Chapter III
The concept of militarization, more or less, denotes the gradual build-up of defensive and offensive capabilities by states. The process of militarization may be carried out discreetly owing to domestic or international pressure. Various countries have justified their military build-ups in the name of preparedness to handle emergency situations, or potential threats from rival countries. Militarization, if unchecked and unrestrained leads to militarism, tyranny and dictatorial regimes. Several Afro-Asian countries have witnessed military governments even after attaining the rights of self-determination. There may be instances of using militarism and militarization interchangeably but both terms have different contextual and theoretical meanings. This chapter deals with the process of militarization in Japan as reflected in its policies and as viewed by various scholars from across the world. The emphasis, however, is on Japanese defense under the US-Japan Security Alliance.

Scholars have tried to look into the concept of militarization through diverse approaches. C B Otley defines militarism as the doctrine and practice of exalting war and the armed forces over other social functions and institutions in the state and militarization as the encroaching of military forms, personnel and practices upon civilian institutions or social orders (C B Otley, 1978: 323). Harold Lasswell (1941: 455) speculated and theorized on the concept of the growth of garrison state in all major powers of the world including the United States even before the end of World War II. He apprehended that soldiers, ‘specialists on violence’ would have supremacy over the ‘specialists on bargaining,’ businessmen in the garrison state. He also brought forth the fear, of the mobilization of public opinion through misinformation about the necessity of the militarization. Often such manipulations succeed in influencing public opinion and the military’s influence on the civilian rulers can not be overlooked. Militarization has tremendous impacts on the social and economic structures of any given country and the potential threats are often used to enhance military capabilities as was evident during the Cold War rivalry between two big powers namely US and USSR (Patrick M. Regan, 1993: 45-58).
The growth of the military-industrial complex demonstrated this impact, which still continues to exert an influence in the post-Cold War world. The liberal approach to the problem of militarism treats the military and the civilian as two separate independent centers of power. Healthy civil-military relations and the civilians control the military. In contrast, the concept of military-industrial complex is premised upon the union of interests between three centers of power – the military, the industrial and the civilian. The concept of military-industrial complex thus can not be overlooked while dealing with militarization.

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first person to use the term, military-industrial complex in 1961 while delivering his Farewell Address to the American people. He put the nation on guard against acquisition of unwanted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The concept of militarization allows the threat arising from the military to be treated as an international or transnational phenomenon, not limited within the boundaries of one state or civil society. This is the case with the arms transfers, which can produce negative impact on the producer, the receiver and the international system as a whole (Glenn D Hook, 1996: 19).

**Raison d'être of Militarization in Japan**

Makoto Takizawa stressed upon three basic reasons behind the remilitarization of Japan. First, the Japanese defeat left them with very few alternatives and choices in the decision making. Second, the Cold War vitally affected Japan’s status in East Asia. Third, the US occupation policy played a determining factor in actual reorientation of Japanese military positions (Makoto Takizawa, 1967: 10-11). Although, there exist several such reasons for the Japanese remilitarization, Japanese policymakers never showed any haste and were very calculating while carrying out their plans.

Richard Nixon (1989: 47-53), former president of the US, stressed on the fact that the size of the US economy was reduced considerably in the late 70s and 80s, from 50
percent of the world’s total economy when US took the responsibility of defense of Japan to 27 percent. Thus, in order to maintain the critically important and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries Japan was forced to remilitarize as the critics in US were against the ‘free ride’ that Japan was enjoying. He also emphasized on the urgency to realize that Japan could not play a great power role without enough military might. Nixon observed that, “for a great power, playing a role on world stage is not a privilege, it is a responsibility.” Therefore, the Americans wanted Japan to realize the importance and play the role of great power which was considered to be equally important for the security of Japan.

Paul Kreisberg (1989: 54-58), however, holds a contrary opinion about the rearmament of Japan. During the Cold War, for almost forty years both the superpowers did their best to gain influence and supremacy over as many countries as they could by using their military and economic might. Japan could manage to gain the centre stage as a super economic power by relying on technological advances, financial clout and US military support. Japan’s defense expenditure compared to the size of its GDP remained considerably very low. The Japanese public also endorsed the idea of minimum basic expenditure on defense. Japan was seen as a success story as early as the 1960s. Kreisberg feels that Japan may continue to enhance its influence and play a prominent role with its economic status without increasing its military might because the 21st century will be comparatively peaceful.

Despite the bipolarity of the world during the Cold-War, the militarization process never stopped. Rather it accelerated.¹ Japan’s long-term interest calculations guided Japan to stick to the US bloc without adopting a high-profile military posture. Japan enjoyed US shield, often called as free ride during the early years following the Occupation era. Glenn. D Hook (1996: 25) opines that,

the radical demilitarization of state and society during the early years of allied occupation meant that, in contrast to the situation in the US and the

¹ Later on with the emergence of the Non-aligned Movement as a neutral block the third block was also created thanks to the leadership of the Nehru, Tito and Nasser. However, neutrality of the NAM countries has been challenged from time to time.
Soviet Union during the cold war, where militarization processes became rooted firmly in the socio-economic structures of society; Japan remained relatively free from militarization processes in this respect.

The US-Japan security alliance remained the major cornerstone of the Japanese security policy. The pro-militarization shift in post-War Japanese security stance has been on an incremental basis. In the early post-War years, Japan preferred to play a low profile role, militarily. However, with the increasing US pressure, growing economy and changing domestic as well as international circumstances, Japan has taken more responsibilities. In spite of reliance on US, Japan has considerably built up its defense capabilities. Japan, despite having pacifist constitution cannot be seen as “military pigmy.”

*Approaches to Militarization in Japan*

Glenn D. Hook has highlighted the three basic, often overlapping— and critical approaches to militarization in Japan: first is the politico-military, second is the humanist-legal and third is the economic approach. These three discourses on militarization or more precisely, remilitarization have played a significant role in sustaining antimilitarist/demilitarized identity of Japan. The most influential is the politico-military critique. Taking lessons from the atomic bombing of its two cities during the WWII, Japan was not only reluctant but totally against militarization. Japanese civilian leaders, as discussed earlier, were against military adventurism even during the World War. The post-War period was full of challenges for the Japanese and they did not want to attract any kind of trouble in the form of war. Despite, the US shield Japan wanted to stay away from the Cold War rivalry. Popular opinion too was in favour of the pacifist constitution and anti-militaristic policies. Hook says that,

Instead of following this well-worn path to try to achieve security, the *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai* (Peace Issues Discussion Group) proposed promoting peaceful coexistence and unarmed neutrality as an alternative policy. This proposal was based on the understanding that in the nuclear era, militarizing Japan and tying it into a nuclear security network with the US or the Soviet Union would not add to the security of the Japanese state and society. Nor would it add to the peace of the region. Japanese troops might once again become aggressors against other Asian
nations, perhaps as the mercenaries of the US. The fear of Japan again becoming an aggressive military power expressed both at home and abroad supported this critique of militarization (Ibid: 34).

The humanist-legal critique based on a view of human nature and international relations is clearly reflected in the preamble of the constitution which states that: “...We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world...”

On the pretext of Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan could look forward to means, other than military, of promoting peace. Kuno Osamu, one of the Japan’s leading philosophers and anti-war activists, advocated the use of non-violent means, non-violent action, civil disobedience and non-cooperation as an alternative to a military establishment in preserving security (Glenn D Hook, 1996: 23). Hook stressed upon the importance of the humanist-legal critique, whatever may be the area of concern. Delegitimizing the military establishment, pursuing an alternative form of security in the nuclear era, opposing the revival of the conscription system, the humanist-legal approach provided a normative platform from which to launch a critique of militarization during the cold-war era.

The economic critique, which exerted a powerful influence especially in the 1950s incorporates two kinds of criticism of militarization: militarization as a negative factor in the growth of the Japanese economy, on the one hand, and militarization as a pernicious influence on the improvement of the people’s life. Even among some of the conservative politicians, support was voiced for constraining the growth of the SDF during the Cold-War era. From this perspective, the Security Treaty with the US offered a way for the conservative governments to maintain a low level of military expenditures. The fear of pernicious influence on the people’s standard of living, on the other hand, was one of the reasons for the labour union’s opposition to remilitarization particularly during the early post-Occupation years. ‘Tax Thief’ (zeikin dorobo), ‘Waste’

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2 Preamble of the Post-War Constitution of Japan
(mudazukai), and so on were common cries when the worker's precious yen was squandered on guns instead of being used for butter. Critics pointed out that even if remilitarization of the economy did expand employment opportunities, wages would remain stagnant and the conditions of employment poor.

Japanese intellectuals too criticized Japan's military ties with the US on economic grounds. One of the points emphasized by the opponents of revision of security treaty in 1960, for instance, was that the new treaty would stimulate the growth of an arms industry and limit the budgetary allocation for education, social welfare and so forth. It was for this very reason that, with the improvement of employment conditions, particularly in the high growth period of the 1960s, the labour unions' opposition to militarization became less strident and the economic criticism of militarization was turned on its head by those supportive of militarization: Japan could have guns as well as butter. The policy of the Japanese government was to have economic security first. On the way to achieve this goal, gradually, the remilitarization process would also gain momentum. One of the reasons that former PM Yoshida Shigeru gave for opposing early American requests for Japan's rearmament, for instance, was its weak economic power (J W Dower, 1979: 383).

Mike M Mochizuki classifies various schools of thoughts that exist in Japan vis-à-vis Japanese security policy (see Figure 3.1). He analyzed the security debate in Japan and grouped the various authors into mainly four schools of strategic thought: political realists, unarmed neutralists, Japanese gaullists, and military realists. He argued that first three schools have their roots in the early post-war years while the military realists developed during the 1970s and 80s and are more pragmatic in their approach. Political realists are the policymakers who favour reliance on US by simply following the Yoshida Doctrine. Unarmed neutralists, as already mentioned in chapter two, are declining in influence, are opposed to a military alliance with US and amicable relations with Soviet Russia and China. Japanese Gaullists are the nationalists who favour revision of security alliance and equal role and status for Japan, if not reversal of role. Military realists is not a very old school of thought. They advocate close US-Japanese ties and have a more
pragmatic approach towards the defense of Japan through technologically sophisticated military build-up (Mike M. Mochizuki, 1984: 158-65).

Richard J. Samuels (figure 3.2), while analyzing the security discourse in Japan has classified Japanese scholars, commentators, politicians and bureaucrats into; Neoautonomists, who believe that the military strength is the way to autonomy and Japan should build a full-spectrum and independent military by keeping distance from US, in short “security with sovereignty”; Pacifists, who do not believe in the military institutions and stress on the fact that autonomy can be achieved through prosperity, in short, “security with peace”; Normal Nation-alists, who believe in seeking prestige through military strength and are not averse to the reliance of US for security needs and; Middle Power Internationalists, who believe in seeking prestige through prosperity.
On the basis of the security and (re)militarization discourses in Japan, one can assume that the diversity of the opinions is essentially a parameter of vibrant democracy and free speech. From the realist perspective, as a sovereign nation in order to address its security concerns, Japan should have strong defense capabilities. Those opposing militarization in Japan have weakened over a period of time but still possess considerable amount of influence in policy making.

