Chapter-1

China’s Evolving Position on Terrorism at the UN and Its New Security Policy in the Post-Cold War
The dramatic and unforeseen developments in international relations since 1989 have led to profound changes in the distribution of power in the global system. Moreover, the nature of the emerging regional and global scenario is difficult to fully comprehend, and analyzing foreign policy in the context of such fundamental change is a major challenge. Possibly the most important of the changes has been the implosion of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and its replacement by a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which four countries share borders with China. The Federation of Russia is by far the largest and most important of these states, but as a world power, its status is clearly not what the Soviet Union's had been. The period of the nineties saw a further spectacular rise in China's economic growth and global standing. For Samuel S. Kim, 'in the post cold-war and post-Tiananmen years, the rise of China has suddenly become all things in the eyes of theorists and practitioners of international politics-a fait accompli, a myth, an unstoppable trend, and a theoretical puzzle'(Liu, 2004: p.353).

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Socialist bloc, a period largely identified as the post-cold war phase, China's perception of the international and security situation was affected by two major incidents. The first was the fallout from the repression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations that produced a strong reaction from the western nations. This incident, abruptly but temporarily brought a halt to China's increasing economic and political engagement with the west and a renewed focus on the human rights question. Second, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union also induced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of China to reflect and reassess a range of issues—both domestically and globally. It embarked on a process of restructuring and reconstructing its global strategy and foreign policy. But the most important task for China was to evaluate the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on country's future security situation. On the one hand, the establishment of Russian federation, it was hoped, would provide a new opportunity to reestablish better relations with its immediate neighbour country compared to the Soviet period though the PRC-USSR relations appeared to be improving during Gorbachev's time. On the other hand, the main challenge was to establish fresh bilateral relations with the newly created

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8 For details on Tiananmen, please refer Cheng (1990).
neighbouring Central Asian states (Yang, 2003:17). In general terms, for China the main task was to maintain peripheral stability and contain the rising Islamic sentiments in these states, most of which shared borders with China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

Following 9/11, the increasing US presence in the Central Asian region has only added more complexity to what China has to face. Moreover, in the wake of the war against terrorism, China has perceived its periphery as such an environment that directly or indirectly relates to China’s fundamental concerns and national security (Yang, 2003: 139). This chapter would examine how terrorism gradually became an important issue in China’s Security Policy after the Cold War (leng zhan) and is divided into three parts. Part I would discuss China’s evolving “Security Concept” and the growing significance of multilateralism in its counter-terrorism strategy; Part II would extend the discussion on China’s multilateral strategy to counter terrorism at the global level by examining its evolving position, accession and participation at the UN. Part III of this chapter would critically discuss and evaluate the chief characteristics of the global order from Chinese perspective especially after 9/11.

PART-I
China’s New Security Concept and It’s Strategy of Multilateralism

The “Balance of Power” and the “Security Dilemma” are two major concepts in the theory of international relations. The prominent figure of “New Realism”, Prof. Kenneth Waltz, once said, “Rational countries living in a state of anarchy and the security dilemma would be suspicious of and hostile to each other because of their tense relations, although that was not their original idea” (Waltz, 1992:3). In this context, it can be argued that in the post-Cold War international environment it is quite natural that countries would use the “Balance of Power” to protect their own security. This would then make the “Security Dilemma” a regular phenomenon in international politics. By following Waltz’s theory, we can too argue that the “Security Dilemma” is both the root, and outcome, of the “Balance of Power,” while the “Balance of Power” is a natural demand by countries in the “Security Dilemma” (Guo, 2001:167). Prof. Waltz also warned all countries against both “practical threats” and “potential threats”, because in the security dilemma, “...measures taken by one country to increase its own security
meant measures decreasing others' security” (Waltz, 1992:3). Besides, following the neo-realist theory of international relations, the core concept of national security depends on international power distribution and reflects the country’s relative power position in the international social structure (Waltz, 1992:3).

Taking China’s cognition of security and its readjustments of such cognition as a clue in the post-Cold War era, China started putting its new security concept while economic security is still thought of highly; non-traditional security has begun to draw attention. Qin Yaqing in his paper “National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on the Interaction between China and International Society” writes that ‘China’s security (anguan) concept has begun to extend outwardly from the core realms. Other aspects of security such as environmental security have attracted more attention and so is international and regional security. It can be said that the new security concept of China featuring cooperative and mutual security is the new thinking of the post-Soviet disintegration and post-Cold War thinking of the third-generation leaders’ (Qin, 2002:SIIS online Journal).9

Under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and policy of opening up to the outside world, China experienced rapid economic growth in the 1980s. During this period, violent and terrorist activities were mostly economic in nature.10 The major terrorist or criminal activities like drug trafficking generally originated from the north-west (Afghanistan-Xinjiang) and south-west (the triangle region-Yunnan). According to Prof. Pan Guang,11 views that ‘on the whole, these incidents of those time were treated by the Chinese government as ordinary criminal acts which were primarily targeted and motivated towards the Chinese economy...The Chinese authorities began to feel the threat of terrorism only when terrorist violence was committed by the separatist “East Turkistan” movement in Xinjiang in the early 1990s’ (Pan, 2004:523-532). He holds with the view

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9 Qin Yaqing is a professor in the Institute of Diplomacy at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS). Shanghai.

10 Violent and terrorist activities were mostly economic in nature means it was basically related to economic and finance areas; like robbing banks, taking hostages and drug trafficking. Most of such activities took place in the eastern coastal regions, where the economy and overseas connections were more developed.

11 Director of the Institute of European and Asian Studies, SIIS, Shanghai.
that terrorism as a security issue for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is relatively a post-Cold War phenomenon and that China’s growing concern with terrorism starts with its domestic worries relating to the issue of ethnic separatism and religious extremism and directly impinges on China’s national security policy. Prof. Pan also argues that in the early 1990s, “when international relations were undergoing radical transitions of the early post-cold war era, Chinese leadership under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping were already considering how to transcend the cold war mentality and construct new notions of security, new state-to-state relations and new patterns of regional cooperation” (Pan, 2004:534).

**China’s Formation of “New Security Concept”**

China’s process of engagement with security regimes began with a highly conservative approach to multilateral cooperation as China endeavoured to craft a new strategic policy to reflect the end of the cold war and its own changing security needs. However, since the mid-1990s this approach changed to reflect the PRC’s growing maturity and confidence, allowing it to pursue its own goals within regional and international security institutions more actively and effectively. While relations between China and Russia have warmed considerably since the early 1990s, other parts of the former Soviet Union, namely the Central Asian Republics (CARs), have presented new and unique challenges for Chinese security (Lanteigne, 2005:115). As a response to these challenges, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Shanghai hezhu zuzhi) (SCO) has emerged as been the tool to shape the future Chinese security as well as the new counter-terrorism strategy.

China’s concern with the rise of secessionist and Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia is a product of concerns about how these developments will influence the Muslim population in Xinjiang. The prospect of “splittism” (fenlie zhuyi) (cited in Lufti, 2001:161), the traditional term used by China to describe a forcible breaking away of Chinese territory, has been of paramount concern for China since the founding of the People’s Republic. Xinjiang is a major strategic asset to China for its proximity to Central Asian trade routes and for its petroleum and mineral reserves (Lufti, 2001:162). Therefore, China is very sensitive to the problem of separatism in that territory. In seeking to restrain extremist factions within its Muslim populations, China
has linked itself through a common cause not only to the Central Asian regimes, but also to Russia, which struggled against armed Islamic-based insurrections throughout the 1990s in northern Caucasus provinces of Chechnya and Dagestan. The Chinese scholars of the view that the creation of “Shanghai Five” agreement of 1997 provided the post-Cold War world with a new security pattern entirely different from the “Cold War mentality” (Li and Wei, 1997:5).

Briefly, since the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, “East Turkistan” separatists rarely undertook armed activities within Chinese borders, but only engaged in certain overseas propaganda under the auspices of Turkey, and certain Western countries. Prof. Pan writes that “the end of the “jihad” against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the chaotic situation in this country in the early 1990s provided the “East Turkistan” separatists with a golden chance of waging a “jihad” in Xinjiang” (Pan, 2004:524). Through the 1990s, China has feared about the emergence of unrest and terrorism in its largely Uyghur Muslim-inhabited frontiers region of Xinjiang. These concerns have heightened since the events of 9/11 with the advent of more prominent U.S. presence in Central Asia and Chinese attempts to link Uyghur separatism to international jihadist groups. The terrorist acts of violence carried out by “East Turkistan” movements inside and outside China not only have endangered China but also have posed serious threats to regional security and stability. These elements have constituted a component of the international terrorist forces and, the actions taken to crack down on the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces are a part of the international struggle against terrorism as well. This fact was well supported with the inclusion of the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)” on the list of international terrorist organizations (CIISS & HIIR, 2004:333). It is also noticed that since the incident of 9/11, a steady flow of reports from the international media—as well as official PRC releases (a document on “East Turkistan” terrorism, a White Paper on Xinjiang, and a list

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12 The actual activities of the “East Turkistan” separatism in China can be traced to the great uprising of the Hui people in the mid-19th century. At the time, Yaqub Beg, the Muslim leader who led the expedition against the rule by the Qing dynasty, turned for fully 10 years (1867–77) parts of Xinjiang into a kingdom independent of the Qing control. Nevertheless, it was in the 1930s and 1940s that a so-called “East Turkistan” state was really established. Uygur separatists established the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkistan in November 1933, but the regime collapsed in less than five months. In November 1943, the Eastern Turkistan Republic was set up in Urumqi, but it lasted half a year only (Pan, 2004:523-532).
of terrorist groups) have prominently highlighted the separatist and terrorist crisis in the Xinjiang region (CIISS & HIIR, 2004:334).

