CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Daily reports of violence, wars and crimes have for many years led social scientists to focus their investigations on aggressive behaviour. It has become a very important area and social psychologists have proposed theories to explain the determinants and antecedents of aggressive behaviour (e.g., Dollard et al., 1939; Buss, 1961; and Berkowitz, 1972). However, in the last two decades, social scientists have become more and more interested in behaviour that might be considered the opposite of aggression. This behaviour consists of a variety of acts such as helping, aiding, sharing, donating, or assisting, and can be seen as having positive consequences and, therefore, social psychologists decided to call such acts as prosocial behaviour. Wispe (1972) suggested using this term "to describe behaviour which was the antithesis of aggressive behaviour, namely, sympathy, altruism, charity, sharing etc."

In his historical review of social psychology, Allport (1961) noted the role that sympathy has played as a fundamental principle of human nature. Yet perhaps it was the more recent fate of Kitty Genovese in New York that most forcefully reconstituted the discipline's concern with the more positive, prosocial aspects of human behaviour.

In 1964, Kitty Genovese was attacked and stabbed to death by a knife wielding assailant, for nearly one-half hour, she was repeatedly and brutally stabbed, her cries of fright and pleas for help ringing through the streets. Although it was 3 AM, some thirty-eight of her neighbours watched the entire episode, hearing her struggle and viewing the man stab her repeatedly. And yet not one sought to intervene, not even by so seemingly simple an act as calling the police. After Genovese was dead, one of the
Thirty-eight finally called in the police. News accounts reported that the witnesses claimed that they did not intervene because they did not want to get involved, and anyway, they were frightened, embarrassed or not really sure of what to do to be helpful (Milgram and Hollander, 1964; Rosenthal, 1964). If altruism involves stepping into help another human in need, its absence in the Genovese case motivated much speculation, and then finally, systematic investigation of the circumstances under which persons will or will not be altruistic.

Thomas Hobbes (1909) felt that we were born as evil, aggressive creatures and that only society's controls prevented our rapacious qualities from leading to destruction. Rosenau (1961) held the opposite view of children and society. He felt that we were born "naturally good", caring and concerned about our fellow human beings and that it was society that corrupted us. However, most of psychologists believe that we are not 'born' one way or another but we all have the capacity for both antisocial and prosocial behaviours within us. Social psychologists have wrestled with the issue of how we define these terms and there is not complete agreement. Acts that may be considered prosocial include a wide range of behaviours—from saving a person who is drowning to helping someone carry their packages, from donating a kidney to donating a penny, from the heroic act to the merely thoughtful. The common denominator of these acts is their apparent selflessness, the voluntary doing of 'good' for another person where the motivation does not appear to be self.

Krebs (1970) has identified three aspects by which conventional wisdom defines prosocial acts. A prosocial act is performed voluntarily by an actor; the actor intends for the act to benefit another person or group of persons, and the act is performed as an end in itself and not as a means of fulfilling an ulterior personal motive of the actor. Staub (1978) also believes that a person's motivations are important in distinguishing between behaviour that is prosocial and behaviour that is altruistic. He states that prosocial behaviour refers to behaviour benefiting others. A prosocial act may be judged altruistic if it appears to have been intended to benefit other rather than to gain either material or social rewards. (p 10) The definition of prosocial behaviour implies that the beneficial act must be
carried out voluntarily, not as a result of external threat or reinforcement. Prosocial behaviour can be carried out only in situation in which the individual has the freedom to decide whether or not to help. It is, however, recognised that an individual may feel an internal pressure or obligation that can lead to prosocial behaviour. Staub (1978) believes, there may be internal rewards associated with the performance of prosocial acts such as sense of self-satisfaction or virtuousness.

Hence, if prosocial behaviour is the antithesis of negative forms of behaviour such as aggression, harm, destruction, or selfishness, then prosocial behaviour should include the forms of behaviour that signify altruism and/ or restitution. Specifically, prosocial behaviour is done for its own end, and (b) the behaviour is done as an act of restitution. This definition limits to two types of the range of behaviour called prosocial. The first is called ALTRUISM and the second is called RESTITUTION.

ALTRUISM

The first type of prosocial behaviour is altruism. Psychologists disagree about the precise definition of altruism although most of them agree that altruistic behaviour:

1. Must be carried out voluntarily.

2. Must aim to benefit another.

3. Must be carried out without expectation of a reward (Krebs, 1970; Berkowitz, 1972).

There is disagreement about some specific preconditions for altruistic behaviour. Thus, Bryan and Test (1967) view altruism as "those acts wherein individuals share or sacrifice presumed positive reinforcer for no social or material gain" Midlarsky (1968) defined altruism "as a subcategory of aiding, referring to helpful actions which incur some cost to the individual but either very little or nothing by way of gain, relative to the magnitude of the investment" Similarly, Walster and Piliavin (1972) argued that "altruistic behaviour is generally thought of as behaviour that benefits
another rather than the self as something that is done out of goodness of one’s heart. Other psychologists have stated additional necessary conditions in defining altruism. For Aronfreed (1970) and Cohen (1972) empathy is an essential condition for altruistic behaviour, only help that comes as a result of empathic reaction to another’s experience can be called altruistic. Batson & Shaw (1991) reviewed the empathy-altruism hypothesis (EAH), which claims that empathic emotion evokes truly altruistic motivation, which is an ultimate goal of benefiting not the self but the person for whom empathy is felt. In three experiments with 252 college students Batson et al. (1991) tested whether empathy evokes egoistic motivation to share vicariously in the victim’s joy at improvement (the empathic-joy hypothesis) instead of altruistic motivation to increase the victim’s welfare (the empathy-altruism). In Experiment 1, subjects induced to feel either low or high empathy for a young woman in need were given a chance to help her. Some believed that if they helped they would receive feedback about her improvement; others did not. In Experiment 2 and 3 subjects induced to feel either low or high empathy were given a choice of getting update information about a needy person’s condition. Before choosing, they were told the likelihood of the person’s condition having improved and to their experiencing empathic joy, was 20%, 50% or 80%. Results of none of the experiments patterned as predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis; instead, results of each were consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

In study by Swap (1991) 14 vignettes were construed to vary aspects of five general dimensions believed to underline perceptions of altruistic behaviour: benefits or costs to the actor or the actor’s close kin, benefits to the recipient of help, behaviour extending beyond usual helping roles and norms, intention of helping, and planned vs. spontaneous helping. One hundred sixty four undergraduates evaluated the actor in each vignette and his/ her behaviour on scales measuring altruism and praiseworthiness. As hypothesized, the first 4 dimensions consistently predicted judgement of altruism, while the 5th did not.

One controversy with regard to the definition of altruism surrounds the problem of rewards. While all the definitions agree that a person
carrying out an altruistic act should not expect any external reward, there is disagreement about self-rewards (such as feeling of satisfaction, pride, and joy, as a consequence of a particular act).

Rosenhan (1972) and Walster & Piliavin (1972) object to considering self-rewarding help as an altruistic behaviour. However, looking at the need to distinguish at least theoretically, between altruistic behaviour and any helping act carried out because of external rewards, Bar-Tal Daniel (1985-86) has proposed to limit the scope of altruistic behaviour by including only the possibility of self-reward. Hence, he suggested a definition of altruism based on one proposed by Macaulay and Berkowitz (1970) with the additional condition. They define altruism as “behaviour carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources”. The condition to be added required that the behaviour must be done voluntarily for its own end only. That is, altruistic behaviour cannot be carried out as a result of obligation or expectations of quid pro quo. When a person who helps feels that he is expected to do so because of previously received help or because he did harm, he makes restitution but does not carry out an altruistic act.

THEORETICAL BASES OF ALTRUISТИC BEHAVIOUR

Social scientists have been keenly interested in the search for origin of altruistic behaviour. All the offered answers can be classified into four different approaches: the exchange approach, the normative approach, the developmental approach, and the cultural approach.

EXCHANGE APPROACH

Homans (1958), a proponent of the exchange approach has proposed the fundamental premises of the social exchange analysis of human interaction.

