Chapter 4

Security Politics and Regional Integration
During the Cold War, Latin America, Southern Africa and even the dynamic Southeast Asia hardly figured in international politics. Studies on the Cold War politics and the scramble for security in other parts of the world, particularly in the industrial West mostly overlooked the Third World countries and their quest for security.

Even after the Cold War ended, Third World security predicaments remain because of the existence of a very complex balance of power that is often precariously balanced. This chapter will therefore look into this Third World security predicament through different factors of security at three analytical levels – the international system, the regional and state levels. This will again be done using the three most important regional organisations in the Third World – ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC. This will reveal how security politics and regional integration are interrelated and intertwined in the Third World. In other words, this will show how one affects the other. In the process, it will contribute to our understanding of how these regional organisations cope and deal with security issues and with the current phase of globalisation.

**What is security?**
At the outset, it is imperative to know what security means in international politics. Following the end of the Cold War, the scope of security in academic studies has been changed with many “wideners” who argued that the subject needed to embrace a more varied range of threats and move beyond the traditional emphasis on the military aspects of security for the state. For a very long time, the traditional thinking had been that “the state is and should be about security, with emphasis on military and political security” (Buzan et al 1998:37). This notion of security has been prevalent since the Westphalian peace of 1648 where the concept of the nation state was created. This view became more important during the twentieth Century with the two World Wars and the consequent Cold War that lasted for almost five decades. Soon, with the end of the Cold War, changes in perception have created debates between those still subscribing to the traditional thinking and those who wanted to “widen” the definition
of security so as to include other nonmilitary threats too.

Truly, it was the end of the Cold War that heightened this debate; but in 1983, during the height of the second Cold War, Richard Ullman (1983: 133) developed a widened approach to security when he wrote that the threat to security is, “An action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.” In addition, by the early 1970s, the economic aspect of security had attracted attention as did environmental security by the 1980s (see Hirsch and Doyle 1977; Meadows et al 1972 and Ruggie 1982). But even in the early 1990s, there are still many who were convinced that security studies should maintain the narrower focus because widening security studies would only dilute it such that any factor could potentially be a security threat. Stephen Walt (1991: 212) wrote, “Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force.”

Simply put, this debate may be divided into the military and non-military sources of threat. Although the end of the Cold War has resulted in a great restructuring of the international system, the military aspect of security remains as apparent as ever, if not more important than during the Cold War. It was thus argued that “We will soon miss the Cold War” (Mearsheimer 1990). However, the simple fact remains that the military threat is not the only security issue. It never has been. Ullman (1983) had argued that demographic pressure and resource depletion need to be addressed alongside military threats to security. Jessica Matthews (1989) stressed the need to address environmental security including ozone depletion and global warming. Post Cold War literature saw many wideners emphasising internal, rather than external threats to security that includes crisis in education, dangerous nationalism and migration (see Ayoob 1997; Peterson and Sebenius 1992; Lynn-Jones and Miller 1995).

This led to the development of new attempts to construct a wider definition of security that would address the whole range of threats to states, and not merely confine itself to the military aspect during the early 1990s (see Buzan 1991a). Barry

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Buzan (1991b) argued that the narrow militaristic approach was too "simple minded" and this led to its underdevelopment. Buzan, along with Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) developed a groundbreaking work on security studies when they broadened it to include political, economic, social and environmental threats in addition to those that are military. The security concept is therefore being revised and broadened. This revised neo-realist approach offers an interesting and operational definition, where an issue becomes a security concern if it poses an "existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory and society)" (Buzan et al 1998: 21-22). Even though the political, economic, social and environmental threats have been added to the military threats, the widened neo-realist approach maintains that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the state. That is, it maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of security.

Another approach to security advocates that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent of security. This approach is the postmodernist approach and seeks to encompass a wide range of non-state actors such as individuals, ethnic groups, regional groups, and other nongovernmental organisations. Ken Booth (1994) thus advocates that human security is ultimately more important than state security. Governments, which are supposed to protect the security of the people, have instead become the source of insecurity. Therefore, in Booth’s view, states must not be the primary referents of security. Buzan (1991a: 38) accepts that states can also be a source of threat and maintains that citizens must either accept the threats that come from the state or accept the threats that arise in the absence of the state. To him, the "bottom-line is survival" (Buzan 1991a: 19). Concerned with the post-Cold War scenario in Europe and the revival of nationalism and upheavals Ole Wæver et al (1993: 23) came up with the concept of societal security which is concerned with "the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats."

Thus, to cut a long story short, security in international politics is a moot point, and it remains so to date. Just to cite an example, James Wirtz (2002: 312) ridiculing the idea that global warming constitutes a security threat writes, "It is not
exactly clear... how military forces can help reduce the build up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere."

Security in the Third World
Having dealt with the theoretical conception of security and how it came to be “deepened” and “widened”, this section will now look at security in the context of the Third World. Needless to say, Third World realities are very different from those of the Western world where much of the earlier concepts and scope of security had been developed. As a result, an analysis of Third World security invariably produces results quite different from those that had been prevalent during much of the Cold War period.

Although the previous treatment of the concept of security may seem to be quite clear, the concept assumes an entirely new dimension when applied to the Third World. Instead, analysts tend to impose a Western model of security that cannot quite fit into Third World cases. In the more developed countries, the question of nation-building, legitimacy of states and regimes, the dimensions of food, health, environmental and military securities have already been solved or been taken care of. However, this is not so in the Third World where these questions may have become even more acute.

Since 1945, many of the most significant threats to state security have become internal rather than external, a shift which has profound consequences for the conduct of international relations. As Holsti (1996: 15) writes, security between states in the Third World “has become increasingly dependent on security within those states.” For the Third World states, security does not simply refer to the external military threat dimension but also to the whole range of the state’s existence which includes internal security and nation building; secure systems of food, health, economy, trade and environment (Thomas 1987). The Third World states, like all states are concerned with their own security, internal and external. The task for these states, however, is quite different because of the many problems that are unique to the Third World. As they are mostly poor, underdeveloped and postcolonial, Third World states inherited their colonial economies, political structures and security perceptions. Some are pre-modern and weak, characterised by low levels of sociopolitical cohesion and poorly
developed structures of government. The securities of these states are therefore shaped by these characteristics. To the authoritarian governments of the Third World, security also means countering internal subversion and keeping internal order at any cost.

