CHAPTER 7
PARTITION OF INDIA

Partition Scheme and Alternatives to Pakistan

Since the Muslim league passed the Pakistan Resolution at its Lahore Session in March 1940, various schemes had been put forward with a view to meeting the legitimate desires of the Muslims of India. These schemes may be treated as alternatives to Pakistan. They include proposals formulas resolutions draft constitution de pulforth voluntarily by various personalities. Here it has been endeavoured to narrate them in short.

(1) The Cripps proposals : 1942

The British Government proposed that steps should be taken on the cessation of hostilities to create a new Indian Union which have the full status of a Dominion with the power to secede, if it so chose, from the British common wealth. The new constitution was to be fcamed by an elected Constitution Making Body formed on the basis of proportional representation. Some region which was not ready to believe the new foundation would be free not to constitution of its own and to have the same status as the Indian Union. It has already been said earlier That the congress rejected it on the ground that it had future promises where as the Muslim League also rejected it saying that it did not contain a definite pronouncement in favors of Partition, although it recognized Pakistan by implication.

In the words of Professor Coupland :

—No one can read the Draft Declaration|| without rcognising that the non adheance provisions are intended only as a means of preventing in the last resort a break down or the whole scheme for setting India free.

(2) Prof. coupland ‘s Regional Scheme :

Coupland took the idea of Regionalism from the scheme of Indian Federation by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan.

It proceeded on the basis that there were two nations in India and that an Indian nation did not exist. He proceeded on this assumption to meet the Muslim League’s claim for
partition as far as he could go. It was intended to ensure equality of status and power to the Muslim regions with the non-Muslim regions.

According to this scheme Northern India should be delimited into three rivers basins viz:

(1) The Indus basin stretching from Kashmir to Karachi (corresponding in political terms to Pakistan)

(2) The basins of the Ganges and the Jamuna between the Punjab and Bengal (corresponding to Hindustan), and

(3) The basin of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra between Bihar and the eastern frontier (corresponding to North East India)

(4) The fourth region corresponds roughly to the Great Peninsula.

Regionalism differs, according to Coupland, on the one hand from partition and on the other from federation. It preserved the unity of India and assumes the establishment of an interregional centre a centre possessing only minimum powers such as (1) foreign affairs and defence (2) external trade and (3) currency. But this scheme could not be convincing as it aimed at the Partition of India in four different regions

(3) Asadulla’s Scheme:

This scheme envisaged North India for the Mohammedans and the South for the Hindus

(4) Aligarh Scheme:

This scheme was prepared by professors Sayyed Jafrul Hasan and Mohd. Afzal Hussain of the Aligarh University. In this scheme Pakistan was carved out not only in the North West but even in the South India

1. Lala Jagat Narayan Lal’s decree:

The every one India Congress operational group in its gathering held at Allahabad from April 29 to May 1, 1942 adopted by a large majority a counter resolution (to that of Rajaji’s formula discussed later) submitted by Jagat Narayan Lal declaring any
proposal to give liberty to any province to secede from India as to Indian interests and therefore, unacceptable. Sentiment against partition of India was so strong that the Congress at that time was unable to read the writings on the wall.

2. Sir Sultan Ahmad’s Scheme:

This Scheme envisaged the formation of Union of India composed of several units as so many sovereign federated States with a centre. The province in the North East shaped two such units with altered frontiers so that the Muslim majority might be substantially increased therein.

This scheme was propounded after considering the proposal for Pakistan which was bound to fail for want of military security, economic stability and peace and justice to the Muslim in the rest of India.

3. Sir Ardeshir Dalal’s Scheme:

Sir Ardeshir Dalal was a staunch nationalist Parsee gentleman.

He was of the opinion that Pakistan involved disruption of our geographical, cultural and spiritual unity and could be considered only if no other alternative was possible. The consequences of Pakistan according to him, would be more disastrous to Muslims themselves than to others.

His scheme, therefore, insisted on coalition governments both at the centre and in the Provinces and fixed the proportion of Muslims in the legislature and in the cabinet in excess on what their population would entitle them to the maximum of 50%. This was simply a legislative move which fell short of Muslim expectations and, therefore, it did not receive any response.

4. Dr. Radha Kumud Mukherji’s Scheme:

This Scheme offered positive protection to the minorities in certain matters and interests which were vital to their self expression and gave them complete autonomy and independence in those matters. Mr. Jinnah criticized the scheme saying that safe guards will ne of no use; so long as there is a communal Hindu majority at the center, the safe guards will remain on paper.
Dr. Rajendra Prasad had expressed surprise that Dr. Mukherji found inspiration for this scheme from the communist ideology, which had supported the League proposal.

5. Sapru Committee's proposals:

These proposals of the committee were consistent both with a Dominion Constitution for an independent India.

The committee was opposed to any division of India. It recommended for a provision for the accession of Indian states as units of the union on agreed terms. It also recommended for the setting up of an independent Minorities commission at the centre and in the Provinces.

While it rejected the Muslim League’s proposal for a division of India, it gave to Muslims parity with the caste Hindus in the constitution Making Body as also in the central Legislative Assembly and in the union cabinet. It did not rule out independence but left the door for a Dominion constitution equally open. It divided the Assembly into communal groups but made the electorate joint, thus allowing all communities to influence the election of members of other groups. It aimed at providing checks and balances so that no one communal groups might dominate either the constitution making body of the union Assembly and cabinet.

These proposals provided checks and balances on communal groups basis instead of division of India and hence fell short of Muslim expectations.

The main criticism of this scheme was that unless the Hindus and the Muslims combined they could not form a government without the help of the Scheduled castes but if any one of them combined with the Scheduled castes it could establish its rule regardless of the other and of other minorities.

