CHAPTER 1

ISSUES ABOUT SENTENCE-STRUCTURE

The structure of a sentence has been considered from two view points mainly in Indian intellectual tradition:

1. Concept of the singleness of the sentence (Ekavākyatā)
2. Division of the sentence (vākyabheda)

In Indian tradition of poetics, various qualities and demerits of a vākya has also been mentioned. These may be included in the singleness of a sentence because the description of merits and demerits of a vākya is always limited to the single sentence.

1. Concept of the singleness of the sentence

In Mahābhārata, Sulabhā describes the five constituents of a vākya when she visits Janaka, the king of Mithilā:

*Saukṣmyam sānkhyakramau cobhau nirnayaḥ saprayojanāḥ*

*Paṇcaitānyarthajātāni vākyamityucyate nrpa*

According to this definition, a vākya has five constituents:

1. Meticulousness
2. Distinction between merits and demerits in a given matter
3. Sequence of statements
4. Final decision
5. Purpose

1. Meticulousness- Meticulousness means to explore all possible meanings of an utterance. A certain structure of a vākya can convey two or more meanings. Kūṭaśloka-s of Mahābhārata are

Mahābhārata, sāntiparva, (320.79)
good examples of meticulousness. Patañjali quotes some sentences having dual meanings. He says:

Tathā vākyani dviṣṭhāni bhavanti 'śveto dhāvati' alambusānām yāteśī
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Where a vākya conveys two or more meanings meticulousness of the intelligence is required. When a speaker wants to convey two meanings he uses such type of sentences. If the level of intelligence is equal, the hearer understands both meanings otherwise it is not possible. This quality of intelligence is called meticulousness. Though this is the quality of intelligence, it is called the quality of the sentence (Vākya) because the sentence is also used after it is structured by intelligence. A vākya becomes associated with that quality of intelligence which structures a vākya. That was also called vivakṣā (intention of speaker). Due to similarity of the quality of the intelligence and a vākya structured by it, both are treated at par and the respective quality of the intelligence is called that of vākya. It is to be noticed that all five meanings to be conveyed by a vākya are actually the qualities of intelligence but due to association (sāhacarya), they are called constituents of a sentence. It is called upacāra technically 2 Patañjali describes many reasons of upacāra in his Mahābhāṣya. Of these, one is sāhacarya (association).

2. Distinction

This is the second meaning that is closely associated with the sequence of statements. Though sequence of statements is the quality that prevails in the whole sentence structure, distinction has been closely associated with the sequence. This association is indicated by compound formation śāṅkhyakramau' where itaretaradvandva indicates that distinction and sequence are associated closer than other constituents. If a speaker changes the sequence of statements, the distinction intended to be conveyed will be changed automatically. If one has to make distinction he

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1 Mahābhāṣya, vol. 1,l, p.78
2 Upārthayoh sādṛśyātiśayamahimna bheda prāṇitīsthaganamāṭram-Sāhityadarpaṇa, p. 37
has to set the sequence of statements prior to use of sentence as this statement should precede this statement. Merits and demerits of a given matter should be clearly conveyed in a sentence which is not possible without following a particular sequence.

3. **Sequence of statements**

Before making an utterance, a speaker sets a sequence of statements to be expressed in his mind. This is the most important and the least requirement for an utterance to become a vākyā. Without sequence of statements, one cannot express anything. If anyone uses words without the sequence in which they are set in the mind before making a statement, that vākyā is not understood by the hearer. It is understood only when hearer makes rearrangement of words in that very order in which they are set in speaker’s mind before using that vākyā. If for any reason, the hearer fails to rearrange those unrelated words in an order that makes their meaning related, understanding does not take place. An example will be helpful to illustrate the point:

1. *Udakāṁ Devadatta ghaṭādāhara śīghram cedastiśītalam*

2. *Devadatta ghaṭād śīghram āhara udakāṁ ced śītalamasti.*

In example (1) words are used not in a sequence that was set in mind of the speaker before uttering the sentence. Example(2) shows the sequence of words, set in the mind of speaker before uttering the sentence. If after hearing sentence shown in example (1) hearer sets the words in the sequence shown in example (2), he will certainly grasp the meaning of the sentence. If, for any reason, the sentence shown in example (1) in the sequence of words shown in example (2), he will not be able to conceive the meaning of the sentence.

In the verse of Mahābhārata, ‘Krama’ seems to have been used in a different sense or in a rather wider sense. Here, it is not the sequence of
words but sequence of statements. It is clear from the explanation of krama given afterwards:

\[ Ida\text{m } p\text{ürvamida } p\text{asc } vaktavyam } yadvivaksitam kramayogam tamapyāhur vākyam vākyavido janāh. \]

It seems that length of a sentence is decided by desire of speaker (vivakṣā). If a speaker only intends to inform a fact or to want someone to execute his order, a sentence can serve the purpose. But if a topic or an issue with its opposition (pūrvapakṣa) and final decision (uttarapakṣa) is taken with a purpose, the whole discussion will form a vākya. That will be similar to adhikaraṇa discussed in Mīmāṃsa which also contains five steps.

If two sides or two persons or more take part in a discussion to know the reality of something, that is called vāda in Nyāyadarśana. When this vāda goes on, two sides have to consider to present their arguments defending or attacking various positions. For this it is necessary to decide the sequence of statements to strengthen their position. If one person presents his arguments in a well thought sequence having a flow and connectivity among themselves, his position in the discussion will be certainly stronger. Here, krama is indicated in that very context. Commentator of Mahābhārata, Nīlakaṇṭha says:

\[ kramaḥ saṃkhyātānāṃ guṇadosāṇāḥ balābalavicāraṇam \]

It means that one has to present his arguments in a sequence so that force of his arguments becomes greater and merits of his own position and demerits of the opposite position are revealed.

4. Final Decision

After considering two sides on an issue of debate- supporting and opposing both- when one arrives on a certain conclusion that is called

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1 Mahābhārata, vol. VI, Sāntiparva, (320, 83)
2 vādaḥ khalu nānāpravaktāḥ pratyadhikaraṇa sādhano' nyatarādhikaraṇa niṃśayaśāso vākyasamāhāṛ-
NDVBH on (1.1.1), P-13

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final decision (*nirnaya*). It is expressed in the concluding part of a sentence. It indicates that in this reference of Mahābhārata, an issue of debate is involved which is required to be resolved through a set procedure of arriving on a conclusion otherwise what was the need of mentioning decision (*nirnaya*) in last part of the sentence:

Dharmakāmārthamokṣesu pratijñāya viśeṣataḥ idam taditi vākyānte procyate sa vinirṇayayāḥ

It indicates that a *vākyā* begins with *pratijñā* i.e. statement of one’s own stand on a issue and ends with the conclusion, stating it is that. This is the indication of five components (*pañcāvaya*) mentioned in *Nyāyadarśana*:

*pratijñāhetūdāharanaḥpanayanigamanānyavayavāḥ*

Of these, *pratijñā* is mentioned by name and *nigamaṇa* is *nirṇaya*. *Hetu* (reason), *udāharaṇa*, (example) and *upanaya* (proving) are included in *sānkhya* (distinction). For making a distinction of merits and demerits of an issue of debate, reason, example and proving following the example are helpful.

This reference of Mahābhārata is at par with the notion of *adhikaraṇa* in Mīmāṁsā and *avayava* and *vāda* in *Nyāyadarśana*.

5. **Purpose**

This decision should be with a purpose. Without a purpose even a layman does not undertake any activity. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says:

**Prayojanamanuddiśya na mando’pi pravartate**

Like any other activity, a sentence should also be purposeful. The purpose decides the conclusion. So, if purpose varies, the conclusion drawn from the same sentence will vary. Both have very intimate relation.

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¹ Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, (320.84)
² ślokavārtika, SAP, 55, p.551
This relation is indicated with the mention of both in a tagged way. Conclusion is tagged with purpose:

\textit{nirñayaḥ saprayojanaḥ}

This element of purpose prevails from the very beginning to the end of a sentence because a speaker, if he is not abnormal or mad, uses a sentence with a purpose in his mind and that purpose guides him to arrive on a certain conclusion.

Mīmāṃsādārśaṇa defined the \textit{vākyā} on base of purpose. According to it, the singleness of sentence is controlled by purpose. If the single purpose is served by a \textit{vākyā}, that sentence is single. Singleness of a sentence is also judged by the factor of expectancy. If a sentence has expectancy in case of division, it is a single sentence. So, there are two factors deciding the singleness of a sentence:

1. To serve a single purpose.
2. To expect other words if it is divided.

Jaimini formulated a sūtra in this regard:

\textit{arthāikatvādekaṁ vākyāṁ sākāṅkṣaḥ cedvibhāgesyāt}\textsuperscript{1}

This definition does not refer to competence (\textit{yogyatā}) and proximity (\textit{āṣātī}) – two other factors of a \textit{vākyā} accepted in Nyāyadārśaṇa. But śabarāswāmī, the commentator of \textit{mīmāṃsā sūtra-s}, has explained these two factors on the basis of the expectancy. According to him, in the case of lack of competence or proximity, there will remain a sense of incompleteness i.e. expectancy\textsuperscript{2}. And as an undivided sentence should not have the expectancy, competence and proximity are bound to be in a sentence. On the time period which decides the \textit{sannidhi}, śabarāswāmī says that expectancy will be the deciding factor. The time gap between

\textsuperscript{1} MS, (2.1.46) SDSS, P.8
\textsuperscript{2} See śabarbhāṣya on (MS. 2.1.46)
two words which does not allow the expectancy to arise is appropriate for proximity.

In view of Jaimini singleness of the sentence is decided by the singleness of purpose. This point is very important. Many scholars of various disciplines established their theories on the basis of it. In poetics, Viśvanātha in his work sāhityadarpana explained the concepts of mahāvākya and vākya. To explain the vākya, he followed the line of Nyāya philosophy and accepted that a group of words having competence expectancy and proximity is a vākya:

\[ \text{vākyam syādyogyatākāṅkṣasatti yuktah padocayāḥ}. \]

But, to explain the concept of mahāvākya, he follows the line of mīmāṁsā. He says that a group of vākya-s is a mahāvākya:

\[ \text{vākyoccaayo mahāvākyam}. \]

And, for example of mahāvākya, he names Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata and Raghuvamśa etc. To support his view, he quotes kumarila bhaṭṭi, without taking his name:

\[ \text{Svārthabodhe samāptānāṁ aṅgāṅgitvavyapekṣayā vākyānāmekavākyatvam punah samhatya jāyate}. \]

It means that after conveying their own meanings, sentences combine to form a single sentence with respect to partness and wholeness. Application of this principle to the given examples of Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata and Raghuvamśa leads us to the conclusion that all sentences available in abovementioned works convey a common sense that pervades the whole text i.e. all sentences of that particular text. With respect to that particular sense, all sentences become parts of that sentence which conveys that particular sense. To convey that sense, all sentences combine

1 SD, 2.1., p.24
2 ibid, p.25
3 Ibid,
to form a single sentence. This single sentence is called *mahāvākya* by Viśvanātha. When Viśvanātha defines *mahāvākya* as a group of sentences, he only means that a work as a whole conveys a single idea that is elaborated through all sentences of the text in parts but to convey an idea as a whole. To call the whole text a *mahāvākya*, it is necessary that all sentences are included in the definition of *mahāvākya*. In this respect, Viśvanātha is right because the whole text can not convey a single idea until all sentences combine to form a single sentence. It can be concluded that in view of Viśvanātha, *mahāvākya* is a single sentence which is so long that it took the form of the whole work and all sentences of the text are parts of it. Viśvanātha indicated also about the single idea which a work conveys. In first chapter (pariccheda) of *sāhityadarpaṇa*, he says:

*Caturvargaphalaprāptirhi kāvyato rāmādīvat pravartitavyam na rāvaṇādivadityādkṛtyākṛtya pravṛttinivṛtt yupadeśadvāreṇa supratītāiva*¹

Through this statement, Viśvanātha suggests the works of poetry based on behaviour of Rāma and Rāvaṇa and other similar works also which may be based on the behaviour of a hero (nāyaka) and a villain (Pratināyaka). Rāmāyaṇa is the main source of all works based on life and behaviour of Rāma. So, it appears that Viśvanātha, here, indicates the single idea that Rāmāyaṇa conveys. This idea is that one should behave like Rāma and not like Rāvaṇa. To convey this single idea, all sentences combine to form a single sentence. All sentences of Rāmāyaṇa when combined in the mind of a poet (kavi) or audience (saḥṛdaya) convey this idea and that is why Viśvanātha calls the group of all sentences a *mahāvākya*.

The concept of *mahāvākya*, prevalent in śaṅkara school of *vedānta* is different from this. In this school, *mahāvākya* means great sentence. The greatness of the statement lies in the meaning it conveys. The meaning of other sentences is contradicted but meaning conveyed by *mahāvākya* is

¹ SD 1.2., p.9,
The concept of singleness of sentence suggested by Jaimini and elaborated by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has been followed by other disciplines also. In vedānta paribhāṣā a verse from Tantravārtika is quoted to support the elaboration of singleness of sentence. This is the same verse that is quoted by Viśvanātha in his work sāhityadarpaṇa to support his statement about concept of mahāvākya. Without singleness of the sentence a mahāvākya is not possible. So, concept of great sentence or a large sentence is based on the concept of singleness of the sentence. That is why Viśvanātha and Dharmarāja dhvarindra both quote the same verse to support their interpretations. When hearer tries to know the sense of a whole text, he rearranges all sentences in his mind to arrive on a conclusion. In this mental state an expectancy arises in the mind of hearer to relate all sentences of that text. This expectancy is fulfilled when he relates all the sentences of the text and arrives on a conclusion. This conclusion is conveyed by a single sentence and it is called mahāvākya. The knowledge of all other sentences of the text is the source of the knowledge conveyed by mahāvākya. Dharmarāja Adhvarindra says:

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\begin{align*}
Kva \quad tarhi \quad vākyairvākyatā? & \quad Yatra \quad Pratyekaṁ \\
bhinnabhinnasamsargapratipādakayor & \quad vākyayorāṅkṣāvaśena \\
mahāvākyārthabodhakatvam------evam & \quad mahāvākyārthabodhe' \\
vāntarvākyārthabodho hetuh tathaivānvyādyava dhāранat^{3}
\end{align*}
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1 Tadviṣayasya jīvaparaśayasya kālātrayābā dhyātvāt – ve p. viṣayaya., p 150
2 Adhunā tattvapadārthayorikyaṁ mahāvākya pratipādyamabhidhiyate- ve.p, viṣayaya, p.195
3 Ve.P., āgama, p.103 and p. 105
It can be concluded that singleness of a sentence is quided by a purpose. The principle of unitary sentence is used by Viśvanātha and Dharmarājādhvarīndra both according to their disciplines they were following. Viśvanātha was faced with a vast literature before him and his main concern was to explain literature. As he viewed the literature (kāvya) in the form of a vākya i.e. rasātmaka vākya, he explained his view about vākya and mahāvākya. After the assertion of kāvya as a vākya, it was the demand of the logical mind that relevance of the concept of vākya is proved. His explanation of the concept of mahāvākya in particular is attempt in this direction. Like vedānta, in literary compositions there are not great sentences available to be allconclusive in nature where knowledge conveyed by all other sentences was included. So, after going through the entire composition, an analytical mind reflects on the message of the work. In this connection to find out a gist of the work is the purpose. This purpose gives rise to the expectancy. Among sentences, the process of unification is guided by this expectancy.

