CHAPTER 3

Universal Category of Sentence Structure

Sentence-structure contains many a category. These categories have been divided in many ways in various disciplines available in Indian Intellectual tradition. Meaning is inseparable from the structure and meaning cannot be determined only on the basis of structure. Division of a sentence has also been made on both basis - structure and meaning. Though any division cannot be exclusively semantic or syntactic, predominance of the either of the two forms the basis of nomenclature. A syntactic division means a division that is mainly based on syntax though not excluding semantics at the same time. In the same way a semantic division means a division that is mainly based on semantics though not excluding syntax at the same time. Some main semantic divisions of the categories of sentence structure are as follows:

1. Uddeśya and Vidheya
2. Kriyā and Kāraka
3. Nāma and Ākyāta
4. Ākyāta with qualifiers
5. Ākyāta with Avyaya, Kāraka and Višeṣaṇa

Some main syntactic divisions of the categories of sentence structure are as follows:

1. Subanta and Tinṇanta
2. Subanta and Subanta
3. Tinṇanta and Tinṇanta
4. Kṛdanta, Taddhitānta, Samāsa and Tinṇanta
5. Kṛdanta, Taddhitānta and Samāsa

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1vyākhyāt prakaraṇā-darthe-adṛśyā-vācakālataḥ śabdārthāh pravibhajyante na rūpādeva kevalāt - VP (2.314)

2(a)prādhānyena vyopadeśā bhavanti- KV,5.45,vol.1,p.431.
(b)vaiśeṣyāt tu tadvadastadvādaḥ- BS (2.4.22), p.228.
6. **Purusa and Upapada**

**Semantic Divisions of Sentence Structure**

1. **Uddeśya and Vidheya**

This division is mainly originated from Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. In every sentence bhāvanā (activity) is the meaning of sentence if it is related with meanings of others words expressing various qualities, form and tools to accomplish a particular action (kāraka). This is the view of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who says not only in veda but also in loka, bhāvanā is the meaning of sentence. He conveys this sense by the word 'sarvatra' (everywhere).

Definitely here bhāvanā means śābdī-bhāvanā (verbal urge). This is generated in hearer when he heares an injunction. In any sentence there are two parts - uddeśya and vidheya. uddeśya is that is already known from other source and is at the same time capable of being mentioned as that with which an enjoined act comes into relation. This is the explanation of Kṛṣṇa Yajvan while analysing the sentence 'dadhnii jhuyii'. In this sentence dadhi (curd) is vidheya because it is not known from any other source and homa is uddeśya because it is known from other source. uddeśya is also called anuvādyā because it is restated, despite being known from any other source. In this sentence, curd (dadhi) is subsidiary to homa because it is a means to the homa. Thus a vidheya (unknown from other source) may be subsidiary if it is an accessory to an action.

In brief, it can be said that whatever is known to speaker is called uddeśya and whatever is unknown is called vidheya. A sentence is used to make this unknown matter the known to the hearer.

It is reasonable that unknown should be made known because there is no need of any effort towards known and none makes any effort to know the known or to achieve already achieved. Mammaṭa also illustrated the point by referring to "adaghadahananyāya'. This nyāya means that when something catches the fire, only

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1 Bhāvanaiva ca vākyaśrūhā sarvatraśādhyātavattiyā anekaugunajñātyādikārakārthānurangitā - MSV, Vākyāḥdikārṇa, 330-31, p.479.
2 Atra homasyoddeśayāt vāmā māmāntaraprāptaye sati vidheyāntvayayā nirdeśyatvam -MP, p.4.
3 Tasyaiva māmāntaraprāptaya punah kathayāmāntarāprāptatvam anuvādyātvan dadhyādiguṇanvayāt tavyā prādhiṇāyika dadhyādignāntaraprāptatvadatraiva vidheyatevan homasādhanātvācca homāpeksayā guṇatvam puruşeṇānushthiṃyāna tvādipādeyatavāca -ibid, pp.4-5.
unburnt burns and the part that is already burnt does not burn. Similarly, what is unknown only that part is vidheya. To make that unknown as known is the aim of a sentence. When accomplished (bhūta) and to be accomplished (bhavya) are uttered together, accomplished is meant for unaccomplished. Accomplished objects become tools to accomplish any given activity. Every sentence is uttered to serve a purpose and that purpose cannot be served if there is no ākhyāta.

Thus, in Pūrvamīmāṃsā, no sentence is used without ākhyāta. It means every sentence must have a verb from. bhāvanā may be conveyed by kṛtya suffixes also i.e. tavya, aniya, ya etc. So, these are also representatives of verb forms. Anyhow, there must be a verb form conveying the sense of activity in view of Kumārila. He does not accept 'suklo gauḥ' as a sentence quoted by Śabaravāmin in his Bhāṣya, arguing that it has been quoted to mention the relationship and thus not a genuine example.

