Chapter Two

THEORY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO POETRY

We normally read a poem first by acquainting ourselves with the poet whom we focus our points on:

(I) date and place of birth, (II) sex, (III) social background, (IV) family, (V) religion, (VI) education, (VII) politics, (VIII) favourite reading, (IX) hobbies and interest, (X) his knowledge of the contemporary literature, (XI) who/what influence him to write, (XII) anything relevant to reactions as a reader, etc. and begin to appreciate his work. But how about reading an anonymous poet and appreciate his work? Do we just have to throw away the work for not supplying the clues of knowing the work? By no means, no. Because for the poet, the work is a secondary source. Primary sources for the poet are the 'feeling' and 'thoughts' for which he finds 'word'. But for the reader the 'words' become the primary sources through which he finds the 'feelings' and 'thoughts' of the poet.

Here the question arises: does the poetical language differ from the language used by ordinary people in ordinary business of life? We can say, yes. Although poetical language is based on everyday speech yet it differs from it. Stankiewicz says:

Form and content are inseparable in poetry. Formal requirements determine and modify content to a far wider extent than in everyday speech. In poetic discourse, in which the transmission of information is secondary to the manner of presentation, the content itself is defined and limited by the formal organisation of the message.¹

From this observation, it can be said that the language in poetry and the language used in everyday speech are different. Because poetical language aims at carefully, consciously transcripting images in the reader's mind. This is done by 'troping', that is, a twist in the expression or thought. So poets are very
particular about the language they use and employ figures of speech in their works. Greater emphasis is given to 'simile' in the Indian tradition and derives all meanings from the 'simile'. Whereas it is just the opposite in the Western literary tradition in which 'simile' is taken as a sub-type of 'metaphor'.

We can ask ourselves again: are figures of speech (called 'almkaras' in Sanskrit which means ornaments), embellishments in a poem used for decorations only? No, they are not just ornaments or willful expression of the poet. Figures of speech are used in a poem for they provide the means of expressions for those feelings and thoughts, which cannot be expressed otherwise. The figures are, in fact, epistemic devices.

Chaitanya in Sanskrit Poetics says: "The mere poetic figure, which has no organismic justification, is compared to the removable ornaments, like a jewelled wristlet or hairpin (Kataka or Keyura) for instance. And the caution is given that the figure should really be like an external limb (Bahiranga), a limb of the body which is strictly functional and structural and ideally responsive to the mind which controls the body." 2

In the similar vein V. Raghavan in Studies in Some Concepts of the Alankara Sutra talks about this relationship between feeling/thought and figures thus: "The figure is the concretisation of feeling (Rasakshipa). It is not realised by an effort which stands out as a separate endeavour from the primary one which feeling moves towards its expression (aprithag Yatna nivvartya). Thus, from feeling to resonant image or musical sound, the ideal verbal figure which realise it, poetry is one unity, one complex of rich expression." 3

Plato in Statement says, "Ornament, painting and music only to give pleasure are toys." A work of art is meant for pleasure as well as lessons it gives but we often judge a work of art by the pleasure it offers only. Plato who is always praising what is ancient and deprecating innovation (of which the causes are, in the strictest sense of the term, aesthetic), and that he ranks the formal and canonical arts of Egypt far above the humanistic Greek art (say "Greek
Geometric art”). And what Plato admired the kind of "primitive" art must not be taken for it has the kind of beauty that is universal and invariable. Coomaraswamy in his analysis of Plato on the relation between figures of speech and figures of thought while differentiating primitive art and what is modern says: "The forms of the simplest and severest kinds of art, the synoptic kind of art we call "primitive " are the natural language of all traditional "philosophy " and it is for this very reason that makes of speech, which are really figures of thought."  