The end of the Cold War and the changes it brought with it, the advent of democracy and new emphasis on economic regionalism has changed the security agendas of the Third World to some extent. In many of the Third World regions, there has been a sea change in outlook and expectations from regionalism. Regime changes in Latin America, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia has contributed towards this optimism. However, compared to the Western states, security in terms of internal stability, secure systems of food and development remain the predominant issues. Until these states feel secure, or are changed so that their perception of security is also changed, the future of regionalism and its benefits for these countries cannot be assured.

The next three sections will deal with security politics and regional integration in the Third World mostly through the different dimensions of security at three analytical levels – the international, regional and state levels. Where appropriate, the security dimensions will include the military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors.\(^1\) Besides these dimensions, security concerns are located in both the external and internal dimensions. As mentioned before, this analysis will be done looking at how the three regional organisations of ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC deal with security issues.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

*The Cold War Period*

The politics of the Cold War had dominated the working of the international system for a major part of the second half of the twentieth century. It is interesting to note that while the Third World states were unimportant in the global balance of power and

\(^1\) This is derived from Buzan et al (1998)
hardly figured in the security agendas of Western policy-makers, the prevailing bipolar system and the preoccupation of the Western powers with the spread of communism and its containment exacerbated conflicts in the Third World. While conflicts in the core and strategic areas of Europe and North America were avoided, the Cold War turned out to be a hot one in and for the Third World states where the superpowers played the game of international politics. The Vietnam War was the clearest result and example of this game. It was during the Vietnam War that ASEAN was established to achieve regional security and economic growth.

The intensity of the Vietnam War and the increasing involvement of the Soviet Union and the growing threat to regional security led ASEAN to adopt a nonaligned policy. The Vietnam War continued to strain members’ relationships and threaten regional security. Communist victories in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam worsened the situation. By 1976, ASEAN was forced to contemplate being an association with security as its predominant concern. Thus at the February 1976 Bali Summit Meeting, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord were signed. They agreed to “The right of every state to lead its national existence; free from external interference, subversion or coercion; non interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; and the renunciation of the threat or use of force” (ASEAN 1976). The reunification of Vietnam, the worsening internal security problems and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia led to another security dilemma for ASEAN during the mid-1970s. Negotiations followed during which time ASEAN’s importance as a regional organisation to settle disputes and maintain security was widely recognised. Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia in 1989 and the Vietnam War was concluded by the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement.

The southern African security problem during the Cold War was exacerbated by the presence of apartheid South Africa, a regime which also adopted a strong anticomunist policy and came out harshly against any socialist orientations. Angola and Mozambique, having chosen this path, were particularly targeted. During the 1950s and more in the 1960s, the South African Defence Force (SADF) developed a

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2 From this meeting also arose the provision for an ASEAN Secretariat.
national security doctrine stressing the psychological, social and economic means to target its enemies, in addition to the military means. This doctrine came to be known as the "Total Strategy". The SADF saw the spread of communism as threatening the country psychologically, economically and militarily. Therefore, the South African government established a framework for implementing policies which completely cut across all sectors of public life, called the National Security Management System. Louis Nel, then South African Deputy Foreign Minister, said in November 1982, "The Kremlin has actively supported the southern African Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements in their quest for power in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The Kremlin is currently backing SWAPO, the South African ANC and the South African Communist Party who operate against SWA/Namibia and the Republic of South Africa, respectively" (Quoted in Hanlon 1986: 8). Using such words had two advantages – the policy of apartheid could be seen as communist-inspired and it demanded Western support as it was a bulwark against the communist onslaught (Hanlon 1986: 8).

The United States, being a great power, recognises Latin America as being under its sphere of influence. Beginning mostly with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 when the US President James Monroe warned the European powers to keep out of the Americas, the US has, in effect, reserved the right to exert influence and interfere in Latin America. This has been a policy factor for the US as well as many Latin American countries for a long time. The Cold War also cut Latin American countries (LAC) from the possibility of relations with other regions. As a result, many of the countries of the region lessened their dependence on the superpowers. It was the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) that shaped much of the South American regionalism. This can be seen as an indirect opposition to the superpower hegemony. Contrary to Europe, this part of the world has been relatively peaceful until the 1960s when the Cold War became a hot one with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. While several interstate wars erupted after the 1960s, the real security problem for Latin America was the Cold War, with the countries of the region progressively becoming an American zone of influence. Since the 1960s, the United States had increasingly intervened militarily in its own backyard and installed puppet governments.
The Cold War also ushered a dangerous arms and nuclear race. In the face of such a threat, in 1971, a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration was signed by member states of ASEAN. This Declaration can be seen as a reaction to the emerging multipolarity of the region with the USSR, US, China and Japan as the principal powers influencing events in Southeast Asia. This idea of a neutral Southeast Asia can be traced back to 1968 when Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Ismail suggested, “(the time is) right for the countries in the region to declare collectively the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. To be effective, this must be guaranteed by big powers, including the Communist China” (see Sopiie 1975: 137). By 1970, this became an official state policy of Malaysia. Thus the ZOPFAN Declaration of 1979 was made with Malaysia taking the first initiative. The Declaration states, “That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers.” Likewise, through the Foz de Iguazu Declaration of November 1985, Brazil and Argentina declared that their nuclear programs were to be for peaceful purposes only. Such action on the part of Third World states can be seen as their desire to keep away from the Cold War politics of interferences and aggressions from the superpowers that destabilise the Third World regions.

Post-Cold War Period

By the late 1980s, the global scenario began to change with the Cold War coming to sudden end. The 1990s ushered in a new phase of security predicament for the Third World with the sudden change in the global balance of power. The decline of the Soviet Union and the change in the bipolar world had more immediate effects for the Third World. It witnessed the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower which has become even more powerful with time.

Politically, the end of the Cold War resulted in the removal of support for many Third World states and movements. The collapse of the Soviet Union has discredited the alternative model and ideology represented by the Soviet Union. This in turn affected many movements and supports in many Third World states including members of ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC. Economically, it has also resulted in
changes in the direction of trade and businesses. The military dimension also produces the same result of redirection of arms trade, transfers and dealings. The post Cold War world, epitomised by the great power influence of the US, its involvement in Third World problems and conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan etc.), besides the complex web of international relations has and will continue to have an impact on Third World security and their regional integration processes. While Third World regional organisations, and for that matter Third World states, are more concerned with security (the security of the Third World states involves the whole range of the state's existence), this concern has become more multifarious after the Cold War as it has become subject to more complex pulls and pressures. The task, problems and process for these states and organisations therefore is quite different from that of the Western regional integration organisations, particularly the European Union.

