Chapter II
THE RISE, IMPACT AND STRENGTH OF ANTI-MILITARISM IN JAPAN

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are among the darkest phases of human history and the clearest examples of the devastation caused by the misuse of science and technology on a large scale by warmongers. After WWII, Japan was forced to denounce war forever as a pacifist constitution was imposed by the Occupation authorities. Ironically, the processes of ‘demilitarization and democratization’ and ‘remilitarization’ of Japan took place almost simultaneously during the Occupation Era because, the Korean War left US authorities with little choice. Therefore, Japan was required to have some kind of troops to defend its own territories and also to maintain internal law and order.

The Japanese public, in general, showed the least reluctance in accepting the no war clause in the newly imposed constitution, though there were exceptions amongst the political elites. The war-weary public was looking forward to the end of their miseries. Occupation authorities were equally considerate in respecting the general public opinion and in implementing the reforms in a manner that suited interests of both sides. Japan got a strong base because of the reforms by the occupation forces, in order to push forward its economic recovery, speedily. In fact, the post-war economic prosperity of Japan was facilitated by the US as part of its anti-communist strategies in East Asia (Warren I Cohen, 2000: 372-74). So it can be inferred that the Cold War, Big Brother rivalry and experiences from the past nurtured the anti-militarist feelings of the Japanese people.

What actually happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki towards the end of WWII? Was the US decision of dropping atomic bombs on these cities inevitable and justified? Were Japanese atrocities ended in the suffering of its own citizens? What impact did WWII memories have on public sentiment? What were the factors that lead Japan to denounce war forever? What was going on at the domestic front in Japan? Did anti-militarism in Japan help its economic growth? Does anti-militarism still hold ground in Japan? Is there any relationship between Japan’s low military profile and its role in world affairs? There are several such questions related to anti-militarism.
Anti-militarism is the most striking feature of Japanese politics and has its roots in collective Japanese memories of the militarist takeover in the 1930s and the subsequent disastrous decision to go to war against America. Anti-militarism is also attributed as one of the prominent reasons for the post-WWII recovery and growth of Japan. The primary lessons that Japan has drawn from these experiences are that militarization must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it threatens Japan’s postwar democratic order and undermines the peace and prosperity that the nation has enjoyed since 1945. This particular view of anti-militarism has become institutionalized in the Japanese political system and is not only supported by Japanese public opinion, but to a surprising degree, is shared by large segments of Japan’s political and business elites as well. The mushrooming of a number of anti-war/anti-nuclear/anti-militarism citizen movements in the 1950s and 1960s did have a significant influence on the policymaking in Japan.

Japan’s culture of anti-militarism originally developed under the aegis of a benevolent US hegemony and also during the 1950s and 1960s. Since then, it has taken root and is no longer a hothouse plant that would wither and die the moment American commitment to East Asia security weakens (Thomas U Berger, 1993: 120). Rather, efforts since 1945 to revive the old prewar nexus between the state, the nation, and the armed forces have been consistently rejected by Japanese public opinion and the majority of the Japanese political elite. While Japanese leaders often make use of nationalist rhetoric, the use of nationalist symbols in connection with military issues remains highly controversial and is the target of fierce criticism in the national media (Thomas U Berger, 1993: 129).
Anti-militarism was at its peak in the 1950s and 1960s. High growth rate, however, did not affect the momentum of rising anti-militarism in the beginning. In fact, Japan witnessed one of the most organized students, workers and citizens movements duly backed up by the socialists. US withdrawal from Vietnam, improvement in the Japan-China relations and several other domestic issues resulted in the decline of the leftists movements in Japan. This is not to say that only leftists supported anti-militarism. However, with prosperity, the issues of citizen concerns were diversified. With the end of the Cold War, the communist threat from USSR ended and focus was shifted towards environmental and consumer rights.
The present global order requires Japan to contribute overwhelmingly to global peace and prosperity. Pacifism, anti-militarism, anti-nuclear and peace groups are either declining in numbers or losing their edge over other localized diverse issues. Whatever said and done, they still possess considerable influence over policy makers. The revival of the staunch nationalists, conservatives and pro-revisionist factions, who are gaining ground in Japan, will not result in the rise of any sort of WWII Japanese militarism. While it is true that anti-militarist norms have been stronger in Japan than in most other major countries, the extent to which pacifist norms are sustained has a lot to do with Japan’s security environment and domestic political conditions, such as security ties with the United States, threat perception, economic prosperity, and political stability (Akitoshi Miyashita, 2007: 107).

In the previous chapter, the difference between militarism and militarization was highlighted. Both the concepts are integral to the security discourse in any given society. However, aggressive militarism is been rejected in most of the democratic setups the world over. Constructivists view anti-militarism as the norm and custom. It is no doubt very deeply rooted in Japan, but at the same time, could not answer several national or international security-related questions. The realists also have certain limitations in explaining state behaviour of Japan vis-à-vis its security and foreign policies. Therefore, academics and strategic experts are adopting more comprehensive approaches including tenets of realism, liberalism and constructivism in order to explain issues like power, interest and identity (Akitoshi Miyashita, 2007, P.J. Katzenstein and N. Okawara 2001/02: 167).

Constructivists hold that international position alone is insufficient to explain state behaviour and the collective identity as a peaceful trading nation and the norms of anti-militarism that emerged after its defeat in WWII have constrained Japan’s postwar security policy. While Akitoshi Miyashita (2007: 101-102), acknowledges the constructivists’ contribution of norms and ideas instead of simply structural or material factors in explaining state behaviour, he raises one unexplained question about the origin of norms. In his own words, “where do norms come from?” He also emphasizes the fact
that in order to explain the emergence and persistence of the kind of norms that have
defined Japan's postwar security policy, one must look not only at the legacy of WWII
but also at realist variables such as structures, threat perceptions, and political processes
that constructivists often claim to be inadequate or irrelevant. Constructivists like Berger
militarism in Japan by emphasizing on the norms and popular culture. However, the
strong presence of different realist schools (Mike M. Mochizuki, 1984 and Rihcard J
Samuels, 2007: 137-38) substantiates the premise that Japan should have its own military
to avoid any unforeseen challenges that may hamper the growth and peace of the country.

Scholars from different streams of social sciences as well as other pure sciences
disciplines have brought to the knowledge of humanity, the devastating effects of nuclear
weapons. A systematic study of the atomic bombing of Japan and its subsequent impact
on the general psyche of the public will be helpful in order to understand anti-militarism
in Japan. This chapter is, therefore, broadly divided into three parts: the first deals with
what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and its influence on the attitude of the
Japanese people, the second underscores the post-occupation reforms Japan and
institutions like the pacifist constitution, participatory democracy and emergence of anti-
militarism in Japan and the third section looks at the decline of anti-war/anti-militarism
groups and related political debates in Japan.

The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

The Fire bombing of defenseless and civilian targets was not a new practice
during WWII. The Allied bombing of Dresden, an undefended city with no significant
war industry remained the single best known and most widely condemned example of
firebombing and deliberate annihilation of the civilian population in the history of war.
Dresden also marked the transition in air strategy, from precision bombing to the
deliberate destruction of the cities and killing of their residents (Kyoko and Mark Selden,
1989: xi). Firebombing did not stop in Dresden but continued. On February, 1945, US bombers in a test raid destroyed a one-square-mile area of snow covered Tokyo. The full fury of US firebombing was unleashed on Tokyo on the night of March 9-10, 1945, with the aim of reducing the city to rubble using jellied gasoline and napalm. Wind made the fire fiercer, resulting in more destruction (Kyoko and Mark Selden, 1989: xiii-xvi).

The US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that “probably more persons lost their lives in a six hour period than in the history of man.” People died from extreme heat as the winds fanned temperature to 1000 degrees centigrade, from oxygen deficiency, from carbon dioxide asphyxiation, or from being trampled beneath the feel of stampeding crowds. The figures of the causalities provided by different agencies vary, but hundreds of thousands of people were killed and millions became homeless or fled to comparatively safer avenues (Kyoko and Mark Selden, 1989: xv-xvi). In July 1945, US planes blanketed Japanese cities with an appeal to the people. It read, “As you know America which stands for humanity does not wish to injure the innocent people, so you had better evacuate these cities.”

While continuing the ongoing process of firebombing, the United States military dropped atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9, 1945 respectively, killing more than hundred thousand people. Ironically, most of them were civilians. These were the first and only nuclear attacks in history. Japan was in a dilemma so far on the question of unconditional surrender. The biggest Japanese apprehension was about the Emperor. Atomic bombs caused more than 210,000 deaths by the end of 1945 (35 percent of the Hiroshima population and 25 percent in Nagasaki) and severe suffering for a large number of the more than 370,000 survivors (Janet Bruin; Stephen Salaff, 1981: 5).

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1 On February, 13, 1945, 1400 British aircrafts followed by 1350 US bombers destroyed Dresden and unleashed a fire storm 200 miles away.

2 The US Strategic Bombing Survey provided the precise figures for what can be the crudest estimates: in that single raid on Tokyo, 87,793 people died, 40918 were injured, and 1,009,005 people lost their homes. The Tokyo Fire Department estimated 97,000 killed and 125,000 wounded. In sum vast area s of Tokyo lay in ruins, more than one million refugees fled, approximately 100,000 people died and many more were injured.
The debate about the necessity of the use of atomic bombs on the two cities of Japan still seems to be alive in academic circle. Despite the fact that almost all the documents related to the use of bombs have been made public, scholars looking into the matter feel that many documents were misplaced, manipulated or destroyed by the authorities before releasing them to public. The Japanese side interestingly accepted the defeat and the supremacy of the US, which is visibly reflected in the psyche of the Japanese. Astonishingly, the American side seems to be divided from top to bottom about the issue. The General public was made to believe that had atomic bomb not used against Japan, US would have suffered the loss of another half a million lives. Notwithstanding the significant criticism of the atomic bombing, majority of the US citizens still do not regret or question the decision.

