Chapter One

Security Perception and Constructivism: A New Approach to Analyse China-India Relations

By introducing the arguments of Constructivism, this chapter will set up a theoretical foundation for the entire research. It will illustrate the relationship between security perception and constructivism, how this theory will be applied to the following analysis and what kind of limitations it has. On this basis, it will further construct a concrete framework of analysis by elaborating both the contents and the parameters of security perception.

1.1 Security Perception and Wendt’s Constructivism: the Effects of Ideas on International Relations

To answer the question why security perception is preferred as a variable to analyse China-India relations, it is necessary to first turn to international relations (IR) theory. In the semantic sense, perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organising sensory information (The Online Free Dictionary), while idea is defined as something “that potentially or actually exists in the mind as a product of mental activity.” (The American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language 2000) Therefore, perception and idea are treated as synonyms by many disciplines including international studies. Security perception is hereby a state actor’s ideas about security, i.e. its recognition and interpretation of security. Since security perception is an idea or a strategic culture of nations, it is necessary to find out what kind of role ideas play in international politics.
Realism and Liberalism have long occupied preeminent positions in IR theory. Realists, from Morgenthau's classical Realism to Waltz's Neorealism, have explained the world in terms of power and interest, "with power understood ultimately as military capability and interest as an egoistic desire for power, security, or wealth." (Wendt 1999: 92) Liberalism covers a more broad perspective ranging from Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace thesis. Liberal thought postulates, that states are but one actor in world politics, while other actors such as Transnational Corporations, the IMF and the United Nations also play a role. Since the 1980s, the main academic debates of IR theory have been dominated by the debate between Waltz's Neorealism and Keohane's Neoliberal Institutionalism⁷. In his book, *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz combines a micro-economic approach to the international system with Realists' traditional emphasis on power and interest, suggesting that international structure has effects on state's behaviour. (Waltz 1979) While conceding the importance of power and interest, Keohane argues that international institutions also play a significant role in international politics, since they could dampen, if not entirely displace, the effects of power and interest. (Keohane 1984) Therefore, the basic difference between Neorealists and Neoliberalists lies on the relative weight of power and interest, and at times, their debate "seems to come down to no more than a discussion about the frequency with which states pursue relative rather than absolute gains." (Wendt 1999: 3)

According to the above mainstream of IR theory, power, interest and institutions have together become 'the three factors' that explain most of the variance in international outcomes. (Wendt 1999: 92) The isomorphic tendency between Neorealism and Neoliberalism has blocked the development of IR theory. To break their long-term dominance or even "hegemony", in the mid-1980s, a fourth factor,
"idea", was introduced and emphasised by some IR scholars. Scholars like Nicholas Onuf (1989), Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) and Alexander Wendt (1987: 335-370) explored constructivism, fundamentally a social theory, in the context of international relations. The end of the Cold War has especially provided more room for the enhancement of this school, since mainstream IR theory fell short of providing satisfactory explanations for the drastic changes in world politics. For example, both Neorealists and Neoliberalists have difficulties in explaining why various partnerships were established among major powers after the Cold War. According to their respective hypotheses, the international system is by nature a self-help anarchy, in which cooperation among intrinsically self-interested state actors is impossible. As Wendt said in his most significant work, *Social Theory of International Relations* (1999), “the revival of constructivist thinking about international politics was accelerated by the end of the Cold War, which caught scholars on all sides off guard but left orthodoxies looking particularly exposed. Mainstream IR theory simply had difficulty explaining the end of the Cold War, or systemic change more generally.” (Wendt 1999: 4) Thanks to this book, which provides a comprehensive framework of constructivist IR theory, Wendt not only has strengthened his position as the leading theorist of this school but also contributed to enshrining constructivism as one of the three predominant schools of thought in international relations, along with realism and liberalism.

Wendt’s constructivism challenges the fundamental assumption held by both Neorealism and Neoliberalism that national interest and anarchy should be taken as given in international politics. It emphasises the role of shared ideas in international interaction, the implications of cultures in the international system, and the importance of the structure in constituting the identities and interests of the state. (Qin 2001: 264) The following are the four basic arguments by Wendt:
First, national interests are constituted mostly by ideas. In IR scholarship national interests are normally defined as needs or the reproduction requirements of states, which consist of life, liberty and property, i.e., physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being. Hypothesising that these interests are “rooted in some combination of human nature, anarchy, and/or brute material capabilities,” Realists assume that states are inherently self-interested or egoistic. States are power-, security-, and/or wealth-seekers by nature accordingly, while the international system is by definition a self-help system. Realists believe that states do what they do because it is in their national interest. Therefore, interest and power are the only proper variables or factors to explain international politics. Neoliberalists also assume that self-interest is the core of the national interest, while admitting that ideas and institutions, independent of power and interest, can explain a substantial proportion of state action. (Wendt 1999: 113, 114, 130, 135, 234, 235, 239)

Wendt rejects the fully material-oriented interpretation of national interest. He argues that interest involves not only an actor’s intrinsic desire but also its belief based on cognition and deliberation. Interest is not “mind independent” but constituted by the “perception of value” that is learned through “socialization to culture”. Interest refers to what actors want, and “we want what we want because of how we think about it.” Like mankind, therefore, states are not inherently selfish or power-seeking. Human nature does not tell us whether people are good or bad, aggressive or pacific, power-seeking or power-conferring, even selfish or altruistic. These are all socially contingent, not materially essential. Human beings are animals whose material needs are a key constituting element of their interests, but in the end their interests are mostly a function of their ideas, not their genes. This is no less true of states. States, no matter they are status quo, revisionist or collectivist, define their interests by virtue of their perceptions of the international order and their place within it, rather than any egoistic or altruistic intrinsic desire. (Wendt 1999: 115-130, 133, 231).
Second, the structure of the international system is a “distribution of ideas” rather than a “distribution of capabilities”. For Waltz the nature of international politics is shaped by power relations. He assumes that the distribution of capabilities is the only variable dimension of international structure. When IR scholars today use the word structure, they almost always imply Waltz’s definition. Wendt rejects this proposition by emphasising that the meaning of the distribution of power in international politics is first constituted in important part by the distribution of interests. The nature of the international structure does not depend on the number and size of major powers but the interests of members in the system. In other words, what states want matters more than how powerful they are. The nature of structure (or the logic of anarchy) can vary when states have different interests. The logic of anarchy among revisionist states takes the form of a fight to the death; among status quo states, arms racing and some brawls; among collectivist states, perhaps heated but ultimately non-violent arguments about burden sharing. Since Wendt assumes interests are ideas, he further argues that the structure of international system is a distribution of ideas. (Wendt 1999: 93-113) He believes that “ideas usually are far more important... if we want to say a small number of big and important things about world politics we would do better to focus first on states’ ideas and the interests they constitute, and only then worry about who has how many guns.” For the US, for instance, five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening than five North Korean ones, because the US believes that North Korea has the will to use them against it whereas Britain does not. (Wendt 1999: 256)