Jaimini also holds those vedic sentences useless who are not for any action and those sentences may be useful only if they are related anyhow with the activity and become part of prescriptive sentences. Thus, Jaimini is followed by Kumārila when he says that every sentence has a purpose and that purpose cannot be served by a pada without ākhyāta. Here, ākhyāta means, the suffix that conveys the sense of injunction. Lin and Let are three lakāra-s in Pāṇinian system that conveys the sense of injunction. kṛtya suffixes suffixes are also prescribed in the sense of lin lakāra. So, they are also prescriptive.

2. Kriyā and Kāraka

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5. Āṃśīyasya kriyārthavādānārthakhyamata darthānāṁ tasmādanitya mucyate-MS, (1.2.1), SDSS, p.2.
7. (a) Vidhininmantraṁ mantraṁ dhāṣṭrasamprasnaPrārthaneśu liṅ - (A.3.3.161).
   (b) Liṅarthie let - (A. 3.4.7).
   (c) Lot ca - (A.3.3.162).
In *Yogadarśana*, Bādarāyaṇa, while commenting on a *sūtra* (3.17) puts his view regarding vākya. According to it there are only two types of words in a vākya: *kriyāvācaka* and *kārakavācaka*. In a vākya one should analyze after hearing it that what word denotes action and what denotes tools of action otherwise in some cases the form of words alone can lead to the confusion:

_Tatra vākye padapadārthābhivyaktistataḥ padāni pravibhajya vyākaraṇīyam kriyāvācakaṁ vā kārakavācakaṁ vā anyathā bhavatyāśvo' jāpayah ityevamādiśu nāmākhyātasārūpyādanir jñātāṁ kathaṁ kriyāyāṁ kārake vā vyākriyeteti._

The whole lingual behaviour is conducted through these two types of words: _kriyā_ and _kāraka_. _kriyā_ is the action and _kāraka_ is the employer of tools and employed tools both. Any expression can contain only two types. One is to express any action that is to be accomplished and other is to express something that is already accomplished. The expression that conveys the sense of an action to be completed is called _kriyārtha_ sabda and the expression that conveys the sense of an object is called _kārakārtha_ sābda.

3. **Nāma and Ākhyāta**

Yāska mentions fourfold division of words in his *Nirukta* and says that where both _nāma_ and Ākhyāta-are used, they mainly denote _bhāva_ (action):

_tadyatrobhe bhāvapradhāne bhavataḥ._

It can be easily assumed that _nāma_ and Ākhyāta_ both are used only in a vākya and so Yāska intends to suggest vākya here. Thus it is clear that Yāska also opines that action is predominant in vākya and action is predominantly expressed by Ākhyāta. Hence, it can be concluded that Ākhyāta is the universal category of the sentence-structure in view of Yāska.

_Nirukta_ is the commentary on *Nighantu*. That commentary includes etymological attempt mainly in order to reveal the meaning of the words collected in *Nighantu*. This collection

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1YSVBH (3.17) p.318.  
2_Tesāṁ sabdārthapravayāyāni pravibhāgaḥ tadyathā śvetate prāśada iti kriyārthaḥ śvetaḥ prāśada iti kārakārthaḥ sabdāḥ kriyākārakaṁ madarthaḥ pratayaśca._ -ibid.  
3_Tadyānyetāṁ catvāri padajātāṁ nāmākhyāte copasaranipātaśca tānāmāḥ bhavanti -Nirukta (1.1) p.3._  
4_ibid., p.7_
is made from vedic mantra-s and none can disagree that mantra-s are vedic sentences. Two Indian philosophies Purvamāṁsā and Vaiśeṣika-refer to veda as a vākyā directly.¹ Other Indian Philosophical schools - Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and Yoga-also discuss about valid verbal cognition at the time of deliberations on verbal testimony. Vākyā may be divided into two types - one type may convey the meaning that is contradicted later and other contains the meaning that is not contradicted.² All Indian philosophical schools explain vākyā as a verbal testimony which conveys the meaning that is fully reliable as it is uttered by a person who realized the truth and conveys it to others as it is without any fear, favour, attraction or ill will.³ Such type of person is called āpta in Indian tradition.

4. Ākhyāta with Qualifiers

Patañjali has quoted the definition of Vākyā provided by a scholar other than Kātyāyana:

Apara aha ākhyātaṁ saviṣeṣaṇamityeva⁴

It means that ākhyāta with qualifiers is a vākyā. It is evident from this definition that ākhyāta is predominant in a vākyā because qualified is always predominant than qualifier and here qualified is ākhyāta. Thus, ākhyāta is proved to be the predominant than all other categories in a vākyā. This definition of vākyā is also endorsed by Hema Chandra in his Abhidhāna Cintāmaṇi and Siddhahaimasabdānusāsana.⁵ Hema Chandra seems to have borrowed this definition from Patañjali.

5. Ākhyāta with Avyaya, Kāraka and Viśeṣa

Patañjali has also quoted this definition of vākyā provided by Kātyāyana:

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¹(buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtaṁ vedaḥ - SDSS, Kanādaśūrūni (6.1.1) p.182.
(b) Vidhūnā tvekavākyatvāt stutarthena vidhūnum sūrāḥ -ibid., (1.2.7), p.2.
(c) Apara aha ākhyātaṁ vedaḥ - Arthasaṅgrahāḥ, p.47.
(d) Codana hi vākyam - MSSBH (1.1.24), p.77.

