US-IRAN RELATIONS: PRE-1979 PERIOD

The present history of international relations between the United States and Iran (formerly known as Persia and presently recognized as the Islamic Republic of Iran) is strainfully unfriendly and adversarial. However the relations between them have not always been this way and the two countries used to enjoy a positive and largely friendly relationship until up to 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. In order to have an appropriate assessment and understanding of US-Iran Relations, the contours of their relationship historically have to be explored.

Political relations between Persia (Iran) and the United States "began when the Shah of Persia, Nassiruddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Persia's first ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan Shirazi, to Washington D.C. in 1856."

Samuel Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy to Iranian 1883. However the non-official relations began before 1856. US citizens used to travel to Iran since the early-to-mid 1880s. The nature of their relationship in the beginning was socio-cultural and religious. As early as 1829 the first American missionaries were sent to Rezaiyeh to work among the Christian Assyrians and were followed by others who preached Christianity and established churches. For this purpose Justin Perkins and Asahel Grant were the first missionaries to be dispatched to Persia in 1834 via the American
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. More importantly, they built schools and hospitals in Azerbaijan and other provinces. These early activities created base for subsequent educational and cultural relations between Iran and the United States in spite of Reza Shah's nationalist onslaught against foreign schools during the interwar period. They stimulated Iranian interest in the American educational system, have been followed during the 1960s and 1970s by the establishment of Iranian schools and colleges after American models, and have constituted the historical background for the education of many thousands of Iranian students in American institutions. During the 1970s, their number had reached the all time high of 15,000 students in the United States.

Amir Kabir, Prime Minister under Nasiruddin Shah, also initiated direct contacts with the US government. By the end of the 19th century, negotiations were underway for an American company to establish a railway system from the Persian Gulf to Tehran. The good will toward the United States created as the result of American private educational efforts was reinforced subsequently by W. Morgan Shuster's gallant resistance to Russian pressure in December 1911 while in the service of the Iranian government, by the American championship of Iranian nationalist self-assertion against the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919, and by the American economic mission headed by Dr. A. C. Millspaugh during 1922-27, and by the sacrifice of Howard Baskerville in 1909, who lost his life supporting the Constitutionalists during the
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 while fighting the Royalists and the forces of the *Qajar* king, Mohammad Ali Shah’s elite Cossack brigade and is remembered as saying: “the only difference between me and these people is my place of birth, and this is not a big difference.”6 This tradition of good will between the two countries fitted in well with a long established pattern of Iranian foreign policy, namely, preservation of Iran's independence by reliance on a third power as a lever against the encroachments of Britain and Russia. But the Iranian interest in involving the "distant and disinterested" United States in Iran in the early 1920s as a counterweight against the two rival powers failed to materialize largely because of American isolationist tendencies during the interwar period.

The decade between the German invasion of Russia and the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran was on the whole marked by the reluctance of the United States to become too deeply involved in Iran on the one hand and the desire of Iran to involve the United States as deeply as possible on the other. Although Reza Shah's plea to President Franklin D. Roosevelt for American intercession against the Anglo-Russian invasion failed, the Iranian and American positions drew closer to each other subsequently. The United States responded sympathetically to the Iranian plea for British and Soviet assurances for Iran's territorial integrity and political independence, for evacuation of the Allied forces after the war, for consultation with Iran about the peace
settlement, and for economic aid after the war as evidenced by Secretary Cordell Hull's influence on the Tripartite Treaty (1942) between Iran on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Britain on the other, and by the decisive American role (particularly the part played by President Roosevelt) in the formulation of the Tehran Declaration (1943). More importantly, the United States' moral support of the Shah’s government against blandishments and pressures of the Soviet Union for oil concessions in 1944, and particularly the American diplomatic support of Iran within and outside the United Nations in favor of the evacuation of Soviet troops from northern Iran and against the Soviet interference in Iran's domestic affairs in 1945-46 left indelibly favorable imprints on the relations of Iran and the United States. Whether or not President Truman in fact did give Stalin an "ultimatum" to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran, the fact still remains that the role of the United States in bringing about that result was decisive. Iran's quest for American involvement transcended efforts at the diplomatic level. Every Iranian government sought to expand relations with the United States in military, technical and economic fields as well, in spite of opposition by the Soviet Union and by an odd mixture of domestic forces including some of the nationalists, communists, merchants and members of the landed aristocracy. The failure of Dr. Millsapagh's second mission was rooted not only in the opposition by these forces, but also in the ambivalent attitude of the United
Until World War II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As a result, many Iranians sympathetic to the Persian Constitutional Revolution came to view the US as a "third force" in their struggle to break free of British and Russian dominance in Persian affairs. American industrial and business leaders were supportive of Iran's drive to modernize its economy and free itself from British and Russian influence.

The American ambivalence toward involvement in Iran was more graphically revealed by the United States' negative attitude toward Iran's repeated requests for credits during the crucial period between the Azerbaijan and oil nationalization crises. Under Secretary of State Acheson feared that if generous American aid was not forthcoming Iran might be dominated by the Soviet Union or divided into spheres of influence between Britain and the Soviet Union. But Washington, in Acheson's words, followed a "narrow concept" of economic policy toward Iran with the result that Premier Qavam's repeated requests and the Shah's own visit to the United States in 1949 produced only a meager $25 million credit from the Export-Import Bank, one-tenth of the Iranian request. To be sure, the reluctance to pour "money down a rat hole" disinclined the United States to extend substantial and prompt aid to corrupt elites anywhere, but the Kuomintang analogy was probably a less significant factor in the case of Iran than the American preoccupation with
Western Europe at the time. Iran had to await the mid 1950s when the American concept of security was extended beyond the NATO alliance to include the West Asia and when the United States was prepared to pay economically, as well as militarily, for creating an alliance system including Iran. In the meantime, the American failure to support Iran financially contributed to the complex of factors that led to the nationalization of the oil industry.⁹