6. Anonymous Confederacy Scheme:

This Scheme was prepared by a -Punjabi-, who did not declare his name. He condemned Dr.Latif’s scheme (discussed later) as impracticable.

According to this scheme India was to be divided into five federations which were free to merge or not in the confederation. He termed such division an ideal integration in which there would be no economic or cultural exploitation by any one community
of one other and it would not involve the problem of transfer of population. On one hand it would give enough opportunity to the Muslims for self determination, and on the other the country would be saved by the disastrous results of the separatist politics.

He says at the end:

"Indian Muslims are also the sons of this soil and we can't agree for separation with them."

The farmer of the scheme, however, did not believe in Indian as one nation and in his opinion the term nationality for a Muslim was different from those generally conceived by Hindus or the West.

His scheme proposed the following federation:

1. Sindhu River Basin Federation:

   It would include western Punjab, Sindhu, the Frontier, Kashmir and Bilochistan. Its population would comprise 82% Muslims, 6% Sikhs and 8% Hindus.

2. Hindu India Federation:

   It would include the U.P., the C.P., Bihar, Hindu Bengal, Asam, Orissa, Madras, Bombay and Rajasthan together with all states except those of the South. There would be 86% Hindus in it.

3. Rajasthan Federation:

   The states of Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat were proposed to be included in it.

4. Federation of Southern Indian States:

   It would include States like Hydrabad, Mysore etc.

5. Bengal Federation:

   It was proposed to include Muslim areas of Bengal, Golpara and Sylhat.

   The author of the scheme did not endeavour to show as to how his scheme would solve the Hindu Muslim problem.

7. M.N. Roy's Draft Constitution:
The basis assumption of this draft was that a democratic constitution presupposed transfer of power must take place on the initiative of the British Parliament. The constitutional authority created later on would enable the people to exercise the right of sovereignty in practice.

The Muslim League did not seem prepared to leave the decision of the question to the realm of futurity and to the hazards of a referendum of all the adults in the Province, nor was it likely to agree to a redrawing of provincial which might not coincide with boundaries drawn on religious and communal basis.

8. Dr. Syed Abdul Latif ‘s Scheme of Cultural Zones :

This scheme was discussed in March, 1939 by the Executive Committee of the Muslim League. The League also requested the British Government for its consideration.

The aim of the scheme was to carve out following four zones for the Muslims:

1. The Punjab, Sindh and the Frontier in the North – West Zone.

2. Delhi and Lucknow Zone were to be separated for the Muslims of the U.P. and Bihar and were to include the Muslim State of Rampur. This zone was to have common western boundary with zone no. 1.

3. The Southern zone was proposed to be for the Muslims residing in areas below Vindhyachal and Satpura including states of Hyderabad and Berar and of which one strip was to extend up to Madras via Kadinul and Kadappa.

The scheme included about half the country’s area for 9 crore Muslims. Dr. Latif fully utilized his imagination in framing this unjust scheme in fact he was alsaid that the Muslims of Delhi Lucknow, Patna, Hyderabad etc., will be rendered eternal orphans under Mr. Jinnah ‘s plan 16(a)

9. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan ‘ Scheme: 1942:

Some times before his death, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Chief Minister Punjab, had prepared a plan under which the predominant of that great province. This would have chilled the ardour of many a champion of Pakistan, for the Punjabis had a loyalty
to their province, which cut across communalism. Linlithgow however, persuaded Sir Sikandar not to publish or proceed with his scheme. Suddenly at the close of 1942, Sir Sikandar died and the only obstacle to Jinnah's leadership in the Punjab was removed.

10. Desai Liaquat Agreement: 1944:

It was one of the abortive attempts to bring out a congress Muslim League understanding and it was repudiated both by M.A. Jinnah and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan. When the agreement was announced Liaquat Ali denied that there was any put as alleged. Jinnah categorically denied that he was consulted or had been in any way a party to it.

1. Congress and League to form an Interim National Government on the following basis, within the framework of the present constitution:

(a) Congress League party in the central Executive;

(b) The claims of the Sikhs and Scheduled Castes not to be ignored.

(c) The commander-in-chief to be an ex officio member of the council.

2. The Executive council so constituted was not to be a party to any measure which did not have support of the majority members of the central Legislature.

3. The members of the working committee and other congressmen to be immediately released after the assumption of office.

4. Congress and the league coalitions to be formed in the provinces; and

5. The Governor General was to be approached to make an offer to India on these lines.

Even this attempt of solving the political deadlock ended in fiasco and the condition remained the same as it was before. Maulana Azad charged Gandhiji and some congress leaders with criticimizing Bhula bhai; who ⋯ walked into the trap laid by his friend Liaquat Ali

12. Rajaji’s Formula:
Rajaji had good reasons to go ahead with a drastic Proposal. Madras, he knew better than any one else, was in imminent peril of a Japanese landing, and the British had already declared their intention of not offering resistance .... only a national government, he argued, could possibly save the country; but the British were not willing to part with power. Therefore, power had to be wrested from them. How could it be done only, it seemed to him, by coming to terms with Jinnah and the Muslim League. Their demand for Pakistan after the war struck him as the lesser of the two evils, since refusal might have encouraged the invasion of India by the Japanese.

Nehru was, in fact, in a most conciliatory mood throughout the crisis and appeared to be in substantial agreement with Rajaji, though he preferred to go with Gandhiji.

On the eve of Gandhiji’s release from detention in 1944, Rajaji proposed a formula for discussion with Jinnah in which was implicit a joint declaration of independence to become operative on the termination of the war and the immediate formation of a National Government except for some temporary reservations in regard to defence.