Third, the structure of international politics is not by nature a self-help system but can have multiple logics. The Neorealists believe that, in a world composed of egoistic states, anarchy is the only structure characterised by self-help that tends to produce military competition, balances of power, and war. Against this Wendt argues
that the definition of anarchy is no more than the absence of centralised authority in
the international system. There is no inevitable relationship between anarchy and
conflict. Anarchy is actually an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic. The logic of
anarchy depends on "what we put inside" it. Here comes the well-known assumption
by Wendt: anarchy is what states make of it. The interaction among state actors
generates shared ideas (or culture); then these shared ideas constitute the structure of
anarchy. The material polarity of the international system matters, for example, but
how it matters depends on whether the poles are friends or enemies, which is a
function of shared ideas. (Wendt 1999: 24, 249)

Anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure, based on what kind of roles\(^\circ\) –
enemy, rival, and friend – dominate the system. Wendt calls these structures
Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In the Hobbesian culture states see each other as
enemies, who will observe no limits in their violence toward each other. As a result,
the logic of this anarchy is the "war of all against all" in which actors operate on the
principle of kill or be killed. The Hobbesian structure is a truly self-help system. In
the Lockean culture states treat each other as rivals who will use violence sometimes
to advance their interests or settle disputes but refrain from killing each other. The
logic of this anarchy is "live and let live". There is a shared expectation that states
will recognise each other's right to life and liberty, i.e., sovereignty. In contrast to the
Hobbesian anarchy, the Lockean structure is self-restraint rather than self-help. In the
Kantian culture states perceive each other as friends who will not use violence to
settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats. The logic of this
anarchy is perpetual peace or "all for one, one for all". Mutual aid is the feature of
this structure. (Wendt 1999: 246-312)

\(^\circ\) Each involves a distinct posture or orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence.
Roles, therefore, are here structural positions and exist only in relation to the Others. See Wendt (1999: 227-229,
257-259).
Flowing from the above discussion, the three cultures of anarchy can be placed in a tabular form for facilitating comparison: (See Table 1)

Table 1  Three Cultures of Anarchy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Hobbesian</th>
<th>Lockean</th>
<th>Kantian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Enemy (unlimited aggressive intentions, not recognising the Self’s right to life and liberty at all, ‘deep’ revisionism, unlimited violence)</td>
<td>Rival (limited aggressive intentions, recognising the Self’s right to life and liberty, ‘shallow’ revisionism, self-restraint violence)</td>
<td>Friend (non-violence, team play)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic of Anarchy</td>
<td>Kill or be killed. (War of all against all)</td>
<td>Live and let live.</td>
<td>Perpetual peace. (All for one, one for all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>Self-restraint (in part Self-help, in part Other-help)</td>
<td>Mutual aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendencies (generated by the structure)</td>
<td>(1) Endemic and unlimited warfare;</td>
<td>(1) Limited warfare, since warfare is simultaneously accepted and constrained;</td>
<td>(1) Pluralistic security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) The elimination of ‘unfit’ actors;</td>
<td>(2) The system can have a relatively stable membership or low death rate over time;</td>
<td>(2) Collective security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) States powerful enough to avoid elimination will balance each other’s power;</td>
<td>(3) States will balance power, and balancing is more of an effect of the mutual recognition of sovereignty;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) The system will tend to suck all of its members into the fray, making non-alignment or neutrality very difficult.</td>
<td>(4) Neutrality or non-alignment becomes a recognised status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the establishment of Westphalian system in the seventeenth century, international politics has experienced a qualitative structural change, from Hobbesian

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9 Members of a community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes by negotiation, arbitration, or the courts. See Wendt (1999: 299-300).

9 When the security of any one member of the system is threatened by aggression all members are supposed to come to its defence even if their own individual security is not at stake. See Wendt (1999: 300).
to Lockean. "In the late twentieth century," he believes, "the international system is undergoing another structural change, to a Kantian culture of collective security." (Wendt 1999: 314) "Even if there is no guarantee" of such an end, he further points out, "at least" the international time is unlikely to move backward. (Wendt 1999: 250-251)

Fourth, the structure of international politics also has constitutive effects on states. Wendt claims that there is an interaction between actors and social structure. The interactions between state actors constitute the anarchic structure; the international system in turn constitutes states. Since Neorealists and Neoliberalists treat interests as given, they assume that only the behaviour of states is affected by system structure. In contrast, Wendt proposes that anarchic structures do affect state identities and interests as well as their behaviour. As elements of structure, states will be under pressure to internalise the corresponding role – enemy, rival, or friend – in their identities and interests. In short, culture (or shared ideas) has become part of the background knowledge in terms of which states define their national interests. For example, in a Lockean culture, states normally define their interests according to the internalised sovereignty norms, i.e., recognising the Other’s right to life and liberty. That just explains why small states have not only survived but thrived in the modern history of international politics. Thanks to the interaction between structure and its elements, culture (or shared ideas) becomes "a self-fulfilling prophecy". Once the cultural formation known as the "Cold War" was in place, the US and Soviets had a shared belief that they were enemies. This shared ideas or culture helped constitute their identities and interests in any given situation, which they in turn acted upon in ways that confirmed to the Other that they were a threat, reproducing the Cold War. (Wendt 1999: 184-189, 247-250)

By challenging the given factors (such as interests and anarchy) determined by
mainstream IR theory Constructivism is trying to redefine the agenda of IR studies. This is precisely the most significant contribution it has made to the IR theory. Most schools of mainstream IR theory have taken rational choice theory as the starting point of their studies. Like classical economics, they have treated states as "economists" who will always try their best to maximise their gains. (Qin 2001: 258) In doing so they have assumed that the international system is a single anarchy composed of state actors who are born egoists. They have thereby neglected the social feature of the international system and its elements. Wendt's constructivism, in contrast, attributes human qualities to state actors and pays significant attention to the ways in which these actors are socially constructed. In recent years constructivism is gaining weight among quantities of critique. Although a consensus has not been reached that constructivism is better than Neorealism or Neoliberalism in terms of explaining international politics, constructivism is at least broadly "permitted" to join the mainstream group, and some scholars have even started talking about the possible transformation of IR studies: from rationalism to constructivism. (Checkel 1998: 324-348) To comment on the position of constructivism in contemporary IR theory is not the objective of this thesis, but this author agrees with Wendt that his theory "makes a difference for thinking about international politics." (Wendt 1999: 2) This is the reason why this author has chosen constructivism as the basic theoretical foundation for the ensuing analysis of China-India relations.