Ironically the path toward greater American involvement in Iran that the Shah had sought was paved by his rival Premier Muhammad Mussaddiqh. The veteran nationalist leader and his supporters had advocated within and out-side the Majlis the doctrine of "negative equilibrium" in Iranian foreign policy before the nationalization of the oil industry. His opposition to the Soviet demand for oil concessions in 1944 was balanced by a crusade against the British subsequently. The doctrine of negative equilibrium theoretically disallowed reliance on any great power, including the United States. But in practice, Dr. Mussaddiqh, as his predecessors, relied during the early phase of the nationalization dispute with Britain and Washington as evidenced by his acceptance of the Harriman mediation, the extension of the American Point Four program and American military aid.¹⁰ This contradiction between theory and practice subjected him to severe criticism by the communists as well as purist members of the National Front.
During the earlier decade the American attitude toward the Mussaddiqh government diverged from the British. According to Eden, the United States had believed that "the only alternative to Mussaddiqh was Communist rule," whereas Eden himself felt that if Mussaddiqh fell, his place "might well be taken by a more reasonable Government." Eden's success in narrowing the gap between the American and British positions subsequently led to the hardening of the American attitude. The United States limited aid to Iran as well as insubstantial technical assistance, in spite of grave economic problems facing the nation, dealt the crucial blow to the Mussaddiqh government. President Eisenhower's letter of June 29, 1953, flatly rejected Dr. Mussaddiqh's urgent request for financial aid. His opportunity to play the United States against Britain and the two Western powers against the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party therefore disappeared as the American and British positions became nearly identical. Dramatic changes in the international system in general and in Iranian particular lay back of the American receptiveness to the British determination to bring down the government of Dr. Musaddiqh. During the war the principal American interests in Iran had been (1) to aid the prosecution of the war against Germany, and (2) to help Iran maintain its independence and territorial integrity vis-a-vis Britain and particularly the Soviet Union. After the war the American interest in the preservation of Iranian independence
continued, but, as seen, preoccupation with the re-building of Western Europe overshadowed American concern with Iran.\textsuperscript{11}

The oil nationalization crisis deepened American interest in Iran. By the time of the crisis the two poles of the international system had emerged sharply. The Cold War between Washington and Moscow intensified in the wake of the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the Communist victory in China and the Communist aggression in Korea. The principal considerations underpinning the American concern in Iran were:

1. that the Anglo-Iranian controversy might lead to the stoppage of the flow of oil to Western European allies of the United States,

2. that the example of Iranian nationalization might have an adverse effect upon the United States oil interests in the Persian Gulf area,

3. that the British departure from the south of Iran would mean the diminution of Western influence in the area, and

4. that a breakdown of the Iranian economy in the face of turbulent domestic politics, particularly resulting from increasing Tudeh influence, might drive Iran to a "Communist coup d’etat"

This last consideration was specifically related to the overall American interest in the containment of the Soviet Union and Communism. President Truman claimed that the United States had "no selfish interest" in the oil dispute, but
George McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, believed that quite apart from oil Iran was a "great and strategic prize," the control of which would put "the Soviet Union outside the communication routes connecting the free nations of Asia and Europe." The United States as the leader of "free nations" did have strategic interests in Iran. As the result of the settlement of the oil nationalization dispute in 1954, however, the American strategic interest in Iran was matched by the emergence of direct American interest in Iranian oil. For the first time the United States oil interest cut across the Persian Gulf, encompassing the two great clusters of oilfields on the Arab and Iranian sides of the strategic waterway. For the first time also the Shah's government finally succeeded in deepening the American stake in Iran, but the result was quite different from what it would have been if American involvement had taken place in the early 1940s. The difference was largely because of the changed international power configuration. The United States became involved in Iran not as a counterweight to Britain and Russia, but as the predominant superpower and the partner of Britain in a global East-West conflict. The rigid bipolar international system left no real room for a third great power on which Iran could rely to counterbalance the British and Soviet power. And the Shah's own traumatic experience with the Soviet-supported communist bid for the destruction of his regime in August 1953 seemed to foreclose at the time any other real option.
As seen from Tehran there was no viable alternative to an alliance with the West just as there seemed to be any better solution for the settlement of the oil dispute than entrusting the control of the oil industry to a consortium of Western oil companies? To be sure, this fell far short of Iran's long-held aspiration for full control of its oil industry, but given the continued predominance of Western companies in international oil markets and Iran's own limited technical, financial and managerial capabilities, the arrangement with the consortium seemed to be the least of all evils under the circumstances. There was little doubt in the minds of Iranian leaders in 1954 that the cherished goal of control of the oil industry must be realized as soon as favorable circumstances would allow. As it happened, however, Iran had to wait nearly 20 more years before it could make a new bid for the control of its oil industry. In the meantime the Shah set the goal of transforming the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) into an "integral international oil company" toward the long run goal of its becoming capable of running the industry when the time come.13

American penetration of the Iranian oil industry and Iran's alliance with the United States through the Baghdad Pact (1955), endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and a bilateral defense agreement (1959) were paralleled by unprecedented American aid to and investment in Iran. Although the beginnings of American technical-military and economic aid to Iran could be
traced back to World War II, massive aid began only after the downfall of the
Mussaddiqh government. Until 1953 total American economic and military aid
to Iran amounted to less than $30 million, whereas between 1953 and 1970 it
exceeded $2.300 billion.\textsuperscript{14} Besides aid, American investment in Iran began to
climb rapidly only after American participation in the oil industry and the
emergence of an US-Iran alliance. Investment by American firms had begun
before, but the protection accorded them in 1955 by means of a comprehensive
treaty between Washington and Tehran was unprecedented. Iran accepted,
apparently without qualms, the American version of international law
requirements that in case of expropriation or nationalization the compensation
paid must be "prompt, adequate and effective." As a result American
investment in Iran increased substantially, reaching a level of over $1 billion
by 1975.\textsuperscript{15}

The rigidity of the bipolar international system and its effect on the character
of the US-Iran alliance allowed Iran little maneuverability in the conduct of its
foreign policy. For example, Iran did try to settle outstanding financial and
boundary problems with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, but as a matter of fact
it had only limited success. The pre-nationalization Soviet- Iranian cold war
was intensified after Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact, and reached a new
peak after the breakdown of Soviet-Iranian negotiations (1958-1959) for a
non-aggression pact and the conclusion of an Iran-US defense agreement. On
two separate occasions afterwards Khrushchev attacked the Shah personally, charging that his agreement with the United States was to protect his throne against the Iranian people. Iran's regional relations fared no better. The Cairo-Tehran cold war that intensified with Iran's participation in the Baghdad Pact culminated in the rupture of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran in 1960. The "Arab Cold War" was matched by the Arab-Iranian cold war and the latter more than the former ebbed and flowed largely according to the vicissitudes of Soviet-American rivalry in the West Asia.\textsuperscript{16}

