Chapter V
JAPAN'S POSSIBLE STATUS AS A REMILITARIZED NATION

As seen in the previous chapter, Japan has a lower number of troops when compared to other major countries. Nevertheless, Japan, in terms of its defense budget, ranks in the top five. Despite the controversies and unresolved historical issues with its neighbours, dependence on foreign trade and crucial economic stakes the world over, Japan has successfully maintained its position of economic super-power and will likely continue to do so in Asia for several more years. Japan’s dependence on the US for its security needs is likely to be carried forward as is evident from the latest policies and defense-related guidelines. Japanese quest for comprehensive security and normalcy are likely to remain the guiding principles of its policies in Asia and the rest of the world. By making use of the opportunities provided by international emergency situations, Japan has successfully empowered its SDF. The transition of JDA into MOD is another step towards normalcy.

The situation in East Asia, the dynamics of domestic politics in Japan and Japan’s assertive gestures to play a prominent role in world politics provide an insight into the Japanese course of action. The forces and factors, both internal and external, opposing as well as supporting, the Japanese quest for normalcy have already been discussed in the previous chapters. In this chapter, Japan’s contribution to the world community and the domestic hindrances in this regard are analyzed.

Japan has contributed a great deal economically, to the world especially, in times of crisis. Its sophisticated and advanced technology and methods for relief and rescue operations are appreciated and awaited eagerly during war or natural disasters. Japan’s physical contribution in terms of troops for the UNPKO, though, only about one and a half decades old, is a good parameter for assessing its military might and contributions. Post-September 11, the shift in the Japanese foreign and security policies was first observed when Japan participated in the Afghan War by providing rear-echelon support to the US and allies, especially when war was on; before the Afghan War Japan had always only provided relief and reconstruction assistance in the post-conflict and non-
combat zones. Japan is expected to follow such moves of assisting the US and its allies in the future as well, although domestic political turmoil may play spoilsport.

Japanese assistance during the Afghan War and the Iraq War, when the MSDF and ASDF missions were sent to assist the US and allies in the Indian Ocean and Samawah in Iraq, respectively, was criticized by the pacifists and other anti-war groups in Japan. Even though, the major aims were reconstruction and relief works, such moves were not free from the criticism of suspicious neighbours. The US and allies welcomed and appreciated Japanese assistance. The rest of the world community also appreciated Japanese efforts in Iraq which continues under turmoil. The Japanese dilemma to give more powers to the defense forces due to popular support against the military build-up has resulted in occasional but not very significant civilian protests. The recent economic recovery due to reforms and confidence-building measures in East Asia through bilateral and multilateral platforms has fetched positive results for Japan.

The Japanese quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council has not been fulfilled despite its significant contribution to the United Nations. Japan is the second biggest donor to the UN after the US. Japan also contributes to Bretton Woods institutions – World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Asian Development Bank (ADB). In addition to this, through its Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan has helped many countries in developing their infrastructure and addressing other problems of grave concern. In spite of huge contributions, Japan has been unable to get a permanent seat in the UNSC. China remains the biggest hurdle. Nevertheless, the Chinese policy is also criticized on the basis that China, being the permanent member of the UNSC, gives its consent for the United Nations resolutions. Such resolutions are mainly against the countries which have caused or pose threat to world peace. All the member nations are expected to participate in the UNPKO or other operations approved by the UN. Japan being a sovereign nation and a member of the UN enjoys all the rights to independently take any decision to support the UNPKO but China has always ridiculed and criticized the Japanese efforts.
In order to play a leader's role in international affairs, Japan has to first deal with several problems which are elaborated in the following passages. These problems are of diverse nature and are major obstacles in the path towards normalcy. Here, in order to make it simple to understand, the issues and problems are broadly divided into two categories – domestic and international.

**Domestic Issues**

*Ageing Population, Fluctuating Economy, Suicide and Freeters*

Japan does not match the overall trend of growing population of the world. In the year 2005, the world population was estimated to have reached 6.5 billion, more than two and half times the level in 1950 and it is expected to reach 9.1 billion by 2050. However, in 2005, Japan's population was 128 million. According to an UN estimate Japan's population will be around 115 million in 2045 and by the year 2050, it will be around 112 million. The population is apparently declining and at this rate, the population will decline by show around 2.8 million between 2045 and 2050 (*United Nations World Population: Estimates and Projections*, 2006: 3 and 15).

Japan has the largest economy in Asia and the second largest economy in the world. The Japanese have comparable or better per capita income and living standards than most of the developed countries in the world. The Japanese economy since 1990 has grown at an average rate of 1 percent annually, much slower pace than rest of the Asia, so it is often said that its relative weight and influence is declining. The situation in Japan vis-à-vis its economy has changed since 2005. Positive trends may be witnessed in the declining unemployment, increasing job opportunities and the stabilization of the economy.

Quite visible is the change in the attitude of the younger generation who do not want to work as full time workers. They are called freeters (*furitta*), a combination of the
English “free” and the German “Arbeiter.” Freeters are mainly involved in part-time jobs after finishing their schools and universities. The number of these increased significantly from 1.9 million in 1992 to 2.48 million in 1995 to 4.17 million in 2001, although the government’s definition of freeters remains less than clear-cut\(^1\) (Hook and Takeda, 2007: 115). A White Paper on the Labor Economy of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) indicates that the number of freeters hit a peak in 2003 of 2.17 million. The number has been in decline for the last two years. The 2005 figure is 2.01 million. It is worth noting that the number in the age group of 24-34 remains relatively high compared to other age groups.

Japan still follows many policies like the Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP). Owing to various factors, the future prospects for Japan do not seem to be very favourable and for the next thirty years, the working population of Japan will decline at the rate of 0.6 percent annually. The large generation of the ‘baby boomers’ born immediately after the WWII will be retiring in the next decade and putting extra pressure on the health care and pensions and hence the public finances. This will ultimately result in low growth and less expenditure on the social welfare and other public works (Michael Smitka, *Europa Regional Survey of the World: the Far East and Australia* 2006: 454). This means that the government does not have enough reasons to enhance its military even if it wants to do so.

The Japanese government is concerned over the issue of ageing and declining population. As already discussed in the previous chapter, even Ministry of Defense in its Annual White Paper has shown concern over the high suicide rate among its troops. It has even started several programmes of counseling and recreation for the SDF personnel. There are several other socioeconomic issues like homelessness, pension, corruption, stressful work culture, health, westernization and so on that are and will continue to divert the attention of the policy makers from the process of normalization/militarization.

\(^{1}\) Statistical data on the number of freeters differ depending on the term’s definition. For example, a report released by a study group of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) counted 2.09 million in 2002, while the 2003 White Paper on National Lifestyle noted instead 4.17 million in 2001, including dispatched workers, unemployed men, and women seeking full-time employment.
Many domestic issues in Japan have international ramifications such as Yasukuni Shrine, which is a Shinto shrine where millions of spirits of the Japanese war dead are venerated. In 1978, names of the class A war criminals, including the war time PM, Tojo, were also added to the roster of spirits of the existing one. This action invited criticism from several corners. Neither of the emperors, Showa and Akihito, had visited the shrine since then.

Article 20 of the Japanese constitution separates the state from religion (seikyo bunri). Even then, the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto Shrine has remained a de facto official war memorial. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare supplied biographical information to shrine officials for all war veterans – and even for SDF troops. Virtually every postwar PM, regardless of political orientation visited Yasukuni while in office. However, the much hyped former Japanese PM, Junichiro Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine visits became major cause of concern for the progressive people within and outside Japan. These visits were seen as the revival of militarism and strengthening of the pre-war Imperialist attitude among Japanese.

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2 The shrine was founded in 1869 as Tokyo Shokonsha, and was renamed Yasukuni Shrine in 1879. It was build in order to commemorate and worship those who have died in war for their country and sacrificed their lives. The meaning of Yasukuni is “peaceful country.” The deities of about 2.5 million people who died for Japan in the conflicts accompanying the Meiji Restoration, the Satsuma Rebellion and similar domestic conflicts, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the First World War, the Manchurian Incident, the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War are enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine in form of written records, which note name, origin and date and place of death of everyone enshrined.

3 The priests secretly enshrined the spirits of Class A war criminals. According to Shinto belief it can not be undone now.

4 Yoshida Shigeru, 10 times and Yasuhiro Nakasone, 11 times.

5 Nakasone was criticized for his visits but he gave the reason that he went to pray for his brother who died in the war.
Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine (Philip Seaton, 2005: 287-88)\(^6\) raised many questions but he declared in the Diet that the class A war convicts were indeed war criminals. On April 21, 2002, Koizumi observed,

Today I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The purpose of my visit was to mourn sincerely all those who lost their lives for their country, leaving behind their families in spite of themselves, during the course of our country’s history since the Meiji Restoration. I believe that the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by many people who lost their lives in war. It is important that throughout the days to come we firmly adhere to the resolution to embrace peace and renounce war to ensure that we never resort to tragic war. I consider it to be natural for me to pay homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, which has become over the course of many years, a central institution for many people of Japan to mourn those who sacrificed their lives for the country. It is not my intention to once again cause anxiety and elevate tension in Japan and abroad by visiting Yasukuni Shrine on or around the day of anniversary of the end of the second world war. After careful consideration, I decided I could sincerely express my honest feelings by visiting the shrine on this day, on the occasion of the Annual Grand Festival in Spring. I believe that this would be fully understood by the people of Japan (Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit to Yasukuni Shrine).

His critics say that he went so far as to enter the sacred innermost precinct of the shrine and signed in the shrine register. Young Japanese people born much after the war may get wrong impressions that class A war criminals venerated there were unjustly convicted. Equally problematic is the Yushukan War Memorial Museum right next to the shrine rebuilt in 2002, where all of Japan’s wars are depicted as glorious fights to liberate Asia and defend Japan. Though symbolic, it is not meaningless. The critics feel that history is distorted and the young people, who haven’t seen the war, may think that Japan under Tojo won the war (Wakamiya Yoshibumi and Watanabe Tsuneo, 2006: 10-11).

\(^6\) Koizumi’s visit was interlinked with several other factors such as text book controversy, revival of nationalism and militarism. The summer of 2001 saw the eruption of two major controversies in Japan concerning the memory and commemoration of the Second World War: a textbook crisis that occurred when the Ministry of Education passed a nationalistic textbook for potential use in Japanese schools; and Koizumi Junichiro’s worship at Yasukuni Shrine in his official capacity as prime minister on 13 August. In both cases, the controversies became major international issues because the Japanese government was perceived to be promoting a nationalistic war narrative downplaying Japanese guilt for aggression and atrocities in the Second World War.
On September 26, 2006, Koizumi was succeeded by Shinzo Abe, who inherited several problems from Koizumi. The issues raised during the former's time became uncontrollable immediately after latter became the PM. Abe's father was the Foreign Minister in Nakasone's cabinet and Abe was his personal secretary at the time of Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni shrine. Unlike Koizumi, Abe had come from the core of the LDP. His familiarity with the problems of Japan was seen as his plus point in resolving several issues. Abe even had given the idea of a branch shrine where spirits of class A criminals could be kept separately. Instead of visiting Yasukuni Shrine, after taking over as the PM, he went to China and then to South Korea (ROK) to ensure amicable relations with the neighbouring countries. Abe was however helpless in several matters, such as seeking extension for the SDF refueling missions in Indian Ocean, and this eventually formed part of the reasons for him stepping down. The expiration of anti-terrorism special measures law in November, 2007 also shows the problems Japan is facing. In fact, Yasuo Fukuda who ascended to the PM's post after Shinzo Abe is keeping a low profile and does not seem to be interested in taking any drastic measure that can ruin his and Party's political stakes. After assuming office, Fukuda too has refrained from visiting Yasukuni Shrine so far. While delivering a speech at Peking University, Beijing on December 28, 2007, Fukuda, by referring to the Japanese (pre-War) militarism as unfortunate period in history, has made his intentions of avoiding controversial issues (“Forging the Future Together” Speech by Yasuo Fukuda).