As mentioned earlier, constructivism emphasises the interaction between state actors and the international system, which forms a mutually constructed process accordingly. Based on this argument, Wendt further claims that ideas play a more significant role in international politics than normally imagined, although they are "not all the way down". This author fully accepts this assumption of Wendt, but two points should still be clarified as follows. One, to accept the importance of ideas does
not mean the rejection of the significance of power and interest. As Wendt points out, his claim does not mean that a substantial proportion of state action can be explained by ideas rather than power and interest. (Wendt 1999: 135) From his point of view, power and interest are just as important and determining as before, but “their meaning and effects depend on actors’ ideas”. (Wendt 1999: 25) The relationship between ideas and power or interest is actually a philosophical issue of ontology. It is obviously beyond the scope of this work. In this thesis, therefore, this author mainly wants to emphasise that more attention should be paid to the role of ideas in international politics, and not go beyond that. When looking back at the studies of China-India relations that have been dominated by the traditional analytical framework, this author has found it imperative to deal with the role of security perception, which is an idea or a strategic culture, in this relationship. Two, in practice, no IR theory can claim to provide a full-fledged explanation of international politics. Some schools such as Neorealism and Neoliberalism can only claim to have done better than the others. This is no less true of constructivism. To choose constructivism as a starting point of this research only means that this author believes that constructivism provides a better alternative explanation of international politics. It does not mean that constructivism is the only possible one. As mentioned above, idea is the ‘fourth’ factor of international studies, apart from power, interest and institutions. It is not possible to put everything within one study. This author does not deny the traditional analytical frameworks of the studies of China-India relations, normally based on either Realism or Liberalism, or their outcomes, nor does the author privilege this analysis as superior to the others. The intention is to suggest a new approach or perspective, namely, security perception, which has seldom been discussed in the past.

While being cautious about Wendt’s assumption on ontology, this author will furthermore, not fully adopt his methodology. Although Wendt proposes that state
actors and the international system are mutually constituted, he seems to emphasise the international system's constitutive effects on states, rather than the other way around. He claims that a key feature of constructivism is holism, "the view that social structures have effects that cannot be reduced to agents and their interactions." (Wendt 1999: 138) Since "the ideas held by individual states are given content or meaning by the ideas which they share with other states—that state cognition depends on states systemic culture," he argues, "in analysing what states think it makes sense to start with the culture of the international system and work top-down, rather than start with unit-level perceptions and work bottom-up." (Wendt, 1999: 372)

The nature of Wendt's constructivism underlies his preference for this top-down methodology. As mentioned above, a significant contribution of Wendt to IR theory is that he problematises one of the latter's basic assumptions that anarchy is a given logic of the international system. In his book Wendt suggests that the international anarchy can have at least three kinds of logic: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In a world with single given anarchy, there is no need to pay too much attention to its effects on its elements. These effects are always clear and relatively static. When there is more than one logic, however, the situation will become complicated, and there is a lot of work to do in this regard. IR scholars who have not paid sufficient attention to the structure's effects on states, therefore, should do more of the "top-down" work. This author will follow this logic and deal with the effects of the end of the Cold War© on the respective security perceptions of China and India. As a mainstream IR theory now, however, constructivism should provide more theoretical perspectives and be more widely applied. This author hereby suggests that, although Wendt says his three kinds of structure are at the macro-level, it can also explain how mutual perceptions are constituted between two nations. In sum, in this thesis, the analysis is not about working "top-down" or "bottom-up", but an international

© This author agrees basically with Wendt that a structural change (i.e. a cultural change in the international society) started to emerge after the end of the Cold War. This will be further elaborated upon later.
structural theory is utilised to explain bilateral relations.

1.2 Agenda of Security Perception

While constructivism provides an answer to the question how perception or idea is relevant in explaining international relations, it does not go further in elaborating what security perception is exactly about. However, the literature of international politics has no dearth of discussions on "security", a core concept of international studies. As Wendt points out, traditional mainstream political science has made valuable explorations into perception. Both however depart on the issue of the role perception plays in international relations. (Wendt 1999: 93-96) Therefore, in the following, this research tries to develop a concrete analytical framework on basis of the hitherto relevant studies on security perception.

1.2(1) Security and Security Perception

Generally speaking, security perception is a state actor's ideas about security. Before going further one must address a basic question: what is security? In a world where every state regards security as its fundamental concern, the term "security" seems to be usually left as an axiom, which means that everyone knows what it is about. When looking into literature of international relations, however, one may find that the definition of security is so complex and ambiguous that there is not a fixed definition at all. Most dictionaries and encyclopedias basically define "security" in the following ways: 1) as a psychological feature or a feeling, security is freedom from anxiety or fear; 2) as a condition or a status, security is the state of being free from danger or injury; 3) as a measure or an act, security is protection or defense against threats. (The Free Online Dictionary; Malec 2003: 6) In IR scholarship security is generally defined in similar ways. Numerous definitions have been
provided and “each one emphasizes different aspects”. (Khanyile 2003: 19) The followings are some well-known definitions of security that have respectively enjoyed a certain support.

• Ian Bellany: “Security itself is a relative freedom from war coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.” (Bellany 1981: 102)

• John E. Marz: “Security is relative freedom from harmful threats.” (Marz 1980: 105)

• Arnold Wolfers: Security is a value “of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measures. It has much in common, in this respect, with power or wealth, two other values of great importance in international affairs. But while wealth measures the amount of a nation’s material possessions, and power its ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” (Wolfers 1962: 150)

• Bernard Brodie: Security is a “derivative value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy.” (Brodie 1949: 477)

• Jules Comban: “Security means more indeed than the maintenance of a people’s homeland, or even of their territories beyond these seas. It means the maintenance of the world’s respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interest, every thing in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself of the nation.”
Among the above definitions, with John E. Marz defining security as condition, Ian Bellany and Arnold Wolfers emphasise both state and feeling, while Bernard Brodie and Jules Comban talks about ability, i.e., guarantee of security. Barry Buzan cites several reasons for the "conceptual underdevelopment of security". The first is simply that the idea has proved too complex to be explained. The second lies in the scope for overlap between it and the concept of power. The third is due to the vague boundary between security studies and strategic studies. The fourth is the consequence of the efforts by the practitioners of state policy to maintain its symbolic ambiguity. (Buzan 1987: 6-9) After the end of the Cold War, the vagueness of the term "security" actually increased as new paradigms emerged to approach the new security challenges. Although the debate on the meaning of security gets more heated, scholars have at least reached one consensus that it is imperative for the security studies to have a clear agenda. A large amount of literature in recent years on the redefinition of the agenda or the framework of security studies has reflected this consensus.