Overextension of American power and overdependence of Iran on the United States within the context of a rigid bipolar international system began to change increasingly in the 1960s with significant implications for US-Iran relations. In spite of increasing oil revenues and continued American aid, the Iranian economy was in the grip of rising prices, falling exchange reserves, pervasive waste, inefficiency and widely acknowledged corruption. The so-called reform government of Dr. Amin finally collapsed under the pressure of a budgetary deficit of some $70 million. The Kennedy Administration was critical of the lack of basic socio-economic reforms and the heavy burden of the Iranian military establishment. Its refusal to bail out the Amin government partly contributed to its fall. The Shah's launching of the land reform programme was hailed by President Kennedy, it signaled the first of a six point reform program, labeled the "White Revolution" by the Shah's regime. Despite
pessimism in Iran and abroad, the combination of reform measures and particularly an economic stabilization program led to a significant upturn in the Iranian economy and the termination of direct American economic assistance to Iran in 1967. According to President Johnson, the termination of the aid program was "a milestone in Iran's continuing progress and in (US-Iran) close relations."

Not many years before 1967 the American military and economic aid programs in Iran had been regarded generally both in Iran and the United States as one of the "more inefficient and corrupted of American overseas aid efforts," but now the New York Times declared that Iran had reached "the take-off point."

This remarkable beginning in Iran's economic recovery in the 1960s continued into the 1970s. For years before the explosion of oil prices Iran's increase in GNP in real terms averaged above 11 per cent. And after the sudden increase in oil prices it hit the spectacular rate of 42 per cent in 1974. The Fifth Development Plan (1973-78) envisaged at first $69.6 billion expenditure, but it had to be scaled down subsequently partly as the result of the drop in oil revenues to $17 billion instead of the $20 billion predicted. The slowdown in spending, however, is also aimed at cooling the "overheated economy," that has resulted from the fast pace of development, and at fighting inflation which has been running at the rate of about 20 per cent.
The two economic problems of continuing concern to American friends of Iran are the fast pace of development and the mal-distribution of wealth. Iranian planners argue that (1) the overheating problem is not as great as it would seem considering the sudden rise of income from $5 to 20 billion, (2) that the determination of "absorptive capacity" of the economy is a difficult "empirical problem," and (3) that Iran has been "bold," but not necessarily "adventurous" in plotting its economic development. Regarding the mal-distribution of wealth problems the basic Iranian argument is that Iranian planners are aware of the problem, are working toward overcoming it by a variety of means including the allowance of workers' purchase of shares in factories up to 49 per cent, and that there is a real difficulty in avoiding economic imbalances of this kind in the current stage of Iran's economic development. Perhaps a more serious problem of daily concern to the masses is food shortages. In spite of progress in land reform and associated programs in rural cooperatives and farm corporations the problem of low productivity continues to haunt Iran.20

In spite of the persistence of these and other economic problems the point of interest here is that not only has the Iranian economy continued to grow rapidly since the termination of the American aid program, but also that growth has (a) increased Iran's economic cooperation with the United States and (b) assisted parallel American interests in West Asia and South Asia. The single most significant agreement for economic cooperation between the two
countries was signed in March 1975, calling for $15 billion of non-oil trade including the sale of eight nuclear power plants to Iran. Although $5 billion of the total was the estimate of the value of American military sales to Iran over five years, the agreement envisaged significant economic activities including the establishment of an integrated electronics industry, the building of a major port, joint ventures to produce fertilizers, pesticides, farm machinery and processed foods, superhighways and vocational training centers. At the time of the signing of the agreement the United States also pledged cooperation to help Iran in setting up a financial center in Tehran for the West Asian region.  

The consistent efforts of Iran at economic cooperation with Egypt, Syria and other countries cut across the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli zones in the area. In the Gulf area Iran's medical assistance to 'Ajman, Fujayrah and Dubai and its commercial and economic efforts at cooperation with other Gulf states complement similar American activities during the 1960s and 1970s. More important, Iran's economic assistance to Egypt parallels American interest in assisting the process of economic liberalization and stabilization in that country. On the economic side it suffices to state here that its billion dollar agreement with Egypt in 1974 is to help finance the reconstruction of Port Said at the northern end of the Suez Canal, the widening of the canal, and the establishment of numerous joint ventures with Egyptian firms.
The fourfold increase of oil prices during the 1970s introduced the most serious economic issue between Iran and the United States, Iran has been among the OPEC members favoring high oil prices. Iran's decision in 1976 to cut the official price of heavy crude was in full conformity with OPEC policy and practice. What is of interest, however, is the fact that in spite of the persistence of the controversy Iran and the United States have not so far allowed it to disturb their basic friendly relations. The principal reason for this is the overriding importance of the new form of their common interest in regional security and stability.

However, Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact exacerbated the ancient Cairo-Baghdad differences, produced adverse effects within the Arab League, and at the same time placed Iraq in the camp of Secretary Dulles's "Northern Tier" states of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Iran's membership in the pact intensified Cairo-Tehran antagonism, pitted Damascus against Tehran, and simultaneously placed Iran, together with Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, in the camp of "reactionary" states. The destruction of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 and the subsequent defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact Organization (since then Central Treaty Organization or CENTO) marked the beginning of the processes of change in American and Iranian security interests in the Persian Gulf area. Iran and the United States had perceived the Soviet threat to the region primarily in terms of direct, overland and southward pressures.
exerted against Northern Tier states, and by virtue of Turkey's membership in the Atlantic alliance, against the southern flank of NATO. Increasing Soviet rapprochement with the new regime in Baghdad, added to the Soviet arms sales to Egypt since 1955, increased the concern of the regional members of CENTO with its viability as a regional security organization. The United States willingness to sign three bilateral agreements with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan did little to overcome their security concern because the American undertakings in fact did not amount to increased commitments to their defense.  

Iran's traditional dissatisfaction with American nonparticipation in the Baghdad Pact was intensified by the United States reluctance in the 1959 bilateral agreement to go beyond its commitment under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The swift events of the 1960s and early 1970s added further to Iran's regional security concerns. The negative American attitude toward aid to Pakistan during its 1965 conflict with India lay back of the emerging conviction in Iran in the early 1970s that CENTO was a "nice club" for discussing economic projects but was "not an effective alliance," and hence Iran had to rely increasingly on its own strength for defense. In the meantime other regional developments contributed to Iran's security concern beyond its eastern flank in South Asia. American preoccupation with the war in Vietnam continued to raise doubts about the wisdom of reliance upon the United States
for security in regions of immediate concern to Iran. The British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and the announcement in 1968 of the British decision to withdraw forces from the area "east of Suez" in 1971 intensified Iran's security concern in the Persian Gulf area.