Any sentence not conveying the complete sense with respect to the message of the whole work, is unified with a sentence that is expected by it to convey the complete message of the work. In this way all sentences unify to form single sentence. Till the all sentences of a work do not unify, this expectancy can not be fulfilled. Any sentence to convey the message of the whole, work is normally not available in the work itself. This is the intended meaning of a work that is conveyed by the mahāvākya. mahāvākya-s of vedānta are of this type. In vedānta, mahāvākyas conveying the message of upaniṣad-s are available within upaniṣads itself. On the contrary, such mahāvākya-s are not available in literary compositions. Viśvanātha was fully aware of this fact. His explanation of mahāvākya is entirely different with that of vedānta. He simply means that the whole literary work is a mahāvākya i.e. collection of sentences of the work. But this collection should have a certain order to become a mahāvākya. This order is already set by the poet in his work.
When a reader receives and retains the whole meaning of the work only through those very sentences used in the work, mahāvākyya is conceptualized in the mind of reader. In the context of literary compositions (kāvyā) divisions of the work such as anka, sarga, adhyāya, parva, taraṅga etc. combine to form a single sentence. Divisions of the work form a single sentence first and then these sentences combine to form a single sentence. All sentences of a division of the work combine and become the part of that whole division and than all divisions become the part of that whole work. This combination is guided by the expectancy. A division of the work expects all sentences of that division to convey a complete sense of that division. And the whole work expects all divisions to combine in order to convey a complete sense of that work. This is the viewpoint of viśvanātha about mahāvākyya in literary context.

View of Vyākaraṇa

In vyākaraṇa tradition Patañjali has discussed about the singleness of sentence. He says that it is not necessary that a sentence must be read at a time in a sequence if it is to fulfill the requirements of a single sentence.

To serve a purpose, a composer can split a sentence and read at two different places in his work. Patañjali gives example from Aṣṭādhyāyī. He opines that in second chapter of Aṣṭādhyāyī luk is prescribed as a general rule and in fourth and sixth chapters aluk is prescribed as an exception to luk. In view of Patañjali, though this prescription of luk and aluk is uttered at three places i.e. different points of time, is a single sentence. He says:

Na videśasthamiti kṛtvāto nānavākyāmabhavati videśasthamapi sadekaṁ vākyāmabhavati tadyathā dvitīye' adhyāye lugucyatasya caturthaśaṣṭhayoralugucyate' pavādah¹

¹ Mbh. On (A 3.4.67), Vol. 3, P 356-57
Here question arises about the factor which regulates the singleness of a sentence. Kaiyata indicates the expectancy as the regulating factor in this regard:

\[ Na \text{ kālabhedānānāvākyatvaṁ bhavati śāstre } \]

Videośāsthānāmapypavāntaravākyānāmānānāvāntavādārśanāṁ
desagrahānam cātra kālasyopalakṣanam śabdakramasya kālakṛtavai

Bhartṛhari explains this statement of Patañjali without taking his name. He concludes that if something is prescribed at a place and the same prescription is regulated and negated with exception at different places, it forms a single sentence though it contains anekākhyāta (many verb-forms) and uttered at different points of time.

\[ anēkākhyātayoge 'pi vākyaṁ nyāyapavādayoh \]
\[ ekamevesyate kaiścibhinnarūpamiva sthitam niyamaḥ pratīṣeṣṭhaśca \]
\[ vidhiṣeṣastathā sati dvitiye yo lugākhyatastaccheṣaṃalukaṁ viduḥ \]

When two or more sentences form a single sentence, there is one main sentence and others are subsidiary to it. Subsidiary sentences join the main sentence and qualify the main sentence. In this position main sentence is called vākya and subsidiary sentence is called vākyaśeṣa.

In mīmaṁsā darśana also, Jaimini discusses the issue of vākyaśeṣa in the context of determination of meaning of ambiguous prescriptions. He formulated a sutra in this regard:

\[ Sandighe tu vākyaśeṣāḥ \]

It means that where meaning of a prescription is not decided it should be decided by the vākyaśeṣa. vākyaśeṣa means a related statement that is read anywhere else after a gap of many sentences between it and main statement.

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1 Mbh prāṇ (A 3.4.67) p.356.
2 VP (2.348-9)
3 MS (1.4.20) kutūhalavīṭī, p 143
View of Rājaśekhara

Rājaśekhara in his famous work Kāvyamīmāṃsā discussed about pada and vākya in sixth chapter named padavākyaviveka. He defines vākya as contextual statement containing padas and conveying the implied meaning:

\[ \text{padānāmabhidhitsitārthagranthanākaraḥ sandarbho vākyam}^{1} \]

Rājaśekhara also defined pada as combined form of word and meaning. Word is defined by vyākaraṇa and meaning is defined by dictionaries. He says:

\[ \text{Vyākaraṇasmṛtinirnītāḥ sabdo niruktanighantvādibhirnirdiṣṭastadabhidheyo'rthastau padam.}^{2} \]

He divided the vākya in ten types on the basis of verb form (ākhyāta). In this context he discussed about the singleness of a sentence that contains many verbs. He quoted the view of some scholars without taking their names that a single sentence has a single verb and so, in this case the number of verbs will decide the number of sentences. But he efutes the view and argues that a sentence is a single sentence inspite of having many verbs if words convey a single meaning and kāraka-s are uniform. The whole debate has been presented by Rājaśekhara in these words:

\[ \text{ākhyātaparatantrā vākyavṛttirato yāvadākhyātamiha vākyāni ityācāryāh ekākāratayā kārakagrāmasya ekārthatayā ca vacovṛttterekamevedam vākyam iti yāyāvariyaḥ}^{3} \]

View of Nyāya

In Nyāyadarśana Vātsyāyana defined the vākya as collection of words conveying a complete sense:

\[ \text{Padasamuho vākyamarthaparisamāptau}^{4} \]

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1 Kāvyamīmāṃsā, sixth chapter, p. 56
2 ibid, p. 54
3 ibid, p 59.

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It means that a sentence is single if it conveys the complete sense. If it does not convey the complete sense, it means that it is not a sentence. This condition of conveying the complete sense is included in the definition to exclude the collection of unrelated words from the category of vākya.

The concept of singleness of a sentence in Nyāyadarśana as found in vyākaraṇa and mīmāṁsā is to be traced. Nothing can be said clearly in this regard for lack of sufficient proof.

2. Concept of the division of the sentence (Vākya bheda)

Jaimini defines that a sentence is single, if a single purpose is served by it. It means number of sentences will be determined by number of purposes. If a single sentence is divided, it will have expectancy. In Indian tradition, vākyabheda has been discussed in the first sense i.e. serving more than one purpose while commenting on the sources texts by commentators. In vyākaraṇa tradition, Bhaṭṭo Ji Diśita says while commenting on a sūtra (A 6.1.94). in his work siddhānta kaumūdi:

Iha viśīyanuvartya vākyaabhedena vyākhyeyam²

The purpose of the division of the sentence is to explain some words used in one form and some words used in two forms. Prejate, upoṣati etc, are the words used in this very form while upedakīyati and proghīyati are the words used in the form of upaidakīyati and praughīyati also. To serve this purpose, bhaṭṭo ji proposes the explanation based on division of sentence.

Patañjali also shows the division of sentence and unity of sentence to serve various purposes. While commenting on ‘iko guṇaverddhi’ (A 1.1.3) he says that if alo’ntyasya and iko guṇa vṛddhī are unified as a single

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¹ NDVBH on (2.1.56), p. 209
² SK, Vol. 1, p.64
sentence, *ikoguna*vṛddhī will become part of alontyasya and if both are different sentences, *iko guṇa*vṛddhī will become exception to alo'ntyasya

**View of Mīmāṃsā**

In Mīmāṃsā darsana, eight defects have been described if a sentence is divided. Mīmāṃsā darsana is predominantly based on prescription. When a sentence prescribes two activities, the sentence is divided. If this division serves the purpose, there is no defect. In this condition, two sentences prescribe two different and independent activities. But where an activity is a part of another activity, there is scope of defect if a sentence is divided in two sentences. In these conditions it is assumed that a particular sentence conveys the prescription of the activity qualified with another activity. *Laugāksi* Bhāskara put this problem of vākyabhedā in the context of somayāga. The sentence is somena yajeta. It is accepted that this sentence prescribes yāga qualified with some. If this is not accepted, this sentence will convey the meaning of two prescriptions- first that of yāga and second of soma. If this is accepted, a sentence will be divided in two sentences:

*Na cobhayavidhāne vākyabhedaḥ pratyeka mabhayasyāvidhānāt kintu viśiṣṭasyaikasyaiva vidhānāt*?

If a prescription is with an option, there are eight defects. Each option has four defects. The commentator of Arthasaṅgraha, Rameshwara shivayogi described these defects in prescription of yāga with vrīhi or yava. If yāga is performed with vrīhi first, there are two defects:

1. Validity of prescription of yāga with yava is not accepted.
2. Invalidity of prescription of yāga with yava is accepted.

If yāga is performed with yava second time there are two defects:

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1 See Mbh on (A 1.1.3) Vol., I I, p 192
2 Arthasaṅgraha, p.50
1. Previously abandoned validity of prescription of \textit{yoga} with \textit{yava} is accepted.

2. Accepted invalidity of prescription of \textit{yāga} with \textit{yava} is abandoned.

Similarly if \textit{yāga} is performed with \textit{yava} first, there are two defects:

1. Validity of prescription of \textit{yāga} with \textit{vṛihi} is not accepted.

2. Invalidity of prescription of \textit{yāga} with \textit{vṛihi} is accepted.

If \textit{yāga} is performed with \textit{vṛihi} second time, there are two defects:

1. Previously abandoned validity of prescription of \textit{yāga} with \textit{vṛihi} is accepted.

2. Accepted Invalidity of prescription of \textit{yāga} with \textit{vṛihi} is abandoned.

It is clear that when a sentence prescribes an activity with two options, one of the two options will be applied first. Other option will naturally be applied second. This order may be changed and previously first applied option will be applied second and second applied option will be applied first. In this way four performances will take place. Each performance will be with two defects and in total eight defects will be there.

\textbf{Sentence structure in Buddhist thought}

Buddhist thought, it is accepted that whole lingual behaviour is unreal as words don't refer to external reality. Words creat mental reality i.e. thought and thoughts creat words. As Ratna kīrti says in apohasiddhi:

\textit{Vikalpayonayah śadbāḥ vikalpaḥ śabdayonayah}\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} Apohasiddhi, Quoted from apohāvādo see also, Tattvasaṅgraha, 1211, Vol-I, P. 313
One should not confuse that this is in line with the view of grammarians that words denote mental reality and not external reality because grammarians accept that words denote the mental image of that reality which exists in external world anywhere. But Buddhist view is different. Buddhist scholars accept ‘apoha’ as the denotation of words. On the contrary grammarians hold the view that words denote mental reality that is perceived by senses previously and this denotation is based on saṅketa i.e. a relationship between word and its meaning. Words have power to denote realities as senses have power to perceive. This power is called śakti by grammarians. On the contrary Buddhist scholars do not accept any relationship between words and meaning. They say that words only denote the removal of other than the concept created by words i.e. apoha and by this apoha when all concepts other than the concept created by that particular word are removed only concept created by that particular word remains and hearer knows the meaning of that word. So, primary role of word in Buddhist thought is not to denote any meaning but to remove other concepts. Words denote mental images created by mind, devoid of any reality. Śāntarakṣita says:

\textit{Arthaśūnyābhijalpottham vāsanāmatra nirmitam pratibimbam yadābhāti tacchabdaiḥ pratipādyate}\footnote{Tattvasaṅgraha, 1203, vol.I. P 311}

Everyone has its own concept. Words only create concepts according to the mental state of hearer. Actually both-hearer and speaker perceive the meaning of words according to their own conceptions but both receive the same meaning of the words denoting external realities because cause of confusion is the same. Śāntarakṣita gives the example of a person with eye-defect who perceives two moons and express his own perception to the person with same defect. As both are having same eye defects, both perceive the same thing i.e. two moons and there is no difference of
opinion between them. Buddhist scholars differ on the point of testimonies and signification of word. They don’t accept verbal testimony and includeds it in inference.

In their view signification of word is apoha.

As the whole lingual behaviour is based on ideas, so the sentence is also based on ideas. One idea is the source of another idea. Ideas of the sentence are in mind of speaker and heaver. This flow of ideas (vijñanasantati) about sentence is the cause of use of sentences. And idea about the sentence is cause of verbal cognition. It can be concluded that a particular form of idea created by words is a sentence. It is structured in mind and received by mind. The words are used in an order in a sentence according to normal view but in Buddhist though order is also an unreal perception and actually words have no order but perceived as having an order. So, in Buddhist thought there are four features of a sentence:

1. The sentence is internal.
2. It is subject to one idea
3. It is a particular form of idea
4. Categories of sentence structure are also unreal and there is no order of words in a sentence actually but order is perceived by persons according to their mental ideas.

It can be assumed that Buddhist view about categories of sentence-structure and universal category of sentence structure is not very specific because whole lingual behaviour is held unreal and only medium of communication.