Remilitarization in Japan

*Initial Phase*

Despite the burgeoning number of critics and citizen movements and even armed threat from the communists and particularly, student wings within Japan (see Chapter 2), remilitarization in Japan started during the occupation period (1945-52). In July, 1947, MacArthur stated that, “the occupation has done its job so thoroughly that Japan would not rearm for modern war within a century” (*Political Reorientation of Japan*, SCAP, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949: 413). Ironically, Japan was compelled to remilitarize within less than five years. The occupation authorities realized the inevitability of remilitarization of Japan owing to many reasons as discussed below. The important phases and landmark events are discussed here with reference to their impact on policy. The public reaction after decisions such as the review of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines has already been discussed in the previous chapter.

Right from its inception, the Japanese militarization was linked more widely to the militarization processes under way in the Asia-Pacific region (Glenn D Hook, 1996: 46). Japanese militarization can not be studied in isolation because of the ever growing concerns of the neighbouring countries and the geopolitics of the region. The major event of the post-Occupation period in US-Japan relations remains the security alliance between two economic countries. All the other events are covertly or overtly influenced by and always revolve around the security alliance (Hiroshi Masuda, 2001). In order to check the potential Soviet threat, and securing its own long term strategic and economic
interests in the Asia-Pacific region in general and in the Far East in particular, the remilitarization of Japan started under the pressure of US. This major shift in the policy of the US was critically reviewed by many scholars who feel that Japanese were made subservient to the US strategic interests (Makoto Takizawa, 1967: 126). The common practice of the cold-war was to build-up defense capabilities to avoid the anticipated threat. Paradoxically, post-Occupation Japan hesitatingly initiated remilitarizing itself at the time when reconstruction work was also on. The Korean War brought new opportunities for Japan and its defense and other related industries were revived with US technological and financial aid.

Pacifism was welcomed and accepted by the majority of the war-weary Japanese public. Despite the public resentment and agitation over perceived violation of Article 9, Japan’s rearmament began with initiation of a US program to build up the Japanese Coast Guard, to recognize and reorganize the Japanese National Rural Police, and to transfer to Japan US Navy mine sweepers. In response to the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, under the pressure from General MacArthur, a 75,000-strong National Police Reserve was established, which further paved the way for the Self Defense Forces (SDF) (Glenn D. Hook, 1988: 382).

Subsequently, it resulted in the signing of the ‘peace treaty’³ and the ‘security treaty’⁴ on American terms. In this way, the demilitarization was followed-up by remilitarization during the occupation-era. The United States supported all elements of Japan’s national life, continuing with its program of military equipment transfers, and recruiting former military officers for police duty. The outbreak of the Korean War focused US efforts on the fight against Communist expansionism. The US military provided substantial, direct technical and financial aid for the reconstruction of Japan’s heavy industry and technological base. This aid came through the use of US defense contracts that both financed new industrial plants and transferred basic technologies to

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³ Peace Treaty was signed between Allied Powers and Japan on April 28, 1952. Japan got all the rights of the sovereign nation and all other outstanding issues were settled.
⁴ Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America was signed in 1952. Japan entered into a security alliance with the US and gave rights to the latter for maintaining its troops on Japanese soil.
Japanese industrial enterprises, which in turn produced substantial amounts of military equipment to US standards and design.

1952 also brought the ratification of the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Japan. Under this first Mutual Security Assistance Pact, US forces stationed in Japan were to deal with external aggression, while Japanese forces would counter internal threats and natural disasters. Thus, by 1952, Japan was well on her way to total rearmament.

Japan concentrated its effort on rebuilding its national economy, leaving security concerns for the United States to handle. US protection during the Cold War allowed Japan to keep its defense expenditure at a minimum, thereby enabling the country to fully utilize its national resources in the economic recovery. The strategy later was known as the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ after Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who laid the foundation of Japan’s post-war mainstream conservatives. The vast United States market absorbed large quantities of manufactured exports from Japan, whereas US military presence in Northeast Asia deterred potential conflicts in the region, assuring safe passage of import and export vessels for the Japanese (Yoichiro Sato, 1999).

Japan’s need for a larger military to handle internal unrest became a binding term of legal treaty with the 1952 Mutual Security Assistance Pact. Later, the Basic Policy for National Defense of 1957 was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by cabinet to establish stronger grounds for Japan’s defense policy. The basic defense policy acts as the basis of the Japanese defense policy with four major aims: to support the UN activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace; to stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism and establish the foundations required for national security; within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation; to deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-US security

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5 Basic Policy for National Defense was approved on May 20, 1957 with the aim to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression harming Japan’s independence and peace which are founded on democracy.
Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future (Defense of Japan 2006: 426).

The initial phases of the Japanese militarization were solely dependent on the US. The post-Cold War period had witnessed noticeable changes in the Japanese security policy. Not that Japan has alienated itself from US. It has, however, started collaborating with other nations and their armies in order to be prepared for any unexpected situation arising from anywhere, which could pose a threat to Japanese security in any form. Japanese dependence on the US in terms of its security proved not only beneficial but secured its boundaries from all potential threats. Japan had to suffer severe criticism from within, particularly from the rightists and conservatives who felt that Japan has surrendered its sovereignty to the US even after the occupation was over, by allowing US to have military bases and troops in Japan. One of the policy documents of the US states that Japan is in a military alliance with the US, the root of which is the Japan-US security treaty. This is part of pacific security treaties of the US signed with other states in the pacific" (US Defense Report 1987: 78)

In 1960, a new US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was signed which was followed by intense and sometimes violent popular demonstrations in Tokyo, organized by students and progressive forces concentrated in the capital against the new security treaty (Kashiwa Heiwa Kekyujo ed., Nihon Gaiko Shugo Bunsho Nempyo: 959-960). The style of leadership of Kishi, the then Prime Minister was also under the line of fire. The attempts of US to make Japan take a pro-active stance for its own security could not fetch results to the extent as was expected. Although the Mutual Security Treaty was successfully enacted, Kishi was forced to resign to take responsibility for the civic unrest

6 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America states that, "Japan and the United States of America, Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law, Desiring further to encourage closer economic stability and well-being in their countries, Re-affirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in the peace with all people and all governments, Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of United Nations, Considering that they have common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security..."
that had plagued the capital, which also resulted in the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan. Internal opposition from rival faction leaders within the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) also came out against the revision of the treaty.

A 'low profile' and 'US dependent' foreign policy remained in vogue during the years to follow, after the civil unrest and anti-government protests and demonstrations. The economic front and the developmental issues and works were given preferences. Ikeda’s tactical maneuver succeeded dramatically in restoring the LDP’s political fortunes. Ikeda’s strategy also benefited from the willingness of the new Kennedy Administration that took office in 1961 to similarly concentrate on the economic aspects of the bilateral relationship. Most of the Japanese PMs followed the ‘Yoshida Doctrine.’ LDP was criticized for adopting double standards, as the party publicly opposed military build-ups but discreetly kept the aspiration of regaining normal status nation. Sato, in 1969, secretly granted the US the freedom to reintroduce nuclear weapons into Japan in the event of a Far Eastern security crisis (John Swenson-Wright, 2002: 87).

John Swenson-Wright, who studied the policy documents of National Security News Service during the Sato’s visit to US in January 1965, contests that “Sato’s covert deal with the Nixon administration was part of a bilateral quid pro quo intended to secure US agreement to return Okinawa to Japan.” Ironically, the same PM also announced the three non-nuclear principles of not to produce, manufacture and introduce nuclear weapons in Japan. Japanese defense policy, on the one hand, was reflecting the anti-militarist and anti-nuclear ideology while on the other hand, encouraging its security alliance partner to even introduce nuclear weapons.

Despite the rearmament and US endorsement for the SDF, Japan did not shed its inhibitions and self-imposed constraints to open militarily. The three non-nuclear

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7 Ikeda served as Prime Minister from 1960 to 1964, and was followed by Sato Eisaku who enjoyed a relatively long tenure as Prime Minister, remaining in office until 1972, when he was replaced by Tanaka Kakuei.
8 Three non-nuclear principles also played a prominent role in the formulation of Japanese Defense policy particularly after the Sato’s declaration of
principles of *hikaku sangensoku* – not to possess, produce or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan, were established in 1967 during Sato Eisaku’s tenure as the PM of Japan. The one percent ceiling of the Gross National Product (GNP) to be spent on defense was established during the Miki Takeo administration and the tripartite ban on arms exports established in 1967 prohibited arms exports to communist countries, countries then involved in international conflicts and countries bordering on involvement. These principles were reinforced by Miki in 1976, when the scope of ban was expanded to all other countries and prohibition on the export of weapon-related technology was added (Chalmers Johnson, 1986: 558).

Japan, however, continued to reap the benefits of Vietnam War. Despite, the strong public reactions against the War, Japanese industries, and hence the economy maintained the high growth rate. In continuation with the ‘low military profile’ principle, Japan also refused to enter into any turmoil arising in the volatile Korean Peninsula and therefore, denied any regional security commitment (Michael J. Green, 2001: 114).

Subsequently, the Nixon Shock, growing anti-Japan sentiments in US because of Japanese trade and China-centric policy of US made the Japanese rethink their defense policy.

The issuing in 1976 of the country’s National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) was the first serious attempt by the Japan Defense Agency and the government of Japan to provide a clearly articulated definition of the country’s defense doctrine. The emphasis was on increasing the sophistication through technology and modernization of the SDF rather than on the size. Through NDPO, Japan tried to promote the strategy of

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9 The export of arms needs a license from the Minister of Economy Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949, now known as Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law) and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949). The three principles provide that the arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted: (1) Communist bloc countries, (2) countries to which arms export is prohibited under UN resolutions and (3) countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

10 This doctrine was the result of discussions held in the Group to think about defense (*Boei o kangaeru kai*), a study group composed of eleven private citizens appointed by Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director-General Michita Sakata in 1975. Central to the NDPO was the “standard defense force concept” (*kibanteki boei ryoku koso*) which held that Japan should possess a peacetime force of minimum size but large enough to meet and repel a “limited and small-scale aggression” and to prevent a fait accompli.
threshold deterrence and mobilization in order to avert limited and small-scale aggression on its own by strengthening its defense capabilities. It was stressed that Japanese should be capable enough to mobilize quickly with an NDPO force structure. NDPO did not face stiff resistance from the opposition as well as public. Since the defense budget remained less than the stipulated one percent ceiling, it had the support of 60 to 70 percent of the public. Mike M. Mochizuki (1984: 154-56) observed that “the NDPO is a watershed in postwar defense policy not because it marked a major departure in military policy, but because it helped to create an environment in which the open discussion of security issues was no longer taboo.”