Iranians believed that Iraq's defection from the Baghdad Pact had removed it as a buffer against the anti-Shah regimes in Cairo and Damascus, had brought the threat of Arab radicalism to Iran's doorstep, and, more important, had brought Soviet influence to the Gulf. The British withdrawal from the Gulf in view of the dim prospects at the time for a new regional security arrangement seemed to expose the lower part of the Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz to potential disruption. Iran's occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs just before the British departure was followed by the extension of the Iranian security perimeter to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Iran had watched with alarm the escalating Soviet naval visits to the Gulf ever since 1968, but the dismemberment of Pakistan as the result of the 1971 war with India, the building of Soviet port facilities at Umm Qasr in Iraq, and the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of economic and political cooperation drew Iran's attention to the maritime spheres lying beyond the Gulf. In principle the Shah wished to see the Indian Ocean immune from superpower rivalry, but he favored an American presence in Diego Garcia so long as the Soviets had a naval presence there.
Developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1960s and early 1970s also began the processes of change in the Iranian conception of regional security with important implications for US-Iran relations. The Arab-Iranian rifts began to undergo dramatic changes with the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. To be sure, the prewar Iran-Israeli relations continued after the war, but a number of factors worked toward drawing Egypt and Iran closer together. Egypt's interest in undermining Iran-Israeli ties, in Arab and non-Arab oil money, and in pressuring Iraq by favoring Iran made President Nasir more receptive to mediation efforts of such countries as Kuwait for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran. Iran's interest in countering the enmity of the al-Bakr regime by reestablishing relations with Egypt, in neutralizing Soviet influence in Egypt, in encouraging Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, in welcoming Egypt's increased interest in resorting to diplomacy as a peaceful means of settling the conflict with Israel, and in mollifying Egyptian opposition to its prospective occupation of the three Gulf islands were important considerations in softening the Iranian attitude toward Egypt. But Egypt's receptivity to the American initiative and finally the acceptance of the Rogers Plan were probably most influential in moderating the Iranian attitude in favor of Egypt.

It was no coincidence that President Nasir and the Shah resumed diplomatic relations after a decade in 1970. Nor was it a coincidence that in the October 1973 war Iran called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, as it had
done previously, airlifted medical supplies to Jordan, sent pilots and planes to Saudi Arabia to help with logistical problems, and permitted the overflight of some Soviet planes supplying the Arabs. Iran has steadfastly supported Secretary of State Kissinger's peace mission in the West Asia, and has accepted the great responsibility of sending peacekeeping forces to the Arab-Israeli zone of conflict as part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.  

Thus the convergence of American and Iranian interest in regional security and stability extends beyond the Persian Gulf area. Iran and the United States had common interests not only in the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf through the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean to world markets, but also in encouraging forces of moderation and in neutralizing Soviet influence in the West Asia on the one hand, and in achieving a peace settlement between the Arab states and Israel on the other. Toward the achievement of these common objectives the United States has sought to assist in building up a "credible deterrent" by means of massive arms sales to Iran. The rigid bipolar international system during the 1950s had entailed overextension of American power in the world, overdependence of Iran on the United States, and overreliance of both upon an inflexible alliance.
As the result of Soviet nuclear parity, the rise of centers of economic power in Japan and Western Europe, the rebellion of De Gaulle within the Atlantic alliance, the "Ostpolitik" of Brandt, the SALT talks, the Chinese nuclear tests, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the disastrous war in Vietnam, the United States began, in the 1960s, to perceive increasingly the emergence of a more flexible and complicated international system. The Nixon Doctrine took note of these new realities. Under it, the United States would honour its commitments to allies like Iran, would defend it if threatened by a nuclear power and at the same time would expect other nations, including Iran, to "assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours." This has made Iran a "Nixon Doctrine ideal" as it is apparently willing to defend parallel American interests in regions of immediate concern to Iran by reliance upon its own strength in situations short of nuclear war. To that extent American assistance to the Iranian military buildup is in effect to avoid direct involvement of the United States in the Gulf region.25

**US-Iran on Nuclear Issue:**

Long before their current nuclear crisis, the United States and Iran overcame concerns about proliferation and sovereign rights to negotiate a nuclear accord. Despite the attention given to recent Iranian nuclear activities, Tehran’s interest in nuclear technology began in the years preceding the 1979 Islamic
Revolution when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi sought a “full-fledged nuclear power industry,” with the capacity to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity, as part of his ambition to turn Iran into a powerful modern state. While the Shah professed not to want nuclear weapons, he was steadfast in Iran’s “right” to the full complement of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The newly created Atomic Energy Organization of Iran concluded nuclear deals with France and West Germany, but its dealings with the United States progressed slowly: Tehran proposed to purchase eight light water reactors from such US suppliers as General Electric and Westinghouse, while the US government encouraged the Shah to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in a US-based uranium enrichment plant being proposed by the Bechtel Corporation.26

The Nixon administration had aligned itself closely with the Shah, his dictatorial rule and human rights abuses notwithstanding, so it did not help matters those only weeks after the Indian test, the Shah made statements that raised questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions. When asked whether Iran would pursue nuclear weapons during an interview with a French journalist, the Shah was quoted as saying, “Certainly and sooner than one would think.”27 Iranian officials quickly denied the statement, suggesting, “His Imperial Majesty actually said Iran is not thinking of building nuclear weapons but may revise its policy if other non-nuclear nations do.” The Shah later confirmed
this position to a *Le Monde* reporter, when he ridiculed the nuclear arms race and observed that if other nations in the region acquired nuclear weapons, “then perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand the same.”