The ambiguity of the concept of security is also manifested in the context of its connection with "national security". In IR literature, "security" and "national security" are sometimes, and in most cases, used interchangeably as if they are synonymous. (Khanyile 2003: 19) Some IR scholars even take it for granted that the term "security" in security studies refers to "national security". According to the evolution of security studies, the relationship between these two concepts actually depends on the extent to which national security is defined.

The traditional approach, which characterises the period before and during the Cold War, refers to national security as the security of the state and narrowly concentrates
on military threats. According to Walter Lippmann, national security is closely
associated with the ability of a nation to deter an attack or to defend itself
successfully if attacked. As he put it, security meant that "a nation is secure to the
extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to
avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war".
(Lippmann 1943: 51, as cited in Rehman 1992: 4) This overwhelmingly military
character of security is based on the assumption that principal threats to security
come from beyond the border of a nation. (Rehman 1992: 4) In this classical view,
therefore, national security is a "derivative" of security or a branch of security.
(Khanyile 2003: 19)

The modern approach, which characterises the period after the end of the Cold War,
has extended the concept of national security beyond the above scope and defines it
in a holistic sense. Apart from military concerns and national perspective, it covers
almost all the non-military aspects and non-state factors of security, from economic
security to environmental security, and from societal security to human security. In
this case there is no difference between national security and overall security.
Security is only an abbreviation of national security. In the view of this author, there
is another significant reason for regarding these two terms as one concept. The end
of the Cold War has not changed the fact that states are the dominant actors in
contemporary world politics, and the state-centrism still characterises the mainstream
IR theories as a result. This state-centrism in security studies, therefore, has justified
the homogeneity between security and national security.

The lack of a common understanding of the concept of security underscores the
difficulty for this thesis to develop its arguments and discussions on the one hand; it
compels this author to above all develop a specific agenda of analysis on the other.
As security is basically defined in terms of status, scope and ability, security
perception may accordingly involve the following three aspects: threat perception, types of security, and approaches to security.

1.2(2) Agenda of Security Perception

Threat Perception

Threat perception is a “process of appraisal” and judgment of the status or condition of security. (Raymond Cohen 1979: 79-80) It is “above all a cognitive construct which creates an image of reality as a hypothesis”. (Malec 2003: 15) According to Raymond Cohen, the perception of threat should be understood as anticipation on the part of an observer – the decision maker – of impending harm (usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind) to the state. (Raymond Cohen 1979: 5)

While Raymond Cohen considers threat as impending harm to the state, in IR literature, threat, like security, is also an ambiguous concept. Taking all the above definitions of security into account, one may find that security is always defined in terms of threat, no matter how distinct these definitions are. Richard Ullman simply offers a definition of security by describing the relations between threat and national security. He assumes that “a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threaten significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within a state.” (Ullman 1983: 135) Klaus Knorr says that threats either may be “actual”, that is inferred from more or less definite signal or intent, or “potential”, that is inferred from some state or the environment or the mere capability of an opponent. (Knorr in Knorr 1976: 78)
state (or a group of states) has both the intention and capability to circumscribe the
security of another state. (Haftendorn et al 1999: 2) For Wendt, however, intention
matters more than capability, just as discussed earlier. Although the introduction of
the term “threat” into the definition of security has not made any change of the
uncertain nature of security, it offers an indicator or a parameter of security. For
instance, analysis of a particular threat or group of threats allows us to examine the
area of security that is threatened (Malec 2003: 13), helping us have a better
understanding of security as a result. Therefore, threat perception is a part and an
indicator of security perception. This author postulates that how China or India
assesses the threat facing it will to a great extent reflect its security perception, and
any change of its threat perception will to a large degree mirror the change of its
security perception.

Threat identification of a nation depends on its scope determination of security, i.e.,
types of security. For example, if a nation views security only in a military sense, it
usually identifies the threat facing it within the same area. This happened in the past,
especially during the Cold War, when security and threat referred mainly to political
and military aspects. According to David Singer, threat arises out of a situation of
armed hostility, in which each body of policymakers assumes that the other
entertains aggressive designs; each side further assumes that such a design will be
pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seem to outweigh estimated
losses. (Singer 1958: 93-94) Since the end of the Cold War, as scope of security
extends to economic and other non-traditional aspects, these have drawn a lot of
attention of state actors.

Types of Security

If threat identification of a nation depends on its scope determination of security,
conversely, how a state actor identifies the threat facing it reflects its determination on types of security. Types of security are the sectors or dimensions of security classified by the character of threats. As mentioned above, before and during the Cold War, the traditional approach narrowly concentrated on the military threats and the sovereignty of the state. In fact, security experts at that time did not pay much attention to the types of security, because they had taken the military and political characters of security for granted. Some scholars, like Walter Lippmann, as mentioned above, even tried to define “security” primarily in these terms. After the end of the Cold War, however, sectors of security broadened dramatically as a result of the emergence of many “new” threats, like environmental threats and terrorism. To be accurate, to call these threats “new” does not mean that they did not exist before and during the Cold War but refers to the “new” characters “that previously had not been perceived, or were given little attention.” (Malec 2003: 1) According to the recent security literature, military security and political security are generally classified as “traditional security,” while the others as “non-traditional security.” Security is thus now being examined in the following typology:

(1) Military security. Military security is freedom from military threats. This type of security constitutes the core of traditional security perception, as “military threats occupy the traditional heart of national security concerns.” (Buzan 1987: 75) Military threats are predicated on the fear that another state or group of states could use military force to subjugate the incumbent government, and armed forces are believed to be the only means to counter military action. (Khanyile 2003: 29) Military threats are of many types. At the extreme end are threats of invasion and occupation aimed at obliterating the state. Military threats may also be of punitive nature whose objective, usually, is to force a change in government policy rather than to seize territory or to overturn institutions. Military threats may also be indirect, in the sense that they are not applied directly to the state itself but aim at its external
interests, like threats to allies, shipping lanes, or strategically placed territories. (Buzan 1987: 75-76)