"Social behaviour is an exchange of goods, material goods but also non-material ones, such as the symbols of approval or prestige. Persons that give much to others try to get much from them, and persons that get much from others are under pressure to give much to them. This process of
influence tends to work out an equilibrium to a balance in the exchanges. For a person engaged in exchange, what he gives may be a cost to him, just as what he gets may be a reward, and his behaviour changes less as profit, that is, reward less cost, tends to a maximum. Not only does he seek a maximum for himself, but he tries to see to it that no one in his group makes more profit that he does. The cost and the value of what he gives and of what he gets vary with the quantity of what he gives and gets" (P. 606).

According to exchange theorists (Thibaut & Kelly, 1959, Homans, 1961, and Blau, 1964) an individual's behaviour is guided by the principle of maximising rewards and minimising costs in order to obtain the most profitable outcomes in any human interaction. Individuals choose one activity or situation instead of another if the one is more profitable or less costly to them than the other one. Thus, social interactions will be repeated only if the participants in that interaction are reinforced as a function of having participated in the relationship, that is, the goal of each individual in any social interaction is the maximization of his profits. The profits include material benefits such as money or goods, and social rewards such as approval, recognition, or power.

According to the exchange approach, altruism is a behaviour instrumental in receiving future rewards. Social exchange involves the principle that one who does a favour for another expects future return (Gouldner, 1960; Blau 1964). Gouldner (1960) even suggested that there is a norm of reciprocity which obliges the one who has first received a benefit to repay it at some time: it thus provides some realistic grounds for confidence, in the one who first parts with his valuables, that he will be repaid (P.177).

Although for many people in many situations externally derived incentives are more important determinants of behaviour than are internalised ideals, profits such as social approval, gratitude, or personal obligation are also important 'goods' of social interaction. Thus, according to the social exchange approach, altruistic acts may be carried out with
exceptions of social rewards. Blau (1964) suggested that these expectations are important causes for altruistic behaviour.

Going a step ahead, Homans (1961) suggested that satisfaction of one's values can be an important reward. He argued that "as long as men's values are altruistic, they can take a profit in altruism too" (P.79). Thus, Homans agreed that doing good to another person may be a pay off by itself. Blau (1964) suggested that "on rare occasions an individual will help another in need even without expecting any form of gratitude from them" (P.91). Blau considers such an act an exchange of help for the internal approval of the superego.

In general, exchange theorists consider altruism an exceptional, rare behaviour. The exchange approach maintains that individuals in most situations help other because they expect material or social rewards. According to the definition of the altruistic behaviour, such help is not considered altruistic. The view that people are by nature utilitarian precludes in general the possibility that individuals would carry out altruistic acts. However, the exchange approach does recognise that on rare occasions individuals can help others without expecting external rewards. In these situation, the exchange theorists argue that individuals reward themselves for the carried-out help.

NORMATIVE APPROACH

The normative approach attempts to explain altruistic behaviour as being dictated by social norms. The term 'norm' is typically used to refer to a set of expectations members of a group hold concerning how one ought to behave (Thibaut & Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1961). Many norms are stable because many of the sets of expected behaviours are passed from generation to generation as a part of a culture. Thibaut & Kelly (1956) suggest that norms replace interpersonal influence in the control of individuals' behaviour. Individuals usually regard norms as rules of behaviour and conform to the norms' prescriptions. One of the important reasons why individuals usually confirm to these recognised standards of behaviours is the concern about reactions of other individuals. A group uses
sanctions in order to enforce conformity to its normative standard of
behaviour. An individual whose behaviour departs from the prescribed
norms is subject to a negative consequence, which may include disapproval
by others. Individually, who follows the norms, are socially rewarded by the
group. Another reason why people behave according to the prescribed
norms is that norms can help define realities and reduce uncertainty (Jones
& Gerard, 1967). Faced with an ambiguous situation, people tend to rely on
norms that prescribe how to react rather than evaluating the particular
situation. Finally, on the basis of Heider's (1958) assumption that people
have a need for predictability, the conformity to norms can be seen as
deriving from the willingness to live in a world in which the behaviour is
regulated by rules. In such a world a person knows what to expect and what
is expected from him in order to behave in an acceptable way.

Individuals follow the prescription of the norms not only because of
external pressure. On the contrary most of the norms are internalised during
the early phases of socialisation. The child is taught to behave according to
the prescription of norms. Later, he internalises many of the norms and
follows them without any external pressure. On the basis of this assumption
individual differences are attributed to differences in the degree to which the
relevant norms have been internalised. Several theorists (Berkowitz, 1972;
Staub, 1972) have suggested that altruistic behaviour is also guided by
prescriptions of social norms. Specifically, it has been proposed that
altruism is regulated by two social norms: the norm of giving and the norm
of social responsibilities.

Leeds (1963) proposed the existence of the 'norm of giving', which
states that one should want to give, not because he may anticipate returns
but for its own value (P. 229). A person who has internalised this norm "has
a need disposition to give". There are three criteria for evaluating whether
a person has reacted according to the norm of giving.

1. The helping act must be an end in itself without anticipation of any gains.

2. The helping act must be emitted voluntarily
The helping act must do well.

A person who fulfils all the criteria and thus complying with the norm of giving is considered as the pure type altruist. The norm of giving is usually carried out in situations where there is 'role vacuum' and/or 'social vacuum'. Role vacuum exists when the norms accompanying a given role do not cover the entire range of possible actions that within normative limits are possible, but not obligatory. Thus, a nurse who takes care of a patient after working hours is an example of one who provides beyond the expectations of role. A social vacuum exists in a situation in which action is required that has not been provided through institutional means or is not capable of immediate mobilisation. For example, a natural disaster provides opportunities for altruistic behaviour.

Berkowitz et al. (1963, 1966 and 1967) suggested the existence of a social responsibility norm, which prescribes that an individual should help those who depend on him and his assistance. An individual who learns that somebody is dependent on his help feels an obligation to aid that person, even though he can anticipate no direct return benefits. However, there is common agreement that the altruistic behaviour of individual is not determined by the prescription of moral norms. The situation characteristics together with the characteristics of the person interest interact strongly with the prescription of the norm (Staub, 1972).

Darley and Latane (1970) and Krebs (1970) have criticised the normative explanation of altruistic behaviour being it a tautology. As a result of this criticism Schwartz (1973) suggested that altruistic behaviour is guided to large extent by personal norms which are defined as the individual's self-expectations which derive from socially shared norms. These norms are products of an interaction between learned expectations of societal norms and personal experience in the socialisation process.

Whether a person acts according to the norms depends on his awareness of the consequences the act may have for other people, on the extent to which his personal norms correspond to the consequences of the act, and on his feelings of personal responsibility to carry out the act. The
personal norms are tied to the person's self-concept. Individual differences in altruistic behaviour are the result of differential awareness of consequences and feelings of responsibility experienced by different people. Individual differences in altruistic behaviour are also caused by individual calculations of costs involved in violation of the norm in relation to rewards resulting from conformity. Several studies (Schwartz, 1968, 1970 and 1973) have confirmed the hypothesis derived from the theory of personal norms that individuals who are aware of the consequences of their acts and who feel personal responsibility to carry out altruistic acts tend to be more altruistic. Simmona (1991) reviews the history of altruism from studies on the motives for and social psychological consequences of altruism. One study comprised survey data from kidney recipients between 1970 and 1973. Another study involved bone-marrow donation to strangers by a national marrow-donor registry. The sociological mechanism, producing altruism, particularly normative obligation are emphasised along with psychological mechanism (e.g., empathy). Some individuals focus more than others on victims' feelings and experience more empathic concern leading to more volunteering behaviour. Empathic concern appears to increase a person's distress in the form of anxiety or sadness, happiness and self-enhancement may also be consequences of altruism (e.g., increased happiness and self-esteem after the kidney donation).

In summary, the normative approach explains altruistic behaviour by postulating that many people in our society have acquired norms of conduct to carry out altruistic acts not for tangible gains or social approval, but primarily for approval for themselves. This approach recognises that, on the one hand, situations are important determinants of altruistic behaviour and, on the other, individuals differ in the degree to which they internalise norms. Therefore, one individual may behave consistently in different situations, and several individuals may behave differently in the same situation.

**DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH**

The developmental approach views altruism as a learned behaviour, which can be explained within the framework of cognitive
development according to the principles of social learning (e.g., McCandless & Evans, 1973; Mussen et al. 1974; Hetherington & Parke, 1975). That is, while it is recognised that the cognitive ability to carry out altruistic acts depends on the development of moral judgement and on the capabilities to empathise with others' needs. One has to learn to be altruistic through the learning opportunities provided by parents, peers and other adults. In contrast to the normative approach, which analyses altruistic behaviour on the societal level, the developmental approach focuses on the behaviour of the individual. Individuals learn to be altruistic and thus there is an individual difference because individuals differ in their personal experience and in their learning opportunities. A number of psychologists (Aronfreed, 1968; Rosenhan, 1989) have argued that the acquisition of altruistic responses requires a history of reinforcement and development of self-reward mechanism. Fisher (1963) and Midlarsky et al. (1973) have shown that when helping is rewarded either materially or with social reinforcers, the tendency of children to be altruistic in a particular situation increases. An observation of helping behaviour is another process through which altruistic behaviour can be learned (Hornstein, 1970; Rosenhan, 1972). Similarly, Hartup and Coates (1967), Rosenhan & White (1967) and Bryan & Walbek (1970) have shown that observation of peer or adult models that are behaving altruistically enhances children's subsequent generosity. The parents, as primary agents of socialisation, are important figures who influence the learning of altruistic behaviour (Rutherford & Mussen, 1968; Rosenhan, 1970). Johnson (1982) studied the reactions of twenty-four 18-24 months old to simulated and naturally occurring incidents of distress in others and the relationship between self-recognition and subjects' prosocial or altruistic responses to others in distress.

Results show that subjects displayed a variety of forms of direct prosocial intervention (e.g., helping, comforting) in both laboratory and naturalistic settings. In the laboratory, subjects were more likely to intervene when the mother was distressed. In the naturalistic settings, subjects intervened when distress was observed in other children and siblings as well as in parents. Recognition of the self in a mirror was positively related to prosocial intervention in the mother-distress situation in the laboratory.
Findings provide evidence for infants' tendency to help and comfort others in distress and tentative support to the hypothesis that self-other differentiation may underlie altruistic behaviour in very young children.

CULTURAL APPROACH

The cultural approach attempts to explain altruism on a societal level, looking for the cultural conditions that may enhance altruistic behaviour. Campbell (1965) proposed an explanation of altruistic behaviour based on biological and social evolution. He pointed out that an external threat to the existence of any society or group increases individuals' solidarity within the group which is exhibited through loyalty, co-operation and altruistic behaviour. In a recent paper Campbell (1972) modified his original position proposing that genetic competition and selfishness in man preclude the possibility of evolving genetic altruism. Man can achieve altruistic behaviour only through socio-cultural evaluation, which is carried out through cultural indoctrination. Cohen (1972) too agreed that man operates by guidance of self-interest motivation. Altruism is developed only in certain socio-cultural reality in which individuals find themselves. The development of altruism depends on the extent to which individuals acquire feelings of empathy. They can acquire such feelings in social and cultural settings that reward this type of feeling. Cohen's analysis suggests that altruism can be learned, but its learning can originate only in cultures with certain social structures. Studies of Rheingold (1982) explored the possibilities that young children would exhibit a set of behaviours that could be characterised as helping. In a laboratory setting that simulated a home, parents and other adults were asked to perform some common household chores, and the children's participation was recorded. In Experiment I, 20 twenty-four months-old children were studied with their mothers and female adults. Sixty 18-24 and 30 months old children were studied with their mothers and female with male or female persons in Experiment II. In both studies, the children spontaneously and promptly assisted the adults in a majority of the tasks they performed. Furthermore, the children accompanied their assistance by relevant verbalisations and by evidence that they know the goals of the tasks, even adding appropriate behaviours not modelled by the adults. Their efforts were construed as prosocial not
only because they contributed to the completion of the tasks, but also because the children showed an awareness of themselves as actors working with others to a common end. Bryan and Crokenberg (1980) investigated the maternal and situational correlates of prosocial behaviour between siblings and the relationship of prosocial to antisocial behaviour. Fifty mothers were videotaped with their first and later born daughters (mean ages 10 years 5 months, and 7 years 11 months, respectively) in a semi-naturalistic game-playing setting. The relative absence of significant correlation among child prosocial behaviours supports the view that there are distinct dimensions of prosocial activity. Moderate but significant correlation were observed between children's prosocial/antisocial behaviours toward sisters and a variety of parenting behaviours considered relevant to the development of prosocial behaviour, of particular theoretical importance was the relationship between a mother's responsiveness to her child's expressed needs and infrequent-antisocial, frequent-prosocial interaction between her children. McDonald (1984) presents on ethnological-social learning theory of the development of human altruism that emphasises the idea that altruism is a biological system involving the interaction of cognitive, affective, and perceptual processes. These affective processes are viewed as depending crucially on biologically based predisposition to respond to social stimuli, especially parents, during processes central to altruism. Cross-cultural and historical evidence indicates associations between the degree of genetic relatedness in societies and cultural controls on altruism have operated by manipulating the affective environment during development.

**RECIROCITY BEHAVIOUR**

A reciprocity act is one type of prosocial behaviour. It occurs when a person who has received help or a favour reciprocates by helping or returning a favour to the original donor. However, reciprocity behaviour is considered to be prosocial only if it is done voluntarily for the sake of restitution and without external pressure. That means that a recipient of help must decide to reciprocate without external pressures. Reciprocity initiated as a result of a threat or anticipation of external rewards is not
considered a prosocial act. However, a recipient may feel an internal urge to reciprocate previously received help or favours.

THEORETICAL BASES OF RECIPROCITY BEHAVIOUR

The theories that attempt to explain the basis of reciprocity behaviour derive from the exchange approach. The basic proposition of the exchange approach states that 'Persons that give much to others try to get much from them, and persons that get much from others are under pressure to give much to them' (Homans, 1958, P.606). Thus, the exchange approach postulates that individuals who receive favour or help are expected to reciprocate. Each of the specific theories will be discussed separately.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE THEORY

Homans (1961) suggested the existence of a "Distributive Justice" principle, according to which, individuals who are in exchange relations compare their profits from the exchange by subtracting costs (e.g., loss of time, effort, money) from rewards (e.g., satisfaction, pride, money) in relation to their investments. The investments are the relevant characteristics of the individuals in interaction that are brought into the exchange. They include such characteristics as education, age, motivation or knowledge. When the compared proportionality between profits and investments does not accrue from social exchange, the rule of distributive justice is violated.

The donor who helps and the recipient who receives the help are considered to be in an exchange relation. In this exchange, a donor incurs some costs and the recipient receives some rewards. The comparison of profits between the donor and the recipient indicates that the distributive justice failed. Schematically, the comparison appears as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Recipient's Rewards} - \text{Cost (Profits)} & > \text{Donor's Rewards} - \text{Costs (Profits)} \\
\text{Recipient's Investment} & > \text{Donor's Investment}
\end{align*}
\]
According to Homans, the recipient, who has a more favourable ratio of profits to investments than the donor, feels an obligation to repay the donor. Such an obligation derives from feelings of guilt, which are proportional to the extent of the advantage.

EQUITY THEORY

Adams (1965) proposed equity theory and postulated that in human interactions individuals exchange inputs for outcomes. Inputs are contributions that a person brings into an exchange. They consist of skill, seniority, effort, knowledge, etc. Outcomes can have positive value (e.g., money, satisfaction, or prestige) and negative value (e.g., dissatisfaction, boredom, or sickness). Furthermore, individuals in exchange interactions tend to compare the ratio of their outputs to inputs with other people who are 'relevant' to that particular exchange. Adams (1965) suggested that "inequity exists for person whenever he perceives that the ratio of his outcomes to inputs and the ratio of other's outcomes to Other's inputs are unequal" (P.280).

There appears to be inequity in the interaction in which the recipient was helped by the donor, if the ratio of the recipient's outcomes to inputs exceeds the ratio of the donor.