A few years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed; Admiral William D. Leahy (1950) went public with the following statement:

> It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan, the Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender... My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children... (Leahy, 1950: 441 as quoted in Gar Alperovitz, 1996: 3)

According to Gar Alperovitz's, "Leahy was not what one might call a typical critic of American policy. Not only had the five-star admiral presided over the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (and the combined American-British Chiefs of staffs), but he had simultaneously been chief of staff to the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, serving Roosevelt in that capacity from 1942 to 1945 and Truman from 1945 to 1949. Moreover, he was a good friend of Truman's and the two men respected and liked each other; his public criticism of the Hiroshima decision was hardly personal" (Gar Alperovitz, 1996: 6).

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1 The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, based on His Notes and Diaries made during WWII.
In the US, the prevailing view is that the bombings ended the war, at least sooner than otherwise, and saved many lives of both sides that would have been lost if the planned invasion of Japan ever took place. At the same time, many high profile Americans questioned and criticized the use of A-bomb. In Japan, the general public tends to think that with hindsight, the bombings were needless as the preparation for the surrender was in progress. The same view can be equated with the statements of Eisenhower. Recalling the 1945 moment when Secretary of War Henry L Stimson informed the atomic bomb would be used against Japanese cities, Dwight D Eisenhower (1963) stated:

During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of face... (as quoted in Gar Alperovitz, 1996: 4).

Moreover, less than a year after the bombings, an extensive official study by the US Strategic Bombing Survey published its conclusion that Japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing, without a Soviet declaration of war, and without an American invasion (Gar Alperovitz, 1996: 6).

All the other incidents of firebombing were no more than curtain raisers to what actually happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bombs, secretly developed by the United States (with assistance from the United Kingdom and Canada) under the codename - Manhattan Project, were the second and third atomic devices to be detonated, and are the only ones ever used as weapons, rather than for testing purposes (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979). The first nuclear test explosion, designated ‘Trinity’ using the weapon was nicknamed ‘The Gadget’ because it was not a deliverable weapon. The test was conducted in a desert in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. US President Harry S.

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\[4 \text{Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings ed. by The Committee for the Compilation of the Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki originally published in Japanese by Iwanami Shoten Publishers, Tokyo, 1979: 335. Here onwards mentioned as Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979.}\]
Truman took the decision to use the bomb in consultation with several other officials and ministers (US National Archives). Air bombing, as discussed earlier, of the cities particularly belonging to the Axis powers, like the bombing of Dresden, was not a new practice of during the World War II. The written order for the use of the atomic bomb against Japanese cities was drafted by General Groves, President Truman and Secretary of War Stimson approved the order at Potsdam. The order made no mention of targeting military objectives or sparing civilians. The cities themselves were the targets. The order was also open-ended. Additional bombs could be dropped as soon as made ready by the project staff. About 60 Japanese cities had been destroyed by then. Truman’s officially stated intention in ordering the bombings was to bring about a quick resolution of the war by inflicting destruction and instilling fear of further destruction that was sufficient to cause Japan to surrender.

After the Hiroshima atomic attack (and before the Nagasaki atomic attack), President Truman issued the following statement:

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth.

Selection of targets

The Target Committee at Los Alamos on May 10–11, 1945, selected in order, the following targets - Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, Kokura arsenal, Niigata, and possibly the Emperor’s Palace (Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Target Committee, Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945, US National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, S Manhattan Project File ‘42-'46, folder 5D Selection of Targets, 2 Notes on Target Committee Meetings).

On the short list of targets for the atom bomb, in addition to Hiroshima, Kokura and Niigata, was the Japanese city of temples, Kyoto. Kyoto was saved due to the

I probably would have done this if I had ever had the opportunity, but there is not a word of truth to it. As has been amply proved by my friend Otis Cary of Doshisha in Kyoto, the only person deserving credit for saving Kyoto from destruction is Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War at the time, who had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlier.

As Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been designated air defense zone, they had special police garrisons, police guards and civil defense systems, and government conscripted worker teams as well as trained local neighbourhood associations and relief, first aid and sanitation teams along with emergency hospitals, first-aid stations and refuge shelters. All preparedness was destroyed (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 367). Rinjiro Sodei points out that, "Hiroshima was a major military city, home both to the large port of Ujina, through which millions of soldiers were sent to the battlefronts, and to many factories devoted to war production. The city of Nagasaki was not very different" (Rinjiro Sodei, 1995: 1123).

**Hiroshima during World War II**

Hiroshima city is built on a delta of the Ota River which flows into the *Seto Naikai* Inland Sea from the northern mountains. The east and west are walled off by hills, and the southern delta area faces the *Seto Naikai* Inland Sea. Since the explosion happened at the heart of this fan shaped flat city, the damage extended through the city unrelated to direction. The degree of damage decreased with distance from the hypocenter, but 92 percent of the total structures (76,327) were damaged to some extent. It is no exaggeration to say that whole city was ruined instantaneously (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 60-61). At the time of its bombing, Hiroshima was a city of considerable
industrial and military significance. However, the population of Hiroshima was approximately 350,000 before the war but was reduced by over 1,40,000 (plus minus 10,000) due to the bombing of the city (Atomic Bombs and Poems of Sankichi Toge: An Appeal of All Voices Under the Atomic Cloud, compiled by the Secretariat of the Shimonoseki A-bomb Exhibition, Shimonoseki City, Japan: 20).

Hiroshima was the primary target of the first US nuclear attack mission, on August 6, 1945 (Warren I Cohen, 2000: 360). The B-29 Enola Gay, piloted and commanded by Colonel Paul Tibbets, was launched from Tinian airbase in the West Pacific, approximately 6 hours flight time away from Japan (Kyoko and Mark Selden, 1989: xvii). Navy Captain William Parsons armed the bomb during the flight, since it had been left unarméd to minimize the risks during takeoff. In every detail, the attack was carried out exactly as planned, and the bomb, with a 60 kg (130 pounds) core of uranium-235, performed precisely as expected ("Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Subsequent Weapons Testing Nuclear Issues" Briefing Paper, 29 May 2004).

About an hour before bombing, the Japanese early warning radar net detected the approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. The alert had been given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima. The planes approached the coast at a very high altitude. The three planes present were the Enola Gay (named after Colonel Tibbets' mother), The Great Artiste (a recording and surveying craft), and the Necessary Evil (the photographing plane). The normal radio
broadcast warning was given to the people that it might be advisable to go to a shelter if B-29s were actually sighted, but no raid was expected beyond some sort of reconnaissance. At 8.15am, the Enola Gay dropped the nuclear bomb called ‘Little Boy’ over the center of Hiroshima. The 123 kiloton atomic bomb exploded in air over Hiroshima, killing tens of thousands of people (Shields Warren, 1977: 97-99). 

The Japanese Military headquarters took time to realize and react to the situation. They got to know that what really had happened only after the report of a staff officer and his pilot who flew towards south west and could see the smoke and city burning nearly 100 miles (160 km) from Hiroshima. They landed in the south of the city and organized some relief operations after reporting to the headquarters. The White House officially acknowledged the bombing through a public announcement in Washington, sixteen hours after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima.

As Japan is prone to the earthquakes, many of the pre-war structures were tremor-proof meticulously designed and constructed. One of those buildings that could withstand the impact of nuclear bomb to some extent was Prefectural Industrial Promotional Hall, designed and built by the Czech architect Jan Letzel, which was only a few meters from ground zero. Later on in 1996, the ruin was named Hiroshima Peace Memorial and made a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1996 over the objections of the US and China.

**Nagasaki during World War II**

Nagasaki city is built around the Nakashina river basin, the Urakami river basin, and Nagasaki bay into which both rivers flow. The city’s two basin districts (Nakashima River District and Urakami River District) are separated by a hill about 200m above sea level (maximum height in the area 360m). The commercial center, the prefectural and

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7 The Tokyo control operator of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the air. He tried to re-establish his program by using another telephone line, but it too had failed. About twenty minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small railway stops within ten miles (16 km) of the city came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these reports were transmitted to the Headquarters of the Japanese General Staff.
municipal offices and other government offices were concentrated in the Nakshima River District. Along the Urakami River District lies a relatively broad expanse between hills running north and south. There were intermittent rows of factories from the west bank of Nagasaki bay, and there were also many residences and schools in the District. The Atomic Bomb exploded at a height of 500m above the center of Urakami River District. Consequently, the damages caused by heat rays and blast were almost entirely restricted to this area, while the Nakashima River District was fairly well shielded by the hills. However, 36 percent of the total structures in both districts were damaged (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 62). The mushroom cloud resulting from the nuclear explosion over Nagasaki rises 18 km (60,000 ft) into the air.

The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials. Nagasaki had never been subjected to large-scale bombing prior to the explosion of a nuclear weapon there. On August 1, 1945, however, a number of high-explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few of these bombs hit in the shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city. Several of the bombs hit the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works and six bombs landed at the Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, with three direct hits on buildings there. While the damage from these few bombs was relatively small, it created considerable concern in Nagasaki. A number of people, principally school children were evacuated to rural areas for safety, thus reducing the population in the city at the time of the nuclear attack.

On the morning of August 9, 1945, the crew of the American B-29 Super fortress Bockscar, flown by Major Charles W. Sweeney carried the nuclear bomb nicknamed ‘Fat Man,’ for their target, Nagasaki (Warren I Cohen, 2000: 360). At 11: 02 am, a B-29 (The

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8 In contrast to many modern aspects of Nagasaki, the residences almost without exception were of old-fashioned Japanese construction, consisting of wood or wood-frame buildings, with wood walls (with or without plaster), and tile roofs. Many of the smaller industries and business establishments were also housed in buildings of wood or other materials not designed to withstand explosions. Nagasaki had been permitted to grow for many years without conforming to any definite city zoning plan; residences were erected adjacent to factory buildings and to each other almost as closely as possible throughout the entire industrial valley.
Great Artiste flown by Capt. Frederick C. Bock) dropped the weapon, containing a core of 8 kg of plutonium-239, over the city’s industrial valley. It exploded approximately 500 meters above the ground almost midway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works, in the south, and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works), in the north, the two principal targets of the city (Atomic Bombs and Poems of Sankichi Toge: An Appeal of All Voices Under the Atomic Cloud, compiled by the Secretariat of the Shimonoseki A-bomb Exhibition, Shimonoseki City, Japan: 20). Although, the city has been reconstructed and almost back to the normal life, one of the monument called the Nagasaki Cultural Center, which was built in 1955 in memory of those who were the victims of nuclear bombing, still reminds us about what the city and its people had gone through (Frank W. Chinnock, 1969: 3-5).