Post-9/11 Period
The world entered into a new period of insecurity and threats after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the events that followed. Soon after, the United States launched a movement and led a coalition to remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The attacks also led to the introduction of “anti-terrorism” legislation in many countries including the United Kingdom, India, Australia, France, Germany, Indonesia, China, Canada, Russia, Pakistan, Jordan, Mauritius, Uganda and Zimbabwe. This has brought to a close the transitional phase that followed the end of the Cold War (Wenger and Zimmerman 2003: I).

For a long time, states and regional organisations had ignored and did not regard terrorism as a priority. While this is true for most states, it is particularly more so in the Third World countries where poverty, diseases, domestic conflicts and hunger had been seen as the immediate issues to be addressed. But this threat had been becoming more a problem for every state mostly beginning from the bombings in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Casablanca in 1999, Bali bombings, attacks in Britain, Egypt, Yemen, Argentina in 1992 and 1994 and other threats and attacks in all parts of the world. Terrorism can no longer be treated as a Western concern. It has become an international security issue where regional organisation must provide a coherent response so that the integration process and inter and intra regional trade will not be hampered by such threats.
Security politics at the regional level is a very important issue that affects regional integration in the Third World. It is at this level that such organisations were formed and its progress, working and objectives defined and sought to be achieved. In this section, security politics and issues will be dealt mostly through the internal and external dimensions divided into two phases – Cold War period and post Cold War period.

During much of the Cold War, as mentioned before, the Third World regions had been neglected and hardly figured in terms of importance in world politics. The Cold War politics played by the US and the Soviet Union and their attempt to control each others’ sphere of influence in the Third World had precipitated several Third World security predicaments. As we have seen in the previous section, sporadic eruption of wars such as the Vietnam War and many clashes marred the history of the world during the Cold War. Some other important players including China, Japan and South Africa have also exacerbated this predicament. For example, the United States was dominant in the region, but paid scant attention to its southern neighbours. Only when crises popped up, it seemed concerned, as happened in 1954 (Guatemala), 1959 (Cuba), 1965 (Dominican Republic), 1970-73 (Chile), 1979 (Central America), and periodically in Mexico when electoral events coincided with financial meltdowns. It concerned itself in sponsoring the elites and interfering in the internal affairs of these states under different pretexts. Inter-American relations rested on an agenda established by Washington for most of this time. It was during this time that the governments in the region began to focus their attention to internal security. As many of the Latin American states were authoritarian in nature, the doctrine of “national security” was widely used to justify their repressive policies.

Southeast Asia
When ASEAN was formed, despite their policy of nonalignment, some members still had official alignments with the US and Great Britain. The fact was that member countries were solely responsible for their own security. Thus, much of the political
and strategic alliances with other countries took place outside ASEAN’s structures. This was clearly stated in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 and the Manila Declaration of 1987. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 stated that “The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.” It also declared the “continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests” (ASEAN 1976). The Manila Declaration of 1987 also stated, “While each member state shall be responsible for its own security, cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis among the member states in security matters shall continue in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.”

After its establishment, ASEAN was seen by the communist bloc as nothing more than a “western-inspired military alliance directed against China and the Indo-Chinese states” (Dixon 1999: 118). True, during much of the Cold War and after, China has been viewed as a major security threat by ASEAN members, which is why most ASEAN states want to see the US remain as a regional power. Many of them feel that US disengagement will create a power vacuum that would be filled by either China or Japan. The reason behind this perception of China as a threat rose from the fact that China had adopted the communist way while the ASEAN states stood against it. China, on its part, began to participate in multilateral security forums and had bilateral talks and agreements with Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia.

With the end of the Cold War, the 1993 meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers sanctioned the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and was formally created in 1994. The ARF was designed to include China in regional dialogues. Since its inception, the ARF has been guided by the objectives of fostering constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues and concerns, undertaking efforts towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy and working towards strengthening political and security cooperation as a means of ensuring peace and stability. The objectives are sought to be achieved through the promotion of confidence building measures, the development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms and the development of conflict resolution mechanisms. ASEAN members’ relation
with China improved considerably since the end of the Cold War. This new relationship with China was reflected in the ASEAN Meeting of 1997. It was held in Beijing. This new understanding was because the ASEAN leaders began to recognise the political and economic benefits of closer ties with China easily outweigh any military risks. The ARF stresses consultations, dialogue and transparency in regional dealings. By 2003, the ASEAN countries made a Declaration stating that “The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further advancing the stages of cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region” (ASEAN 2002a). The Concord also adopted an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation. It stated that, “ASEAN shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.”

In December 1995, a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty was signed by ASEAN heads of government in Bangkok. This treaty prohibits the manufacture and storage of nuclear weapons within the region. Member states undertake not to allow nor develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; or test or use nuclear weapons; dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the Zone any radioactive material or wastes; dispose radioactive material or wastes on land in the territory of or under the jurisdiction of other States; allow, within its territory, any other State to dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere any radioactive material or wastes (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok, Thailand, 15 December 1995).

In 1999, ASEAN established the ASEAN Troika comprising of three ASEAN foreign ministers of the present, past and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC). The Troika was established to enable ASEAN in addressing urgent and important political and security issues in a timely manner and to help ASEAN to be more responsive to the growing interdependence between the countries of
Southeast Asia. The Troika has, however, never been heard of again since its creation.

On the East Timor issue, in spite of the popular support for its independence and international condemnation of the conduct of the Indonesian militia, ASEAN leaders declared that a united democratic and economically prosperous Indonesia is basic to the maintenance of regional security and it emphasised its support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Widespread violence perpetuated by Indonesian militia against the civilian population brought in UN peacekeepers. Earlier, the East Timorese people had held a plebiscite where 78.5 per cent voted for independence. During the crisis, ASEAN and the ARF were under severe criticism for their inaction and inability to stem the violence. The Philippines contributed to the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) by sending police and electoral volunteers. UNAMET’s presence in East Timor did not stop the gross violations of human rights. By the end of 1999, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) was created by the UN Security Council through Resolution 1264 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was only then that the ASEAN members — the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand contributed troops. INTERFET was soon replaced by the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). Malaysia, however, objected to the Australian leadership of the UNTAET claiming that an ASEAN-led mission would be more appropriate. Other ASEAN members were, however, reluctant to assume responsibility while Australia and East Timor objected to Malaysian leadership owing to its close relation with Indonesia. It was only after the UN Secretary General intervened that Malaysia contributed limited personnel to the UNTAET. ASEAN’s role during the crisis highlighted its sensitivity to another member’s sovereignty and its strict adherence to the principle of noninterference and to informal mechanisms of conflict management or the “ASEAN Way”. East Timor became an independent country in May 2002.