This inequity can be represented schematically as follows:

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<th>Recipient's Outcomes</th>
<th>Donor's Outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient's Inputs</td>
<td>Donor's Inputs</td>
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The theory further assumes that inequity results in aversive feelings. A recipient who experiences inequity can reduce it in a number of ways. He can change the outcomes of the donor by reciprocating the previously received help. He can leave the field by discontinuing further interaction with the donor. He can also distort cognitively either his inputs and/or outcomes or the donor's inputs and/or outcomes. The recipient, for example, may decide that the donor enjoyed giving the help that increased the
donor’s outcomes, or the recipient may decide that the receiving help was very costly, thus decreasing self-outcomes.

RECIPROCITY THEORY

This theory is formulated by Gouldner (1960) who postulates the presence of a universal norm of reciprocity which states: (1) “People should help those who have helped them”, and (2) “people should not injure those who have helped them” (P.171). He reasons that reciprocity implies the internalisation of a norm that oblige a recipient to repay his benefactor. The strength of this obligation varies according to the needs of both parties engaged in the exchange, the resources of the donor, as well as the motives of the donor and the constraints of the giving act. Gouldner (1960) further states that the norm of reciprocity has an important role in stabilising human relations in society. In addition, the norm serves as a starting mechanism for human interaction. A person who initiates an exchange by helping another person is confident that the recipient will reciprocate. Society enforces the existence of the norm by applying negative sanctions to those recipients who do not repay their debts.

INDEBTEDNESS THEORY

In an attempt to analyse the process underlying reciprocity, Greenberg (1968) has reformulated the concept of the norm of reciprocity in terms of psychological state of indebtedness (i.e., a state wherein a person feels an obligation to repay a benefit). According to him, indebtedness is an unpleasant arousal state characterised by alertness to cues relevant to the reduction of an obligation, may be viewed as a special case of cognitive dissonance, in that one is aware of a need to reciprocate because of normative requirements, but one has not yet reciprocated. Indebtedness thus has motivational properties such that the greater its magnitude the greater their efforts to reduce it. The magnitude of indebtedness is assumed to be a function of four factors:

The more rewards the recipient received and the more costs the donor incurred, the greater the indebtedness the recipient experiences.
A recipient feels the most indebtedness when the perceived locus of causality of the donor's help resides within him. A recipient feels less indebtedness if the donor initiated the help himself and the least indebtedness when the locus of causality resided in the environment.

The magnitude of indebtedness depends also on the recipient's perception of the donor's motive in giving the help. The recipient will experience the greatest indebtedness if the donor gave an intentional and personal help.

Finally, the magnitude of indebtedness depends on the cues received by others. Others may indicate verbally or non-verbally what the recipient ought to do. The indication that the recipient ought to reciprocate increases the feeling of indebtedness.

Individuals who experience indebtedness attempt to reduce it. The reduction of indebtedness can be accompanied either through reciprocity behaviour or by cognitively restructuring the situation which can be done by re-evaluating the quantity and quality of the resources received and given up by the recipient and the donor, by reassessing the donor's motives for helping, or by reassessing the opinions of others in the situation. Greenberg (1968) suggested that the recipient will prefer cognitive restructuring as away to reduce indebtedness to the extent that (a) cognition associated with the helping act are ambiguous, (b) there are few witnesses to the helping act, (c) further interaction with the donor and witnesses is not anticipated, and (d) the recipient perceives little or no opportunity to reciprocate.

OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF RECIPROCITY BEHAVIOUR

The reviewed theories of distributive justice, equity, reciprocity, and indebtedness agree that individuals who receive help or favour feel an obligation to reciprocate. However, a number of other explanations were also offered to account for the empirical evidence of reciprocity behaviour. The possibility is that individuals reciprocate simply because of the prescription of an altruistic norm (Norm of Social Responsibility), which states that individuals should help those who are dependent upon them.
According to this explanation, the help received from the donor heightens the salience of the norm, thereby, inducing the recipient to help in return.

A second explanation derives from a consideration of attraction between the recipient and donor. According to this explanation, the recipient helps the donor because he is attracted to him. However, studies by Nemeth (1970), Greenberg et al. (1971) and Stapleton et al. (1973) found no relationship between attraction and reciprocity. A third explanation states that recipient who received help feel “a warm glow of success” (Isen, 1970; Isen & Levin, 1972), that is, they are in good mood and consequently they act charitably. Research by Greenberg (1969), Regan (1971) and Bar-Tal and Greenberg (1973) demonstrated that the “warm glow of success” by itself cannot explain the act of reciprocity. Finally, following the exchange theorists Greenberg (1968) suggested the “reciprocity may be motivated by the recipient’s desire to receive future rewards from the donor” (P.20).

COMPENSATORY BEHAVIOUR

A compensatory act occurs when a person who has harmed someone later compensates the victim. Harm is defined as behaviour that results in some kind of damage to another’s property, product, or person (the victim). The compensation act is considered as prosocial behaviour to the extent that it is carried out voluntarily for the sake of restitution and without anticipation of external rewards.

Most psychologists agree that the harm-doer experiences distress after harm-doing. There is, however, disagreement about the nature of this feeling. Several psychologists (e.g., Freedman, 1970; Rawlings, 1970) have labelled this distress as guilt; others (e.g., Bramel, 1969) have called it dissonance, or inequity (e.g., Walster et al., 1970, 1973); and there are some (e.g., Lerner & Mathews, 1967) who have described this distress as a consequence of one’s violation of a need to believe in justice.
GUILT

Several psychologists (e.g., Rawlings, 1968; Carlsmith & Gross, 1969;) suggested that when a person harms someone, he experiences guilt. Guilt is characterised as an internal feeling of 'responsibility and regret' (Freedman, 1970). It is experienced because a harm-doer has done something he considers to be morally wrong and hence deserving of punishment. Guilt feelings are aroused when a person acts in a way that violates moral standards and brought punishment in the past. In this vein, Rawlings (1970) suggested that guilt occurs whenever a harm-doer is aware of a sizeable discrepancy between his act and his internalised values. Carlsmith and Gross (1969) state that individuals who experience guilt look for ways to expiate it and one way to expiate guilt is compensation.

DISSONANCE

Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance posited that a person experiences dissonance as a consequence of carrying out behaviour that is contrary to his beliefs and values. On this basis Bramel (1969) suggested that when a person harms somebody, he feels dissonance because harm doing is inconsistent with his expectations about himself. Because he does not usually choose voluntarily to hurt, he is surprised to see himself doing exactly that. McMillan (1971) and McMillan and Austin (1971) offered a similar explanation. Their interpretation is derived from a recent attempt by Aronson (1969) to classify dissonance theory. According to Aronson (1969) one of the major determinants of dissonance arousal is whether or not inconsistency exists between an individual's behaviour and his self-concept. If an individual possesses a positive self-concept then an act of harm lowers self-esteem, the harm-doer that believes that he is good person finds himself in a situation of immorality. One of the ways to raise self-esteem again is to compensate the victim.
INEQUITY

On the basis of Homans' (1961) notion of 'distributive justice' and Adams' (1965) theory of 'equity', Walster et al. (1970, 1973) have specifically extended the theoretical formulation of equity to harm doing situations. Thus, Walster et al. (1973) posited that individuals in interactions, contribute inputs and receive outcomes. Both inputs and outcomes can have negative and positive values. Individuals who are interacting with each other do generally behave equitably, that is, their profits are more or less equal. However, individuals become distressed when they find themselves participating in inequitable relationships. The more inequitable the relationships, the more distressed individual feel. In harm-doing situation a harm-doer commits an act which causes his partner's relative outcomes to fall short of his own. As a result, the harm-doer and the victim find themselves participating in inequitable relationships and the harm-doer experience distress. Walster et al. (1973) suggested that this distress derives from fear of relation and/or threatened self-esteem. In order to reduce the distress, the harm-doer attempts to restore equity. One of the ways to restore an equitable relationship is to compensate the victim.

VIOLATION OF NEED TO BELIEVE IN JUSTICE

Lerner's (1970) theory regarding a person's need to believe in a "just world" also concerns itself with an explanation of the harm-doer's psychological state. Lerner (1970) has argued that people strive to maintain their belief in a "just world" in which one gets what one deserves. Deserving people are rewarded and the undeserving are appropriately deprived or punished. Thus, causing someone to suffer when the victim has done nothing to merit punishment, threatens the harm-doer's belief in a just world and motivates him to eliminate the unjust suffering by compensating the victim for it.