²Yasya vākyasya tāparyasyaśājyābhūtasaṁsargasya māṁntaṁreṣa na bādhyate tadvākyāṁ pramāṇam - Ve. P. Āgama-pariccheda, p.86.
³(a) Āptopadesaḥ sabdaḥ - SDSS, Sāṅkhyaśūrūni, (1.1.101) p.128 and Nyāyasūrūni, (1.1.7), p.152.
(b) Āptena drṣṭo'numita vārthat paratra svabodhāsaṁkrāntaye sabdenopadiśyate sabdāt tadarthaviśayā vṛttiḥ śroturāgamah - YSVBH (1.7), p.28.
⁴Mbh. (on A2.1.1) Vol. 2, p.43.
⁵(a) Saviṣeṣaṇaṁkhyātaṁ vākyam - Abhidhānaṁcintāmaṇi (2.156)
(b) Saviṣeṣaṇaṁkhyātaṁ vākyam - (SH. 1.1.26) quoted from Ācārya Hemachandra aura Unakā Sabdānusāsana eka adhyayana, Nemichandra Sastri p.26.
"Ākhyātāṁ sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṁ vākyam."¹

Like abovementioned definition, this one also shows the predominance of ākhyāta because both definitions interpret vākya as ākhyāta in association with višeṣaṇa and avyaya etc. In paninian system of grammar tṛṭyā vībhakti (third triplet of nominal endings) is used with the word that is associated with avyaya ‘saha’ when the word associated with saha conveys the sense of non-dominant.² Saha is replaced by ‘sā’ in bahuṣvṛti compound optionally³ and thus two forms may be used to convey the same sense. Here, one of the two forms is used and ākhyāta is qualified by the compound word sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇa. It will be quite right to say that this definition also reflects the predominance of ākhyāta in a vākya.

Syntactic divisions of sentence structure

1. **Subanta and Tiṇṇanta**

Amarasirhha defines vākya as collection of subanta, tiṇṇanta and subanta tiṇṇanta both if action is related with tools of action:

Tiṇṇsubantacayo vākyam kriyā vā kārakānvitā⁴

In his view if action (kriyā), is related with tools of action (kāraka), three types of collection of subanta and tiṇṇanta may be called a vākya. Of these three types, first type is collection of subanta and tiṇṇanta. Some examples will illustrate the point:

1. Rāmaḥ odanaṁ pacati
2. Akṣataḥ hasati
3. Dhānyaṁ kṣetre śuṣyati

In abovementioned examples all tiṇṇanta pada-s are connected with tools of the action and there is a collection of subanta and tiṇṇanta. So these may be called vākya-s.

2. **Subanta and Subanta**

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¹Mbh. on (A.2.1.1) vol.2, p.43.
²Sahayukte' pradhāne (A.2.3.19).
³Vopasar janasya (A. 6.3.82).
⁴Amarakosa (1.6.2), p.81.
This is another type of the three, mentioned by Amarasimha where at least two subanta pada-s form a vākya if the condition of connection between kriyā and kāraka is fulfilled. Some examples will be helpful to illustrate the point:

1.  Caitreṇa pathitavyam
2.  Navaditā śvetayā saha sūṣaṅgatā

In above mentioned examples two and more than two subanta pada-s are used and condition of connection between kriyā and kāraka is fulfilled. So, these may be called vākya-s.

3.  Titānta and Tilīnta

This is the third type of the three types indicated by Amarasimha where two tiṇṇanta-s form a vākya if the condition of connection between kriyā and kāraka is fulfilled. Some examples will make the point clear:

1.  Pacati bhavati
2.  Pacati paśya
3.  Gāyati śṛūyatām

In above mentioned examples two tiṇṇanta pada-s form a vākya because one of the two tiṇṇanta pada-s acts as a kāraka and another as a kriyā and there is a connection between them. Example (1) thus means that cooking is taking place and here pacati acts as a kāraka and bhavati acts as a kriyā. Example (2) means cooking is going on and you should look it. Here, pacati acts as a kāraka and paśya as a kriyā. Example (3) means that singing is going on and you should listen to it. Here, gāyati acts as a kāraka and śṛūyatāṁ acts as a kriyā and both are connected.

4.  Kṛdanta, Taddhitānta, Samāsa and Tiṇṇanta

This is merely expansion of first type i.e. subanta and tiṇṇanta. subanta may be divided in three types - kṛdanta, taddhitānta and samāsa. Pāṇini showed it in a sūtra prescribing the name prātipadika.¹ Some examples will be useful to illustrate the point:

¹Kṛttaddhilasamāsāśca - (A.1.2.46)
1. Rāmo mārutiṁ sūnīveṣaṇe prāvartayat

2. Dūravarśane calacitrāṇi adyatve sārīraṁ pradārśanam mānasābhivyānjanāpekṣayā bahulāṁśena kurvanti

3. Māheśvarasūtraṁ pāṇiniyātve vivādāḥ adhunāpi anirākṛta eva tiśṭhati

In abovementioned examples prāvartayat, kurvanti and tiśṭhati are tīṁanta pada-s, Rāmāḥ, dūravarśane, vivādāḥ etc. are kṛdanta pada-s, māruti, sārīraṁ and māheśvara etc. are taddhīnta pada-s and rest are samāsa (compound formation).