Li Wei, the Director of the Counter-terrorism Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC writes that 'in the light of the developments in the last decade, the realistic threat of terrorism faced by China primarily originates from "East Turkistan" terrorist forces' (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:331). He also views that 'the terrorist acts of violence carried out by "East Turkistan" elements inside and outside China not only have endangered China but also have posed a threat to regional security and stability'. In a similar view, stressing a new security policy and strategy, Yang Yan Li, Deputy Director General of the Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his Foreign Affairs Journal article writes that ‘in the face of the ongoing complex and profound changes in the global security situation...it might be worthwhile to take a closer look once again at China’s perception and policy on security cooperation’ (Yang, 2003:17-19).

Even Prof. Li Yihu, Secretary General of Association of International Political Studies of the Beijing University views that “in the post-Cold War period,...non-traditional security issues caused by international terrorism have become more and more serious against the background of settlement to a great extent of traditional security issues through the enhancement of cooperation between nations, of international norms and of effectiveness of international systems and international laws” (CIIS and HIIR, 2004:270-271). Similarly, an article in People’s Daily pointed out that ‘to conform to the changing international situation, China has made a timely adjustment to its national security conception. China maintains that a universally-accepted new security model should be set up to replace the Cold War mentality and bloc politics. To lay a political foundation and provide a pre-requisite for global and regional security, China proposes countries should establish relations with each other on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (People’s Daily, 30 June 2002).

In this context, Xiong Guangkai’s14 presentation paper at the Munich Conference of International Terrorism on The Global Challenge of International Terrorism speaks about the “New Security concept” and links the national security with foreign policy of

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13 My interaction with Li Wei, the Director of the Centre for Counter-terrorism Studies, CICIR in Beijing.
China. The paper mentions that "... the growing threat of terrorism to human security shows that the issue of security in today's world touches on broader issues and is becoming more global. Nations share more common interests and are increasingly interdependent in terms of security" (Xiong, 2003). With this in mind, in order to secure an international environment of peace and shape a future in which all human beings can enjoy prosperity and security, the Chinese Government believes it important to foster a new security concept that keeps pace with the times and to enhance mutual trust through dialogue and promote security through cooperation.

The new security concept initiated by China has four pillars, namely "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination" (Xiong, 2003). This paper also defines the four pillars of the "new security" concepts as follows:

- "Mutual trust" means nations should think beyond the difference in ideology or social systems, discard the Cold War mentality and power politics and refrain from mutual suspicion and hostility.
- "Mutual benefit" means that nations should meet the objective demands for social progress in the time of globalization, respect the security interests of one another and try to create conditions favourable to the realization of security of others while pursuing security interests of their own with a view to realizing common security.
- "Equality" means all nations should be regarded as equal members of the international community despite their different size and strength, and respect and treats one another on an equal footing. Nations should not intervene in the internal affairs of others, but rather promote the democratization of international relations.
- "Coordination" emphasizes that disputes should be settled peacefully and nations should promote extensive and in-depth coordination on security issues of common concern to remove the hidden perils and avoid wars or conflicts' (Guangkai, 2003).

The fundamental elements of what has been dubbed "the new concept of security" are "common security" based on common interests (as contrasted to the traditional single-state security), "cooperative security" (since the security of all states is clearly interlinked and interconnected); "multidimensional security" (security is no longer understood in politico-military terms but now is far broader and includes economic, scientific, technological, environmental, cultural as well as other non-conventional aspects); and finally, "comprehensive security" which underscores the necessity from the non-traditional security threats such as terrorism (kongbu zhuyi), drug trafficking (pandu).

14 Xiong Guangkai is the Deputy Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China.
pandemics, environmental degradation, ethnicity, identity, intervention, migration, fragmentation, financial instability, energy security etc., which are often also interlinked, which have gained in importance and danger (Acharya, 2006:28).

**Rational Behind Multilateralism**

In the existing literature on Chinese foreign policy, it is argued that China is often portrayed as a reluctant and suspicious participant in multilateral diplomacy, particularly in the domain of security multilateralism (Lanteigne, 2005:10). As a staunch advocate of the Westphalian international system of nation-state and national sovereignty, China is more comfortable dealing with other nations bilaterally rather than multilaterally (Hongying, 1997:158). Since entering the United Nations (联合国) (UN) in 1971, China’s perception of the UN, particularly its function of collective security in international and domestic conflict resolution, has experienced some significant changes: from being suspicious and non-participatory to being passively involved with reservations to being a more active and conscious advocate of multilateralism and the UN (Jianwei, 1999:75-81). Indeed as late as 1999, some Chinese elite still regarded multilateral diplomacy as a taboo that should not be touched. Yet, the beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed China’s increasing embrace of multilateralism in its foreign policy and a flurry of new initiatives and practice of multilateral diplomacy where security has of course been given the prime importance.

If we look at China’s association with international institutions since the 1980s, participation has been a crucial component in its multilateral approach to foreign policy and to the advancement of state power. China’s embrace of multilateralism, however, has been more forcefully reflected in its regional foreign policy. Ever since the Western sanctions against China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China has implemented the so-called “peripheral diplomacy”, or “good-neighbourly policy”, to break the post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation (Lanteigne, 2005:7). While initially a tactical measure to counter the Western pressure after Tiananmen, the peripheral

15 A Chinese scholar of international relations quoted from his conversation with an army official in his article on Multilateralism. A general of the Chinese Defense University warned him: “China should not get involved in multilateral diplomacy. It is not suitable for China. You scholars could do a lot in other areas, but don’t touch this subject. In any case, for China, multilateralism will do more harm than good” (Wang, 2001:3).
diplomacy has gradually gained strategic significance in the entire Chinese foreign policy. This strategic adjustment was first implemented by traditional bilateral diplomacy, through improving relations with the former Soviet Union and later Russia as well as through establishing diplomatic relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries.

Starting from the late 1990s, however, multilateral diplomacy obtained its salience in China's peripheral or regional strategy. There has emerged a consensus among the Chinese foreign policy establishment that multilateralism might be the most effective means to mitigate the suspicions of China's Asian neighbours, maintain good relations with China's neighbours, and increase its influence in the region (as cited in Lanteigne, 2005:2). Some scholars like Pang Zhongying advocate that China's Asian strategy should be the so-called “flexible multilateralism” (as cited in Lanteigne, 2005:3). This “flexible multilateralism” means that China will not pursue a single model of multilateralism in the region. Instead, China will take different approaches of multilateralism according to different geopolitical and geo-economic conditions. It is interesting to note that the scholars in the field of Chinese foreign policy and politics, opine that what separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status (as cited in Lanteigne, 2005: p.1). Jianwei Wang writes that China's accelerated pace in global and regional multilateral diplomacy is not just a kind of ad hoc, short-term reaction to outside stimulus. It also reflects its overall assessment of the nature and trends of the international system and the international environment, its evolving concepts of national security, and its deepening understanding of the function of multilateral diplomacy under new circumstances (Wang, 2005:160).

16 Jiang Zemin defined this strategy at the Sixteenth Party Congress as “building a good neighbourly relationship and partnership” with China's neighbours (Xinhua News Agency, 17 November 2002).

17 Pan argues that although China's Asian neighbours always want to use multilateral mechanism to check China, China should not be afraid of multilateralism and should not reject it. Rather China should positively and actively pursue multilateralism in the region to safeguard China's national interest and security.
At this point, it might be appropriate to discuss how China has shifted from passive-individualist response to active participation and even initiation, of multilateral diplomacy, which has increasingly become an integral part of Chinese foreign policy to counter terrorism. The following section will focus on the evolving Chinese participation at the global fora like UN to fight against terrorism. China’s multilateral approach to counter terrorism does not merely serve the traditional function of external balancing or utility generating; it also indicates China’s growing interest in establishing a less-instrumental, more rule- and norm-based international order (Pan, 2004:527). Under the new international circumstances, and with a new understanding of the international security situation, especially after the 9/11 incident, multilateralism has been increasingly regarded as a more effective means to address China’s security concerns. In fact, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, head of the Chinese delegation, at the First Committee of the Fifty-Eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly opines that instead of just reacting or responding to the call of multilateralism by others, China “should vigorously promote multilateralism”. With regard to counter-terrorism, China’s increasing multilateral practices need to be examined closely.

PART-II
UN, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CHINA’S ACCESSION

Terrorism emerged as a serious international issue following the February 1972 Munich Olympics massacre in which eleven Israeli athletes were killed. Although “terrorism” has been in public discourse for more than two hundred years, with this incident, the serious threat of “International Terrorism” was perceived and debated by the members of the United Nations (UN). There was pressure on the People’s Republic of


19 Against the backdrop of increasing terrorist incidents, including acts of violence against national leaders, diplomats, international passengers, and civilians in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim asked the General Assembly to place the issue of terrorism on its agenda in 1972. He acknowledged that the problem was complex and not easy to solve but pointed out that far from being an isolated domestic activity, terrorism was taking on an increasingly international character, both in terms of its violent expression and its root causes, that it was becoming increasingly sophisticated owing to modern technology, and for these reasons, that it needed to be discussed in an international setting.
China (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghequo) (PRC), which had been admitted, to the world body in 1971, to react to this incident.