Southern Africa
In Southern Africa, the presence of the Republic of South Africa and the policy of apartheid caused many problems. Security for Southern Africa was hard to come by. Many of the Southern African countries had to bear the brunt of the Republic of South Africa’s (RSA) racist regime for a long time. Security concerns in the region became a big issue since the early 1960s, ever since the wars of national liberation erupted in
Angola and Mozambique, both Portuguese colonies. Help from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) enabled the Portuguese to hold on to their colonies for about two decades. This led to the rebel forces to rely on the Soviet bloc for military and political support. South Africa initially supported Portugal, but later engaged in military actions in Mozambique and Angola. By the mid-1970s, it came to realise that these states could be used by black forces to wage war on South Africa. In 1969, the Frontline States (FLS) were formed through the Lusaka Manifesto to aid the liberalizing struggles of Southern African states. As South Africa feared, independent Angola and Mozambique quickly assumed their involvement in the FLS. What followed was the policy of destabilisation, blackmail, economic sanctions and military actions from South Africa towards what it called communist forces threatening to destabilise the region. By the late 1970s, black states had agreed to create an organisation to lessen their dependence on apartheid South Africa and to unite and fight against the injustices meted out to them. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the forerunner of the SADC, the community, was thus formed in April 1980 comprising of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The southern African scenario during the establishment of the SADCC can best be understood by recognising the predominance of apartheid RSA within the region. In order to maintain its dominant position within the region and continue to hold strategically important ports, mines and bases, it adopted the policy of exerting pressure on its neighbours and maintained a relationship of terror and aggressiveness towards them.

With such a scenario, the Southern African states were particularly concerned with their security from South African attacks and terror tactics rather than with regional integration. These states had two kinds of security concerns – internal and external. Internally, they faced problems of rebellion, food security, weak political systems and ethnic conflicts. Externally, they faced the aggressive policy of RSA and dependence on the South African economy. All these security issues were before the states forming the SADCC.

During the 1970s, the RSA conceived of the idea of a constellation of states to
implement its plan for regional security and maintain its position. It was also meant to deter its neighbouring states from supporting and harbouring the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC) guerillas, to prevent black states for calling for sanctions against it and to strengthen its own position within the region.

It was in such a background that the SADCC emerged. It was felt by the founding members that they would have a better chance of ensuring security and facing RSA's attacks and pressure tactics. As the SADCC began to take steps towards its objectives, RSA virtually went on the rampage. Attacks on Angola and Mozambique intensified resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands. Cross border raids continued during 1981-1983 with attacks on Mozambique (30 January 1981 and 23 May 1983); Angola (30 November 1981); Lesotho (9 December 1982); Zimbabwe (25 July 1982) and Angola (December 1983) just to cite a few incidents. At the same time, economic sanctions were imposed on Mozambique and Zimbabwe. To others, it applied pressure tactics and sanctions ruining their economies. On 16 February 1984, Angola and South Africa signed the Lusaka Agreement whereby South Africa agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola. Exactly a month later, on 16 March 1984, the Nkomati Accord on "nonaggression and good neighbourliness" was signed between South Africa and Mozambique. Under the Accord, Mozambique agreed to stop supporting the ANC and South Africa agreed to stop supplying the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The Accord obliged each state to respect each other's sovereignty and independence; refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs; and renounce the threat or use of force against each other. However, the apartheid regime continued to funnel aid to the resistance force. What followed was a period of complete confusion where South Africa tried to project itself as peacemaker on the one hand and violating its commitments on the other. Thus by the mid-1980s, the SADCC countries had suffered a great loss in property and lives as can be seen from the following table.
Loss suffered by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe in millions of US dollars during 1980-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct war damage</td>
<td>1610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra defence expenditure</td>
<td>3060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher transport and energy costs</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost exports and tourism</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced production</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost economic growth</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotts and embargoes</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading arrangements</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10120</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hanlon 1986: 265

This scenario was suddenly changed at the beginning of the 1990s when the apartheid regime of South Africa was removed. South Africa itself became a part of the reinvigorated and renamed Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Peace and security has almost always eluded the southern African states for decades. The beginning of the 1990s opened a new phase for southern African states. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the formation of the SADC and its attempt to reconcile differences between erstwhile states of divergent policies and regimes were significant developments. At the Gaborone Summit of 1996 of the SADC heads of government and state, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) was launched. It has the following functions and objectives:

- Protecting the people and safeguarding the development of the region against instability arising from a breakdown of law and order and interstate conflict;
promoting political cooperation among member states and evolving common political value systems and institutions;

- Developing a foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and lobbying as a region on issues of common interest in international forums.

- Cooperating fully on regional security and defense through conflict prevention, management, and resolution;

- Mediating in inter- and intra-state disputes.

For the first time since the SADC was established, the region now had stable regional security architecture. The framework of the OPDS as stated in the 1996 Summit was that, “the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security shall operate at the Summit level and shall function independently of other SADC structure. The Organ shall also operate at Ministerial and technical levels. The Chairmanship of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and on a troika basis.”

The Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) which had been established in 1994 was incorporated into the newly found OPDS. The OPDS was also empowered to establish other structures as the need arise.

Although the OPDS was established, there was no clear cut consensus among member states as to how it should function. The existence of two chairs, of the SADC and OPDS, gave the impression that there existed two separate organisations (Zacarias 2004). Military intervention in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 brought the problem to the fore again. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia’s intervention in the DRC was justified as an invitation by an SADC member state. This decision was taken by them under the auspices of the ISDSC. South Africa, maintaining that the intervention in the DRC was unjustified used the same justification to intervene in Lesotho. It was thus stated, “due to the non-functioning of the Organ, attempts to find a solution were not and could not be conducted in an entirely unified way” (Brammer 1992: 21).