The US ambassador to Iran and former director of central intelligence, Richard Helms, was satisfied with these corrections. In a cable to the State Department, he wrote, “I want to emphasize to you personally that there has been no change in Iran’s declared policy not to acquire nuclear weapons.” But Defense Department and CIA officials were not certain about what the future held. Officials at the Pentagon’s Office of International Security Affairs observed that in light of the Shah’s “caveats” about changing circumstances, “It is inevitable that some in the press and the public will interpret an agreement to supply nuclear fuels as assistance toward a nuclear capability.” CIA analysts further suggested, “If Iran has a full-fledged nuclear power industry and all the facilities necessary to make nuclear weapons (by the 1980s), and if other countries have proceeded with nuclear weapons development, we have no doubt that Iran will follow suit.” Later accounts confirmed these suspicions. The diary of the Shah’s minister of court, which was published in 1993, recounts that the Shah “has a great vision for the future of this country which, though he denies it, probably includes our manufacturing a nuclear deterrent.”
Today, the international community is most concerned about Iran’s effort to enrich uranium, but in the 1970s, the US government and others were most concerned about the Shah’s interest in a domestic reprocessing facility. At that time, reprocessing did not have significant commercial potential, but it did enable scientists to recover plutonium from nuclear fuel once it had been used in a power reactor, and that plutonium could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. During fall 1974, by which time Ford was the President, senior US officials recommended a general approach to nuclear negotiations with Iran. Trying to balance nonproliferation concerns with the priority of maintaining good relations with the Shah, they favored a position that was not so “strong” that it would encourage him to buy nuclear technology elsewhere, but not so “weak” that Congress would reject it. Of the four options for negotiating with Iran, State bureau chiefs recommended that Kissinger approve the second toughest, which would provide Washington with “veto rights” on how Tehran would deal with US supplied nuclear spent fuel, allowing the United States either to insist on “external processing and storage” of spent fuel or to set standards “for internal disposition and possible construction of a multilateral reprocessing plant.” While these provisions might alienate the Shah and other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories, the officials suggested that US could take the position that it was setting a “new standard” for future agreements.³¹
Kissinger signed off on the recommended option, but it would undergo additional scrutiny before Ford approved a negotiating position. In early spring 1975, before the Shah’s scheduled May visit to Washington, Kissinger presided over an interagency review to determine the best possible approach to the reactor sale, one that would optimally balance proliferation “principles and objectives” with the swift conclusion of an agreement and the resulting nuclear exports. Agency representatives saw a “serious dilemma” in dealing with Iran because they wanted to impose tighter restrictions than US had required in other nuclear agreements. Recognizing that an “overly receptive US reaction” to Iranian interest in reprocessing “could detract from any efforts to discourage such developments” in Pakistan and elsewhere, agency officials believed it was important to seek a virtual veto of reprocessing US-supplied reactor fuel. Because US agencies saw the negotiations with Iran as a potential model for future understandings with other countries, they wanted to persuade Tehran to accept restrictive terms and not feel that US was abruptly taking a discriminatory approach on reprocessing, a possibility that worried Helms.\(^{32}\)

After reviewing a number of options, ranging from a veto over reprocessing to allowing Iran to “perform reprocessing” with adequate safeguards, Kissinger signed a National Security Decision Memorandum on April 22, 1975.\(^ {33} \) The initial negotiating position on reprocessing outlined by the memorandum would be firm: “Continue to require US approval for reprocessing of US
supplied fuel,” with the establishment of a multinational reprocessing facility an “important factor” for securing such approval. As a fallback position, the US would approve reprocessing of US material, even if it did not supply the technology and equipment, as long as the supplier was a “full and active participant in the plant,” and the possibility of US involvement should be “open.” Mutual agreement on “safeguard ability” was essential. These positions were consistent with Helms’s suggestion that Washington work for a tacit veto by acquiring “a voice in management decisions” in a reprocessing plant.34

When talks between US and Iran began in late April 1975, the Shah’s representatives wanted more give on reprocessing. The Iranian negotiators reasoned that if Tehran made a “strenuous” effort to develop a multinational facility, but failed to get a supplier involved, Iran should not be penalized. The US response was that good intentions weren’t enough: “The added assurances against proliferation which accompany supplier involvement depend on its actually being achieved.”35 The concept of a multinational reprocessing facility continued to meet objections from Iran. To better explain Iran’s concerns, Jack Miklos, the deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Tehran further analyzed the Shah’s interest in nuclear power. He observed that no Iranian official had “satisfactorily explained how Iran expects to absorb 23,000 megawatts-electric of additional power within the next 20 years.”36 He
concluded that the Shah’s motives were “not entirely clear,” and he did not rule out the possibility that the “interest in acquiring nuclear know-how and plutonium is, in part, motivated by the desire to preserve the nuclear option should the region’s balance of power shift toward the nuclear states.”

Regardless of the Shah’s nuclear weapon intentions, Miklos argued that Iran undoubtedly wanted to develop uranium enrichment capabilities and to “possess its own fuel reprocessing facility.” Iranian opposition to proposals for a multinational reprocessing facility could be a consequence of Tehran’s “unwillingness to submit their plants to foreign surveillance.”

Talks held in Vienna during September and October 1975 failed to bridge the disagreement, and Iranian atomic energy chief Akbar Etemad rejected US insistence on a multinational reprocessing plant with US involvement. For Etemad, who spoke for the Shah, US policy was too restrictive because it would “tie Iran’s hands for 30 years.” Iran would not buy US reactors “unless the United States was prepared to base cooperation only on principles of the NPT, and unless it was clear that Iran was not being treated as a second-class citizen.” He insisted that Tehran had to be able to make “the final decision” on reprocessing.

Not ready to back down, in October, Kissinger asked Helms to explain US motives to the Shah and to make the point that “we are not in any way singling
out Iran for special, disadvantageous treatment”, the issues at stake were “directly related to security and stability in the region.” Worried about a “nuclear deadlock” that could hurt US-Iranian relations and deprive US industry of an opportunity, Helms cited the Shah’s remarks in a Business Week interview, where he complained that the US position conflicted with Iran’s sovereignty: Washington was asking for things “that the French or Germans would never dream of doing.” Given the Shah’s nationalistic objections, Helms concluded that the proposal for a regional reprocessing facility was dead and that if Iran insisted on a plant it should be under joint US-Iranian control with “stringent safeguards.” Nevertheless, in November, Etemad objected to “terms of conditions that go beyond Iran’s NPT commitments if they are dictated by nuclear-have nations.”