It would be relevant here to refer to the precise terms of Rajaji’s formula for partition which he evolved during the detention of congress leaders in 1942 – 44:

1. A plebiscite, after the termination of the war of All the inhabitants of demarcated by commission, to determine whether a separate state or states should be established;

2. In the event of separation being the verdict, agreements for safeguarding defence, commerce, communications, etc. to be drawn up for acceptance by both sides;

These terms to be binding only on condition of British willingness to transfer full power and responsibility to the Indian people.

Gandhiji, in accepting the formula as the basis for his discussions with Mr. Jinnah in September, 1944, relied on the promise, implicit in the formula of a treaty of separation which, as they told the leader of the Muslim league,

The breakdown of these taking with Mr. Jinnah, barred further discussions, but the point to remember is that neither Gandhiji nor Rajaji ever contemplated abrupt separation. In the establishment of Pakistan as a sovereign, independent state, an
essential feature from their point of view was the treaty of separation to provide for a difficult period of transition.

It was our misfortune that the threat of near chaos which hung over the subcontinent on the eve of our freedom in 1947 and the anxiety of the British to withdraw from India by 15th August left no time or opportunity for calm deliberation on the details of such a treaty. Such an atmosphere was hardly conducive to political settlements between two parties having diametrically opposite therefore, the Gandhi – Jinnah talks broke after 18 days of discussions. Jinnah did not want a plebiscite for the reason that, the Muslim league having claimed Pakistan on the basis of Muslims being a separate nation, such a reference was unnecessary. Moreover, according to him, there was to be no treaty of separation between India and Pakistan on the lines contemplated by Gandhi.

Jinnah was, however, prepared to make a gesture even if he could not accept an agreement. He is known to have stated in a newspapers interview in October, 1944 that Pakistan would not only have neighborly relations with Hindustan, but also discourage any outside design or aggression on this subcontinent.

He remarked:

Mr. Rajagopalachari seems to feel like an orphan in the storm keenly feeling for kith and kin when the deserted in search of green pastures. Nobody can accept his proposals.

The infeasibility of the various scheme and their non acceptance by either of the warring party made them in fructuous. Only Rajaji’s formula deserved consideration in most of the quarters including the British. It became the basis of the Mountbatten plan later on.

it had expressed its decision not to discuss any scheme which did not start with accepting the Lahore resolution of the league. Mr. Jinnah was not ready to discuss the Rajaji’s formula and during him in the principles and policies underlying that resolution without coming to any details. Thus no concrete scheme was required by the Muslim league.
Actually, it sought to coerce the congress into acceptance of its demands and played into the hands of reactionaries and imperialists. The cumulative result was political stagnation.

The vacuum was eventually filled by the cabinet Mission Plan.

13. The cabinet Mission Plan:

In September, 1945, Mr. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, made the historic announcement recognizing India’s right to independence. A cabinet Mission comprising lord. Alexandar was sent to India in March, 1946 to discuss the framing of a new Indian constitution.

The assignment lastly future a three zone alliance in India, with an All – India amalgamation administration which would contract with overseas affairs defence infrastructure and basic rights with the essential powers of taxation : and with Hindu – muslim in the central legislature as well as the central cabinet. The residuary powers were to rest with the provinces. The union was to sub – divide itself in three zones: of which zone B would contain the bulk of the sub continent and an overwhelming Hindu majority, zone A consisting of north western provinces would have a considerable Muslim majority. This ingenious plan, generally credited to cripps, conceded sub continental federal unity to the congress, and the substance of autonomous though not independent Pakistan to the Muslim league plus Muslim weightage in the centere.

The congress hesitated, mainly under pressure from Assam congress leaders, who would have liked to see that province included in the Hindu Zone B, and possibly to other factors of it lost the final opportunity of retaining a united India.

Jinnah, maybe for the primary occasion in his political vocation, went against the consensus of Muslim Indian in accepting the cabinet Mission’s proposals; only to reject them later, partly because of the congress hesitation in accepting them, partly due to the pressure of the rank and file of the Muslim consensus and Of the Muslim press.

This, both sides in fact accepted this plan, but they then fell out over the second part or interim plan. This provided for an interim government which would call a ingredient Assembly to sketch up a foundation on the decided foundation of part one. Breakdown occurred over the allotment of cabinet seats, the congress still claiming to represent the
whole of India and therefore, to be entitled to appoint a Muslim members and the league claiming to represent all Muslim and, therefore to have a monopoly of all their appointments. It was inevitable that the breakdown should have been accompanied by recriminations.

It can safely say that the cabinet Mission formed the point of no return after which Partition was inevitable. Jinnah believed obstruction to be correct because time was on his side. Every week that passed stimulated the mass Muslim support which was the ultimate sanction of his policy.

The Muslim league thus found the plan unacceptable and observed 16th August, 1946 as straight act Day to attain Pakistan... And to obtain rid of the present slavery under the league’s deed was the sign for the beginning of communal riots in Bengal, discussed earlier, which gradually engulfed the whole of India. B.R. Nanda Director Nehru Memorial Museum, Delhi adduced documentary proof to establish that it was the Muslim league’s rejections of the cabinet Mission Plan after having first accepted it .. The reversal came in the wake of the plan’s accept acne by the congress.

In the midst of these disturbances the General invited the leader of the congress to form the interim management which came into existence on September 2, 1946 (the Muslim league keeping out), with Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Mr.Rajagopalachari, Dr. John Matthai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Sir Shafat Ahmad Khan, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, Syed Ali Zaheer, and Messers Bhabha, Asaf Ali and Sarat Chandra Bose. On October 13, 1946, the league decided to join the Interim Government, and two days later, five of its members became central Ministers, (to make room for which some of the existing ministers resigned).