On 25 October 1971, the 26th UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 with a majority unseating representatives of Taiwan from the UN and its related organization and bringing in the PRC. Although the entry of the PRC into the UN was supported by much of the third world with the expectation that it would become an active proponent of the Non-Aligned Movement, the PRC has had mostly a passive role within the UN since 1971. It has only rarely been an active mover of events within the UN and this occurs mainly when it perceives its national interests to be at stake. Looking at the Chinese position at the UN during this period, it was one of the rare occasion where the PRC government reacted and participated in the debate on international terrorism. In general terms, the initial Chinese position (weizhi) on terrorism (kongbu zhuyi) can be assessed from the first UN debate on the Munich Olympics massacre of February 1972.

A first attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations, but the convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence. The UN member states still have no consensus regarding the definition. In addition to this, many governments in the world have failed to appreciate the extent and implications of the terrorist threat to modern societies. As a result, a large number of countries are still short of confidence and commitment to deal effectively with the challenge. It is clear that the major reason for this failure is the definitional and moral clarity over what constitutes terrorism and terrorists. Every sovereign state reserves to itself the political and legal authority to define terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs. And yet, some governments speak with a bewildering variety of voices on the subject of terrorism. Terminology consensus would, however, be necessary for a single comprehensive convention on terrorism, which some countries favour in place of the present 13 piecemeal conventions and protocols. The lack of agreement on a definition of terrorism has been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures. In order to cut through the definitional Gordian knot, terrorism expert

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20 For sources on the definitional issues of terrorism as well as for literature on the general topic of terrorism, see, for instance, (Alexander, 1991; Crenshaw (Ed.), 1995; Hoffman, 1999; Laqueur, 1999; Reich, 1998).
A. Schmid suggested in 1992 in a report for the then UN Crime Branch that it might be a good idea to take the existing consensus on what constitutes a "war crime" as a point of departure. If the core of war crimes - deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking and the killing of prisoners - is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism as "peacetime equivalents of war crimes" (Report of the Working Group of the Six Committee, Item No.148-166).

The debate of 1972 was a failure and didn’t arrive at any conclusion; this debate in UN left the issue of terrorism as complicated and opens over its definitions and nature for the years to come. In the UN debate on the terrorist attack 1972 China opposed US government’s draft *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism*\(^1\) tabled in the General Assembly, which was explicitly and deliberately limited to certain acts of international terrorism and did not suggest any legal definition of the phenomenon. Exactly after thirty years, the debate following 9/11 in the UN, China was more active, prompt and immediate to support many US and UN actions against terrorism (refer Table II) and moreover, to impress both UN and US, it released an official *Position Paper Against International Terrorism* (Permanent Mission of the PRC: 2001).

The then Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, while drawing the attention of the various countries of the world, commented that the UN should not remain a "mute spectator" to such acts of terrorist violence but should prepare concrete measures to prevent further bloodshed. Many countries of Asia, Africa and the Arab world, by opposing the Secretary General’s view (which was supported by Western countries) argued that “people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force” (Hacker, 1976:174). The non-Western countries tried to justify their position and views by arguing that all genuine liberation movements were invariably decried as “terrorists” by the regimes against which they were waging their struggles and it was not the violence per se

that was relevant as much as its "underlying causes" which included "misery, frustration, grievance and despair" that led to the violent acts.\(^22\)

The General Assembly, in referring the agenda item to its Sixth Committee on Legal affairs, foreshadowed the basic outlines of the debate on terrorism that followed by giving the agenda item the rather explicit title of: "Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes".\(^23\) In that committee, the United States introduced a draft convention for the prevention and punishment of certain acts of international terrorism, which provided that rectifying states would impose severe penalties in punishment of terrorist acts.\(^24\) The United States supported the convening of an international conference to establish a convention. The Soviet Union preferred that a convention result after consideration by the International Law Commission. Both countries disavowed the use of terrorism for any purpose, including that of national liberation. However, a number of Third World countries expressed the view that Western governments had long tolerated brutal, inhumane, and terrorist treatment of oppressed and colonized peoples and only now reacted when this mistreatment manifested itself in international terrorism.

\(^22\) It's been noticed that international law tolerates acts of war undertaken by states for legitimate reasons, such as self-defense and as a collective punishment for aggression, especially when they are undertaken by the armed forces of countries and protect innocent civilians, terrorism explicitly targets innocent civilians. However, acts of terrorism have been very common in the post-World War II era, often in connection with struggles for national liberation and self-determination, which complicates any effort to outlaw or punish terrorist activities, especially when they are financed or supported by the policies of governments. The issue was also significant in the UN setting, because the secretary-general himself sought to have the matter included on the General Assembly agenda.

\(^23\) In November 1972, the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) considered these articles and, in Resolution 2926, invited States, specialized agencies, and interested inter-governmental organizations to submit their written comments concerning the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other protected persons. Debate over this title evoked considerable controversy, and the decision to include it on the agenda was effected by a vote of 66 to 27, with 33 abstentions, indicating that many states even had reservations about discussing this thorny issue.

\(^24\) Weighing heavily on the minds of many speakers were the recent attacks on Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich. Many delegations held that all such acts undermined international order and required priority attention.
As a newly appointed member of UN as well as being a nation from the Third World, there was enormous pressure on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to comment, react and participate in the prevailing debate. In general terms, the Chinese response to and understanding of terrorism can be seen from its support for the national liberation movements worldwide. In the early 1970s, its endorsement of individual armed struggles was actually quite sparing: only 23 out of a possible 120 revolutionary and armed struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America in 1965 (Van Ness, 1970:82). Nonetheless, China’s entry to the UN marked a decline in verbal support for ‘people’s war’ in favor of emphasis on a united front within the Third World against superpowers ‘hegemony’ and power politics. This new policy reflected greater emphasis on relations with regional governments and, following its admission to the UN (jianhequ), China quietly halted support to groups seeking the overthrow of governments with which it had diplomatic relations (Kim: 1974:178-182).

But the post-Cultural Revolution moderation of Chinese sponsorship for ‘people’s war’ worldwide was not immediately evident in the Middle East where, during the early 1970s, China continued to advocate armed struggle as the only way to achieve victory over Israel (Van Ness, 1970:83). It is quite important to note that Arab as well as US and Soviet peace initiatives were rejected by China. The evidence in this regard can be seen in the March 1972 ‘Hussein Plan’ for a United Arab Kingdom comprising the east and west banks of the Jordan, which was deplored by People’s Daily as ‘a wicked conspiracy of the Jordanian reactionaries’ (People’s Daily, 18 March 1972). Later that year China refused to support the Jarring peace mission or to join big power talks on the Middle East. Reacting for the first time on any conflict situation especially on a sensitive issue like terrorism, in that October 1972 debate in the Sixth (legal) Committee of the General Assembly, the Chinese representative declared that activities of Palestinian and African liberation movements did not constitute terrorism. The Chinese delegation went to the extent of arguing that by calling for measures against terrorism, the UN was in fact proposing to deprive the “oppressed nations and peoples” of the only effective weapon which they could use to oppose “imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and Israeli Zionism” (Weng, 1972:30).
Referring to the 1972 'Munich Massacre' of Israeli Olympic athletes as detrimental to the Palestinian cause, in September 1972 while condemning retaliatory Israeli air strikes on Palestinian targets in Syria and Lebanon, Huang Hua told the UN: 'The occurrence of the Olympic incident...is unfortunate. we have never seen such adventurist acts of terrorism' (Peking Review, 1972: 13). Although Chinese ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua voted for the Security Council condemnation of Israel (26 June 1972) for attacking Lebanon, Peking Review asserted that: "China has reservations on the wording 'deploring all acts of violence' in the resolution, which makes no distinction between right and wrong, or between the aggressor and the victim of aggression and other ambiguous wording and phrases" (Beijing Review, 1972:21). This was the PRC's first official position at a global forum. However, with the introduction of open-door policies in 1978, Deng Xiaoping's domestic economic modernization considerations began to play a greater role in China's international image. Decreased tensions with the superpowers allowed China the strategic space for improving its relations and project itself as a 'responsive and responsible' power. This included making its stand more clearly to the world on the issue of terrorism, in 1985 Premier Zhao Ziyang clarified China's previous ambivalent stand on terrorism by declaring that; "We oppose all forms of terrorism and the practice of using terrorism as a means in political struggle" (Xinhua, 1985:A-3).

Almost after thirty years after the 1972 UN (lianhequo) discussion, during the debate following 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the Chinese government while releasing the official “Position Paper Against International Terrorism” stated, “The Chinese Government opposes and condemns all forms of terrorism and is against using terrorism as a means of achieving political objectives” (italics added) (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China, Geneva: 2001). There has thus been a rather long march from the initial position on terrorism taken by China to its current stand at UN. The 2001 Position Paper Against International Terrorism also stressed that “China supports all efforts aimed at strengthening anti-terrorism conventions within the framework of the United Nations, including the early completion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism”. What is really interesting to
observe that in the aftermath of 9/11, the Chinese government has attached more importance to the enhancement of international counter-terrorism cooperation through multilateral mechanisms like the UN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Shanghai hezhu zuzhi) (SCO). More impressively, in the rising fight against international terrorism, China has supported the adoption of a series of counter-terrorism resolutions by the UN Security Council and has maintained that the UN charter and the principles of international law must be observed in the counter-terrorism process.