In early 1976, Robert Seamans, director of the Energy Research and Development Administration (the Energy Department’s predecessor) traveled to Iran for meetings with the Shah to move negotiations along. Believing that the Shah would not accept an “ultimate US veto” over reprocessing and that a multinational or bi-national reprocessing facility could also prove nonnegotiable, Seamans suggested the possibility of some level of US “consent” involving assignment of US personnel to a reprocessing facility and a “continuing requirement that we be satisfied the safeguards applied to these activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are effective.”
To increase US “leverage” against Iranian national reprocessing, some State officials were interested in a “buy-back” option to purchase spent fuel rods. Kissinger supported exploring this idea, but if it failed, he wanted US diplomats to try to negotiate other forms of leverage over Iranian decisions on reprocessing.40

Besides negotiating a suitable US agreement with Iran, Kissinger also faced the prospect of Pakistan building a nuclear weapons capability and the consequences of West Germany’s nuclear commerce with Iran, which also raised concerns about reprocessing. Believing that the Germans had not taken a tough enough position in their nuclear agreement with Iran, Kissinger told Germany’s ambassador to the United States, Berndt Von Staden, “We had strongly urged that the Federal Republic of Germany not transfer reprocessing to Iran.” Von Staden argued that Germany’s agreement included safeguards designed to limit Iran’s freedom of action, yet he conceded that the agreement did not prevent reprocessing. This prompted Kissinger to observe, “This agreement is not greeted with enthusiasm by the United States. We cannot avoid saying that we did not approve of this agreement.”41

The prospect of a multinational reprocessing facility in Iran remained part of the US negotiating position throughout 1976, but by May, Kissinger already had serious doubts about it. While he observed that opposing reprocessing
made sense, in his mind, the multinational concept was contrary to US interests and a “fraud.” For example, a multinational reprocessing facility in Pakistan designed to serve countries in the region could be a “cover” for national reprocessing, while the Pakistanis would not want one located in Iran, outside of their control. “We should not fall on our own swords to push others into multinational projects,” Kissinger opined. The negotiations with Iran, however, had gone too far to abandon the concept.  

Hopeful that it could persuade the Shah to “set a world example by foregoing national reprocessing” as a “major act of nuclear statesmanship,” the Ford administration was more interested in the “buy-back” concept as a fallback to the multinational facility option. By May 1976, the two sides appeared to converge on basic principles. Based on talks with Etemad, State and the Energy Research and Development Administration sent the US Embassy in Tehran a draft agreement. The key provisions concerned reprocessing and safeguards. 

In keeping with the US interest in “consent,” the draft stipulated that reprocessing spent fuel obtained from the United States must be “performed in facilities acceptable to the parties.” Before Tehran could consider reprocessing, though, the United States would have the right to buy back spent fuel, with payment in money or in the equivalent value of reactor fuel.
Alternatively, Iran could transfer spent fuel to another country or group of nations, as long as it was used for peaceful purposes under mutually acceptable safeguards. The US draft spelled out additional arrangements—above and beyond IAEA safeguards intended to prevent diversion into military applications—to support nonproliferation interests. Additionally, it stated that Washington would have the right to review the design of any reactor or other equipment and devices “determined to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards,” and designated US personnel would have “access in Iran to all places and data necessary to account for special nuclear material.”

The agreement included a note designed to address “special” aspects of the US-Iranian relationship. If Washington did not exercise the buy-back option and Iran chose to establish reprocessing facilities, Tehran would be required to “achieve the fullest possible participation in the management and operation of such facilities of the nation or nations which serve as suppliers of technology and major equipment.” Moreover, Iran would invite the United States to “participate fully and actively in the management and operation” of the facilities. If Iran’s “strenuous” efforts to secure multinational participation failed for “reasons beyond its control,” Tehran could develop reprocessing facilities “acceptable to the parties” that followed the agreement’s rigorous safeguards.
In Iran’s response to the US draft agreement, Etemad rejected a veto of Iranian reprocessing of US-supplied spent fuel: “Iran seriously intended to have reprocessing performed in facilities established in Iran. In all fairness Washington should be prepared to supply Iran with the means to establish all facilities which constitute an integral part of Iran’s nuclear power program.” He continued, “Iran should have the full right to decide whether to reprocess or otherwise dispose of or treat the materials provided under the agreement.” Nevertheless, the Iranians left the US buy-back option on the table, if Iran chose not to reprocess, Washington could either provide financial compensation or enriched uranium “equivalent in energy value to the recoverable special nuclear material” contained in the spent fuel.45

As far as Kissinger was concerned, the crux of any agreement with Iran would be the buy-back option. He was not willing to take any chances that Iran would someday use US technology to reprocess spent fuel. In early August, Kissinger met with the Shah in Tehran. While the record of their discussions is not available, Kissinger apparently let the Shah know that Washington could not accept a “purely national” Iranian reprocessing plant and that even a bi-national plant would not be possible. Indeed, Kissinger later wrote that “we’ll insist on processing in the United States.”46 Whatever the Shah may have thought about Kissinger’s stand on national reprocessing, when US officials traveled to Iran in late August, they found Etemad relatively cooperative,
while insisting that Iran would not “accept discriminatory treatment,” he conceded that the key issue for Iran was an “assured fuel supply.” US officials could not make such assurances, but they explained that they wanted the agreement to reflect “US intent to perform” within “practical and legal limits.” “They also stressed that the bottom line of the US May 31 draft enables reprocessing in Iranian national facilities, thus ensuring that Iran is not foreclosed from every solution to reprocessing problem.” In the ensuing discussion, the Iranians showed readiness to consider the alternatives to the “bottom line,” e.g., the buy back (“fuel exchange”) or third-country reprocessing.47

Helms saw these discussions as a “promising basis” for continuing negotiations with Iran. But the domestic pressure of the 1976 presidential elections forced the Ford administration to tighten its policy on reprocessing. Near the end of October, Ford belatedly responded to Jimmy Carter’s criticisms about his nonproliferation policy. In keeping with the direction of the ongoing negotiations with Iran, Ford took a restrictive approach toward reprocessing: “It should not proceed unless there is sound reason to believe that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.” To support that judgment, Ford called for changes in domestic nuclear policies, cooperation between nuclear exporters on behalf of “maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment
technology,” and international cooperation to ensure that “customer nations have an adequate supply of fuel for their nuclear power plants,” among other measures. Ford’s new policy approach raised questions about the Iranian agreement. If reprocessing at home or abroad “should not proceed,” the provisions in the draft agreement allowing Iranian reprocessing under some conditions would likely require renegotiating. In any event, the 1976 presidential campaign put the talks on hold, and the incoming Carter administration’s nonproliferation policy review would produce further delay. Carter’s likeliness to take a harder line against reprocessing than Ford may have influenced a February 1977 Iranian announcement that Tehran had given up the option of a national reprocessing facility and was, instead, looking at bi-national and multinational options. In making this announcement, Etemad said that he assumed safeguards would be integral to the Carter administration’s approach, but he asserted that no country “has a right to dictate nuclear policy to another.”