The constituent Assembly assembled for the first time at new Delhi after six months of the elections, on December 9, 1946, the Muslim league remaining aloof. It actually boycotted its sittings and declared that the resolutions of that body would be ultra vires, invalid and illegal

LEAGUE ‘S COMMUNAL ATTITUDE AND ACTIVITIES:

The Swelling membership of Leagues:
It is interesting to study there mass growth in the following of the muslim League during the period 1927-47.

The membership of the Muslim League which had totalled 1330 in 1927 increased in 1938; according to its claim; to hundreds of thousands; and by 1944 to an officially claimed figure of some 2 millions.

The 1946 Election results:

The 1946 election make known the distorted place. In the middle and local Legislative Assembly election the Moslem Leagues won 461 out of the 533 Moslem seating.

To the great surprise of the Congress, nationalist Muslim parties and the unionist party, the league swept the polls in Muslim constituencies, securing 75 percent of the total Muslim votes polled in the country.

It was seats in the Muslim majority provinces as per details given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Muslim seats</th>
<th>Seats won by Muslim League</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly, in the Hindu majority provinces also, its victories in Muslim constituencies were equally heavy. The particulars are as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Muslim Seats</th>
<th>Seats won by Muslim league</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>C.P.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>N.W.F.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the north west Frontier Province, though congress captured 19 Muslim seats (excluding two Jamiat-ul-ulema members), its gain in the rest of Indian was barely 5 a result which once again proved the fact that in ten out of the eleven province the congress did not represent the Muslims.

Not only this, the strength of Muslims increased as the assemblies settled down to work. For example, in Sind, the league strength rose to 35 January, 1947, giving it a clear majority in a house of 60. In that province and in Bengal the league established its governments with an amount of vengeance; almost wholly Muslim ministers were formed; in Sind, all the six ministers were Muslim and three Hindu. But in the Punjab, the league victory was circumvented by a combination of the congress, the unionist party (reduced only to 20 by the new elections, and later only to 16 by defections) and a few other groups, and a unionist headed Ministry was formed.

177
In the northwest frontier Province, however, the Muslim voters had rejected Pakistan at the polls of 1946.

The Muslim Convention‘s Bellicose Speeches:

Soon after the results of the 1945 elections became known, the entire body of the league legislators met in a convention where some of them made bellicose speeches:

1. Ismail Chundrigar of Bombay said that the British had no rights to hand over whom they had ruled for 500 years.

2. Shaukat Hayat Khan (a Minister in Khizr Hayat Khan‘s war time cabinet, later dismissed) said if Muslims were given a chance, they would show a rehearsal

3. Sir feroze Khan Noon thundered that if they were driven to fight a central government of Hindu Raj then the havoc which the Muslims will play will put to shame what chengiz Khan or Hallaku did.

In view of such bellicose speeches and instigations, the Muslim convention adopted the following resolution:

The Muslim country will never submit to any constitution for an united India and will never participate in any single constitution making hardware setup for the reason. The determination requested that the zones embodying Bengal and Assam in the north east and the Punjab and the north west boondocks territory, Sind and Baluchistan in the north west of India….. where the muslims are a predominant lion’s share, be constituted into a sovereign State; and two divide constitution making figures be sovereign state; and two differentiate constitution making forms be set up by the individuals of Pakistan and Hindustan with the end goal of encircling their individual constitutions. The acknowledgement of this request and its usage immediately are the sine qua non for the Muslim class co operation in the arrangement of a break government at the centre.

The events of the next few months put the league right on the road to Pakistan. And circumstances so shaped they that there was no going back.

Pro – Pakistan Bloody Communal Riots and

From this time on, India slid steadily towards a civil war of the most frightful kind punctuated by communal killings when each community in turn wreaked vengeance on the other. First came the recriminations. Jinnah charged the government with bad faith
because it had not entrusted the league only with the administration when congress refused to join the interim plan. Then Nehru declared at a congress meeting in July that the congress would go to the constituent Assembly uncommitted to any plan. This sounded the tocsin for Jinnah who declared a direct Action Day for 16th August, mentioned earlier. Bloody riots broke out in Calcutta which the Muslim league government was unable or unwilling to control until British troops were brought in. Here the Hindus suffered chiefly. An account of these riots has already been given in the preceding pages.

Soon after, the Hindus in Bihar turned on the Muslim minority and there were further outbreaks in (the then) East Bengal and U.P. with fury aroused and passions unleashed, each outbreak involved hideous excesses.

Consequent Hurried Political Developments:

Sobered the events of August, 1946, the congress took office in early September, and Jinnah, in fear of isolation, joined in October. But the league came to fight rather than co-operate and its next step was to boycott the constituent Assembly in December. Mr. Liaquat Ali, finance minister, interfered in every department, withheld payments and sanctions of money till he proved that the congress ministers could not even create the post of an ordinary peon without his approval. A worried governor general found that he could only remonstrate with men who would not listen to reason. The cabinet now called the leaders to London and when this had no effect determined on shock treatment as a last resort. On 20th 1946, prime minister Attlee announce that authority would be handed over not later than 30th June, 1948, agreement or no agreement among the various political parties and that Lord Mountbatten would succeed Lord Wavell to prepare a plan for the hand over. At last the leaders were sobered, with the Muslim league, in the words of Jinnah, not yielding an inch in its demand for Pakistan, and with the British pledged to withdraw by a specific date they saw a spreading vista of civil strife of a very horrible kind leading to chaos if no settlement was reached by the appointed date. With the collapse of the Khizr ministry early in the year 1947 the Punjab was locked in virtual civil war which destroyed Amritsar and Multan. The congress hope of securing the levers of power in time to prevent partition
had now faded with the new time limit. If no settlement was reached the governmental
machine would be handed over in parts and these parts very possibly in disrepair.
Fragmentation rather than partition was now the day. He already paid a big price and
was to pay a bigger. He had succeeded in presenting the congress with the choice of
Pakistan or chaos. Only Gandhi was to face chaos.