Japanese conservatives feel that China and Korea are also promoting anti-Japanese sentiments among their masses. For instance, figures related to Nanjing massacre are always inflated by China. Majority of the Japanese, except few hardliners, feel that despite the controversy related to numbers, whatever happened shouldn't have happened. On the contrary, Koreans and Chinese blame Japan for distorting their history in the text books (Richard J Samuels, 2007: 131-32). Among the several reasons for

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7 Already discussed in Chapter 4.
8 In June 2005, a joint study team of Korean and Japanese historians issued a report on interpretations of the past. The group was formed after the ROK protested certification by Japanese authorities of a revisionist textbook prepared by the private Japanese society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashi Kyokasho o Tsukurukai). The joint commission could not agree on the common fundamentals for a common narrative: the Japanese side insisted that annexation of Korea in 1910 was in accordance with international law, but the Korean side argued it was under threat of force.
Koreans' hatred for Japanese, is issue of comfort women. Many women from Korea and other South East Asian countries were sexually tortured and humiliated by the Japanese soldiers during the war. One of the recent surveys shows that 60 percent of the Chinese people believe that the Yasukuni is a "symbol of militarism" while two-thirds of Japanese see it as a "place to mourn war dead," "which is why the official visits by the Japanese PM meet with such controversy," observes Samuels (2007: 131).

Few scholars believe that the criticism is confined to the three countries mainly China, DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea) and ROK (Republic of Korea) and they are guided by ulterior motive of drawing more and more money from Japan. They offer a very valid reason, that paying tributes to the dead in war or otherwise solely is internal matter of any country. Not only the neighbouring countries but the intellectual community, especially those with the left/communist orientations, has always criticized the attempts to glorify Japanese militaristic past by introducing them into the text books in a distorted form.

Japan cannot go ahead unilaterally simply by ignoring pervasive concerns of the affected countries. Japan has to play a key role and at the same time, the rest of Asia cannot deny Japan's relevance and contribution. Asia without Japan will demonstrate an incomplete picture and may covertly benefit Western countries. Japanese policymakers in Japan can influence a whole new generation by glorifying their militaristic past which is neither required nor welcome and will only affect Japan's interests, internationally.

In order to inculcate nationalism among the Japanese younger generations and to provide favourable environment for the Japanese SDF, places like the Yushukan War Museum next to Yasukuni Shrine are used to display symbols of pre-war Japanese military might. These include war planes and other such materials glorifying the militaristic past. Many SDF bases are open for the civilians and especially for children where the relief and reconstruction work done by the SDF are displayed in the form of photographs, literature and occasional movies. Even the tanks, helicopters, guns and other sophisticated arms and ammunition are displayed. What is required now is not to
take any extreme set to satisfy a few and ignore the multitude. The best way to do so is to stay off controversial issues, particularly like Yasukuni and text books, and to focus on other more important issues.

Revision of the Constitution

As discussed in the Chapters 1 and 2, some Japanese lawmakers were not happy with the way the post-World War Japanese constitution was framed by the Occupation authorities. However, they could not put up much resistance against MacArthur’s designs. The debate of the revision of the constitution is as old as the constitution itself. This debate of constitutional amendment, specifically regarding Article 9, has been intensified recently. The dilemma of whether to stick to the old constitution and play a low-profile military role even during the time of regional and global security crises or to amend the war-renouncing constitution has dominated the political sphere in Japan.

The domestic as well as international implications of constitutional amendment act as a frictional force. Under the leadership and guidance of former Prime Minister Mori Yosihiro, a new drafting group, which issued the penultimate ‘Mori Draft’ on July 7, 2005, was formed.

In post-war Japan, the pragmatists and pacifists despite following two extreme political ideologies, extended support to Article 9 and enhanced its longevity. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) issued its own guidelines for revision. The Communist and Socialist parties have positioned themselves as defenders of the 1947 constitution,

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9 In 2000, the LDP established an internal research committee (Kenpo Chosakai), and both houses of the Diet established committees to study constitutional revision. In 2004, the LPD issued a discussion paper (10 June 2004) identifying the articles it seeks to revise, with proposals for the full draft. Thereafter, a partial draft was issued as a ‘Tentative Plan’ (16 November 2004), but that document’s formulae regarding the status of the House of Councilors, Article 9, and the Self-Defense Force provoked so much domestic and international criticism that it was withdrawn.

10 The committee was formally called Jiminto Shin Kenpo Kiso Iinkai (Liberal Democratic Party New Constitution Drafting Committee), and the document it issued is formally titled Kenpo kaisei yokoan (Outline for Constitutional Revision).
and Article 9 especially. A variety of civil society groups also have become involved (Helen Hardacre, 2006: 234-37, Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S Krauss, 2005, J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, 2005: 1-5).

Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (2007: 63-65) has identified five groups involved in the contradiction of Japanese constitutional amendment. The first group consisting of DPJ and SDPJ is for protecting Article 9. The second group involves moderates in LDP as well as in DPJ who advocate that Japan can play a meaningful role in international politics without amending Article 9. The main proponents of moderates have been the newspaper, Asahi Shimbun and the former PM Miyazawa Kiichi, who died in 2007. The next three groups are for constitutional amendment with varying logics. The third one is the proposal of Ozawa Ichiro as discussed later in this section. The fourth group, consisting mainly of LDP, SDF and JDA (now MOD) advocates a constitutional amendment or reinterpretation of Article 9 to make it possible for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. Nakasone is the leading proponent of this group whose latest proposal suggested rewriting the second paragraph of Article 9 so that Japan can

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11 The domestic political scene of Japan has changed after 1993-94 when 1955 political system for the first time was changed by the formation of a non-LDP coalition government. The LDP, however, managed to get back to the seat of power in a short time but it changed the dynamics of domestic politics giving rise to the subsequent coalition governments. The collapse of the 1955 system weakened the opposition mainly Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and Left’s anti-amendment stand. The SDPJ decision to be the coalition partner of LDP from 1994-96 came at the cost of giving up its traditional opposition to the constitutionality of the JSDF and US-Japan security treaty. SDPJ lost its credibility among Japanese people and was reduced to 11 members in the Japanese Diet, in 2006. The main force in the Japanese politics opposing remilitarization of Japan has considerably weakened. Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) which was formed by the splinter groups of SDPJ and LDP in 1996 took over the place of SDPJ as the main opposition party. It is blamed that the DPJ is mainly centrist in orientation and the LDP dissidents have significant influence on the party who do not differ much vis-à-vis security concerns and policies of the LDP.

12 These are mainly SDPJ and JCP (Japanese Communist Party). Their weakened position on the constitutionality of SDF and Article 9 has already been discussed. Their foreign policy stance of ‘unarmed neutrality’ has also become insignificant. See chapter 2 and 4.

13 This group has made a counter-proposal of Yomiuri Shimbun’s proposal of revising constitution. It consists of six components, including the establishment of international cooperation law as well as a Peace support Force and a reform of the SDF without amending Article 9. Miyazawa, however, is against the Japan’s participation in UN mission through its SDF and he termed September 11 attacks on US as criminal acts and not as war.

14 This group believes that constitutional amendment will enhance Japan’s military as well as diplomatic capabilities and further strengthens the ties with US. Unlike moderates this group believes in the collective security measures on the line of NATO.
maintain a minimum level of military forces of self-defense. However, in October 1999, Hatoyama Yuko, who also belongs to the fourth group, and was then chairman of the DPJ, made his proposal to rewrite Article 9. The fifth group wants to revise the constitution out of nationalism. Ishihara Shinataro, the governor of Tokyo, the leading proponent of the nationalists, believes that Japan should behave like any other sovereign nation and should revise its constitution.

Japan as a sovereign nation has every right to replace the 1947 constitution written by the Allied Occupation with a document drafted by its own citizens. Revision is a normal process of constitutional government, necessary to maintain a balance between fundamental principles and changing reality. LDP’s main argument in favour of the revision is that many countries have revised their constitutions from time to time: Italy has revised its constitution 14 times, France 16 times, and Germany dozens of times. The list includes Russia, China and Pakistan too (Helen Hardacre, 2006: 236). Moreover, under Chapter IX, Article 96 of the Japanese constitution, the Diet can amend the constitution by following a specified procedure.

The LDP’s pro-revisionist faction grew stronger under the leadership of Koizumi and his Yoshiro Mori faction. The famous statement of Koizumi that, “I will destroy LDP to get my policies through,” seems to be yielding results with the pro-revisionist lobby dominating the politics of Japan with Shinzo Abe succeeding him. Abe is a grandson of Nobusuke Kishi who was considered as the architect of revision attempts in the 1950s.

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15 Nakasone’s proposal is not a harsh one and one can even assume that his suggestions also means that Japan can manage its defense through SDF and the debate over the constitutionality of the SDF has disappeared and more and more people are in its favour.

16 Hatoyama’s proposal, which came after one month of Ozawa’s first proposal, says, “Japan shall maintain land, sea, and air forces, as well as the war potentials. Japan shall neither use these forces for acts of aggression nor shall Japan employ conscription.” His proposal is similar to Yomiuri Shim bun’s (1994) proposal. The only major difference was that the latter insisted on maintaining first paragraph of Article 9 - renounce war as a sovereign right. In 1995 Yomiuri even added establishment of Comprehensive Security Council that would quickly respond to an emergency.

17 This is the same group that supported the National Anthem and Flag Law.

18 Article 96: Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. 2) Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.

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and 1960s. The pro-revisionist factions of LDP like Yasuo Fukuda, present PM and Taro Aso, former Foreign Minister and presently Secretary General of LDP who is also a grandson of former PM Yoshida, are the dominant figures in the Japanese government as of today.

Ichiro Ozawa, who served as the Secretary General of LDP during the Gulf War I, and later on became leader of the Liberal Party and afterwards became the leader of DPJ, argued that during Gulf War I, the SDF could have been deployed in the Gulf without revising the constitution in line with the ‘international security’ or ‘collective self-defense.’ Ozawa puts forth the point that the Japanese constitution’s preamble obliges Japan to cooperate with the international community in order to maintain international stability. Furthermore, it indicates that Japan can participate in any form of UN-sanctioned and UN-centered multilateral military activity without violating Article 9 (Akihiko Tanaka, 1995: 41). However, contrary to his views, Japan eventually settled down with minimal ‘human contribution.’ Ozawa added a new Chapter titled “International Peace” which would have followed Article 9: “The Japanese people should actively contribute to international peace through participating in international peace and security of international society... and through taking every possible means including military.” His proposition seems to be too idealistic (Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, 2007: 64).

The Diet has passed into law a controversial national referendum bill for constitutional amendments (International Herald Tribune, May 14, 2007). The bill was discussed with the leading opposition party, the DPJ, in order to form a broad consensus.