The Blantyre, Malawi Summit of August 2001 finally brought the OPDS under the SADC becoming a substructure of the SADC. Through the Protocol on
Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, the OPDS became the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The OPDSC and the SADC now have the same Secretariat. The Protocol also created the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) to achieve the political and diplomatic objectives of the OPDSC. Article 2 of the Protocol on the OPDSC set out the following objectives:

1. The general objective of the Organ shall be to promote peace and security in the region.

2. The specific objectives of the Organ shall be to:
   a) Protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression;
   b) Promote political co-operation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
   c) Develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy is collectively in international fora;
   d) Promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defense and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;
   e) Prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;
   f) Consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;
   g) Promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the Organisation of African Unity and United Nations respectively;
   h) Consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defense Pact to respond to external military threats;
   i) Develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to address:
      (i) Cross border crime; and
      (ii) Promote a community based approach to domestic security;
j) observe, and encourage State Parties to implement, United Nations, African Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;
k) Develop peacekeeping capacity of national defense forces and co-ordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
l) Enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance.

(SADC 2004)

With the resolution of the modalities on which the OPDSC must function, security issues may be more appropriately dealt with. As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, the end of the 1990s saw much of the long drawn-out wars in Angola, DRC and Mozambique and other places coming to an end. Peace efforts in the DRC and Angola have opened up new opportunities for collective peace and security that the SADC needs to push forward for economic cooperation and integration. In the DRC, the formation of a new government of national unity has been quite successful. Many refugees have also been repatriated. In Angola, the opposition UNITA (Uniao para e Independencia Total de Angola) even stated that “Peace in Angola means a lot for regional security and stability and the new UNITA is on the move to add to the creation of a new era of democracy and freedom for all Angolans” (Chanda 2003). This development was brought into being by the death of Jonas Savimbi, a veteran rebel leader in early 2002. In fact, none of the countries in the region are beset by ongoing armed conflict now. As Steinhilber (2006: 11) notes, “International terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on the other hand, play as good as no role at all in the region.” However, the problem of HIV/AIDS is a big concern for all African states. This creates instability and as a result affects regional integration. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has been a major factor and issue that raises a big concern for southern African states at present. Prega Ramsamy (2001: 35), the former Secretary-General of the SADC stated that, “the [HIV/AIDS] pandemic continues to escalate in our Community. Available statistics indicate that the rates of infected people in the region could be as high as one in five in some member states. At least four member states have rates higher than 400 per 100,000 population indicating the magnitude of the problem.” The SADC on 4 July
2003 met in Maseru, Lesotho and noted that "the HIV/AIDS pandemic is reversing the developmental gains made in the past decades and is posing the greatest threat to sustainable development of the region due to loss of the most productive individuals in all sectors of our economies, decline in productivity, diversion of scarce resources from production to the care and support of the HIV/AIDS infected and affected persons, as well as mitigating the effects on various sectors, and resulting in an increase in the number of orphans and the disruption of family structures" (SADC 2003). The SADC members also committed themselves to collectively fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in an urgent manner.

According to a paper prepared by The POLICY Project for Bureau for Africa Office of Sustainable Development and the US Agency for International Development, October 2001, the number of infection would increase from 12.1 million in 2001 to 145 million in 2005 and reach a total of 16 million by the year 2015. This can be seen from the following chart:

**Number of People with HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa**


In 2003, a Mutual Defence Pact was signed by SADC members. This was an official commitment by SADC to function as a collective defence organisation. In 2004, the SADC Protocol entered into force listing 12 objectives that included (1)
protecting the people and region against instability; (2) promoting interstate political cooperation and evolving common political values and institutions; (3) developing common foreign policy approaches; (4) promoting regional coordination and cooperation on security and defence matters and establishing appropriate mechanisms to this end; (5) preventing, containing and resolving interstate and intrastate conflict by peaceful means; (6) considering enforcement actions in accordance with international law as a matter of last resort; (7) promoting democracy and universal human rights; (8) considering development of a collective security capacity; (9) developing close cooperation between the region's police and security services to address cross-border crime and promoting a community-based approach to domestic security; (10) observing and encouraging implementation of international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states; (11) developing national peacekeeping capacities and coordinating the participation of the region's peacekeepers in international and regional operations; and (12) enhancing the regional capacity for disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance. The SADC also prepared a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) to provide an orientation of SADC plans. The RISDP also recognises the importance of the link between SADC and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in areas of policy harmonisation. The OPDSC also prepared a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2001.

The Southern Cone

Improved relations, the changed security agendas and the process of democratisation in Latin America since the late 1980s and early 1990s have led to a newly shared perception of a vision for Latin America. The Treaty of Asunción established MERCOSUR in March 1991. With the admission of Bolivia and Chile, MERCOSUR expanded to represent 230 million inhabitants, that is, 45 per cent of the population of Latin America. Though the countries of the southern cone do not face much external threats, closer economic ties and open borders often cause security problems for their neighbours.

Through the 1990s, MERCOSUR nations have moved towards greater transparency and military joint exercises. An annual meeting of the joint general staff and armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile has been held to
discuss security matters. Several bilateral arrangements had also been made for cooperation on security matters. Thus the Argentine and Brazilian navies have engaged in joint manoeuvres in 1997, Chile and Argentina in 1998, and armed units from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have also conducted training exercises together (Pion-Berlin 2000). However, Brazil and Paraguay and other states are wary of the Argentine idea of greater cooperative security integration because smaller and weaker neighbours and members are suspicious of the stronger members whom they see as dominating and domineering. But it is strange to note that in July 2006, the former Argentine President, Carlos Alvarez, also the president of MERCOSUR rejected the Venezuelan proposal and suggestion for a joint MERCOSUR army.

As the military has taken new tasks, the problem is whether a balance is maintained between member countries in matters of security responsibilities and management. Argentina and Brazil are also opposed to the idea of the institutionalisation of the conference of American defense ministers. This explicitly implies that they are against a continental security system. Though they explain that the countries of the continent are too different, it can also imply that the two most powerful states in the Southern Cone desire to wield their influence on other members of the MERCOSUR and on the functioning of the regional integration arrangement itself. Paraguay and Uruguay favour a joint manoeuvre and want an advisory body for this purpose because they are afraid that Argentina and Brazil could use their nuclear technology for their own ends despite nuclear treaties. Brazil is also said to have its own nuclear project. Chile meanwhile opted to have an autonomous defense policy. On the economic front, the MERCOSUR countries are yet to achieve security – the Brazilian Real devaluation of 1999 and other financial crises in Argentina and Brazil being cases in point. These crises have even led to the MERCOSUR members to question its existence.