1. A Critical Examination of the Figural mode (Metaphor)

Metaphor - is derived from two Greek words meta "change" and " I bear" which comes to mean transfer of significant from lone object or idea to another. The linguistic devices of metaphor have been the subjects of wide discussion since ancient times. Aristotle, in Poetics (Chapter XXI) defined metaphor as giving the thing a name that belongs to something else, the transference being either (1) from genus to species, (2) from species to genus, (3) from species to species and (4) on grounds of analogy.

Quitilian also describes four types of metaphorical transference:

(1) from inanimate to animate,

(2) from animate to inanimate,

(3) from inanimate to inanimate, and

(4) from animate to animate.

Once we recognise the figurative sentence is a metaphorical sentence, then a problem arises as to how we interpret it literally of what the poet/writer means literally. The ancient formula to 'say one thing and mean another', Black says:

"A successful metaphor is realized in discourse is embodied in the given "text" and need not be treated as riddle. So the writer or speaker is
employing conventional means to produce a non-standard effect, while using only the standard syntactic and semantic resources of his speech community. Yet the meaning of an interesting metaphor is typically new and creative", not inferable from the standard form the standard lexicon. A major task for theorists of metaphor, then, is to explain how much such an outcome-striking for all its familiarity- is brought about.

Olsen in his article, "Understanding Literary Metaphor", tries to solve the problem faced by the reader of metaphor in interpretation of metaphor literary says:

"Literary interpretation aims at a total understanding of the work, it is an attempt to connect the different elements of the poem in a coherent whole. In literary interpretation the reader identifies connections between images, characterizes their cumulative effect, the tone of the poem (...) and so on (...). The interpretation of an image may very well start with free association by the reader, guided only by his own assumption about what associations words should have, and what the object referred to by the metaphor is really like. To supplement the reader may bring in references to other uses by the another of this type of image and his use of the key terms of the image in other context."7

Frist Searle argues:

"How is it possible for the speaker to say metaphorically, " S is P" and means "S is R", when P plainly does not R; further more. How is it possible for the hearer who hears the utterance "S is P" to know that the utterance of P calls to mind the meaning and, hence, truth conditions, associated with R, in a special ways the metaphorical utterances have of calling other things to mind".

He further argues:

"Does every existing language provide us exact for expressing literally whatever we wish to express in any given metaphor? "However, Searle agrees that, we use metaphor precisely because there is:
A graphical comparison of the relations between sentence meaning and utterance meaning where the sentence meaning is $S$ is $P$ and the utterance meaning is $S$ is $R$, that is, where the speaker utters a sentence that means literally that the object $S$ falls under the concept $P$, but where the speaker under the concept $R$.

a. Literal Utterance. A speaker says $S$ is $P$ and he means $S$ is $R$. Thus the speaker places object $S$ under the concept $P$, where $P=R$. Sentence meaning and utterance meaning coincide.

b. Metaphorical Utterance (simple). A speaker says $S$ is $P$ but means metaphorically that $S$ is $R$. Utterance meaning is arrived at by going through literal sentence meaning.

c. Metaphorical Utterance (open ended). A speaker says $S$ is $P$, but means metaphorically in indefinite range of meanings, $S$ is $R_1$, $S$ is $R_2$, etc. As in the simple case, going through literal meaning arrives at utterance meaning.
d. Ironical Utterance. A speaker means the opposite of what he says. Utterance meaning is arrived at by going through sentence meaning and then doubling back to the opposite of sentence meaning.

e. Dead Metaphor. The original sentence meaning is bypassed and the sentence acquires a new literal meaning identical with his former metaphorical utterance meaning. This is a shift from the metaphorical utterance (simple, b above, to the literal utterance, diagram a).

f. Indirect Speech Act. A speaker means what he says, but he means something more as well. Thus utterance meaning includes sentence meaning but extends beyond it. 8

The most outstanding discussion of metaphor in modern times is taken up by IA Richards (1936) who devised the term "tenor" for the subject of a metaphoric expression, and the analytical term "vehicle" for the object of comparison, the metaphoric word itself.

Leech reformulates Richards's formula and brings forth the methods of analysis in three stages:

Stage I: separate literal from figurative use.