19 Japan paid huge amount of US$13 billion for the Gulf War and after the war was over six MSDF minesweepers were deployed, in April 1991. The reason given was that the clearing mines from the sea lanes did not mean the use of force.

20 The government will be able to hold the referendum as early as 2010 under a bill approved by the upper house of Parliament. The lower house passed the bill in April 2007. Experts say it may take far longer than three years to persuade voters and opposition lawmakers to back changes to the Constitution. Polls show that the Japanese remain split, especially on the Constitution’s Article 9. But the approval of procedures for holding a referendum was an important preliminary step in rewriting the Constitution, a goal long cherished by the governing LDP. Proposals for any amendments would have to be approved by two-thirds of both houses of Parliament and then by a majority of voters in a national referendum. The Liberal Democrats would effectively need the approval of opposition parties, which either want to maintain the current Constitution or have their own preferences for revisions.
Although, the ruling LDP and its junior coalition partner, New Komeito successfully manipulated the situation, they could not avoid the criticism of the opposition and anti-war groups.\(^{21}\) Abe advocated the “breaking away from the postwar regime” policy but critics felt that he owed an explanation for the hasty way in which the bill was passed for referendum. The new proposal of the LDP included replacing of SDF (*Jiei-tai*) by self-defense military (*Guntai*) with the PM as the supreme commander-in-chief (*The Asahi Shim bun*, May 16, 2007). Critics, furthermore, say that Abe’s hastiness was guided by the desire to win the Upper House elections held in July 2007. All his efforts could not yield expected results as LDP lost ground in the Upper House and the DPJ won the elections with a thumping majority (*The Japan Times*, July 31, 2007).\(^{22}\) Takenaka Harukata (2007: 8) says that, “the main reasons that the LDP went down to its historic defeat are undoubtedly the string scandals involving the public pension system and the shady ties between politics and money that hit the news from mid-May.” The defeat of LDP shows that domestic issues are of equal importance. Any attempt to subside them will continue to face the same fate as declining popularity of LDP.

The majority of Japanese citizens are in favour of the constitutional amendment (*Jitsuo Tsuchiyama*, 2007: 67) owing to various reasons such as US (foreign)-imposed constitution, impediments to realization of national autonomy and the need for a proactive posture in foreign affairs. Over a period of time, the peace clause appears to have lost much of its importance. The fact that LDP and the DPJ have come out with their own versions of a revised constitution vis-à-vis Article 9 supports this argument. Japan is on the verge of a major change and one may expect Japan’s transformation into a normal state if the constitutional amendment takes place.

\(^{21}\) Opposition lawmakers said Abe had used the LDP’s control of both houses of Parliament to push through the legislation with little debate. They also criticized the new law for not establishing a minimum turnout in a referendum, which would give disproportionate weight to the most fervent supporters of change. The law bans public servants, including teachers, from participating in any debates over constitutional change. Critics said the ban seemed aimed at preventing teachers, who tend to be supporters of the current Constitution, from influencing young voters.

\(^{22}\) The LDP coalition after the elections have left with only 105 seats while opposition (DPJ and alliance) has 137 seats out of total 242 seats in the upper house. LDP on its own could manage only 37 seats out of the 121 for which election was held.
International Issues

Economic and Strategic

Japan, as already discussed in the previous chapters, faced regional security crisis right from the occupation period but it did not offer much in terms of physical contribution to its own security and continued to enjoy the US security umbrella. However, major demands for the ‘human contribution’ came from the US with time and especially in 1991 during the first Gulf War. The US demanded that Japan should send SDF troops to the Gulf region as part of multinational coalition. Since September 11, 2001, the global security concerns and situation have changed drastically putting Japan under the immense pressure of the US to deploy the JSDF supporting the US-led war on terror. The situation in the East Asia also got tense owing to the North Korean nuclear crisis. Robert Hartfiel, and Brian L. Job (2007: 1) observe,

After a temporary downturn in many Asian states after the 1997 Economic Crisis defence expenditures are rising again. Although most states put internal and trans-border security issues at the top of their list of potential threats, an examination of recent trends in regional defence expenditure trends and weapons acquisition patterns belies this. Resources are being directed predominately toward externally oriented weapons systems such as fighter aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and missiles of all types. The dramatic accumulation of such potentially destabilizing weapons systems, particularly in Asia’s traditional flashpoints, risks fuelling competitive arms processes throughout the region.

China, meanwhile, has declared a policy of ‘peaceful development.’ Other than the domestic issues, Japan’s geostrategic location, presence of US troops on Japanese soil, increasing threat of international terrorism, increasing interdependence on other countries due to globalization and market economy are the main issues pushing Japan to seek normalcy. The pragmatists in Japan cite the military build-up in the vicinity to justify militarization in Japan. Arpita Mathur (2006a: 619) says,

Japan’s security perceptions in this period (last decade) have been shaped by two distinct factors: hard security concerns that flow from the rising power and influence of China, and the uncertainties in the Korean Peninsula, especially in regard to the North Korean
nuclear and missile programmes; and those that emerge from its quest for assured energy supplies from abroad and security of its large maritime interests as a trading nation. In the past five years it has sought an active international role to deal with its emerging security challenges, and a greater influence on global institutions that deal with security issues. Japan’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, the changing role of its Self-Defense Forces abroad, the ongoing attempts to revise the Constitution, its active participation with the United States in the ballistic missile defence programme, and its search for new strategic partners in Southeast Asia and India – all indicate a fundamental shift in security policies and its emergence as a ‘normal state’.

**Asia-Pacific**

Roughly 40 percent of the total trade of the world takes place through the Indian Ocean, which increases the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in terms of business and other essential supplies like energy resources. The region has considerable political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity, and conflicts between countries remain despite the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the presence of so many troops of different countries has made the region highly militarized (Map 5.1). For countries like Japan which are dependent on foreign trade, raw materials and imports of essential food items, protection of sea lanes becomes the foremost concern. Japan’s geostrategic location and economic stakes world over are speculated as the factors of Japan’s increasing desire to play an active role in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s influence and domination in the economic sphere, specifically in Asia, can not be taken lightly. The rise of China has made the entire world cautious. With India slowly catching up, Japan is making efforts to elicit the best out of both the countries. Japan has already signed many bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties with several countries of the region and now trying to bring more countries like India, Australia and New Zealand into the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), in order to check growing influence of China. The *Diplomatic Blue Book 2007* confirms that,

there are issues that must be faced in forging an Asia of stability, prosperity, and cooperation, including issues that directly affect the security of Japan, such as the situations on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait, challenging issues common to the entire region.
such as terrorism, piracy, energy issues, and new strains of influenza and other infectious diseases, and destabilizing factors such as the rise of nationalism.

The MOFA says that in order to address such concerns, the fundamental objective of Japan's diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific is to lead the region to become one which shares universal values, characterized by long-term stability and predictability and grounded in mutual understanding and cooperation. Since foreign policy is closely associated with the international security policy of Japan, it can be inferred that Japan wants to solve the contentious issues with neighbours and play a meaningful role in securing its own as well as entire region's interest at large. Japan is also advocating the creation of an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. The Diplomatic Blue Book 2007 further says that

Japan will be taking up the following three fundamental principles in its diplomacy towards the Asia-Pacific region. The first of these is that, in order to establish stable international relations, Japan must engage in confidence-building with other countries and resolve issues through diplomatic channels, firmly maintaining the Japan-US Security Arrangements, which are critical for the security of the region, and continuing to endure deterrence against any movement that might destabilize the region as it strengthens its strategic partnerships with stable democracies such as Australia and India. At the same time, Japan calls for increased transparency in any movement towards a military buildup. The second is that Japan will elicit the region; sentential to the greatest possible extent in dealing with common regional issues by taking a multilayered approach. This approach will include not only bilateral diplomacy but also the promotion of East Asian regional cooperation, such as through the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN+3, Japan-ASEAN, and Japan-China-ROK frameworks, and cooperation that broadly incorporated countries outside the region, such as cooperation with APEC, ARF, and ASEM, in addition, within these efforts, Japan will promote the establishment of universal values. The third is that Japan squarely faces the facts of history in a spirit of humility, that in the past it has caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people in Asian nations. With feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan has consistently made efforts for the past sixty years as a “peaceful nation” underpinned by its solid democracy and market economy. As a fore-runner, Japan will continue to undertake various kinds of cooperation, including efforts for the consolidation of peace, reinforcement of governance, and development of economic rules while supporting the development of an Asia grounded in common values (pp. 10-11).
Map 5.1

Major Military powers in the East Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)

Notes:
1. Source: "Military Balance" (2007) publications of the US Department of Defense and others (actual numbers as of the end of fiscal 2006 are shown for Japan)
2. US ground forces in Japan and the ROK are combined figures of Army and Marine Corps personnel
3. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft
4. Figures inside parentheses show the number of divisions

Legend:
- Ground forces (200,000 troops)
- Naval vessels (200,000 tons)
- Combat aircraft (500 aircraft)
Table 5.1
Military Expenditure by Country,
as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1997-2005

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>[1.7]</td>
<td>[1.9]</td>
<td>[2.0]</td>
<td>[2.0]</td>
<td>[2.2]</td>
<td>[2.3]</td>
<td>[2.3]</td>
<td>[2.0]</td>
<td>[2.0]</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>[4.5]</td>
<td>[3.3]</td>
<td>[3.4]</td>
<td>[3.7]</td>
<td>[4.1]</td>
<td>[4.3]</td>
<td>[4.3]</td>
<td>[3.9]</td>
<td>[4.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[ ] = SIPRI estimate, for Japan figures do not include military pensions and are for the adopted budget and not for actual expenditure.


Table 5.1 shows the military expenditure, of some of the prominent countries of the Asia-Pacific, in terms of the total GDP of each country from 1997-2005. The table also shows that Russia and US are the highest spender in terms of their respective GDPs whereas Japan has the lowest military/defense expenditure. Table 5.2 US remains the highest spender throughout whereas Japan is the second highest spender in the region. There is a considerable increase in the US military expenditure while Japan’s expenditure is either more or less constant or decreasing in the last few years.

Table 5.2
(Figures are in US$ million, at constant 2005 prices and exchange rates, and for calendar years)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>[16800]</td>
<td>[19300]</td>
<td>[21600]</td>
<td>[23800]</td>
<td>[28000]</td>
<td>[33100]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
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<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>16706</td>
<td>16127</td>
<td>15689</td>
<td>16652</td>
<td>17120</td>
<td>17605</td>
<td>18197</td>
<td>19000</td>
<td>20333</td>
<td>21853</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>[21300]</td>
<td>[13600]</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>33615</td>
<td>328611</td>
<td>329421</td>
<td>342172</td>
<td>344932</td>
<td>387303</td>
<td>440813</td>
<td>480451</td>
<td>504638</td>
<td>528692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan*</td>
<td>43521</td>
<td>43405</td>
<td>43483</td>
<td>43802</td>
<td>44275</td>
<td>44725</td>
<td>44814</td>
<td>44473</td>
<td>44165</td>
<td>43701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures for Japan include Special Action Committee on Okinawa, [ ] = SIPRI estimate, for Japan figures do not include military pensions and are for the adopted budget and not for actual expenditure.