DEVELOPMENT OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

In contrast to the extensive research on the prosocial behaviour of adults, few studies have investigated the development of prosocial behaviour in children.
One important finding confirmed by several experiments is that prosocial behaviour steadily increases with age during the first ten years of life. In one early study by Ugurel-Semin (1952), children aged 4-16 years were asked to divide an uneven number of nuts between themselves and another child. The results of this study indicated that selfish behaviour diminishes with age while at the age of 4-6 years, 67% of the children were selfish, at the age of 9 years, only 23% of the children were selfish, at the age of 12 years, selfish behaviour completely disappeared. On the other hand, the result showed that altruism steadily increases with age and reaches its peak at the age of 7 years, when 63 percent of the children shared the nuts altruistically. After the age of 7 years, the children preferred to share the nuts equally.

In another experiment, Handlon and Gross (1959) investigated the sharing behaviour of children in pre-school, kindergarten, fourth, fifth and sixth grades. The children were paired with their classmates of the same sex and played with an apparatus from which pennies fell. When the pennies reached the children, one child was asked to leave the room and the other child was instructed to divide the pennies. The results again showed that as age increases, the subjects kept fewer pennies for themselves. Thus, while the kindergarten children kept for themselves 72 percent of the pennies, sixth-grade children kept only 40% and gave 60% to the other child.

In a recent experiment, Green and Schneider (1974) investigated age differences in altruistic behaviour in three situations. Subjects were 100 boys in four age groups: 5-6 years old, 7-8 years old, 9-10 years old and 13-14 years old. The boys of the youngest group were tested individually, while the older ones were tested in groups. In the first situation, the subjects were asked to volunteer to put together books for poor children. They were asked to work 15 minutes of their lunch period for either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 days. In the second situation, the experimenter 'accidentally' dropped five pencils on the floor and the subject had an opportunity to help pick them up. In the third situation, the subjects were given five candy bars and were told that they could share the candy with other children in the school. The results of the study indicated that sharing the candy increased with the
age, helping to pick up pencils increased until ages 9-10, when virtually all the boys helped, but volunteering to put together books was unrelated with age. He argued that the failure to find age differences on the volunteer, to work variable might be due to an inability on the part of the younger subjects to fully appreciate the implication that the expression of intention to help has for their future behaviour. Greenberg et al. (1985) conducted two field studies to assess material altruism in 503 children aged 3-16 years. Study 1 examined subjects' money altruism (i.e., donation of pennies), and Study 2 investigated their donations of preferred candy. Results indicated that early elementary school-aged subjects (around 7 years of age) donated fewer pennies and less of preferred candy than did both younger and older subjects. These findings corroborate recent reports and contradict accepted generalization that children's altruism steadily increases with age.

Only a study by Staub (1970) found that children's attempts to help a distressed child increased from kindergarten to second grade, but then decreased from second to sixth grade. In this study children of kindergarten, first, second, fourth and sixth grades were taken either individually or in same-sex pairs to the experimental room, where they were instructed to draw some thing. While the experimenter went to get crayons the subjects were exposed to a tape-recorded sequence consisting of distress stimuli. The results indicated that in the kindergarten 19 percent of the individual subjects and 50 percent of the pairs attempted to help. In the sixth grade 15 percent of the individual subjects and 31.3 percent of the pairs attempted to help, while in the second grade 51 percent of the individuals and 93 percent of the pairs attempted to help. Staub (1970) explained these findings by suggesting that while the youngest children still had not learned rules of 'proper behaviour', the older children having learned rules of 'appropriate' social behaviour were inhibited from helping by fear of disapproval for potentially inappropriate conduct. However, in the study of Tyler and Verma (1988) 56 males and 56 females of 10 years old children were selected as high and low competence subjects using scores on a psychological competence incomplete stories test adapted for Indian children. Results show that constructiveness of help seeking and helping were a function of psychological competence.
Inspite of Staub's findings, the data of other studies (Wright, 1942, Midlarsky and Bryan, 1973) in general replicated the positive relationship between age and prosocial behaviour. Several non-mutually-exclusive explanations can be offered for these results. First, as children grow older, their competence in interacting with their environment increases. This competence is expressed in communications skills that make possible complex interchanges and in frequent interactions with peers and adults. As a result of such maturing children realize that adults expect children to help when help is needed. This realisation may lead to an increase in the feelings of responsibility to help others who are in need. Second, an increase in helping with age may also be expected as a consequence of increase in the capacity to empathise with others, that is, to consider events form another's point of view, and to experience vicariously another's emotion. In fact, Aronfreed (1970) suggested that empathy is necessary precondition for altruistic behaviour, and the ability to empathise was suggested to be closely related to age (Aronfreed, 1968). In an experiment (Zarbatary et al. 1985) 1st, 3rd and 5th graders voted on how to spend a gift of money under one of five conditions: experimental influence (3 levels), peer influence, or no influence. Voting choices (in increasing order of generosity according to experimenter-defined weights) were splitting up the money equally among class members, buying something for their class, buying something for their school, or giving the money to poor children. Voting choices also were scored according to empirically derived weights based on rankings provided by an independent sample of 50 1st, 3rd and 5th graders. Both scoring systems indicated that 5th graders were more generous than younger subjects were, but only under high levels of experimenter demands, and that peer influence did not increase generosity. First graders appeared more generous when the child derived rather than the experimenter derived scoring system was used. Data suggest that generalizations regarding age differences in prosocial behaviour observed in laboratory research must be strictly limited to contents involving similar experimenters behaviours. In a study (Ma & Leung, 1992) 144 children in grades 1 to 6 were each given 30 candies, which they could share with their most liked or least liked classmate, or with their sibling or an unknown child. Subjects were more altruistic to someone they liked than to someone they disliked, to someone whose performance they regarded as academically
superior than to someone whose performance they regarded as academically poor and to a sibling than to an unknown child. Older subjects tended to give more candy to someone they liked than did younger subjects. The number of candies given to classmates or siblings decreased according to how much the subjects liked the candy. Naparstek (1990) used the relational facet to examine the relationship between age and perceptions of sub-constructs of prosocial behaviour on the part of second, fourth, sixth and eight graders and adult teachers. It was found that differentiation of subcontracts of prosocial behaviour increased with age. Finally, altruism may increase with age through observation of the behaviour of adults and older children, through direct tuition, and through reinforcement. It is through these processes that the children may increase their knowledge of how to help others and their feelings of competence to carry out prosocial behaviour. In addition to these explanations, from the standpoint of social cognitive development theory, age-related increases in the incidence of prosocial behaviour can be linked to changes in the child's moral development. That is, a child's cognitive development is closely related to moral judgement, which in turn affects prosocial behaviour.

There are various factors, which affect the development of prosocial behaviour in children.

**FAMILY STRUCTURE AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR**

Family is in key position to affect prosocial behaviour development in children. Another vital aspect in this respect is structure of the family i.e., nuclear or joint. A nuclear family can be characterised by its limitedness, that is, it consists of parents and their children only while a joint family is characterised by its largeness, that is, it consists of grandparents, parents, uncles, aunts and their children. And these specific characteristics of nuclear and joint families provide a differential environment to the children and affecting their personality development, development of morality and specific values in the children which prone them to behave in differential ways in such social situations where they are expected to be prosocial.
Cohen (1972) argues that the intensity of empathy varies across social groups. The reasons for the differences are the differential family structure and intra-family relations in different societies. Empathy can develop only in nuclear families that have durable and stable relationships and do not share the household with the other adults. Rehberg and Richman (1989) assessed the family variables on prosocial behaviour (helping and/or comforting) of 146 pre-school children by observing their reaction to a peer in a distressful situation. Father-absent males were found to have the highest scores for comforting behaviour compared with father-absent females and subjects from two-parent families. Comforting was related to the mother’s dependency on their children for emotional support, whereas helping was related to the number of chores subjects performed. Subjects from smaller families had higher comforting scores than did those from larger families. Findings support a social psychological view of prosocial behaviour, suggesting, it is comprised of separate unique actions, each of which is developed in a different manner.