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1 Timropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śāśīdvayam svasamāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahārīr maññā - ibid, 1210, p 313.
3. **Issues taken into account by Bhartrhari**

**Issues regarding structure of vākya**

Bhartrhari discussed mainly two issues regarding structure of vākya:

1. Vākya is divisible unit of language.
2. Vākya is indivisible.

Bhartrhari discussed eight views regarding sentence. Of these, three views are related to those who think Vākya as an indivisible unit and five views are related to those who think Vākya as a divisible unit. The whole Vākya kānda deals with the debate on these eight views regarding Vākya. A brief account of eight definitions of vākya presented by Bhartrhari is as follows-

1. **Verb**

Bhartrhari says that some scholars view the vākya as the verb (ākhyāta śabda). Later Bhartrhari clarified that the intention of the scholars viewing the vākya as verb is not the only verb. Where other tools to accomplish an action are understood by only utterance of the verb only there the verb can convey the sense of whole vākya. In this particular condition only the verb may be a vākya because it is able to convey the meaning of whole sentence. In this view vākya is a divisible unit of speech.

2. **Group of words (saṅghāta)**

In view of some scholars a group of words (saṅghāta) related to each other is vākya. These scholars think that the vākya is divisible in words because words related through a particular relationship form a sentence. In this view vākya is a divisible unit of speech.

3. **Universal residing in Group (saṅghāta vartini jāti)**

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1 Yathā pade vibhajyante (VP 2.10)
2 (a) Tathaivaikasya Vākyasya (VP 2.9)
   (b) Śabdasya na vibhago’sti (VP 2.13)
3 ākhyāta śabde niyatam...... V.P. (2.326)
4 guṇa bhāvena.....VP (2.48)
Some scholars opine that the universal residing in the group of related words forming a sentence is a vakya. They intended to say that when a speaker makes an utterance in the form of a sentence and a hearer hears it both conceive the same notion of sentence due to commonness in the forms of different sentences. This universal is the cause of the conception of the sentence despite the use of different words in different sentences if this universal is not in sentences one cannot recognise the group of related words as a vakya because in one time he can learn only about a sentence and afterwards he will need again the instruction of a learned person to recognise a different sentence. But in common practice it is being observed that after the learning some sentences one becomes able to recognise the sentences he has not exactly learned. This proves that there is a universal pervading in the group of words which makes one able to recognise any utterance as a vakya. In this view vakya is an indivisible unit of speech.

4. Single speech without parts (eka anavaya śabda)

Some scholars hold the view that the speech without division and sequence of utterances is a viikya. Later it becomes clear that Bhartrhari stands in favour of this view. In this view vakya has no words and subsequently words also do not have syllables. There is not any sequence of uttered words permissible in this view. The sequence that is perceived by a hearer is actually the quality of time and it is due to sounds which reveal the speech in an utterance. Though there is a sequence of uttered words in common lingual behaviour, it is the incapability of hearer that he cannot grasp the speech as a whole. Bhartrhari made it clear in the first chapter that speech residing in mind is the cause of hearing and understanding of different words. If it is not there, any understanding of utterances is quite impossible. Bhartrhari illustrate the point by an example he says that if there is no fire in the wood it is not possible the production of fire by rubbing two pieces of woods. In this view vakya is an indivisible unit of speech.

5. Sequence (krama)

\[^{1}\text{yathākṣepaviśeṣő pi\ldots\ldots VP (2.20)}\]
\[^{2}\text{yathāīkaeva\ldots\ldots VP (2.7)}\]
Some scholars view the vakya as a sequence of words\(^1\). They opine that the words can be called a sentence only if they are uttered in a sequence. This is the fact that is easily acceptable to all because it is in accordance of the common observation about the lingual behaviour. In this view vakya is a divisible unit of speech.

6. **Abstraction in mind (buddhyanusanāhṛti)**

Some scholars view the vakya as an abstraction in the mind\(^2\). Puṇyārāj clarifies that this view is near to Buddhist thought of the sentence but not exactly the same. In this view there are no words in a sentence and sentence is without any part. When one hears a sentence he thinks that he is hearing the words but this is not the reality. Actually sentence is concluded in mind and the conception of words is also in mind. This is the similarity between this view and the Buddhist view of the sentence. But there is dissimilarity too. In this view the words and their meanings are based on the objects existed in external world but in Buddhist view the words and their meanings are in mind and they are falsely imposed on the objects of external world. In this view vakya is an indivisible unit of speech.

7. **First word (ādyapada)**

In this view first word is vakya when it is related with other words uttered later\(^3\). The scholars supporting this view imply that in a sentence first word determines the sentence and it has power to convey the sense of whole sentence. It should not be thought that only first word without relation with other words can serve the purpose of whole sentence because the first is a relative term and implies that there are other words also in the sentence necessarily. The predominance of the first word in a sentence is implied to be indicated here. In this view vakya is divisible unit of speech.

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\(^1\) Santaeva........VP (2.49)
\(^2\) yadantāḥ śabdattvāh tu ............VP(2.30)
\(^3\) viśeṣa śabdāḥ........VP(2.17)
8. All words but with expectancy if divided

In this view all words used in a sentence form a sentence if they have expectancy in case of separation. This view follows the definition of the vākya provided by Jaimini. Jaimini says that a sentence is single if it serves the single purpose and has the expectancy if divided. Bhartrhari puts this view here at the last as one of the eight definitions of vākya. In this view vākya is a divisible unit of speech.

**Issues regarding structural components of vākya**

After establishing indivisibility of Vākya as real and division of Vākya as a tool designed to educate the common people who are unable to conceive language without analysis (Apoddhāra), Bhartrhari discusses components of sentence structure in Padakāṇḍa. In view of Bhartrhari analysis of structure of Vākya is unreal and aimed at learning language correctly. Pada is not capable to convey the meaning on its own and twofold, fourfold or fivefold division of Pada depends on analysis of Vākya. In padākāṇḍa Bhartrhari dealt with fourteen topics under fourteen heads called Samuddeśa. They are as follows-

1. Jāti Samuddeśa
2. Dravyasamuddeśa
3. Sambandhasamuddeśa
4. Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa
5. Gunasamuddeśa
6. Dīksamuddeśa
7. Sādhanasamuddeśa
8. Purusasamuddeśa
9. Samkhyāsamuddeśa
10. Upagrahasamuddeśa
11. Lingasamuddeśa

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1. sākāṃśāvayavaṁ bhedē... VP (2.4)
2. (a) Vyāptimāṇsca laghuscaiva Vyavahārah Padāśrayah
   (b) Tasmādaukiko Vakyadanyah Kascinna Vidyate (VP 2.343, 344)
   (c) Upāyāh śiksamāṇānāṁ (VP 2.238)
3. Dvidhā Kaścit Padam Bhinnam caturdhā Pañcaddhāpi vā.
   Apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyah prakṛtipratyayādi Vat (VP 3.1)
Under all these above mentioned heads Bhartṛhari mainly had a discourse on aspect of meaning and meaning is unavoidable part of structure because without consideration of meaning, any structure of Vākya cannot be decided grammatically correct or incorrect. The entire lingual behaviour is to communicate the meaning. This is the principle none can disagree with. It is stated by Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya. Any discourse on Vākya is not possible without meaning. So the meaning decides the structure on the part of speaker and the structure decides the meaning on the part of hearer. Meaning is also a mental structure. When Vākya is structured in mind of speaker before its articulation, it is in form of meaning. In the same way after hearing, structure of Vākya results as a particular meaning related to that Vākya in the mind of hearer. These are three stages of the same Vākya. Bhartṛhari illustrated these three stages by example of an artist. First of all an artist views a person with his limbs outside, then perceives his shape with all limbs as one object in mind and then again creates it on a canvas. Here the person is same but there are three stages of his form. His one form is outside, second is in mind of artist and third is again painted at Canvas. In the same way at first stage Vākya is heard, then conceived in mind and then again articulated to communicate the meaning to others. Here, heard Vākya is with sequence, conceived Vākya is without sequence and articulated Vākya is with sequence. With this elaboration, it is clear that structure of Vākya is transformed as meaning in mind after hearing and the meaning again is transformed into Vākya when articulated to convey the meaning. Meaning is without sequence and words in a sentence are heard in a particular order because articulation is an action and action is measured in time. Sequence is the quality of time and any action including uttering a sentence, measured in time is bound to have sequence. It can be concluded that meaning of Vākya is related to mind and structure of Vākya is related to senses of articulation and hearing. Bhartṛhari calles this meaning in mind as “Buddhistha Śabda” and it is entered in mind

1 Arthagatyarthah Śabdapravayogah – Mahābhāṣya (3.1.7)
2 Yathaikabuddhvisayā mūrtirākriyate pate
   mūrtyarāsya tritayamevam śabde’pi drṣyate (VP 1.52)
3 (a) Kriyābhedāya Kālastu (VP 3.9.2)
   (b) Kramohi dharmah Kālasya (VP 2.50)
4 Aranistham yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarākāranaṃ
   Tadvace ṣabdo’pi buddhisthah śrutinām kāranam prthak

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before articulation. This entered speech is expressed by sound that is produced by articulatory organ.

In first Kārikā of Jātisamuddeśa, Bhartṛhari informs us that some scholars classified pada in two types, some in four types and some in five types. Bhartṛhari does not indicate his stand in favour of anyone of them but says that this classification is based on analysis of sentence through separation from Vākya.

This analysis of sentence is similar to the analysis of Pada in root and suffixes etc. Bhartṛhari indicates that both analysis of Vākya and Pada are not real but needed for practical purposes. He indicates this by using term “Apoddhṛtyaiva” here because previously he stated it clearly. Further he discusses the two types of meaning of Pada—Universal (Jāti) and particular (vyakti). At first sight it may appear that this is related to meaning and has nothing to do with the structure of Vākya but the case is not so. When universal is the meaning, singularity and plurality are not implied, but when particular is the meaning the singularity, duality and plurality—all are implied. Bhartrhari puts it as the opinion of some scholars. We know that this is the opinion of Pāṇini but Bhartrhari does not take the name of anyone. Two possibilities may be there. Some scholars other then Pāṇini may be known to Bhartrhari, holding the above mentioned view or disciples of Pāṇini (Pāṇinīyas) are being indicated by Bhartrhari by using the term ‘Kesāncit’.

When particular is the meaning of Pada, only single form conveys the meaning of the group consisting of other similar forms through ‘Ekaśeṣa’. Bhartrhari is putting the view of Pāṇini and probably other like minded scholars here without taking the name. Pāṇini formulates a sutra in this connection.

Vitarkitah purā buddhyā Kvacidarthhe niveśitah
Kārnebhiyo virṛttena dhavanīni sō’ nurgryate (VP 1.46, 47)
1 VP (3.1.1)
2 Vyāptimānśca laghūcaiva vyavahārah padāśryah
loke śāstre ca Kāryārtham vibhāgenaiva kalpitah (VP 2.343)
3 Ekatvam vā bahutvam vā kesāncidavivakshayam
 tadādi jātyabhidhāṇāya dvitvam tu sāyavivakṣitam (VP 3.1.52)
4 Jātyākhyāyāme kasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyām (P 1.2.58)
5 Sarūpasamudayāttu vibhaktiryā vidhyate
Ekastatrārthavān siddhah samudāyasya vācakah (VP 3.1.90)
6 Sarūpānāme kaśesa ekavībhaktau (P 1.2.64)
In Dravyasamuddeśa, Bhartrhari elaborates reality of speech. All speeches express the eternal reality which stands after disappearance of all forms. This is the reality of speech (Śabdatattva) and does not vary. He gives the example of gold and golden ornaments. The gold is one and invariable while ornaments made of it vary in shape, size and number. In the same way, all Variables (Vikāra-s) are unreal and their source is only real. This real is expressed by all speeches.

In Sambandhasamuddeśa, Bhartrhari discusses about relationship between speech and meaning expressed by it. This relationship is not set by anyone but came down to us naturally and its starting point can not be indicated. He gives the example of senses here. As senses are able to perceive their objects without assistance of anyone and this ability is without beginning, so speech can express meaning. Another issue that has something to do with the structure of Vākya is mental reality expressed by Speech. Bhartrhari calls it “upacārasatta”. If this mental reality is not accepted, several usages in speech can not be justified. If this mental reality is accepted, past tense and future tense can be used otherwise there is not existence of the object in past as well as in future and in this case, use of past and future tense can not be justified. The usages like Ankuro Jāyate (Sprout grows) can be justified only when mental reality is accepted because if external reality is accepted as base for lingual behaviour, sprout does not exist at the time of growing. When it emerges out of the seed, it is called sprout but before emerging out of the seed, it cannot be called sprout. In this case the sentence ‘sprout grows’ can not be used because that which grows is not sprout and that which is sprout, does not grow.

All meaning including unreal things never stand without this mental existence. Conception of meaning depends upon spoken word and this spoken word is produced out

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1 Satyamākrtisamhāre yadhāte vyavatisthate
tannityam śabdāvacyam tacchabdatttvam na bhidyate (VP 3.2.11)
2 Vikārāpagame satyam suvaram kundale yathā
Vikārāpagame satyām tathāhuh prakṛtim paramā
Vācyā sā sarvaśabdānām śabdāsca na prthak tathā
aprthātkve ca sambandhayornānātmoriva (VP 3.2.15-16)
3 Indriyānam svavisayesvasvanādīryogya yathā
Anādirarthaḥ śabdānām sambandho yogyaḥ tathā (VP 3.3.29)
4 (a) Athopacārasattaiva vidheyastatra lādayah
janmanā to virodhiḥvānmukhyā satā na vidyate (VP 3.3.46)
(b) Vyapadeśe padārthaḥānamanyā sattapacārikī
sarvāvasthāsu sarvesāmātmātpasya darśikā (VP 3.3.39)
of mental reality.\textsuperscript{1} If meaning of a word is not situated in mind previously, hearer cannot conceive the meaning of speech. At a unknown point of time, mind first bears the spoken word in a certain meaning, only after that it is expressed by sound passing through various speech-organs.\textsuperscript{2}

Bhartrhari explains many conditions with appropriate reasons that why mental reality is the base of entire linguistic behaviour. We can enlist them in following manner-

(a) When we use the sentence like ‘one takes his lunch’, it cannot be said that hear meaning was previously in the mind because action is taking place just now in external world before speaker and hearer both. But Bhartrhari says that even in this case when speaker looks one taking his lunch, he has a similar meaning in his mind by virtue of having viewed anyone else taking his lunch previously. That previous meaning produces the meaning of one’s taking lunch in his mind.\textsuperscript{3}

(b) Mental reality cannot serve the practical purposes. As only water found in external world can quench our thirst and the water imagined in mind cannot serve the purpose. But Bhartrhari says that only mental reality reflected in actual reality can relate itself with opposite properties. It is not possible with actual reality of an object that it can bear both opposite properties at any given point of time. He gives the example of crystal here that reflects the colour and form of the nearby object. In the same way spoken word also situated in conceptual reality gets related with opposite and non-opposite properties at the stage of Vākya.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} Šabdah kāranamarthasya sa hi tenopajanyate
Tathā ca buddhivisayādarthācchabdah pratīyate (VP 3.3.32)

\textsuperscript{2} Vitarkitah purā buddhyā kvacidarthe nivesītah
karnebhyo vivṛttena dhavaninā so’nughrhyate (VP 1.47)

\textsuperscript{3} Bhojanādyapi manyante buddhyarthē yadasambhavi
budhyarthadhēva buddhyarthē jāte tadapi drṣyate (VP 3.3.33)

\textsuperscript{4} Spatikādi yathā dravyam bhinnarūpairupāśrayaih
Svaśaktīyogāt sambandham tādṛṣṭyaḥ upapagacchati
tadvacchabḍoṣi sattāyāmasaṃyām pūrvam vyavasthitah
dharmairupāti sambandhamavirodhivirdhibhih (VP 3.3.40-41)
(c) Whenever we use negative usages like 'âbrâhmaṇa' to convey the meaning of negation, this usage can only be justified if mental reality as the meaning is accepted because 'âbrâhmaṇa' means 'Brâhmaṇa not existing' and this meaning is self-contradictory as existence and its negation cannot stand together. If 'âbrâhmaṇa' means the non-existence of 'brâhmaṇa', yet the negation is not justified because only existing should be negated. If anything does not exist at all, there is neither need nor any justification to negate it. But if we accept mental reality as the meaning of all words there is not inadequacy in the case of negation also. In the case of acceptance of mental reality as the meaning of words, in this particular usage of 'âbrâhmaṇa' meaning of Brâhmaṇ is imposed on Ksatriya etc. and that mental meaning is subject of negation.