**Impact of Atomic Bombing**

The impact of the atomic bombs was instantaneous and sweeping without discrimination. Atomic bomb damage then, is so complex and extensive that it can not be reduced to any single characteristic or problem. It must be seen overall, as an interrelated array – massive physical and human loss social disintegration and psychological and spiritual shock that affects all life and society (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 337). The essence of atomic destruction lies in the totality of its impact on men and society and on all the systems that affect their mutual continuation. Densely populated cities were destroyed. Community life, all the social systems, structures and functional organs built up over many years were burned and blasted into oblivion.

Various agencies carried out surveys to examine the damage caused. First of all, the administration, universities, the National Research Council of Japan and military agencies conducted the surveys. During US occupation, the special Manhattan Engineer District Investigating group headed by Thomas Farrel with some 30 members from medical and engineering fields was dispatched from US to Japan. To carry out a preliminary study on the impact of Atomic Bomb and also to determine the safety of the Occupation Troops were the main objectives of the group. Later on, the Japan – US Joint
Commission for the investigation of the Effects of Atomic Bomb in Japan, constituted of the General Head Quarters (GHQ) Army Surgeon Team, the Manhattan Team and Japan government Team was formed (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 508). Japanese reports were compiled in “Collection of the Reports of atomic Bomb Casualties” edited by The Science Council of Japan (1953). American data was compiled by Oughterson, Shields Warren, AA Liebow, GV LeRoy, C Hammond and H Barnett in the “Medical Report of the Atomic Bomb in Japan – Atomic Energy Commission classified Document.” The Special Committee for the Investigation of Atomic Bomb Damages (SCIAD) of the National Research Council of Japan (1951) in its report said that there was complete functional breakdown, disintegration of the family, loss of livelihood and personality breakdown (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 105).

Table 2.1
Total number of Casualties due to the Atom Bomb, Hiroshima, August 10, 1946*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance from hypocenter (km)</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Severely injured</th>
<th>Slightly injured</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Not injured</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 0.5</td>
<td>19,329</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>21662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5-1.0</td>
<td>42271</td>
<td>3046</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1366</td>
<td>4434</td>
<td>53036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0-1.5</td>
<td>37689</td>
<td>7732</td>
<td>9522</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>9140</td>
<td>65271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5-2.0</td>
<td>13422</td>
<td>7627</td>
<td>111516</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>11698</td>
<td>44490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0-2.5</td>
<td>4513</td>
<td>7830</td>
<td>14149</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>26096</td>
<td>52686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5-3.0</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>2923</td>
<td>6795</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19907</td>
<td>30796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0-3.5</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10250</td>
<td>12777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5-4.0</td>
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<td>4260</td>
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</tr>
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<td>36</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6593</td>
<td>6817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 5.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>11798</td>
<td>12162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>118661</td>
<td>30524</td>
<td>48606</td>
<td>3677</td>
<td>118613</td>
<td>320081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*military personnel not included

Table 2.2
Number of Casualties due to the Atomic Bomb in Nagasaki*
as of December 31, 1945

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>73,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>74,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected</td>
<td>120,820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* It is unknown whether floating population, such as military personnel and other volunteer corps are included.
Source: Nagasaki City Atomic Bomb Records Preservation Committee.

The numbers of the affected and killed people given in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 are based on the calculations done immediately after the bombings. More elaborate and detailed account of the total casualties is given in Table 2.3. The number of victims kept increasing because of the exposure to the radiation. Even the late entrants, who came for rescue and relief work got exposed to the radiation (Table 2.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hiroshima</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Hiroshima Prefecture, Governor’s report August 20, 1945</td>
<td>32,959</td>
<td>9,591</td>
<td>42,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hiroshima Prefecture, public health section report, August 25, 1945</td>
<td>46,185</td>
<td>17,429</td>
<td>63,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hiroshima Prefecture, police department report, November 30, 1945</td>
<td>78,150</td>
<td>13,983</td>
<td>92,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hiroshima City, survey section report, August 10, 1946</td>
<td>118,661</td>
<td>3,677</td>
<td>122,338**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Joint Japan-US survey report, 1951</td>
<td>64,602</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>64,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Japan Council against A and H bombs: White papers on A-bomb damages, 1961</td>
<td>119,000-133,000 (32,900 military personnel not included)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>151,900-165,900 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nagasaki</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nagasaki Prefecture, report August 31, 1945</td>
<td>19,748</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>21,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nagasaki Prefecture, external affairs section, October 23, 1945</td>
<td>23,753</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>25,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Private estimate by Motosaburo Masuyama, January 1946 survey</td>
<td>29,398-37,507</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>29,398-37,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. British mission report***</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>39,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nagasaki City, A-bomb preservation committee, 1949</td>
<td>73,884</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>73,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Joint Japan-US survey report, 1951</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All estimates are of civilian deaths (military personnel excluded)
** Estimated one year after the bombing
*** The British Mission participated in the US Strategic Bombing Survey but compiled an independent report, which is thought to have been done prior to 1947.
Impact on Health

Atomic Bomb illness is not only a pathological condition the human race has confronted for the first time but also possesses a specific characteristic, unlike usual war damage and injury. In the first place, the energy causing vital damage is vast. Not until August in the year of 1945 had mankind ever experienced large scale thermal radiation and blast. Together with thermal radioactivity, these caused the deaths of 140,000 in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki. In the second place, atomic bomb illness is the first and only example of heavy lethal and momentary doses of whole body irradiation, observed in a large population. It destroyed the actively regenerating cells in the body and greatly devastated the vital defensive mechanism. These heavy doses were the main reasons for poor repair, prevalence of infection and extremely high mortality in atomic bomb injury. The atomic bomb not only brought tragic and horrible injuries but also hindered the basis for the reparative and regenerative processes of the living body. Thirdly, whole body irradiation injures the nuclei of the cells and their component DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and may lead to malignances (cancer and leukemia) and alteration of genes (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 115).

A 50 percent death rate is presumed in those exposed at 1-2 km of the hypocenter and higher rate of 80-100 percent is presumed in those exposed at shorter distances. Even among those escaping instant death on the day of exposure, the mortality rate later became extremely high in those exposed at close distances and in those sustaining serious injuries (Science Council of Japan, Genshi Bakudan Saikai Hokokusho (SRIABC), 1951: 41 as quoted in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 106-107).

The following factors made it extremely difficult to grasp the actual conditions at that time: the extreme destruction of the local society, disorganization of war mobilization following Japan’s miserable defeat in WWII and limitation on investigating Atomic bomb casualties imposed during the United States occupation of Japan (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 108). According to the report of SCIAD of National Research Council of Japan (1951), the total number of the deaths during the early stage (upto the end of 1945) following exposure to the atomic bomb in Hiroshima was
estimated to be approximately 100,000 (announced by the Hiroshima Prefecture as of August 25 and November 30, 1945) (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 113).

### Table 2.4
Comparison of Conditions Causing Secondary Atomic Bomb Victims, Hiroshima and Nagasaki

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Data</th>
<th>Kind of victim</th>
<th>Hiroshima*</th>
<th>Nagasaki</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health and Welfare Survey, 1975</td>
<td>Early entrant</td>
<td>57,839 (73.007)</td>
<td>21,135 (26.93)</td>
<td>79,154 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relief work and other worker</td>
<td>6,184 (67.08)</td>
<td>3,035 (32.92)</td>
<td>9219 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of atomic bomb holders March 1978</td>
<td>Early entrant</td>
<td>77,590**</td>
<td>28,596**</td>
<td>106,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relief work and other worker</td>
<td>11,347**</td>
<td>5,568**</td>
<td>16,915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total number of secondary victims.

**Impact on Economy/Wealth**

The Economic Stabilization Board’s Report (1949) made rather careful estimates of direct and indirect damages. Though perfection is impossible due to loss of vital records in the wartime and postwar confusion, the estimate of loss of non-military wealth is 65,000,000,000 Yen (49.6 Billion in direct losses). This report acknowledges that detailed estimates for Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not possible, but puts their aggregate share of the total loss at about 2 percent (Hiroshima alone 1.4 percent), which is a loss of 65,000,000,000 Yen and 281,000,000 Yen for Nagasaki (August 1945 values). It has
been estimated that the city lost 763,430,000 Yen (October, 1945 Survey), a figure fairly close to that of the Economic Stabilization Board (The Hiroshima City Almanac, Hiroshima Shiyakusho, 1947: 63-64.). It is not certain how accurately the estimates reflect the real losses (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 386). As mentioned above, the damage was multidimensional. Everything and everyone was affected by the atomic Bomb.

Third Time Nuclear Victims (Bikini Incident)

The first US Hydrogen Bomb test was conducted by the Atomic Energy Agency (AEC) on March 1, 1954. It occurred at Bikini atoll, located in the Marshall Islands, a UN trust territory in the Pacific. The AEC had staked out a danger zone of fifty thousand square miles (an area roughly the size of New England) around the test site. But the blast proved more than twice as powerful as planned and generated vast quantities of highly radioactive debris. Within a short time, heavy fallout descended on four inhabited islands of the Marshall grouping, all outside the danger zone. This prompted US officials to evacuate 28 Americans working at US weather station and 236 Marshallese. Thanks to their rapid escape, the Americans went relatively unscathed. But the Marshall islanders, who were not removed from their radioactive surroundings for days, soon developed low blood counts, skin lesions, hemorrhages under the skin, and loss of hair. Over time, the Islanders also suffered a heavy incidence of radiation-linked illnesses, notably thyroid cancer and leukemia (Lawrence S Wittner, 1997: 2).