(2) Political security. Political security is freedom from political threats. The core of this sector is about non-military threats to state sovereignty. Normally the target of political threats is supposed to be the idea of the state, particularly its organising ideology, and the institutions which express it. (Ibid: 76) In other words, the objectives of political threats are, first, against the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which relates to ideologies and other issues defining the state, and second, against the external position of the state and its external legitimacy. (Buzan et al 1998: 144) Political threats traditionally stem from ideological competition, cultural penetration and secessionism fomentation. Cultivating an anti-ideology, as the Americans have done with anti-communism and the Soviets with anti-imperialism during the Cold War, may constitute a political threat to the state that represents this ideology. Both intended and unintended cultural exports may produce political threats to local cultural tradition, especially to those that are weak or small. Secessionism fomentation involves such political activities as propaganda support for secessionist groups of the rival state, and from there into the funding and creation of such groups, all the way up to the military training and arms aid to rebels. (Buzan 1987: 76-77) Political threats “are not less significant than military threats as ignorance of political threats may drastically hamper the security of a nation”. (Rehman 1992: 10)

(3) Economic security. Economic security is the top sector of security perceptions after the end of the Cold War. Attention drawn by the “comprehensive power” and development of the economic globalisation have dramatically increased the significance of economic security. As meaningful participation in the global

Sometimes dissident groups are included.
economy has become the ultimate objective of every state, increased economic competition could increasingly expose the country to various threats and vulnerabilities, like the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, while increased commercial interactions between states do generate growth and wealth. (Khanyile 2003: 31-32) According to Barry Buzan, economic security refers to “access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.” (Buzan 1991: 19) Economic threats include all those activities that could hamper the state’s economic growth and erode citizens’ standard of living. (Khanyile 2003: 32) The objective of a state’s economic security is to ensure access to global markets, continuity of supply of essential resources and to buffer vulnerability to turbulent global market changes. (Buzan 1991: 237-242) Energy security is therefore a part of economic security.

(4) Societal security. Societal security is about identity problem that may threaten the organisational stability of social order: state, system of government, and ideology that gives the state and the government legitimacy. Societal security is so closely related to political security that it used to be regarded as an aspect of political security. After the end of the Cold War, as civil wars and regional conflicts caused by identity crises like ethnic competition and religious quarrel increased dramatically, the salience of societal security has emerged to such a extent that it is being dealt with as an independent sector of security. According to Waever, there is a significant distinction between the terms “social” and “societal,” as each of them refers to different aspects of identity. Social security, therefore, refers to individuals and the economic aspects of their life, whereas societal security refers to collectives and their identity. (Waever et al 1993) The most common issues concerned with societal security are migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition. Migration may bring about a shift in the composition of the population, which may threaten the identity of the indigenous people. Horizontal competition designates that people
change their ways of thinking because of overriding cultural and linguistic influence from a neighbouring culture (e.g., Canadian fears of Americanisation). Vertical competition prescribes that people will stop seeing themselves as one group because of the process of integration (e.g., the EU), or because of a secessionist "regionalist" process (e.g., Quebec, Catalonia, and Kurdistan). (Malec 2003: 40-41)

(5) Environmental Security. Environmental security “concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” (Buzan 1991: 19-20) The threat posed by environmental factors to human survival was not largely recognised until 1972 when the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held. Environmental threats are very broad and complex, ranging from scarcities of clean air and water, fuel and arable land, degradations of lands, forests and fisheries, to impacts of climate change and population growth. (Malec 2003: 41-42) Most of the threats stem from human activities. Industrialization in significant part plays a role in such phenomena as global warming, ozone depletion and acid rain. Nuclear accidents (for instance, the meltdown of the Chernobyl reactor) or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may lead to man-made environmental disasters. Environmental security can be a cause of political instability and conflict. For example, the scarcity of water in the Middle East is cited as one reason for worsening of Arab-Israeli conflict and a future war. (Gautam in Prasad 2002: 115-116) Though there are still heated debates on the security relevance of environmental variables (Malec 2003: 42), it may be generally accepted that the higher the potential severity and durability of the impact of man-made biospheric imbalance, the higher the chances that such an imbalance would be regarded as a security threat. (Khanyile 2003: 31)

(6) Terrorism. Terrorism is a sector of security directly named after the threat, though there is no international consensus on the definition of terrorism so far.
According to Walter Laqueur, terrorism is "the substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change." (Laqueur 1996: 24) There are two features of terrorism that distinguish it from other acts of violence: political goals usually lie behind terrorist acts, on one hand; innocent people are the direct target of the violence, on the other. (Li in Yizhou Wang 2002: 1-42) Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and is traditionally perceived as a political threat. It has been known since the mid-1970s, when the world started to get used to it as an unconventional and violent method of gaining "political" goals used by such groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), and many other groups. (Malec 2003: 51) After the end of the Cold War, terrorism has reached a new high because it is considered by the "weaker" as an effective method to coerce the "stronger" into concessions. Terrorism has become a great security challenge for most countries in the world. Terrorism has therefore started to be treated as a separate area in security studies. The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, has further enhanced terrorism's place in many countries' security perceptions, since it revealed the potential and scale of destruction of this asymmetric threat. The United States has announced that terrorism is currently the biggest security challenge to it. As technology advances, terrorism may carry new characters. For example, cyber terrorism could severely threaten a state's national security. Cyber-terrorist threats could inflict considerable damage to both defence and civilian sectors by employing software commands or malicious programs. Such attacks could disable a state's key military computer systems or paralyse its critical infrastructures such as communications, transportation, power systems, and industrial enterprises.

Taking the current situation of security studies into account, it is not possible to discuss all the emerging ramifications of the types of security. There are many
criteria by which security can be categorised. Apart from the above types, security can also be categorised into global, regional, state and individual securities in terms of the levels of the threat's source, symmetric and asymmetric securities in terms of the power gap between the target and the attacker, etc. There are also some emerging conceptions, like "human security," which is still being debated. For the purpose of this thesis, the above broad typology is sufficient. By examining how China and India respectively categorise their own security and how they prioritise these types of security, one may get a better understanding of their respective security perceptions. By exploring the changes in these categorisations and priorities, one may discover the changes in their security perceptions, which as stated at the outset, is the fundamental impetus of the transformation of China-India relations in recent years.