Rejected a last attempt by the new governor general to obtain an agreed settlement,
the congress leaders determined that a partition was inevitable. At last Nehru broke
with Gandhi on this issue. The veteran mahatma returned to his reconciling work in
Bengal and did not attend the Independence Day celebrations in August.

(19) The Mountbatten plan:

In the meantime governor general wavel was succeeded by mountbatten who
deputed by British prime minister for immediate political solution of India and end of
deadlock Mountbatten now produced a plan which owed much to the tireless energy
of the Reforms commissioner; V.P. Menon, and which was accepted alike by
congress, league, and the Sikhs on its publication on 3rd June, 1947. Two states, India
and Pakistan were to be set up to whom the British government would hand its assets
and they would draw up their own constitutions. The independence or handover date
was advanced to midnight of 14th August. The States would be released from British
paramountvy and treaty obligations on that date, but would be encouraged to accede to
either India or Pakistan before that date. Provinces would determine their new
allegiance by vote of their legislatures. But in the Punjab and Bengal, where communal
numbers were nearly equal, there would be division by means of a boundary
commission. (this later became the Redcliffe Award) and in the frontier province,
where a Red Shirt ministry held office by a precarious majority, there was to be
referendum. The two main parties proposals; so did the Sikhs though they had far
greater cause for discontent since their population was divided in half by the probable
line of partition in the Punjab.

Once the partition had been agreed the final arrangements were carried through by
lord Mountbatten, a master of rush tectics, with lightning speed. Lady Mountbatten, by
her Unaffected concern for the India people, did much both in public and private to
smooth ruffled feelings. The two formed an irresistible team for the occasion.
In cooperation the congress and the Muslim association management had establish it easier to negotiate with the British against one another than unite in common front after the second world war and in marked contrast to the congress league Khilafat alliance which followed the first world war. British policy took advantage of this weakness. Sir Evan Jenkins the governor of Punjab wrote to Mount batten on 16th June 1947 Muslim league think it is a master stroke by Jinnah the congress think it is master caress by patel who have pressed the Muslims keen on a bend or into two corners will be clever to obliterate them previous to very extended 35(a)

The Disgraceful, undemocracy partition of India

The claim for political separation of the territories in the north east and north west could only be justified if it were established that the decisive majority of the population in these territories desired such separation. What is here in question is not the long established and recognized national claim of a subject people, like the claim of the Indian people to be free from British rule. what is here in question is very controversial claim newly evolved in the fities by political theorists from above and injected into politics in a situation of intense communal antagonism. In view of the controversial character of the claim, and the extremely divided character of the population in these territories, it was only reasonable that the wishes of the people concerned with regard to such a separation should have first been established and proved by the holding of a plebiscite or similar means of democratic consultation. This plan (for a plebiscite of the whole population in Muslim majority regions) was put forward by C. Rajgopalachariar. In 1942 and by Gandhi in the Gandhi – Jinnah conversations of 1944. But this proposal was rejected by Jinnah on behalf of the Muslim league. He took the position first, that any limitation of Pakistan to contiguous districts with absolute Muslim majorities would only represent a maimed, mutilated and motheaten Pakistan and secondly, that any plebiscite of the population as whole would violate the exclusive right of self determination of the Muslims as Muslims. This implied that any plebiscite should be confined to the Muslim 555 of the population which meant that 28% of the population (51% of 55%) could determine the issue for the whole population. It is obvious that no democrat could support these proposals.
The demand for Pakistan as officially presented by way of an ultimatum irrespective of popular wishes and with resistance to any democratic solution, became in practice a reactionary, antidemocratic and disruptive demand which played into the hands of imperialism.

In an interview on December 10, 1945 Jinnah defined the Muslim league claim in the following terms

The British. It is between the Hindu congress and the Muslim league. Nothing can or will outline and settle on the constitution of Hindustan and the other to edge and choose the constitution of Pakistan.

Gandhi might say: 'I concur that there ought to be Pakistan. I concur that one-fourth of India, made out of six areas sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, the North-west Frontier area, Bengal and Assam-with their present boundries, may as well constitute the Pakistan state'…

"It is conceivable there well must be a trade of it could be carried out on it is conceivable there will be a trade of populaces assuming that it might be carried out on a voluntary support. There will likewise doubtess must be wilderness changes. There will likewise certainly must be frontier adjustments…

all that can come, however first it is vital to take the present common outskirts as verges of the what's to come Pakistan. Our Pakistan Government will likely be a Federal Government displayed on the lines of self-ruling territories.

"I directly don't doubt the truthfulness of the British government. Yet I do mistrust the truthfulness of the aforementioned who profess to see any trust pf a settlement outside the gauntig of full Pakistan to the Moslems of India."

finally, the Muslim Legislators' assembly in April, 1946 characterized Pakistan in the following terms:

–That these zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, sind and Baluchistan in the North-west. India, namely Pakistan zones where the Moslems are in a dominant majority be consti-tuted into a sovereign independent state.”
Mountbatten’s Warning to Jinnah:

Immediately after his arrival in India Mountbatten come to the conclusion that the only solution of the consti-won over the congress leaders to that view point.