Stage II: construct "tenor" and "vehicle", by postulating semantic elements to fill the gaps of the literal and figurative interpretation.

Stage III: state the ground of the metaphors. 9

The nineteen century Philologists A.H. Sayce and Max Muller viewed that "all language is metaphor". This is argued by Bickerton (1969) and brings forth three assumptions:

(1) Words have fixed and definite meanings,

(2) The meaning of a sentence is the sum of the meanings of the words that compose it, and
(3) The interpretability of texts is mode-of-discourse free. However, Mathews argues that the above statements of Bickerton's assumptions are false and replies that:

(1) Bickerton fails to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the distinguishing of metaphor from non-metaphor, and

(2) Bickerton's theory fails to confront the problem of how metaphors are interpreted or understood, once recognized. To support that metaphor has its literal counterpart, Mathews analyses the metaphor, "The volcano burped". Accepting the fact that a volcano is not a human being, the hearer of the metaphor may see that a volcano's cone as lips, crater as mouth, vent as throat, etc., but this is not central to what it means to say that volcano burped. Understanding the metaphor does not entail these associations.

Black (1962) also devised the constituents of metaphor into pairs of terms: "Focus and frame "and" principal and subsidiary subject "Black terms focus" as the non-literal, or metaphorical constituent in a metaphor; as distinct from the literal "frame". Keeping in mind Richards's original formula, Reinhart (1980) reformulates Black's formulae into two procedures:

Given a metaphorical expression Fi[Ei],

(1) Ei is the focus if it is possible to substitute Ei for Ei, so that Fi[Ei] is a literal expression and Fi[Ej] is similar in meaning to Fi[Ei].

(2) The vehicle is the frame Fj[ ] in which the occurrence of Ei results in a literal expression, F[Ei], where Fj[Ei] is not similar in meaning to Fi[Ei].

Illustrating the above procedures, Reinhart analyses the metaphor:

'The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window panes.'

(T.S.Eliot, 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock')
...the focus is rubs its back upon, or comes up against, to yield a literal expression, such as the yellow fog that touches the window-panes. This literal expression is roughly similar in meaning to the metaphorical expression according to the definition above, since its predicate intersects in meaning with the predicate of the metaphorical expression (…)

The vehicle in this metaphor is Cat (…). This construal of the vehicle follows from definition of vehicle suggested above, since if we put rubs its back in the frame the cat that [ ], the result is a literal expression. The cat that rubs its back upon the window panes which is not, however, similar in meaning to the original metaphor, being a statement about a cat rather than about a fog.¹²

Now let us see what the Indian rhetoricians talk about figures of speech say, metaphor. The Indian theory of alankara is not new phenomenon; it is almost as old as the earliest writing of Vedas, for in Vedic literature we have Upama-Rupaka, etc. the embellishments in literature. The earliest work on poetics now available is that of Bhamaha' Kavyalankara. Bhamaha deals briefly with the forms of Kavya and concentrates on the study of figurative language, which according to him is the defining characteristic of Kavya. Bhamaha also mentions the views of others that alankara is an external element. But he refutes this by saying that figures are an essential part of the meaning, not something external.

We may mention the old school of rhetoricians Dadin, Bhamaha, Bhattodbhata, Rudrata, Bhattanayaka (6th to 18th century) and then the transition period rhetoricians, Vamana, Bhoja, etc. Anandavardhana, Kuntaka, Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka, Bhojaraja, Mammata, Hemchandra, Kesavamisra, Purusvara, Vidyanatha, Vidyadhara, Viswanatha and Appayadhikshita represent the new medieval school of rhetoricians.

Bhamaha in his book Kavyalankara accounts for rupaka (metaphor) of two kinds:

(1) Embracing or occurring in all parts (samasta-vaśtu-visaya)
(2) Occurring only in a position (*ekadesavivartin*).\(^{13}\)

Viswanatha in his book *Sahiya-Darpan* mentions *rupaka* of three types:

1. *Paramparita* (effected through casual link),

2. *Sanga* (effected by the whole song with its part) and


*Paramparita* is sub-divided into four:

The ascription of something serves as cause for the ascription of another object, it is either by words with pun or without pun, and each (of the two) is either simple or serial.