5. Kṛdanta, Taddhīnta and Samāsa

This is the expansion of the type-subanta and subanta. In this type also the condition of relation between kriyā and kāraka must be fulfilled. Some examples will help to conceive the point.

1. Rāmo rājamaṇīḥ sadā vijaya te bhūyah śaranyo mataḥ

2. Rāmeṇābhihatā niśācaracamūraupātīkī yā satām

3. Pradhānamantrinā pārīṣadaīḥ saha mantrayitavyam.

In above mentioned examples kṛdanta, taddhīnta and sāmasapada-s are used and kriyā is also related with kāraka. In example (1) kriyā expressed by mataḥ is related with kāraka Rāma and kṛdanta pada-s - Rāmāḥ, mataḥ, Vijaya and te, taddhīnta pada-s - sadā, śaranyah and bhūyah - and sāmasapada rājamaṇīḥ are used. In example (2) kriyā expressed by kṛdantapada 'abhīhatā' has relation with kāraka-s rāmena and niśācaracamūḥ and other kṛdantapada-s - yā and satām - with taddhīnta pada autpātīkī and sāmasapada 'niśācaracamūḥ' are used. In example (3) kriyā expressed by 'mantrayitavyam' has relation with pradhānamantrinā. pārīṣadaīḥ, is used as a taddhīntapada, pradhānamantrinā is used as a kṛdanta pada and saha as a avyayapada.

Thus, it is evident from abovementioned syntactic divisions of the categories of sentence structure that every division unavoidably follows the condition of relationship between kriyā and kāraka. kriyā and kāraka both are semantic categories. Of these two, kāraka is based on kriyā because kāraka-s are to accomplish the kriyā. In this light it can be concluded that kriyā is a universal category of sentence from the semantic point of view.
and ākhyāta is a universal category of sentence structure from the syntacto-semantic point of view. ākhyāta is also defined entirely on semantic line because meaning determines the structure and both cannot be considered separately.

6. **Puruṣa and Upapada**

Pāṇini prescribes three puruṣa-pr athama, madhyama and uttama when śeṣa, yuṣmad and asmad are used or understood as having the same locus. He formulates three sūtra-s in this regard:

1. yuṣmad yuṣmad yuṣmad samanāh karṣaṇe sthāninyapi madhyamah
2. asmadyuttamah
3. śeṣe prathama

In above mentioned sūtra-s sūtra (1) prescribes that in case yuṣmad (you) is uttered near tin and having the same locus that tin has, madhyama puruṣa is used. In the case yuṣmad is not uttered but is understood through context, so madhyama puruṣa is used. In the same case with asmad (I & we) uttama puruṣa is used. This is the prescription of sutra (2). sutra (3) prescribes that in case yuṣmad and asmad are neither uttered nor understood and any other word than yuṣmad and asmad is uttered or understood with the same conditions, prathama puruṣa is used. Here, the noticeable fact is division of sentence between upapada and puruṣa, upapada-s are of three types and puruṣa-s are also of three types. Upapada means that is uttered near. This nearness is to the tin because it is referred to in this context. Nearness may be of two types - temporal nearness and spatial nearness. In the context of utterances only temporal nearness is possible and relevant. Nearness does not mean to be immediately before or after anything. So, upapada means that pada which is uttered before or after any puruṣa. As nearness merely does not define the length of interval between upapada and puruṣa, number of words between upapada and puruṣa depends on the desire of speaker. Here puruṣa means triplets of tin suffixes in order of their reading named as prathama, madhyama and uttama by Pāṇi

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1 (A. 1.4.10.5)
2 (A. 1.4.107)
3 (A. 1.4.108)
ni\(^1\) Though Pāṇini does not use the term *puruṣa*, Pataṅjali uses the term, possibly based on the tradition of other grammarians, available to him. Bhartṛhari also writes *puṣa*- *samuddeśa* in his work *Vākyapadīya* which indicates the use of the term current in Indian grammatical tradition.

Agent (*kartr*) and object (*karman*) can be of three types - first person, second person and third person. Of these, first person is expressed by *uttama puruṣa*, second person is expressed by *madhyama puruṣa* and third person is expressed by *prathama puruṣa* in Paninian system of grammar.

Some examples will illustrate the point:

1. *tvam gām dadāsi*
2. *tvayā gaurdīyate.*
3. *ahāṁ vyākaraṇāṁ paṭhāmi.*
4. *mayā vyākaraṇāṁ paṭhyate.*
5. *mayā atra sthīyate.*
7. *dhānyaṁ śuṣyati.*
8. *dhānyena śuṣyate.*
9. *santoṣena mūṁśa adhyāpyate.*
10. *pacyate odanah śvayameva.*
11. *pacyate odanena.*
12. *asih sādhu chinatti.*
13. *sthālī pacati.*
14. *paṭhasi.*
15. *paṭhāmi.*
16. *paṭhati.*

In example (1) *dadāsi* expresses the *kartrkāraka* that is denoted by 'tvam'. Thus 'tvam' has the same meaning i.e. doership (*kartrtvā*) that is expressed by *dadāsi*. In this way 'tvam' is having the same locus (*kartrtvā*) as *dadāsi* has and 'tvam' is also uttered near *da*

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\(^1\) *itiḥastrīṇi trupi prathamamadhyamottanāḥ* - (A. 1.4.101)
As both conditions of the use of *madhyama puruṣa* are fulfilled, first example is grammatically correct.