The Mountbatten plan, was in fact the Rajaji’s Formula (c.r. Formula) given practical shape. Before publicly announcing it, Mountbatten gave copies of the plan to Indian leaders to enable of June 2, 1947. Jinnab said he could not take any decision himself; nor could his Working Committee.

Mountbatten then reminded Jinnab that _the congress party were terribly suspicious of this particular tactic, which he always used, whereby he waited until the congress party and made a firm decision about some plan, and then left himself the right to make whatever decision suited the leaders were very cautious this time because only a few weeks before, Jinnah had demanded an eight hundred mile corridor to link west Pakistan with East Pakistan and the league organ dawn and started a campaign for it. Jinnah attitude that he could not call a meeting of the league council for several days was regarded by congress leaders as confirmation Of their suspicion. Mountbatten, therefore, firmly told Jinnah If that is your disposition then the guides of the congress party and Sikh will deny last acknowledgement at the gathering in the morning disarray will take after, and you will lose your Pakistan, likely for great. Jinnah I don't propose to give you a chance to wreck all the work that has gone into this settlement. Since you won't acknowledge for the Muslim class, I will represent them myself. I will take the danger of saying that I am fulfilled with the confirmation you have given me, and if your gathering neglects to confirm the understanding, you can put the fault on me. I have stand out condition, and that is that when I say at the gathering in the morning, Mr. Jinnah has given me assurances which I have accepted and which satisfy me you will in no circumstances contradict that, and said that when I look towards you will not your head in acquiescence.

In the morning Jinnah did as he was told. The congress leaders (Nehru, Kriplani and Patel) also signified their acceptance of the Plan, although Gandhi refused to align himself with it. And within a few days of the announcement of the Plan, the working committees of the congress and the League formally accepted it. Thus the miracle was achieved the impossible became a fait accompli and Mr. Jinnah’s cherished dream a stern reality.
To give effect to the plan the legislative Assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal were summoned, and a referendum is prearranged in the North West border area and in the Sylhet region of Assam. Every of the two Assemblies met in two parts in one part set both Hindu, Muslim and other Indian representatives of the Muslim majority districts (that is the west Punjab and east Bengal ), and they decided in favour of division, by a majority vote, all Muslims voting for the division. Members sitting in the other part voted for a united India and one constituent Assembly. The Sind Assembly also voted by a heavy majority in favour of Pakista.

Situation in N.W.F.P. and Frontier Gandhi:

Referendum in the North West Frontier province was held conditions of anarchy and violence. Muslim leaguers over non violence.

Leader of Muslim congressman and Khudai Khidmatgars, Abdul Gaffar Khan felt that in such an atmosphere a fair referendum was impossible and he decided to boycott it. In a press statement on June 25, he said:

―During the last few months an organized compaign of terrorism was lauched by Muslim league which resulted in the murder of hundreds of innocent men, women and children. property worth crores of Rupees was destroyed. The whole atmosphere is surcharged with communal frenzy and poison. Even now leading members of the Muslim league are carrying on a reading and tearing compaign to frighten the people from voting against them in the referendum. Evidently they want to prevent tens of thousands of refugees who have gone out of the province from voting in the referendum. Religious passions of the unsophisticated pathans are also being aroused by describing the contest on the present issue as a contest between Kafir and Islam.

We are a nation of 90 million Muslims, a Muslim, now a Pakistani, said to Philips woodruff in 1946, what does it matter if we lose 10 million to gain our freedom? There will be million of us left.

This is another way of looking at human life, in terms of numbers of graphs of biological evolution … with over fifty percent of the population voting for the league, the referendum verdict was in favour of the inclusion of inclusion of the frontier province in Pakistan. Sylhet gave similar verdict, and under similar circumstance.
Congress succumbed to the communal fenzy:

Early in Mrch, the congress was so overwhelmed by the cruel happenings in the Punjab, that its Morning committee asked for early division of the province into Muslim Punjab and non Muslim Punjab. The league repudiated this resolution saying that it would have the whole of Punjab. This created more trouble and the fire spread to those parts which so far remained immune.

The Indian Independence Act, 1947 and its Results:

In July, the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which provided that on August 15, 1947, the two independent Dominions, India and Pakistan, would come into existence. The Act vested in the legislatures of the two Dominions full powers to make laws both for internal and external operation and laid down that no law enacted by these legislatures would be void or inoperative on the ground that it was repugnant to British law. This divected the British Parliament of its control over India and made India and Pakistan masters of their destiny.

Hope and Prophecy:

However, it will not be out of place to mention that it also began to be reasoned in optimistic sections that The State of Pakistan would not prove viable and after passing through bitter experiences, Pakistan would ultimately come back to form father a stronger union with India.

Acharya Kriplani thus declared:

– A strong, happy, democratic India can win back the seceding children to its lap. || In this changed circumstances Bengla Desh has rightly proved the prophecy of the grand old politician Dr. Syed Abdul Latif even went a step further the held that the states of Pakistan when isolated from the rest of India will soon orlate find themselves unable to maintain their independence and in consequence will either lapses into the position of a dependency or protectorate of some foreign power or return chastened in spirit to the Indian union.

Criticism:
Some of the important causes of the partition of India were the mutual suspicion and hatred of the Hindus and the Muslims for each other, Muslim jealousy and fear of the economically and culturally more advanced Hindus Muslim inferiority complex and last but not the least the colouring of politics by Hindu revivalism. The uneven development of the Hindu and Muslim sections of the Indian bourgeoisie and disparity in the economic life of the two communities were another important factor in shaping Muslim political consciousness. Reactionary communal leaders were more successful with the Muslim masses who lost in the predominantly Hindu environment was slightly better than that of social out castes.