Much of this might have gone unnoticed by the outside world had there not been a further incident. About eighty five miles from the test site, outside the official danger zone, radioactive ash from the H-Bomb explosion showered on a small Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon. By the time the ship had reached its home port of Yaizu two weeks later, the twenty three crew members were in an advanced stage of radiation sickness, with skin irritations and burns, nausea, loss of hairs, and other afflictions. The Japanese government promptly hospitalized the ailing fishermen and destroyed their radioactive cargo. As the disturbing news spread across Japan, panic swept across the
nation. Although most of the crew recovered, the ship's radio operator died during the 
hospital treatment in September (Lawrence S Wittner, 1997).

In the midst of a growing international furor, US officials sought to reassure the 
public that all was as it should be. On March 31, in a statement read at President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s Press conference, Lewis Strauss, the AEC chair, maintained that testing 
was always under control and that US personnel as well as Marshall Islanders were in 
good shape. He said that there seemed to be some problem with the Japanese fishermen 
but denied any responsibility for it. He went on to the extent of glorifying the H-Bomb 
and said it could be made as large as necessary.

*Debate over the Decision to Drop the Bombs*

There arose many theories about whether the use of the atomic bomb was 
inevitable or if the Japanese would have surrendered any way owing to the then prevalent 
circumstances. While some members of the civilian leadership under the leadership of the 
then PM Konoye did use covert diplomatic channels to begin negotiations for peace, on 
their own they could not negotiate a surrender or even a ceasefire (John Toland, 1971). 
Japan, as a Constitutional Monarchy, could only enter into a peace agreement with the 
unanimous support of the Japanese cabinet, and this cabinet was dominated by militarists 
from the Japanese Imperial Army and the Japanese Imperial Navy, all of whom were 
initially opposed to any peace deal.

The helplessness of the civilian rule during the war and the ultra-nationalist and 
ultra-expansionist militarists’ refusal to give up despite the ongoing bombings of the 
Japanese cities and other significant losses at various war fronts ultimately forced the 
emperor to intervene to stop the war.

Scholars justifying the use of the atomic bomb stress on the fact that with the 
Japanese surrender, the Japanese atrocities in China and other parts of Asia also ended. 
So also did the sufferings of the prisoners of war. Thousands of prisoners were released
from the Japanese concentration camps following the surrender. Potential Soviet acquisition of Japanese-held territory was also apparently minimized with the quick end of the war. Finally, supporters also point to Japanese plans, devised by their Unit 731 to launch Kamikaze planes laden with the plague-infested fleas to infect the populace of San Diego, California. The target date was to be September 22, 1945, although it is unlikely that the Japanese government would have allowed so many resources to be diverted from defensive purposes.

Gar Alperovitz (1996: 14) observes that, “Hiroshima and Nagasaki – now I think, have very little to do with the past. How we chose to deal with them, I believe, may have everything to do with the future. We are all Americans who should have known better about our own silent refusal to confront the enormity of nuclear weapons.”

During WWII, the atomic bomb was seen and valued as a potential rather than an actual instrument of policy. Responsible officials’ believed that its impact on diplomacy had to await its development and perhaps even a demonstration of its power. Henry L Stimson, the Secretary of War, observed in his memoirs: “The bomb as a merely probable weapon had seemed a weak reed on which to rely, but the bomb as a colossal reality was very different” (Martin J Sherwin, 1973: 946).

The cenotaph at the Hiroshima Peace Park is inscribed with a subject less sentence: “Let all the souls here rest in peace, as we will never repeat this mistake.” This construction, natural in the Japanese language, was intended to memorialize the victims of Hiroshima without politicizing the issue. Even before the event, the dropping of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was controversial. The Manhattan Project had initially been envisaged to check Germany’s atomic bomb programme. With the defeat of Germany, the threat got over. Scientists were against its use against humanity. One of the prominent critics of the bombings was Albert Einstein (Lawrence S Wittner, 1997: 6-7). Leo Szilard, a scientist who played a major role in the development of the atomic bomb, argued:
...Today with this danger averted we feel impelled to say.... the war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and the destruction of Japanese cities by means of atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that such an attack on Japan could not be justified ....the United States ought not to resort to the use of atomic bombs in the present phase of the war, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan after the war are publicly announced and subsequently Japan is given an opportunity to surrender. If such public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender, our nation would then be faced with a situation which might require a re-examination of her position with respect to the use of atomic bombs in the war. Atomic bombs are primarily a means for the ruthless annihilation of cities. Once they were introduced as an instrument of war it would be difficult to resist for long the temptation of putting them to such use (Szilard Petition, First Version, July 3, 1945). 9

Kyoko and Mark Selden contested that the Japanese were already essentially defeated, and therefore the use of the bombs was unnecessary (Kyoko and Mark Selden, 1989: xxvii). Others contend that Japan had been trying to surrender for at least two months, but the U.S. refused by insisting on an unconditional surrender. In fact, while several diplomats favored surrender, the leaders of the Japanese military were committed to fighting a “decisive battle” on Kyushu, hoping that they could negotiate better terms for an armistice afterward. Other Japanese sources have stated that the atomic bombings themselves were not the principal reason for capitulation. Rather, it was the fast and upsetting Soviet victories on the mainland after Stalin’s August 8 declaration of war forcing the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945. The fact of the matter remained that the pressure from both sides i.e. US and USSR impacted the surrender decision, but more than the US factor, the fear of Soviet occupation accelerated imperialistic Japan’s acceptance of defeat. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, after interviewing hundreds of Japanese civilian and military leaders after Japan surrendered, reported: Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31

9 Dr. Leo Szilard, a Hungarian-born physicist who helped persuading President Roosevelt to launch the A bomb project and who had a major share in it. In 1945, however, he was a key figure among the scientists opposing use of the bomb. Later he turned to biophysics, and was awarded the Einstein medal for “outstanding achievement in natural sciences.” Szilard Petition, First Version, July 3, 1945, Source: U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, Harrison-Bundy File, folder 76. Source for number of signers of July 3 petition: Szilard to Frank Oppenheimer, July 23, 1945, Robert Oppenheimer Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. http://www.dannen.com.
December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Critics believe that the U.S. had ulterior motives in dropping the bombs, including justifying the $2 billion investment in the Manhattan Project, testing the effects of nuclear weapons, exacting revenge for the attacks on Pearl Harbor, and demonstrating U.S. capabilities to the Soviet Union. Stanley Goldberg writes:

The bomb dropped on Hiroshima....justified the more than $1 billion investment....the bomb dropped in Nagasaki justified the more than $400 million....It seems that the rush to produce the active material and to drop the bombs on Japan as soon as possible was driven largely by a fear that the war might end before both type of fission bombs could be used (Stanley Goldberg as quoted in Gar Alperovitz, 1996: 654).

Some believe that more effort to reduce casualties should have been made. Further, some claim this could have been done without affecting the stated purposes of the bombing. No evidence has ever been uncovered that leaflets warning of atomic attack were dropped on Hiroshima. However, after the Hiroshima bombing, President Truman announced, "If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth." On August 8, 1945, leaflets were dropped and warnings were given to Japan by Radio Saipan. (The area of Nagasaki did not receive warning leaflets until August 10, though the leaflet campaign covering the whole country was over a month into its operations.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) On August 6, 1945 leaflets were dropped saying
TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:
America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet. We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29s can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly accurate.
We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city. Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our president has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender. We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better and peace-loving Japan.
You should take steps now to cease military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.
The decision to bomb Nagasaki only a few days after Hiroshima raises separate issues. Many scholars have from time to time stated that the decision of the bombing of Hiroshima is 'debatable' but that of Nagasaki is 'unnecessary' (Gar Alperovitz, 1996: 648). Some people hold that most of the arguments for the use of the atomic bomb do not justify dropping the second one on Nagasaki. Japanese citizens, after the occupation era was over and many restrictions were waived off, came out in numbers and opposed the use of nuclear weapons. Masayoshi Fukuda in a newspaper article wrote,

the democratic movement, particularly the peace movement after the end of World War II had to make two tasks clear. One was to carry out a thorough investigation of the war crimes committed by Japanese imperialism and prevent resolutely our nation from going to war again. Another was to expose the ambition of US imperialism which occupied Japan after the war. The war crimes of Japanese imperialism were examined closely and severely by the democratic camp. But, the ambition of US imperialism was not fully exposed. It is because the democratic camp did not have the basic understanding of the position of US imperialism in the Allied Forces and its stance and policy toward Japan after the war. The unclear understanding of these matters made the people hesitate about judging whether it would have a historically positive meaning to protest against the US although they were angry at the atomic bombings, that is, massacre of unarmed citizens by the US and based on their real feelings, they could never tolerate this fact. .... How could you erase the undeniable fact that a great number of innocent young and old men and women were massacred! Any explanation was meaningless for masses. The Chugoku Regional Committee of the Japanese Communist Party... appealed to the people of the region not to forgive US imperialism under the name of humanity for perpetrating the massacre of innocent unarmed citizens unprecedented in history for that program. The regional party committee also pointed out in its appeal that the Yoshida government had taken the course of militarist revival under the control of US imperialism and turned Japan into a US military base.11

Thus, in the backdrop of the post-war reconstruction work, assessment of damage, debate over the use of the bomb, commencement of remilitarization, institutional and constitutional changes, many organizations opposing war and use of atomic bombs mushroomed. Initially, this growth was confined to particular pockets and with bare minimum demands but as the truth of Japanese atrocities during WWII and the use of the

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bomb came in the public domain through media and other anti-militarist organizations, the demands for compensations and proper policies also became prominent. So immense was their influence that Japanese government was forced not only to make proper policies for compensation and rehabilitation of the war affected people but also to play a low profile military role.