Professor Li Yihu, Secretary General of Association of International Political Studies of All-China Institutes of Higher Learning in his article “Strengthening the Role Played by the United Nations in the International Struggle against Terrorism” writes that “...In a sense, the United Nations and other international organizations have become an organic component of the international order and one of the basic factors of “state of autonomy” which has emerged in the international community” (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:267). Justifying the rationale behind the fight against terrorism (kongbu zhuyi) through UN, Prof. Li writes that in the field of international struggle against terrorism, the important role played by the UN in recent years has attracted much attention: First, the UN has provided the legitimacy of striking international terrorism (guiji kongbu zhuyi) through international cooperation; Secondly, the role played by the UN in the international struggle against terrorism cannot be matched by any other international organization; Thirdly, the UN has already done a great deal of work in the international struggle against terrorism.

The Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Security, PRC, Yang Huanning in his paper “New Features of the Current International Terrorism and the Basic Principles of the Chinese Government on Counter-Terrorism” writes that “the task of counter-terrorism is arduous and the road is long looking at the new features of international terrorism” ‘(sic)’...the Chinese government has all along resolutely opposed and denounced all kinds of terrorism, and has taken all necessary steps to prevent and crack down on terrorism according to law” (italics added) (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:183). Following this line of argument, Xiong Guangkai views that “terrorism and counter-terrorism have been the primary driving force on which the development of the international situation hinges. It was against this backdrop that a new round of adjustment of the major power relations
was kicked off, and cementing the cooperation of fighting terrorism has become the common view of the international community, and as a result, terrorism has become "a political rat" (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:165). Supporting UN norms to fight against terrorism, Xiong Guangkai also goes on to say that the Chinese government has shaped up a systematic and comprehensive stance on the issue of counter-terrorism and they are:

- 'China is against all (italics added) kinds of terrorism;
- China maintains that international community should take the same stand and concerted actions to crack down upon terrorist activities regardless of where and at what time they happen, their organizers or in whatever form they take (italics added again). No double standards should be practiced in dealing with terrorism;
- The scope of fighting terrorism should not be broadened infinitely. Counter-terrorism should not be related to a specific nationality or religion, and should not (sic) broaden the scope of counter-terrorism willfully;
- Fighting against terrorism should not exacerbate national conflicts, religious hatred and civilization clashes, and should not foment the feelings of estrangement among people.
- Counter-terrorism should be an operation of treating both the cause and the symptoms of the problem;
- The struggle against terrorism should be carried out by sticking strictly to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the commonly recognized regulations of the international laws. The Chinese government advocates that a fair, rational and effective (italics added) international mechanism for fighting terrorism should be established as quickly as possible and full play should be given to the leading role of the UN and the Security Council in fighting terrorism;
- China is willing to join all the countries in the world to prevent and to crackdown on terrorism and to cement cooperation with other countries in terms of information sharing with regard to counter-terrorism, cutting off the financial supply for terrorism, extraditing and expatriating suspects of terrorist crimes, in particular' (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:170-172).

In addition to this, Xiong also writes that China, being a responsible power has been energetically taking part in the international struggles against terrorism and has done a great deal of effective work and the following actions testify to it:

- 'The Chinese government has been constantly and seriously implementing the related resolutions adopted by the UN;
- China is a pioneer in the initiation of strengthening regional cooperation in terms of opposing terrorism, has been vigorously participating in experience exchange and cooperation within SCO, APEC, and ASEAN forum, and has inspired SCO to establish a regional standing organization of counter-terrorism;
- China's effort in cracking down on “East Turkistan” terrorist forces has, in its own way, made great contributions to the international struggles against terrorism' (CIISS and HIIR: 2004: 171-72).
Furthermore, the most important statement or policy position of the Chinese government can be seen at the 56th Session of the General Assembly of UN on Item 166 (Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism), when Wang Yingfang said that "The Government of China firmly opposes and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It is China's basic policy to prevent and combat all terrorist activities... The Chinese Government is determined to fight resolutely, together with all other States, against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations" (italics added). Further elaborating on this, Wang Yingfang said at the United Nations, Security Council Meeting, held on January 10, 2002, that "international terrorism causes tremendous losses of life and property of innocent civilians and seriously endangers human society and political and economic order of countries, thus constituting a serious potential danger against international peace and security. He added that China supports the United Nations in strengthening its work in preventing and fighting terrorism and favors continued strengthening of cooperation among member states".25 Here, what is interesting to note is that the PRC's position in the aftermath of 9/11 has been clear and consistent and moreover, China has begun clearly supporting the UN actions, treaties and conventions on terrorism. As a result, China has given its consent to 12 international conventions against terrorism out of the total 13 conventions (Refer Table-I).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHINA'S STATUS IN UN TERRORISM CONVENTIONS</th>
<th>YEAR OF ADOPTION</th>
<th>STATUS OF CHINA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Conventions on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed On Broad Aircraft</td>
<td>14 September 1963</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Convention for the Suppression Of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft</td>
<td>16 December 1970</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Convention for the Suppression Of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation</td>
<td>23 September 1971</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Prevention and Punishment of</td>
<td>14 December 1973</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 In early January 2002, the Chinese government transmitted the text of the amendments to the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, as an addendum to a report it had submitted to the committee in December 2001 on its implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373(2001).
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Convention against the Taking Of Hostages</td>
<td>17 December 1979</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Suppression of Unlawful Acts Of Violence at Airport Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression Of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation</td>
<td>28 February 1988</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation</td>
<td>10 March 1988</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf</td>
<td>10 March 1988</td>
<td>State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Marking of Plastic Explosives For the Purpose of Detection</td>
<td>1 March 1991</td>
<td>Not Signed Yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Suppression of Terrorist Bombings</td>
<td>15 December 1997</td>
<td>Signatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism</td>
<td>9 December 1999</td>
<td>Signatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism</td>
<td>13 April 2005</td>
<td>Signatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State Party fulfills and implements domestic legislative legal practices to bring about the legal application of the Treaty by the government and other entities to which the Treaty is applicable. A Signatory State refers to a State whose competent authority or representative has affixed its signature to a Treaty text thus indicating acceptance of the Treaty and a commitment not to undertake any actions that would undermine the purpose of the Treaty.


IMPLEMENTING AND FOLLOWING UN STANDARDS

After 9/11, the Chinese government has supported almost all the counter-terrorism resolutions and actions adopted by the UN and its Security Council (Please refer the Table I and II). China has stressed that the way to eradicate terrorism was to address the "root causes" under UN auspices than through exclusively unilateral military means. The Defense White Paper, 2002 says that "the fight against terrorism requires conclusive evidence; clear targets and conformity with the purpose and principles of the
UN Charter...The leading role of the UN and its Security Council should be brought into full play” (China’s National Defense, 2002). However, there are 13 major multilateral conventions and protocols related to states' responsibilities for combating terrorism from the UN initiatives. But many states are not yet party to these legal instruments, or are not yet implementing them (refer UN Actions Against Terrorism). The recent *National Defense White Paper (2004)* also speaks about China’s concern and continuous support to strengthen international counter-terrorism cooperation through UN. The white paper says “the PRC supported the UN, particularly the Security Council in playing a leading role in this regard, and seriously implemented Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism issues, as was shown by its reports to the Council on the implementation of Resolution No. 1373. It has actively supported and participated in the drafting of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism” (China’s National Defense, 2004).

In another section, clearing its position on a sensitive issue like nuclear terrorism, the paper “Opposition to Nuclear Terrorism” released on November 5, 2002, on [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjwy/cjyk/26211/t115386.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjwy/cjyk/26211/t115386.htm), the Official website, says that “China is firmly against any forms of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism” (italics added). This section also states that China supports the IAEA in contributing to preventing nuclear terrorist activities in accordance with the Statute and decisions of the Board of Governors. Further, China is willing to implement the related action plans of the IAEA according to the decisions of the Board of Governors. On the fight against nuclear terrorism within the framework of the IAEA, Zhang Yan, China's ambassador to the United Nations in Vienna, at an IAEA board meeting, said China has been calling for the strengthening of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (China Daily, 20 March 2002). Zhang Yan also reiterates that "China is ready to join with other countries in this effort to move cooperation in this area forward...terrorism is the common enemy of humanity and a cancer in the fabric of civilized modern society ... my government is resolutely opposed to all forms of terrorism, including nuke terrorism." Zhang further stressed that it is the unshakable responsibility of all governments to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material, facilities and other radioactive materials in their own countries. As a result,
"they should pay close attention to this matter and take practical and effective measures in light of their own conditions" (People's Daily, 19 March 2002). Highlighting the Chinese government’s position with regard to potential nuclear terrorist activities, the Chinese ambassador said:

- Governments should take necessary preventive measures together with the world community "based on a realistic assessment of the possible threat."
- On the IAEA’s role in the protection against nuclear terrorism, Zhang said ‘the focus of the agency should be placed in such aspects as organizing and participating in the development of relevant standards, guidelines and recommendations; providing training, technical advisory services at the request of member states; and cooperation and coordination with other international organizations'.
- On financing anti-nuclear terror programs, Zhang said China favors "voluntary contributions without indicative targets." "We believe it's necessary to find resources for the agency to carry out activities in the protection against nuclear terrorism. However, such funding should not affect the core activities of the agency. Particularly, it should not have any negative impact on the technical cooperation plan" (People’s Daily, 19 March 2002).