*Sanga*, if the principal together with its subordinates (or if the whole together with its constituent parts) be ascribed, and it is either *samastavastu visaya* i.e. covering the entire sphere, or *ekadesavivartin* i.e. applicable only to a position of the entire sphere.\(^{14}\)

Mammata in his *Kavya-Prakasha* defines *Rupaka* thus:

"Where there is non-difference between the 'object to' and 'the object compared', it is Metaphor". Mammata sub-divided into four types:

1. Metaphor Universal- in cases where what is imposed is directly expressed.

2. Partial Metaphor- in a case where what is imposed is directly expressed as well as indirectly implied.

3. Pure Metaphor- that which is devoid of constituent and

4. Consequential Metaphor- where as a means of the imposition there is imposition of something else, where the expressive word is either 'coalescent' (in pun) or 'distinct'.

Mammata also mentioned a type of metaphor known as Modal Metaphor (*Samasokti*) where the object is implied by means of paronomastic differentiating
adjusts. He explains this thus: When a sentence descriptive of the object meant to
be described serves to imply something else not meant to be described, through
the force of adjectives used punningly and not through any force of the object
itself, - it is Modal Metaphor- so called because it consists in a 'statement' (ukti)
of two meanings, 'in brief' (samasaṇa).

II. A critical examination of the figural mode (Simile)

The dictionary meaning of simile is the comparison or linking of two
things having some point of resemblance, both of which are mentioned and the
comparison is directly stated. Most commonly used words in similes are- 'like',
'as', 'or', 'than', and the formula 'like as ... so do' is also in use.

In the Western tradition "simile" is regarded as a version of the metaphor,
which is also traceable to Aristotle. The simile is a kind of metaphor, the
difference being, 'but slight'. Leech says:

"Simile is an overt, and metaphor a covert comparison... for each
metaphor, we can devise a roughly corresponding simile, by writing out
tenor and vehicle side by side, and indicating (by like or some other
formal indicator) the similarity between them."

Whereas the Indian rhetoricians derive all figurative languages from the
simile. According to Vamana, all figurative or indirect meanings and expression
in language are but aspects of upama- prapanca, "the constructs of similitude.

Vamana in his book Kavyalankara-Sutras divides simile into two kinds:

(1) based upon the meanings of words, and
(2) based upon the meaning of sentences.

Vamana sub-divided Simile into two: Complete and Elliptical. Vamana
defines Complete Simile, when the sentence contains words denoting all the
factors of comparison -viz. (a) the common property, (b) similitude, (c) the
standard of comparison and (d) the object of comparison. And he defines
Elliptical Simile as -when there is absence of one or more of the factors of comparison- viz, (a) the common property, (b) similitude, (c) the standard of comparison and (d) the object of comparison. Vamana also instructs that simile is employed in (a) praising, (b) dispraising and (c) describing the real state of things.

Again, Vamana mentions the defects of simile (a) deficiency (in completeness), (b) excess, (c) disparity of gender, (d) disparity of number, (e) non-similitude and (f) impossibility (in congruity).\(^{17}\)

According to Viswanatha simile is the clear statement of similarity without any reference to difference of two objects in a single sentence. Viswanatha also mentions the two types of similes viz. Complete and Elliptical Similes. Of Complete Simile, he says, if the common property (or attribute), words indicative of the similarity, that thing which is compared and the standard of comparison be all expressed in words.