In example (2) 'diyate' expresses karmākāraka and 'tvayā' expresses kartṛkāraka and both are not having the same locus. Though 'tvayā' is upapada i.e. word uttered near to diyate, it is not having the same locus and so, for the lack of fulfillment of one condition, *madhyamapuruṣa* is not used.

Example (3) and (4) have the same explanation as (1) and (2) have, only with the change of *puruṣa* i.e. *uttamapuruṣa*.

In example (5) sthīyate expresses action i.e. signification of verb-root. mayā expresses kaṛṛkāraka and thus not having the same locus as sthīyate has. In this case, despite the use of mayā as upapada, uttamapuruṣa is not used. The same explanation applies to the example (6).

In example (7) śuṣyati expresses kartṛkāraka and dhānya also is kartṛkāraka, thus both having the same locus. dhānya is other than *yuṣmad*(you) and *asmad* (I & We), uttered near śuṣyati and having the same locus i.e. doership (kartrtva). As all conditions are fulfilled, *prathamapuruṣa* is used.

Example (8) is only indicative of change of voice. śuṣyate expresses the action and dhānyā is kartṛkāraka and not expressed by *ta* suffix. So, third triplet in singular number is used with dhānya to express doership. Pāṇini prescribes the rule that if agent and instrument are not expressed by anyone, third triplet of *sup* suffixes should be used. 1 Example (7) and (8) have intransitive verb but example (9) has transitive verb. In example (9) adhy āpyate expresses karmākāraka (object) and mūnāmsā is also karmākāraka and other than *yuṣmad* (you) and *asmad* (I & We). So the use of *prathamapuruṣa* is justified. *San toṣa* is agent(kartṛkāraka) and not expressed by *ta* suffix. Hence, doership in *Santoṣa* is expressed by third triplet of nominal suffixes (*sup*) in singular number. Example (10) is the case of indication of extreme easeness to accomplish the action. Example (11), (12) and (13) are also of the same nature. In example (10) object of cooking is rice (*odana*).

This action of cooking is performed with so ease that doer of the action feels no effort on his part and he uses such type of sentence meaning rice is cooked itself. In such cases the structure of sentence conveys meaning of extreme ease i.e. almost no effort

1 *kartrkaraṇayostṛtyā*(A. 2.3.18)
on the part of doer. In examples (10), (11), (12) and (13), not a single word is used separately to denote the sense of extreme ease but structure itself conveys the sense. In example (10) pacyate expresses kartṛkāraka and odana is also kartṛkāraka. As doership (kārtṛtya) of odana has been expressed by ta suffix, first triplet of nominal suffixes in singular number is used to express the meaning of nominal base (prātipadikārtha). Pāṇini has formulated the rule in this regard:

prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātren prathama

In example (11) pacyate expresses the action (bhāva) and odana i.e. kartṛkāraka remains unexpressed. Hence, third triplet of nominal endings (sup suffixes) in singular number is used to express the doership of odana.

In example (12) sword (asi) is an instrument of cutting but when due to sharpness, it cuts with extreme ease without almost any effort on the part of the doer, he uses such type of sentence. chinatti expresses the agent (kartr) and asi is also agent. Both are having the same locus (samatāndhikaraṇa). asi is other than yuṣmad and asmad (šeṣa) and uttered near chinatti. Thus, asi is fulfilling all conditions for the use of prathama.

Example (13) also may be explained in the way example (12) is explained but with a slight specification. Example (12) indicates the treatment of instrument as agent but example (13) indicates the treatment of locus as agent, when sthālī (a type of cooking vessel) helps in cooking very much and doer of cooking feels almost no effort on his part, he desires to express that extreme ease or to give full credit to the vessel (sthālī). This desire of expression causes the use of such type of sentence. Example (14), (15) and (16) are the cases of non-utterance of upapada-s responsible for use of three puruṣa-s. In example (14) yuṣmad is not used but understood and madhyamapurusa is used in example (15) asmad is not uttered but understood and uttamapurusa is used.

In example (16) word other than yuṣmad and asmad is not uttered near pathati but understood by the speaker and prathama is used.

Though upapada-s responsible for use of puruṣa-s are not uttered, they are understood as agent (kartṛkāraka) because otherwise they will not have the same locus.

Pāṇini prescribes la to express agent, object and action and la is replaced by tin. tin are eighteen suffixes added to the verb root and express agent, object and action as per the

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1 (A. 2.3.46)
use. When agent is expressed by *tiṇ*, first triplet of nominal endings (*prathāmā vibhakti*) is added to the word denoting agent.