Qian Wenrong in his article “International Counter-Terrorism Coalition” in Foreign Affairs Journal of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs writes, ‘since 9/11, the world community has witnessed an all-round development of the international anti-terrorism coalition and today, we have seen that three levels of international counter-terrorism coalition have been established, they are: global counter-terrorism within the framework of the United Nations, the regional counter-terrorism coalition and the U.S.-led coalitions’ (Qian, 2003:42). He also writes that the issue of terrorism has been on the U.N. agenda for many years and for the first time the United Nations Security Council recognized that the right of military “self-defense” was applicable against terrorist acts perpetrated by non-state actors- applicable not just against the shadowy perpetrators, but against the states harbouring them (Qian, 2003:42) (see UN Resolution 1368).

Supporting Dr. Henry Kissinger’s view that an effective anti-terrorism coalition should possess four elements: “common objective, common policy, concrete means of cooperation and appropriate supervision”, Qian Wenrong has added few more points to the anti-terrorism coalition. Those are:

- **First.** Counter-terrorism should be pursued on the basis of purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and recognized norms of international law, allowing the UN and its Security Council to play a leading role.
• **Secondly,** the fight against terrorism should have concrete evidence and specific targets, avoid harming innocent civilians. Efforts should be made to prevent the arbitrary enlargement of the scope of counter-terrorism campaign, but proven terrorist forces. Full considerations should be conducted on the enlargement of the scope of counter-terrorism campaign.

• **Thirdly,** all kinds of terrorism should be opposed. The UN Security Council Resolution 1377 adopted on November 12, 2001 stresses that all acts, methods and practices of terrorism should be condemned and opposed, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed. The resolution 1373 adopted on September 28, 2001 also affirms the principle that every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards such acts. So, no double standards should be applied by any country under whatever grounds or pretexts.

• **Lastly,** cooperation should be carried out on the basis of mutual help. An effective coalition requires cleared-eyed judgments about priorities, an apprehension of others interests, constant consultations among partners, and willingness to compromise on differences between partners (Qian, 2003:42).

Highlighting the challenges and debatable issues arise out of the current international anti-terrorism coalition, he has pointed out few factors which should be given importance with regard to the future of fighting against terrorism. They are: the definitional aspect of terrorism, nature of terrorism, proper approaches to effectively fight against international terrorism and lack of an internationally recognized screening mechanism for identifying terrorist groups (Qian, 2003:42).

In another note, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), *China active in global counter-terrorism* (10-09-2002) it is maintained that, China's stance on international counter-terrorism is "clear and persistent". China supports the fight against all forms of terrorism and abides by relevant resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and Security Council. China holds that all actions against terrorism should have solid proof and a clear target and adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. China opposes arbitrarily widening the scope of strikes in the name of fighting terrorism and it also opposes identifying terrorism with any specific country, ethnic group or religion (Permanent Mission of the PRC, Geneva: 10 September 2002). Shen Guofang, the Assistant Foreign Minister of China views that like many other members of the international community, China stresses the multilateral approach and added that “we all call for the leading role of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism and the strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the recognized norms of international law” (Speech of Shen Guofang, 22 September 2003).
During the UN 54th Session of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Professor Chen Shiqiu stressed that “it is necessary for every nation to enhance international cooperation as terrorist organizations worldwide have strengthened their collusion and their terrorist activities and imposed threat upon the international community” (People’s Daily, 14 August 2002). He also stressed that ‘the United Nations and its Security Council should play the leading role concerning coordinative mechanism of justice, neutrality, ration and efficiency in the combat against terrorism’. Chen emphasized that ‘the international community should avoid double standards in the fight against terrorism. Every nation ought to treat and deal with all the terrorist activities either domestic or abroad in accordance with the same standard.’ Li Wei also believes that the fight against international terrorism should be under the strict guidelines of UN rules and regulations. The Chinese professor also pointed out that while fighting against international terrorism, it should be borne in mind that anti-terrorism activity should not necessarily be connected with specific ethnic groups or religions.26

The official website of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC further points that ‘UN Security Council should draw up a long-term and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy in line with the UN Charter...China supports a bigger role of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council’ (Position Paper, PRC at UN: 59th Session). The paper also mentions that “China endorses and has taken an active part in the formulation of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and hopes that all parties concerned will continue consultations on the remaining questions of the two conventions in a constructive and cooperative manner and adopt them as soon as possible” (Position Paper, PRC at the UN: 59th Session).

In another section of the above source, China seeks cooperation worldwide to fight “East Turkistan” terrorists (15 December 2003), the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland appealed on behalf of the China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for greater international cooperation in combating terrorism after

26 My interaction with Li Wei in Beijing.
issuing a list of the first identified "East Turkistan" terrorist organizations (Permanent Mission of the PRC at the UN, accessed on 23 February 2006: http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zt/zgfk/t89059.htm). Responding on the decision of UN Security Council to add “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)” to the UN list of terror groups, the Chinese spokesperson Kong Quan said “The "ETIM" is part and parcel of the international terrorist forces and has carried out a large number of violent terror incidents both inside and outside China and is a severe threat to regional peace and stability. The Chinese side will continue to intensify cooperation with the international community to fight against terrorism in all forms including the Eastern Turkistan Terrorist Organization” (accessed on 25 January 2006: http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zt/zgfk/t89059.htm). Yet another Position Paper on UN Reform released on June 7, 2005 carries a substantial section on ‘counter-terrorism’ strategy. Emphasizing multilateralism, promoting democracy and rule of law in international affairs and urging reforms in United Nations, the position paper says, “China stands for and supports the fight against terrorism in all forms and manifestations (italics added). International counter-terrorism efforts should give full play to the UN leading and coordinating role, address both the root causes and symptoms and avoid politicization and double standards” (China Daily, 8 June 2005).

Table-II

CHINA'S POSITION ON MAJOR UN ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM

| * China participated on the UN draft resolution of 1267 and requested that the text be limited to the issue of combating terrorism. |
| * China voted in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1368 authorizing the use of military force against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan-this is the first time China has voted for the international use of force since its UN entry in 1971. |
| * Among the thirteen existing anti-terrorism international conventions, China has acceded to nine conventions and signed three, while apparently supporting 1373 UN resolution considering it as a legal basis for future anti-terror cooperation. China has participated in the whole process of drafting the International Convention on the Suppression of Incidents of terrorist explosions/the Act of Nuclear Terrorism/funding Terrorism. |
| * China supports the UN Security Council Resolution 1377 adopted on November 12, 2001 which stresses that all acts, methods and practices of terrorism should be condemned and opposed, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed. |

* The paper is detailed in four parts: (a) development, (b) security, (c) rule of law, human rights and democracy, and (d) strengthening the UN. For the full text of China's Position Paper on UN Reforms, please refer http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/08/content_449696.htm.
* China participated and adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 on October 8, 2004. Condemning terrorism as one of the most serious threats to peace and security, China called on countries to prosecute or extradite anyone supporting terrorist acts or participating in the planning of such acts.

* China is a state party to most of the important nuclear treaties and agreements such as Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Safety Convention and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and is a signatory of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

* China is a State Party to many of the main Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions such as Chemical Weapons Conventions (CWC), Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions (BTWC) and Geneva Protocol. China has issued a statement indicating its reservations to the BTWC. A number of states, including China, declared upon their accession to the protocol that it would cease to be binding on them if their enemies, or the allies of their enemies, failed to respect the prohibitions of the protocol. A set of voluntary confidence building measures agreed to at the Second Review Conference of the States Party to the BTWC (1986) under article V, and China submitted information on BTWC Confidence Building Measures from 1997-2002. China’s stand is not known in two WMD delivery systems such as International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile and Proliferation Security Initiatives. But China has issued statements of support in favour of Proliferation Security Initiatives.

* China is a member of both Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group. Although China is not a member of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but it has shown willingness to adhere to its guidelines, and announced in November 2000 that it would refrain from helping other countries build ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. At the same time, China is not a member of other two Non-Proliferation Export Control Regimes such as Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement.


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Recently, China’s top legislature passed a resolution ratifying the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,\(^28\) to protect the safety of the increasingly large number of Chinese citizens working overseas. China’s Vice-Foreign Minister said that “as China is taking a more active role in UN peacekeeping operations, the accession to this convention is conducive to the protection of Chinese personnel joining UN peacekeeping actions... If Chinese peacekeepers are harmed; China has the right to demand that relevant countries prosecute the suspects or extradite them to China according to the convention” (Xinhua, 28 August 2004).\(^29\) Another official with the Foreign Ministry said that the protection of ordinary Chinese citizens' safety overseas is

\(^{28}\) The Convention on the safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, which was formulated by the United Nations and took effect in 1995, has been accepted by 72 countries including Russia, Britain and France.

