CONCLUSION
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Within about two years of its independence, Singapore found itself in a precarious situation where it had to face the problem of its very survival. The British who provided the major security anchor, had announced in 1967 their intention to reduce military presence from the "East of Suez" by the mid-nineteen seventies. Singapore had recently been separated from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965. The Indonesian confrontation had just ended in 1966. Keeping in view their security dependence on Malaysia as also their strong economic linkages with it, Singapore leaders had to do some serious reappraisal of their security policy approaches towards that country. It was all the more necessary because of the traditional image it continued to evoke in the minds of the Malay leaders in Malaysia as well as Indonesia. It could not any longer afford to ignore the fall out of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's high-profile elections campaign, based on its concept of "Malaysian Malaysia" in 1964 elections, during its membership of the Malaysian Federation.

Since its foundation by Stamford Raffles in 1819, entrepot trade had mainly been responsible for the Republic's economic growth. Lacking in almost all natural resources, it had thrived economically by using the region as its hinterland. But as the neighbouring states began to market their own products and reduced the need for a 'middle man', the Republic was forced to diversify its economy from an entrepot
to an export-oriented industrial economy. Economic nationalism of the neighbouring countries and the British military withdrawal, in this sense, became the major reasons for the transformation of the Republic's orientation from being a 'regional' to a 'global city'.

The preponderant Chinese population placed Singapore apart from its two Malay adversaries, Indonesia and Malaysia. More significantly the Chinese in Southeast Asia had traditionally been the object of jealousy, hatred, and persecution. They were perceived by them as potential 'fifth column' and 'Third China', and a vanguard for Chinese expansionism. The actual threat to Singapore thus came from these two giant neighbours.

Involved in the process of transformation of Singapore's orientation were serious political, military strategic and economic implications. Moreover, in search of its security and survival, the newly-born Republics foreign policy as well had to undergo a major change in order to suit its requirement. It had to seek reliable friends who could provide a similar and if possible, better security guarantee. At the same time it had to build up its indigenous defence capability to protect itself.

Singapore began its defence preparedness in 1967. In the early stages it was based on a National Service Scheme, i.e., national conscription. The objective was to develop a small, professional defence capability, out of its small
population in order to deter an external attack. The emphasis was on quality and not quantity. It was engendered by the physical constraints of Singapore, especially its small size and population. Being a small state with almost no natural resources, Singapore was not in a position to threaten anyone and its preparedness was purely for self-defence. The preparations for security and defence got accelerated following British announcement in 1968 to withdraw by the end of 1971. The leaders generally believed that it would place the Republic in a comfortable position to participate in any bilateral or regional endeavour aimed at ensuring peace, stability and good neighbourliness in Southeast Asia.

In addition, Singapore tended to make friendly alliances with like-minded countries. Before Singapore gained independence, defence was the responsibility of the British. When Singapore was part of Malaysia (1963-1965) the Anglo-Malayan (later Malaysian) Defence Agreement signed in 1957 was extended to Singapore. Following Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965, the Republic did not feel inclined to enter into any formal security arrangement with any country even though negotiations for some kind of security arrangement were being conducted with Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. These negotiations eventually culminated in the Five-Power Defence Arrangement in November 1971, involving Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. The Arrangement called for immediate consultations among the five countries in the event
of a threat or attack. Being not fully satisfied with the nature of the Arrangement Singapore adopted a five-pronged foreign policy strategy to deal with the problem of security and defence. These included judicious blending of a small but well trained and well equipped defence force, national development, cooperation in the ASEAN regional framework, friendly alliances and giving as many countries as possible, especially the United States, a tangible stake in the security and viability of the state.

Indeed, even though Singapore was a founder member of ASEAN (established in August 1967) and had been taking part in all the cooperative efforts of ASEAN, at least initially, it did not visualize any direct benefits accruing from this organization. Certain significant developments led to a change in the Singapore perspective. These were, the British decision to withdraw from Singapore, the beginning of American disengagement from Southeast Asia as announced in the U.S. President Nixon's Guam Doctrine, the growing acceptance of China as a respectable member of international community and the general perception that the communists might emerge victorious in Indochina. Besides, Singapore leaders thought that joining ASEAN would help mitigate the image of its "Chineseness" in the region and in the build up of a new Singaporean national identity.

As a result, Singapore was prompted to reconcile its national objectives of security and economic development by balancing its attention between regional and global interests.
This was markedly demonstrated in its endorsement of the ASEAN concept of zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in November 1971. In order to show its regional credentials and thereby, win the goodwill of the two dominant neighbours, i.e., Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore had ignored its reservations about the usefulness of this regional concept.