**Occupation Era: The Rise of Anti-Militarism**

Occupation authorities under the US flag not only demilitarized and democratized but also reformed and reconstructed Japan. In fact, reconstruction was not in the primary agenda of the occupation authorities. Initially they worked on ‘disease and unrest’ formula. This formula was meant to stop contagious diseases so that the US troops would stay healthy and check the unrest because of prevailing situations. Later on, the occupation authorities realized that the Japanese did not put any severe resistance in their path and were compliant to the directives of the SCAP to a surprising degree (John Curtis Perry, 1988: 108-109). Severe control was imposed by Occupation Authorities on publishing reports on atom bomb. In 1946, the Japanese were forced to accept a new constitution drafted primarily by MacArthur’s staff. It eliminated the emperor system and placed sovereignty in the people, which was to be exercised through their elected representatives in the Diet, Japan’s Parliament. The emperor, having renounced his divinity at the beginning of the year, was reduced to being a powerless symbol of the state. The constitution, put into effect in 1947, created a new form of government along British lines, with the Prime Minister and cabinet drawn from the dominant parliamentary party and responsible to the Diet. The right to vote was granted to all men and women of twenty years and over.12 None of these changes would have been made voluntarily by Japanese officials, but they accepted what they lacked the power to reject and adapted to the new system quickly and quietly, if not always to SCAP’s satisfaction (Warren I Cohen, 2000: 373). MacArthur was fully aware of the situation and he felt that without

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12 Most striking, and in accord with the highest American priority, Article 9 required the Japanese to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and consequently the right to maintain military forces.
making Japanese realize and accept the constitutional changes, the results would be short-lived.

Prominent members of SCAP were determined to bring economic, social and political democracy to Japan. They forced a program of land reform on rural Japan to end centuries of peasant exploitation by absentee landlords, and they sought to bring about the dissolution of the zaibatsu, the big business houses that dominated the Japanese economy. The zaibatsus were believed to have underwritten Japanese aggression. Many other reforms to improve working conditions and labour laws, including equal work equal pay, were carried out. The Japanese elites, the bureaucrats and businessmen upon whose cooperation the occupation authorities became dependent were unsympathetic to most of these reforms. In general, these men welcomed demilitarization, which eliminated troublesome competitors in the society.

Yoshida Shigeru was the dominant Japanese political figure during the years of occupation, serving as Prime Minister for most of the years. He had an excellent working relationship with MacArthur, especially after American pressures for social and economic reforms eased. When occupation ended, the Japanese conservatives led by Yoshida realized that some of the reforms could not be reversed. The Japanese people by now had embraced the pacifism of Article 9 of the American-imposed constitution, and that land reform had created a powerful class of small landholders whose interest could not be challenged. The famous historian John Dower (1979: 313) has written that the legacy of the occupation was “a new conservatism, but within a restructured state in which progressive and reformist ideals, and laws, retained a substantial constituency among the Japanese people themselves.”

The new political system under the post-war constitution provided Japanese people the right to speech and expression. This right had been curtailed during the pre-war period as well as the occupation era. Japanese also got the right to form organizations and criticize the government. They could enjoy real freedom and through their demands influence government policies.
The present constitution of Japan was neither produced by an elite group of clan oligarchs nor by a learned constitutional commission or a national or constituent assembly convened as a result of a popular vote or otherwise elected for the purpose of drafting a constitution, submitting it to the electorate for ratification. On the contrary, the national legislature that adopted the current constitution consisted of one house chosen under the Meiji Constitution by direct popular vote and another house composed of nobles, peers, and persons appointed by the emperor and others elected by the biggest taxpayers. The legislature continued to sit with an equally obsolescent privy council for the primary purpose of enacting a series of vitally important statutes designed to conform the law codes of the land to the principles of the new fundamental law (Charles L Kades, 1989: 217).

Under the supervision of the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ), a special committee within the Japanese Diet was established to amend the old Imperial Constitution. An initial draft was rejected by the GHQ because it did not sufficiently implement a democratic system. After further revision, the final draft of the Japanese Constitution was passed by the Diet and promulgated on 3 November 1946, a year and three months after the allied powers occupied Japan. An international tribunal on war criminals was held in the Far East in a manner similar to that at Nuremberg. The spirit of peace, encapsulated in Article 9, began as one of four principles incorporated in the Preamble to the Japanese Constitution. Eventually, the renunciation of the war principle was moved from the Preamble to Article 9. The original English version stated clearly that Japan renounced all wars and prohibited rearmament for war potential. However, a subsequent amendment by the House of Representatives softened the tone by inserting

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13 The most important war crimes trials following World War II were held in Nuremberg, Germany, under the authority of two legal instruments. One, the so-called London Agreement, was signed by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in London on August 8, 1945; the other, Law No. 10, was issued by the Allied Control Council in Berlin on December 20, 1945.
the phrase, “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph” (Shotaro Hamura and Eric Shiu, 1995: 429-30).

In his penetrating introduction to Japan’s Commission on the Constitution: The Final Report, John M Maki of the University of Massachusetts concluded that the Commission on the Constitution had created a new and special framework within which revision would have to be carried out and that the components of that framework preclude revision. Those components which Maki describes with deep discernment, are: first, the commission unanimously affirmed the three basic principles of the Constitution: popular sovereignty, pacifism, and the guarantee of fundamental human rights. Second, no single potentially crippling defect in the Constitution has surfaced; third, the constitution is functioning effectively in practice as a fundamental law for Japanese society based on general principles of democracy; fourth, no matter what the outcome on the question of revision, one inevitable result would be a deep scarring of the body politic; and fifth, no revision, whether on a large scale or small scale, would be quick or easy (Charles L Kades, 1989: 243).

One remarkable feature of the peace constitution is the decentralization of the central authority by giving considerable amount of autonomy to the prefectures. Yoshiaki Yoshida (1990: 123-133) observes that,

it is significant that the Constitution guarantees local autonomy....First, the Constitution clearly points to the essence of local autonomy. The introduction of the principle of local autonomy in the Constitution implies the protection of the local governments against the national government, and at the same time initiates the development of local autonomy. Second, the Constitution purports to guarantee that the national government does not necessarily restrict or violate the rights of local public entities. Third, the Constitution expressly and positively delegates powers to local public entities. Local public entities have the power to manage and administer their own affairs to insure social welfare in their communities and to maintain public order and security. Thus, local public entities have acquired financial, executive, and legislative powers.

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14 According to Maki, after 131 Plenary Sessions, 325 committee and subcommittee sessions, 56 public appeared, over a period seven years.
The autonomy enjoyed by the local bodies also promoted the anti-war and anti-militaristic movements, especially in the worst affected cities and prefectures such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The anti-bomb movement was not allowed during the occupation period. Despite the presence of thousands of people, the Hiroshima Peace Festival of August 6, 1950 was banned. The anti-war and anti-bomb sentiment had deeply pierced the minds and souls of the Japanese. Sankichi Toge was one of the leading anti-bomb activists behind the rise of the most visible movement in the post-occupation Japan.\(^{15}\) His poem, *August 6\(^{th}\)* appeared for the first time in special issue of the Newspaper, *Peace Front*, published by *Akahata* (Red Flag) Chugoku Regional head office in Hiroshima. It is worth mentioning that for the first time in Japan, the cruelty of the atomic bomb was exposed in public through photographs and Toge's poem was part of that feature.\(^{16}\) Finally, in August 1955, the First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb was organized in Hiroshima.

The emotional impact of atom and saturation bombing, defeat, the liberation from more than a decade of regimentation, the welcome and much publicized new Constitution, and MacArthur's often quoted 'Japan, the Switzerland of Asia' provided the basis for opposition to any defence policies, and to any peace treaty which tended to associate Japan with one of the two power blocs. It was around the slogan the 'Four Peace Principles' (a peace-treaty with both power blocs, neutrality, opposition American bases, opposition to rearmament) that Sohyo, Japan's largest trade union confederation, grew in strength, as did its dependents in the Diet, the Left-wing Socialists (D. C. S. Sissons, 1961: 45-59).

\(^{15}\) Sankichi Toge (1917-1953) was a poet and a witness and a sufferer of the ill-effects of bomb who died because of the exposure to the radiation at the age of 36. He sacrificed his strength to write anti-A-bomb poems and develop anti-war peace movement. He played an important role in the Peace struggle in Hiroshima particularly on August 6, 1950. He is still considered as one of the leading anti-bomb poets in the Japan.

Peace Societies, Hibakusha and the Evolution of Culture of Anti-Militarism in Japan.

Emergence of peace loving and war opposing societies, after WWII, had influenced the government policies to a greater extent. The Japanese government could not satisfy its citizen in the beginning. Subsequently, it implemented such laws as demanded by the people. Among the most remarkable, studied and discussed anti-nuclear organizations are those of Hibakusha. The survivors of the bombings, over one-half of whom were women are called Hibakusha, a Japanese word that translates literally to ‘A-bomb received persons’ or ‘bomb affected people (Janet Bruin; Stephen Salaff, 1981: 5-18).’ The sufferings due to the bombing is the root of Japan’s postwar pacifism, and the nation has sought the abolition of nuclear weapons from the world ever since.