\(^{29}\) China has sent 2,500 military personnel and 220 civil police to participate in UN peacekeeping operations over the past ten years, with some casualties. The convention provides a legal basis for China to make an extradition request to other signing parties (Xinhua, 28 August 2004).
also the goal of China's accession to the convention.\textsuperscript{30} On 19 July 2004, the State Council, China's cabinet, held a special working conference to discuss the safety protection of overseas citizens and organizations. In fact, by May 2004, China had signed just 21 bilateral extradition agreements, which restrained the effort to protect its own citizens overseas, said an official with the Department of Treaty and Law of the Foreign Ministry, "so China is speeding up the ratification of some multilateral treaties to protect its overseas citizens' safety and interest through judicial means," the official said (\textit{Xinhua}, 28 August 2004).

After the September 11 incident, the Chinese government has reiterated on many occasions that it has always been opposed to \textit{all} forms of terrorism. Supporting and reiterating similar views, the Chinese experts and academics also stress the new role of UN to fight against terrorism. During the organization of China's first anti-terrorist force in July 2002 at Shenyang, Professor Wang Jianping at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) described it as demonstrating the Chinese government's resolve to combat terrorism (as cited in Lan, 2002:16). Justifying the formation of the corps', he said that its primary task is to prevent and suppress unexpected terrorist and violent activities in the region (Lan, 2002:16). Externally, China has shown active support of all UN counter-terrorism resolutions, including resolutions 1368 (China's first explicit vote in favour of the international use of force) and 1373 (aimed at disrupting terrorist finances) (\textit{US Department Report}, 2001:16). Internally, China has amended the criminal law of the PRC to address terrorism and terrorist financing (Xiong, 2003:5). The Chinese response to the US-led war on terrorism is mixed at best because China is attempting to satisfy both international onlookers by showing support for anti-terrorism efforts and international coalitions like Shanghai Cooperation Organization (\textit{Shanghai hezhu zuzhi}) (SCO), as well as domestic audiences, where the US is often demonized and seldom depicted as a reliable partner. The necessity of involving the UN and channelizing all international responses through the international organization, in "compliance with the

\textsuperscript{30} According to the report of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in 1978, only 200,000 Chinese citizens went abroad, while in 2003 the figure rose to 20.2 million. "In recent years we often heard news of Chinese citizens overseas being attacked. In Kirghizistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Chinese diplomats and citizens have been attacked by terrorists," one official said. Since the beginning of this year, 10 incidents have occurred in which Chinese citizens got attacked or killed overseas, with more than 70 wounded or dead, according to rough statistics. The Chinese government has begun to pay great attention to this issue.
international law” (Xiong, 2003:5) has been a major stand in the Chinese approach. They did however back UN Resolution 1373 endorsing the use of force, though it is clear that they would support a prominent UN role, which would ensure the Chinese relevance and influence. But the question that arises immediately is what has been the domestic fallout of this international coalition against terrorism in terms of legal reforms in China. While the objective of this study is to examine the Chinese response and position, some degree of the impact of China’s position on the domestic scenario is warranted.

Yang Fan and Zhao Binghui of the China Foreign Affairs University says that the terrorist attacks on the United States have greatly affected the world. The war against terrorism has become a central issue in international politics. It is necessary for us to reassess trends in international situation and changes in China’s security environment in these early years of the 21st century. Shen Guofang, in his keynote speech on the sub-item of “the Role of the UN Security Council in Future World Order” at the International Conference of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (21 November 2003) said that the international situation is really undergoing a complicated and profound transformation (Shen, 2003:14-15). First, security threats have taken on multiple dimensions. Traditional security concerns such as ethnic or religious conflicts and border or traditional disputes still exist, while non-traditional security threats are quickly growing. Non-traditional security problems such as terrorism, cross-border crimes, environmental pollution, population explosions, drug trafficking and infectious diseases have become the major problems impeding human development. Secondly, security threats have a complex nature. Non-traditional security threats have complicated causes and diverse manifestations. Terrorists go after their goals through violence, their activities are becoming more secretive, and means more brutal. The use of biological and chemical weapons, cyberspace and other high-tech means makes terrorists more and more dangerous. Thirdly, security threats have reached global proportions (Shen, 2003:14-15). Today, with the deepening of globalization, countries are more interdependent. Security is no longer a local issue bearing on individual countries or regions, but a global one that threatens to impede peace and development of the world. No country can keep itself out.
as a old Chinese saying goes, no individual can simply “clean the snow on his own doorsteps while turning a blind eye to others” (Shen, 2003:14-15).

In the same issue of the Foreign Affairs Journal, Major General Pan Zhenqiang, former Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of PLA, University of National Defense citing the importance of fighting against terrorism in terms of UN guidelines, writes that China is of the view that the international community should strengthen dialogue and consultation and develop cooperation, join hands in preventing and fighting against international terrorist activities, and make efforts to eradicate the root causes of terrorism. The fight against terrorism requires conclusive evidence, clear targets and conformity with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter, and the universally acknowledged norms of international law. He too writes that the international community should make common efforts to resolutely condemn and attack terrorism whenever and in whatever form it appears. In fighting terrorism, it is necessary to address both its symptoms and root causes, and adopt comprehensive measures, especially in solving the question of development, narrowing the North-South gap, and ending regional conflicts (Pan, 2003:33).

At the domestic level, China has responded positively to the recent debate on terrorism by bringing some reforms in the legal machinery. On December 29, 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted amendments to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. The stated purpose of the amendments, which entered into force the same day, was to “punish terrorist crimes, ensure national security and the safety of people’s lives and property, and uphold social order” (People’s Daily, online: 24 November 2001). The amendment was formulated “to deal more harshly with criminal acts of terrorists, for the protection of national security, social order and safeguard the safety of people’s lives and property” (People’s Daily, online: 24 November 2001). Prior to the adoption of the Amendments, the Criminal Law already included provisions punishing some “terrorist” crimes in a section of the law dealing with “Crimes of Endangering Public Security”. Most of the Amendments adopted
in late December 2001 modify existing articles in that section of the law (Xinhua News Agency, 24 December 2001).31

The amendment has detailed explanations of the criminal responsibility of a variety of terrorist activities, including spreading poisonous, radioactive or contagious material; sponsoring terrorism and executing terrorist activities; manufacturing, trading, transporting, storing, and stealing or robbing, poisonous, radioactive or contagious material; and fabricating threats of explosions, bio-chemical attacks, radiation and other terrorist information, or knowingly disseminating terrorist information of a fabricated nature. It also stipulates that people who organize and direct terrorist activities should be severely punished. In light of the spirit of the amendment, a campaign against ‘separatism, terrorism and extremism’ was launched in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Lan, 2002:17). Professor Wang Jianping said that the adoption of the Third Amendment to the Criminal Law is an important measure of China’s top legislature dealing with the current need to combat terrorism. In addition to the amendment, he stated that China’s Civil Aviation Law also contains clear-cut stipulations regarding the hijacking of aircraft and other related terrorist activities, and the NPC Standing Committee has enacted special statutes on some crimes of a terrorist nature (Beijing Review, 12 September 2002:17). However, the main changes brought about by the amendments are:

- **Amendment in Article 120 of the Criminal law**: punishment for those people who “organize or lead a terrorist organization”. Prior to this amendment, it was punishable by three to ten years’ imprisonment, which has been increased by between ten and life imprisonment. Under this provision, “active” participation in a “terrorist organization” is punishable by between three and ten years and “other participants” can be punished by up to three years imprisonment (Beijing Review, 12 September 2002:17).

- **New Provisions in Article 114 of the Criminal Law**: the existing provisions of Article 114 which punish “causing fires, floods or explosions, or using other dangerous means that harm public security” added new provisions like to punish the “dissemination”, or “illegal manufacturing, trading, transporting or storing”, or “the stealing or seizing or plundering”, of “poisonous or radioactive substances or contagious-disease pathogens” (Beijing Review, 12 September 2002:18).

11 In early January 2002, the Chinese government transmitted the text of the amendments to the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, as an addendum to a report it had submitted to the Committee in December 2001 on its implementation of Security Council resolution 1373, 2001.
- **Article 191 of the Criminal Law** speaks about the punishments of illegal financial operations or gains related to a range of crimes, including narcotics and smuggling crimes, and now it has added “terrorist crimes” to this range of crimes (*Beijing Review*, 12 September 2002:18).

Recently, during the China-ASEAN workshop for senior police officers at Beijing, a senior counter-terrorism official Zhao Yongchen said that China will draft a counter-terrorism law to strengthen its fight against terrorist activities. Zhao, the deputy director of the counterterrorism bureau of the Ministry of Public Security said that “the law will define what kind of activities are terrorist activities and measures to be taken in fighting terrorist activities” and for this “preparations for formulations of law are underway” (*PLA Daily*, 17 June 2005). He called the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces the number one terrorist threat to China, saying they have carried out more than 200 terrorist activities in China’s Xinjiang in the 1990s. Adding to this, he also said that China now faces a threat from international terrorist forces, mainly to China’s interests abroad. 2004 records show that Chinese citizens were sabotaged by terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To crackdown on terrorism, he said that it is important to cut the financial links that fund them, a tactic that requires close international cooperation (*PLA Daily*, 17 June 2005). Even in 2005, top Chinese leader Luo Gan urged law enforcement officers and armed police in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to crack down on criminals to create a safer environment for economic growth and social progress. The Ministry of Public Security said that “in the last two decades; more than 266 terrorist acts have been committed in Xinjiang, causing 160 deaths and 440 injuries” (Sun, 2005). The Ministry labeled “East Turkistan” as the main terrorist threats to China. Luo urged armed police to “keep improving their abilities of dealing with emergent events and fighting against terrorism as well as increasing combat and defense capabilities” (Sun, 2005). The PLA in Xinjiang must push forward modernization and shoulder the responsibility for safeguarding stability in the region, said Luo, who is a member of the standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee (Sun, 2005).
Does China Have a Consistent Counter-Terrorism Policy?