Mountbatten has very recently accepted the blunder committed in 1947 in the following words:

_We accepted partition rather than go on without the transfer of power, but I always regretted it and never more so than at this moment._

The Aftermath:

The new government was inaugurated on 15th August. The first strain, which threatened the very existence of the government, was that of the migrations which followed the Punjab massacres. The Radcliffe Boundary Award was announced on 17th August, dividing the Sikh Community, as anticipated, into two almost equal groups. The Sikh leaders had accepted the award in advance but a large section was determined to resist. Within days of the award, Sikhs and Hindus were falling on the Muslims of the East Punjab and Muslims on the Sikhs in the west. There was general fighting accompanied by every kind of atrocity; convoys were waylaid, refugee trains helanp and their passengers slaughtered, man woan and children. Within days, long convoys were marching east and west seeking shelter in the other dominion. The tide of refugees caused explosion of community was uprooted and for atime the stability of the government was threatened. The exact number of the dead will never be known and estimates have differed widely. But we shall probably be somewhere near the mark with Judge g.d. khoslais’s (stern Reckoning, p. 299) conclusion, after a very judicious analysis, of about 5,00,000. Apart from this holocaust there was a huge involuntary exchange of population. It is reckoned.
That about five and a half millions travelled each way across the new India-Pakistan border in the Panjab. In addition about 4,00,000 Hindus (Sindhis) migrated from Sind and well over a million moved from the then East Pakistan to west Bengal. However, as many as ten million Hindus in East Bengal betrayed no fear of insecurity and stuck to their ancestral homes. (Most of them sought shelter in India on account of the atrocities of the west Pakistani Junta on the Bangladesh issue)

Originally in thirties the idea of exchange of population was laughed off. But both became the cruel realities of history. It shows that politicians usually fail to take into consideration the psychological factor, which becomes of mounting importance in the long run though its face value always seems to be negligible.

With the massacres ended, the new government was faced with the settlement of the refugees. In the Punjab there was at least the land belonging to the departed Muslims. During the autumn of 1947, this built up a fresh crisis. The refugees not only occupied many of the enclosures which surround Delhi some like the Brana Qila contained Muslims waiting to be expatriated they spilled over into the streets and occupied many mosques. Communal feeling began to rise again and it looked as though a pogrom of the remaining Muslim minority might soon start. Gandhi came to Delhi from Bengal in October and now directed his reconciling mission from there. This time it was the Muslims he was championing and he found he was opposed by some elements within the government itself. It was the noblest and most courageous moment of his life. He had quelled the last outbreak of communal rioting in September and in January 1948 the inner voice spoke again. This time the issues were two fold, the payment to Pakistan of her agreed assets which had been withheld owing to the Kashmir dispute and the restoration of peace in the capital. Only when the money had been paid and a peace pact, including the evacuation of the mosques, had been signed, did he give up his fact, on 18th January, 1948. Twelve days later, while proceeding to his daily prayer meeting, he was shot by a young Hindu fanatic. The effect of his death was electric. After the lamentations had died down it was seen that Hindu political extremists were discredited. They were saddled with the responsibility for the plot and have not as yet recovered their political influence.

Criticism:
In 1937 the Muslim in India were politically week and disorganized, yet ten years later they were able to put forward a convincing claim for a separate state. How did this come about the lack of any sense of urgency in making a constitutional settlement between the wars, congress

Miscalculations during the war, and the political exploitation of Muslim nationalism; all played a part, but the interpretation of the events leading to partition tends to very with the preconceptions and present day outlook of the various contributors to the debate.

It is frequently said that without Jinnah there would have been no Pakistan, and he himself remarked that it was he with he help of his secretary and his type writer who won Pakistan for the Muslims. No one doubt that he played the major part and the positive part, in these crucial years from 1937-47. He dominatd the league organization: to all intents and purposes he was the league organization.

According to the Lahore determination of the Muslim alliance Gandhi composed in April, 1940, unless whatever is left of India wishes to take part in interior frat ricide, the others will submit to the Muslim transcription, if the Muslims will depend on it. I know of no non fierce technique for urging the submission of eight crores of Muslims to the will of whatever is left of India, however capable a greater part the rest may speak to. Any part might guarantee a division.

This view he much of the time rehashed. In the same period Nehru's reaction to the Pakistan was to say that If individuals needed such things a recommended by the Muslim class at Lahore then one thing was clear. They and individuals like him couldn't live together in India. He might be ready to face all the results of it, yet he might not be ready to live with such individuals.

The practical effect of both taking and announcing this attitude towards the Pakistan movement was drastically to reduce congress power of maneuvere vis – a –vis the Muslim league, and to place total emphasis on persuasion and negotiation, without reference to congress ‘s power in the land. This being so it is startling to find congress in April, 1942 rejecting by a large majority Rajagopalachari ‘s proposal that for the purpose of negotiation congress should recognize Muslim separatism in some form, without closely defining what was implied. Not content with this rejection, congress
proceeded to declare that any proposal to deteriorate India by offering freedom to any part state or regional until to secede from the India union or organization will be hindering to the best investment of the individuals of the distinctive states and territories, and the nation all in all, and the congress accordingly can't consent to any such proposal. This seemed to rule out some loose kind of confederation which was the most obvious, most practicable alternative to Pakistan and therefore the most promising line of negotiation.

If force or any threat of force was excluded and the main line of fruitful negotiation was closed, there remained either successful pursuasion of the majority of Muslims to the congress point of view or acceptance by congress of Pakistan. Thus when the politics of mass communalism supervened, congress found that the only course left open was not so much even to oppose partition as to try to limit, so far as it could, the area which was to he accepted as the state of Pakistan.