(d) ‘Devadatta is born’ like sentences can not be used if external reality is accepted as a base for linguistic behaviour because ‘to be born’ means “to obtain himself” and here in this example Kartā (Devadatta) and Karma (Devadatta) are same which is not possible as “Devadatta goes to village” is like the example “Devadatta obtains himself”. In the example “Devadatta goes to village”, Devadatta is subject of the sentence and village is the object and both are different from each other. In the same way in the example “Devadatta obtains himself” Devadatta should be different from himself but that is not possible. Another problem is that Devadatta is existing before going takes place but likewise Devadatta is not existing before birth of Devadatta takes place. Also village, the destination, is existing before Devadatta starts to go to village but this is not the case with the usage like “Devadatta obtains himself (his form)” because Devadatta cannot exist before Devadatta starts to obtain his own form. So, if the external reality is accepted as the meaning of words, Sentences like “Devadutta is born” cannot be justified but if mental reality is accepted as the

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1 Evam ca pratisedhyeṣu pratisedhāprakṛptaye āśriteṣūpācāreṇa pratiṣedhah pravartate (VP 3.3.42)
2 Ātmālābhasya janmākhyā (VP 3.3.43)
3 Sato hi ganturgaṇamam sati gamye pravartate
   Gaṇṭṛvaccenā jānmantho na cet tadvanna jāyate (VP 3.3.44)
meaning of words, there is justification as in this view even Devadatta is absent in external world, he may exist in mind. Now mental Devadatta obtains his form in external world and in this way, the explanation of birth as to obtain his own form, also gets confirmed. Otherwise if Devedutta is present in external world, it cannot be said that Devadatta is taking birth because Devadatta obtained his form in external world already and if Devadatta is not existing, how can he obtain his form? So, there are many problems if we accept that words refer external objects and all these problems get resolved if we accept that words refer mental realities.

(e) Bhartrhari also presents the examples of existence. Existence means “to hold itself”.\(^1\)

This is the view of Niruktakāra Yāska. Bhartrhari is translating this view here. When we say that “something exists”, it means that some thing is holding itself by itself.

Though here according to meaning ‘As’ dhātu should be sakarmaka but as meaning of ‘As dhātu’ has included the object, that is itself, it is akarmaka.\(^2\)

Usages like ‘Pot exists’ can also be justified only when mental reality as the meaning of all words is accepted because use of present tense denotes that action has not been completed and is to be accomplished. In this case when pot has not completed the act of existing the word pot cannot be used as pot is not at all.\(^3\)

But this is the problem when we accept that meaning of the word is external reality. All problems get resolved when we accept that use of sentence is based on mental reality.

At last Bhartrhari indicates that Mahābhāṣya has also the same view in this regard.\(^4\)

Patañjali while commenting on matuppūtra (P 5.2.94) pointed out the purpose of using the term ‘asti’ in sūtra that matup suffix should be applied only when existence

\(^1\) Ātmānāmaṁtmanā bibhṛbadastūṁ vyapadīsyate
Antarbhāvācca tenāsa karmanā na sakarmakaḥ (VP 3.3.47)

\(^2\) (a) Tathā ca niruktādāraḥ astītyotpannasyāṁmadhārṣamucyate - helārāja on (VP 3.3.47)
(b) Astītyotpannasya sattvasyātmadhāraṁ - Nirukta (1.2)

\(^3\) Prāk ca sattābhśisambandhāṃnukhyā sattā kathaṁ bhavet
Asaṁcā nāṣteḥ kartā syādūpācārastu pūrvvavat (VP 3.3.48)

\(^4\) Pravṛttihetuṁ sarveśāṁ sabdāṁmauca śāriṁ
Etāṁ satāṁ padārtho hi na kaścidavārata
sā ca sampratisattāyaḥ pṛthagbhāṣye nidarśitaḥ (VP 3.3.50 to 3.51)
should be related to present, not to future or to past.\(^1\) It means that in view of Patañjali also words are used to denote mental reality because only mental reality can be in present, future and past. External reality can be only in present, neither in past nor in future.

**Lingual behaviour is not perfect**

In sambandhasamuddeśa, Bharṭṛhari says that words do not refer to complete reality.\(^2\) Either words denote incomplete reality or false concept of reality. Either non-existence is denoted or indirect indication is made.\(^3\) When the word cow is used, it does not refer all properties of cow. When universal inherited in any object, action or property of any object is described, it is not direct description of the object because jāti, Guṇa and Kriyā are different from the object and any description based on jāti, Guṇa and Kriyā is the description of the object through all these inherited properties and not a direct one. In view of vijñānavādin all reality is internal and appears external. So whole lingual behaviour is description of contrary (viparyaya). In view of Brahmavādin also Brahman is one without the other but appears many due to upādhi and words denote the manifested forms of Brahman. So the denotation of words is again the contrary in view of nature of meaning. Śūnyavādin (Nihilist) opines that everything emerges from Śūnya that cannot be expressed (nirupākhyā). So in their view, words denote Śūnya and thus denote non-existence for practical purposes.

In Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa, Bharṭṛhari defined Drvya\(^4\) and separation of Drvya as meaning of word from sentential meaning. When pronoun is used to denote an object that

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1. *Idaṁ tarhi prayojanaṁ sampratisattayaṁ*  
   *yathā syādbhūtabhaviṣyatsattayaṁ*  
   *mā bhūt gāvo'śyāsan gāvo'sya*  
   *bhavitāraḥ - Mahābhāṣya (P 5.2.94)*

2. *Pradeśasyaikadeśanāṁ va parato vā nirūpāṇaṁ*  
   *viparyayamahāvānaṁ vā vyavahāro'nuvartate* (VP 3.3.52)

3. *Akrūnāvniṣayābhāṣaṁ sābdāḥ prayayamāśnāḥ*  
   *Arthamāṇāhānirūpaṇa svarūpāṇaniśpitām* (VP 3.3.54)

4. *Vastiśpalakṣaṇaṁ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate*  
   *Dravyamītyucyaṁ so'ṛtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ* (VP 3.4.3)
meaning is called ‘dravya’. This is the first definition of Dravya. Pronouns are of two types. Some pronouns denote all objects generally as sarva, viśwa etc. and some pronouns denotes specified objects as anyatara, anyatama etc. This definition is related to first category of pronouns who denote all objects generally. Second definition of dravya is purely linguistic. According to this, the meaning which is intended to be expressed as qualified (viśeṣya), is called dravya. This second definition has something to do with structure of vākya because qualifier and qualified should have same number, gender and case. Not only this Pāṇini also formulates the rule that viśeṣaṇa shold come first and viśeṣya thereafter in a compound.\(^1\) It affects the structure of vākya indirectly. Pāṇini also formulates the rule that number and gender of viśeṣaṇa should be in agreement of viśeṣya whose suffix denoting some meaning is deleted.\(^2\) It affects the structure of vākyay directly.

In Guṇasamuddeśa, Bhartṛhari has defined quality\(^3\) Vyākaraṇaśāstra also accepts the practical perception of quality. What is that perception? Quality is always dependent upon substance (dravya). Quality delimits the particular substance from its fellow substance. Objects belonging to the same class are differentiated by the quality. This is the function of quality that it distinguishes a particular substance from other substances. When we describe superiority of anything, we apply some suffixes to the base. Tarap, tamap, iṣṭhan’ iyasan are suffixes, prescribed by Pāṇini to denote superiority of quality, dependant on the object. Here, superiority is a relative term used also in bad sense because as we use “Prakṛṣṭatara” so we use “nikṛṣṭatara” also.\(^4\) In other words when a object is described inferior or superior, the base for this linguistic behaviour is quality.

In Diksamuddeśa Bhartṛhari defined direction. Concept of partial division of solid objects is firstly based on direction. Direction has the first power to decide many parts of an

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1. viśeṣaṇaṁ viśeṣyeṣa bahulam (P 2.1.57)
2. viśeṣaṇaṁ cājāteḥ (P 1.2.52)
3. Sarhsargi bhedaṁ yadyat savyāpāraṁ pratiyate gunatvaṁ paratantratvāttasya śāstra udāḥtam (VP 3.5.1)
4. Sarvaṁ ca sarvato’ vaśyaṁ niyamena prakṛṣyate sarhsargiṇā nimittena nikṛṣṭeṇādhikeṇā vā (VP 3.5.6)
object. Paramāṇu, the minutest particle of the object, has no partition further. Though its part is imagined in mind on the basis of direction. When we have to express the limit of anyone in relation to other, Pañcamī vibhakti is used. But the same word is used with śaṣṭhī vibhakti when it expresses the meaning of part. Bhartṛhari explains it in a Kārikā. Pāṇini formulates rules in this connection. The word expressing part of anything should be used with śaṣṭhī vibhakti. This is not stated clearly but suggested through two sūtras by Pāṇini. In vyākaraṇaśāstra, some rules related to words expressing direction determine the structure of vākya. Words used to express direction become antodātta in compound when villages, janapada (district in loose sense) ākhyāna (narrative) and the word cānarāta are articulated after these words (diksābda). The words used to express the sense of direction also express space and time. When these are used with saptamī, pañcamī and prathamā vibhakti, a suffix called astāti is applied to them. This suffix does does not change the meaning but adds to the structure of word. When words expressing direction are compounded, they become pronouns optionally. This makes a slight difference to their structure in some cases. Pāṇini formulated other rules also related to direction but they have to do with Pada only and structure of vākya is not affected directly in those cases.

In sādhanasamuddeśa, Bhartṛhari discussed about tools to accomplish any action. According to Bhartṛhari capacity inherited in its own locus (svāśraya) or in different loci (āśrayāntara) to accomplish an action is called sādhana. Mental reality is the base of linguistic behaviour. This is the principle of vyākaraṇaśāstra. Bhartṛhari applies it to

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1 Paramāṇorabhāgasya diśā bhāgo vidhyate
   bhāgaprakalpanāśaktim prathamāṁ tām pracakṣate (VP 3.6.13)
2 Avadhitvena çipekṣayoge diglakṣalā vidhil (VP 3.6.21)
3 Anyārāditaretadiksābdāducittarapadājāhyukte (P 2.3.29)
4 (a) Tasya paramāṃcritam (P 8.1.2)
   (b) Pūrva parādarottaramekadesinai dhikārakarane (P 2.2.1)
5 Diksābdā grāmājanapadādhikānyācānāntara (P 6.2.103)
6 Diksābdēbhāya śaptamāpaṭcamāprathamābhyyo digdēsākālesvastāti (P 5.3.27)
7 Vibhāṣā dīksamāse bahuvrhihau (P 1.1.28)
explain partition (Apāya). When speaker divides two or more meanings, it implies that previously those meanings were one in his mind otherwise division cannot take place. When unified meaning is divided then departure is meant. Both functions of unification and division take place in mind. So paṇḍāna is mental and paṇcāmi vibhakti is used to express the meaning of paṇḍāna. When a narrative is narrated or a drama is played, the form of various characters of remote past is produced by speech in the mind and hearer or viewer perceives those characters as sādhana (karm, karaṇa etc.). This process of perception is the same in case of painting or a statue. So, this is the mental reality which is imposed on objects and their capacities are assumed as sādhana. Bhartrhari explains all this on the basis of Mahābhāṣya. Entire vākyapadiya is based on Mahābhāṣya. Bhartrhari himself admits the fact at the end of vākyakāṇḍa that his guru composed this collection of āgama after practicing vyākaraṇa darśana and other philosophies.