Through the US-Japan 1978 Joint Defense Guidelines, Japanese and American leaders sought to institutionalize more pro-active role for Japan. Closer security relations with Washington included an Agreement by Washington and Tokyo in 1978 on a new set of US-Japan Joint Defense Guidelines outlining how the two countries would co-operate in the event of armed attack on Japan. Japan’s military would be responsible for repelling, limited, small-scale aggression while awaiting support and reinforcement from US forces. Japan, in addition to the already enhanced indirect support to the US bases and troops on its soil the Japanese, were forced to commit to the US, overall military strategy in the Asia-Pacific.11 The guidelines were believed to have brought as much change in the US-Japan relations as the revision of the security treaty could have. Hook argues that like the San-Francisco peace treaty and the security treaty, the guidelines were not even sent for the Diet ratification. Thus, an inference can be drawn that guidelines are essentially a military subject and had precedence over the Diet (Glenn D Hook, 1996: 48). Such initiatives reflected elite level co-operation rather than widespread popular support. For Japan, the option to choose an alliance partner was limited. Japan had to depend on the US for its security.

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11 The Guidelines expanded the range of cooperation to include (1) preemptive defense against attack, (2) cases of possible military attack against Japan, and (3) situations in the Far East judged to exert a serious influence on the security of Japan.
The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Internationalization

Security implies the means to provide safety or protection to the people from different types of intimidations. With the changing global political equations and strategic environment during the Cold War, it was felt that the Japanese do not possess even bare minimum denial forces in case of armed aggression by neighbouring countries. The declining US influence, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and Russian military buildup in the area's surrounding Japan were seen as posing a severe threat to the security of Japan. It was speculated that the US nuclear umbrella might act as a deterrent but it would not be enough in case volatile neighbours, particularly Russia and China, create emergency like situation. Japan's geo-strategic location, over leaning on US for the security needs, the insufficiency of the natural resources, problems of food security and energy security remained a cause of concern.

In the backdrop of such a global environment around Japan, the concept of comprehensive security emerged. Comprehensive Security is a Japanese term intended to describe how Japan should help to forestall, to prevent or to limit war. Japan's 'comprehensive security' (sogo anzen hosho) policy, with greater emphasis on economic and diplomatic means than on military means for pursuing the nation's security, was an expected result of Japan's postwar experience with national security issues and a reasonable conclusion to a careful examination of its security environment in the late 1970s (Tsuneo Akaha, 1991: 324-325).12 In 1979, in order to address the vital questions related to the security of Japan, a task force headed by Dr. Masamichi Inoki, former head of Japan's Defense Academy was assigned to prepare a study of comprehensive national security. The Task force's report was submitted to the acting PM Ito in July 1980, shortly after Ohira's untimely death. More emphasis was given on increasing the spending on

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12 A 1978 report by the National Institute for the Advancement of Research (NIRA) and the Nomura Research Institute called for comprehensive and varied responses to national security threats whether political, economic, or military. That approach was endorsed in a 1980 report prepared by a task force appointed by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira that postulated three levels of national security measures for Japan: (1) self-help or self-defense; (2) efforts to render the whole international system conducive to Japan's security; and (3) intermediate-level efforts to build a favorable security environment in the region. The three-level approach has since become official policy and it enjoys wide public support. Heiwanondai kenkyukai, Kokusai kokka nihon no sogo anzenhosho seisaku (Comprehensive Security Policy for the International State Japan), Tokyo, Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1985 as cited in Tsuneo Akaha (1991).
Research and Development and technology than on expanding the forces. In other words, quality enhancement was given importance. Robert W Barnett (1984: 8-9) contested that the Japanese comprehensive national policy, antedated by many years, its actual inception. He endeavoured to read between the lines the text of Article 9, and also to look into the security treaty with the US, creation of SDF, utmost caution in maintaining peaceful if not amicable relations with the neighbours and huge voluntary donations not only to the international bodies like UN, World bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) but also to the needy nations and crisis like situations. His argument that all of this precedes the actual documentation of the report was based on the well researched study. Further, critically analyzing his argument one can say that Japan despite its burgeoning economy did not play a commensurate military role.

The other concept which informed the defense policy of Japan was internationalization. While there was much talk in the 1980s of ‘internationalization’ or kokusaika, policy often appeared to be inward rather than outward-looking, a tendency perhaps best epitomized by the interest of Japan’s politicians as well as the Japanese business and defense communities in promoting self-sufficiency and the indigenous production (kokusanka) of leading-edge defense technologies (Michael Green, 1995: 10-11). The biggest self-imposed hurdle of not exporting defense technology to the communist countries left Japan with minimum optio of trading mainly with US as far as its defense industry was concerned (Gregory P. Corning, 1989: 278). However, Marvin S. Soroos (1988: 24) believes that internationalization issue was not new to Japan even during the Meiji Era, when attempts were made to modernize Japan when it was feared that Japan had fallen behind other regions of the world politically, socially, militarily, and technologically. These two concepts guided the Japanese defense policy in the middle of the Cold War and still are visible in the Japanese defense policy.

13 Relative to the United States, Japan’s arms production is very low due to the ban on arms exports. Total sales to the SDF for FY 1980 were only about $3 billion. In that same period, military-related production as a share of total industrial production was only 0.4 percent for Japan while approximately 5 percent for the United States. However, the growing importance of dual use electronic technology to modern weapons has brought Japan more deeply into arms-related production. Electronic components constitute a substantial part of most weapons. In the case of the SDF, the share of electronics in total weapon cost is 23 percent for the T-74 tank, 21 percent for the F-4 aircraft, and 40 percent for the P-3C aircraft.
1980–1991: Dilemma of Free Ride

The major visible shift in the Japanese security policies came under the assertive leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was the only postwar PM who also served as director general of the Boei-cho (Japanese Defense Agency, now Ministry of Defense). Unlike his predecessors, Nakasone was very interested in defense issues and proud of his service at the Boei-cho (Chalmers Johnson, 1986: 557). Nakasone was a popular leader despite his hawkish appearance and defense background. It was during his time that the one percent ceiling on the defense budget (one percent of the total GNP) was abolished. Even then it went as high as 1.004 percent of the GNP in 1987. For Japanese people, the one percent mark was a symbol of a demilitarized state but Nakasone’s political priorities made him cross that limit, which resulted in severe criticism from home and abroad. He realized later that Japanese strength lay in its economy and also refrained from many controversial positions, such as visit to Yasukuni Shrine (see chapter 5). Nakasone, however, could not succeed in implementing several of his desired policies to make Japan a militarized nation. The most severe criticism came from within the LDP and former PMs such as Miki, Fukuda and Suzuki. Even the general public sentiment and his weak faction in the Diet proved hindrance in the path of normalization of Japan (Glenn D Hook, 1996: 54).

Japan faced a series of disturbing international developments in the 1970s and early 1980s such as: superpower strategic parity and the short-lived detente, the Sino-American rapprochement, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the deepening Sino-Soviet rift, the two oil crises, and the US defeat in the Vietnam War. The 1973-74 oil crisis brought forth the vulnerability of energy-hungry and resource-starved Japan. Japan’s response was ‘economic security’ which was moderately successful in reducing

14 Interestingly, Nakasone’s key political successes were concentrated in the domestic arena, in the fields of education, administrative reform, and the deregulation of the tobacco and telecommunications sectors. It was in this context that he was able to build important bureaucratic coalitions of support and win the backing of a domestic public that was rarely impressed by the Prime Minister’s attempts to walk tall on the world’s policymaking stage.
15 In 1987, for the first time Japan’s defense budget surpassed one percent ceiling established by Miki (in 1976). In 1980 it was 0.993 percent of GNP; 1.013 percent in 1988; and 1.006 percent in 1989.
16 Almost all the Japanese PMs have visited the Yasukuni Shrine and Nakasone visited it 11 times see chapter 5 for details.
its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. However, failure of Japanese diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict in the Middle East and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war into the Persian Gulf, and the relentless Soviet force buildup in East Asia, significantly affected its security perspective.

The Japanese stance of imposing partial economic sanctions on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a bit rigid. Japan’s diplomatic and economic initiatives on the Cambodian conflict, including endorsement of Association of South East Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) unified position on a comprehensive political settlement and increased economic aid to the ASEAN countries, had virtually no effect on the course of the conflict. Tokyo stayed neutral, maintaining diplomatic and economic ties with Iran and Iraq, both nations while simultaneously taking steps to limit direct damage to its oil shipments during the Iran-Iraq war. Instead of sending its troops to the Persian Gulf, Japan preferred giving money to support US ships in the region. The Japanese stand invited criticism mainly from its allies. The Soviet threat loomed large till the end of cold-war giving reasons for Japan to beef-up its security, a clear cut shift from its initial policies based on ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ (Tsuneo Akaha, 1991: 325-326).

In 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki announced that Japan would guarantee the security of its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for a distance of 1,000 nautical miles beyond its shoreline. Japan’s announcement of securing its SLOC again showed the gradually advancing stage of militarization. Although it was necessary for Japan to protect its SLOC given its geostrategic location and volume of foreign trade, it was, even then, against established norms and a breach of the self-defense law, which states that Japan maintains security forces just to defend its territories.

One more apparent shift in the Japanese defense policy came in 1983, when a technology-sharing agreement between Washington and Tokyo intended to promote the flow-back of important new defense technology from Japan to the United States was signed. In the initial decades of the post-War relationship between US and Japan, the
technology flow was unidirectional, that is from US to Japan. In the wake of the guidelines, Japanese advanced technology with military applications was officially transferred to the US. The Pentagon was believed to be interested in gaining access to dual-use technology such as very high speed integrated circuits and optical fibers, which could be used in future weapon developments. Such technology was needed for the guided mechanism of the high precision weapons as missiles and sophisticated computers to monitor and process information with high speed (Glenn D Hook, 1996: 47).

Japan relied more on 'cheque book' diplomacy through ODA and 'free ride' rather than on the traditional concept of security, that is, the building-up of defense capabilities and use of force to solve any international impasse. The free ride criticism, mainly by the US, was based, not on the Japanese low defense budget and more reliance on US but on the increasing 'double deficit,' the budget deficit and trade deficit and the high growth rate of Japan. Hook points out that the difference between the US military assistance to the various countries, when compared with Japan, was considerable very high (Hideki Kan, 1987: 18 as cited in Glenn D. Hook, 1996: 60). Denying the US claims that Japan enjoys a free ride, James E. Auer argues that Japan's defense budget is the highest in Asia and even higher than many industrialized and highly militarized countries of the west. After Nakasone became the PM, restriction of export of defense technology was lifted in the early 1980s only to accommodate US. The US also enjoys mutual benefits and to some extent 'free ride.' The US public is misinformed and Japan contributes enough to its defense (James E. Auer, 1989: 161-68). Low defense budget definitely helped Japanese economy. Nevertheless, Japanese defense budget remained low, not only because of economic reasons but also due to the several domestic and international factors (see chapter 2).

If Japan enjoyed a 'free ride' in the initial phase of its post-war remilitarization, then US began enjoying a 'free ride' from 1978 onwards, when Japan started to

17 Technology transfers were based on the Mutual Defense Assistance Programme of 1954, the Data exchange agreement of 1962, the Memorandum on Joint Research Development, 1966.
16 A protocol giving details of the procedure was signed in 1985.
19 A pentagon review of the period 1950-71 clearly stated that the amount of military assistance to Japan at 2 percent was slightly lower than West Germany (2.1 percent) and the lowest in E Asia and the Pacific, far behind Vietnam (17.2 percent) and S Korea (9.5 percent).
contribute towards payment of Japanese workers at US installations. Kanemaru Shin, the head of the Defense Agency called these payments *omoiyari*, 'sympathy' payments. In the following years, the Japanese government agreed to pay the salaries of Japanese staff, for the construction and maintenance work in the US bases. Hook contests that the US was given a free hand under the 1951 security treaty while the revised 1960 treaty puts restriction on that freedom. The US is supposed to consult Japanese before taking any serious measure against the enemy or on the Japanese soil. But the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan and use of Japanese-bases during the Vietnam War raised criticism about the violations of terms of the treaty.