PARENTAL MORAL VALUE AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Parental moral value is one of important factors which plays vital role in moral development of children and in turn ultimately affects the prosocial behaviour of children. Practically everyday we have to make judgements about 'right' and 'wrong'. When we do we are reasoning about moral issues. The kind of moral reasoning done by most adolescents and adults is often quite different from the child's moral reasoning. It is possible that older children are more altruistic than younger not only because of the greater opportunity to learn this culturally valued activity, but because they may be shifting the basis of moral judgement from a hedonistic position to one emphasising social approval.

In fact, Piaget (1932), the principal proponent of cognitive development theory of moral judgement, suggested that moral judgement advance in stages related to change in the child's general cognitive development. He told stories to children of various ages and asked the children to make moral judgements about the fictional characters in the stories. For example, one story was about a boy who broke a tea cup while
trying to steal some jam when his mother was not at home. Another boy broke a whole trayful of teacups, but it was just an accident; he was not doing anything wrong. Piaget asked his subjects "which boy is naughtier?" He prevented a number of such stories varying the amount of damage done, as well as the character's intentions. Piaget found that pre-school children tend to attribute blame according to the amount of damage done, regardless of intention. Older children take motives or intentions into account. A person with good intention is not considered morally blameworthy, even if he or she does a great deal of damage. He proposed the existence of two broad stages of moral development. The child develops in an unvarying sequence from an early stage called 'moral realism' to a 'more mature' stage referred to as "autonomous morality" or as "morality of reciprocity".

In the first stage the child develops concern and respect for rules. The child feel an obligation to comply with rules because they are coming from external authority and sees any deviation from them as inevitably resulting in punishment. In this stage of moral realism, the rightness or wrongness of an act is judged on the basis of the magnitude of its consequences and the extent to which it conforms exactly to established rules. Two important characteristics of this stage contribute to the child's moral judgement. One is his ego-centricism, which enables him to subordinate his own experience and perceive situations as others would. The other is his realistic thinking, which leads him to confuse external reality with his own thought processes and subjective experiences. In the stage of moral realism the child initiates prosocial acts only if they are perceived as required by rules of adult authority. Lack of the ability to empathise and ego-centricism diminish the possibility of initiating prosocial acts.

In the more advanced stage (autonomous morality) the child realizes that social rules are established and maintained through arbitrary agreements, that can be questioned and changed. The child realizes that obedience to authority is neither necessary nor always desirable. The child also learns that violations of rules are not always wrong, nor are they inevitably punished. In the autonomous stage the child starts to judge acts and results of behaviour on the basis of perceived intentions. The child also
begins to conform more to peer expectations, and he develops the cognitive capacity to recognise and appreciate the needs of others as well as to express gratitude for past affection and favours. Above all, the child acquires the ability to put himself in the place of others. In this second stage, the child moves from an emphasis on 'equality', which means that all should share exactly equally regardless of specific circumstances to 'equity', which means that the sharing should be tempered by considerations of circumstances. In this stage, once the child has learned the societal prescriptions pertaining to prosocial behaviour he is cognitively capable of carrying out prosocial acts. The ability to recognise the needs of others empathises with them makes the child able to perform altruistic acts. Batson et al. (1981) hypothesized that empathy leads to altruistic rather than egoistic motivation to help. Having subjects watch another female undergraduate receive electric shocks tested this hypothesis and then giving them a chance to help her by taking the remaining shocks themselves. In each of two experiments subjects’ level of empathetic emotion (low v/s high) and their care of escape from continuing to watch the victim suffer if they did not help (easy vs. difficult) were manipulated in a 2 X 2 design. They reasoned that if empathy led to altruistic motivation, subjects feeling a high degree of empathy for the victim should be as ready to help when escape was difficult as when escape was easy. Results of each experiment followed the former pattern when empathy was high and the latter pattern when empathy was low, supporting the hypothesis that empathy leads to altruistic rather than egoistic motivation to help. However, Strayer and Roberts (1989) found that although children’s emotional empathy was associated with parental perceptions of the child as empathic, it was not related to parent’s own empathy. Also, the ability to feel indebtedness for past help or favour and the ability to feel guilt for harm done make the child able to carry out reciprocity or compensatory behaviours.

The American psychologist Kohlberg (1969) extended Piaget’s work on moral reasoning to include adolescence and adulthood (Kohlberg, 1969; Colby and Kohlberg, 1983). By presenting moral dilemmas in story form he arrived at six developmental stages of moral judgement grouped into three levels (Table # 1).
Kohlberg believed that all children start at Level 1, pre-conventional moralities, they evaluate actions in terms of whether or not the actions avoid punishment or lead to rewards. His studies indicate that below age 10, pre-conventional responses are dominant. Some people never progress beyond this level. From age 10 on, responses at Level II, conventional morality, increase: youngsters begin to evaluate actions in terms of maintaining a good image in the eyes of other people. By age 13, a majority

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<th>LEVELS AND STAGES</th>
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<td><strong>LEVEL I Pre-conventional morality</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>STAGE 1 Punishment orientation</td>
<td>Obeys rules to avoid punishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAGE 2 Reward orientation</td>
<td>Conforms to obtain rewards, to have favours returned.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LEVEL II Conventional morality</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STAGE 3 Good boy/good girl orientation</td>
<td>Conforms to avoid disapproval of others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAGE 4 Authority orientation</td>
<td>Upholds laws and social rules to avoid amure of authorities and feelings of guilt about not doing one's duty.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LEVEL III Post-conventional morality</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>STAGE 5 Social-contract orientation</td>
<td>Actions guided by principles commonly agreed on as essential to the public welfare, principles uphold to retain respect of peers and thus, self-respect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAGE 6 Ethical principles orientation</td>
<td>Actions guided by self-chosen ethical principles (that usually value justice, dignity, and equality), principles uphold to avoid self-condemnation</td>
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of moral dilemmas are resolved at level II. In the first stage of this Level (Stage 3) one seeks approval by being 'nice'. This orientation expands in the next stage (Stage 4) to include "doing one's duty" showing respect for authority, and conforming to the social order in which one is raised.

According to Kohlberg, many individuals never progress beyond Level II. He sees the stages of moral development as closely tied to Piaget's stages of cognitive development, and only those people who have achieved the later stages of formal operational thought are capable of the kind of abstract thinking necessary for post-conventional morality at Level III. The highest stage of moral development (Level III, Stage 6) requires formulating abstract ethical principles and upholding them to avoid self-condemnation. Kohlberg reports that fewer than 10 percent of his adult subjects show the kind of "clear principled" Stage-6 thinking.

A longitudinal study of moral reasoning that followed one group of 58 American boys over a 20 year-period (from the time they were between 10 and 16 to age 30 and 36) found the developmental progression up through stage 4 to be as Kohlberg predicted (Colby et al., 1983). And a shorter longitudinal study of boys in Turkey obtained similar results (Nisan and Kohlberg, 1982). In these studies no subject skipped a stage, and only 5 to 10 percent showed progression in any of their responses. However, less than 10 percent of the subjects attained consistent Stage-5 reasoning, and none reached Stage-6. Consequently, post-conventional morality (Level III) cannot be considered part of the normal or expected course of development. It represents a philosophical ideal rather than a developmental sequence through most people pass. Progress beyond the conventional level of moral reasoning may depend on formal schooling or a particular cultural viewpoint (namely, one that emphasises democracy and individual judgement). According to Kohlberg (1973) movement from one stage to the next involves an internal cognitive recognition rather than simple acquisition of the moral concepts prevalent in their culture.

Other psychologists disagree, pointing out that the development of a conscience, a sense of right or wrong, is not simply a function of maturing cognitive abilities. Children's imitation of their parents and the way in which
they are rewarded or punished in specific situations will influence their moral views, as well as the moral standards adopted by the children’s peers and by characters on television and in books. Studies have shown that moral judgements can be modified by exposure to models when children see adults reinforced for expressing amoral viewpoint based on principles different from their own, they may change their judgements up or down a level (Bandura & McDonald, 1963).