The arrival of the Lucky Dragon at its home port, Yaizu, along with its irradiated Japanese crew and cargo created a furor all across the nation. Nuclear fallout or as the Japanese called it, the ‘ashes of death’ became a household term. Terrified of being poisoned by radioactive fish, hundreds of tons of fish were destroyed by the Japanese government. Consumers shunned this staple of the Japanese diet. A May 1954 poll by the Asahi Shimbun found that only 11 percent of respondents wanted to cooperate with the American H-Bomb tests to protect the security of the free nations. Another poll revealed that 78 percent of respondents opposed all nuclear testing under any circumstances; only two percent unconditionally approved it. That same month, determined “to protect the lives and the happiness of all mankind,” middle-class housewives of the Suginami ward in Tokyo began a petition campaign against H-Bombs. This ‘Suginami Appeal,’ carried in their shopping baskets, blossomed into a nationwide movement and by the following year, had attracted the signatures of 32 million people, about a third of the Japanese population. Meanwhile, the Yaizu city council passed a resolution urging the US to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs, an action repeated in most villages, towns, and cities throughout the country.
Some of this resistance to the Bomb emerged from Japan's traditional anti-nuclear constituency. Immediately after the *Lucky Dragon* incident, the Japanese Women's International League For Peace and Freedom (WILPF) section appealed to halt nuclear testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Like the Japanese Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), the WILPF assisted with the mass petition drive, and followed it up in October with a call for a ban on the A-Bomb and the H-Bomb. Scientists too played a prominent role in the anti-nuclear effort. "The scramble we see around us for the production of ever bigger and more fearful atomic weapons can not but leave us in despair," observed an April 1954 declaration by the Science Council of Japan. "We believe we are voicing the common feeling of the people of the entire world in sincerely appealing for the suspension of the atom and hydrogen bomb experiments, the abolition of mass-destructive nuclear weapons, and the establishment of really effective international control of atomic energy." Assailing the nuclear arms race, venerated physicist Hideki Yukawa warned that the atomic Bomb was threatening to become the cancer that will destroy mankind (Lawrence S Wittner, 1997: 8).

The pace of anti-nuclear activism quickened among survivors of the atomic bombings. Organized during these years in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and nationwide, *Hibakusha* associations such as Japan confederation of A-bomb and H-bomb Sufferers Organizations (JCSO) agitated not only for medical treatment and other relief measures but for an end to the nuclear arms race.17 As a result of the efforts of JCSO, the cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki petitioned the national government to pass the "Relief Law for Atomic Bomb Casualties", which finally became a reality in 1957, twelve years after the war's end (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 566-67). This law, however, broadly covered only certain designated illnesses and did not cover overall treatment expenditure.

The message of peace, anti-war and anti-A and H bomb was given to the world by both Hiroshima and Nagasaki through newly constructed peace parks, including exhibit

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17 The Hiroshima Prefecture Federation of A-Bomb Victims Associations and Nagasaki Federation of A-Bomb Victims Associations as well as similar associations of Nagano and Ehime were well established by 1955. After the 2nd World Conference against A & H bombs the nationwide Japan confederation of A-bomb and H-bomb Sufferers Organizations (JCSO) was formed on August 10, 1956. JCSO played a major role.
halls within them, to memorialize their residents annihilated by the atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{18} On August 6, 1954, a record turnout of 20,000 people attended Hiroshima’s yearly Peace Memorial Ceremony, presided over by Mayor Shinzo Hamai. With the appearance of H-Bomb, he noted, “the whole human race has come to be exposed to the ever-increasing menace of its total extinction.” Consequently, “we make this appeal to the entire world: Let all wars be outlawed and all atomic energy placed under an appropriate control. And to the consecrated souls of our fallen citizens, we humbly pledge ourselves that with renewed determination we shall pursue the way leading to the establishment of peace.”

The Japanese anti-nuclear movement soon spread far beyond the Hibakusha and other early opponents of the Bomb (Lawrence S Wittner, 1997: 8). On August 6, 1955, thousands of delegates, mostly Japanese, convened in Hiroshima for the First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.\textsuperscript{19} The anti-nuclear movement faced several challenges as well. The first such challenge came during 1959-61 when the movement was reaching new heights of influence. A split in the movement resulted in the formation of the Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Nihon Gensuikyo) and the National Council for Peace and against Nuclear Weapons (Kakkin Kaigi). The second split, in 1963-64 resulted in the formation of the Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo) and the Japan Congress against A and H Bombs (Gensuikin). Although the court ruling of 1964 made it the state’s responsibility to provide relief to the A-bomb victims, the movement witnessed a slump for a few years.

The JCSO retained enough autonomy to rupture but could not forestall stagnation of its activities. Gensuikyo became one of Japan’s most important mass movements. Much of its activist base came from the powerful Socialist Party and its trade union affiliate, Sohyo. Some also came from the smaller Communist Party. Nevertheless, Gensuikyo and its work did not immediately take on a left-wing tone, for anti-nuclear

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\textsuperscript{18} In 1955, the first year of their operation, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Nagasaki International Cultural Center drew some 336,000 visitors, and the numbers climbed steadily thereafter.

\textsuperscript{19} The list of sponsors included Tetsu Katayama (a former prime minister and Socialist Party leader), Saburo Yamada (President, Japan Academy of science), Tamaki Uemura (President, Japan YWCA), the Reverend Benkyo Shiio (President, All-Japan Buddhist Association), Shozo Murata (President, International Trade Promotion Commission), and Hamai.
sentiments enjoyed a broad popularity in Japanese life. Following the success of a pamphlet known as Crane Pamphlet in 1966, the JCSO came out with a set of three demands in 1973. They demanded both US and Japan to assume their war responsibilities, adequate compensation for the victims (from the national government), and comprehensive relief for the victims and a pledge of no more Hiroshima’s and Nagasaki’s in the future. The JCSO’s demands were instrumental in convincing the national government to pass A-bomb Special Measures Law (1968). The struggle stayed active till the end of 1970s. The movement was quite successful in getting its demands through (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1979: 568).

The memories of *Hibakusha* were kept alive by various authors through their writings. In one such effort in 1983, works of Japanese literature dealing with the event and with the *Hibakusha* were compiled into a vast, fifteen-volume compilation, *Nihon no genbaku bungaku*, the first major collection of A-bomb literature (Reiko Tachibana Nemoto, 1996: 1). It is noteworthy that the non-*Hibakusha* authors including many foreigners who wrote about the horrors of atomic bomb. Oe Kenzaburo’s *Hiroshima Noto*, a compilation of his essays on Hiroshima distinguished him as the most prominent spokesman for atomic bomb literature in Japan (John Whittier Treat, 1987: 97-98). Thus, literature also played an important role in strengthening anti-militaristic sentiments.

The anti-militaristic feelings are passed on from generation to generation through various anti-war and anti-nuclear weapon organizations. The A-bomb Survivors’ Association of Shiminosheki (ABSAS) is one of them with the aim to carry out the mission of conveying their experience to the youth for a peaceful future. This philosophy of peace was best reflected in the speech of Ms Yukiko Yoshimoto, chairperson of the ABSAS at a meeting of A-bomb survivors from three prefectures of the Chugoku region on August 5, 2001 in Hiroshima city. She said,

...we atomic bomb survivors (Hibakusha) of Shiminoseki ... took courage to tell our experience which we had not told even our children. ... We have chosen the course of working for the public good, for our future generation, no matter how

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20 *Crane Pamphlet* was mainly based on the sufferings of the A-bomb victims and the inadequacy of Medical Care Law.
small our contribution may be.... we came to be deeply convinced of the significance of our work when we learned later about the impressions of the pupils.... they listen to us carefully and are touched about our stories. We hear that their attitude has changed a lot both at school and in the home.” (Atomic Bombs and Poems of Sankichi Toge: An Appeal of All Voices Under the Atomic Cloud, compiled by the Secretariat of the Shimonoseki A-bomb Exhibition, Shimonoseki City, Japan: 31-32)

Table 2.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Demands</th>
<th>Focus and Scope</th>
<th>Govt. funds of A-bomb victims (unit: 100 million Yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-organizational activity</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Small groups organized in bombed areas</td>
<td>Medical care</td>
<td>Mutual help</td>
<td>0.4 (1954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5 (1956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of organizations</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Local associations of A-bomb victims; Japan confederation of H-bomb sufferers organizations’ decline; new body formed</td>
<td>Livelihood and vocational state compensation</td>
<td>Campaigns to press demands on national govt; increasing dependence on small scale pacifist organizations</td>
<td>2.5 (1956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.9 (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of organizations</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Growth of Japan confederation of A-bomb and H-bomb sufferers organizations’ local chapter</td>
<td>Comprehensiv e relief law based on state compensation</td>
<td>Escalation of demands on national government; establishment of autonomous mass movements</td>
<td>23.9 (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>539.4 (1978)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.5 shows size, focus and demands of the A-Bomb Victims Organizations and increasing amount of financial support from the government from mid 1940s to late 1970s.
The Japanese anti-militarist movement seemed to be burgeoned from the anti-nuclear movement, especially after WWII. Of all nations, as a US intelligence report noted in early 1957, Japan was "most sensitive to developments respecting nuclear weapons." Behind this sensitivity lay the terrible Japanese experience with nuclear war, as well as the vigorous anti-nuclear activities of key constituencies. Calling attention to the menace of nuclear weapons, the revered religious pacifist, Toyohiko Kagawa urged all the world people to do their utmost to ban A and H bombs. Japanese scientists also played an important role in the anti-nuclear struggle. On February, 1957, more than 350 of them issued a public appeal to their British Colleagues to help convince the British government to cancel plans for forthcoming nuclear tests at Christmas Island. They declared that nuclear testing was, "the worst sort of crime against all human beings." Later that year, 1,141 Japanese scientists signed Linus Pauling's anti-testing petition. Students, too, gakuren (National Federation of student Self-Government Associations) launched boycotts of classes and massive public rallies against nuclear weapons with the participation of an estimated 350,000 students at more than 200 universities.