The influence of the military in Japanese politics and society was not particularly significant in the 1980s, and military spending as a percentage of the GNP, officially at around one percent of GNP, remained lower than other industrially advanced countries. However, defense capabilities were enhanced both quantitatively and qualitatively. The election of Nakasone as PM suggested growth in the political power of those supportive of militarily strong Japan crossing popularly accepted normative boundaries. Here onwards, many initiatives to break the widely established and accepted norms were taken by the Nakasone government and his successors. In the 1980s, making Japan a conventional military big power associated with the global strategy of the US was the foremost priority of the political realists and Japanese Gaullists who were part of the government. Even to some extent, military realists also wanted Japan to open up militarily. This argument is fortified by the continuous increase in the defense budget. Given the volume of the Japanese economy, even one percent makes Japan one of the highest spenders on defense.

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20 The Japanese government due to the appreciation in the value of Yen accepted the responsibility for their social security payments to a total sum of 26 billion yen.

21 The Japanese government paid more than 2,000 billion yen towards the cost of the US presence in Japan during 1980-89, nearly three times the amount of earlier decade.
Post-Cold War Developments

All western capitalist countries faced the dilemma of justifying their defense budgets in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR and the so-called Soviet threat. Japan, closely following the western lines for the initial two years, sidestepped the issue by saying that the Cold-War was not over in East Asia. The Japanese security policy as seen in the previous paragraphs was undergoing noticeable changes. It, at times, even ignored many laws and norms in the search of normalcy. It seems not to be enough. They realized the necessity to rethink and redirect the security policy (Akio Watanabe, 2003: 239).

Eugene Brown (1994) observes,
Of the world's major nations, Japan occupies the anomalous position of being an economic superpower without wielding the political and military power ordinarily conferred by wealth. A product of Cold War circumstances, this wealth-power disconnect was widely accepted, even welcomed, by postwar Japanese leaders, opinion elites, and mass public. Given the depth of antimilitarist pacifism within postwar Japan and the broad distrust of its intentions among its Asian neighbors, the so-called Yoshida Doctrine of focusing on economic matters while generally following the lead of the United States on strategic political and security issues served Japan exceptionally well for nearly half a century (p. 430).

The Japanese response to the first Gulf-War did not meet the expectation of the international community. Its huge US$13 billion financial contribution was criticized as 'check-book diplomacy.' Nakasone's policies could not be followed aggressively. The Japanese reluctance to contribute physically during the Gulf-War I invited criticism of its allies, despite the fact that Japan made major financial contribution. Countries like Germany, having almost the same experiences and restrictions as Japan, made its presence felt during the Gulf War I. Even Australia for that matter, participated physically in the war. Whether the reasons were, weak leadership or the pressure of anti-militaristic groups, Japan lost a chance to exhibit its willingness to help its allies in the dire hour of need.

The efforts of many LDP members, particularly the political realists, did not get enough support in the Diet and resulted in political turmoil within LDP, opening a way for coalition politics in Japan. This international criticism, however, gave opponents of
the Yoshida Doctrine political leverage to secure enactment in 1992 of the UN Peace Keeping Operations Cooperation Law, authorizing SDF participation in UN Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO). In a landmark event and a significant step towards asserting itself as a normal nation, Japan after passing a law, sent its troops abroad (Aurelia George, 1993: 560). Japan sent its first batch of soldiers to Cambodia (Defense of Japan 1993: 134). Japan had earlier also sent election observer to Namibia and Nicaragua. Prior to the adoption of the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992, Japan even had sent disaster relief teams overseas in accordance with the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams in 1987.

Under the Law, sending of the Japanese SDF overseas to participate in UN activities is subject to the Diet’s approval if the following five conditions are met: (1) agreement on a cease-fire has been reached among the parties to the conflict; (2) the parties to the conflict, including the territorial State(s), have given their consent to deployment of the peace-keeping force and Japan’s participation in the force; (3) the peace-keeping force is to maintain strict impartiality, not favouring any party to the conflict; (4) should any of the requirements above cease to be satisfied, the government of Japan may withdraw its force; (5) use of weapons is limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of the personnel, etc (Defense of Japan 1993: 128).

Critics said that Japan would soon be following the same militaristic lines as it did during the WWII. Many Asian countries are still suspicious of Japanese militarism owing to the fact that between 1894 and 1945 (a period of 51 years), Japan undertook 12 military operations of various kinds, averaging one every 4.3 years (MV Naidu, 1993). Aurelia George (1993: 560) explains why Japanese troops participating in UNPKO was referred to as a watershed in the Japanese Defense and Foreign policies,

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22 After the International Peace Co-operation Law, following the Gulf War, about 600 Self-Defense Force personnel were deployed in international peace assignments (engineer units and cease-fire observers) in Cambodia. Thus civilian police officers and international polling station officers were dispatched to Cambodia in September 1992 under the direction of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

23 Its amendment to permit the engagement of the Self-Defense Force in international disaster relief activities came into effect in June 1993.
taken to its logical conclusion, UNPKO participation represents the first stage in Japan's abandonment of its 'global civilian power' status in which it confined its international contributions to strictly nonmilitary areas such as ODA expenditure and nonmilitary contributions to U.N. operations.

Post-Cold War trade rifts between two economic super-powers came as a threat to the long-term alliance. The incidents that took place in the post cold-war era estranged the relations between the two countries. Japan's performance at the economic front world wide was unparalleled until the 'bubble burst.' Therefore, under the increasing pressure from its citizens, particularly businessmen, US brought in the policy of 'trade balance.' Another jolt came when US president Bill Clinton decided to visit Beijing in June 1998. To everyone's surprise, Tokyo was not in his Asian itinerary. Speculations in Japan grew so much that some people said that 'Japan passing,' a policy of consciously overlooking Japan, had been added to the existing pattern of 'Japan bashing.' The Asian financial crisis of 1997 also affected the Japanese economy and further strained the relations between two allies. The relationship constraints, particularly after the Gulf-War-I, gave momentum to a considerable broadening of Japan's military responsibilities under the US-Japan alliance to include logical and other support to US forces responding to regional contingencies. This undertaking, which was formally announced at the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto summit, sprang primarily from concern in both Tokyo and Washington that the alliance might not survive a repetition of the gulf-crisis, particularly if it involved a military conflict near Japan in which US forces sustained heavy casualties while the SDF again sat on its hands. This concern was heightened in 1994 by the inability of Japan to provide assurances of operational assistance in the event of US conflict with North Korea over the latter's nuclear program (John H Miller, 2000: 17). This meant another breach of the constitutional provision.

Regional contingencies mean the emergency like situation emerging in the surrounding areas surrounding Japan which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.
The official reappearance of US commitment to maintaining a high profile security presence in the region was highlighted with the issuing of the Pentagon’s 1995 East Asian Strategy Report. In Japan, a similar point of view was expressed with the publication of the Higuchi Report, in August 1994. During the tenure of the PM Morihiro Hosokawa, a non-statutory body, The Advisory Group on Defense Issues chaired by Hiratro Higuchi was formed in 1994 to review Japan’s defense policy. The group, in its report, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*, brought forth few important points. It believed that the post cold-war world faced non-military threats arising from “an opaque and uncertain situation” (Akio Watanabe, 2003: 240). Therefore, the need to be prepared to tackle such unpredictable dangers was stressed upon. It is said that the threat of incidents like September 11 attacks was mentioned in the report way back in 1994.

Nevertheless, Japanese dependence on the US continued for its defense needs. The establishment in 1997 of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which in response to the 1995 Okinawa rape controversy, recommended the consolidation of US bases on Okinawa (principally via the relocation of a US marine heliport at Futenma) as a means of defusing base-related tension and to respond to local grievances. Agreement between Washington and Tokyo in 1997 on a new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was intended to ensure partial Japanese support for the training of US forces in Japan, as well as joint exercises and operations during emergencies. The Japanese Diet finally approved the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines in May 1999, which was initially endorsed by the governments in 1997. John H Miller argues that, “Japan’s willingness to cooperate militarily with the US in promoting regional security represents another breakthrough in Japanese thinking.” The guidelines provide an important, new, clearly defined institutionalized structure for bilateral co-operation via the creation of a Bilateral Planning Committee, Bilateral Co-ordination Forum, and Bilateral Co-ordination Center.

25 For details of SACO see Chapter 4.
In August 1999, both Japanese and American governments approved a memorandum of understanding setting out the terms for a two to five year program to study the feasibility of jointly developing a Naval Theater-Wide Anti-ballistic Defense system (TMD). The memorandum represented the culmination of bilateral talks that began in 1993 and was a direct response to the emerging regional missile threats posed by both Beijing and Pyongyang. An agreement was signed in March 2000 by US State Department and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials to establish a joint commission, focusing on arms control and non-proliferation initiatives (Michael J. Green, 2000).

The Obuchi government's decision, in March 1999, to develop and launch four intelligence satellites within three to four years came out because of three main reasons. Firstly, its security concerns, secondly over-dependence on US even in the matters of information gathering and thirdly, the increasing pressure from various circles within the conservative circles. Despite progress on the satellite issue, Washington and Tokyo continued, during 1999 and 2000, to wrestle over a number of bilateral irritants. US government officials were frustrated by the slow reaction of their Japanese counterparts to complaints regarding harmful dioxin emissions from a rubbish incinerator located next to the US Atsugi naval base; disagreement over Japan's level of host-nation support (HNS) for US bases in Japan imposed strains on ties with Washington, as Japan’s Ministry of Finance pointed to the down-turn in Japan’s economy as justification for a scaling back on Tokyo's commitment (Michael J. Green, 2000; William T. Breer and Tokuko Shironitta, 2000).26

More significantly, perhaps, Okinawa, remained a contentious issue between the two countries largely because the governor, Keiichi Inamine, despite having seemed initially supportive of the base-relocation strategy associated with the SACE committee, appeared to have aligned himself more closely with local opposition groups in Okinawa, calling for a 15 year time-limit for the new basing arrangements intended to replace the previous Futenma facility. US defense planners have been, and remain opposed to formal time-limits, fearing the impact this would have on other American facilities elsewhere in

26 This issue was only resolved in April 2000 with a modest reduction in Japan’s “sympathy budget.”
the region, and failure to resolve this issue remains a significant problem for both sides, exacerbated since July 2001 by yet another rape incident involving a US serviceman.