**THE STATE LEVEL**

An analysis of Third World security at the state level encounters enormous problems because of the vast dimensions of security and differences in the perceptions and conditions in these states. Security for these states always goes beyond the common issue of the state’s ability to protect its resources and borders and involves the dimensions of food, environment, economy, elites, society, culture and the legitimacy
and survival of the states and regimes. In other words, the whole dimensions of military, political, economic, societal and environmental securities are all equally important for the Third World. In recent years, the problem of transnational crime, drug trafficking and terrorism have also added to the security dilemma of these states.

Firstly, the role played by the armed forces is vital for regimes and governments in ensuring and maintaining their sovereignty, ideology and legitimacy. This political role of the military in the Third World coupled with the weakness of government institutions have led armed groups and the paramilitary forces to gain more power and influence. In the case of Thailand, military coups after military coups have happened because of the extremely powerful political position that the military enjoyed. In Indonesia too, the longevity of regimes depended on controlling the military. The military has also been used to gain more power even illegitimately. This in turn leads to the use of more military might against opposition forces leading to the deaths of thousands. This type of military adventurism and use of the military is particularly widespread in Africa. For example, in August 1998, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia decided to take part in an intervention operation in the DRC to fight against rebel forces. This intervention happened based on the request of President Laurent Kabila who came to power through military force. In most parts of the world, the militarisation of these problems and the new role that the military began to play ironically led to more insecurity for the civilian population. Such roles as played by the military could bring them into contact with the civilian population and increase the chances of human rights violations. It could also bring them into direct confrontation with the people (Pion-Berlin 2000). But as a whole, the political role that the military played had immensely reduced since the process of democratisation began. From the 1980s, the military spending of the Latin American countries have reduced at around 3 per cent on an average across the region (Kruijfit 2001). For Argentina, the defence spending dropped to about 1.24 per cent of its GDP in 1997 (Pion-Berlin 2000).

In addition to the secessionist movements, ethnic violence and internal unrest, the states of ASEAN are susceptible to economic crises and are economically unstable. Monetary security has not been achieved. For example, the Thai economy underwent a severe economic crisis during the 1970s and early 1980s that led the
economy to the verge of collapse. Several reforms were initiated under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank through which the Thai economy slowly recovered. The Asian Crisis of the late 1990s also had severe effects on the economies of these states.

For the Third World states, security means much more than the concept of being secure from external attacks and the ability to sustain itself. It also involves the dimension of security of social groups, individuals and other minorities. Thus, for all Third World states, it also includes comprehensive and human securities (Malik 1992; Axworthy 1999). Thus, even after the advent of democracy and the end of the Cold War, the power relationship between the people and the governments continue to shape its politics. As Bearman (2001: 70) stated, “For many Latin Americans in 2000, hopes of economic development, political stability, and government institutions able to provide justice and security and basic human requirements remained unfulfilled. The regions’ two-decade-long struggle to reform state institutions, so that they promote economic growth and provide capable civilian leadership focused on public welfare rather than personal convenience or gain, continued to yield mixed results.”

The formation of collective identities like nations, religious groups had been problematic in the Third World. Secessionist movements, uprisings, insurgencies, ethnic conflicts in most part of the Third World demonstrate this tendency. Latin America faced numerous security problems including violence, corruption, drugs, insurgent groups, illegal cross border activities, political differences, militarisation, interventions, limited legitimacy, over exploitation of resources and weak political structures. The threat perception in Latin America has led to numerous problems both for the governments and the people. This very perception often gives rise to revolutionary groups and at times paramilitary groups that ultimately lead to the fracturing of society and the political structure through civil wars. Instability within the region has often led to interventions, revealing the weakness and loss of national security. Therefore, Latin American security predicament revolves round both threat perceptions and conditions. Real and perceived threats undermine MERCOSUR states’ progress towards democratisation. This in turn leads to political differences that give rise to revolutionary groups and rebels. Organised transnational crime including drug trade and arms trafficking, corruption, kidnappings and protection
rackets also haunt these states. This increases insecurity among the borders. The complex jungle borders and rivers that connect the MERCOSUR states have been used by smugglers to smuggle arms, drugs and people. To deal with this problem, Brazil has, from 2001, increased its military presence along its borders. In addition, Brazil has now organised a monthly meeting of intelligence chiefs of the region to promote information sharing (Bearman 2001). The weaknesses of government institutions have often been exploited by both armed groups and the paramilitary to gain more power and influence too.

Environmentally, over exploitation of resources and the limited concern paid to the environment has now been the subject of international dispute and one in which regional organisations are now more involved. As the ECLA (2001) stated, “The environment has played an important role in the production of resource-based commodities as well as in the provision of food and other amenities for the population. Nevertheless, an integral relationship between economic and social development and the environment did not form the basis for development strategies and policies pursued in the Caribbean. Since the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations, the importance of environment to trade and development has become generally accepted. However, developing countries have been concerned about proposals to bring environment and labour standards within the purview of the WTO. This was part of the reason for the failure to launch a new round of trade negotiations in Seattle in 2000. Environmental issues were again on the agenda at the Doha Ministerial meeting in November 2001.”

The beginning of the twenty-first century has also ushered in a completely new form of security threat for the world and for ASEAN in particular. This was international terrorism, a threat Southeast Asia did not anticipate at all. Security has once again become pivotal within the region for all forms of international interactions and has replaced the strategy of economic and developmental growth. Not since the Vietnam War has ASEAN been confronted by a force so disruptive that could potentially render it extremely vulnerable.

In response to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon, ASEAN leaders in November 2001 issued a Declaration of
Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. Through it, ASEAN leaders reiterate their resolve to “counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions.”

The Bali bombing of 12 October 2002 has further exposed the ASEAN countries to the threat that has now become the main concern of the international community. It exposed the vulnerability of Southeast Asia to this threat. Several steps were taken by ASEAN to counter terrorism including:

• The ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in November 2001;
• A special ‘work plan’ on how to counter terrorism in May 2002;
• The US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism in August 2002;
• The establishment of a Regional Counterterrorism Center in Kuala Lumpur in July 2003;
• The ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism in January 2003; and
• A wide range of special meetings and settlements on preventing international crime and a number of domestic reforms, as well as academic conferences on issues related to terrorism. (Öjendal 2004)

Secessionist movements, regional rebellion, communist coups d’etat, regime maintenance and socioeconomic inequity remain the basic internal security threat for most ASEAN states.

