the Vietnam war to Cambodia, the US - Democratic Republic Vietnam agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam in January 1973, the US debacle in IndoChina in April 1975, the
unification of Vietnam in July 1976, the genocidal record of the Khmer Rouge government (led by Pol Pot) in Democratic Kampuchea, (the new name of Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge took over in April 1975), the Vietnamese armed intrusion there in December 1978 - January 1979, the Chinese invasion on northern borders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in February 1979, growing rapprochement between the US and China (beginning with President Nixon's visit to Shanghai in February 1972) and souring of relations between China and Vietnam, all created pressures for an concerns about regional security in general and Singapore's security in particular.

These events in their totality changed the whole structure of the regional and international configuration of forces. The pressures arising out of these changed circumstances impelled Singapore to review its foreign policy options. According to Singapore leaders there would never again be a situation in Southeast Asia where the US would be the only power of significance. The Soviet Union would not disappear nor could the growth of China's influence be prevented. In Singapore's security perception, the region had become a tripolar region, with a number of regional powers associated with one or the other big powers. It was in this context that Singapore had to devise new approaches in the conduct of its foreign policy.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the security perceptions of Singapore and examine the determinants of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the major powers - during 1968 to 1980. Despite being a small nation, how it managed to survive and maintain its sovereignty and integrity while at the same time keeping its economy growing.

The proposed study would also analyse the domestic policies and their impact on external relations, the nature of great powers interests and the extent of their involvement in and around Singapore and the related responses and policy postures of Singapore. It should be noted that being a small country Singapore had to employ various ways and means in order to survive in the complex international system. In this context the study would attempt to project the geo-political strategy and security perceptions of Singapore with specific reference to its relations with major powers. Finally, the study would focus on particular aspects of Singapore's foreign policy, which were designed to enhance its security and survivability despite entrenched presence, interests and involvement of major powers.

The first chapter is devoted to introduction and survey of historical background to the evolution of Singapore's foreign policy till it emerged independent in August 1965. This Chapter would also present a theoretical analysis of foreign policy, its related concerns.
The second chapter examines the major determinants of Singapore's foreign policy. It would also examine the psychological, geo-politico and economic compulsions in the conduct of Singapore's foreign policy as seen in the background of the profile of the country. The third chapter would deal with the Singapore's security perceptions, objectives, strategies and policies during the period under study. The fourth chapter would be devoted to examining the security perceptions of Singapore in the context of its regional environment. Primarily it would be studying Singapore's foreign policy based on its own security perception as it pushed through the ASEAN framework, and the ASEAN responses towards the same. The fifth chapter would focus on the study of various external powers, interests and stakes in the geo-politically significant and economically viable Singapore in their respective strategic calculations. In this regard the policy of China, USSR, Australia, and Japan and their ability to influence Singapore's foreign policy would be analysed. This chapter would further discuss Singapore's reactions, responses and reflections relating to the external great powers' policies towards it.

The sixth chapter deals exclusively with the United States which came to occupy an important place in the calculations of Singapore. The concluding chapter will present the findings of the thesis.
The completion of this thesis has been made possible through various kinds of support, advice and encouragement. It is, therefore, a great pleasure for me to acknowledge their benevolence.

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Bagwan Das Arora, for his learned and able guidance. It is only because of his encouragement and affection I could complete this work in time. I am grateful to Prof. Parimal Kumar Das and Dr. Ganga Nath Jha who always showed a keen interest in my work. I also acknowledge the help by Mahendra Kumar Dubey, Ashit Bhushan, Rajesh Kumar Sinha, Satya Priya Ranjan, Sudesh Kumar, and a number of friends who helped me at various stages of this work. I am indebted to my parents, and my wife Archana Sinha whose constant encouragement and love inspired me to accomplish this work.

I collected materials for the thesis in various libraries in India and abroad. I am specially thankful for the help rendered by the Librarian and other members of the staff of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, Indian Council of World Affairs Library, Saprty House, New Delhi, Teen Murti Library, New Delhi, American Centre Library, New Delhi, National Library of Singapore, and Library of Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
I am particularly thankful to Mr. P.S. Chahar and Mr. Sharma who typed the work in a very short time and enabled me to submit this work in time.

New Delhi
20 July 1992

(SUJOY KUMAR)