This sādhana has been named as kāraka in vyākaraṇaśāstra. Kāraka means Kartr (doer). As every sādhana accomplishes some action, so every kāraka has doership (kartrtva). Only function of every kāraka differs that is why karman, karaṇa, sampradāna, paṇḍāna, and adhikaraṇa are also called kāraka not only Kartr. Kartr is technical term which can not be replaced by Kāraka though semantically both express same meaning. Kartr is independent and other Kāraka-s are dependent on Kartr. When Kartr appoints other Kāraka-s in their respective functions, other Kāraka-s are independent to accomplish their

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1. Buddhyā samāhitaikatvān pañcālān kurubhiryadā punarvibhajate vaktā tadā' pāyah pratīyate (VP 3.7.4)
2. Paṇḍāne paṇcāmi (P 2.3.28)
3. Sabdopahitarpānsc buddherviṣayatāṁ gatān pratyaśamiva kāṁśādāṁ śādhanatvena manayate (VP 3.7.5)
4. Buddhipravṛttirūpaṁ ca samāropābhidhārtrbhīḥ artheṣu śaktibhedānāṁ kriyate parikalpanā (VP 3.7.6)
5. See Mahābhāṣya on (P 2.3.42 and 3.1.26)
6. Parvatādāgamarī labdhvā bhāṣyābjānusāribhīḥ Sa nīto bahuśākāhātvān candrācāryādibhīḥ punāḥ Nyāyaprasthānamārgasthābhasya svām ca darśanam pranīto gurunāmākayamāgamasamgrahāḥ (VP 2.481-482)
7. Nispattimātre kārttrvāmśarvatraivāstī kārake Vyāpārabhedāpeksāyāṁ karaṇādītvasāṁbhavaḥ (VP 3.7.18)
8. Svatantraḥ Kartrā (P 1.4.54)
function but dependent to accomplish main function that is to be accomplished by all functions together. So, dependence of Kārka-s is relative to Karta otherwise they are independent to accomplish their functions. Bhartrhari explains it with an example. As in a war, king appoints soldiers to fight from his side. Soldiers are independent in fighting but the main function is to get victory. So, in this example, soldiers fight but at the end, this is the king who wins or loses the war, not soldiers. Defeat or victory goes to the king, not to soldiers. Soldiers are independent to fight but they are fighting to win victory for their King, so they are dependent on king for starting or stopping to fight as king appoints them to fight. Soldiers do not fight on their own wish. This is their dependence. Same is the case with Karta and other Kāraka-s. when Karta appoints other Kārka-s in their respective functions, they are dependent on Karta to accomplish the main task by performing their respective actions without help of any other. In this condition, other Kāraka-s also become Karta. This can be easily understood by some examples-

(i) Bāli Hanyate (Karman is Karta here)

(ii) kāṣṭhāni pacanti (Karaṇa is Karta here)

(iii) Balāhako vidyotate (clouds and lightning are intended one by speaker. Apādāna is Karta here)

(iv) Sthāli pacati (Adhikaraṇa is Karta here)

Patañjali endorses all this interpretation in Mahābhāṣya (P 1.4.23) Sampradāna and Apādāna have not that type of independence which karma, karaṇa and adhikaraṇa enjoy in linguistic behaviour. Yet Sampradāna also has own specific independence in his own function. That is to inspire some one to give and to permit someone (any dependent son,
wife, servant etc.) to give and finally to accept the alms. Not to reject to take something is the function where sampradāna enjoys freedom. But as sampradāna requires giver and apādāna requires departer, they can not enjoy independence like other Kāraka-s. That is why patañjali shows the example of Apādana as kartā by intended unification of clouds and lightning otherwise apādāna cannot act as kartā because it demands someone else as departer.

Every Kāraka has its own well defined action. Different vibhakti-s are used to express the meaning intended by speaker. Bhartrhari gives an example to show the use of different vibhakti-s according to intention of speaker. Father and mother both are subject (Kartā) in giving birth to a progeny but the word expressing the meaning of mother is used with saptami vibhakti and word expressing the meaning of father is used with Pañcamī vibhakti because mother is the locus of the womb, thus adikaraṇa Kāraka here and father makes the mother conceived by the act of fertilization, thus apādāna Kāraka here. This difference is solely based on implication of speaker.

When a doer requires another doer to accomplish an act, he is called hetu. Instrument is to accomplish the act. So act is principal and instrument is subordinate. In various usages, for this reason, instrument is represented by anyone as in the example “Bāñena hataḥ”, there is no representation of act of killing but representation of arrow is seen as bullet, mine, knife, javelin or spear. In the same way when act is for hutu (technical term for appointer of a doer), hetu is primary and act is secondary. In this case hetu is not represented. Example is “adhyayanena vasati”, one resides for study. Here, Trīyā vibhakti is used not to denote instrument, but to denote a cause. Here study is primary and cannot be represented and if another cause is taken, that will be primary and then that cause cannot be represented. When the same act is performed representation is possible

1 Kārakaṁ niyatakriyam (VP 3.7.25)
2 Putrasya janmani yathā pitroḥ kartṛtvamucyate. Ayamasyāmiyaṁ tvasmāditī bhedo vivakṣayā (VP 3.7.19)
3 (a) Kartā karantarāpekṣāṁ kriyāyāṁ heturiṣyate (VP 3.7.25)
   (b) Tatprayojako hetusca (P 1.4.55)
but when act changes with the change of representative, representation is neither required nor justified because representation is needed to accomplish the same act in absence of prescribed object, person etc. When study is hetu suffix is added to the verb root. In given example “adhayanaṁ vāsayaṁ” will be sentence.

There are seven types of Karaka-s where six are specified with most desired object, instrument, object of donation, departure and locus and seventh is general Karaka, that is non-implication (avivakṣā) of other Karaka-s, called śeṣa in vyākaranasāstra.

Karma and Apādāna kāraka are described in many ways in vyākaraṇa Śāstra but that elaboration is for them who are not so wise. Pāṇini defines karma kāraka as most desired by kartā. Patañjali rejects the superlative degree of desire and accepts only desire. So, whatever is desired by doer is karma. This is the definition of karma. Only this single definition is sufficient to include all varities of karma, elaborated by other sūtra-s by Pāṇini. Keeping this in mind Bhartṛhari said that only one karma and one apādāna kāraka has been described in Śāstra. Desire is not always after due consideration but also due to fickleness of mind or fear etc. That is why a grieved person takes poison etc. When a person thinks that life is more sorrow.

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1 Hetumati ca (P 3.1.26)
2 Sāmānyāṁ kārakaṁ tasya saptādyā bhedayonayāḥ
3 Sat karmāchyā dibhedin Śeṣabhedaṁ satpadīṁ (VP 3.7.44)
4 Yathāya vākṣaṁ śabdiṁ Śāstrei bhedena darśitaṁ
   Tathaikameva karmāpi bhedena pratipādaṁ (VP 3.7.78)
5 Nirdhāraṇe vibhakte yo bhīṛtrāthānāṁ ca yo vidhiṁ
   Upāṭtāpekṣitāpyaṁ so 'budhāpratipattaye (VP 3.7.147)
6 Karturipsitatamaṁ kārma (P 1.4.49)
7 See mahābhāṣya on (P 1.4.49)
ful than death and only death can give him salvation from miseries of this world, he
wishes to take poison because in that mental condition poison also becomes desired to be
achieved (Ipsita). Patañjali puts this simple fact of everyday life while commenting on a
sūtra (P 1.4.50).\footnote{Viṣabhakṣaṇamapi kasyacidīpsitaṁ bhavatikathāṁ iha ya esa manuśyo dukkhārto bhavati so'nyaṁ
dukkhāṇyanunīśāmya viṣabhakṣaṇameva jyāyo manyate. - Mahābhāṣya (P 1.4.50)} Bhartṛhari adds a bit to it. He says that one engages himself in unwanted
harmful activities due to ignorance. Fickleness of mind is direct cause of having a desire
of harmful things. This inconsistency, impatience or hopelessness of mind is caused by
imagination of fear etc.\footnote{Viṣādiṣu bhayādibhyastathāvāsau pravratate (VP 3.7.80)}

Akarmaka dhātu-s become Sakarmaka and Sakarmaka dhātu-s become Akarmaka in
certain conditions. Bhartṛhari says that when action, time, distance to be travelled and
places relate with akarmaka dhātu, they become Sakarmaka. In this case akarmaka dhātu
includes another action that is part of main action.\footnote{Kālabhāvādavadeśāntantarbhūtakriyāntaraṁ
Sarvairakarmakaṁyo karmaṇamupajāyante (VP 3.7.67)}

Examples are as follows-

1- Māsamāste (.... lives a month)

2- Godohamāste (.... Sits till cow is milked)

3- Kṛoṣaṁ svapiṁ (....Sleeps upto a mile)]

4- Kuruṁ svapiṁ (....sleeps in Kuru)

Here kuru is a famous place and used in plural number to denote the people who live
there.\footnote{Lupi yuktavadyaktivacane (P 1.2.51)}

In the same way Sakarmaka Dhātu-s become Akarmaka in certain conditions. There are
certain conditions where karma remains but due to some factors, sakarmaka dhātu is also
said Akarmaka. Generally these are four but may vary more also due to variation of
factors. Bhartṛhari says-

Dhātorarthāntare Vṛttedhātuvarthenopasāṅgrahāt

Prasiddheravivakṣātaḥ karmāṇo' karmikā Kriyā
Bhedā ya ete catvāraḥ Sāmānyena pradarśitaḥ

Te nimitiddibhedena bhidyante bahudhā punah¹

These four conditions may be elaborated in following ways-

1- First is change of meaning of dhātu. When dhātu deviates from its commonly used meaning to another meaning, dhātu becomes Akarmaka. Example is 'Bhārāṃ vahati' (one carries the weight). Here weight is the object of verb carrying. When vah dhātu deviates from this meaning and express the meaning of flowing, it turns Akarmaka. Example is 'Nādi vahati'. In this condition, object is not different from the subject because when question arises as what river flows, answer is nothing other than river itself. Flowing is itself in the form of the river. So in this usage, vah dhātu becomes Akarmaka.

2- Second is inclusion of object by verb in its meaning. When dhātu expresses the meaning of Karma also, it becomes Akarmaka because of inclusion of Karma, there is not any different karm left which can be related to the dhātu and this relationship is virtually compulsory for a dhātu to be Akarmaka. Example is 'Jivati' (.... survives). Survival means to hold breath. As breath (Praṇa) is object of verb hold and that is here included by survive or any other verb having similar meaning, verb has turned Akarmaka.

3- Third is understanding of Karma without any fail. When Karma is so well-known and its relationship with action is so certain that mere use of dhātu makes karma known, dhātu becomes Akarmaka otherwise it is Sakarmaka. Example is 'varṣati' (... rains). Here, use of rain makes the object water known without any fail because relationship of verb rain is so certain with water that mere use of verb rain suggests the object water. The object which is not famous, the verb becomes transitive with that object. Example is 'śarāṃ varṣati' (... throws arrows). Here arrow is not so well related object with varṣa dhātu that mere use of varṣa dhātu can suggest the object.

¹ VP (3.7.88-89)
4- Fourth is non-implication of karma. When object is not implied by speaker, though it has a relation with verb, the verb becomes Akarmaka. Examples are 'na dadāti, na pacati, no juhoti, na karoti, na pathati' etc. Here what does he give, cook, offers, do or read is not implied by speaker. Speaker has not intention to elaborate the detail. He simply intends to convey the meaning of negation.

These four factors have been generally described but variations of these are many. Bhartrhari not elaborated these variations but left them on wit of reader. Commentators indicated some of them and at last they also left the elaboration saying that other usages should be sought likewise. Actually this is not easy to collect all usages showing variation of all these above mentioned four conditions of being intransitive. Helārāja indicated some of them. They are being enlisted here as follows-

1. Use of upasarga (Prefix) changes the meaning of dhātu and dhātu becomes Akarmaka. Example is vāspa uccarati, dhūma uccarati etc. Here cara dhātu is Sakarmaka but due to use of upasarga ut, it expresses the meaning of moving upward and becomes Akarmaka otherwise it was Sakarmaka, meaning to go from a place to another place and thus having place as its object.

2. Use of átmanepada, several times, expresses Akarmakatva (intransitiveness). Pāṇini formulated rules in this regard. As use of átmanepada and parasmaipada is only confined to Sāṁskṛta, these rules are not so valuable for other languages. According to Pāṇini also, in these cases use of átmanepada is not making dhātu akarmaka but the case is reverse. Akarmaka dhātu is expressed by the use of átmanepada. So, here átmanepada is marker of Akarmaka dhātu. Examples are uttapatē, Vitapatē, uttiṣṭhatē etc.

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1 Iti yathāyogamanusaranīyam prayogajātamiṣṭam- Helārāja (VP 3.7.89)
2 a. Akarmakāca (P 1.3.26)
   b. Udvibhyāni tapah (P 1.3.27)
   c. Āno yamaḥanaḥ (P 1.3.28)
   d. Sāmo gamyṛcchipacchisvaratyartiśruvidhyah (P 1.3.29)
   e. Akarmakāca (P 1.3.35)
   f. Akarmakāca (P 1.3.45)
   g. Anorakarmakā (P 1.3.49)
3. Sometimes meaning of sentence expresses in transitiveness. Examples are nadi vahati, Vāyurvahati etc. Previously this example (nādi vahati) has been given to show deviation of meaning but here repeated to show that the said deviation of meaning sometimes takes place due to understanding of vākya. These abovementioned three sub-factors are related with deviation of meaning of dhātu.

4. Inclusion of object by meaning of verb also varies for many reasons. In some cases this is the capability of verb itself that it includes the object. Examples are jivati (... holds breath), mriyate (... relinquishes breath), asti (...) holds itself) jāyate (...) obtains himself) etc.

5. In some cases, object is included in verb meaning purely by grammatical analysis. Example is putriyati (... behaves someone like son). Here son is object but only Kyac suffix has been added to putra and 'putriya' verb included the object son in its meaning. Actually son is not here but a particular wish to behave without following the meaning of son is reflected. Bhartrhari explained it. 'Putriyati chātraṁ guruḥ' is the example. Here verb is transitive though it should be intrasitive as it included the object son by its structural meaning. Helarāja replies that here verb has included the object 'putra' and should be Akarmaka but remains Sakarmaka because of the object 'Chātra' which stands excluded. He says-

Ācāraṁ yacya tvatropamānakaṁ kārmaṁtarbhūtam upameyakarmo 'tu Sakarmakatvam. ²

Similar is the case of examples like 'muṇḍayati maṇṇavakaṁ' 'miśrayati tilān etc. In usages like vāśpāyate, Ŭśmāyate, Romanthāyate etc. verbs become Akarmaka because objects have been included by verb. Inclusion of object has also certain limits. Where object of certain verb is well-known as separate from the verb it is not included by verb. Usage in currancy indicates where object is separate and where it is included. For example the verb cook and the verb penetrate have their separate objects as usages of these verbs indicate like one cooks rice and one penetrates airport security. Where the object is commonly used as separate from verb, the inclusion is possible. But where it is not used as separate

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¹ Putriyatau na putro'sti viśeśecchā tu tādrśī vinaiva putrānugamādā putre vyavatiḥṣhate (VP 3.14.69)
² Helārāja on VP 3.7.89
from verb, inclusion of the object is not possible as shown above with cook and penetrate.

In usages like 'jalaṃ varṣati' (water falls) object is used separately but where it is included in the verb, it cannot be used separately. So there are not sentences in use like one survives breath (jīvati prāṇān) because the verb survive (jīv) includes the object breath by virtue of its meaning and in this case separate use of the object is not required.