Terrorism comes from the Chinese word *Kongbu*, which is composed of the characters *Kong*, which translates as "terror", "fear", or "dread" and the character *bu*, which translate as "fear" or "be afraid of". But the Chinese have rarely articulated as to what specific action constitutes terrorism and this is true in China's criminal code amendments made in December 2001 establishing terrorist offences and their penalties (Amnesty International Index, 2002).\(^3\) Though the Chinese government has responded to the issue of international terrorism from time to time, the government has rarely articulated as to what specific action constitutes terrorism or a way to define the term *terrorism*. Chen Lianbi defines "terrorism (as having a) distinct political objective to create widespread terror by launching fully organized plans of indiscriminate attack on common citizens including women, children and old people as well as executive and legal institutes of the government through brutal means, namely, explosion, abduction, plundering, poisoning and assassination, and thus realize evil political goals by spreading their political message among wider mass" (Chen, 2002:58). From the official point of view, on a rare occasion, Zhao Yongchen, deputy director of the counter-terrorism department of the Ministry of Public Security in a news conference on December 14, 2003, defines "terrorists" instead of "terrorism". He defines *terrorists* as "those who have established links with terrorist organizations and who engage in terrorist activities which harm state security or the lives and property of people (whether they are Chinese or foreign citizens)" (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003). In addition to this, they must:

- Organize, lead or belong to a terrorist organization;
- Organize, plan, instigate, propagate or incite the implementation of terrorist activities;
- Fund and support terrorist organizations and terrorists to assist them in the conduct of terrorist activities;
- Receive funding or training from the above-mentioned terrorist organizations or other international terrorist organizations to engage in terrorist activities (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003).

By this definition, China includes any group or individual it perceives to be a threat to the regime including Muslim separatists, Tibetans, Falun Gong, and political and

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\[^3\] Amnesty International reports on "the lack of definition of 'terrorism', 'terrorist organization', and 'terrorist crime'". The standing committee of the National People's Congress adopted these amendments on 29 December 2001, and they entered into force the same day.
religious dissenters. While the Chinese government has provided a detailed list of terrorist organizations and individuals in its official paper titled *East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity*, it provides no concrete definition of the term “terror”, or “terrorism”. It has been noticed that potentially it has given the authorities a free hand to interpret such crimes in a sweeping rather than a narrow sense. It is interesting here to mention that the Chinese government’s use of the term “Separatism” (*fen lie zhuyi*) refers to a broad range of activities, many of which amount to no more than peaceful opposition or dissent, or the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of religion (Amnesty International Index, 2002). As there is no internationally accepted legal definition of the term “terrorism”, the above mentioned attempt of the Chinese officials to define such terms at the national level are unconvincing. The above Chinese interpretation or definition of “terrorists” does not at all fall under the parameters of the most recent definition of “terrorism” given by UN. Article 2 (b) of the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* (May 5, 2004) defines “terrorism” as “any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (Permanent Mission of the PRC at the UN).

Jia Duqiang, Associate Research Professor of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CASS, has slightly different opinion on defining terrorism. He defines that “terrorism is in general a kind of extreme criminal activities that endangers freedom, property and even people’s lives and stirs up social horror by means of using or threatening using violence. When terrorism crosses national boundaries, it becomes international terrorism” (Jia, 2005:122). He too believes that there are four types of extremist forces in China: terrorism, religious extremism, national separatism and cult. By defining each concept in a different ways, he writes that “extremism refers to all organizations or actors that harm the human society and nation-state in various radicals’ ways such as radical theory, violence and terrorist activities usually and mainly for the sake of its political agenda….. terrorism, however, is only one of extremist forms…” (Jia, 2005:121). He has also differentiated between the two most contested concepts: “Religious extremism” and
“National separatism”. For him, ‘Religious extremism refer to the forces that using religion as an instrument to facilitate and fulfill its particular radical political goals usually affiliated with violence and terrorism and in a narrow sense it refers to Islamic fundamentalism’ (Jia, 2005:122). Whereas “national separatism appertains to the type of extremist nationalism that seeks secession of an ethnicity or area it inhabited from a multi-national country via extremist means and operations” (Jia, 2005:123). Generally, two kinds/forms of national separatism can be seen in the 20th Century:

- An ethnic minority demand for autonomy or independence from a unitary country;
- An ethnic minority that was currently “divided into several parts subjecting to different countries” because of various reasons sought secession and reunion to build a new nation-state (Jia, 2005:122).

Jia also writes that “national separatism and religious extremism are often associated each other in their operations and both increasingly tend to use violence and terrorist tactics for particular political gains; often, combined with various extremist forces, which resulted in a variety of variants of terrorism such as religious terrorism, national separatist terrorism and cult terrorism” (Jia, 2005:125). For example; Al-Qaeda has the features of both international terrorism and Islamic extremism; the East Turkistan Islamic Movement as well is a national separatist organization combined with Islamic extremism and international terrorism (Jia, 2005:125-126).

Professor Jin Canrong, Deputy Dean of the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China, writes: “One of the characteristics modern terrorism exhibits is that terrorists are good at maneuvering mass media. The wider the attention their attack claims, the more likely their goals can be achieved. For terrorists, mass media can be an important way to draw public attention” (Yan, 2004:14). According to Dong Guanpeng, Assistant Dean of the School of Journalism & Communication of Tsinghua University, for one thing, they understand that terror can spread faster than any other kind of news, and for another, they understand that the U.S. media, is focused on terror. Over the past years, Chinese security experts and international relations specialists have had lively discussions on various aspects of the terrorist attacks and their implications. There are in-depth analyses of a whole range of significant issues which mirrors mainstream Chinese thinking on the world after 9/11 and on international terrorism. Most authors of
these publications are prominent scholars and influential analysts whose views are likely to attract the attention of Chinese leaders and senior government officials.33

Chinese analysts invariably regard the 9/11 incident as a terrorist act. They argue it is of an extreme and evil nature, which will have negative effects on both the US and the world. While Chinese security specialists disapprove of many aspects of US foreign policy, they maintain that nothing can justify such barbaric acts (Shi, 2002:45). They argue that international terrorism is rooted in an unjust international political and economic order, which is largely dominated by a hegemonic power, namely, the US. Yang Yunzhong has argued that 9/11 should be seen as an extreme form of struggle between hegemonism rather than a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West (Yang, 2002:5). Tang Zhichao in his article ‘Why America is hated by the Arabs’ in Global Times argued that 9/11 makes it more urgent to promote ‘democratization of international relations’ (Ni and Wang, 2002:22-26). Given the plethora of challenges in a globalizing world, some Chinese scholars such as Pang Zhongying believe it is essential to establish a new global order based on equality, justice and mutual respect (Pang, 2001:29-31). Guo Xiangang, Director of Comprehensive Research Room of China Institute for International Studies in his article “Terrorism and the Impact of Counter-Terrorism Struggle on the International Situation” writes that “Nontraditional security issue has become the main factor bearing on international relations” (CIISS and HIIS, 2004:210).

A clear picture on China’s policy on terrorism and counter-terrorism strategy is mentioned in Gunagkai Xiong’s presentation paper titled “The Global Counter-terrorism Campaign: Its current Situation and Future Prospects”, at the Munich Conference of International Terrorism on The Global Challenge of International Terrorism. This is the first paper, which discuss in details about the Chinese policy framework on counter-terrorism. Emphasizing and linking national security with foreign policy and counter-terrorism policy of China, the paper argues that “…ways to prevent and fight terrorism have become new and prominent items high on the national security agenda of major countries” (Xiong, 2003). The paper also reiterates China’s “new security” concept. This

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33 For a discussion of the advisory role of Chinese policy analysts and security specialists in China’s foreign policy-making process (see Rex, 1999:116-118).
concept features "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation" as the guiding principles of China "in formulating counter-terrorism policies and conducting international counter-terrorism cooperation" (Xiong, 2003). The new security concept has been incorporated as an important adjacent to China’s foreign policy. It also constitutes the guiding principle in China’s formulations of counter-terrorism policies and its participation in international counter-terrorism cooperation. The paper identifies the essential elements of China’s counter-terrorism policy based on the new security concept as follows:

- "We condemn and oppose terrorism of (sic) all forms and manifestations;
- We must address both symptoms and causes of terrorism;
- We must take an integrated approach to combat terrorism;
- We must give full play to the leading role of the UN in coordinating international counter-terrorism campaign" (Xiong, 2003).

However, this paper is the first paper after 9/11, which very precisely clarifies China’s conceptual policy on counter-terrorism initiatives at the global level.