As said earlier, the US-Japan security alliance still remains the main axis of Japanese defense policy. Despite some incidents of contentions, mistrust and misunderstanding, the alliance has grown stronger with each passing day. The impetus for a reassessment of the alliance was bipartisan, with both Republicans critics and members of the Clinton administration warning that relations with Tokyo had stalled (Kurt M. Campbell, 2000: 125). The product of this concern surfaced in a thoughtful report released in October 2000 by the National Defense University headed up by two longstanding Japan-hands, Richard Armitage for the Republicans and Joseph Nye for the Democrats. They stressed on the fact that the 1997 defense guidelines\(^{27}\) should be seen as a floor rather than a ceiling for future defense cooperation. Past US-Japan policy was criticized for being too episodic and betraying a lack of leadership. In its place, the report lobbied for an unambiguous US commitment to the defense of Japan, including the Senkaku islands; enhanced cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries; and a more mobile and flexible US-Japan defense structure in which the Marines based in Okinawa should have a larger regional role.

The report also argued for the removal of Japan’s prohibition on the right of collective defense, wider sharing of defense technology; radically expanded intelligence co-operation, and clear US recognition that a more consciously independent and distinctly Japanese foreign policy need not conflict with America’s diplomatic priorities.

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\(^{27}\) Signed in September 1997, the new guidelines clearly enumerated many suggestions made in the joint declaration and brought about a marked change in the security relationship. As mentioned in the declaration, they called for defense cooperation in three circumstances: Under normal peace-time conditions; in response to an armed attack on Japan; in response to situations in “areas surrounding Japan that have an important influence on Japan’s security.

The guidelines envisaged an expanded role for Japan’s forces in the case of any contingency in the defense of not just its own territory, but also in “areas surrounding it.” Besides, the guidelines called for the two partners to cooperate not only on matters of regional, but also global concern. This would include increased Japanese assistance in the United Nations peacekeeping operations and provision of humanitarian aid.
The July 2001 summit meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi gave more strength to the US-Japan partnership.\textsuperscript{28} Notwithstanding differences over the Kyoto Protocol and Tokyo’s dismal record on whaling issues, US proximity with Japan has improved over a period of time.

Despite these positive indicators, it remains uncertain whether by themselves they will prove sufficient to lift the bilateral relationship to a significantly higher, more involved and mutually supportive level of co-operation. Much will depend on how Japan chooses or is able to respond. In terms of the security relationship with Washington, there are tentative signs that the defense communities in both the countries may be moving closer together. More broadly, in the field of co-operative and collective security, Japan has continued to display a constructive and sometime initiating role in a variety of contexts that could be calculated to dovetail closely with American interests, including sponsoring anti-piracy proposals in Southeast Asia; supporting the monitored dismantling of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapon-stocks; helping to destroy Japanese wartime chemical weapons left over in mainland China (“Japanese Chemical Weapons in China,” 2000); continued participation in Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG); and engaging in separate bilateral dialogue and personnel exchanges with the Chinese and Russian navies (John Swenson-Wright, 2002: 98).

It should be stressed that the Japanese government’s ability to broaden and modify its relations with the United States and with some of its regional partners and former adversaries have not been exclusively a response to changing international factors. It has also been substantially influenced by shifts in opinion domestically. Both public opinion and the views of party politicians have shifted markedly in response to the new regional security challenges, generating, as a consequence, a policy environment more receptive to an increasingly realist foreign and defense policy. North Korea’s unpredictable and often destabilizing behaviour, for example, has prompted a discernible

\textsuperscript{28} During the summit an announcement of an ambitious joint economic initiative, the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth, to address the challenge of structural economic reform in Japan, was made.
shift in public concern in Japan. According to a *Yomiuri Shimbun* newspaper poll carried out in the late summer of 1999, 72 percent of respondents expressed a strong interest in defense issues and 46 percent favored improvements in Japan’s emergency legislation to allow the national government to respond swiftly and effectively to a threat to the country’s security.

Other indications of a developing realist inclination have been the generally high levels of Diet support (a more than 70 percent approval rate) for the new US-Japan Security Guidelines; passage in the Diet in August 1999 of LDP legislation officially recognizing the “rising sun” flag\(^{29}\) and the *kimigayo* anthem\(^{30}\) (“Flag and National Anthem of Japan”) as national symbols; and cross party-support, in both the LDP and Japan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), for a more active Japanese defense policy, involving measures for more effective territorial defense and possible Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations involving the direct use of military force.

There are occasional forceful public statements by senior Japanese figures such as former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka’s suggestion that it would be constitutionally possible for Japan to launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if it felt a missile attack was imminent. It further implied that the government may be less constrained by traditional post-war Japanese pacifist cultural norms. Attitudinal changes, however, take time before they begin to have a substantive impact on actual policy. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that Japan would become, as some have argued, an independent, expansive security player in the region. For one thing, the Japanese military

\(^{29}\) Hi no Maru or Nisshoki, Japan’s flag simply represents the rising sun. While no one knows exactly the history behind it, sun symbolism can be found in much of Japan’s culture. The central deity in Japanese mythology, Amaterasu Omikami, is a sun goddess, and Nippon, Japan’s name in Japanese, means “origin of the sun.”

lacks the critical go-it-alone defense capability needed if it wishes to strike out independently from the United States. Although Japanese military spending has historically been the highest of all of the states in the region, Japan's armed forces remain crucially deficient in a number of key areas, including ship-based air support, long-range air support, and access to aircraft carriers.

Japan’s preference for a financial rather than a personnel-based contribution to the 1999 East Timor crisis reveals the continuing difficulty of turning to the United Nations in order to boost its regional or global security credentials. Similarly, the emphasis in 1998 by former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi on “human security” has attracted considerable academic interest, but the focus seemed to be more rhetorical than results-oriented.

Process of Militarization after September 11, 2001

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, the Japanese government has enhanced the powers and role of the SDF by waiving off restrictions through special laws. Provided that American economic interests in Asia will continue to expand, some level of military presence is essential, and bases in Japan provide the best deal available for the United States. However, the United States should not take advantage of the countries which host its bases. A lack of force reduction at the time of reduced threats can be interpreted by China, North Korea, and Russia as signs of aggressive posture of the US-Japan alliance. Robyn Lim and James E. Auer (2000) argue that it has become fashionable to think of Japan as a nation in economic turmoil headed toward a period of 'remilitarization'. They further say, "This is simply not the case, the reality is that both China’s assertiveness and America’s inattention to Japanese security concerns have sparked a reaction in Japan. This is hardly surprising, as the Clinton administration was more intent on pursuing the chimera of ‘strategic partnership’ with China than with giving the US-Japan alliance the overhaul it merited after the Cold War. Japan need not become a major military power with offensive capabilities, but it must show a willingness to share risk with America in defense of common security goals. And the US must
become more attuned to Japan's concerns or Japan could start to drift away, with
dangerous consequences for East Asia's security" (Robyn Lim and James E. Auer, 2000).
The overall security scenario has changed in East Asia in particular and the world in

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed by the Japanese Diet in
order to strengthen the SDF and to enhance the Security of Japan. The purpose of the
Law was to endorse international effort to fight terrorism, to answer the request of the
UN, and to assist the US and its allies which would enable Japan to contribute actively
thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan's
own. On October 8, Japan established the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters by a
Cabinet decision (Kantei 2001 "Establishment of the Emergency Anti-Terrorism
Headquarters") and passed its own Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Kantei 2001,
"The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law") on October 29 in order to provide as much
assistance and cooperation as possible in the military operations undertaken by the US
and other forces against the Taliban to the extent permitted under the Japanese
constitution (Japan Defense Agency 2002).\footnote{The law entered into force on November 2.} Japan also froze suspected accounts, and in
addition, maintains a watch-list that contains nearly 300 groups and individuals. It was
feared that around 103 buildings in Japan were under the threat of terrorist attacks.

On November 16, the basic plan on Japanese activities to support the US
assistance under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was decided by the
Government of Japan. After that, implementation guidelines were drafted by the Defense
Agency, which were approved by Prime Minister Koizumi on November 20. The
Minister of State for Defense ordered SDF to implant the activities, upon the formulation
of these plans. After six months, on May 17, 2002, the government of Japan extended the
duration of the implementation guidelines by six months.

A contingency unit consisting of six vessels, including the Sawagiri, supply
vessel Towada and minesweeper tender Uraga, were organized by the Maritime Self
Defense Force (MSDF), to carry out the prescribed Response Measures in accordance with the implementation order. Three vessels out of six, the destroyers Kurama and Kirisami and supply vessel Hamana were dispatched earlier for information gathering activities. The other three vessels, including the Sawagiri, left their designated ports for the Indian Ocean on November 25. These vessels started the prescribed cooperation and support activities of fuel supply for US naval vessels in the Indian Ocean on December 2. From January 29, 2002, the fuel supply activity was also extended to UK naval vessels.

The unit to implement assistance to the affected people, which consisted of the Uraga and the Sawagiri, delivered about 200 tons of aid material such as tents and blankets to the UNHCR local office to Karachi port in Pakistan on December 12. The Uraga returned to Yokosuka Base on December 31, 2001 to complete its mission. The Sawagiri, along with Towada, met the Kurama and other vessels to engage in cooperation and support activities in and around the Indian Ocean. In addition, on February 12 to 13, 2002, the destroyers Harama and Sawakaze and the supply vessel Tokima left their designated ports for the Indian Ocean to take over the mission. On March 16, the Kurama, Kirisame and Hamana, which left at the beginning of November, returned to Saseba Base to complete their mission. The Sawagiri and Tomada also returned to their designated ports to complete their mission on April 25. By the end of June 2002, the SDF unit's cooperation and support activity of proving refueling operations for US Naval vessels amounted to 87 refuels for approximately 1,53,000 Kl. Besides the above activities, the SDF has been providing port services to assist the port entry and exit for US vessels at the US Navy base in Yokosuka and other places.

The Air Self Defense Forces also participated actively in providing assistance, including transportation with C-130 H aircraft from the ASDF First Transport Wing (Komaki Base) between United States Forces Japan (USFJ) bases. It was started on November 29, 2001. On December 3, the ASDF started the overseas transport between USFJ bases and or US base in Guam (Diplomatic Blue Book, 2002: 15-16). Japan’s Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law helped Japan not only to assist the coalition forces but also in providing humanitarian assistance during the war.
The significance of this development should not be underestimated, since it may presage a removal of Japan's long-standing ban on participation in collective security initiatives. Japanese officials are well aware that failure to contribute tangibly (in the form of men and materiel rather than simple financial support) to any allied initiative against Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network would be politically and diplomatically disastrous for Japan. The interesting thing to note was the overwhelming support of the Japanese public and the ever-growing suspicion of its neighbours. At the very least, it should be stressed that these changes are part of a larger, long-term pattern of evolving security realism by Japan. In the short-term, both popular and official opinion are likely to continue to evolve in a more activist direction, in the process deepening and strengthening existing ties with the United States, yet in a context where enhancing Japanese foreign and security policy flexibility remains a priority for Japan's leaders.