These two (serial no. 4 & 5) sub factors are related with inclusion of object by verb. Of these, factors of grammatical analysis is language specific. It is possible in one language if it has this type of grammatical ruling based on the usages in that particular language.

6. Where object is so well known that mere use of verb denotes the object, hence separate use of object is not required, verb becomes Akarmaka. This fact of being well-known also varies for some reasons. Place and time are also the reasons for variation. In place where non-vegetarians are in majority, cooking means cooking of meat etc. In Dakṣināpatha fore noon indicates that cooking will be of Odana.¹

7. In some cases by virtue of the verb itself the object is ascertained due to very much currency of that type of usage as dhatu vrṣ makes the object water known.

8. Sometimes doer (kartr) denotes the object by virtue of its own features. For example 'a gentleman does' denotes the beneficial action and "a wicked person does" denotes the harmful action.

9. Sometimes a particular society decides the object by merely using the verb. For example in society of grammarians 'discuss' denotes the object as language, in society of Naiyāyika-s, it denotes sixteen ontological categories (Ṣodaśa Padārtha), in society of Sāṃkhya-s, it denotes twenty five elements.

These four above mentioned sub factors (Serial No. 6, 7, 8 and 9) are related with the well known ness of the obejct.

10. When a Vākya conveys similarity only, Karma is not implied and the verb becomes Akarmaka. For example, 'Rāma speaks as Syāma conveys similarity of

¹ Tadyathā Daisiṇāpathe pūrvāhe pacyaṭām ityukte yavāgūkarmakah pāko′vagamyate aparāhe punarodanasādīhanaḥ māṁsabhāṣīṣthe tu deśe māṁsasādhanah pākah prasiddhah - Helārāja on (VP 3.7.89)
Rāma and Śyāma with respect of speaking. Here word, tone or style as the object of speaking is not implied.

11. When a sentence conveys only a particular action, relation of object with verb is not implied there. For example, one asks about the action of someone as what does he do, and the answer is 'he reads'. In this case only to convey the action of reading is implied, not the object of reading such as books, newspaper or magazine etc.

12. When a sentence conveys the continuation of an action than also object is not implied. For example, he only reads, he only gives, he cooks only. In these sentences the continuation of the action is conveyed hence object is not implied.

These three above mentioned sub-factors (Serial no. 10, 11 and 12) are related with non-implication of object.

Karman becomes Kartṛ

Bhartrṛhari explained previously in Sadhanasamuddeśa (VP 3. 7.20-21) that śādhanas (Kāraka-s) are independent to accomplish their own actions but in the presence of doer, they become dependent on doer in respect of accomplishment of main task which consists of many activities performed by other Śādhanas (Karma, karāṇa, Sampradāna etc.) Now he explains that not only Kartā becomes karma but in some cases, Karma also becomes Kartā (Karmakartṛbhāva). When kartā does not appoint other kāraka-s in their own actions, they become free to perform their respective actions. Karma also, in this condition, becomes free to perform its respective action and in absence of appointment made by kartā, achieves its freedom to perform its action. This is its own kartṛtvā of karman which it retains in absence of kartā. Bhartrṛhari says all this in these words-

Nivṛttapreṣaṇāṁ karma Svākriyāvayave sthitam

Nivartamāne karmatve sve kartṛtvēvatiṣṭhate.¹

As karma becomes kartā (in absence of kartā) Pāṇini formulates a rule in this regard to apply some prescriptions applicable to karma on kartā. This also shows that karma

¹ VP 3.7.56
becomes kartā and to explain the usages current in contemporary language in this regard, Pāṇini treats this kartā as karma by formulating a rule1 in this regard otherwise there was no need for the rule. Bhartṛhari also points out this position of vyākaraṇa Śāstra in this kārikā-

Tadvyāpāraviveke'pi svavyāpāre vyavasthitam

karmāpadiṣṭān labhate kvacīchāstrāsrayān vidhīn2

Bhartṛhari briefly puts the view about karmakartṛbhava assuming that reader is aware of the elaboration made in this regard through examples in Mahābhāṣya.3

Dhātus are called Sakarmaka and Akarmaka due to pradhāna arma. Karma which is dravya (substance) is main and time, distance, action and place are not pradhānakarma because kriyā, at first, relates with dravyakarma and then with time etc.-4, so, where dravyakarma is not present, lakāras etc. express time etc. For example four sentences may be seen here as follows-

1. Āsyate māsah
2. Āsitavyo māsah
3. Āsito māsah
4. Svāso māsah

In all these four sentences karma 'māsa' (month) is expressed by lakāra, kṛtya, kta and khalartha suffixes respectively.

Ās dhātu is called Akarmaka because it has no dravyakarma, even time etc. are available as karma as they are available every where. So bhāva (meaning of verb) is also expressed by lakāras etc. Example is

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1 P. 3.1.87
2 VP 3.7.55
3 See Mahābhāṣya on (P 3.1.87)
4 Ādhāratvamivaprāptāste punardravyakarmanu kālādayo bhinnakaksyaṁ yānti karmatvamuttaram- (VP 3.7.68)
“Māsamāsyate bhavatā”. In this example kta suffix expresses kartā (Devatta) because kta cannot express karma as ās dhātu is Akarmaka. In the example ‘masa māsitam devadattena’ Kta suffix expresses bhāya (action) that is here sitting.

Pāṇini has also attributed the name karma to other karaka-s when they are not implied as themselves. In this regard Bhartṛhari explained that pradhānakarma is called which is desired to be gained through action and akathita karma is called which is used as a medium to gain that pradhāna karma and connected to action. Hence, this akathitakarma also expressed by dvityā vibhakti. When a sentence is used to explain anything, a difference occurs between the two-explanatory sentence and explained thing. Though the meaning is the same, structure of vābya is different. Bhartrhari indicates it in this kārikā-

Bhedavākyam tu yat ṇyante nīduhiprakṛttau ca yat
Sabdāntaratvānnaivāsti sāmśparśastāṣya dhātunā for example “gamayati” is explained by the sentence ‘gacchantam prayuṅkte’ Though the meaning is same but structure of vākya is different. Hence system of arrangement of kāraka-s also differs. Kartā becomes karma when some dhātu-s are used with nic suffix. Pāṇini formulates a rule in this regard.

When a karma is related with two actions, one being main and other being subordinate, suffix expresses the karma related with main action and in that case, karma linked with subordinate action, though unexpressed,

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1 akathita) ca (p 1.4.51)
2 Pradhānakarma kathitaṁ yat kriyāyāḥ prajyakam Tatsiddhaye kriyāyuktamanyattvakathitaṁ smrtam – (VP 3.7.71)
3 Pradhānakarma kathitaṁ yat kriyāyāḥ prajyakam Tatsiddhaye kriyāyuktamanyattvakathitaṁ smrtam – (VP 3.7.71)
4 Gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabdakarmākarmakānāmaṇ kartā sa ṇau (p 1.4.52)
stands as expressed following the karma related with main action. “Paktvaudano bhujaśate” is the example suggested by Bhartiḥari

In Śādhanasamuddeśa Bhartiḥari while defining karaṇa says that nothing can be decided as karaṇa without fail because only implication of speaker decides it. Bhartiḥari chooses the example ‘Sthālyā pacyate’ to show the sthāli simply used as Adhikaraṇa kāraka as often, to be used here as karaṇa kāraka, This is due to implication of speaker.

Pāṇini defined that karaṇa is the most efficient and Bhatṛhari defined that karaṇa is that immediately after whose function, action is implied to be accomplished. There is not any difference between two definition Bhartiḥari only explains pāṇini that this is the efficiency of karaṇa that its function is required immediately before the completion of activity. This superlative degree of efficiency is related with other kāraka-s and should not be applied to the own category of karaṇa-s when many instrument are implied for completion of a action, all are equally efficient and no superiority or inferiority is sought there. This superiority is sought with respect of other kāraka-s Bhartiḥari put it in a kārika-

Svakāṣyāsu prakaraṇaśca karaṇānāṁ na vidyate

Āśritātiṣayatvāṁ tu parastatatra laṅaṇam

Example may be ‘Aśvena pathā dipikayā yāti’. Here horse, path and lamp all are instrument equally helping in completion of action of going there is no superiority or inferiority among them.

When instruments used in cutting like sword, knife etc. are used as kartā in a vākya, sharpness, heaviness, hardness shape etc. become instrument (karaṇa). For example, sword cuts by virtue of sharpness’ (Asiḥ

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1 Pacāvanuktam yat karaṇa ktvānte bhāvā bhidhāyini, Bhujau śaktyantare' pyakte tadvaddharman prakāṣate- (VP 3.7.83)
2 Śādhaṅkatamam karaṇam (p 1.4.42)
3 Kriyāyāḥ parinipteryadvyāpārādantaṁ vivakṣyate yada tatra karaṇatvāṁ tadā śmṛte- (VP (3.7.90)
4 VP (3.7.93)
taikṣṇyena chinatti) is the sentence where sword is subject and sharpness becomes instrument. Sharpness also may be implied as kartā and karaṇa both. Examples are as follows-

1. ṛṣiḥ taikṣṇyena chinatti
   (Sharpness is instrument to cut here)

2. Taikṣṇyam svasāmartyena Chinatti (Sharpness is subject here) This is the dualness of sharpness that it turns kartā and karaṇa loth as per implication of speaker¹

It is not necessary for instrument to be present at the time and place of the action in progress.

It may be absent and yet may be karaṇa if it accomplishes the action implied by the speaker. Examples are following:-

1. Dātraḥ lunāti (karaṇa is present and accomplishing the task of harvesting)

2. Ekena na viṃśatiḥ (One is absent and karaṇa here and accomplishing the negation of twenty)

Pāṇini also supports this view. It is shown by a rule formulated by him in this regard. He says that rtīyā and pañcamī vibhakti should be used to express the meaning of karaṇa when stoka Alpa, kṛcchra and katipaya express the meaning other than substance. It means that stoka (small amount) etc. are not present at the time of action yet they may be implied as karaṇa. Examples may be following:-

1. Stokena muktaḥ
2. Stokānmuktaḥ
3. Alpānmuktaḥ
4. Alpena muktaḥ

¹ Dātraḥ lunāti (karaṇa is present and ) accomplishing the task of harvesting.
5. Kṛcchrena muktaḥ

6. Kṛcchrān Muktaḥ

7. Katipayena muktaḥ

8. Katipayān Muktaḥ

All abovementioned examples are related with recovery of borrowed money or money of penalty etc. when borrower or offender gets off with a small amount of borrowed money or fine. But here small money is not implied because if it is implied, again it will express a substance that is money, which should not be expressed according to rule. Here only small amount is implied nothing else because if small is used as an adjective, it expresses the substance.

Pañini defines kartā as independent Bhartṛhari explains it by supply of reasons\(^1\). These six reasons are as follows-

1. Kartā has power to accomplish the act even before the function of other kāraka-s

2. Kartā makes other kāraka-s subordinate to himself and dependent on himself.

3. The function of other kāraka-s is controlled by kartā.

4. Kartā stops other kāraka-s from functioning when action is completed while itself stops on its own.

5. Kartā is never replaced by anyone while other kāraka-s are replaced by other objects having alike power. So, kartā is not represented while other kāraka-s are represented in absence of prescribed object.

6. Kartā is seen in absence of all other kāraka-s while other kāraka-s can not be seen in absence of kartā

\(^1\) UP, 3.7.101-102
On account of abovementioned six reasons, \( kartā \) is controlled by himself and thus called independent. But there is a problem when unconscious object is subject because it has not mind to act on its own and also to appoint other \( kāraka-s \) to perform. Bhaṭṭṛhari resolves the problem by applying the principal of implication of speaker.

Examples may be following-

1. Ātmā ātmānam ātmanā hanti (one kills himself by himself)
2. Ātmānam sṛjāmyaham\(^1\) (I manifest myself)
3. Saṁstabhya-tmānam-atmanā jahi\(^2\) (Kill after stabilizing’ himself by himself)

In first and third example, subject, object and instrument are the same but treated as different \( kāraka-s \) by virtue of implication of speaker. In second example, instrument is not indicated but subject and object are same and treated differently according to implication of speaker Bhaṭṭṛhari put it in the following kārikā-

**Ekasya buddhyavasthābhīrbhede ca parikalpīte.**

**Karmatvaṁ karaṇatvaṁ ca kartṛtvam copajāyate**

When a vākya is used to indicate the change of form, the problem of kartā arises. The origin and its changed form both have qualification to be kartā. Bhaṭṭṛ, hari, on the basis of usage in language decides that both may be \( kartā \) as both type of uses are available- Bhaṭṭṛhari indicated some of them. Keeping a vārtika in this regard in his mind, he indicates that \( caturthī vibhakti \) expresses changed form (vikāra) with the dhātu \( ktp \) used in sense of becoming.

Example is yavāģūṛmuṭrāyā kalpate

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\(^1\) BG,(4.7) 2. ibid, (3.43) 3. VP, (3.7.104)
\(^2\) Klpi sampadyamāne caturthī vaktavyā- vārtika on (p 2.3.13)
In this example mūtra (Urine) is kartā and yavāgū is indirectly kartā because it is related with action through mūtra. When a difference between origin and its change is implied, pañcamī vibhakti is used but kartā is again mūtra. Example is Bijādaṅkuro jāyate. In mahābhāṣya also, dual number is used to indicate the kartṛtvā of vikāra. patañjali says-

Punarāvṛttataḥ suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ bunaraparayā kṛtyā yuktāh
hadirāṅgārasavarne kuṇḍale bhavataḥ¹

In the abovequoted statement of patañjali, dual number is used according to the number of kuṇḍala-tas suffix expresses kartā here. So kuṇḍala is kartā here not origin, suvarṇapiṇḍa (The lump of gold)²

These abovementioned two indicators denote the changed from as kartā.

But there are also uses denoting both as kartā and denoting the origin as kartā. Examples are mentioned below-

1. Asaṅgho brāhmaṇaḥ saṅgho bhavati

2. Saṅghībhavanti brāhmaṇāḥ³

In these two above mentioned examples siṅgha is changed form and Brāhmaṇa is the origin of saṅgha. Example is the explanation of second example and the meaning of both examples is same. But in first example saṅgha is kartā which denotes that vikāra (changed form) is kartā and in second example brāhmaṇa is kartā which denotes prakṛti (origin) is kartā.