Fu Mengzi, Director of the Institute of American Studies under the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in a recent major international symposium on East Asian security has said that ‘in future, China will follow a peaceful development policy where a comprehensive security concept is an essential’. The content of the “security concept” can be summarized as follows:

- ‘Security is a comprehensive concept and not limited to one area. A country’s development expands its internal and external national interests. Security in one area, such as no outside invasion, does not guarantee the essential security of a country. In other words, a strong military force cannot fully guarantee a country’s security. The September 11 events are such examples.
- Security should be mutual while not one-sided, multilateral while not unilateral, and comparative while not absolute. There is no absolute security. While people in one country maintain absolute security, those in other countries must feel unsafe. This makes security hard to realize.
- Security should be based on mutual trust. A country’s role should be evaluated objectively and one country should not seek confrontation with another country through exaggerating its threats. Cooperative security should be pursued.
- There are traditional as well as non-traditional aspects of security. During peacetime, it is more important to cope with threats to non-traditional security’ (Beijing Review, 23 May 2005).
In addition to this, Fu Mengzi also stressed that China’s security concept in military and at national strategic levels includes the following three pre-requisites:

- ‘First, is to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Though no large-scale military invasion occurred after the Cold War, China still has tough tasks to maintain border security. With the development of its economy, China will naturally increase its military expenditure, but China’s military strategy is totally defensive.
- Second, China is willing to properly solve border disputes with its neighbors on the basis of equal negotiation and mutual trust.
- Third, China should also have the ability to cope with traditional threats...Terrorism, transnational crime; environmental deterioration and the spread of diseases have become important aspects of national security environments. These challenges are beyond the ability of one country and form the basis of full cooperation among different countries’ (Beijing Review, 23 May 2005).

Another important stand and appeal of Chinese government in response to the 9/11 incident is the position of the government at the 56th General Assembly First Committee meeting. The Chinese representatives urged ‘every government to seriously reflect upon its security strategy and priorities’. The Chinese group argued that establishing a new concept of security based on international cooperation had become a pressing task (Press Release, GA/DIS/3199).

Yang Huanning, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Security, PRC views that based on its understanding of terrorism and the common wish of all the people in the world, the Chinese government stands for:

- “The aim of counter-terrorism or measures, steps and approaches taken by the international community in this regard should be conducive to safeguarding the long-term interests of regional and world peace;
- Counter-terrorism should not only aim at solving the present problems but should also keep an eye on the long term solution to this issue;
- The Security Council is the nucleus of the international security mechanism. The Chinese government supports all the relevant resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and by the Security Council. China stands for bringing terrorists to justice and supports the move of cracking down on the terrorist organizations” (CISS and HIIR, 2004: 183-184).

Following the above mentioned principles, Vice-Minister Yang also writes that China has laid down the counter-terrorism policy of “prioritizing prevention”, taking initiative to strike out, handling with high efficiency, and promoting international cooperation”. With
this policy as the framework, “China will constantly enhance the legislative work in terms of anti-terror, improve and perfect the anti-terror mechanism, build up the professional anti-terror forces, reinforce counter-measures, work hard to crack cases involving terrorism, and energetically support and take part in international cooperation on counter-terrorism” (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:184).

PART-III
9/11, CHINA AND THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER

9/11 has greatly affected the world in many ways and the most striking element of this incident is that it has really brought into question the nature and characteristics of international relations. According to Yang Yan Li, ‘in face of the ongoing complex and profound changes in the global security situation, the debate over whether 9/11 has changed everything or has not really changed anything is still underway and has been further heated by the war on Iraq’ (Yang, 2003:17-19). It might be worthwhile to take a closer look once again at China’s perception, understanding and policy on the emerging world order.

Fei-Ling Wang, an associate professor and director of the China Summer Program at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, argues that two facts of today’s international relations appear to be now widely accepted in China. First, ‘the world is organized as an anarchic nation-state political system and as an international market economy, quite unlike the “Chinese world order” of the Middle Kingdom or the promised utopian land of world communism. Second, China needs the Western capital, technology, and markets to pursue its dream of being equal to the west. Economic development is viewed as the key national objective; and conforming to, rather than challenging; the existing international order becomes the strategic choice’ (Wang, 2005:23-24). Wang says that ‘the incident of 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terrorism” changed international relations and also affected Chinese views. Without a fundamental change of its domestic incentive structure, China’s strategic assessment in the post-September 11 era has remained unchanged’ (Wang, 2005:24). However, it can be argued from the Chinese point of view that the United States is less a direct challenge for China, since US is heavily preoccupied with the task of fighting international terrorism and is expected to do so for some time to come.
Speaking in early 2003, some Chinese security analysts argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, China now “enjoys the best international and neighboring environment since the establishment of the PRC” (Wang, 2005:26). The main objectives of Chinese foreign policy remain “to seek a long-term peaceful environment for our nation’s economic construction; and to promote our economic development through opening to the outside world” (Wang, 2005:25). More specifically, China “no longer stresses establishing a new international order; rather, it is joining the existing international order” as it “realizes more and more the importance of participating in international affairs, including international organizations (Wang, 2005:24).

With such strategic thinking, Deng Xiaoping’s famous twenty-eight-word guidelines of “keeping a low profile”, proposed first in late 1989, still seems to be guiding China’s foreign policy. The same goes for Jiang Zemin’s sixteen-word guideline for China’s US policy, “Enhance trust, reduce trouble, develop cooperation, and avoid confrontation”-which was first proposed in 1993 (Xinhua, 30 December 1996). However, the pre-September 11 nationalist aspirations, concerns, and anxieties over US as a super power still remain in China. For them, “we must see not only that the US needs cooperation from the major powers in its war against terrorism, but also the fact that the US strategic objective is world hegemony...The United States still treats China as a ‘potential threat’ and has never given up on the policy of containing China” (Wang, 2005:25). Hence, China must “unequivocally oppose hegemonism while upholding the banner of anti-terrorism” (Liu, 2003:54). Some experts also argue that China must “watch out for the United States, which may take advantage of the war on terrorism and increase strategic pressure on China while seizing the opportunity presented by the war on terrorism to promote Sino-American relations” since “the United States is the main executioner of hegemonism but also is irreplaceable in the international community” (Liu, 2003: 54-56).

A senior Chinese diplomat stressed that that “the United States continued to relentlessly pressure us politically, even after 9/11 on human rights and other political issues...especially the Taiwan issue. Its basic assessment and hatred of China remains unchanged...Washington does not trust us at all and is still demonizing China and trying to contain China” (Wang, 2005:30). Jiang Zhongren in his article “Changes and Non-
Changes in the post-September 11 International Situation” in *Foreign Affairs Journal* writes that the ‘9/11 has changed both the world and the United States and the following changes can be observed: *first*, the myth of the US immunity from harm has been shattered, which compels the United States to readjust its strategic security deployment. *Secondly*, the 9/11 events aggravated the US economic recession and caused negative impact on the world economy as well. *Thirdly*, to prosecute the war on terror so as to clear potential dangers and threats to its security, the United States has no alternative but to solicit international cooperation, thus leading to improved relations among the big powers’ (Jiang, 2002:12).

Jiang Lingfei, Professor of International Relations at the University of National Defense says that the aftermath of 9/11 has highlights three basic trends in the globalization process. These are:

- ‘The first trend is the closer connection and increased interdependence among various countries.
- The second trend is the integration of the world. The September 11 incident was the reason why the United States launched a global anti-terrorism war, and also gave it an opportunity to achieve political globalization.
- The third trend is the global conflicts. Transnational terrorism was in fact an extremist reflection of the sharp differences in the worldwide distribution of wealth and East-West cultural differences. These trends actually include the globalization of world politics, such as the issue of global security; global threats to security; and global peacekeeping actions- a future world development resulting from the September 11 terrorist attacks. In other words, 9/11 has ushered in an era of global politics (Jiang, 2002:7).

Yan Xuetong in his article titled “Global Security Environment is not Optimistic” in *Beijing Review* writes that after 9/11, all major countries including China, Russia, Japan and major European countries, strengthened or improved ties with the United States, particularly China and Russia. Relatively speaking a cooperative attitude is common among countries and governments concerning international anti-terrorism and other political issues (Yan, 2002:11-13). At the same time, Yang Chengxu, Director of China Institute of International Studies holds of the opinion that ‘the 9/11 attack has not weakened America’s superior role in the world dynamics; the US has not given up its demand for world hegemony or its progressive tendency toward geo-politics due to its fight against terrorism, and dealing with threats from other countries is another big
challenge it faces' (Yang, 2002:9-10). Qian Wenrong is of the view that 9/11 'dramatically altered the international landscape on terrorism and made the entire world aware of the fact that terrorism has become one of the most serious threats to the world peace and stability and the combat against terrorism has become a pressing task without delay' (Qian, 2003:41). Furthermore, it is clear that terrorism cannot be effectively dealt with without effective cooperation. There is no doubt that the impact of 9/11 has brought a sea change in the mode of thinking and behaviour pattern of various countries decision-makers in the world. It is a catalyst which is directly or indirectly making the major powers to readjust their foreign policy and redefine their respective security concepts in the emerging world order. In this context, it is quite demanding to examine vividly the response and position of China to the major cases related to terrorism in the world. China as an important power and partner deals with these major terrorist challenges which the world is facing today. It is therefore necessary that we have an in-depth look at the Chinese perceptions and frameworks, and the factors, which shape their response to it.

As mentioned in our introduction, this study is designed to take up three particular cases to examine the Chinese response and policy patterns on international terrorism and they are: SCO, Kashmir, and the 9/11. Our next chapter which is the first case study of China's response to international terrorism is SCO, will examine how China has used this organization and deal with terrorism in the Central Asian region. This proposed case study would therefore examine and analyze China's role and effort to organize and build the SCO as a useful mechanism to raise its influence in Central Asian regions and at the same time to fight against terrorism.