**Middle East**

Terrorism and proliferation of WMD are the major threats which have engulfed the Middle East for quite some time now. In addition, it is also faced with challenges including the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Middle East peace process. Therefore, the region has a significant influence on the peace and prosperity of the entire international community. Japan relies on the Middle East region for almost 90 percent of its crude oil supply, which makes the Middle East a region of crucial importance from the perspective of Japan’s energy security as well. The Japanese official sources, *(Diplomatic Blue Book 2004)* say that,

Based on such recognition, Japan has been actively making efforts toward ensuring the peace and stability of this region. In addition to the above-mentioned dispatch of the SDF to Iraq and the announcement of its reconstruction assistance, Japan has decided and implemented assistance totaling approximately US$477 million as of March 1, 2004 for Afghanistan, whose nation-building efforts are underway. In particular, Japan has filled a leading role in assistance for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in order to implement the Register for Peace project substantively. With regard to the issue of peace in the Middle East, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi made a visit to the Middle East region, including the Palestinian territories, at the time of the appointment of Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, immediately after the conclusion of the military operation against Iraq at the end of April, and there she emphasized the importance of peace in the Middle East for all countries concerned. Japan also endeavored to establish an environment for peace, by holding in Tokyo in May the Conference for Confidence-Building, to which public and private representatives from both the Israeli and Palestinian sides were invited. Although the outlook for peace in the Middle East is severe with the Roadmap currently stalled, Japan will continue its policy of advancing its efforts persistently toward a breakthrough, while maintaining cooperation with all countries concerned (p. 7).

Japanese dispatch of troops to the Gulf and Indian Ocean is not merely because of the US pressure but is based on the pragmatic calculations and Japan will continue to participate in similar operations and may take a more assertive stance in the future.
**China**

Nowhere in history have two countries been equal in terms of strength, economy and influence. When Japan was at its peak, China was struggling to carry out reforms and follow the principles of market economy. Now China is emerging and speculations for Japan’s decline are making rounds in media circles. China with world’s largest population has noticeably addressed its domestic and international issues through its policies. Through strict state control, China could manage the problem of containing population growth and by the year 2050, the population will have considerably declined (*United Nations World Population: Estimates and Projections, 2006: 3 and 13*). In realistic terms, the stronger China grows, the more cautious Japan becomes. China’s military build-up and growing influence over the third world countries are seen as the potential challenge to the Japan.

**Table 5.3**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
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<td><strong>Mid-range projection</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>143.9</td>
<td>185.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations and maintenance</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement and R&amp;D</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximum Projection</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>145.0</td>
<td>207.4</td>
<td>287.3</td>
<td>403.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations and maintenance</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>113.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement and R&amp;D</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>114.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio between maximum and mid-range projections</strong></td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The RAND study has projected China’s defense expenditure to soar by 2025 to the optimum level of 403.4 billion dollars taking all other expenditures into account (Table 5.3). According to the official sources of China, its military expenditure has

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23 In 2045, population of China will be 1,416,926,000 while by 2050, China’s population will be 1,392,307,000.  
24 Based on the SIPRI and RAND studies.
gone down and the biggest beneficiaries are education and social welfare departments. The Chinese official sources put the figures of their defense expenditure slightly different than the SIPRI and other sources (White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2006). However, China ruled out any possibility of large scale war in the near future and its impetus is mainly on economic development. According to the White Paper, in 2005, China’s defense expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of the United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan. China’s defense expenses per serviceman averaged 107,607 Yuan (around US$13,450), amounting to 3.74 percent of that of the United States and 7.07 percent of that of Japan. Taking all the calculations from different sources (SIPRI, Chinese and Japanese official sources) into account, one can say that China’s defense spending is on a constant rise.

China and Japan ranked highest in the East Asia for military spending, together accounting for almost 70 percent of the region’s military expenditure. Both in real terms and as a proportion of its GDP, Japan’s military spending has been largely stable over the past decade, rising by only 1.9 percent since 1996. This stability in the level of spending together with its very significant volume, ¥4.9 trillion ($42billion) in 2005, has acted as ballast against volatile fluctuations elsewhere in East Asia. Nonetheless, the rapid increase in China’s military expenditure is countering this effect, and Japan’s total share of East Asian military expenditure has fallen from 45 percent in 1996 to 35 percent in 2005. In contrast, China has shown a rapid and sustained boost in military spending.

25 China’s GDP in 2004 and 2005 was RMB 15,987.8 billion and RMB 18,308.5 billion, respectively, with a growth rate of 10.1 percent in 2004 and of 10.2 percent in 2005. The state financial expenditure was RMB 2,848.689 billion in 2004 and RMB 3,393.028 billion in 2005, up 15.57 percent and 19.11 percent respectively over the previous year. China’s defense expenditure in 2004 and 2005 was RMB220.001 billion and RMB247.496 billion, respectively, with growth rates of 15.31 percent and 12.50 percent. In the past two years, the share of China’s annual defense expenditure in its GDP and in the state financial expenditure in the same period has decreased, being 1.40 percent and 7.74 percent respectively in 2003, 1.38 percent and 7.72 percent in 2004, and 1.35 percent and 7.29 percent in 2005. Its defense budget for 2006 is RMB283.829 billion.

26 SIPRI experts say that China’s official defense budget is not comprehensively disaggregated. Public data on official provisions and spending do not, for example, include defense investment, weapon and equipment production or funds for weapon purchases abroad. Nor do they reveal expenditure by subnational governments. In fact, arms exports are also not very transparent.

27 The slight real-terms decrease in Japan’s military expenditure in the past two years (by 0.8 percent in 2004 and by 0.7 percent in 2005) is attributable to continued financial difficulties. The trend in military spending—which has consistently been approximately 6 percent of the national budget since 1999—
over the past decade, with real-terms growth in excess of 10 percent in most years. This constant increase has built up a significant 165 percent rise in military expenditure since 1996. The proportion of GDP spent on the military has risen from 1.6 percent in 1996 to 2.4 percent in 2004 (*SIPRI Year Book 2006*: 310-11).

China justifies increase in the defense spending by citing increase in the salaries of the personnel, modernization and ‘informationization’ of China’s military capability. The policy makers in China need to retain the loyalty of the defense personnel and feel that they should also get benefits of country’s prosperity. China has downsized its army from 2.5 million troops in 2003 to 2.3 million troops in December, 2005. The defense expenditure is also justified because of Taiwan issue and Anti-Secession Law was passed in March, 2005 to provide legislative backing to any action against Taiwan (*SIPRI Year Book 2006*: 312). Richard A. Bitzinger (2007: 117) contests that PLA annual spending on equipment has increased from US$3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated US$12.3 billion in 2006 – a four fold increase in real spending; at this rate the 2007 budget would total around US$15 billion (and this does not include likely extra budgetary funding for foreign arms purchases which is running at around to US$1.5 billion to US$ 2 billion a year).

Given the high defense budget of China and increasing defense related exports, Japan can not observe all these developments meekly. No nation can ignore the developments in the neighbouring countries. Japanese military build-up is not in retaliation to the Chinese build-up but in order to seek normalcy. Nevertheless, Chinese threat theory prevalent among the right wingers in Japan especially after 1995 had helped and will continue to provide justification for Japanese security concern to enhance military capabilities. In the recent developments following Abe’s visit to China last year and Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan in April, 2007 the ‘icy political relationship’ are seemingly becoming warmer and more emphasis is being given on the economic relationships. Both

follows that of the rest of Japan’s budget. The demand of JDA (now MOD) of 1.5 percent annual increase in the budget was turned down by the Ministry of Finance because of the financial constraints and ongoing reforms under Koizumi. Instead, the government intends to reduce the planned ¥25.01 trillion (US$216 billion) 2005-1009 defense build-up programme by ¥ 900 billion (US$ 7.8 billion).
countries have agreed upon to work in the direction of mutual benefits through better understanding. The tension related to historical reasons will take time to disappear as it could not be solved overnight. China has agreed not to play the historical issues card in the future. Japan on the other hand agreed to play as little role as possible in Taiwan. The concept of ‘One China,’ is more or less recognized by Japan. Healthy relations between Japan and China are necessary for entire Asia, including India. As Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh during his Japan visit, while addressing Chinese threat said that, “there is ample of space for all of us.....” (The Times of India, December 15, 2006). It means that China is seen more as an opportunity than threat.

Japan is also looking for key allies in the rest of Asia and the growing interest of Japan in India in the recent few years is seen as the counter-measures to check rising China. According to the former Indian Foreign Secretary and Indian Ambassador to the United States, Lalit Mansingh, (while speaking at a panel discussion, “Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” organized by the IPCS at the IIC on January 10, 2007),

Japan perceives China’s rise as anything but peaceful. Despite the fact that Japan and China are each other’s principal economic partners, there are concerns about China’s escalating military budget, its growing maritime presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, its reluctance to settle the Senkaku Islands dispute and its aggressive claims to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea. Japan is determined not to permit China to emerge as a hegemonic power in the region. While officially China is not described as a threat by the Government of India, many within the strategic community here share the same concerns which the Japanese have about China emerging as a hegemonic power. For the present, China is a subject of common strategic interest to both countries. However, should either country drift towards a state of conflict with China, the response of the other is unpredictable.

According to Kevin Sheives (2006: 205), “the past decade has witnessed a fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy. Its involvement in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as warming relations with the US and Russia, indicate a more assertive and responsible international diplomacy.” Besides, China is also taking keen interest in Central Asia and Africa. Chinese companies are trading in each part of the globe and are considered as potential challenge to the
existing ones. Chinese defense white papers of the recent years also show their intentions and policies. In the most recent development a Chinese warship, *Shenzhen*, visited a Japanese naval base. This was the first such visit by Chinese naval vessel to Japan after WWII and is seen as strategically a landmark in the Japan-China relations (*Financial Post*, November 29, 2007).

Predicting future course of action and Japan's possible role vis-à-vis China are not easy tasks. However, on the basis of present order in East Asia, future bilateral relations between two great powers can be tested. Lam Peng Er (2006: 16-18) observes that, “conceivably, there are at least four developments that will test the mettle and wisdom of leaders and citizens in both nations to maintain pragmatic relations.” First is the phenomenon of “China rising, Japan stagnating.” If China, following its economic rise, behaves arrogantly then it may spark nationalism in Japan and may force policy makers in Japan to think and act aggressively. Therefore, a balance “China rising, Japan recovering,” is a must between the two prosperous Asian giants and can be achieved through self-imposed restraints and wider channels of effective and timely communication. Second is the Japanese attempt to seek normalcy through amendment of its pacifist constitution, particularly Article 9. It may generate more anti-Japanese feelings among Chinese and can result in growth of nationalism and anti-Chinese sentiments in Japan. Third is public opinion in both the countries. China may not be able to control its media the way it is doing now because of increasing complex and pluralistic nature of Chinese society. Strong nationalistic sentiments in Japan may erode friendly relationship between both countries. Then, the role of academicians, think-tanks and civil societies will become important to narrow down the differences. Fourth is the US war on terror which may or may not be extended to North Korea and then to East Asia.

Considering all the developments that Lam Peng Er has pointed out vis-à-vis Japan’s relations with China, the possibility of Japan playing militaristic policies in the foreseeable future are slim. The best approach for both Japan and China will be to accommodate each other’s concern and focus more on economic rather than historical issues. Moreover, Japan needs China’s help to secure itself a permanent seat in the
Security Council. Hence, normalization of Japan can take place provided China ignores what is essentially a domestic matter for Japan.