Now again Bhartṛhan quotes from mahābhāṣya in favour of origin as karīṇa patañjali says:

Atvam tvam sampadyate tvadbhavati⁴

In this example tvam (you) is vikāra (changed form) but madhyama puruṣa is not used to denote yuṣmad. Prakṛti (origin) is here different

¹ Pasaśa² mahābhāṣya
² VP, 3.7.116
³ VP, 3.7.116
⁴ Mahābhāṣya on (p 1.4.108)
from *yuṣmad* (Atvam) and *pratham puruṣa* is used to denote *śeṣa* that is Atvam here. So that usage indicates that origin is karta\(^1\)

If both prakṛti and vikāra become kartā in different usages, what is the justification? Bhartṛhari says that when some thing arises from its origin, it does not quit its previous state (original form) and touches the later state (changed form). So, the one substance delimited by two states (previous and later) is mentioned as *jāyate*. So, kartṛtva and sāmānādhi karāṇya (location in same base) of prakṛti and vikāra is logically justified. Examples may be following.

1. Bījamaṅkuro jāyate
2. Kṣīraṁ dadhi sampadyate
3. Vṛksaḥ paṇca naukā bhavati

Above mentioned three examples can be used in many ways. The first example may peresented in two more ways-

1. Bījādaṅkuro jāyate?
2. Bījamaṅkurupena jāyate?

In first example Bīja (ssed) is expressed by paṇcamī vibhakti, denoting Apādāna kāraka and kartā somewhere and somewhere it is Apādāna. Though powers of kartā and apādāna are different but they associate somewhere as in the example Bījamaṅkuro jāyate. When origin is implied to be born, it is main subject and changed born (Vikāra) is kartā only through the origin. And when vikāra is implied to be born, it is main subject and origin is subject through vikāra only. So, Directly related to verb is the main subject and indirectly related to verb is subordinate subject Bhartṛharī put it in following kārika-

*Savyāpāratarah kaścit kvaciddharmaḥ pratīyate*

*Samsṛjayante ca bhāvānam bhedavatyopīṣaktayah\(^1\)*

\(^1\) VP, 3.7.117
Sampradāna kāraka has also participation in completion of action by not denying the giver, inspiring the giver to give and to accept the object to be given. This threefold function of sampradāna kāraka is part of giving.² Sampradāna means to give in an appropriate manner. When ownership of self is removed and ownership of anyone else is established, sampradāna is said to be accomplished. Examples may be following-

1. Upādhyāyāya gām dadāti.
2. He donates maney to the school.
3. He gave a cloth to a beggar.
4. Kanyām dadāti
5. Gurustasmai capetām dadāti

In above mentioned five examples four examples show the transfer of ownership but in fifth example giving (Dāna) is not meant because ownership of slap is not meant here yet it will help the student to study with more concentration in future. Aim of giving is to help some one. That is present here. So, intension of ownership is here through help.

Rajakasya vastrām dadāti and ghnataḥ prṣṭham dadāti are not example of sampradāna kāraka because ownership is not transferred here. Sūryāya arghyām dadāti is example of sampradāna because though ownership is not transferred here nor it is possible in this case, determination is to make the sundeity owner of that water. Pāṇini defines Apādāna as the point of departure in case of separation³ Bhartṛhari explains that Pāṇini does not intend the stability of a substance but stability related to separation is intended. ⁴Bhartṛhari gives the example of devadatta falling from the running horse. When Devadatta falls from

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¹ VP (3.7.119)
² Anirākaraṇātkartustyaśāgāṅgāṁ karnāṇeṣṣāt parṣanaṁmatibhyāṁ vā labhate sampradānatāṁ – VP (3.7.129)
³ Dhruvamapāye pādānam (p 1.4.24)
⁴ VP, 4.7.138, dravyasabhāvo na dhruvyaṁ--------

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the running horse horse is dhruva because action of falling is not linked with horse but with Devadatta. When both are moving from each other, then one is dhruva with respect of other because one’s departure is not related with other. *Apasarato meśānmeṣo’ pasarati* is the example when one is implied to be stable with respect of other.

*Parasparasmānmeṣāvapasarataḥ* is the example when both are implied as a point of departure (dhruva) with respect of each other. Both may be *kartā* of action of separation if other is a point of departure as Bhartṛhari says-

*Meśāvapāye kartārau yadyanyo vidyate’ vadhiḥ*

*Vṛkṣasya parṇam patati* is the example when point of departure is not implied. Here relationship of the leaf with tree is implied, so there is no scope for *Apādāna kāraka*. All properties are not implied in cloud at a time by speaker. So, according to implication of speaker, usages vary. Patañjali showed these examples in *mahābhāṣya*. Examples are as follows:-

1. Balāhakād vidyotate
2. Balāhake vidyotate
3. Balāhako vidyotate

When clouds and lightning are implied as separate, first example is used. When cloud and lightning are implied as one second example is used. Third example is also used when both are implied as one. Difference between second and third example is that of *adhikarana* and *kartā kāraka*. When lightning situated in clouds shines, second example is used. When

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1 Ibid, 3.7.140-141
2 ibid, 3.7.142
3 VP, 3.7.143
4 sec mahābhāṣya on (p 1.4.23)
cloud shines with the power of lightning third example is used\textsuperscript{1} Bhartrhari defines Adhikarana kāraka as helping in completion of action by holding the action indirectly, mediated by kartā and karma. Bhartrhari says-

\textit{Karttrkarmavyavadhāyasūkṣāddhārayat kriyām}

\textit{Upakurvat kriyāsiddhau Sāstre’ dhikaranam smṛtam}\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Kāte āste} is the example of holding kartā and thereby action situated in kartā. In this example, kaṭa (Mat) is adhikarana because it is helping in completion of action by holding kartā, it is impossible for kartā to complete the action of sitting. Sthālyām pacati is the example where sthāli is Adhikarana because it holds karma (rice etc. which is cooked) and by holding karma, indirectly helps to complete the action of cooking.

Adhikarana is base. pāṇini defines it in that way.\textsuperscript{3} Bhartrhari also explains Pāṇini. When he says- śāstre’dhikaraṇam smṛtam, It means that he is referring to vyākaraṇasāstra and pāṇini is the first known ācārya whose complete work is available today. In addition to this, Bhartrhari quotes dhruva, Apāya Nirdhāraṇa, vibhakta etc. several terms used in his śūtra-s by pāṇini. So, there is no doubt about it.

Container (Ādhāra) and contained (Ādheya) have a relationship. That relationship is called upśleṣa. This relationship is the same in three types of Adhikarṇa-s Abhivyāpaka, vaiṣayika, and Aupaśleṣika. Examples of three types of Adhikarṇa-s are following-

1. \textit{Tilesu tailam} (Abhivyāpaka Adhikaranā)
2. Khe śakunayaḥ (vaiṣayika Adhikaranā)
3. \textit{Kate āste} (Aupaśleṣika Adhikaranā)

\textsuperscript{1} Bhedābhedauprthagbhāvah sthitisceti virodhinaḥ / yugapanna vivakṣante sarve dharmā Balāhake – VP (3.7.144)
\textsuperscript{2} VP, 3.7.148
\textsuperscript{3} Ādhāro’dhikaranaḥ –(p 1.4.45)
Though relationship is the same, manner of help varies to complete the action. These helps are of mainly three types, enlisted by Bhartrhari as follows-

1. Protection from destruction
2. Independence to hold heavy objects
3. Determination of a particular direction.

Example of first help is tileṣu tailam. Tila helps taila in protection from destruction. Example of second help is kate äste. Mat is independent to hold the sitter and helps him to sit otherwise he will fall. Example of third help is khe śakanayah. Sky helps birds to remove the relationship with downward direction otherwise it is not possible for birds to go up in the sky. This is the help of sky to the birds. There are also some examples where adhikarana kāraka helps to convey a relationship with a particular direction. They are following.

1. Prācyamāditya udeṭi
2. Praticyāmamastameti
3. Dakṣiṇasyāmagastyaḥ
4. Uttarasyāṁ dhruvaḥ

In all these above mentioned examples, relationship with a particular direction is conveyed and it is the only help of adhikaraṇa here.

grāme vasaṁstrirātramupavasati is a typical example which is explained by Bhartrhari while considering Adhikarana kāraka in sādhanaśamuḍdeśa. The meaning of the example is that one stays in village without taking food for three nights. The action of staying is not possible without a location that is village here. So, the person who stays wants the village most because he cannot stay without village. In this case village should be karma kāraka and hence there should be used dviṭiḥā vibhakti with the

\[1\] Particyāmamastameti
village. Bhartrhari says that vasdhaatu with prefix upa expresses the meaning of not taking food. So, not taking food is principal action here and staying is subordinate to it. Staying is done to accomplish the taks of fasting. Fast naturally associates with time because fast prevails during a specific period. So, action of fasting relates first with duration of a period (Here three nights) and then associates with the village through the action of staying. Action of staying is part of action of fast. So, here village can not be karma karaka. When tirthe upavasati is used and no vas dhatu is used separately as in previous example, yet place as adhikarana-kara is used with saptami vibhakti because place can not associate with upavas but with vas dhatu. In the same way, without use of time period as triratradi, vas dhatu with upa prefix projects eligible karma that is time because time is associated first with act of fast, being internal and village, being external, associates after indirectly through subordinate action of staying. Bhartrhari put all this in two karika-s:

Yadyapyupavasirdesavišesamanurudhyate śabdapravṛttidharmāttu
kālamevāvalambate

Vasatāvaprayukte’ pi deśo’ dhikaraṇam tataḥ aprayuktam trirātrādi
karma copavasau smṛtam

Relationship

While dealing with the structure of vākya, Bhartrhari explains relationship also. According to him relationship is different from karaka-s and expressed through action and tools of action irrespective of use of verb in a sentence.

1. Verb may be used or not used in a sentence but relationship is expressed by kriyā and kara-s. Relationship is between two and expressed by šaṣṭhī vibhakti. Now there is a problem. Between two, with

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1 VP, 3.7.154-155
2 Ṣambandḥaḥ kārakebhyo'nyaḥ kriyākārakapūrvakaḥ śrutāyāmasrutāyāṁ vā kriyāyāṁ so’ bhidhiyate (VP 3.7.156)
which śaṣṭhī vibhakti should be used to express the relationship because relationship is situated in both? Bhartrhari says that relationship though situated in both is indicated separately in subordinates because they are for others. When a relationship is expressed in subordinates, it is also expressed in the principal because subordinates depend on principal.¹

As relationship is indicated by śaṣṭhīvibhakti² Bhartrhari is suggesting the use of śaṣṭhī vibhakti with subordinate to indicate relationship.

Bhartrhari needs some elaboration here. When he says that relationships is through kriyā and kāraka, he means that both related items were previously kāraka-s and related with kriyā as always there is a natural association between action and its tools. Some examples, may be shown in this regard-

a)  Rājā puruṣāya vetanam dadāti
b)  Vṛkṣo’vayavī śākhāyāmavavabhūtāyām tiṣṭhati
c)  Pīṭā putram janayati.

In example (a) king is employer of a person and gives him the salary. So, employer is here sampradāna kāraka and the action of giving is establishing a relationship between the king and his employee. Now, the relationship of employer and employee is established through action of giving and sampradāna kāraka that is employee.

In example (b) tree prevails in its branch. So, branch is Adhikarana kāraka and the action of prevailing is establishing a relationship between tree and its branch. Now, the relationship of part and whole is established through action of prevailing and Adhikarana kāraka that is branch in this example.

¹ Dviṣho’pyasau parārthatvād guṇesu vyatiricyate Tatrābhidhīyamāneḥ san pradhāne’ pyupabhujayate (VP 3.7.157)
² Dviṣho’pyasau parārthatvād guṇesu vyatiricyate Tatrābhidhīyamāneḥ san pradhāne’ pyupabhujayate (VP 3.7.157)
In example (c) father produces the son. So, son is *karma kāraka* here and action of producing is establishing a relationship between father and son, now. The relationship of product and producer between father and son is established through action of producing and *karma kāraka* that is son here.

These are the examples when verb is used. The same examples can be used without verb also—

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\begin{align*}
a) \quad & \text{Rajñāḥ puruṣaḥ} \\
b) \quad & \text{Vṛkṣasya śākhā} \\
c) \quad & \text{Pitūḥ putraḥ}
\end{align*}
\]

Above examples show relationship without the use of verb. Relationship is the same but verb is not used here but supposed. Without supposing the respective actions, relationship cannot be expressed. To understand relationship, we have to understand action and the tool of accomplishing the action first as shown in abovementioned examples.

Second issue is related with the decision of subordinate and principal between two things mutually related. This will decide the use of *saśṭhī vibhakti* to indicate the relationship. And *saśṭhī vibhakti* will be used with subordinate and not with the principal. So, to indicate a relationship above mentioned examples will be used as shown and not otherwise. The example ‘Vṛkṣasya śākhā’ will not be used as śākhāyāḥ vṛksaḥ. And likewise pitūḥ putraḥ will not be used as putrasya pita.

But if speaker wishes to convey the reverse meaning and used *puruṣasya rāja*, it means the king qualified by the person is expressed here and in this example person is subordinate and the king is principal. In this case also, *saśṭhi vibhakti* is used with subordinate to indicate relationship and thus the definition of relationship presented by Bhartṛhari is not violated.

Helārāja puts the view in these words:
In the same way if speaker wishes to convey the meaning that branch is subordinate and tree is principal, the example ‘śākhāyāḥ vṛksaḥ’ is possible. The same case will be with the example ‘putrasya pitā’.

Now, it should be considered that relationship is common between two and śaṣṭhī vibhakti indicates it when used with subordinate but the principal should also express it. What is the way principal expresses it? Bhartrhari says that though relationship is situated in principal also, śaṣṭhipi is not used with the principal to indicate it. Principal receives the relationship expressed by the subordinate with the indicative śaṣṭhī vibhakti and thus relationship situated in the principal is expressed. Here, subordinate denotes the own meaning qualified by relationship and the principal denotes only pure own meaning without any qualification. This is the principalness of principal that it does not change itself according to the subordinate and experiences the relationship without any deviation from its own form. Prathamā vibhakti used with the principal shows only the meanings of term without any qualification. HeHiraja puts this view in these words:

Tathā hi guṇeṣu vyatirekamādhikyaṃ darśayati sambandhaḥ pradhānam tu svarūpādapracyavamānaṃ evaṃ hi tasya prādhānyaṃ bhavati yadi guṇanurodhena rūpaparivartanāṃ nāsādayati

In some examples expressing relationship factors deciding a particular relationship are determined but in some cases it is not possible. In those cases karma pravacaniṣya plays a decisive role. It determines the particular action as a deciding factor of a relationship, Bhartrhari says-

\[ 1 \text{ Nimittaniyamaḥ śabdāt sambandhasya na grhyate} \]

\[ ^1 \text{ Helārāja on vp, 3.7.157} \]
\[ ^2 \text{ Pratipadikartha liṅgaparimāna vacanamātre prathamā (p 2.3.46)} \]
\[ ^3 \text{ Helārāja on (vp, 3.7.157)} \]
Karmapravacanīyaistu sa viśeṣe'varudhyate

Some examples are as follows-

1. Sākalyasya samhitāmanu prāvarṣat
2. Adhi Brahmadatte pañcālāḥ
3. Abhimanyurarjunataḥ prati

Where action is not known, karmapravacanīya determines the particular action as a causing factor of a particular relationship and where action is known as verb is used, verb is sufficient to determine the factor causing relationship. No need of karma pravacanīya is there.