When object is expressed by *tiṇ*, object is followed by *prathāmā vibhakti*. When action is expressed by *tiṇ*, agent is followed by *ṛṣṭiyā vibhakti*. When instrument, locus or object etc. are treated as agent to indicate extreme ease, *prathāmā vibhakti* is added to the sentence like tools. So, there may be fourfold division of sentences also from the viewpoint of structure. It is evident in the above mentioned examples. This division is included in the division of *puruṣa* and *upapada* also. In division of *puruṣa* and *upapada* word-order in a sentence is arbitrary. In fourfold division also based on expression of object, agent and action and treatment of other *kāraka*-s as agent, the word-order is not regulated, *yuṣmad*, *asmad* and rest of the words may be used, mediately or immediately before or after the verb. Anyhow, a bit of arbitrariness with respect of the word-order on the part of speaker is indicated by these three rules of Pāṇini.

In all conditions, it is clear that verb is always used. So, verb is the universal category in the view of Pāṇini. Wherever the verb is not uttered, it is understood or added to the sentence to convey a complete sense.

**View of Pāṇini**

Pāṇini has not expressed his view about any category of *vākya* in explicit terms but it can be inferred from his treatment of the issue. He has discussed about *vākya* mainly in two rules. In one rule (A.8.18) he prescribes that the term used to address someone in the beginning of a *vākya* is doubled if a *vākya* conveys the sense of malice (*asūyā*), consent, anger, censure and condemnation. In another rule (A.8.2.82) *ti* of *vākya* is prescribed to be *pluta* and *udātta* up to the end to the second quarter of eighth chapter. This rule is introduced in twenty six rules. In these rules Pāṇini discussed some activities expressed by the *vākya*. These are following:

1. To respond to a salutation

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1 (a) *vākyaḍer*--------- (A.8.1.8)
   (b) *vākyasya*-------- (A.8.2.82)

2 *ti* is a technical term indicated by Pāṇini. This means the part beginning with the last vowel of any word or sentence.

3 *pratyabhivāde śūdre* (A.8.2.83)
2. To call from distance
3. To begin
4. In the context of sacrificial ceremony
5. To respond to a query
6. To question after defeating in the debate
7. To Judge
8. To respond to a listening
9. To question and to respect
10. To compare
11. To violet the courtesy, to wish and to employ
12. To narrate

If a vākyā has to convey the sense of above mentioned activities, it must contain a verb-form with tin, krtya, kta and ktavatu. So, it can be concluded that in view of Pāṇini a vākyā should convey a sense completely. In addition to this Pāṇini has quoted a part of a mantra available in Nāsadiya Sūkta (Rv. 10.129.5) as a vākyā i.e. uparīṣviddātī. This vākyā conveys the sense of inquiry and has a verb-form āsīt. Though the inquiry has not been completed in this vākyā because the whole sūkta conveys the sense of inquiry, yet one of the options of inquiry is complete in this utterance. Thus, it is a vākyā.

If this vākyādhikāra and metarule about word based prescription (padavidhi) both are considered together, view of Pāṇini about a vākyā will be quite clear. As a point of conclusion it can be asserted that at least a verb-form must be in a vākyā according to Pāṇini.

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1. dūrāddhēte ca (A.8.2.84)
2. omabhyādāne (A.8.2.87)
3. ye yugākarmānti (A.8.2.88)
4. vibhāśā prṣṭapratīvunanē (A.8.2.93)
5. nighrhāyugṛe ca (A.8.2.94)
6. vicāryumānānām (A.8.2.97)
7. pratīṣṭhāvane ca (A.8.2.99)
8. anudūttam prāśnāntābhīṣehūtayoh (A.8.2.100)
9. cidātī copamārthe prāṣyayamane (A.8.2.101)
10. kṣīyāśiḥprāśeṣu tīnākān̄kṣam (A.8.2.104)
11. anantyasyāpi prāśākhyaṇāyoh (A.8.2.105)
12. uparīṣviddāṣiditī ca (A.8.2.102)
13. samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ (A.2.1-1)
View of Kātyāyana and Patañjali

Patañjali quotes two definitions of vākya most probably provided by Kātyāyana. Both definitions indicate the primacy of verb. First definition uses the term ākhyāta and second definition uses the term tin. Both terms indicate verb with a slight difference. Ākhyāta is a broader category including verb with tin endings and verb with krt endings verb - forms with tin endings can be called ākhyāta but all ākhyāta pada-s are not included in verb forms with tin endings. Words with krt suffixes denote the accomplished form of action and that is why they are called like substances in Indian grammatical tradition. Patañjali says:

Kṛdabhihitop Bhāvo dravyavadbhavatiti

But some forms with avyayakrt (ktvā, tumun, namul etc.) endings are called like action and they denote the unaccomplished state of action. Patañjali says at the end of the commentary on the sūtra eko'sya sakṛcca (A. 5.4.19):

Kṛdabhihitop bhāvo dravyavadapi Kriyāvadāpi bhavati

Kaiyata explains it that words with avyayakrt are like action and words with krt endings other than avyayakrt endings are like substances. So, anyhow it is clear that at least one verb must be there in a vākya. This verb may be expressed as to denote the accomplished or to be accomplished form. tin, satr and sānac suffixes with verb express the state to be accomplished and kta and ktavatu suffixes with verb express the accomplished state. kṛtya suffixes denote unaccomplished action to be completed in future. In view of Kātyāyana and Patañjali a verb with any of kṛtya, kta, ktavatu, satr, sānac or tin suffixes must be in a vākya.