**Korean Peninsula**

Due to its geographical proximity, developments in the Koreas are of natural concern for Japan (Seung-young Kim 2007: 159). The Korean peninsula covers an area equivalent to approximately 60 percent of Japan and about 1.5 million troops from North Korea and ROK are deployed against each other in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). North Korea in terms of population and economy is much behind ROK but in terms of armed forces it exceeds ROK. North Korea armed forces have approximately 1,100,000 personnel and ROK armed forces have 690,000 personnel. Besides, 29,000 US armed personnel are stationed in the region. Militarily, it is one of the most volatile regions in the world. Such military confrontation continued since the armistice of the Korean War. Therefore, maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia including Japan (Defense of Japan 2007: 34 and Military Balance 2007).

**Republic of Korea**

The ROK is not only the geographically closest country to Japan, but it shares with Japan such basic values as democracy and a market economy, and these two countries are extremely important to each other as political, economic, and cultural partners. In recent years, the bilateral relations have deepened and widened even further, which is essential for both the countries as well as the whole region. In order to sort out some issues of contention as dealing with Takeshima and history recognition, people-to-people exchanges have steadily developed through activities including the exchange programs of the Japan-Korea Friendship Year 2005 (Diplomatic Blue Book 2006: 19).  

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28 N Korea has 1,000,000 ground troops, S Korea has 560,000 ground troops and US has 20,000 troops.
29 Japan-Korea Friendship Year 2005 was launched in commemoration of the 40th year since the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two nations.
The major issues of concern among the two neighbouring countries are still to be resolved and needed to be addressed. However, both share many commonalities and values like dependence on US in terms of security, democracy and so on. North Korea remained the serious concerns for the entire region, that is, East Asia and has helped both countries to come closer. The historical factors like ‘comfort women,’ ‘text-book controversy’ to glorify Japanese pre-war militarism and to omit Japanese war-time atrocities and ‘Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine,’ are raised by the Koreans time and again (The Asahi Shimbun, October 11, 2006). Although Japanese premiers have apologized several times in official capacity and otherwise, any action related to these three issues create a furor in ROK.

Several significant developments such as progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the US strategy have taken place. Such developments have eased the tension in the region and brought neighbouring countries together more often. It is a well known fact that the presence of the US troops in the Korean peninsula has strengthened the ROK position in the region. But now steps are being taken for the transition of the operational control authority. The US Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed at their meeting in February 2007 that the two sides would disestablish the US-ROK Combined Forces Command on April, 17, 2012 and complete the transition of the wartime operational control authority to the ROK. In the future, transition to the new “supporting-supported” command relationship between US and ROK forces will be promoted in line with a substantial decrease in the ROK’s forces, and it is necessary to monitor if the transition is conducted while maintaining deterrent on the Korean Peninsula (Defense of Japan 2007: 43).

ROK forces continue to dispatch engineering and medical units to assist US-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Regarding the units dispatched to Iraq in response to the request from the US, the ROK continues the dispatch although the scale of dispatched forces has been reduced to at least 1,200 or approximately one-thirds of the initial size. The country, however, states that it will establish a plan for the troops
dispatched to Iraq to successfully complete their duties there, comprehensively considering the movements of other countries that have dispatched their units to Iraq.

ROK is modernizing its defense capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies, balanced development of its Army, Navy and Air Force, and elimination of inefficiency. ROK intends to promote "National Defense Reforms 2020," to enhance civilian participation in decision making regarding military affairs, to enhance defense capabilities in conformity with the modern war, to reorganize and downsize the present number of the troops (Defense of Japan 2007: 44). The defense budget of the ROK for the current financial year was up by 8.8 percent. Besides, ROK maintains strategic relationship with Russia and China as well.

The Shinzo Abe’s visit to the China and ROK and other confidence building measures over a period of time has strengthened the bilateral relations between both countries. He assured his counterpart in Republic of Korea that his government will take initiatives to resolve controversial matters (The Japan Times, October 10, 2006). Critics say that Japan needs the firm support of its neighbours, particularly Republic of Korea, in order to claim the permanent seat in the Security Council. Peace and stability in the region will be beneficial for Japan as well.

**North Korea**

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a “powerful and prosperous nation” as its basic national policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas – ideology, politics, military affairs and economy. It adopted a “military-first politics” to realize this goal (Defense of Japan 2007: 35). Although North Korea is faced with serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5 percent of the
It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to an official announcement made at the Supreme People's Assembly in April 2007, the proportion of defense budget in this year's national budget is 15.8 percent but it is estimated that the official defense budget represents only a portion of the real defense expenses.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and also by large-scale special operation forces. Such behaviour of North Korea increases military tension over the Korean Peninsula and acts as a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan. Despite its ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1987, North Korea possesses Biological and Chemical Weapons but the exact number is difficult to assess given its extremely closed environments. Even the Defense White Paper of the ROK published in December 2006 pointed out, "it is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of a variety of agents, including nerve agents, remain stored in a number of facilities scattered around the country and that North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, small-pox and cholera."

On October 9, 2006, North Korea apparently conducted nuclear test inviting criticism and stern action from all over the world. The US president, George W Bush said that "this act is unacceptable." Similar were the reaction from the Chinese, Republic of Korean and Japanese side. Shinzo Abe said that "Japan will step up cooperation with the United States in missile defense and other areas of defense...North Korea will have to bear the sole responsibility...North Korea's moves cannot hamper Japan's relations with China and Republic of Korea" (The Japan Times, October 10, 2006). Against these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, UNSC adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 and imposed economic sanctions on North Korea (Defense of

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30 The approximate percentage of active servicepersons in total population is 0.2 percent in Japan, 0.5 percent in the US and 0.7 percent in Russia.

31 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has authentic proofs that North Korea has biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of various biological warfare agents. DIA believes North Korea has had a longstanding chemical weapons stockpile of nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents.
Japan 2007: 36). The test has brought neighbours together who share common concern about their security arose due to the nuclear test. Arpita Mathur (2006b: 868) argues that “The test conducted on October 9, 2006 made Pyongyang the second nuclear weapon state in North East Asia after China.”

US was concentrating on the Middle-East and issues of potential threat due to terrorism at the time of the test. However, US president Bush, after the September 11 attacks, termed North Korea as 'Axis of Evil' along with Iran and Iraq. No nation in East Asia can take North Korean threat lightly. However, North Korea returned to six-party talk eventually on February 13, 2007, during the third session of the six-party talks in Beijing, the parties reached an agreement for the initial phase of denuclearization, the main provisions of which called for; North Korea to shut down and seal its Yongbyon nuclear facility within 60 days for the purpose of eventual abandonment; North Korea to invite back the personnel from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification; and China, Russia, South Korea, and the US to begin providing emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Japan was unwilling to take part in the supply of the fuel oil given the state of its relation with North Korea, particularly the conflict over the abduction issue (Watanabe Hirotaka, 2007: 25). North Korea demanded release of money from frozen accounts due to economic sanctions. The situation in the Korean Peninsula, though tense, seems to be under control as North Korea has agreed to open its nuclear sites for IAEA inspections. The North Korean threat justifies the Japanese quest for normalcy and the recent war exercises with several countries to enhance interoperability can be considered as another step towards normalcy.

32 The North Korea has missed a deadline of December 31, 2007 for completely abandoning its nuclear plans and opening all the sites for IAEA inspection as was agreed upon in the six-party talk. North Korean official agencies complained about “aerial war exercises” and also accused “belligerent forces” in the US of behind-closed-doors preparations to ignite a second Korean War. ROK source say it was not clear whether North Korea’s stance was an adamart refusal to provide a full declaration, or a stalling tactic typical of Pyongyang, aimed at getting more compensation from the US (Teruaki Ueno, December 27, 2007).
Despite being neighbours, the relations between Russia and Japan were not very friendly owing to some historical reasons. After the more than six decades of WWII, the issue of settlement of the unresolved tension between the Russia and Japan over the Northern Territories lingers. Despite their small size and inhospitable environment, the Kurile Islands have been the center of a territorial dispute between Russia and Japan since the 18th century. Modification of the Kurile boundary occurred three times, twice through peaceful negotiation and once by military actions. Due to the diplomatic and military interactions that produced this historical situation, it would be fair to say that the border between Russia and Japan is still pending historically and politically.

Resolving the issue however, will serve the interests of both sides. One of the pamphlets of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that Japan and Russia have developed cooperative relations which stretch across a wide range of fields, but the level of cooperation is not sufficient. The two countries can benefit from each other in terms of trade given Japan’s economic power and Russia’s richness in natural resources and great technological strength. Not only in terms of trade but geo-politically also both countries can compliment each other by contributing to the peace and stability of the region.

Both countries are sensitive about the issue. The issue over the disputed territories, claimed by Japanese as theirs historically and legally, will not be easy for either of them because of the interests of the citizens of both the countries. Also, some popular movements are also reported by the Japanese official sources. However, the Russian view is contrary and equally passionate for instance Vladimir P Lukin (1992: 61) says that,

In the first place, our relations with Japan, their considerable normalization notwithstanding, remain very complicated. Because of the unresolved territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands, Japan is the only great power with which Russia does not have normal, legally established relations. No clear solution to that intricate dispute is in sight because of the internal political dynamics in both countries, but especially in Russia, where the idea of “giving the islands away” has become a very
controversial and increasingly unpopular proposition. Whatever the intrinsic merits of the case may be, one has to reckon with the new domestic sentiment when pursuing a democratically based foreign policy. All in all, the absence of a regular, established relationship with such a giant as Japan may lead to serious problems.

The MoF A of Japan, through its official website, publicized Japan’s position on the Northern Territories (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s Northern Territories”):

The attribution of the Northern Territories to Japan must be confirmed. If flexibly to the timing and manner of the return of the administration over the Northern Territories were forcibly displaced by Joseph Stalin, Japan now wants to forge a settlement with the Russian government so that Russian citizens living there will not experience the same tragedy. In other words, after the transfer of the administration of the islands to Japan, it fully intends to respect the rights, interests and wishes of the Russian residents on the islands.

In January 2003, Koizumi and Putin adopted the Japan-Russia Action Plan on Koizumi’s visit to Russia. The plan provided the foundation for future peace treaty negotiations by citing the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956, The Tokyo Declaration of 1993 and Irkutsk Statement of 2001. The mutual understanding and trust between the two neighbours is deepening and three frameworks for visits to the Northern Territories have been established and taken as welcome move by the citizens of both countries; the four island non-visa exchange program, free visits, and visits to Graves.

The Japanese government extends humanitarian assistance that is truly necessary to the Russian residents of the islands. This includes accepting medical patients from the islands and foodstuffs in accordance with local needs. Since the Soviet Union occupied the Northern Territories following the end of WWII, there was a period when it did not recognize the existence of the territorial issue, even after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries by the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956.

33 Under this program, until the resolution of the Northern Territories Issue, Japanese citizens and Russian residents on the islands are able to engage in mutual visits without passports or visas. This is to aim for promoting mutual understanding between them and contributing toward settlement of the problem.

34 From a humanitarian perspective, visits to the Northern Territories by Japanese citizens who were former residents of the islands and their families are made as simple as possible.