Japanese public opinion seemed remarkably receptive to anti-nuclear appeals. Surveyed in January 1956, 55 percent of Japanese respondents favoured (and only 9 percent opposed) banning nuclear weapons even if it meant leaving "anti-Communist powers militarily weaker than the Communist powers." That June, 86 percent of Japanese expressed disapproval (and only 5 percent approval) of US nuclear tests (Lawrence S Wittner, 1997: 8-10). In May 1957, the US ambassador remarked glumly that the "US position on nuclear testing has virtually no support from the Japanese public. In their present emotional mood, the Japanese were unwilling to support anything less than unconditional suspension of all nuclear tests." This was no exaggeration. Polling the Japanese population in June 1957, the US Information Agency found that 91 percent of respondents viewed nuclear tests as either dangerous or very dangerous. Only 2 percent

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21 Sponsors of the Second World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in August 1956 in Nagasaki, represented every political party and a broad array of organizations, including women’s organizations, religious and scientific bodies, unions, and pacifist groups. It was reported that in addition to the gathering at Nagasaki Gensuikyo arranged meetings as well as many smaller events at Tokyo and Osaka stations with twenty to thirty thousand people in attendance.
thought they were not so dangerous, and no one considered them harmless. In July, the *Asahi Shimbun* reported that 88 percent of the public thought that the nuclear tests were horrible; only 6 percent disagreed. That same month, a poll found that 89 percent supported Japanese government's appeal for a world-wide ban on the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons.

Greatly disturbed by this situation, US officials waited expectantly for the tide to turn, but without any luck. In February, 1958, the US embassy reported hopefully that the vigor and ambition of Japanese opposition has appeared to diminish in recent months. Only weeks later, however, after the Soviet Union had announced a halt to its own tests, a new wave of intense criticism swept over Japan. Newspapers issued slashing condemnations of nuclear testing, with *Yomiuri Shimbun* denouncing the US government's forthcoming series as diabolical. By contrast, the US embassy observed that, "no one has failed to welcome the Soviet action as at least a step forward." By November 1958, according to polls, 78 percent of the Japanese population considered H-Bomb explosions harmful to the health of future generations, which was up by two points from the previous year.

Nor did the Japanese seem to be very interested about other uses of atomic energy. In June 1957, a poll found that only 5 percent supported (and 76 percent opposed) arming US forces in Japan with atomic weapons. Although the Tokyo government moved gradually to develop its own military forces, extraordinarily few Japanese wanted them equipped with nuclear armaments. Over the years, both national and regional surveys demonstrated almost unanimous rejection of nuclear weapons for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Indeed, in July 1957, 87 percent of the Japanese surveyed told pollsters that they favored a complete ban on A and H bombs. In July 1958, a poll found that 91 percent of the population favored establishing a worldwide organization to ensure that no nation could produce nuclear weapons. Despite considerable publicity for the wonders of the peaceful atom, the idea had limited appeal in Japan. Asked in the fall of 1957 if they thought atomic energy would prove more of a
boon or a curse to humanity, only 28 percent predicted that it would be a boon (Lawrence S Wittner, 1997: 43).

In 1960, the approval of the Japan US Security Treaty provoked a series of demonstrations against PM Kishi’s action (W S Uemura, 2001: 1-2). The demonstrations reached a climax on May 26, when, according to police reports, 620,000 took part in Tokyo and about 202,000 throughout the country. Left wing groups like the Japanese Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions, and the Federation of Student Self-Government Association held a series of protest demonstrations since September, 1958, following the announcement of the decision to renegotiate the treaty (Kashiwa Heiwa Kekyujo: 1036).

The post-war citizen movements, mainly anti-war, anti-government and anti-US, were very influential and active in catching the attention as well as participation of general masses. However, they lost momentum by the late 1980s. The famous AMPO struggle, mainly against the revision of the US-Japan Security treaty in 1960, continued in different forms by Japanese people, also known as AMPO generations. The struggle was not only confined to opposing the security treaty but also involved many other environmental, political and social issues. One such movement was a local farmers movement, Sanrizuka-Shibayama Rengo Kuko Hantai Domei (The Sanrizuka-Shibayama Farmers League Against the New Tokyo International Airport), which was later joined and supported by several groups including students, labour, professionals, bureaucrats of lower ranks, and militants mainly leftists. The struggle became more important because of the fact that the Airport (Now Narita Airport) represented the largest single project ever undertaken by the government.

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22 On May 19, 1960, Force was used to suppress protesters by PM Kishi, on June 15, 1960, right wing groups attacked citizen marchers subsequently, riots broke out that resulted in the first fatality during the protests. All this lead to more aggressive protests.

23 The first AMPO 1960s generation, characterized by great determination and moral perseverance was broadly, concerned about US imperialism. The second generation, AMPO 1970 was deeply involved in the University struggle and in opposing the Vietnam War. The Third generation, faced with the declining influence of the New Left, generally was concerned with much a much altered and international and domestic situation, particularly Japanese Imperialism.
The *Asahi Weekly Journal* compiled a list of organizations and their addresses involved in the citizen movements movement in April, 1971. It was found that out of the total 676, 134 (20 percent) were anti-war groups (Table 2.6). Kuroda (1972) argued that the rise of citizen movements in Japan is a clear cut indication of the rising public awareness and participation in the overall democratic process. Japanese people were never so free to participate in the pre-war period. Kuroda writes,

A survey conducted in March 1971 by the *Shakai Chosa Kenkyujyo* shows that 42 percent of the citizens are willing to participate in a movement in their community, while only 29 percent would refuse to participate. This decade is not an era of non-involvement by any means. This change in perception of events around the people may have been caused by the well developed mass media in contemporary Japan. I would, therefore, look at these movements as a result of the people's awakening accompanied by the phenomenal growth of Japan's economy (949).

### Table 2.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Organizations</th>
<th>Numbers Listed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Ecology Groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Urban redevelopment</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Anti-Public enterprise e.g., airport, pipelines, highway construction</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Health e.g., drug, milk, etc.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Preservation of natural and historical sites</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Researchers</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Anti-military base</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Anti-power plant</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Anti-building construction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Ecology groups</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Garbage and sewage disposal</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Dust control</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Anti-offensive odors</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Anti-polluted water</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Anti-polluted ocean water</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Anti-polluted air</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Anti-War Groups</strong></td>
<td>134 (20 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Anti-Immigration Office (Org. to assist foreign residents in Japan)</strong></td>
<td>37 (6 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Human (civil) Rights Groups</strong></td>
<td>93 (13 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number</strong></td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Decline in Anti-War/Anti-Militaristic Movements in Japan

The first wave of protesters that went to Sanrizuka grew up in grimness, poverty and individual hardship. That generation knew the past as shame and hunger. Later, its members were known for their austerity, both in principle and in practice. It and the succeeding AMPO 1970 generation which directed the explosions in universities have provoked crucial questioning on large issues of principle and made political demands for due process and greater citizen and community participation. They attacked not only the direction of the government policy but also the way government policy was made, arguing that the factionalism and corruption of the LDP, the legalism and bureaucratization of Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the ineffectiveness of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) meant that parliamentary government was no good. They rejected the highly structured networks of prevailing institutions. Apter and Sawa (1984: 69) observe that, “So total was their critique that the militants became marginals in their own society.” In order to show their protest and resentment to the existing system they voted with feet. Women walked out of arranged marriages and students quit studies. They were also termed as the New Left.24

However, the opposition of the Airport construction, the Vietnam War and several other issues slowly took the back seat with the declining New Left which took over the farmers’ movement and changed it into an armed conflict with the government. With the construction of the new Airport, Chinese support for the treaty and US withdrawal from the Vietnam War, the criticism of the Japanese government lost relevance (Mike M. Mochizuki, 1984: 163). The New Left and other movements gradually disappeared with the rising economy, better standards of living and individualization. The socio-economic changes and the introduction of many welfare programmes, including the compensation for the war affected and hibakusha also diverted the attention of the Japanese people from such protests. The revision of US Japan Security Alliance in 1960 and the Japanese

24 Apter and Sawa claimed that New left was a phenomenon that appeared in Japan before anywhere else in the world.
realization of importance of US security umbrella did influence the public attitude. Akitoshi Miyashita (2007: 113) observes that,

Indeed, the alliance with the United States became a material and structural basis upon which Japan’s culture of antimilitarism rested. Without the security guarantee provided by the United States, it is highly questionable whether the public support for the modest defense force, the peace constitution, and other pacifist policies could have been sustained. In this sense, it was the long postwar peace, more so than the disastrous defeat in the World War II, that kept the postwar Japan a pacifist state.

Thus, despite the fading opposition, anti-militarism still holds ground in Japan. The primary reason for Japan’s anti-militarism is not to be found in any structural factor, such as a high degree of dependence on trade or the absence of any potential security threats, but rather is attributable to Japan’s postwar culture of anti-militarism. This anti-militarism is one of the most striking features of contemporary Japanese politics and has its roots in collective Japanese memories of the militarist takeover in the 1930s and the subsequently disastrous decision to go to war with America (Thomas U Berger, 1993: 119). Mike M. Mochizuki’s (1984: 165) unarmed neutralists are the leftists who remained dead against the militarization of Japan and perceived a threat even in the US-Japan security treaty. They believed that any turmoil with Soviet Russia could engulf Japan. Mochizuki opined that “the direct policy influence of the unarmed neutralists is limited, but their opinions and the pacifist sentiments which they arouse in the public do constrain Japanese security policy.”

The major lesson Japan has drawn from these experiences is that the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it threaten Japan’s postwar democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity that the nation has enjoyed since 1945. This particular view of the military has been institutionalized in the Japanese political system. This view was not only supported by Japanese public opinion for a considerable time, but was, to a surprising degree, shared by large segments of Japan’s political and economic elites as well.