In first example samhitā and pravarṣaṇa have a cause effect relationship where samhitā is cause and raining is the effect. The action in particular deciding cause-effect relationship is indicated by karmapravacanīya anu here because previously anu has been used with the action- anunīśamya. Karmapravacanīya cannot express the action taking place at present but always expresses the action taken place in past. By derivation karma pravacanīya means one that expressed the action.2 As anu has been found used to express the action of hearing (niśam), it will also express the action of hearing as cause of the relationship between samhitā and raining.

In second example, karmapravacanīya adhi expresses the action of preserving etc. as a cause of owner-owned relationship.

In third example. Karmapravacanīya prati expresses the action of representation as a factor of imitator-imitated relationship between Abhimanyu and Arjuna. Bhartṛhari explained it in vākyakāṇḍa that karmapravacanīya decides the particular of a relationship3.

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1 VP, 3.7.158
2 karma proktavantaḥ karmapravacanīyah iti- mahābhāṣya (P 1.4.83)
3 Kriyāyā dyotake nāyaṁ na sambandhasya vācaḥ nāpi kriyāpadākṣepī sampandhasyatu bhedakah - vp (2.204)
One that is principal in a particular relationship becomes subordinate with respect of another relationship but even then it remains principal with respect to that subordinate in that particular relationship. Some examples may be presented in this connection:

a) \( Rājñaḥ puruṣasya kambalaḥ \)

b) \( Rājñaḥ puruṣasya dhanam \)

c) \( svaputreṇa sahāgato devadattaḥ \)

The examples (a) and (b) are of same category. The example (c) is also of the same category but needs some explanation. When king qualifies the person, king is subordinate and the person is principal. That is why \( śaṣṭhī vibhakti \) is used with the king and not with the person. But the person who is principal with the respect of king becomes subordinate in relation with blanket or money. It should not be considered contrary that how the same item can be principal and subordinate. It is possible because matter and time differs matter becomes different because relationship changes and time also changes. In the example (a) and (b) the king qualifies the person and after that person qualifies the blanket or money and becomes subordinate to the blanket or money. So, the change of time is also quite evident.

In example (c) son being principal with respect of Devadatta, becomes subordinate to Devadatta when meaning of togetherness is associated with the son. So, the usage ‘son of Devadatta’, shows that Devadatta qualifies the son and becomes subordinate to principal son but Devadatta came with son shows that son is subordinate to Devadatta because it qualifies Devadatta with coming together. That is why Pāṇini prescribes \( tṛtiyā \) in the association of saha

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1 sahayukte' pradhāne (p,2.3.19)
Always qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is subordinate and qualified (*viśeṣya*) is principal because qualifier is used for qualified and one that is used for anyone else is subordinate to that\(^1\)

Bhartṛhari says that it is accepted in tradition that addressing some one is not meaning of vākyā-

*Sambodhanam na vākyārtha iti virddhebhyaāgamaḥ\(^2\)*

The fact that Bhartrhari is quoting the tradition to show that addressing or calling someone to make him attentive towards the caller is not meaning of vākyā, deserves proper attention.\(^3\) It means that all *kāraka*-s and a *kriyā* may be vākyārtha but sambodhane is not traditionally accepted as vākyārtha. Bhartrhari said in second half of the kārikā that where ever meanings of vibhakti-s are mentioned by taking names, they are separated from meaning of vāgya *uddeśena vibhaktyarthā vākyārthāt samupoddhṛtāḥ\(^4\)*

To exclude sambodhana from the category of vākyārtha, Bhartrhari quoted the tradition before saying that meanings of vibhaktis are separated from vākyārtha. There should be some similarity responsible for the possible confusion between other meanings of vibhakti-s and sambodhana and Bhartrhari has tried to avoid that confusion by quoting the tradition. Certainly there is a similarity. Other meanings of vibhakti and sambodhana-both expect action. There is a dissimilarity too.

*Sambodhana* is understood without association of other words and so it does not require other words in order to be understood while other meanings of vibhakti-s like *karma karaṇa* and *adhikaraṇa* etc expect association of other words to be understood.

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1. Dviṣṭho'payasau prarthatvād- (vp 3.7.157)
2. VP, 3.7.164,
3. VP, 3.7.163
4. VP, 3.7.164
Bhartrhari has previously explained that powers of substances are called sādhana or kāraka and meaning of vibhakti is different from meaning of the word. Vibhakti-s and other suffixes indicate sādhana or power of the substance to accomplish an action. Whatever helps to accomplish an action, is called sādhana in that case. As power cannot reside without the substance, substances are called sādhana or kāraka but even in condition of being kāraka, the original nature of the substance remains intact.

These are the principles of vyākaraṇa, denoted by linguistic behaviour. Bhartrhari says that capacity of the substance is separate from its locus in vyākaraṇaśāstra because it follows the people and people hold language as an evidence. In linguistic behaviour, power of substance is separate because it is expressed separately by vibhakti-s indicating kāraka-s. Bhartrhari puts it in this kārikā:

Tattve vāvyatireke vāvyatiriktaṁ taducyate
śabdapramāṇako lokaḥ sa śāstreṇānugamyate

In Kriyāsamuddeśa, Bhartrhari defines action. According to him kriyā must have two features:

1. Anything, complete or incomplete, must be expressed as to be completed.
2. It must have a sequence.

An action has many steps from starting to completion. All these steps are assumed as one group and this one group is expressed by Ākhyāta. When

1 Svāṣraye samavetāṁ tadvadevāśrayāntare kriyāśāmachintiśpattau sāmarthyaṁ sādhanāṁ vidū- vp (3.7.1)
2 vibhaktyartho'nya iṣyate – vp (3.7.43)
3 Yadyadā yadanugrāhī tattadā tatra sādhanam svaśabdairabhidhāne tu sa dharmanābhidhīyate vibhaktyādibhīvāśvāvamārāḥ pratiyāyate vp (3.7.12-13)
4 Dravyāṁ tu yad yathābhūtaṁ tadatyaṁtāṁ tathābhavet kriyābhedpi tasyāsau dravyāṁtāṁ nāvahīyate – vp (3.7.166)
5 VP, 3.7.38
6 a) yāvatsiddhamāsiddhaṁ vā- vp (3.8.1)
b) Guṇabhūtairavavaiḥ- Vp (3.8.4.)
When anything is completed, there is no need of tools. Hence, expectation of sādhana ends in that case and terms denoting actions are not used.²

Ākhyāta-s express the meaning with sequence and nāmaśabda-s denote the meaning as concluding the sequence. This is the main difference between two. Bhartrhari puts it very clearly in this kārikā-

Sāvevambhūto' Bhidhiyate

Nāma śabdāh pravartante saṁharanta eva kramam³.

Ākhyāta-share many meanings but mainly they express activities because they are to be completed by readymade tools⁴

Kriyā is invisible and not a substance. In this case numbers can not be used with Ākhyāta but we have use of them as pacati, pacatāḥ pacanti etc. pañcakṛtvah pacati and Dvīḥ pacati are other examples where numbers are used with kriyā. Bhartrhari replies that though action is one because speaker wishes to express it as one, yet when same action is repeated, it becomes countable and thus numbers are used with action otherwise action can not have numbers be cause it is not countable as a substance.⁵

Krāntapada conveys the meaning as completed and tiṅantapada conveys the meaning as to be completed. Bhartrhari says that if krāntapada as pāka conveys the meaning of completed, sādhana (Kāraka-kartṛ, karma etc.) cannot be used with krāntapada and if krāntapada conveys the meaning of to be completed then nothing is the difference between krānta and tiṅanta. Bhartrhari says this with some examples of a certain category in his mind- some examples may be presented in this regard-

a) odanasya pākaḥ - (Odana is karma)

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¹ Pūrvottaraistadā bhāgaiḥ - vp (3.8.11)
² Siddhe tu śādhanākāṅkṣā- (VP (3.8.17))
³ VP (3.8.29)
⁴ sādhyatvatatra cākhyātairvāpyāraḥ siddhasādhanāḥ prādhānyenābhidhiyante phalnāpi pravartitāḥ - vp (3.8.40)
⁵ Ekatvärvitibhedābhyaṁ - vp (3.8.41)
b) *apām sṛṣṭā* - (Ap is karma)

c) āścaryo gavāṁ doho’gopena (go is karma)

d) bhavatā modako bhoktavyah (modaka is karma)

e) Rāmeṇa bālī hataḥ (Bālī is karma)

f) Sukaraḥ pātho bhavatā (pāth is karma)

In abovementioned examples kṛdantapada is associated with karma- karma is a sādhana (tool) and kṛdantapada conveys the meaning of siddha (completed). It is not justified that kṛdantapada associates with sādhana-karma etc. Bhartṛhari presents the problem thus-

_Siddhasyarthasaṁ pākādeḥ katham sādhanayogītā sādhyatve vā tiṁantena kṛtāṁ bheda na kaścana_

Though in a pada, division of sādhana and sādhyā is accepted in śāstra, it does not really exist in vākyā. Bhartṛhari says-

_Etāvatsādhanāṁ sādhyametāvadīti kalpanāśāstra eva na vākye’sti vibhāgaḥ pramarthataḥ_ As division of sādhyā and sādhana in śāstra, the same division in kṛdanta is also accepted

In the same way, verb-root expresses the action as to be completed and *kṛt* suffix used after verb-root expresses the portion of substance Substance is used with gender and number. That is why kṛdanta is used with gender and number while tiṁanta is used with number only and that number is also of sādhana-kartā and karma.

The same verb expresses sādhyāvästhā in tiṁanta and siddhāvästhā in kṛdanta. How is it possible? Bhartṛhari gives an example to show that two opposite features can be together. Example is Bandhūtā. Bandhūtā means the groups of kins. Now Bhartṛhari shows that kins are many but the

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1 VP, 3.8.42
2 VP, 3.8.45
3 VP, 3.8.46
4 VP 3.8.47
group is one. Here, group is really nothing other than Bandhu. So, group is a state of Bandhu and that is expressed by tal suffix. In this example, nominal base Bandhu is bearing the property called bandhutā in different form and suffix tal is expressing the group i.e a particular state of Bandhu, in a single form. In the same way in kṛdanta pada also, verb-root expresses state of to be completed and suffix expresses the completed state. So, the problem can be resolved in examples like odanasya pākaḥ etc. by accepting that verb-root pac in pāka is associated with sādhana, odana in sādhya-vasth āpac is siddha with respect of kṛt suffix ghaṇ but sādhya with respect of sādhana-karma etc.

In kālasamuddeśa, Bhartṛhari says that the meaning expressed by Ākhyāta is principal because it is to be completed and other terms qualifying ākhyāta follow the time of Ākhyāta-

Ākhyātapadavācyे’rthe nirvartyatvāt pradhānātā viśeṣānaṁ tadākṣeṣpāt tatkāle vyavatiṣṭhate.

Bhartṛhari is justifying the use of sentences like Bhāvikṛtyamāsit” and also the formulation of rule by pāñini in this regard. He is himself presenting the example and indicating the rule (p 3.4.1) by using the term sutra in the following kārikā-

Vyabhicāre nimittasya sādhutvaṁ na prakalpatebhāvyāṣīditi sūtreṇa tat kale’nyatra śiṣyate.

In this example ‘Bhāvi’ is denoting the future as ṇini suffix is applied after verb root ‘Bhu’ in sense of future. Āsīt is denoting past. When both terms are related in a vākya the past time will be principal because it is the meaning expressed by Ākhyāta āsīt and the meaning of future will be subordinate and follow the meaning of past. This is the explanation of

1 VP 3.8.48
2 VP, 3.9.99
3 Dhaatusambandhe pratyayāḥ (p 3.4.1)
4 VP, 3.9.93
5 p. 3.3.3.
Pāṇini by Bhartrhari. The sentences expressing mixtimes will be explained grammatically if the rule explained here (p 3.4.1) prevails⁴. In the same way in everyday life people use present tense to express the past or future action nearer to the present. Pāṇini formulated the rule in this regard. Bhartrhari explains that what is completed but remains in mind as an impression of that completed action and what is not undertaken but started in mind as a mental determination-both are shown as nearer to the present in vyākarṇaśāstra.

When we express probability or wish, we expect something and expectation is always related with future. This expectation to obtain something is Āśamsā. The expected thing is present in our mind in the form of knowledge but the thing we are expecting is not present but the subject of future.

That is why Patañjali says in mahābhāṣya³.

Āśamsā nāma bhaviṣyatkālā⁴—The use of present tense and past tense is prescribed by Pāṇini and use of future tense is not prescribed because it is natural. The use of past, present and future tense is done in language when we wish to gain something. To explain the linguistic behaviour in this regard, pāṇini prescribed the use of past and present tense to express the wish. But this is not the direct prescription. Pāṇini prescribes through similarity. He says that to express the wish suffixes must be added to verb-root as they are added to denote past and present tense. This suggests that Pāṇini is well-aware of the fact that wish is related to future. That is why he prescribes the application based on similarity. When similarity of past and present tense suffixes is applied to express the wish, it is proved that wish is entirely related to future, otherwise there is no need to application of past and present tense suffixes because only different thing

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⁴ VP, 3.9.98
² vartamānasāmipyevartamānavadvā (P 3.3.131)
³ Adhvano vartamānasya yaḥ sēṣo ya upakramāḥ Tadvartamānasāmiṃpyān śāstre bhedena darśitam (vp 3.9,102)
⁴ Mbh on (P 3.3.132)
is needed to be applied similarly. It is proved also because there is only
three stages of time—present, past and future and once it is prescribed that
it is like past and present, only future is left to be connected with. So,
Patañjali is only putting the fact in clear terms which was only indicated
by Pāṇini.