The policy of the "consolidation of peace" of former PM Koizumi was announced in May 2002 (Koshida Kiyokazu). Using this new diplomatic tool, Japan had been trying to play an active role in providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries, including Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, East Timor, sub-Saharan and finally, Iraq. Immediately after September 11, however, the government already launched plans to utilize ODA money to contribute to the US-led global "War on Terror." On September 19, 2001, Tokyo announced Japan's measures to respond to the terrorist attacks in the US, including financial assistance to Pakistan and India. In 1998, after Pakistan tested a nuclear weapon, Japan imposed sanctions, suspending new ODA (both grants and loans). However, just eight days after September 11, Japan announced that it would lift the sanctions. Prime Minister Koizumi

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32 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro announced that Japan would strengthen its efforts for the "consolidation of peace" and nation building, making this a pillar of Japan's international cooperation. Minister of Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi Yuriko also emphasized the importance of the "consolidation of peace" concept before her visit to Afghanistan. Japan's ODA related to the "consolidation of peace" had three components: (1) the promotion of peace processes, (2) securing domestic stability and security, and (3) humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

33 It offered three billion yen in emergency financial support and 1.7 billion yen for refugees support, and implemented 64.6 billion yen of official debt rescheduling. The three billion yen of emergency financial assistance was categorized as "Non-Project Grant Assistance," which can be used to purchase any "goods" needed by the recipient government. But since no reports have been made on what goods were purchased, it seems likely that this money was in fact a "gift" for the Musharraf regime, which became one of the US's key allies in the War on Terror.
told a special envoy of President Musharraf that he respected Pakistan's attitude of breaking off its ties with the Taliban and cooperating with the United States.

Japan has long been able to produce massive nuclear weapons. One of the prominent political leaders in Japan, Ichiro Ozawa claimed that Japan could make a large number of nuclear weapons to curb China's 'excessive expansion.' Such contemptuous remarks made by Japanese right-wing forces remind people that Japan would become a military power with nuclear weapons, which reflects the actual intentions of the nationalists. Japan has developed its military strength for many years by using development of its neighbouring countries' military strength as an excuse. "Japan saw China as a threat, arguing that the Chinese army is enormous, which is in fact, untenable," observes Wang Baofu (2002: 12), a Chinese Scholar.

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) released in December 2004 showed another incremental proactive change in the security policy of Japan. The document cited various threats, such as ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, and instability on the Korean peninsula, to demonstrate the need for new capabilities and justify the call for continued strategic dialogue with the United States (Defense of Japan 2005: 178). In a February 2005 joint statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the two governments noted that Japan's efforts to respond to new threats in the context of the US global defense posture review underscored the need to pursue common strategic objectives, both regionally and globally, to preserve a peaceful security environment. Central to this process was "the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of SDF and the US Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. The joint statement also noted the importance of realigning the US force posture in Japan to meet the demands of the post-September 11 security environment and to

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34 Ichiro Ozawa was the leader of Japanese Liberal Party leader at the time he made above mentioned statement. Presently, he is the leader of DPJ.
35 NDPG show basic principles of Japan's security policy and the basic guidelines of Japan's defense capability in the future including significance and roles of the defense capability as well as the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major defense equipment to be built up that are based on these principles and the guidelines. NDPG were formulated twice in the past, once in FY 1977 (NDPG 1976) and another in 1995 as the NDPG in and after FY 1996 (NDPG 1995).
reduce the burden on local Japanese communities (US Department of State, “Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005). The SCC issued a progress report in October 2005 with recommendations for realignment and the assignment of new roles and missions. Each time, Japan has justified its incremental growth of defense capabilities by citing international situation as the reason; first communism during the Cold War, then regional conflicts in post-cold war period and after that September 11 attacks on the US and escalating terrorist threat.

In the Defense of Japan 2007, the basic concepts of the NDPG are stated as,

The purpose of Japan's security is to protect peace, independence and the territory of Japan, to maintain the national system based on the freedom and democracy, and to protect the lives and property of the nation.... NDPG define following two objectives for security: (1) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and, in the event it does, repel it and minimize any damage, and 2) to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place (p. 121).

The most visible change in the defense posture of Japan may be seen in the emphasis MOD has given on the shift in the policy from “deterrent effect” to “response capability.” David Arase (2007: 582-83) pointing the changing Japanese security policy observes that

Structural, institutional, and normative factors that in previous periods inhibited Japan's security policy have been rearranged, especially since 9/11, in a way that helps to explain the rapid transformation of Japan's security posture by the new generation of leadership. The parallel alignment of factors at different levels of analysis, together with Japan's record since 9/11, suggest that Japan's security role could change with unexpected speed and scope in coming years, for good or ill. Until now Japan has relied on the U.S. to manage its security environment, and therefore Japan's new leaders have not been tutored by elders who have managed heavy international security responsibilities. This untested generation seems more willing to confront neighbors - who are themselves increasingly assertive, nationalistic, and unpredictable (if one uses past behavior as the measure for comparison). The U.S. continues to encourage Japan's remilitarization with increasing effect as Japan's identity as a strategic actor grows more active and receptive to U.S. pressure. In this situation, Japan and its neighbors are interacting without a multilateral security regime to organize collective or cooperative ways to contain conflict.

122
Japanese Participation in the Iraq War II

The militarization in Japan was carried out under the anticipated threat of the communist bloc during the Cold War. Prof. Akio Watanabe argues that in the post Cold-War period Japan could have used North Korean or Chinese threat to justify the military build-up. Instead, Japan passed two very significant laws following the recommendations of the Higuchi Report. In 2003, Japan's National Diet passed two important laws relating to national security and defense policy. The first was the Law concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a situation of Armed Attack, passed on June 6; this and two other related laws passed at the same time are usually referred to simply as the war contingency laws. The second was the Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law, enacted on July 26, 2003.

The importance of the Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law increases manifold as it came as a major defense and foreign policy shift in the post-WWII Japan. For the first time in more than fifty years, Japan dispatched its troops to a country where war was on. Usually, Japanese were reluctant in sending their troops abroad, other than UNPKO (after 1992 only), that too for non-combat and post-conflict roles of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Unlike Japan’s participation in the peace keeping operations in Cambodia and East Timor, Japan’s attempts to make its presence felt in the international level even in the conflict-ridden zones could be seen as a quantum leap as far as Japanese security and defense policy is concerned (Akio Watanabe, 2003: 238).

Arpita Mathur (2004: 509) argues that the significance of the Japanese decision to send troops to Iraq cannot be denied. It can be attributed to Japan’s assertiveness at two levels – one, as an important member of the international community, and two as an effective and dependable ally of the US. In fact, Japan stood in support of the US decision to attack Iraq even without UN sanctions, when prominent European countries like France and Germany opposed the step and refused to send troops. The gradual expansion in the scope of activities of the SDF to meet the requirements of the situation
in Iraq thus simultaneously increases Japanese contribution to the alliance. According to former Japan Defense Agency Director General Shigeru Ishiba, the twin reasons for sending troops to Iraq were to serve Japan’s national interests by bringing stability to a region from which Japan imports almost all its oil and secondly, to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. There is no doubt that after the crisis faced by Tokyo during the first Gulf War, it has chosen to be a more active participant, a step taken to maintain its relevance in the alliance.

*From Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense*

After more than five decades of gradual process of militarization, in the midst of security debate in Japan, a full fledged Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to the Ministry of Defense. 36

It is evident from the above discussion that both domestic and international factors played vital role in the shifts and turns in the foreign as well as defense policy of Japan. The continuous criticism and skepticism of the neighbouring countries have immense pressure on the Japanese policymakers. On the contrary, the Japanese saw the military build up in the neighbouring countries as intimidating and a cause for enhancing their defense capabilities and a justification for further militarization. 37

*The China Factor*

Japan initially initiated official level dialogue with China only after the US president Nixon visited China in 1971. His visit is known as the ‘Nixon Shock’ in world history. Nevertheless, it paved way for Japanese trade and investment in China. The August 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in particular, symbolized the growing intensity of China and Japan’s strategic interaction (William T. Tow, 1983: 51). China has benefited immensely from the Japanese trade and so has Japan, because of

36 For details see Chapter 4.
37 The recent developments in the region are discussed in Chapter 5 as well.
the huge size of the Chinese market, cheap labour for Japanese manufacturing units and easy availability of natural resources.

The Taiwan question had been a major cause of tensions in Japan’s relations with China in the early part of the Cold War as Japan supported American containment strategy toward China and maintained a close relationship with the Taiwan. It was not until 1972 that Japan and China reached a settlement on Taiwan, when the two countries established diplomatic relations. Japan’s official recognition of China’s sovereignty on Taiwan, as a result of diplomatic normalization, provided an important basis for bilateral relations to flourish in subsequent years. China’s nuclear tests, the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands off the Eastern China sea and other issues like text-book controversy, anti-Japan protests did generate tensions between the two countries. Taiwan has re-emerged as a contentious issue that threatens to unravel China’s relations with Japan. In the aftermath of China’s missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in early 1996, Japan has committed itself to providing logistical support for American military operations in the Taiwan Strait under the revised US-Japan security cooperation guidelines (Qingxin Ken Wang, 2000: 353).

Japan, however, could manage amicable relations with both countries, despite the rising tension with China, especially after 1995. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro stated in a policy speech on 29 August 1997, on the eve of his official trip to China, that “as the Chinese economy develops, there will be greater stability in China, resulting in further stability in Asia and the world” (Christopher B. Johnstone, 1998: 1081). Soeya Yoshihide (2001: 146) observes, “one of the key factors behind a relatively stable security situation over Taiwan, despite Beijing’s occasional military activities, verbal blackmailing and hypersensitivity towards Japan, has been Japan’s self-restraint from developing an independent strategy and its concomitant commitment to the security relationship with the United States.”

In 1992, Chinese government reasserted territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, as well as China’s right to use force. These claims included the uninhabited
Senkaku islands, which no previous Chinese government had claimed. Administration over these islands was returned to Japan with Okinawa's reversion in 1972, granting them *de jure* protection under the US–Japan Security Treaty. North Korea's launch of a long range missile over Japan in August 1998 had an effect on Japan akin to the impact of Sputnik on the US in 1957 because it revealed a new vulnerability to nuclear attack. Recent evidence shows that China, despite denials, has been helping North Korea with missile technology. Nor does China's rattling of its missile arsenal against Taiwan escape attention in Japan. China is also building new and more accurate missiles designed to attack peripheral countries such as Japan. Yet China rails against the 'destabilizing' proposed Japanese theater missile defense.

Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in late 1998 signaled the beginning of the end of Japan's appeasement of China. Showing no gratitude for vast amounts of Japanese aid, Mr. Jiang behaved in a way that heightened skepticism of weakening bilateral relations. He pressed on the war guilt issue. These tactics were beginning to backfire, because even Japanese willing to admit the reality of atrocities committed in China resent Beijing's manipulation of the war guilt issue.

According to the Diplomatic Blue Book (2004), China, under its new President Hu Jintao, has been exerting proactive diplomacy, especially in Asia, with a view to ensuring stable surrounding environments for the advancement of its economic development. With respect to its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) on the occasion of the China-ASEAN Summit held in October in Bali, Indonesia. China also signed the "Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" and has been striving to strengthen its cooperation with ASEAN. China played an active role regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile issues and received the attention of the international community; it acted as a mediator between the international community and North Korea, contributed to the realization of
the Three-Party Talks among the US, North Korea and itself, as well as the Six Party Talks (Diplomatic Blue Book, 2004: 3).