Nonetheless, Japan’s anti-militarism suffered a decline along with the declining socialists and citizen movements. The anti-war, anti-nuclear and anti-militarism was at its
peak during 1960s. With the proliferation of the environment citizen movements of the 1970s, citizen movements got diversified and started losing its hold. With the rise of the Consumer movements of 1980s and 1990s, the anti-militarism movements were further diluted (WS Uemura, 2001: 1-2). Ironically, the rise of other movements is linked with the decline of unarmed neutralists/leftists and anti-militarist groups. It is also being felt that anti-militarist movement could not survive in case of a weakened alliance with the United States or the emergence of a new regional security threat. In such a scenario, Japan’s political system would undergo a profound crisis and a new coalition of political actors might come to power, possibly with a far more aggressive approach towards national security. Indeed, rather than a resurgence of militarism, the main danger Japan faced till mid 1990s was precisely the opposite; because of its unwillingness to make a greater military contribution to regional and international security. Japan even threatened to damage its alliance with the United States, the key element that enabled Japan to maintain a relatively low posture on defense. Thus, paradoxically, Japan’s extreme anti-militarism increased the likelihood of a shift in the opposite direction (Thomas U Berger, 2001: 120-21).

The constructivists feel that it was in the interest of the United States to help Japan manage a slow and orderly evolution of this peculiar culture toward a more realistic stance with regard to security affairs in order to be prepared for any military threat emerging in the region. The experiences of defeat, and how that experience came to be interpreted and institutionalized in the Japanese political system and in Japanese defense policy, continue to shape Japan’s willingness to make use of the military today. In this context, it may be useful to compare Japan with West Germany, for while both nations’ experiences were similar in many respects, the differences between them led them to draw very different lessons from their experiences of the war and to develop correspondingly very different forms of pacifism (Thomas U Berger, 2001: 132).

The grassroots groups have distanced themselves from the parties and persist in efforts to promote pacifism. Japan's peace activists are less isolationists than before and have broadened their portfolio by adding social justice and sustainable development to
nonviolence. Regional solidarity has replaced one-country pacifism. But the peace movement is a shadow of its former self. In 2001, 25,000 people gathered to protest Prime Minister Koizumi’s support of the revengeful war in Afghanistan by the United States, just 10 percent of the crowds that gathered in 1960 to protest revision of the security treaty or in the 1970s to protest Japanese complicity in the Vietnam War. However disappointing this was to the organizers, the numbers declined further. In 2002, only three gatherings attracted more than 10,000 participants, and the Japanese protest of the Iraq invasion in 2003 paled in comparison to that in the world’s other democracies. By 2004, anti-war protests focused on the US bases, but the pacifists were more out of step, and more marginalized, than ever. As we shall see, they were even beginning to cede leadership of the anti-base movement to the right (Richard J Samuels, 2007: 137).

**Political Debates in Japan over Anti-Militarism**

Japan’s defeat in World War II was devastating. Over two and a half million Japanese had lost their lives in the course of the struggle; its cities were ruined; it was the target of atomic bombing; and for the first time in its recorded history it was conquered by a foreign power. The defeat had de-legitimated Japan’s prewar regime and its expansionist ideology. By the end of 1945, the dream of building a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere under Japanese control had turned to ashes and the average Japanese citizen was completely absorbed in the task of merely staying alive.

Over the course of the 1950s, the centrist position basically won out in the Japanese policymaking process. The urgent task of rebuilding the economy, the need to end the U.S. occupation as soon as possible, and the necessity of U.S. cooperation to achieve these goals allowed no other course of action but alignment with the West in the intensifying atmosphere of the Cold War. At the same time, widespread fears of a militarist revival, anxiety that over involvement in the U.S. alliance might drag Japan into a land war in Asia, and unwillingness to divert resources from economic reconstruction
compelled the Japanese political leadership (mainly LDP) to keep its military commitments to the minimum.

The centrist position was associated with the Yoshida Doctrine, named after centrist Prime Minister Yoshida who had led the country in the early 1950s. While the Yoshida Doctrine was never clearly defined, its main elements included close alignment with the United States (even at the cost of Japan’s traditional ties to mainland Asia), a focusing of national energies on economic pursuits, and the maintenance of a minimal military establishment for the purposes of maintaining domestic security and satisfying U.S. demands for burden sharing. This doctrine, in somewhat more clearly articulated and developed form, continues as the basis for Japan’s defense policy today.

Despite the evident rationality of the Yoshida Doctrine in light of the international environment, in the beginning, domestic support for it was narrow. The centrists were seriously challenged by both the left idealists, who dominated the opposition parties and had strong mass appeal, and by the right idealists, who were particularly strong within the conservative parties. After the creation of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, the centrists temporarily lost control of government. Under Prime Ministers Hatoyama and Kishi, the right idealists tried to lay the groundwork for a major expansion of the armed forces, a reversal of some of the more intense pressure that the United States, especially John Foster Dulles, placed on Japan, and a fostering of national pride (John Dower, 1985: 131-35).

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which became the Social Democratic Party in 1996 remained the main supporter of anti-militarism in Japan. The JSP was the largest opposition party in Japan during the cold war. It often opposed the LDP’s defense policy by championing unarmed neutrality with a specific focus on the abolition of the US-Japan security treaty, preservation of Japan’s peace constitution, and elimination of the existing SDF. The JSP even claimed that the SDF is unconstitutional. The JSP, particularly in 1950s, had a strong base among not only the workers and intellectuals but also among other sections of society. After 1960, its influence was reduced as its policies
and philosophy could not inspire more people. The decline was more visible in the post-cold war era. The number of seats the JSP gained in the lower house elections fell from 136 in 1990 to 70 in 1993 and then to 15 in 1996 and 6 in 2003.

The 1990s witnessed major changes in the Japanese politics. The LDP lost power in 1993 for the first time in its history due to an internal split and the emergence of a coalition of most opposition parties and a group of politicians who defected the LDP. With Morihiro Hosokawa, the former governor from Kumamoto prefecture and the head of the Japan New Party, as the Prime Minister candidate, the JSP joined the anti-LDP coalition. Policy differences were ignored to oust LDP from power. Eventually, the JSP ended up paying a huge price for making the coalition government as it could not convince other partners to divert from LDP formulated security and foreign policy. JSP had to compromise on several issues including the US–Japan Security Treaty and JSDF. Despite being in government, the JSP could not oppose a bill that allowed a dispatch of SDF airplanes in order to rescue Japanese people facing military conflicts in overseas. The government led by the JSP did not last long and entered into a coalition with its arch rival LDP in 1994 to form a coalition government under the socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama.

It was clear indication that the JSP has back tracked from its ideology of pacifism and unarmed neutrality. In July 1994, Prime Minister Murayama announced in the lower house that the US–Japan alliance was indispensable for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. He also acknowledged that the JSDF (of which he was the commander-in-chief) was constitutional (Akitoshi Miyashita, 2007: 113-14).

After the LDP regained majority in the lower house, its honeymoon with the JSP ended, leaving little political space for the latter even in the opposition. In 2001, the JSP adopted a new security guideline, which was to abolish the US–Japan Security Treaty, arguing that with the end of the Cold War the treaty is no more required. It also called for a reduction of the SDF (The Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2001). Akitoshi Miyashita (2007) argues that the JSP stance towards anti-militarism changes and becomes more aggressive.
depending on its distance from the power. Similar policy line is followed by the Komeito. Akitoshi Miyashita further stresses on the fact that since it joined the LDP and the Liberal Party to form a coalition government in 1998, it has altered its position on security issues, including the US–Japan alliance and rearmament.

Indeed, once in power, the Komeito became more supportive of Japan’s stronger military ties with the United States and a larger role for Japan’s SDFs in both abroad and at home. Without the backing of the Komeito, for example, the LDP could not have been able to pass the bills that allowed the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Like the Socialists, the Komeito has abandoned its earlier position to stay in power. The episode of the JSP’s and Komeito’s security policy illustrates the essence of Japan’s postwar pacifism: norms are inseparable from underlying power and interests relations. Just as the ‘comfortable’ status as a permanent opposition allowed the JSP to sustain its pacifist principles, the peace and prosperity Japan enjoyed under the American hegemony made it possible for Japan to develop and maintain the culture of antimilitarism that constructivists claim has shaped Japan’s security policy (p. 115).

The opposition, particularly, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has become stronger in Japan in the past few years. In the November 2003 election, the DPJ managed to pick up 40 new seats, winning 177 of the 480 seats in the lower house of Parliament. Liberal Democratic Party dropped to 237 seats, only able to retain control through alliance with other parties. The DPJ has emerged as the most prominent critic of the government’s decision to dispatch troops to Iraq, especially after the July, 2007 Upper House elections. Japan’s current involvement in Iraq has triggered new debates over the constitutionality and legality of the government’s action. Public debate has resulted in various rallies being staged throughout Japan. The organizing bodies behind these rallies have mainly included Japanese Trade Unionists, the opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan and the Social Democratic Party. There have also been a small number of citizen groups involved. Comparatively, however, the Japanese protest movements have remained a token gesture in comparison to similar types of peace demonstrations visible in other major capitals across the world (The Japan Times, December 10, 2003).

Komeito, the political party established in 1964 with the backing of an influential Buddhist organization in Japan, once held a pacifist security stance, which included preserving Japan’s peace constitution, opposing rearmament, and terminating US–Japan security treaty in the long run.
The reemergence of the opposition in the Japanese politics has halted the ongoing process of constitution revision and reversed the direction of what the government pledged for providing assistance in Iraq to assist US forces. The Japanese government has pulled back its refueling ships from the Indian Ocean, giving in to the popular sentiment of the people.\textsuperscript{26} The domestic issues are still more important than Japan’s international commitments and stature. The pull back this time from the Indian Ocean has proved that although the anti-militarism lobby is not that strong, other domestic as well as international factors possess control over Japanese assertive policies and designs.

The following chapter titled, “Trend towards Remilitarization in Japan: Post-September 11 Developments” is an attempt to conceptualize militarization, to see difference between demilitarization and remilitarization. Critical evaluation of this much debated topic and the US-Japan military alliance is part of the discourse endorsed by the shift in public opinion and government policies after September 11. Recent laws and changes indicate that the nation is clearly remilitarized and all set to move further on, if not revive its prewar militarism.

\textsuperscript{26} For details of debates over Constitutional amendment and assisting US and allies in the Iraq see Chapter 5.