In South America, two terrorist attacks claiming the highest toll of the 1990s happened in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. For MERCOSUR members, the security dimension has taken a new direction and they have to make progress towards confidence building and increased cooperation between members to effectively fight terrorism and maintain peace within the region. Thus from the aforesaid points, we can ascertain that there is still a long way to go towards an integrated security policy for MERCOSUR. The relationship of mistrust, suspicion and uncertainty between
members and outdated ideas of security needs to be changed. A shared perception of threats and common goals is the need of the hour.

SECURITY PREDICAMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION

From what has been said above, security and its perception, for many of the Third World states continue to be the main source of strain for any regional integration movements. Security for these regions always goes beyond the common issue of the state's ability to protect its resources and borders. The meaning of security for these states rather spans the dimensions of food, environment, economics, elites, society, culture and the legitimacy and survival of the states and regimes. The Cold War has ended and the international system has changed. In the changed situation, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the SADC must also change their security agenda and embark on a new series of confidence building measures so that they could adopt new agendas and make progress towards regional tie-ups and cooperation that Third World countries need to develop. But before all these, their very concept of security has to change. Unless this is done, regionalism and economic cooperation and development will not change. In a changed world, the mindset should also change. Instead of adopting rhetoric, as in the case of the Venezuelan idea of a joint MERCOSUR army, they need to look at the reality of things around them and the level of development and cooperation amongst them first.

The different views and approaches to security have been studied. It has also been argued that applying Western conception and models tend to be inaccurate because they have been developed in countries where the questions of nation building, legitimacy of states have already been answered. Such approaches could not fit into Third World political order. In the first chapter we have seen the approach to develop a "sense of community". According to Karl W. Deutsch (1957: 5), this community can be brought about through "a belief on the part of the individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be solved by process of peaceful change." However, such a "sense of community" will be hard to come by when we look at Third World realities where security does not simply mean the external military threat but to the whole range of
the state's existence including its legitimacy and socioeconomic and political order. The reason was that many concepts were developed looking at the European example, while others were developed during the Cold War when the Third World was mostly overlooked. Thus, security assumes a whole new dimension when applied to Third World reality.

Third World regionalism was greatly influenced by external and internal wrangling at all levels. During the Cold War, the international system had created a condition that led to the emergence of internal strife and, sometimes, wars. Such ill effects destroyed the thin fabric that holds Third World countries in their endeavour to come together. At the regional level, and the state level, we have seen the vast array of security issues that the Third World states need to solve for attaining a successful regional integration to occur. Unless security in all its dimensions are solved the Third World countries' sufferings and failures to launch successful regional organisations will continue.

ASEAN, most often dubbed the most successful attempt at regional integration (Acharya 1993) also needs to change the ASEAN Way. The very nature of the ASEAN Way of noninterference, multilateral consultations can also be modified to a more useful and practical way. Instead of ignoring the underlying problems and skirting the issues, they must be directly addressed. Of course, sovereignty of a member should be respected, but as a regional organisation, it is also its responsibility to effectively deal with a member’s problems in a constructive way. However, as indicated before, the Third World notion of security is quite different from other notions of security. Even between Third World countries, security concerns are different. As it is stated, “The ASEAN states, most notably Malaysia and Indonesia, also began to advance security concepts which had a distinctly regional flavor in both form and substance... Unlike Japan... the ASEAN nations give primacy in their security to requirements of internal stability, national development and social harmony, reflecting their concern with regime maintenance, their relative weakness as nation states and their sense of vulnerability to internal threats and external intervention” (Dupont 1997: 35). It was also observed that, “The nature of security problems between any two member states of ASEAN in their bilateral relations is unique in each case. Between Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance, there is a common
problem of illegal border crossing, just as between Indonesia and the Philippines. And Malaysia and Thailand share security problems along their common border as have Malaysia and Indonesia in Kalimantan in the past. Thus, common problems are likely to be easier to find on a bilateral basis between two states than in a multilateral framework". (Djiwandono 1997: 175)

Linked to all of these is the problem that ASEAN regionalism faced. It lacked in capacity and resources. These limitations are augmented by charter constraints which accord a high priority to principles like sovereignty and noninterference. In such a situation, prospects for cooperation are further reduced. Even as ASEAN had “come to be regarded as one of the most successful experiments in regionalism in the developing world” (Acharya 1993: 3), ASEAN Way or ASEAN’s informal process of noninterference has come under severe criticism. It can be said that ASEAN has never resolved any conflict. All it has done is to prevent them, or skirt the issues. When disputes arose between members, the issue is settled between them. ASEAN does not get involved in the domestic or bilateral disputes. These have led some to comment that its “central purpose seemed to consist in concealing fundamental differences of view among its members under the guise of consensus and non-interference” and that “The ASEAN Way” did not deal with underlying tensions; it simply ignored them” (Jones and Smith 2002: 103, 108).

Southern Africa was not very much affected by the Cold War politics as ASEAN was. But at the same time, communism and the attempt to contain its spread led to numerous security problems, mostly felt by the FLS. South Africa projected itself as the bulwark against international communism in Southern Africa; and it particularly targeted its neighbouring countries with any communist leanings. But the end of the Cold War eventually led to the reformation of Southern African political set up when South Africa joined the erstwhile SADCC. For the SADC to continue as a strong regional organisation, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) should not be allowed to function as its predecessor, the OPDS. Members’ suspicion of each other can be removed through a series of confidence building measures, and the adoption of a system of shared leadership. For the OPDSC to be effective, it needs to adopt a concept of security that takes into account military, political, social, economic and environmental issues. Mutual
suspicion still remains in southern Africa that led to diverse perception of security. Southern African states have not yet shared common values and visions too. An optimistic outcome that can be ascertained from the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) is that the SADC seem to have abandoned the narrow view of security that was prevalent during the Cold War period. Its agenda now includes both the politico-military threats (inter-state war, internal war, large-scale human rights abuses, war crimes against humanity, genocide, coups d'état and other forms of illegal seizure of power, poor governance and abuse of power, dangers of instability accompanying political transition periods and attacks on democratic institutions) and non-military threats (food security, mass movements of refugees, illegal migrants, humanitarian and natural disasters, disease, poverty and underdevelopment and ecological degradation) (Hammerstad 2005: 7). Another major issue for southern Africa in recent times has been the problem of AIDS/HIV. These issues have to be addressed by the SADC so that Southern African states can begin to think sensibly and seriously and embark on a journey of a successful regional integration process. Interaction and cooperation between people, individual, parties, leaders and government will help a great deal. It is now up to the states to gather pace and start the process of confidence building and cooperation in the military, political, social, economic and cultural fields.