China always keeps a close watch on the developments in Japan. Even internal matters like the visit of a Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine, where the souls of the war dead are believed to be enshrined, raise hue and cry in China. Recently, each visit of former PM Koizumi followed up by the Chinese protests and demonstration because they see such attempts as the revival of Japanese pre-war militarism. Text-book controversy is usually a normal phenomenon in all the countries world-wide specifically where nationalism is stronger. The process of militarization in Japan continued owing to the communist threat during the Cold War and due to the hostile neighbours in the post-Cold War era.

The North Korean Issue

The problem of North Korea can be traced back to the Korean War (1950-53). North always sided with the socialist bloc and was dependent on the Soviet Russia and China for the initial few decades. During the Korean War, US took significant advantage of its military bases in Japan, which served as an excuse to North Korea to aggressively develop its ballistic missiles capable of attacking Republic of Korea and US bases in Japan. Following the USSR’s call for denuclearizing the East Asia, North Korea also started demanding withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region as early as mid-1970s. Despite all the statements, declarations, bilateral and multilateral agreements North Korea never stopped strengthening its military capability.

Even in the Post Cold-War era, the suspicion among US, Japan and South Korea about the destructive plans of N Korea not only persists but has grown stronger, further substantiated by the actions of the N Korea. Taepodong missile crisis, fear of possession

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38 On June 23, 1986, North Korea announced its “statement concerning the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” mainly focused on the removal of US nuclear umbrella from South Korea and called for 1) withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed in the south, 2) ban of experimentation, production, storage and inflow of nuclear weapons, and 3) ban of intrusion into and passage of the Korean peninsula of aircraft and vessels carrying nuclear weapons.
and use of biological and nuclear weapons always kept US and allies on their toes. US had tried hard to persuade N Korea to disclose its nuclear sites. The main site of contention was Kumchangri. In 1998, N Korea tested a long range missile over the Japanese territory inviting worldwide criticism. Judging the danger of the North Korean threat to the US Andrew Scobell (2002) notes,

As such, the DPRK represents the state with the most clear and present military danger for the US in the first decade of the 21st century. Pyongyang is the poster child for “outlaw regimes” or rogue states. North Korea epitomizes the kind of regime possessing ballistic missiles that threaten the US and is regularly cited as prime justification for National Missile Defense (NMD). The missile threat from Pyongyang was underscored by North Korea’s launch of a three-stage rocket that traversed Japanese airspace before plunging into the Pacific Ocean to the east in August 1998 (p. 351).

N Korea objected to the criticism by blaming US for defaming and maligning its image. Furthermore, N Korea went on to demand an apology and material and cash compensation worth $300 million, in case US would fail to prove so called allegations. Partnership among US, Japan and S Korea was termed as ‘criminal triangular military alliance. Japan was criticized by N Korea for gaining public support for building concrete base for Theater Missile Defense (TMD) (Kyung- Ae Park, 2000-2001: 536-37).

North Korea has always used the nuclear threat to get its demands through. According to Yun Dukmin (2005: 37), the North Korean problem is “neither fabricated nor exaggerated.” North Korea never stuck to one policy and has a dubious record of back-tracking from its own commitments. Yun Dukmin also observed that “North Korea has deceived the international community three times. It thrice promised to abandon its nuclear weapons program, signing the NPT in 1985, issuing the inter-Korean declaration in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in 1992, and striking a bargain in the 1994 Geneva agreed Framework.” However, in October 2002, North Korea acknowledged its ongoing process of developing nuclear weapon through Uranium enrichment (Yun Dukmin, 2005: 10 and 32). 39 US realized that bilateral talks are not

39 In November, 2002, the board of directors of Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) decided to suspend the supply of heavy oil to the North Korea. On December 22, 2002, North Korea declared the end of its nuclear freeze, expelling the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
going to serve any purpose and in order to pressurize North Korea from the entire region multilateral Six-Party Talks were initiated.\textsuperscript{40} After the third round of six-party talks, North Korea stayed off the talks. Nevertheless, after the assurances and persuasion of ROK and US, on July 9, 2005, North Korea resumed the talks. On September 19, 2005, at the six-party nuclear disarmament talks, North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programs for a fourth time (Park Kun Young, 2005: 69).\textsuperscript{41} The US and China could bring North Korea to the six-party talks through division of labour, with US playing the bad cop and China the good cop.

North Korea, in fact, always remained critical of Japanese support to the US, even after September 11, 2001. Yinhay Ahn (2002: 53-54) observes, “North Korea has argued that the underlying purpose of dispatching troops outside Japan’s territory is not to act against terrorism but to provide the legal and institutional devices necessary to reinvade Asia. Such hidden militarist motives, in North Korea’s view, are manifested in the controversy surrounding Japan’s distorted history textbooks and the Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.

The North Korean ‘brinkmanship’ has fetched rewards instead of punishments in the form of compensation, especially during the Clinton’s era, when each threat of the North Korea was well compensated to avoid conflict or unrest in the East Asia. The Bush administration initially took a different line but till the nuclear test, preferred engagement through talks rather than offensive (Kim Keun Sik, 2005: 64-65). The North Korean logic is well defined by Kim Keun Sik (2005: 44) who says,

\begin{quote}
During the first and second nuclear crises, North Korea adopted contradicting rationales for its nuclear development: the need to develop the nuclear energy
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{40} The first session of six-party talks, participated by the two Koreas, Russia, Japan, China and the US was held on August 27, 2003. North Korea proposed a four stage formula, “package solution and simultaneous action.”

\textsuperscript{41} On September 19, 2005, after years of strenuous and intense negotiations, the six nations participating in the North Korean nuclear disarmament talks in Beijing finally reached an agreement that contained a set of shared principles under which North Korea would barter its existing nuclear programs for measures that would guarantee its survival as a nation and a regime. However, initially it appeared that the problem has been solved but the solution could not last long.
industry through peaceful use (that is to have nuclear power plants for energy), vs. the need to have nuclear weapons as deterrent against the United States for self-defense. During the first crisis between 1993 and 1994, it held consistently to the claim for peaceful nuclear use and induced an agreement from the United States to provide light water reactors, with which the moderated reactors. But in the current second crisis, it proclaims that it has no choice but to have nuclear arms as a deterrent against the United States in order to confront the US hostile policy.

Japanese official sources say that,

regarding North Korea, Japan has been implementing various measures based on the concept of “dialogue and pressure,” to achieve a comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear, and missile problems, based on the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration with the aim of normalizing relations in a manner that would contribute to peace and stability in the region. To tackle the nuclear issue, the six parties announced their first joint statement, in which North Korea promised to verifiably dismantle “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” Later, however, North Korea hardened its stance during the first phase of the fifth-round Six-Party Talks held in November, on the grounds of the anti-money laundering measures taken by the United States (US) against a Macau-based bank, and refused to attend the Six-Party Talks. Progress was achieved at the consultations held in December, in which Japan and North Korea decided to launch Comprehensive Talks in order to comprehensively resolve the abduction and other outstanding issues of concern. As such developments take place, in dealing with the abduction issue, which is of the highest priority for Japan, Japan has been repeatedly and strongly requesting: (1) prompt return of the surviving abductees, (2) unveiling of truth regarding those whose whereabouts are unconfirmed, and (3) handing over of suspects. Japan has been consistent in its stance that diplomatic relations cannot be normalized without first resolving the abduction, nuclear, missile, and other issues. This position is maintained in the Comprehensive Talks, which center on discussions on abduction, security, and normalization talks” (Diplomatic Blue Book 2006: 19).

In the Republic Of Korea, the administration of President Roh Moo Hyun advanced the “Peace and Prosperity Policy” toward North Korea, which followed the “Sunshine Policy” that had been pursued by the previous Kim Dae Jung Administration. Although North Korea continues its provocative diplomacy regarding the nuclear issue, it has responded to the call by China and other countries concerned and participated in the Three-Party Talks with the US and China in April and the subsequent Six-Party Talks with Japan, the US, ROK, China and Russia in August 2003 and February 2004. No significant progress could be made in the situation concerning North Korea (Diplomatic Blue Book, 2004: 3).
The East Asia and Asia-pacific is always under the threat of unclear N Korean nuclear designs. Recently, a nuclear test by N Korea forced neighboring countries and US to rethink their domestic and defense policies. More than any other factor, Japan’s public opinion has undergone drastic change. Recent surveys show that Japanese public won’t even mind if SDF participates in the conflict zones and that too when war is on (Diplomatic Blue Book, 2004). This transformation in public opinion and other domestic and international factors have helped Japan to remilitarize itself.

Among other issues of contention between Japan and N Korea, the most sentimental issue is that of abduction of Japanese citizens by the N Koreans. Five Japanese citizens, who were abducted to train the N Korean spies on Japanese manners and language, are still in N Korea. There is no news about the remaining ten. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MoFA) official document states that:

The resolution of the abduction issue is one of the most important issues facing Japanese diplomacy, and Japan has been calling forcefully on the North Korean side toward its swiftest possible resolution, Japan attaches importance to both “dialogue” and “pressure” in its attempt to resolve issues related to North Korea, and has further taken every opportunity to call on North Korea for a comprehensive resolution to the various outstanding issues, while enhancing the enforcement of domestic legislation such as ship inspection and export control” (Diplomatic Blue Book, 2004: 7).

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a ‘strong and rising great power’ as its basic national policy, aimed at creating a strong socialist state, and adopting a ‘military first policy’ to realize this goal. It appears that Kim Jong Il intends to continue running the country by attaching importance to and relying on this policy. Although North Korea is faced with serious economic difficulties to this day, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces (Defense of Japan, 2005: 9).

The Russia Factor

Bilateral relations between Japan and Russia (former USSR), despite the existence of thriving bilateral trade even in the pre-WWII period, have remained hostile.
It is generally believed by the Japanese that the most serious consequence of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan in August 1945 was the appearance of border dispute between Russia and Japan after the war. The Russians occupy the Kurile Islands including Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai, and Shikotan, and the Japanese territorial demand for the four islands continues (Map 3.1). In spite of the territorial settlement specified in the Joint Declaration between the Soviet Union and Japan in 1956, the intensity of the Cold War impeded the settlement. Therefore, the territorial dispute over the Southern Kurile is unfinished business resulting from the both Second World War and Cold War (Richard de Villafranca 1993: 610). Without territorial settlement and a peace treaty between the two countries, substantial interstate relations based on mutual assistance and cooperation will not truly be established. During the Cold War period, Russo-Japanese relations were largely studied based on the Cold War paradigm, where the United States and the Soviet Union competed with each other to enlarge their spheres of influence. However, the end of the Cold War enormously changed the nature of the international system. The issue of the Southern Kurile Islands is no longer considered solely based on the power struggle during the Cold War period. Therefore, a different approach that de-emphasizes security measures of Russia and Japan should be applied to depict the territorial dispute in the post-Cold War period. Japan’s claims are based on historical evidences. Japan discovered and surveyed the Northern Territories before Russians arrived there, and by the early 19th century, Japan had established control over the four islands.42

42 Through the Shimoda treaty of 1855 Russia also accepted that boundary between the two nations would be between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. In 1855, under the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia (The Shimoda Treaty), Japan and Russia confirmed that just as had been established peacefully until then; the boundary between them lay between the Islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. Japan took over the southern part of Sakhalin at 50 degrees North Latitude from Russia under the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty which ended the War between Japan and Russia. In February 1945, by signing the Yalta Agreement Britain, Soviet Union and US stipulated that “the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union and the Southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.” However, the Yalta Agreement could not determine the final settlement of the territorial problem as it was no more than a guide but the leaders of the Allied Powers to postwar settlements. (Territorial issues should be settled by peace treaty).
In February 1945, by signing the Yalta Agreement Britain, Soviet Union and US stipulated that “the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union and the Southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.” However, the Yalta Agreement could not determine the final settlement of the territorial problem as it was no more than a guide but the leaders of the Allied Powers to postwar settlements. (Territorial issues should be settled by peace treaty). Japan is not legally bound to the agreement, as it was not a party to it. The Potsdam Declaration stated that the terms of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which stipulated that “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed,” should be
carried out and that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the Islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor Islands as the Allies determined."