1Mbh on (A.5.4.19) vol. 5, P. 495
2 Ibid, P. 496
3 Yathā dravyaḥ liṅgasankhyāsādhanaḥ sambadhyaḥ tathā ghaṇādyabhihito bhāva ityarthah avyayakṛdab bhīhitastu bhāvo liṅgasankhyāsādhanasambandhābhāvāt sādhyasyabhāvo eva pratītyate nāt dīdha svabhāva iti kriyāvadevāsau bhavati na tu dravyavaditi - Mbhra. on (A. 5.4.19), vol. 5, P. 495.
View of Nyāya Philosophy

In Nyāya philosophy first definition of vākyā has been given by Vātsyāyana:

*padasamāho vākyam arthaparīsamāptau*

Only collection of words can not be called the vākyā because it must convey a complete sense to be qualified as a vākyā. What collection of words can convey the complete sense?

Certainly there should be a relationship among words to convey a sense completely. Relationship among words can be judged through expectancy. Holding this view in mind, Jagadīśa defines the vākyā as a group of words having mutual expectancy:

*mithāḥ sākāṅkṣāśabdasya vyūho vākyam*

Keśavamiśra adds completeness and proximity to expectancy and holds that a vākyā is the group of words having three factors - mutual expectancy, competence and proximity.

It is clear that definitions of vākyā available in Nyāya philosophy do not indicate the primacy of verb to denote an action always necessarily. Annambhīṭṭa in Dīpikā, a self-composed commentary on Tarkasāṅgraha, raises the issue and clarifies the position of Nyāya philosophy in this regard. He, first, presents the view of those who are in favour of primacy of verb in a vākyā to denote the action because in their view the entire behaviour is targeted to accomplish any action and sentences are used to communicate the ideas expressed regarding that action. Then he refutes the standpoint that entire behaviour is aimed at action. According to him, behaviour is also aimed at accomplished forms as the sentences like 'a king in a city' are also used where the King and the city both exist already and they are neither to be achieved nor to be completed. He says:

*nānu sarvatra kāryaratvād vyavahārasya kāryavākyā eva vyatpattir na siddhe iti cet na kāncyām tribhuvanatilako bhupatir ityādau siddhe' pi vyavahārāt*

Headlines of any news item in newspapers may be taken as siddha vākyā where sometimes verb is not used. So, according to Nyāya Philosophy, verb as a syntactical category, is necessary only in those utterances where an action is expressed but where any object is expressed, there is no verb is needed because no action is expressed there.

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1 NDVBH on (2.1.56), P. 209.
2 SSP. 13, P. 63.
3 vākyam tvākāṅkṣāyogatāsannidhimatāṁ padānāṁ samāhaṭ- TB. P. 87.
4 TSD., P. 152.
Therefore, it can be concluded that in Nyāya philosophy verb is not a universal category of a sentence.

**View of Mīmāṃsā Philosophy**

Jaimini defines the vākyam as serving single purpose and having expectancy if divided. It indicates that any sentence can not be without purpose in Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa reiterates it in vākyādhikaraṇa in ślokavārtika. He explains that nowhere any sentence is uttered purposeless and without ākhyāta, no pada can serve any purpose:

*Nahi prayojanāpetāṁ vākyamuccāryate Kvacit prayojanaṁśamanāṁ nāpi padamākhyātav arjitam* 

If one has to inquire the view of Mīmāṃsā about utterances where employment of any kind is not expressed and merely existence of objects is expressed, a study of arthavāda vākyas will be appropriate. Jaimini says that vedic sentences without any sense of injunction are useless and they are uttered to praise injunctions:

*āmnāyasya kriyārthatvādānarthakhyamatadarthānāṁ tasmādanityamucyate*

So, the sentences, describing the fact and not prescribing any action should be unified with the sentences which are prescribing any action:

*vidhinā tvekāvākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhināṁ syuḥ*

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that bhāvanā (activity) is everywhere meaning of a vākyam and there must be an ākhyātapada. So, in view of Mīmāṃsā philosophy, verb is the universal category of sentence structure.