For the countries of Latin America, the presence of the US was the main factor shaping the security issues during much of the Cold War. While being directly under its influence, the US did not pay much attention to it and as a result, Latin America played a very marginal role in world politics. It became one of the most peaceful in terms of nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons, non-proliferation, warheads or strategic carriers. In fact, the Tlateloco Treaty of 1967 created a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. It also has one of the lowest military spending in the world and one of the lowest interstate conflicts. Particularly, Latin America has largely embraced peace since the end of the right wing dictatorships during the 1980s. The region, since the 1980s has also undergone changes – changes in the governmental setup from mostly authoritarian to democratically elected governments. By the 1990s, many of the erstwhile interstate conflicts (Argentina-Chile, Peru-Ecuador, El Salvador-Honduras, Chile-Peru) had been diplomatically resolved (Steinhilber 2006: 7). The policies of rapprochements
followed both by Brazil and Argentina had also paid dividends leading to the eventual formation of MERCOSUR, one of the biggest economic groupings in the world, eventually representing 45% of the population of Latin America. When interstate wars of more than 150 years had ended, what may be expected is the further recession of such traditional threats within the region. Therefore, security issues for the Latin American countries stem mostly from internal and domestic problems. Democratic institutions in Latin America being relatively new, they are weak in their structures paving the way for nonstate actors to wreak havoc (Steinhilber 2006: 7). The internal problems therefore include drugs trafficking, arms trafficking, organised crime, environment, natural disasters, social deprivation, transnational crime, guerrilla organisations, state dysfunction and counterrevolutionary violent activities that in many cases lead to militarisation and confrontations between groups. The key risk factors for Latin America after the Cold War are associated with lack of governance, instability, and weak democratic institutionalisation (Aravena 2004: 6).

After the Cold War, as during the Cold War, international terrorism did not seem to affect the Latin American countries very much. But since the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argentina, the perception of international terrorism changed. This marked the arrival of international terrorism in the region where there has always been a feeling of being secure from this new security issue threatening the fragile peace all over the world.

In October 2003, the Organisation of American States (OAS) adopted a multidimensional security concept that included terrorism, transnational organised crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons and the connections among them, extreme poverty, social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, natural and man made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, environmental degradation, trafficking in persons, attacks to cyber security, the potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials and the possibility of access, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists (OAS Declaration on Security in the Americas October 28, 2003).
One good prospect regarding the Southern Cone is that peace seem to be secured as the two biggest states, Argentina and Brazil now have good rapport that could eventually lead to an ideal integration through MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR countries have also adopted a democracy clause through which they could expel offending governments. With the end of the Cold War, new avenues for regional and inter-regional cooperation were opened. This, however, created new issues. In spite of an average growth of 4 per cent in Latin America during 2000 (Bearman 2001: 71), Latin American countries experienced ongoing insecurity – increasing poverty in Mexico, financial crisis in Argentina, and high levels of external debt. Added to this is the Brazilian real devaluation, lukewarm commitments to regionalism, protectionism, cross border illegal activities, increasing poverty, social tension and many other problems. This was why MERCOSUR was seen as an imperfect customs union, incapable of promoting its goals. Neither was economic security secured. MERCOSUR needs to jointly address these issues. The call for the suspension of MERCOSUR by members when crises occurred reveals how shallow their commitment to regional integration and cooperation is. Such acts of indiscretion on the part of members, especially Argentina and Brazil must be reviewed so that MERCOSUR as a customs union for monetary purposes and as a regional organisation to ensure security (both political and economic) is able to achieve its goals or at least its objectives.

Internal security issues in the Third World are also another important point to be dealt with because the internal dimension of security sharply affects the regional politics and the integration process. This internal dimension of security was most important for the Third World states during the Cold War. ASEAN’s progress as a regional organisation to ensure regional security was hampered by several security issues and political tensions soon after it was formed. Disputes between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah and between Indonesia and Singapore arose, straining relationships within ASEAN states. These disputes were however resolved leading the member states to see the growing importance of ASEAN to continue to maintain regional peace and security. However, the continuing Cold War and developments in and around Southeast Asia affected ASEAN in such a way that it could not pursue its economic objectives at that moment in time.
Even after the SADCC was formed, security remained a big problem. There was no stable regional security architecture. The Windhoek Treaty, establishing the SADC committed the member states to peace and security, human rights, democracy and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The overall task of overseeing and planning was however to be done by a team comprising of the ministers of economic planning and finance (Council of Ministers). This created difficulties and problems on the security front, in effect marginalising it. While for the many members, and for that matter; most Third World states, security (political and military) is the pivotal issue that must be addressed first and effectively, such a step is not acceptable. This led some members to propose an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) which would function independently of the SADC and which would deal with the political and military aspects of security separately. This proposal soon became unpopular as it was felt impracticable to launch a new secretariat dedicated to security affairs. Besides, the issue of leadership of the proposed secretariat would also become a bone of contention and would create new security issues instead of resolving them.

Though the Cold War has ended and ASEAN has adopted several measures to ensure regional security, internally, ASEAN countries still face territorial disputes in the South China Sea, nuclear proliferation in Northeast and South Asia, secessionist movements, ethnic violence, and international terrorism. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea have, now and then, hampered the smooth functioning of ASEAN. The Spratly Islands is claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. The ASEAN-China Consultative Workshop on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea has met several times to negotiate a code of conduct in the South China Sea. This has immensely helped in resolving, to some extent, many of the issues and disputes within the area. In 2002, ASEAN and China leaders made a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea through which the parties reaffirm their “respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognised principles of international law; to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned; to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of
inhabiting on the presently inhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner" (ASEAN 2002b).

As a whole, the regions of Southeast Asia, Southern Africa and South America have peculiar kinds of security concerns different from the Western idea of security. For them, security does not alone imply being safe from external threat and having a huge stockpile or arsenal; it also means being secure from internal subversion. It also means regime maintenance and continuance, secure systems of food, health, trade and development. All these problems are interlinked. These problems challenge the legitimacy of governments which in turn results in ineffective governments incapable of ensuring security for the people. But at the same time, no single organisation or model has managed to establish strong governance for these regions to achieve these goals satisfactorily. To create a new organisation to address these issues is out of the question. The existing ASEAN, SADC and MERCOSUR organisations can lead the way in improving relations while at the same time seeking ways to ensure security for the Third World states, provided that these organisations become more proactive and sincere in its activities.