Approaches to Security

Approaches to security are the methods or ways taken by a state in dealing with its security issues to accomplish or preserve its national security. According to Wendt's ideal model of international structure, there are primarily three approaches to security: unilateral security based on the Hobbesian logic of "all against all"; alliance security on the Lockian "live and let live"; and collective security on the Kantian "all against one". These approaches have on the whole represented the ways for security pursued by most countries in the world before the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, and consequent on the great changes concerning threats' structure (as mentioned above) and the lessons that state actors drew from their experiences in the past, especially those in the period of the Cold War, many countries have started seeking, experimenting and promoting new security approaches. Among these numerous and controversial means to security, common security, cooperative security and comprehensive security are the three which have drawn most attention and worth discussing here therefore.
(1) **Self-help security.** This approach originates from the logic of the Hobbesian anarchy, the "war of all against all", in which state actors operate on the principle of kill or be killed. In such a true "self-help" system, actors cannot trust anyone or count on each other. States can only rely on themselves, and survival depends solely on military power. As a result, the state actor sees security as a deeply competitive, zero-sum affair and attempts to establish absolute military superiority by unrestricted expansion of unilateral military power. The big problem of this approach is in terms of a vicious cycle of mistrust, since increases in the security of A necessarily reduce that of B, who can never be sure that A's capabilities are defensive. Therefore, B is compelled to "prepare for the worst" by taking counter-measures to enhance its own power. A security dilemma arises herefrom. (Wendt 1999: 265; Herz 1959: 231-235) Self-help security was broadly implemented during the Cold War, and the all-out arms race between the USA and the Soviet Union was typically characteristic of the security dilemma.

(2) **Alliance security.** According to Wendt, alliance security is made possible by the logic of the Lockean anarchy. Although in the Lockean world there is still no Leviathan that states can count on for security, the system is not self-help all the way down. State actors see each other as rivals which may use violence to settle disputes but do so within "live and let live" limits due to the institution of sovereignty. Although actors still to a great extent believe that they cannot count on each other and they themselves bear the ultimate responsibilities for their own security, the self-restraint nature of the system enables them to ally themselves with those who also have an interest in this alliance. Alliance security is preferred especially when one's own power is insufficient. An alliance is in fact a temporary, mutually expedient arrangement. States in the alliance each feel individually threatened by the same threat. Their collaboration is self-interested and will end when the common
threat is gone. Military power is still important, because allies expect to eventually revert to a condition in which war between them is an option. Therefore, alliance security is usually adopted by actors along with self-help security. This has been characterised by the confrontation between the two blocs during the Cold War, in which both the USA and the Soviet Union attempted to anticipate each other by building up their own power on one hand, and by recruiting allies on the other. Like self-help security, alliance security can also lead to a security dilemma. (Wendt 1999: 229, 301)

(3) Collective security. The introduction of collective security represents a shift away from a competitive, self-help approach to security, to one which is premised on collaboration. (Khanyile 2003: 38) The theoretical genesis of collective security can be traced back to the idea of mutual aid, or ‘all for one, one for all’, advocated by Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace.” (Wendt 1999: 300) IR history has witnessed the implementation of collective security by several concretised institutional frameworks, from the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, through the League of Nations in the 1920s-1940s, to the current United Nations. Externally, collective security means that, when the security of any one member of the system is threatened by aggression, all members are supposed to come to its defence even if their own individual security is not at stake. (Ibid) Internally, collective security implies that disputes within the system will be handled by negotiation or arbitration rather than war or the threat of war. (Ibid: 299-300) According to Wendt, the basic difference between alliances and collective security lies in how the system’s members define each other. Parties to the former treat each other as rivals whose capabilities pose a latent threat to each other, and they collaborate only because that threat is temporarily suppressed by the greater threat of external aggression. Parties to the latter regard each other as friends whose capabilities are believed to be used only on behalf of the collective. (Ibid: 301)
universal system, collective security has been, to certain extent, practised at the regional and sub-regional level, such as NATO after the end of the Cold War, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). (Khanyile 2003: 40) Without a universal consensus on its definition, however, the failure of this approach to prevent World War II, the Cold War and countless regional wars, and the weakness and inefficacy of the current UN, have made it a rather confusing idea and led to heated debates. (Ding in Yan and Zhou 2004: 146)

(4) Common security. The idea was initially introduced in Europe during the Cold War by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which was commonly known as the Palme Commission – named after the Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, who chaired the commission. In 1982, the Palme Commission published a report, claiming that common security refers to “achieving security with others, not against them,” and that security would be best assured through cooperation rather than competitive power politics. (Ibid) In essence, the Palme Commission attempted to verify that “the unilateral self-help security system” was obsolete due to the existence of nuclear weapons, and sought to rid the world of the arms race and nuclear weapons by introducing far-reaching arms control and disarmament. (Khanyile 2003: 48) This idea underlay the activation of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)\(^\text{1}\) in 1980s. After the end of the Cold War, this Euro-centric notion found an echo in Asia-Pacific, when the Canadians and Australians advocated applying it to this region. (Ding in Yan and Zhou 2004: 146) In practice, common security has carried some new characters, with its nucleus shifting from arms control and disarmament to cooperation and dialogue. It is believed that “in the interdependent world, it is impossible for one country to achieve lasting security at the expense of the security of others”. (Budania 2001: 34-35) As countries share greater common security interests and are more

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\(^{1}\) Now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
interdependent on one another for security, they should “respect each other’s interests and concerns and create conditions for others’ security while ensuring their own security”. (Yizhou Wang, 2003)

(5) **Cooperative security.** Cooperative security expands the understanding of security to include non-military issues and emphasises the significance of cooperation rather than competition. The concept can be traced back to the late 1980s, and was first raised by American scholars with a focus on the competitive relations with the former Soviet Union. Then, it was reconceptualized by the Canadians. This approach promotes “consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.” (Snyder in Snyder 1999: 114) For these to materialise, various confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) are introduced. These CSBMs include joint training exercises, demilitarization of common borders, exchange programmes of military personnel and weapon acquisition programmes. (Khanyile 2003: 49) As security goes beyond the military issue, security cooperation should be sufficiently broad to involve political, economic, and other aspects as well. The essence of cooperative security is to shift the emphases of approach to security from contingency reaction to systemic prevention. (Yunling Zhang, 2000) Cooperative security has been broadly implemented both at bilateral level and at regional level. The current bilateral relationship of the major powers, compared with that during the Cold War, is characterised more by the cooperative rather than competitive aspect. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) represents a good example of regional cooperative security.