Officials at the US Embassy and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, who had been visiting Iran, did not entirely believe Etemad’s statements about reprocessing. When Oak Ridge officials received a briefing from Iranian officials about plans for the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, they observed that its location reminded them geologically (“between two mountains”) of the US weapons laboratory at Sandia, New Mexico. According to the Oak Ridge scientists, the “unusually large” size of the facility “makes it
theoretically possible to produce weapon-grade material (plutonium),” although they were unable to make “categorical statements” and concluded that the facility could just as easily produce “mixed oxide appropriate for reactor cores.” In any event, the scientists concluded that the facility “bears watching” because its plans included a “large hot lab,” which would be capable of supporting the first steps toward reprocessing. The implication of this analysis was that as hard as Washington was willing to work to leverage nuclear sales for nonproliferation ends, Iran might circumvent an agreement and pursue weapons-related activities.49

The Carter administration’s policy review took longer than anticipated, but on April 7, 1977 it issued its first official policy statement on nuclear proliferation. The key announcement was the decision to defer “indefinitely” commercial reprocessing in the United States in order to discourage other countries from reprocessing. While acknowledging that nuclear exporters such as France and West Germany had a “perfect right” to reprocess spent fuel, Carter wanted to reach a “worldwide understanding” with them to curb the risks of widespread reprocessing capabilities. To show that Washington would be a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel, he announced that he would submit to Congress “legislative steps to permit us to sign supply contracts and remove the pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear fuels.” In response to press questions about the multinational reprocessing option that the Ford
administration had considered, Carter said that he had not made a decision but that “regional plants under tight international control” were a possibility to explore.\textsuperscript{50} Carter amplified the new position in subsequent statements, and the tough line on reprocessing undoubtedly shaped his guidance on negotiations with Iran. Carter’s ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, presented his credentials to the Shah on June 18. Not wanting to look too “eager”, Sullivan did not bring up the nuclear negotiations, but the Shah told him that he was ready to resume the talks and expressed hope that the reactors would be sold. The Shah also made a “specific disavowal of interest in reprocessing plant.” Skeptical, an official at the Pentagon’s Office of International Security Affairs’ Iran desk drew a little picture of a bull next to that words.\textsuperscript{51} While State officials had hoped that early congressional action on White House nonproliferation objectives would expedite the agreement with Iran, Carter did not sign the Nonproliferation Act that codified his policies until March 1978. Either way, the act did not change anything in the negotiations with Iran because its provisions—i.e., the application of IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports and a prohibition of reprocessing US-supplied material without US approval—kept with the direction of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{52} Indeed, US and Iranian officials had completed negotiations the month before, after a brief conversation between Carter and the Shah in Tehran in late December 1977 had hastened the process.
During the weeks that followed Carter’s visit, riots broke out in Tehran. In the first half of 1978, few were prescient enough to anticipate the looming revolution, and the two sides concluded the nuclear negotiations on the assumption that the United States would sell Iran eight reactors. During that summer, US and Iranian diplomats initialed the accord, signaling informal agreement, although neither Carter nor the Shah would ever sign it. As in the 1976 draft, the final agreement retained a US veto on reprocessing but did not include options for buy back or a multinational plant. Under Article 6, Iran would not reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium supplied by the US “unless the parties agree.”

The agreement’s separate note was more detailed than in the 1976 draft. In addition to including language on physical security, expeditious US Nuclear Regulatory Commission action on licenses, and international fuel cycle studies, the note provided alternative suggestions for handling spent fuel resulting from both US-supplied fuel and reactors: storage in Iran, storage in the United States, or “storage, processing, or other disposition in accordance with internationally accepted arrangements.” The latter could involve reprocessing in Britain, France, or “other mutually agreed states and return of recovered plutonium in the form of fabricated fuel to Iran, under arrangements which are deemed to be more proliferation resistant than those which currently exist.”

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The bottom line of each of these possibilities was that Iran would not have the option of reprocessing US supplied material. Iran’s spent fuel could be reprocessed in Western Europe but only if it was impossible to store the material in Iran, the United States, or Western Europe. During negotiations, Washington wanted reprocessing in Western Europe to be “an option of last resort,” but Tehran wanted it to be an “equal choice” with the storage options. According to a State telegram, the Iranians feared a discriminatory outcome: “The United States would strike a deal with others to allow commercial-scale reprocessing subsequent to US-Iran agreement.” To accommodate the Iranians on this point, without sacrificing nonproliferation objectives, Washington agreed to include a separate paragraph in the agreement that spelled out circumstances under which nondiscriminatory treatment would be possible and reprocessing in Europe would be better than a “last resort.” All options would be “subject to US law which includes determination of no significant increase in the risk of proliferation associated with approvals for reprocessing.”

Even though the agreement was premised on constraining Iran’s freedom to operate nuclear technology, the Shah and his advisers accepted the conditions as part of the price of the nuclear reactors and, presumably, good relations with the US. Whatever the Shah’s motives, domestic Iranian instability ballooned during August and September 1978, throwing the nuclear agreement and everything else up in the air. The US Embassy interpreted an editorial on
nuclear policy in the prestigious *Kayhan International* newspaper as a sign that some officials in the government wanted to renegotiate the accord, partly because of the provisions on reprocessing.\(^{55}\)

Not long after the Shah initiated martial law under a new prime minister, Jalfaar Sharif-Emami, in August 1978, Etemad resigned his position as atomic energy chief. Major cutbacks in government capital investment programs, the US Embassy reported, had already “paralyzed the decision-making process in both (the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran) and Ministry of Energy on matters nuclear.” Except for the four reactors under construction with the help of Germany and France, “nuclear activity has come to a halt.” Iranian officials were nonetheless bullish about their country’s nuclear prospects telling a local Westinghouse representative that they wanted to work with the US nuclear industry and that “the bilateral would certainly not be scrapped.” \(^{56}\) This attitude proved to be wishful thinking. When the Shah’s regime collapsed in 1979, so did the nuclear power program, neither the French nor the Germans finished work on their reactor projects.