35 From a humanitarian perspective, Japanese citizens are able to visit family graves on the islands with only an identity card.
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russia abandoned the division of WWII between the victors and the defeated and decided to settle the territorial issue of which country the islands of Etorofu belonged to, and set out clear negotiation guidelines, stating that the issue should be resolved on the basis of historical and legal facts, based on the documents to which both parties agreed and on the principles of law and justice. The Tokyo Declaration is the starting point for peace treaty negotiations, and it is still viewed as being necessary for the negotiations to be conducted in accordance with this Declaration.

In view of the new changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-pacific region, the building of a strategic partnership between Japan and Russia based on a relationship of genuine trust is not only in the interest of Japan but for Russia as well. For this purpose, it is essential to conclude a peace treaty as soon as possible through the solution of the Northern Territories issue. It is also important that Russia shares these basic ideas. In order to settle the Northern Territories issue and to conclude a peace treaty between Japan and Russia, the understanding and cooperation of the citizens of Japan and Russia, and of many others are indispensable. Putin has acknowledged Japanese concern and it is more than apparent that Moscow is ready to work with Tokyo on a solution. "We understand the motives of our Japanese partners' behavior. We would like to get rid of all the thorns of the past, and together with Japan we are looking for a solution to this issue" (The Associated Press, June 6, 2007).

Border disputes or the disputed territories between the two nations have always provided justification for the escalation of troops and military maneuvering e.g. India and Pakistan spent a major chunk of their military budget on maintaining hundreds of thousands of troops in the Kashmir region. Interestingly, most of the military operations are in inhospitable, uninhabited and extremely hostile regions. In case of Northern Territories, both countries have decided to look for alternative solutions till the time a mutually agreed resolution of the issue is reached. The dispute of returning Northern Territories may linger on however, the two countries are seeing each other as potential partners and both have recently come out of economic recession. Japan is ready to invest
its capital in the resource rich Russia and Russia on the other hand seeking Japanese technology in updating its public transport and other infrastructure. Ministry of Finance of Japan’s trade Statistics suggests that Japan’s trade with Russia surpassed ¥1 trillion in 2005, an unprecedented figure including the Soviet period. Total volume of trade in 2005 rose by 23 percent over the previous year. In terms of US-dollar, the total trade was US$10.74 billion, an increase of 22 percent over the previous year). A Russian minister recently asked Japan for its bullet train technology and with Japan looking for alternative markets and resource rich areas while Russia can provide both. Suspicions of armed attack or other maneuvering have reduced significantly.

In the area of energy, the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects, petroleum and natural gas development projects in which Japanese companies are participating, have been making progress. Regarding the ‘East Siberia-Pacific’ pipeline project for transporting crude oil from Siberia to the Pacific coast, in relation to the Japan-Russia cooperation for the speedy and complete materialization of the project, the leaders from both countries agreed during President Putin’s visit to Japan in November, 2005 to work toward reaching mutual understanding between both governments at the earliest possible stage, and signed a document pertaining to the issue. Based on this development, relevant discussions are being conducted between experts from Japan and Russia (Diplomatic Blue Book 2006: 98). Both countries are facing common threats like terrorism and need each other’s cooperation to deal with any untoward incidents. More emphasis is given to the cultural interactions to enhance people to people level contacts ((Diplomatic Blue Book 2006: 98)).36 Japan is also trying to engage Russia militarily through joint-exercises, high-level defense dialogues. Thus, the relationship between two countries is not merely economic or confined just to the trade. They have entered into strategic dialogues through the confidence building measures initiated more rigorously, recently. The domestic political situation in Russia seems to be much stable and may continue to

36 In the area of cultural and interpersonal exchanges, the year 2005 marked the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia, and several commemorative events were held in both countries to celebrate the occasion. In Japan, a commemorative ceremony was organized by the government in April at Shimoda, which was followed by a ship tour in June where youth from both countries stayed on board and visited memorable sites connected with the Japan-Russia relationship such as Vladivostok, Hakodate, and Shimoda. In addition to this, approximately 120 commemorative events were also conducted by local governments and private sector groups.
be same under the leadership of Putin or his successors. The Northern Territories issue will take a backseat in the burgeoning economic interests of both the countries and Japan will gain immensely from in the near future from the close ties with Russian Federation.

**Japan and Regional Organizations**

**Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

Japan-ASEAN relations, officially and economically, progressed after 1997, thanks to the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ which was propounded by the then Japanese PM Takeo Fukuda, although the initiatives in engaging all the East Asian countries were started in 1990s. The Fukuda Doctrine’s significance increases owing to the fact that it was Japan’s first attempt to adopt a more independent policy towards the region in the wake of US withdrawal and the end of Vietnam War in 1976. However, the Japanese attempt to bridge the gap between ASEAN and communist Indochina did not yield any results and with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 came the Japanese policy of ‘support ASEAN.’ The Japanese primary concern then onwards is to promote stability and maintain peace in the region.

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37 ASEAN was established in 1967 with the primary aim of economic, social and cultural cooperation. It was not a military alliance between the independent countries and the most significant achievements in the regional cooperation have been political and diplomatic in nature.

38 The Fukuda doctrine states that, 1) Japan rejects the role of a military power; 2) Japan will do its best to consolidate the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on “heart-to-heart” understanding and 3) Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN, while attempting to foster mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.

39 In fact, the momentum toward increased regional interaction stemmed neither from Japan nor China, but from ASEAN states and, periodically, South Korea. In late 1990s Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, frequent critic of the West and father of a “Look East” campaign, proposed to China’s premier Li Peng the creation of an “East Asian Economic Caucus.” Vigorous opposition from the United States and Japan effectively blocked Mahathir’s proposal. Soon thereafter, ASEAN initiated a free trade agreement (AFTA, signed 1992), and at the 1994 summit in Bogor, Indonesia, APEC members agreed that developed countries would reduce tariffs to below five percent by 2010 and that developing countries would do so by 2020. The strong recovery of China after Tiananmen attracted an increasing wave of foreign investment that pulled the debate over membership in a new direction. In 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum, which gave ASEAN officials opportunity to talk to representatives of surrounding states, held its first meeting. Owing to the development in Europe and opposition of ASEAN countries the then Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei yielded to the “ASEAN consensus.” After preparatory meetings in Osaka and Phuket, ASEM held its first meeting in Bangkok in March 1996, with a membership essentially equivalent to Mahathir’s proposed East Asian Economic Caucus.
After the Cold War, there have been subtle changes in the Japanese policy towards ASEAN. During the economic crisis of 1997-98, Japan although adopted aggressive foreign policy and generously provided financial assistance but was criticized for not taking up the leadership role. The 2003 Tokyo Declaration was issued during the ASEAN-Japan Comemorative Summit to mark 30 years of relationship which was another milestone in the multilateral relationship. The main outcome of the Tokyo Declaration was the ambitious long-term goal of setting an East Asian Community. However, creating East Asian Community was not that easy (Yeo Lay Hwee, 2006: 259-261).

Despite the huge investment of Japan in the ASEAN countries and economic domination of Japan on most of the trade of the region, the apprehension among the general public about the Japanese past still prevails. Japan has exploited the economic potential of the region as it served as the easy supplier of the raw materials and a market for Japanese processed goods.

Japanese financial aid during the time of financial crises and relief aid during natural disasters, for instance Tsunami and earthquake that hit Indonesia and other coastal countries, have played a major role in changing the attitude of the people and political elites in the ASEAN countries. Japanese SDF also was welcomed and there was negligible protest to oppose the SDF relief works. SDF are involved in a wide range of activities, including relief measure and reconstruction and ASEAN countries have accepted the constructive role of the SDF. Japan will continue to play a significant and big brotherly role in the ASEAN region.

Japan is also trying to engage India, Australia and New Zealand in the multilateral talks that have now become ASEAN+3+3. This regional character of the organization will disappear once US joins. The critics say that entry of India, Australia and New Zealand was to check the increasing influence of the China. Japan will continue to play a prominent role. Japan understands the geo-politics of the region and will continue to act
as a balancing power which is necessary in order to secure its economic and strategic interests in the South East Asia in particular and Asia at large.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Japan’s enthusiasm for regional security multilateralism grew considerably during the early 1990s. People from different streams began to call for Japan’s more active role in establishing a region-wide security framework. MOFA also played a significant role in establishing the ARF in 1994 by convincing US about the importance of promoting multilateral security dialogue in the region and also by shoring up Singapore’s initiative to expand the ASEAN PMC (Post-Ministerial Conference) structure to the wider Asia-Pacific. By 1994, MOFA even established a new division in order to give impetus to its regional multilateral policy. The military rise of China, the rapid progress on economic and political areas among the ASEAN members, and growing relevance and need of multilateralism to promote regional security framework were the prominent reasons motivating the establishment of ARF (Takeshi Yuzawa, 2007: 168-169). The idea of including regional multilateralism in the security policy, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, became more appealing and ARF was supposed to run almost parallel to the US-Japan security alliance. However, by the late 1990s Japan’s enthusiasm for the regional multilateral security diplomacy started fading away and the limitations of ARF became problems.

Takeshi Yuzawa, (2007: 169) observes,

In the end, Japan’s optimistic ‘liberal’ conception of the ARF gave way to a more pessimistic ‘realist’ persepctive from which the ARF could, at best, be seen to contribute only to a minimum level of confidence building among participating countries by providing with an opportunity to exchange their views of regional security issues and establishing additional diplomatic channels to hold bilateral talks.

However, Japan’s interest in the Asia-Pacific security multilateralism has not completely disappeared and the non-traditional threats to the security like terrorism have provided a practical problem. ARF has the potential to address such security concerns.
Japan has realized that sole dependence on the US can not solve all of its security concerns.

**Japan and International Organizations**

**Japan and the UNO**

Japan has always contributed to the UN and its contribution, ever since its economic recovery during the 1960s, remained considerably higher than most of the industrialized nations. Japan never defaulted in contributing to the UN while the world’s biggest economy, US on several occasions appeared on the defaulter’s list. There is no provision in the UN to reclaim that money. Japan is the most reliable country in terms of its monetary contributions to the UN. Japan has contributed in other fields also e.g. Japan has been one of the principal promoters of the United Nations University, which is headquartered in Tokyo. Japanese government has been reasonably diligent in its efforts to bring the country into compliance with many of the international standards set forth in resolutions and treaties adopted in international institutions. To increase the number of Japanese working in international organizations, the government has assigned personnel officers to its UN missions in New York and Geneva (Sadako Ogata, 1983: 29-41).

Japan is eager to become permanent member of the UNSC and campaigning hard to project itself as the most deserving nation. The Japanese policy makers are wise enough to speculate and express concern over the prevailing international situation. In order to effectively address these threats, the necessity of the implementation of decisions of the Security Council fully and promptly has been stressed upon by the Japanese diplomats, so that collective action receives maximum participation and cooperation from Member States. Japan also emphasized on the fact that the institutional reforms of UN are long overdue.

The Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as an institution, should reflect the reality of international politics of the 21st century in the composition of its membership, not that of 60 years ago. Japan believes that it is crucial to enhance the
accountability and transparency of the Security Council to non-members of the Security Council. For that purpose, Japan intends to make strenuous efforts. For example, in order to enhance accountability, Japan intends to make efforts to create a framework for consultation on PKO mandates between the Security Council and the non-members of the Security Council, such as those dispatching personnel and those bearing a considerable proportion of the financial obligations. Japan intends to bring in more financial discipline into Security Council-related activities based on in-depth cost/benefit evaluation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” Autumn, 2004).