(6) **Comprehensive security.** The proponents of comprehensive security argue that security is a comprehensive matter far beyond the military dimension. It
intentionally downplays the role of military means with regard to security, and stresses the importance of non-military aspects, such as national development, internal stability and social harmony. Therefore, to safeguard one's national security requires a comprehensive approach: active diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, as well as military preparedness. (Ibid) Originating from the Ohira Administration in Japan in the 1970s, the concept was taken up and strongly advocated by ASEAN countries in the 1980s. Since the end of the Cold War, this approach has played an important role in promoting security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Both the ARF and CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), the major Track I and Track II regional dialogue mechanisms, have discussed and implemented major principles of comprehensive security. (Ding in Yan and Zhou 2004: 147)

Since definition has always been a problem for security studies, there are no clear dividing lines among the above six approaches. Sometimes they share a concrete step, for example CBMs can be implemented in any of the approaches except the first one. Sometimes they share a behavioural principle, for example, the latter two approaches all emphasise the non-military means. Furthermore, in reality, none of them is exclusive for a state actor. In other words, sometimes a state may simultaneously take more than one approach to cope with its security issues. Which approach to security a state will take depends on how it categorises and prioritises its security, and the approach or approaches to security it has taken will, thereafter, determine its national security strategy and policy.

1.2(3) Evolution of International Strategic Culture

The above examination of the hitherto relevant studies on security perception not only helps this research set up an analytical framework but also reveals the evolution of security perception on the macro-level, i.e., from the Cold War mindset to the
post-Cold War new security perspective, or in Wendt’s words, the tendency of structural change or change of international strategic culture.

The first aspect of change comes to the source of threat. Although the Cold War mindset and the new security perspective concur on the point that threat is constituted by both capability and intention, they disagree on the role each of the two factors plays. According to the Cold War mindset, capability plays a major role in the construction of threat, while the intention of a state to obtain benefits through force can be taken for granted. When a state or a group of states has acquired military superiority, it is bound to use force to enlarge its benefits. Therefore, the major threat to a nation’s security is derived from the military superiority of its opponent. As for the new security perspective, intention is far more important than capability. Whether a state poses a threat to the other depends more on its intention than its capability. Weak actors can cause insecurity within strong ones. Although the US has an absolute military superiority over North Korea, the former still worries about the latter’s military capability. Similarly, after the Cold War, many countries consider terrorism as a prominent threat to their national security, even though the military capability of the terrorists is far inferior to that of a nation. (Yan 2005: 162)

Moreover, states are not born aggressive. It is not inevitable that a state with outstanding military capability will entertain aggressive designs. Only with the intention will its military capability carry the nature of threat. Manifestations of this can be seen in the peace among the major powers since the end of the Cold War.

The second aspect of change lies in the categorisation and priorities of security. The Cold War mindset takes the military and political characters of security for granted. It believes that military threats always occupy the heart of national security concerns. As a nation faces a threat due to the military superiority of its opponent, the threat will be greater if the opponent enjoys a divergent ideology. In other words, an
opponent with ideological differences may pose a greater threat to a nation than that posed by a state with the same political system. The new security perspective extends the dimension of security from military and political to economic and other non-traditional aspects. After the Cold War, external military threats are not imminent for many countries, especially for the major powers, and ideological difference does not cause confrontation as a result of the disappearance of the bipolar confrontation. As economic globalisation develops rapidly and the world becomes more interdependent, non-traditional threats become more and more salient. In light of the lessons of the split of Soviet Union, economic security should get much more attention. Military capability of a nation should be underpinned by its economic strength. Therefore, many countries see economic security as equally important, while some, like China in the 1990s, give priority to economic security.

The third change is with regard to the approaches to security. The Cold War mindset believes that a nation’s security depends on its overwhelming military strength against its opponent. Approaches to preserve a nation’s security, therefore, are military build-up/self-help security and military alignment/alliance security. The new security perspective conceives that the foundation of security is mutual trust and common interests. The new security perspective considers that the Cold War mindset leads nowhere but a security dilemma, since one side’s military superiority will make the other side feel insecure, which will force the latter to search for a stronger military strength and hence initiate a vicious cycle between the two opponents. To get out of this security dilemma, it would be better for countries to replace the zero-sum competition with cooperation when dealing with security. Cooperation promotes mutual trust. When one side thinks it can trust the other, it means that the former believes that the latter has no intention of using force against it, no matter how powerful the latter is. If mutual trust develops between the two sides, neither of them will find the urgency to strengthen its capability. Then this will lead their
security relations to a healthy spiral. Cooperation grows common interests. If common interests between two countries outweigh each side’s estimated gains from a war, it will exempt both sides from any intention of using force. Common security, cooperative security and comprehensive security, the post-Cold War prevalent approaches to security, all lay stress on cooperation.

As change of the international strategic culture is still in the process, it is the transition period when both the Cold War mindset and the new security perspective exist simultaneously. As a result, each country’s security policy is, to a different extent, influenced by both of these two security perceptions. Some countries incline to the new security perspective, some tilt to the Cold War mindset, while others stay in between. The dual impacts of the two security perceptions lead many countries to a complex, sometimes a contradictory, security policy which includes both competition and cooperation. For example, the US has taken a contradictory security policy toward China since the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, it is trying to build a constructive and cooperative partnership with China, which represents a new security perspective. On the other, it is seeking to strengthen the US-Japan military alliance, a legacy of the Cold War, to cope with the “potential threat” of China. (Yan 2005: 164)

1.3 Parameters of Security Perception

The above discussion about the agenda of security perception provides a theoretical direction for the following and concrete analysis of the respective security perceptions of China and India. Before starting this analysis, however, there is still another important question to answer: how to identify and define a state’s security perception. In the real world, no state actor makes a formal or informal announcement in this regard. Therefore, some measures or parameters are needed in
order to solve this problem. Parameters of security perception here refer to the factors that reflect the security perception. In light of the above direction of analysis, this author will take recourse to such parameters as assessment of the security environment, security strategy and policy, and mutual perception. Assessment of the security environment will, to a great extent, reflect a state's perception of threat, while security strategy and policy will unravel how a state categorises and prioritises its security and through which ways it deals with its security problems. Mutual perception is especially pertinent to the analysis of bilateral relations especially China-India relations.