In a direct response to the fall of non-communist regimes in Indochina in April 1975, Singapore reoriented itself to an ASEAN-first foreign policy posture, aiming at enhancing regional cooperation in order to counter what it perceived as unfavourable developments in Indochina. In this regard, it saw the Bali Summit of ASEAN Heads of Government in February 1976 and the subsequent attempts at closer economic cooperation as positive developments. However, the Republic simultaneously tried to reach a kind of modus vivendi with communist Indochina, but failed to make any headway. It could be ascribed to the complications arising from ethnic antagonism among communist parties in Indochina which hindered any closer development of ASEAN-Indochina relations. Initially, Singapore, along with other ASEAN states welcomed the Vietnamese-Khmer rivalry. Later, however, traditional antagonism between the Vietnamese and the Khmers, as also divergent geo-strategic perceptions of the leaders in Hanoi and Phnom Penh, culminated in the eventual Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978-1979. An immediate cause as partly correctly emphasized by the Vietnamese leaders was the genocidal activities of the Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge government in Democratic Kampuchea.
The Soviet support to the Vietnamese venture transformed the entire complexion of the regional political scene. Not only did Vietnam emerge as a dominant power in Indochina, its security treaty with the Soviet Union altered the great power configuration as well as balance of power in the region. What added further complications in the situation was the Vietnamese agreement to permit the Soviet Union the use of military facilities in Danang and Cam Ranh Bay bases there. With a view to reinforcing the anti-Vietnamese feeling among the ASEAN partners, the Singapore leaders came to put major emphasis on the Vietnamese threat to Thailand and the rest of the region and sought to articulate a high-profile foreign policy of countering the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. In order to counter-balance the same, they even advocated the evolution of a regional and international 'united front' aimed against the Vietnamese and Soviet efforts at regional and global hegemony, respectively. And for this, they adopted a strong diplomatic offensive against both these countries. The major objective and the guiding spirit behind the Republic's foreign policy, however, remained as to how to ensure and enhance the chances of its own survival.

Singapore considered inadequate many of the tactics of traditional diplomacy available to small states, such as alliance, non-alignment and neutrality. Hence, it chose the instrument of balance of power, thinking that it would offer
a better solution to the complexity of the problems it faced. This strategy was adopted at a time when President Nixon's administration was in the process of military disengagement from Indochina. It was at this stage that the Soviet Union had begun to pay more attention to the Indian Ocean region. By 1971, the PRC was also admitted to the United Nations. In short the threat to Singapore's survival coincided with a major shift in the great powers' alignments in the region such as increasing Sino-Vietnamese hostility, Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty of November 1978, improvement in Sino-American relations, and growing Sino-Soviet rivalry. It was in these circumstances that the Singapore leaders adopted a foreign policy strategy of maintaining a balance of power in the region. They considered that it would both enhance the chances of the Republic's survival and its economic prosperity.

Being small and vulnerable, the Republic's leaders realised that they could not wish the great powers away, especially when the later had vital interests in the region. They also thought that the presence of the great powers and their investments in the region would be a sort of guarantee of security from the communally oriented politics in the neighbouring states and would possibly turn their orientation to the tasks of economic development. For this purpose it adopted an 'open door' policy.

Hence, the best alternative was to invite the presence of all the major powers. In short, great powers' presence was a significant policy approach Singapore could pursue from
time to time. More important, the greater the number of great powers in the region the better, it perceived, were the chances of its survival. In this regard, it became a major foreign policy objective of Singapore to ensure that there was always, at any given time, a multipolar presence of great powers in the region. By having a clear sense of national priorities and objectives and at the same time promoting major powers' presence in the region Singapore could hope to survive and prosper.

In addition to security consideration, Singapore considered the presence of the great powers necessary for economic prosperity of the Republic as well. In this connection it realised the importance of keeping open the major regional sealanes, especially the Malacca straits, upon which it depended for its own economic survival. Fortunately for Singapore, all the major powers had a vested interest in seeing the Malacca straits kept open. Moreover, for its economic development Singapore wanted a continuous flow of investments from major industrialised states. In short, in addition to great powers political and military rivalries, the Republic found their mutual competition in the region useful for its own development. That explains why it had encouraged the U.S., Japan, China, the U.S.S.R. and Australia, to play a more important economic role in Southeast Asia, while at the same time keeping a comfortable distance with them. By having a tightly organised and efficient society and disciplined trade unionism etc., the Republic had pursued policies to ensure that the great powers found the Republic attractive.
for economic investments.

It was in this context that the Republic promoted the security and economic interests of the major powers in the Southeast Asian region and with it enhanced its own security and economic prosperity.

In view of the great-power rivalry in the region, the Republic supported the continuation of preponderant U.S. economic, political, diplomatic and military presence there. This was because the leaders of Singapore realized that only the U.S. had the interest, will and capacity to act as a counter-weight to the growing Soviet presence in the region as well as future Chinese penetration. This stance could be seen as a pragmatic response to changing great powers' political alignments and certain significant developments in the region. This in a way represented a foreign policy exercise rationalized as part of the country's ideology for survival. This led to a marked shift in Singapore's initial position on American involvement in Vietnam. Following independence, Singapore had maintained a neutral posture with regard to Indo-China war. But after 1967, the Republic approved of the American military intervention in Indochina describing it as a great American contribution aimed at providing valuable breathing space to the non-communist countries of the region in the face of massive communist onslaught. Interestingly, Singapore gained substantially from American war in Vietnam, in addition to their investments in various fields as it served as a recreation centre for the American soldiers.
The change in Singapore's position toward Indo-China war could be directly related to the British decision to withdraw its forces from Singapore. In other words, the change in Singapore posture vis-a-vis the United States was a stop-gap measure to mitigate the negative impact of British policies on the Republic. Singapore was generally pro-U.S. in the sense that for economic survival it established close links with the U.S. very often at variance with the views of regional partners.

Thus, despite the fact that the constraints, such as small size, lack of natural resources, its demographic image, a very poor military capability and an economy based mainly on entrepot trade, and the decision of the British to withdraw its forces 'east' of Suez' had put the Singapore in a very difficult situation in 1968. But, by using skilfully its foreign policy, Singapore could ensure its security and thrived economically, making it a highly industrialised economy in 1980.