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1 arthaikatvādekaṁ vākyamāṁ sākāṅṣāṁ cedvibhāge syāt - MS (2.1.46)
2 MSV, vākyādhikaraṇa, 346, p. 579.
3 MS (1.2.1)
4 ibid. (1.2.7)
5 bhāvanaiva ca vākyārthaḥ sarvatrākhyātavattayā - MSV, vākyādhikaraṇa, 330, p. 579.
View of Advaita Vedānta

In view of Śaṅkaraschool of vedānta syllables (varṇa) in a particular sequence with the prior knowledge of the relationship of a particular meaning with them will convey the respective meanings without any deviation after they are reflected in identical forms in all-conclusive intelligence when listened one by one in lingual behaviour. Though syllables are the same, they will be recognized as a particular word when uttered in a particular sequence. Śaṅkara says while commenting on Brahmāsūtra (1.3.28):

satuṇa samastavarnapratyavamarśe yathā kramānurodhih iṣṭaṁ kramaviśeṣakṛtā pañcaviśeṣaprattitaṁ virudhyate vrddhavyavahāre ceme varṇāḥ kramānyanugṛhitāḥ grīṭhārthaviśeṣasambandhas'ca santah svavyavahāre' pyekaikavarna grahanānanantarāṁ samastapratyavamarśinyāṁ buddhau tādṛśāṁ eva pratyavabhāsamānāḥ hi taṁ tamarthamavyabhiñārena pratyayayisyanti

It is clear from the above mentioned statement that syllables in a particular order are conceived as a particular word. It indicates that syllables uttered in a particular order are words or a sentence. Though 'Vākya' as a term has not been used but the term 'vrddhavyavahā' indicates sentence because no lingual behaviour is possible without sentences. In Vedāntaparibhāṣā, it is clarified that a vākya conveys the content of intention. This content of intention may be either the relationship between word meanings or a complete object as per the desire of speaker. In lingual behaviour relationship between word meanings is conveyed by a Vākya but in Vedānta pure consciousness or Brahman is intended to be conveyed by sentences and there is no scope for action because pure consciousness can not be achieved by any action So, in Vedānta verb denoting action can not be an universal category of sentence - structure. To conclude it can be asserted that there is no universal category of sentence - structure in Śaṅkara school of Vedānta.

View of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

In Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta a vākya conveys the relationship between word meanings (padā rtha - saṁsarga) as Rāmānuja says:

1 BSSBH (1.3.28)
2 vākyaṁ jñānajñānaṁ viśayatve hi na padārthasāṁsargatyavān tantram anabhimatsaṁsargasyāpi vākyaṁ jñānajñānaṁ viśayatvāpattate kintu tātparyviśayatvam - ve. P., Pra., pp.34-35
3 nāstyaktāṁ kṛtena - Mu. up. (1.2.12), isa., p.15.
It indicates that in this school of thought also there is no universal category of sentence structure and any word-meaning related with other word meaning is conveyed by an utterance (vākya). As there is no discussion about categories of sentence-structure separately, it may be assumed that prevalent lingual behaviour in practice is accepted in this school of thought and speaker can use utterances denoting action as well as objects existing already.

**View of Dvaita Vedānta**

In Dvaita vedānta, the view adopted by Nyāya philosophy is accepted. In Tarkatāṇḍava, words having expectancy, competence and proximity are called a vakya:

vibhaktyantā varnāḥ padam ākāṅsāyogyatāsannidhimanti padāni vākyam

This indicates that there is no discussion about any universal category of sentence-structure because if any school of thought or any discipline has its specific reservation about any category, it indicates about it in the definition itself as Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā indicate about it in their definition of vākyā itself. As there is no indication about any universal category of sentence-structure in Dvaita school of vedānta, it can be assumed that there is no category as universal in the structure of sentence in view of this school.

**View of Śāṅkhya**

Syllables and words are accepted non-eternal in Śāṅkhya and denotative of the meanings:

pratityapratītibhyāṁ na sphoṭātmakaḥ śabdāḥ

and -

na śabdānityatvāṁ kāryatāpratītēḥ

As position of Vyākaraṇa(sphoṭa) and Mīmāṃsā (varnanityatā) are refuted here, it seems that like Nyāya philosophy, collection of words having mutual expectancy, competence and proximity are accepted as vākyā in Śāṅkhya. Nothing can be concluded about the position of Śāṅkhya regarding universal category of sentence-structure in absence of any evidence. Yet it can be assumed that there is no universal category of sentence-structure in Śāṅkhya.

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1. Vedārthaśaṅkraha, p.33.
2. TT., pariccheda - 2, p.359.
4. ibid, 5.58,
View of Yoga

In vyāsabhāṣya on Yogasūtra (3.17) it has been indicated that every word has the power of vākya. Words may denote any object. In this case every object exists and so the word denoting a particular object denotes its existence also. When one says 'tree', it is understood that tree exists. When one says 'Cooks' it is understood that some tools as a person, fuel and rice etc. are already there because any action can not be completed without appropriate tools required for that particular action. There are two types of vakya-s. First type is that denotes an action and second type is that denotes any object. It is clear that where action is denoted, verb must be there but where only object accomplished by an action is denoted, no verb is necessarily needed because existence is understood without utterance of the verb expressing existence.

It can be concluded that verb is an universal category of sentence structure in view of Yoga because when only object is expressed and no verb is uttered, in that case also a verb expressing existence is understood. This is almost the same view that even without utterance of any verb, a verb expressing existence (asti) is there:

\[ \text{asti viśeṣam ākhyātaḥ} \]

\[ \text{asti viśeṣam ākhyātaḥ} \]


2 Mbh. on (A.2.3.1) vol. 2, p. 251.