1.3(1) Assessment of the Security Environment

Security environment is another concept taken for granted by IR scholarship. According to The American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language (2000), environment refers to surroundings, which is further explained as “the external circumstances, conditions, and objects that affect existence and development.” Based on this explanation, security environment therefore can be defined as the circumstances and conditions that affect the existence, maintenance and development of a state. When examining the IR literature, one will find that there are not many discussions on the definition. This kind of theoretical negligence has not mitigated any relevance of security environment to IR studies, however. On the contrary, everybody, from the IR scholars to the decision-makers of states, refers to security environment. Although there is neither a unanimous definition nor a rigorous analytical framework, it is widely accepted that assessment of the security environment is the first step for a state to shape its security strategy. (Shiping Tang, 2004: 1-34)

Traditionally, assessment of the security environment is undertaken as a process of
threat-identification. (Ibid) In other words, to assess a state’s security environment is to identify the real and the potential threats or challenges it faces. Both Barry Buzan and Stephen Walt have tried to provide an ideal framework for understanding the security environment, but none of them can make "a fundamental departure from the threat-identifying approach." (Ibid: 3) In Buzan’s “security complex,” factors such as geography, distribution of power, and patterns of amity and enmity are introduced to illustrate the regional security, but understanding threats is finally emphasised as the basis for understanding security. (Ibid: 2) According to Walt’s “balance of threat” theory, the assessment of a state’s security environment involves factors such as power, geographical proximity, offensive capability, and perception of intention, and the objective of this assessment is to identify threats, on which states choose to balance threat rather than balance power to ensure its security. (Walt, 1987)

In the real world, this threat-identifying approach is usually combined with “level analysis”. (Malec, 2003: 52-66) According to the sources of threats, the assessment of a state’s security environment can be divided into global (or international), regional (or neighbouring), and domestic ones. For instance, when a state is talking about its regional security environment, it is in fact trying to enumerate the threats it faces in the region.

To sum up, the assessment of security environment is to identify threats from each level. How a state defines its security environment will reflect its threat perception. Since the assessment of security environment underlies the formation of a state’s security strategy, and the implementation of the security strategy will eventually have certain implications for its external relations, to examine how China and India respectively assess their own security environment will provide not only a significant parameter for understanding their security perceptions but also help in understanding their security strategies and the interaction between them.
1.3(2) National Security Strategy

National security strategy is "the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security." (Online Encyclopedia) The formulation of national security strategy varies from country to country. Some states have a specific report on it and also make regular announcements, while others implicitly include it into different official documents.

The US is the country that currently enjoys the most sophisticated system of both the formulation and the implementation of national security strategy. According to the US National Security Act of 1947, "the President [shall] transmits to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States," and each report "[shall] sets forth the national security strategy of the United States and [shall] includes a comprehensive description and discussion of the following: (1) the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States; (2) the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States; (3) the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1); (4) the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy; (5) such other measures as may be helpful to inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the
United States.” In short, a state’s national security strategy normally should outline its major national security concerns and how the administration plan to deal with them.

National security strategy is a comprehensive parameter for a state’s security perception. How a state defines its security interests and concerns will reflect its categorisation of security, the objectives of its national security strategy will illustrate the priority of its security, and how a state is supposed to use its national power to achieve these objectives will manifest its approaches to security. Although neither China nor India has the same arrangement of a specific report as the US does, there are other sources that can provide a contour of their respective national security strategy. This research will examine at least three major sources: the government documents, especially those on foreign policy and national development, the speeches by the top leaders, and the strategic analysts from each side who have various connections with the government and play a role in policy-making.

1.3(3) Mutual Perception

Mutual perception can be categorised into the assessment of security environment and be analysed at the regional level mentioned above. Regional security environment consists of multilateral and bilateral sublevels. When a state assesses its regional security environment, it not only deals with the region as a whole, but also takes major bilateral relations into account. Therefore, mutual perception is about two specific nations’ threat-identification vis-à-vis each other. Since this thesis is about a bilateral relationship and since its theoretical basis, viz., Wendt’s constructivism, provides a sophisticated explanation of mutual perceptions’ effects on the bilateral relations⁰, this research will treat mutual perception as an

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⁰ As mentioned in the previous introduction of Wendt’s constructivism.
independent parameter of security perceptions.

According to Wendt, mutual perception refers to role-identification between two nations. As mentioned above, he basically sorts them into three roles: enemy, rival and friend. How the "Self" (one side) defines the role of the "Other" (the other side) will first affect its own policy towards the "Other". Representing the Other as an enemy tends to have at least four implications for a state's foreign policy posture and behaviour. First, it will act like a deep revisionist and try to destroy or conquer its enemy. Second, its decision-making will tend to heavily discount the future and be oriented toward the worst-case. Third, it will see relative military capabilities as crucial. Fourth, it will observe no limits on its own violence if there is an actual war. (Wendt 1999: 262) Representing the Other as a rival also has at least four implications for the Self's foreign policy. The most important is that it will behave in a status quo fashion no matter what conflict it may have with the Other. Secondly, its anxiety about security will be less intense due to the institution of sovereignty. Thirdly, relative military power is still important but no longer dominates all decision-making, and allies can be more easily trusted when its own power is insufficient. Finally, it will limit its own violence during war. (Ibid: 282-283) When the Self represents the Other as friend, the implications for its foreign policy are two-fold. On the one hand, it will settle its disputes with the Other without war or the threat of war; on the other hand, it will cooperate with the Other if either of their security is threatened by a third party. (Ibid: 299)

In Wendt's mind, the roles here are more of a structural phenomenon than is often assumed at the unit-level. In other words, "roles are structural positions, not actor beliefs." (Ibid: 258) How the Self defines the role of the Other will not only affect its own policy towards the Other, but also have constitutive effects on the Other's perception of it, which will in turn influence the Other's policy towards the Self.
Therefore, mutual perception implies a process of interaction, which may finally create a structure of logic. For example, when the Self represents the Other as enemy, it is forced to mirror back to become the Other's enemy. When the Self acts like an enemy towards the Other, this enmity will confirm whatever hostile intentions the Other has attributed to the Self, forcing the Other to actually enact its role as an enemy, which will in turn reinforce the Self's perception of the Other. Once this logic of enmity gets started, whether or not states really are existential threats to each other is not relevant. In short, real or imagined, if actors think enemies are real then they are real in their consequences. (Ibid: 262-263)

Based on the above model of Wendt's, this research will examine how China and India have perceived each other, how their mutual perception has interacted, how the mutual perception has affected their respective decision-makings, and what implications they have had for their bilateral relationship.