Thus, although there are obviously ‘age trends’ in the way children think about moral issues, there may be partly a function of what parents teach and reinforce in children at different ages. Very young children may need the threat of punishment to keep them from doing something wrong. As children mature, social sanctions become more effective.

Because similar moral principles may lead to different judgements and behaviour in different people, the level of a person’s moral thinking may not tell us much about actions that person will choose. Haan et al. (1968) and Giligan (1977) have tried to answer whether people’s levels of moral reasoning can predict such behaviour as cheating, campus activism, fairness in distributing valued goods, and even abortion. They have found some relationships between moral reasoning and behaviours, but the relationships have often be complex. For example, juvenile delinquents show lower levels of moral judgement than law-abiding youngsters of the same age and intelligence. And people who attain higher moral levels on Kohlberg’s dilemmas are more likely than low scorers to offer help to a person in distress (Blasi, 1980). Similarly, as it was expected, campus activism was found to be especially likely among college students who had reached Kohlberg’s pre-conventional level, but it was also likely among students who still reasoned at the pre-conventional level. The researchers suggested that the post-conventional students may have been activists defending abstract principles and the rights of all whereas the pre-conventional students may have become activists for egocentric reasons, defending their own personal rights. But, in general, research relating Kohlberg’s levels to behaviour in specific situations, for example, whether a child will cheat on a test or behave unselfishly, has found low correlation (Mischel & Mischel, 1976; Rest, 1983) Evidently, there are some
connections between moral reasoning and moral behaviour, but the precise connection may vary from one individual to the next and from one situation to the next.

Often one knows how he should act; however, he may not do so when his self-interest is involved. For example, children's judgement of 'fairness' tended to be more mature and just in hypothetical situation (how should candy bars be distributed among workers in a group?) than their reasoning was when the situation became real. Those who had suggested giving the most candy to the person who produced the most when the situation was hypothetical were apt to say that everyone should share equally when it came to dividing the candy among their own work group - particularly if they had been among the less productive workers. Some of those who had earlier advocated an equal division demanded the largest share in the real situation (Damon, 1977)

Moral conduct depends on a number of factors, in addition to the ability to reason about moral dilemmas. Two important factors are the ability to consider the long-range consequences of one's actions (rather than immediate gain) and to control one's behaviour. Equally important is the ability to empathise with other people—that is, to be able to put oneself in someone else's place. Understanding what another person is feeling motivates us to help.

Zahn-Waxler et al. (1983) studied the development of young children's concern for others in distress. In study 1, 24 children were studied at 10, 15 and 20 months of age and followed up 5 years later for a 3-months period. Their mothers tape-recorded the children's responses to the distress emotions of others (family, relatives, friends, and strangers). Stimulation of emotions also was performed in the home to provide standardised assessments of children's responses to distress. In study II, twenty-seven 18 and 21 months old children's responses to simulations were videotaped. In the home and in the laboratory, naturalistic peer interactions were observed by outside observers in the laboratory setting. All subjects in this study had a parent with manic -depressive disorders. Mother-child interaction was observed in the homes in both studies. Results
show that capacities for empathy, altruism, and guilt are present in early stages of development. Scrutiny of individual cases suggested that different patterns of styles of altruism emerge early. It is important to recognise that parental problems (e.g., marital discord, mood disorders) do not go unnoticed by young children. Further, that exposure to these situations has the potential not only for producing stress and guilt in children, but for eliciting different kinds of altruism, empathy and care giving as well. In a recent study (Kalliopuska, 1992) 215 children aged 9-12 years were measured on the following variables: helping, empathy, altruism, morality, attribution of responsibility, cognitive readiness to help, willingness to help, social desirability, and abstract thinking. In a factor analysis, age and sex were included. Five factors were extracted and interpreted: empathic helping, socially desirable helping, cognitive helping, intentionally and rational helping. According to grouping analysis these five factors were weighted differently and three groups were identified: (i) Real helpers with high empathy, altruism, morality and cognitive readiness to help; (ii) Normative helpers, motivated by social desirability or cognitive factors with empathy levels; and (iii) Cognitive premature rational helpers, with poor empathy and weak social desirability.

In short, the theories of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969) suggest that the development of prosocial behaviour is related to the development of moral judgement. Hoffman (1975) tested the hypothesis that altruistic behaviour relates positively to having parents who (a) are altruistic; (b) frequently use victim-centred discipline techniques, especially those suggesting separation and apology, and (c) frequently express affection. Subjects were 40 male and 40 female, 5th graders— all middle class, white, first bows of above average IQ. Their altruistic behaviour was assessed in terms of peer reputation. Parental data were obtained from separate interviews with mothers and fathers. Altruistic behaviour in girls related significantly to altruistic values of their mothers ($P<.05$) and father ($P<.01$) and to frequent use of victim-centred discipline by fathers. Altruism in boys significantly related to altruistic values of fathers, to affection, and to use of victim-centred discipline by mothers. Results suggest that altruistic children have at least one parent (usually the same sex) who communicates altruistic values, thus, serving as model, and one who uses victim-centred discipline.
Affection appears influential only in the mother-son dyad. Eron and Huesmann (1984) suggested that the most important factor in the encouragement of prosocial behaviour is close identification between the child and his/her parents. Sparks et al. (1984) compared the prosocial behaviour of children whose parents had congruent scores on the Parent as a Teacher Inventory (PAAT) with the prosocial behaviour of children whose parents' control scores were incongruent. Subjects were thirty 3-6 years old from two-parent families. Subjects' prosocial behaviours were observed in their homes on three occasions. Chi-square analysis revealed no significant difference in prosocial behaviour between subjects of parents with high vs. low scorers on the PAAT. The data show, however, that 5 of the 6 subjects with the lowest percentages of prosocial behaviours had mothers who evidenced a high need for control. Similarly, all 8 of the subjects who exhibited the lowest level of prosocial behaviour had fathers whose scores were all below the factor mean on the PAAT. A teacher in our society is considered as a man with high moralistic value and a parent who scores high on PAAT can be considered as high on moral value. Peterson et al. (1984) observed that parental limitations on children's altruism were a direct function of the situation costs involved, and the age and familiarity of the recipient. Eisenberg et al. (1985) examined the development of moral reasoning about prosocial conflicts and the interrelations of moral reasoning and prosocial behaviour in West German children (30 pre-schoolers and 29 2nd graders, and 334 1st graders) and in American children (30 pre-schoolers, 2nd graders, and 39 4th graders). Prosocial moral judgement was assessed with 4 illustrated moral dilemmas; prosocial behaviour was observed under two circumstances with the German subjects only. In both groups, hedonistic reasoning decreased in usage from the pre-school-years to 4th graders; direct reciprocity, need-oriented, approval interpersonal and reasoning involving approval inter-personal and reasoning involving references to other's humanness increased with age.

Abelman (1985) examined the parental disciplinary practices under which children are modelling of prosocial TV portrayals are likely to be maximised and minimised. Two types of enduring parental styles of discipline induction and sensitisation were extracted from the literatures on children's moral development and applied to social learning from TV Data
were gathered from a field survey that employed 286 mother-child pairs. Mothers and their 4th and 5th grade children were administered questionnaires separately. Results indicate that children of parents who were inductive were greater consumers of TV’s prosocial fare and demonstrated a greater propensity for prosocial solutions to conflict than did children whose parents were primarily sensitising. Lourenco (1990) investigated development of altruism in children according to a theoretical perspective that integrated Piagetian micro-model is accounting for change from pre-operational to operational stages. Subjects were 90 children of 5-12 years of age. Older children were more likely to consider an altruistic act in terms of gain construction than cost perception. Ma (1992) presented 811 Hong Kong Chinese students (Grade 10: College) with a series of manipulating altruistic orientation, human relationship and moral judgement across different situations. The results proved the hypothesis that high moral judgement actors are more willing to scarifies their lives for any recipient than are low moral judgement actors. Children must reach a certain level of moral development in order to be able to carry out prosocial acts. And it is clear that parents as the most significant persons around the child exert their genuine influence through their insistence on morality. In this way, children of parents both of whom are of high moral value find themselves in such environment, which prone them to be more prosocial as compared to when either father or mother is of high moral value or to be worse when both of them are of low moral value proning the children to be more and more selfish rather than prosocial.