The Japanese argued that this was in violation of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact. The Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945 and continued its offensive against Japan, even after Japan had accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, 1945. From August 28 to September 5 of that year, the Soviet Union occupied the Northern Territories without any legal grounds. The Japanese army did not put up any resistance to the occupation and it was carried out without violence.43

As the differences of positions of Japan and the Soviet Union as to which country the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri belonged did not provide any prospect for the signing of a peace treaty, the two countries signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration instead. This declaration officially ended the state of war and restored diplomatic relations between them. In Article 9 of the Declaration, the two countries agreed to continue negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty and the Soviet Union agreed to hand over Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. The actual handover of these islands was to take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was a legally-binding treaty, ratified by both parties. While the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956 restored diplomatic relations (James William Morley, 1957: 370), the Soviet Union denied the existence of the territorial issue for a long time.

In the 1990s, in spite of different perspectives on the issue, regional and local cooperation between the Russian and the Japanese was gradually enhanced. Since the Tokyo Declaration of 1993 signed by the leaders of Japan and Russia on a state visit to Japan by the president of the new Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin both Japan and

43 The Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact signed in 1941, was valid for five years until 1946. It stipulated that the pact should be automatically extended, if not denounced by either of the parties a year before its expiration. The Soviet Union unilaterally announced its intention not to extend the pact in April 1945.
Russia have repeatedly affirmed the common principle of the peace treaty negotiations.44 Furthermore, the Tokyo Declaration established clear guidelines for the negotiations. These guidelines state that the territorial issue should be resolved on the basis of historical and legal facts, based on the principles of law and justice. It is necessary for future negotiations to be conducted in accordance with these guidelines (MOFA, “Overview of the Issue of the Northern Territories”).

Russia however has weakened economically as well as in terms of its international position vis-à-vis Japan and Asia-Pacific. This can be best understood with the explanation of Vladimir Lukin who writes that “Relations with countries of the Asian-Pacific region continue to be of critical significance to Russia...Russia’s geopolitical situation in that part of the world has not changed, but its position in terms of historical development has, and rather dramatically. In the past, Russia saw itself as being ahead of Asia, though lagging behind Europe. But since then, Asia has developed much faster. The contrast is clearly visible in comparing Russia with Japan. Both countries began their modern development at almost the same time, with the “Great Reforms” of Czar Alexander II in Russia and the Meiji reforms in Japan. For some time, both were developing “neck and neck,” but then the Bolshevik-totalitarian experiment significantly misdirected our progress, even though we came out of World War II as victors and the Japanese as the vanquished” (Vladimir P. Lukin, 1992: 59-60).

It was reported in April 2002 that although Japan has conducted the so-called ‘parallel consultation,’ which divides the Northern Territories issue into the discussion regarding Habomai and Shikotan on the one hand and the discussion of Kunashiri and Etorofu on the other, the Russian side has rejected this approach (MOFA, 2002 “What are the circumstances of the negotiations regarding the Northern Territories issue? How will the negotiations proceed in the future?” 2002). The first visit to Japan by a Soviet leader was in April 1991 by President Mikhail Gorabachev. He and PM Tohili Kaifu signed the Japan-soviet Joint Communiqué. This was the first time that the Soviet Union recognized

44 Leaders of both countries felt the need to conclude a peace treaty by solving the issue of which country the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai belong to.
in writing that the four islands Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai were the subject of the territorial issue. In October 1993, the Tokyo Declaration signed by PM Morihiro Hosokawa and President Boris Yeltsin, clearly defined the territorial issue as being an issue of which country the islands of Etorofu, Kunadhiri, Shikotan and Habomai belong to. The Declaration clearly set out that Japan and Russia should conclude the peace treaty by solving the territorial issue and thereby fully normalize bilateral relations. It also set out clear negotiation guidelines; the Northern Territories issue should be resolved on the basis of historical and legal facts, based on the documents to which both parties agreed, and on the principles of law and justice.

In November 1997, at Krasnoyarsk, PM Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Boris Yeltsin agreed “to make the utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000 on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration (Krasnoyarsk Agreement).” Alexei V. Zagorsky (2001: 75) contests that Japanese initiative under the leadership of Hashimoto paved the way for two “no neckties” Russian-Japanese summits in 1997-1998 and for the Official visit to Moscow by Hashimoto’s successor, Keizo Obuchi, in 1998, which was responded to by the visit of Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, to Tokyo in 2000. In April 1998, Japan produced its proposal for the resolution of the territorial issue, the Kawana Proposal. In response, when PM Keizo Obuchi was visiting Russia in November 1998, Russia produced its proposal, the Moscow Proposal. Unable to find an agreement, 2000 passed without a peace treaty being concluded, as was stated in the Krasnoyarsk Agreement.

In March 2001 at Irkutsk, PM Yoshiro Mori and Vladimir Putin defined the Japan-soviet Joint Declaration of 1956 as the starting point of the negotiating process to conclude a peace treaty and confirmed its legal validity in writing for the first time since 1960 when the Soviet Union all but denounced the validity of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. The also reaffirmed their common recognition that on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration, a peace treaty should be concluded by solving the issue of which country the four islands belongs to. However, the Russo-Japanese relations are becoming normal again and the latest developments are discussed in the Chapter 5.
The disputed islands issues remained the serious concern for the Japanese especially during the Cold War. The same issue also provided a justification to strengthening the defense system that supported remilitarization of Japan during the Cold War. Japanese inclination towards the US bloc and the presence of US troops acted both as deterrence as well as threat for the Japanese security. Moreover, absence of any peace treaty increased the potential threat.

Evaluation of Militarization in Japan

The press briefings of the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe aptly endorsed the proactive role for Japan in the international affairs. The long-debated constitutional amendment, particularly of Article 9, has reached the climax. Japan so far has managed without amending its pacifist war-renouncing constitution, by simply bypassing constitutional provisions. However, the amendment process has been initiated and will definitely take some more time. Incidents like the September 11 attacks, Iraq Wars I and II, and the North Korean crisis have given opportunities to Japan to open up militarily and to become a normal nation. Japan also has made the best use of such opportunities. National interest has always been given the top priority often inviting criticism from the world community.

The pragmatist and perfectionist Japanese have started to realize that their 'soft power' status is not going to last long. The Chinese threat in the present context is more economic than strategic. Japanese economy has reached a saturation point and China's emergence as economic giant and militarily 'hard power' have altered the thinking of Japanese policymakers. They have realized that 'quick bucks' are in military equipment.

Hans van de Ven (1997: 373), in his article, while discussing the necessity of the militarization points out that, "Militarization (in China) stimulated industrialization and social discipline, both necessary for the creation of a modern society. The military's effect cannot be reduced to a merely destructive one on true revolutionary purpose or the expression of conflict between regional military interests." The Chinese criticism of Japanese militarization loses its relevance because of the fact that all the sovereign nations have the right to pursue their policies independently.
If Japan were to declare its right to exercise collective self-defense, a right which the UN charter grants all members and which Japan acknowledged in the 1960s, it could contribute meaningfully to regional security without developing power-projection capabilities that would rattle the region. Japan need not revise its constitution to make such a shift. But if its parliament decided to do so in the interests of transparency, it would not mean a return to militarism. Rather, it would mean the US-Japan alliance had become less lopsided and more sustainable, with Japan more willing to share risk.

Only on the basis of a reinvigorated alliance between Japan and the US can the two countries hope to manage the rise of China. Beijing needs to get the message that while it is entitled to its place in the sun, unacceptable behavior will incur costs. In this way, Japan and the US can pursue peace through deterrence, as they did in the 1980s in the Japan Sea.

The concept of comprehensive security which places more emphasis on diplomatic efforts and economic cooperation can be utilized in reducing Japan's vulnerability without antagonizing its neighbours. Despite US pressure that Japan shoulders a larger burden in regional defense, US policymakers seem to understand the constitutional limit imposed upon Japan. Since the mid-1980s, the focus of the US demand has also shifted more on sharing the cost of research and development of the most sophisticated weapon systems. Such bilateral cooperation, with an aim of further extending such a network to other Asian countries, but without provoking any other Asian country, may play a leading role in building a regional security framework. The military presence of the US may fade away without causing instability in the region. Its continued economic presence, which will possibly have declined in proportional terms, will still serve as an assurance that the US will not retreat into a closed North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), but continue to provide an outlet for Asian products. A smooth transition to such a regional framework based on trust among Asian nations requires cautious policymaking which is hard to achieve. Japan's geopolitical vulnerability, need for some trade surplus, historical legitimacy deficit in Asia, constitutional limits on the Self Defense Forces, and domestic pacifism which supports
the constitution need to be well communicated to the American public as well as the world in an honest manner. The concept of comprehensive security offers Japan an alternative approach to assure its survival without threatening other countries. Despite some pessimistic observations about its future and ups and downs in the relationship, the US-Japan alliance seems to survive with some modification in its objectives and means. Japan's support roles in joint US-Japan military operations have considerably expanded.

Japan always has made use of the opportunities it came across, for instance, the Korean War, the first Iraq War, the September 11 attacks and recently Gulf War II. Japan has gained either economically, politically or strategically every time. The North Korean crisis has given Japan another chance to shed out its military inhibitions and to take pre-emptive offensive measures instead of waiting for its neighbours to strike. With North Korea's intentions to resume talks, it is difficult to forecast the actions of US and its allies, Japan in particular. Economic sanctions against North Korea in the wake of nuclear test will stay till a solution is worked out. The pragmatist policymakers of Japan have secured their national interests in an impressive way. Nevertheless, it also developed its military might and has one of the most sophisticated and well-equipped defense forces with the second highest budget in the world. The remilitarization process that started during the Occupation period has placed Japan among the top ranking nations.

The debate over the existence of the SDF: "SDF is unconstitutional but legal" has kept suspicion alive both among Japan's neighbours and in the Japanese public. The debate about the legality of SDF among the intellectual circles has shifted the focus from its creation to the constructive roles played by the SDF in the recent past. Japan's peacekeeping operations and post-war reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are critically examined and discussed in the following chapter, "The SDF and its Expanding Role."