One of the publicity pamphlet released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) states, No other time in history than today has the work of the UNSC become more essential – humanity is afflicted everyday by countless threats to peace and security. Sources of instability are abundant: disputes over resources or along ethnic lines, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, massive human rights violations, or failed governance and endemic poverty especially in post-conflict situations. The Security Council must adapt to these realities of the world and effect a swift and decisive response to various challenges so that peace may ultimately prevail. Outdated structure of the Council despite the demands of the world today in the sixty years of UN history, its membership has grown 51 to 192; Asia and Africa have increased their presence; and the end of the Cold War has reshaped not only Europe but global threat perceptions, Yet the composition of the Security Council is still frozen in the past, with fifteen members including the permanent five (P5) who enjoy their privileged status. Reform is long overdue” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan in the United Nations Security Council: Our Viewpoint”).

Japan has a two-point agenda in order to achieve early reform of the Security Council and Japan’s permanent membership. Japan claims the permanent seat in the UNSC by comparing its contribution to the UN and the number of the terms it has served the Security Council. Japan’s contributions amount to one-sixth of the UN’s and PKO’s total budget. Japanese huge aid for the reconstruction and development amount are second only to the USA. Japan has been elected most frequently as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. It has served in this capacity for 9 times (Table 5.4). Japan’s claim that it is better suited for the permanent membership of the UNSC are genuine and the by following the recent trends one can assume that Japan is showing its assertiveness in word and spirit by promptly responding monetarily or otherwise.

40 First, there should be a better represented and more transparent security council that can live up to the demands of the new Century. World leaders met at the UN in 2005, committing themselves to achieving a decision on Security Council reform. Second, Japan calls on the international community to turn these words into action and make a real progress on the expansion of the Council. In a reformed Council, Japan is ready to play a larger role as a permanent member.
Table 5.4
Countries That Have Been Elected Most Frequently a Non-Permanent Member of the Security Council (as of March 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Country name</th>
<th>Number of times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.5 and Figure 5.1 show country-wise contribution of few prominent countries to UN, in 2007. US contribution is the highest at 22 percent and Japan contributes nearly 17 percent of the total.

Table 5.5
Country-wise share of UN Assessed Contributions in 2007 (US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>493.2</td>
<td>22 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>332.6</td>
<td>16.62 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>132.9</td>
<td>6.64 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>126.1</td>
<td>6.30 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>2.67 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>1.20 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan’s expertise and perspective in building peace as shown while leading international efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation as a major non-nuclear weapon state and its efforts to strengthen peace building and human resource development in Asia and engagement with Africa through the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) process are highlighted as plus points for the qualification of permanent seat. Another important point contested by the government of Japan is that at present world population is 6.5 billion out of which 3.9 billion reside in Asia. On top of that, one-third of the Security Council resolutions are related to the issues emerging in Asia. However, only 3 out of 15 Council members are from Asia. “Japan,” according to the MoFA, “can become an important voice within the Council representing the aspirations of Asian states and bringing the Council’s attention to this vital and vibrant region.” Japan’s campaign is mainly based on its contribution to the world through the UN or other international agencies. Japan has requested all UN members to support and elect its candidature in the forthcoming non-permanent membership election for the Security Council (2009-10), in 2008. The campaign pamphlet states that Japan believes and strives to promote world peace and prosperity. Apparently, Japan has geared-up to take the role of global leader. Ever since Japan passed the UNPKO law it has been participating in the international peace cooperation activities (Table 5.6). Japan
has also actively participated in international humanitarian relief operations (Table 5.7) and international election monitoring activities (Table 5.8).

### Table 5.6
**Record of Japan’s International Peace Cooperation Activities based on the International Peace Cooperation Law (As of March 2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)</th>
<th>Total numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</strong></td>
<td>Staff officers Feb 1996-present 2 persons x 9, Transport units Feb 1996-present 43 persons x 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)</strong>*</td>
<td>Civilian police Jul-Sep 1999 3 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNAMET: UN Political Mission

Source: *Diplomatic Blue Book 2006* : 155

Sub-total: 4633 persons

225
Table 5.7
International Humanitarian Relief Operations

| Relief of Rwandan refugees | Refugee relief units | Sep-Dec 1994 | 283 persons |
| Relocation of East Timorese displaced persons | Airlifting units | Nov 1999-Feb 2000 | 113 persons |
| Relief activities of Afghan refugees | Airlifting units | Oct 2001 | 138 persons |
| Relief of Iraqi refugees | Airlifting units | Apr 2003 | 56 persons |
| Relief of Iraqi victims | Airlifting units | Jul-Aug 2003 | 104 persons |

Source: Diplomatic Blue Book 2006: 155
Sub-total: 812 persons

Table 5.8
International Election Monitoring Activities

| Bosnia and Herzegovina general and regional elections | Elections supervisors and observers | Sep 1998 | 30 persons |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina municipal assembly elections | Polling supervisors | Mar-Apr 2000 | 11 persons |
| Timor-Leste constituent assembly elections | Electoral observers | Aug-Sep 2001 | 19 persons |
| Kosovo assembly elections | Electoral observers | Nov 2001 | 6 persons |
| Timor-Leste presidential election | Electoral observers | Apr 2002 | 8 persons |

Source: Diplomatic Blue Book 2006: 155
Sub-total: 74 persons
Total: 5519 persons
(Excl. liaison and coordination personnel)

Japan and the World Bank

Japan joined the World Bank in August 1952 and began to borrow the large sums necessary for its post-war reconstruction. Initially, Japan borrowed heavily for the
development of its infrastructure. In 1966, Japan signed its final World Bank loan and became the 11th country to graduate from borrower status. The total amount borrowed by Japan from the World Bank in 31 loans amounted to US$863 million, with the final repayment made in 1990.

Since the opening of its Tokyo Office in 1970, the World Bank has fostered a wide range of partnerships with Japan, ranging from the Japanese Government to the private sector, academics and research institutes, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations. Japan is now the second largest supplier of capital to the World Bank. Japan is also one of the largest donors to trust funds that help the World Bank and its partners support the achievement of development results at global, regional, and country levels.41

The Japan Policy and Human Resource Development Fund (PHRD), established in 1990 as a partnership between the Government of Japan and the World Bank, has supported technical assistance (TA) activities in more than 140 countries. PHRD is currently one of the World Bank’s largest sources of grant funds available to developing countries. The Fund’s objective is poverty reduction in developing countries, which is achieved through technical assistance and institutional strengthening, supporting the design and implementation of World Bank-financed projects. The strength of PHRD comes from its ability to make resources available to the public sector in the poorest countries to acquire international technical expertise and promote capacity building, helping countries to formulate their own policy reforms and investment programs in support of poverty reduction and socio-economic growth.

The Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) was established by the Government of Japan and the World Bank in June 2000 as an untied mechanism for providing direct assistance to the poorest and most vulnerable groups in eligible member countries of the

41 The largest share has gone to the Japan Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) Fund and the Global Environment Facility. Other important beneficiaries have been the Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF), HIPC, the Iraq and West Bank and Gaza Trust Funds, and the Consultant Trust Fund (CTF).
World Bank Group. As on March 2005, the Government of Japan had provided over US$250 million to the JSDF and over 160 grants, amounting to more than US$180 million had been approved. The Fund aims to build capacity and provides grants for promoting broad participation in the development process. Projects financed by the Fund are selected on the basis of their compliance with the developing country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), or as a World Bank pilot project in planning, or as a supplementary project for an existing World Bank project already underway.

Japan also contributes to the World Bank Institute (WBI) programs contributing to human resource advancement in developing countries. Activities range from general training run in partnership with various development institutions, to the Brain Trust Program, which applies economic development research from the Asian region to developing countries. More broadly, Japan is delivering a major assistance program to reconstruction operations (Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iraq) and post-conflict assistance. Japan and the World Bank also cooperate to help people suffering from the effects of natural disasters. For the Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) worked in close conjunction with the World Bank to conduct a study to identify specific needs for reconstruction. The partnership between Japan and the World Bank at the operational level is now very dynamic, especially in Asia (both Eastern and Central). Areas for close collaboration include joint project programming and co-financing, research, collaboration on in-country and regional distance learning and knowledge sharing activities linked with the global distance learning network (GDLN). In June 2004, Japan provided a five-year, multi-year commitment of $25 million to establish the Tokyo Distance Learning Center to connect to the GDLN (Japan and the World Bank).
Table 5.9
Japan: Medium-Term Projections, 2006-12
(Percentage change from the previous period, unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total domestic</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net exports</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(contribution)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rate (percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI inflation</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings-investment balances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Account</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance*</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* in percent of GDP

Taking the IMF’s projection (Table 5.9) for the Japanese economy up to 2012 and the military expenditure of Japan into consideration, the defense spending of Japan in the coming years at the persistent rate of 0.9 percent of the total GDP may stay same. The GDP growth rate will be on an average approximately 2 percent while the military budget will remain less than one percent of the total GDP. Even then, Japan will continue to enjoy the US nuclear umbrella. Technologically also Japan is much superior to other Asian countries. Despite its increasing budget, military reforms and modernization efforts China will take time to reach Japanese standards. North Korea will continue to pose a threat to the security of the region.

**Disarmament, NPT and Arms Control**

“Disarmament” aims to eliminate armaments, while the objective of “non-proliferation” is to curb and prevent the spread of weapons, in particular, weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, their delivery means and related materials and technologies. “Arms control” covers the regulation of arms,
verification and inspection, confidence building measures, and restrictions on the transfer of conventional weapons and others. The government agencies of Japan such as MOFA and MOD also acknowledge that Japan, being the only victim of the nuclear attacks, should play a prominent role in the elimination of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destractions), disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons. Japan so far has contributed in this regard through several multilateral and bilateral forums and international regimes like NPT. The basic stance of Japan on the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and arms control is based on the principles of humanity provided in the preamble of the Japanese post-war constitution,

We, the Japanese people .... resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government...We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want...

It becomes extremely essential for Japan to support and encourage disarmament measures even from its own security viewpoint. Two of Japan’s neighbours are major powers with vast territories and enormous military capability that includes nuclear weapons. Even North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Taiwan Strait also increases the risk of hostilities in the region surrounding Japan even after the end of the Cold War. Humanitarian approach and policy emphasis on human security are some more basic factors behind Japan’s support for the disarmament efforts (Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed., 2004: 1-26). Table 5.10 shows the various treaties related to arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation regarding weapons of mass destruction, and other weapons.

42 The concept of arms control originates from the US-USSR arms control negotiations held in 1970s. The concept originally aimed to construct a structure to control nuclear weapons between the nuclear superpowers. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, which target armaments, weapons and related materials and technologies based on such rules. The genesis of such disarmament and non-proliferation policy comes from a deep, earnest desire of humankind to create a peaceful and secure world.