The family has an important function in shaping children’s behaviour. Children’s behaviour is highly influenced by the behaviour of their parents and the type of relationship they have with their parents. Several studies have investigated the effect of parent-child relationship on the development of prosocial behaviour. In two studies (London, 1970 & Rosenhan, 1970) there were interviewed individuals who carried out altruistic acts. London (1970) interviewed 27 individuals who during World War-II had rescued Jews. Although the rescuers differed significantly in their background and in the circumstances under which they carried out their rescue acts, all of them risked their lives in some way in order to save the lives of others. Through the interviews London (1970) found that all the
rescuers had three things in common. First, almost all the rescuers tended to identify strongly with one of their parents, not necessarily with the same-sex parent. Second, the parent with whom the rescuer identified tended to be a very strong moralist. Such moralism had different bases for different people; for some it was religious moralism, for others it was ideological moralism. Third, most of the rescuers were socially marginal. Hence, London’s findings suggest that a moralistic parent with whom a child identifies serves as a powerful model for altruistic acts. In addition, the experience of social marginality probably sensitizes people to others’ need and aids the development of empathy. Interestingly, Rosenhan (1970) who interviewed civil rights activists, obtained findings, very similar to London’s (1970). Thirty-six people who had participated in civil rights activities prior to autumn 1961, provided the data for this study. The activists were divided into two groups: those who remained active in the South for at least one year (fully committed) and those who went on one or two freedom rides (partially committed). The results of the interviews clearly showed that while the fully committed respondents maintained warm and respecting relationships with at least one parent, the partially committed respondents described their parents in more ambivalent terms. Moreover, while the fully committed respondents reported that at least one of their parents was highly moralistic, the partially committed respondents reported ambivalence and confusion concerning their parents’ morality. This study confirms London’s (1970) findings that identification with a moral parent who can provide an example of altruistic acts can be an important determinant of the development of prosocial behaviour. Studies by Rutherford and Mussen (1968), Mussen et al. (1970) and Hoffman (1975) showed that the affection of parents and their altruistic values are important for children’s acquisition of altruistic behaviour. Rutherford and Mussen (1968) studied 4 years old white boys and found that their generosity was related to perceptions of their fathers as warm, nurturing and affectionate persons. These results indicate that paternal nurturance serves a double function; it motivates the child to emulate the father’s behaviour and at the same time, it provides a model of behaviour that is essentially kind and considerate. The father’s sympathy and compassion may be conceptualized by the child as generosity. Similarly, Mussen et al. (1970) and Hoffman (1975) showed that the acquisition of altruistic behaviour depends on the extent to which at
least one of the parents can serve as a model for such behaviours. Thus, for example, in Hoffman's study the altruistic behaviour of fifth graders, measured by classmates’ ratings, was positively related to the same-sex parent's altruistic values.

Franco (1978) exploring the learning of generosity, a sub-concept of altruism, in 84 2nd & 3rd grade Catholic children found that moral instructions to children by their parents play positive role.

PARENTAL VALUE PATTERN AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Parental value system that is the value they are dominated by also play its vital role in the development of prosocial behaviour in children. Allport (1961) stressed the importance of a unifying philosophy of life in his description of the mature person. He also maintained that such a philosophy is founded upon values-basic conviction about what is and is not of real importance in life. Believing that a person’s efforts to find order and meaning in life are governed by values, Allport et al. (1960) proceeded to identify and measure basic value dimensions. The success of his effort is evident in the well-known personality test that he helped to develop the “Study of Values”. Within the framework of trait theory, this test illustrates Allport's attempt to dissect enormously complex component of personality (values) into empirically measurable terms. To accomplish this difficult task, Allport had derived required model from the work of Spranger (1928). In this book “Types of Men”, Spranger (1928) outlined six major value types conceived as the basic altruistic value directions evidenced in human life, not as six main types of people, these values are found in varying degrees in all people; people construct the unity of their lives around them (Allport, 1961). Thus, no one person falls exclusively under any one-value category, rather, different value combinations are more or less salient in the lives of different people. For Allport, these values are best described as deep-level traits. They are described as follows:

1. The Theoretical. The person emphasising this value is primarily concerned with the discovery of truth. Such a person is characterised by a rational, critical and empirical approach to life. The theoretical
person is highly intellectual and tends to pursue a career in science or philosophy.

II. The Economic: The economic person places highest value on whatever is useful or pragmatic. He or she is thoroughly "practical and conforms closely" to the stereotype of the successful business person. Such a person is keenly interested in making money and regards un-applied knowledge as wasteful. Many great facts of engineering and technology have resulted from the demands that economic persons have made upon science.

III. The Aesthetic: This person places highest value on form and harmony. Judging each single experience from the stand point of grace, symmetry, or fitness, such a person perceives life as a procession of events, with each individual impression enjoyed for its own sake. The person need not be a creative artist but is aesthetic to the degree that his or her chief interest is in the artistic episodes of life.

IV. The Social: The highest value of the social type is love of people. Such a person is likely to view the theoretical, economic, and aesthetic attitudes as old and inhuman, regarding love as the only suitable form of human relationship. In its purest form, the social attitude is altruistic and closely related to the religious value.

V. The Political. The dominant interest of the political person is power. Vocational activities of this type of person are not necessarily confined to the realm of politics, since leaders in any field generally place a high value on power and influence. Thus, clear individual differences in the power value do exist. At the same time, direct expression of this motive overrides all others in that political types yearn for personal power, influence, and renown above all else.

VI. The religious: This person is mainly concerned with understanding the world as unified whole. There are, however, different models of expressing this desire to understand. For instance, some religious
persons are "immanent mystics" who find meaning in the affirmation and active participation in life, while others are "transcendental mystics" striving to unite themselves with a higher reality by withdrawing from life (e.g., monks). Regardless of the particular type of expression, the religious person seeks unity and higher meaning in the cosmos.

It is clear from above discussion that the behaviour of an individual is also significantly affected by dominance of specific value. That is, if he is high on one of six values, for example, on theoretical, his behaviour should be different from that individual who is high on another value. Similarly, low insistence on a particular value should also tend the individual to behave in a differential way than that person who is low on another value. In this way, value system can be classified as 'high on one and low on another value' and individual's behaviour shall be determined by this specific classification. Prosocial behaviour is one, which is directly affected by value of the person. Since, values are learnt mostly in childhood, family specifically, parents play a vital role in determining the value development of their children, which in turn, affects the prosocial behaviour of their children.

In his study Franco (1978) found that the subjects who valued religious beliefs were high altruistic. Siegel (1990) identified ten pre-school children who were not demonstrating age-appropriate, acceptable, social behaviour in school. A program was developed, the objectives of which were to decrease children's aggressive behaviour and increase the frequency of social activity. The ten children attended three individual sessions with an adult in which they learn about prosocial solutions to everyday problems. The parents of these children were asked to complete a q-sort dealing with parental values. Parents also spent time with their children in school every week and received information on developmentally appropriate practices relating to social skills and on the priorities that other parents set for their children.

Although each objective was not met for each child, positive results were generated by the project Eisenberg et al (1992) videotaped dyadic interactions of parents in 20 white families with their 1-2 years old children.
in the home on two occasions approximately six months apart. The children were also videotaped playing with a peer at 3.5-4.5 years of age. Parental reinforcement of compliant prosocial behaviour was negatively related to children's compliance with a peer's request for prosocial behaviour and positively related to defensive behaviour with the peer. Mullis et al. (1983) studied prosocial behaviour in group observations of 33 pre-school children (aged 36-72 months) drawn from 33 two-parent families. The Iowa Parent Behaviour Inventory (IPBI) was administered to all parents to measure parents' behaviour toward their children. Prosocial behaviour in the children was hypothesized to be related to parental inductive guidance as measured by the IPBI factors of limit-setting and reasoning guidance. Finding s indicate that mother's and father's reported guidance technique had differential influence on the development of certain aspects of prosocial behaviour in young children. Limit-setting by both parents seemed to be good predictors of sociable and sharing behaviour, and children's age was a positive predictor of helping and sociable behaviour. Results support the notion that fathers can be a positive social influence in their children's expression of prosocial behaviours.