The apprehension about nuclear proliferation in South Asia and the West Asia that may have encouraged the Shah to think about a nuclear option did not vanish with his overthrow, however. Significantly, the same nationalism that informed Iran’s stance toward nuclear technologies under the monarchy and
emphasized Iran’s “full right” to reprocess and concerns about “second-class” status foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” under the NPT. And ironically, US enmity toward Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution has critically impacted the regime’s security calculations, increasing its interest in nuclear deterrence. Understanding the background to Iran’s initial quest of nuclear power technologies will not in and of itself create better negotiating positions for today’s leaders, but a more comprehensive understanding of the motivations at play is essential if present negotiations are to succeed.

A country that was seen for the most part of the period after 1941 as an ally could also be seen as a hostile country with passing about three decades. In Iran throughout the late 1970’s Shah Reza Pahlavi remained in power. In 1977 he passed censorship laws which caused a massive demonstrations and dissents throughout the country. There were calls for a new regime along with human rights, more freedom, and more democracy. Within the Iranian revolution there were two distinct movements. The first was the religious movement headed by the Ulama, calling for the return to a society based on the Shari'ah and headed by an Ulama administration. The second was a liberalization movement calling for Westernization along with greater democracy, economic freedom, and human rights. As the revolution proceeded, these two groups gradually merged to form a unified front.
An influential leader within the Muslim faith was Ayatollah Khomeini, an exile from Iran. With cassette tapes of his sermons, his message was spread encouraging Iranians to fight for a Muslim republic. The spark that got the US to take more of stand on the Shah staying in power was a protest in Qumm on January 9, 1978. Students were protesting the visit of President Jimmy Carter and the government keeping Ayatollah Khomeini in exile. They demanded that Khomeini be allowed to return to the country. The Shah launched an attack on the protesters in response. His police opened fire on the students and killed seventy. The Shah was losing control. Another massacre "Black Friday," happened on a Tehran demonstration killing several hundred people. The Shah declared martial law and imprisoned as many opposition leaders as he could lay hands on. Secretary of State Syrus Vance and President Carter agreed that the Shah had to go and his hand-picked successor would take his place. While the US was trying to solve this conflict, the Shah fell ill of cancer. Jimmy Carter reluctantly allowed the Shah into the United States to undergo surgical treatment at a New York Medical Hospital. On January 16, 1979, the Shah left Iran for good. On February 1, Khomeini returned to Iran to a welcoming crowd of several million people. The Revolution was over and Khomeini declared a new Islamic Republic.

In November of 1979 under the encouragement of Khomeini student protestors took sixty-nine American hostages. This is what became known as
the Iranian Hostage Crisis. Military action was too risky, so Carter tried to put pressure on Iran by economic sanctions, and froze its assets in the US throughout his term. Carter’s approval ratings dived for he was facing the waterloo of his presidency. Finally, in September of 1980, Khomeini's government decided to end this matter. There was no more advantage to be gained from further ongoing sanctions, making it harder to straighten out an already chaotic economy. There were rumors that Carter might pull out an "October Surprise" and get the hostages home before the election but he was not able to.61

Although the history of international relations between the United States and Iran can be traced back from the nineteenth century, yet the in the earlier period it was socio-cultural and diplomatic in nature. With the advent of twentieth century they involved in political relations which has a trend of constant ups-and-down. In fact, the United States' politically engaged with Iran with the concluding periods of World War II. Iran served as a catalyst which changed the American perception of the nature of Soviet policies in the postwar period and provided the first stimulus for a radical reorientation of US foreign policy and strategy. US-Iran relations were formulated in stages corresponding to the events involving Iran, its close neighbors, and the Soviet Union. However, throughout the history the relationship has generally been close, but it has been punctuated first by the involvement of the CIA in the
coup of 1953 which overthrew a popular prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddiqh, and then by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which led to a breach in relations that has not yet been repaired. Indeed, the two countries that were once close friends and allies now see each other, respectively, as the "Great Satan" and a member of an "Axis of Evil."

At one time, Iran even viewed America as a key ally in helping them to overcome negative interference from the Russians and British – which is something that America was keen to help Iran to achieve. In a nutshell, from 1941-53, Iran sought United States as a protector and friend under the leadership of Shah. During the period from 1953 to the late 1960s (as the prime minister, Dr. Mosaddiqh was overthrown with the restoration of the Shah, as the result of a coup engineered in large part by the CIA and British intelligence), Iran was very dependent on American protection, support, and aid. This was quite a patron-client relationship, and in partnership relations the U. S. was the senior partner. Between the periods from 1973 to 1979, the relationship was seemed to be much more of partnership. The shah was much more stable at home, wealthier, and more adept at handling his foreign relations. He began to make demands. However, since the year of 1979, as the Islamic Revolution was broke out in Iran that targeted the very psychology as well as physiology of the United States, there has been a constant hostile relation existing between the two important countries.
References:


5. See, Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, op.cit., p-14


7. Ibid. p. 122.


9. William E. Warne, *Mission for Peace: Point Four in Iran* (Indianapolis/New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956). See also Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 235


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12. Ibid. op.cit. p. 65


16. *Ibid., op.cit., p-9*

17. See, H. Bradford Westerfield, p. 209

18. *Ibid., op.cit., p. 211*


22. See Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, p. 277


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29. US Embassy, Tehran, cable 5389 to State Department, “Iran’s Intentions in Nuclear Matters,” July 1, 1974.


41. Memorandum of Conversation, State Department, “The Secretary’s Meeting with FRG Ambassador Von Staden on the FRG/Iran Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,” July 2, 1976.

42. Memorandum of Conversation, State Department, “Proposed Cable to Tehran on Pakistani Nuclear Processing,” May 12, 1976.


47. US Embassy, Tehran, cable 7886 to State Department, “Nuclear Energy Discussions,” August 31, 1976, with annotations and cartoon by Pentagon official.


49. Ibid. op.cit, p-239


54. Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation,” pp. 239–240. A requirement for IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities (“full scope”) in the 1978 law would not apply to the agreement with Iran because it was not to go in effect for 18 months.


59. Memorandum of Conversation, “Secretary’s Meeting with the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament,” January 6, 1977. This memo along with many of the documents cited in this article can be found at the National Security Archive, www.nsarchive.org.