43 See Diplomatic Blue Book and Defense White Paper of different years
Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Treaties</th>
<th>Outline (Purpose and Others)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control, disarmament Non-Proliferation Related treaties</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)</td>
<td>The NPT recognizes the five countries - US, Russia, UK, France and China - as nuclear weapon states. It prohibits acquisition of nuclear disarmament in good faith. Peaceful use of nuclear energy, NPT recognizes the inalienable right of signatory states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (Article 4-1) The NPT obliges non-nuclear weapon states to accept safeguards by IAEA to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy for peaceful use to military technologies. (Article 3). NPT entered into force in 1970. There are 190 signatory countries to the NPT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td>
<td>The CTBT prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion by signatory states at any place in the world, including outer space, the atmosphere, underwater and underground. CTBT has been signed by 177 states and ratified by 137 states. (of 44 designated countries whose ratification is necessary for the treaty’s enforcement, 41 countries have ratified it). All of the 44 states need to ratify the treaty so that it can enter into force. But some of states which have yet to ratify the treaty so that it can enter into force. But some of states which have yet to ratify the treaty are uncertain if they will ratify it. As a result, the treaty has yet to enter into force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export control System for Non-Proliferation</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)</td>
<td>NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling exports of materials, equipments and technologies that could be used for development in 1978 following a nuclear test by India in 1974. The group consists of 45 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological and Chemical Weapons</td>
<td>Chemical weapons convention (CWC)</td>
<td>CWC pursues to abolish chemical weapons by prohibiting signatory states from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring or using such weapons and obliging them to destroy the weapons if they own them. A strict verification system has been established to make the implementation of the convention effective. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established in Hague, Netherlands, in 1997 in order to implement verification measures stipulated under the CWC following its enforcement. The CWC entered into force in 1997. CWC signatory states: 182 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)</td>
<td>BWC is designed to destroy biological weapons already in possession of some countries as well as prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. BWC entered into force in 1975. 155 states have signed BWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australia Group (AG)</td>
<td>The AG has been trying to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons by controlling exports of materials, manufacturing facilities and related technologies that could be used for making such weapons. The first meeting took place in 1985. Participating States: 40 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery means including missiles</td>
<td>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)</td>
<td>The HCOC is a political agreement that mainly stipulates principles such as prevention of Proliferation of ballistic missiles and restraint on tests, development and deployment of such missiles, and confidence-building measures among member states. The HCOC was adopted in 2002. Participating states: 126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The MTCR is designed to control exports of missiles, which can serve as means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and general-purpose equipment and technologies that are capable of contributing to missile development. The MTCR was established in 1987. Participating states: 34.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention on certain conventional weapons</td>
<td>The CCW is designed to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, such as land mines and booby traps. CCW entered into force in 1983. Signatory states: 102.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Convention)</td>
<td>The convention totally prohibits the use of mines, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel while obligating signatory states to destroy stockpiled mines within four years and remove laid mines within 10 years. It also stipulates international cooperation regarding the removal of anti-personnel mines and assistance of mine victims. The convention entered into force in 1999. The states: 153.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction on illegal Transaction of Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
<td>The United Nations is currently studying ways to restrict illegal transactions of small arms and light weapons and to reduce excessive accumulation of such arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of the UN Register of Conventional Arms</td>
<td>This register has been in operation from 1992 to help increase the transparency of armaments, following a proposal made by Japan along with countries of the European Community (then). Under the system, each country is required to register to the United Nations the quantity of its annual exports and imports of defense equipment in seven categories and the countries where such equipment is imported or exported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The *Defense of Japan 2007* says that Japan has been continuing to strive for an early enforcement of the CTBT and for the reinforcement of IAEA safeguard measures from a viewpoint of strengthening global efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD. Besides, Japan has been also actively participating in discussion being made by the NSG, OPCW, CWC and AG (see table for details). The chemical school of the GSDF, located in Saitama City, Saitama Prefecture, has synthesized small quantity chemical materials to research protective measures, which are subject to regulations of
the convention. In line with the regulations, the school has opened its facilities to inspection by the OPCW six times since the OPCW’s establishment. The MOD has dispatched its officials to an annual meeting of the MTCR since 1992 in order to make MTCR regulations and rules effective.

Japan has successfully destroyed all anti-personnel mines in February 2003, with the exception of a minimum number of anti-personnel mines necessary for the development of and training in mine detection or mine clearance techniques, as permitted by the Ottawa Convention. Japan is also taking measures to implement what is being decided or agreed upon in various conventions like CCW. Japan’s interest and role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is also noteworthy. Regarding the future efforts of the Japan in this area the *Defense of Japan* 2007, says that,

Under the New National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan in a bid to further solidify its peace and security has pledged to participate proactively and on its own initiative in activities being conducted by the global community to improve the international security environment. In addition the Mid-Term Defense Program calls for Japan to participate in joint exercises on international peace cooperation activities, including the PSI. In light of cases, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in areas surrounding Japan, Japan should do its utmost to prevent proliferation of such weapons by regarding the PSI as a broadly defined security issue including defense diplomacy law execution and export control and by tackling the issue proactively and on its own initiative even during peacetime. Therefore, Japan will try to establish an ideal organizational structure within the Government in close cooperation with relevant organizations (p. 389).

Japan’s future role in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament can also be predicted by the Japanese policy of showing faith in and extending support to the UN Resolution 1540 concerning the Non-Proliferation of Mass Destruction, which was unanimously passed in April 2004, by the Security Council. Despite the North Korea nuclear threat and other hypothetical situations unification of Koreas, their closeness to China and anti-Japan stance, Japan will not opt for nuclear weapons. Mike M Mochizuki

44 The Government of Japan has been working on the project to dispose of chemical weapons that were abandoned in China in line with CWC. Past investigations have shown that an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons that were abandoned by the former Imperial Japanese Army in China remain buried in the Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province. Every year GSDF Officials are being sent to China in this regard.
(2007: 303) observes, "the most likely Japanese course for the time being is to strengthen the alliance with the United States and improve conventional defense capabilities, including missile defense. Although the taboo about public discussions of the nuclear weapons option may be weakening, Japan will continue to forgo that option."

**Future Role of Japan in International Politics**

If reports of a survey, AsiaBarometer, are to be believed, then the popularity of the Japan among the citizens of the various countries of the world is amazingly high. The survey was launched at the initiative of Professor Inoguchi Takashi of Chuo University, Tokyo. It was based on the question that asks people to assess the influence of other countries on their own country. The results indicate that Japan’s influence is regarded as a positive one in most of the places surveyed except South Korea and China. Similarly, majority of the people interviewed in Japan and South Korea do not have good opinion of China. Tanaka Akihiko feels that this is because of the mutual distrust among the North East Asian countries and Japan should emphasize more on the ways of improving its relations with the neighbouring countries by minimizing the differences and feelings of distrust. The most noteworthy finding of the survey was that Japan’s positive image was the highest in Afghanistan where Japan has contributed in the reconstruction work (Tanaka Akihiko, 2007: 31-34).

On the basis of above discussion, Japan’s future status as a normal nation holding a permanent seat in the UNSC, can be foreseen. If the pragmatists will continue to rule Japan and their assertive policies can be carried forward, Japan would also be playing a more active role in the world politics. Koizumi was a flamboyant and popular PM but under his leadership bilateral relations with neighbouring countries suffered. Abe could not deliver much because of domestic problems; however, the improvement of relations with the neighbouring countries was his biggest contribution to Japan as well as North East Asia. He successfully convinced Japan’s neighbours and the rest of the world that the Japanese do not have any ulterior motives with its ongoing militarization process. Yasuo Fukuda, the present PM, is the first son of a prime minister to also serve in the
post, has pledged to keep Japan as a strong US ally in the fight against terrorism, improve relations with Asia and address growing inequalities in the world’s second-largest economy (CNN.com, September 25, 2007). Like his very father Takeo Fukuda, who as Japan’s Prime Minister from 1976 to 1978 and was instrumental in concluding a treaty of peace and friendship with China, Yasuo Fukuda has advocated more amicable relationship with China (The Japan Times, December 29, 2007). Fukuda in one of his recent policy speeches has stressed on “Pursuing diplomacy which contributes to peace and development in the world” and projected Japan as a “Peace Fostering Nation” (Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to the 169th Session of the Diet January 18, 2008).

At present, the world is confronted with various difficult challenges which cannot be resolved by one country alone. Included, in addition to security issues such as the fight against terrorism, are global warming and poverty. A peaceful and stable international society constitutes an invaluable asset for Japan; thus Japan needs to cooperate to the utmost for this end. With the Japan-U.S. security alliance and international cooperation as the basis, Japan will actively address these global challenges, and play a responsible role in the international community as a “Peace Fostering Nation” which contributes to peace and development in the world. We will strive to create a country that toils for the common interests of the region and the world, a country which is full of charm and has sublime aspirations. We will be actively engaged in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We will resume refueling activities in the Indian Ocean, and continue our assistance to the peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq for the reconstruction of their countries. ....Japan aspires to become a hub of human resource development as well as for research and intellectual contribution to further promote cooperation in the field of peace-building...Peace fostering is not limited to the security area in the narrow sense of the term. Eradication of poverty as well as improvement in health and hygienic conditions are humanitarian requirements, but at the same time, they provide hope and opportunity to all peoples, paving the way towards peace and stability. This year, Japan will host the fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) and the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit meeting; at these meetings and others, Japan will cooperate with the G8 countries, EU and other parties in order to resolve such issues within the scope of “human security.” Japan will also promote international cooperation so as to utilize Japan’s accumulated know-how on disaster reduction and disaster management overseas, due to the frequency of natural disasters in this country. In order to fulfill its role as a “Peace Fostering Nation,” Japan needs to

45 The treaty with China put a formal end to the two countries’ World War II hostilities. It was signed in 1978, six years after normal relations were restored between them, and it also made Japanese aid available for China’s modernization efforts. For more details see chapter 3.
broaden the stage where it conducts its diplomatic activities. For this, we will pursue the goal of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and will work towards United Nations reform.

Japan has a remarkably peaceful, tension free atmosphere in its surroundings other than North Korea. However, the North Korean issue has provided another opportunity to promote and justify the building-up and strengthening its defense capabilities.

The future role of Japan on the basis of the analysis of this chapter can be assessed thus, that Japan has hostile, but in terms of economic and financial security, equally cautious neighbours on the one hand, and a hard-pushing longtime strategic ally and major trade partner, like the US, on the other. This situation presently seems to be the order of East Asia and is likely to remain for a few more years with China as an exceptional case possessing the capability to cause major upheaval in the region. However, the global economic order has forced the region to look beyond the conventional markets and to be innovative in their approach. Emerging giants like India are favoured destinations for capital and other strategic long-term investments and are speculated to be trump card to check the Chinese rise. On the domestic front, Japan has to face several problems like decreasing population, ageing society, constitutional amendment, political instability and economic reforms. Its neighbours’ criticism of Japan will take a back seat because of their booming economies and fast-changing social and political structures.

If Japan fails to take a leading role in the East Asian region in particular and Asia in general, then its present status may suffer. China is fast catching-up with Japan and other industrial powers. The US deterrence will continue to shield Japan from any possibility of armed attack by hostile neighbours. Continued reliance on US for its security needs may invite more unseen and unpredicted threats and challenges for Japan. The Japanese policy of engaging the Russian Federation through dialogue and peace treaties may develop a new power equation in the region. Russo-Japanese economic ties and increasing trade relations will be beneficial for both countries and the long-standing
territorial dispute will be marginalized in the due course of time. The Russian challenge to the security of Japan has reduced significantly and is not going to pose any serious problem in the foreseeable future. The domestic Japanese political as well as economic environment seems suitable for the ongoing reforms after a long period of time with the rise of the DPJ proving to be the only exception. The onus of the change lies mainly with the leadership. The international community has welcomed and would continue to support Japanese contribution in various fields. Japan has all the potential of emerging as a 'Big Power' in all possible terms provided future opportunities are used in a positive and constructive manner as Japan did in the post-WWII period.