In a Complete Simile (Purna)- the common property stands for either attribute or action such as fineness-, which is responsible for the similarity of the two words. Words indicative of similarity are 'iva' and the like. Upamaya such as face as the like. Upamana such as moon and the like (6 kinds). Of Elliptical simile (Lupta) he says, upama is said to be "suppressed", if one, two, or three of the four, such as the common property etc. were not mentioned. He also discusses twenty-one kinds of Elliptical Similes. And thus become twenty-seven kinds of similes in all.\(^{18}\)

Mammata in his Poetics, Kavya-Prakasa defines thus:

"When there is similarity of properties, while there is difference (between the objects themselves)". Simile is of two kinds:

(I) Complete and (II) Elliptical

Of the Complete Simile he mentions six types:
1) The Directly Expressed Simile, in a Sentence.

2) The Implied Simile in a Sentence

3) The Directly Expressed Simile in a Compound.

4) The Implied Simile in a Compound.

5) The Directly Expressed Simile in a nominal affix, and

6) The Implied Simile in a nominal affix.

Mammata mentions nineteen types of the Elliptical Simile-according to the element or elements omitted- 'the common property' may not be mentioned, 'the term of similitude' may be left out or more than one of these elements may be omitted.

The nineteen Elliptical Similes are:

1) Omission of the common property, and directly expressed, in a sentence.

2) Omission of the common property, implied

3) Omission of the common property-directly expressed, in a compound

4) Omission of the common property- implied, in a compound.

5) Omission of the common property, implied, in a nominal affix.

6) Omission of the 'object compared to' in a sentence.

7) Omission of the 'object compared to' in a compound.

8) Omission of the term expressing similitude, in a compound.

9) Omission of the term expressing similitude, in the affix used in the sense of the accusative.

10) Omission of the term expressing similitude in the affix used in the sense of the location.
11) Omission of the term expressing similitude in the affix used in the sense of nominative.

12) Omission of the term expressing similitude in the affix as the force of the accusative.

13) Omission of the term expressing similitude in the affix as the force of the nominative.

14) Omission of both the common property and the term expressing similitude in the affix.

15) Omission of both the common property and the term expressing similitude in a compound.

16) Omission of the common property and the object compared to in a sentence.

17) Omission of the common property and the object compared to in a sentence.

18) Omission of the term expressing similitude and the object compared in the affix, and

19) Omission of the term expressing similitude, the common property and the object compared to. 19

We have observed that vast sources of models available both in Western and Indian literary traditions for use in analysing the figural languages especially metaphors and similes used by Eliot in the selected poems. However, we have to be very selective and choose a modal be it from Western or Indian literary tradition, which will suit our purpose.

After examining the various models propounded by the Western rhetoricians we are at least in a position to make use of them in analysing the types of metaphors used by Eliot in the selected poems which in fact, carry the central meaning. But what about the types of similes? They also constitute central to the meaning in expressing Eliot's thoughts and feelings. And as we see simile is taken as a sub-type of metaphor in the Western tradition so far as no one has
brought forward a sound model for use in analysing any types of similes, we need to go a little further beyond the cultural context and use Indian literary model which holds equal importance to both metaphor and simile.

And as we have observed of the deep influence of the Indian thought on Eliot (at one point of time Eliot contemplated even to convert to Buddhism). It will not be a futile attempt if we try to analyse his use of figurative languages in the selected poems in Indian literary tradition on the assumption of that modes of expression are in fact indices of modes of thought. Now we are plunged to make a choice and use only a model from the various models of Indian literary tradition, we often say: 'Too many cooks spoil the broth' likewise, using more than a model in analysing the figurative languages used by Eliot, somehow instead of deriving a coherent meaning will spoil the meaning really intended. After our close examination of the models set by Vamana, Viswanatha and Mammata, we choose Mammata. The reason being Vamana emphasises the importance of all figurative languages but he does not mention about metaphor. Bhamaha hardly mentions about simile. Viswanatha studies both metaphor and simile extensively but we are analysing English texts not Sanskrit texts and his model is too exhaustive and the sentence structures differ. Therefore, the obvious choice is made to Mammata which becomes an ideal model for the reason that it covers universal application.
References


5. ibid., 16