But it was not until may 1, 1947 that the congress working committee formally accepted the principle of partition, on that day Nehru writing to Mounbatten, in regard to the proposals which, I presume, lord ismay is carrying with him to London, our committee are prepared to accept the principle of partition, based on self determination applied to definitely ascertained areas. This involves the partition of Bengal and the Punjab.

Against the foundation of congress strategy and the bureau Mission arrange, which had begun with an acknowledgement of an Indian Union, Mountbattin's arrange seemed to reject the union as the successor to power and seemed rather to welcome the proclamation of cases of alarge number of successor states who might be allowed of to unite assuming that they so wished into two or more states .There was no difference between the plan discussed at this conference and the partition plan taken by I smay to London.

In this plan on 10th may, Nehru interpret that the province would have the right to decide their possess prospect and therefore, Madras, Bombay, the U.P., the C.P., Bihar, Orissa and Assam would formally have to reaffirm that they wished to remain the Indian constituent Assembly. Bengal and the Punjab were to determine their own future. Sylhet would be given the option to join a partitioned Bengal, and a referendum was to ascertain the will of the people. There was provision for Baluchistan to express
self determination. Each of the successor treaties, presumably also with the British Government.

Nehru’s response to this proposal was instant and fervent instead of producing any sense of certainty, security and stability, they would encourage disruptive tendencies everywhere and chaos and weakness. He could not but be keenly aware that already H.S. suhrawardy was actively campaigning an independent Bengal, and that the larger Indian states were using the fact of British paramountcy to emphasize their separateness.

Nehru in fact still saw the Indian union as the successor state, and Pakistan in the position of an area or areas that had seceded from the parent country. His response to the arrangement was, in this way comprehensible, and totally in the connection of his own and congress' longstanding approach, and not in any manner a deviation or taken in attack of Obsence of brain or political amnesia. He had dependably dreaded the discontinuity of India.

The Inevitable Ultimately Happened.

Could the Pakistan have been Avoided This is a very vital point and it has been endeavouned to give opinions of B.Shiva Rao the noted journalist, K.M. Munshi, M.C. Chhagla and Maulana Azad, the renowned political stalwarts Shivarao ‘s opinion

Much has been written on the circumstances that converted Jinnah from an ardent nationalist till 1937, to a fanatical adherent to division and much will continue to be written as more details come to light to explain the basic reasons for the change.

In 1917 in Bombay he explained to Horniman the title sect among the Muslims to which he belonged believed in the ten avataras and had much in common with Hindus in their inheritance laws and social customs.

When the pamphlet entitled Pakistan was distributed among the member in the very first session of the central legislative Assembly at Delhi in early 1935, over the signature of Mr. Rahmat Ali referred to earlier, Sir Henry craik, the very strong Home Member of the time, had a good

Laugh over it and Mr. Jinnah had even a heartier one.
Mr. Jinnah, when asked by a journalist about Iqbal’s scheme replied you know Iqbal is a poet and poets are visionary.

There is convincing evidence that in early 1930s Jinnah believed in a united India, even including Burma.

A strange incident deserves to be recorded here. A palmist who read Jinnah’s hand prophesied for him the headship of an independent state at the end of his career. Jinnah laughed at the suggestion as absurd but the memory of it might have lingered and seeped over the years as an activating agent on his subconscious mind.

The rapid growth of the Pakistan cult between 1937 and 1940 is one of the unexplained (but not inexplicable) phenomena of our recent history. One of the important causes was the disappointment of the league at the congress going back on the understanding, prior to the 1937 elections, that it would form a coalition with the league in the U. P. , and the growth interest of feudal elements in the league as a rallying point against the radicalism of the growing congress left. The congress actually dismissed the league at this juncture as a British created faction.

The two nations’ theory (denounced in caustic terms) By Jinnah in the twenties was made the basis for the new demand of the league, but not yet crystallized in the concept of Pakistan. Possibly, if the left wing of the congress had played a less intrinsigent role on the outbreak of the second world war and permitted the party Ministers to continue in office, the governor general might have been persuaded to attempt a war time federation with some conventions introduced to confer on the executive council the status and even some of the functions of a national government.

To do Jinnah justice, he was too hard headed a politician to subscribe readily to the concept of a separate Pakistan. The league had become by 1940 a formidable Muslim mass movement, with a momentum he could not resist. Suhrawardy (whom he did not trust) declared at a league session, Pakistan is only our latest demand, but not the last one.

Jinnah, if Khaliquzzaman’s record (in Pathway to Pakistan) is authentic, had doubts at the start about Pakistan being a workable scheme. He had sown the wind but was being forced by circumstances, over which had hardly any control, to reap the whirlwind.
Early in 1940 the Governor – General expected Jinnah to have a positive scheme of his own rather than have a negative attitude towards everything coming from congress.

This gives a glimpse of the forces at work. Jinnah was now on the crest of a wave which he certainly did not create and about whose direction he was uncertain. So Pakistan came into existence, consisting of regions which had steadily opened separation from India – and carved by man who, except for the last decade of his life, was a more ardent Nationalist than any Muslim of his generation to the congress, vitalized by forces that had no real interest in India’s partition and utilized by Churchill for indefinitely postponing India’s freedom. Too late the congress leaders realized the price they were being compelled to pay for their failure to be accommodating when Jinnah was prepared to be reasonable, and could control the forces that adopted his banner. Opportunism on all sides had exacted a terrible price.

K.M. Munshi’s Verdict:
K.M. Munshi wrote: –I cannot imagine a greater contrast than between Shri Jinnah with his hard heard pragmatism and Gandhiji of flaming ideals. However, inspite of difference in gifts and outlook, they had one thing in common: neither of them would rest content till he dominated the scene. In the nature of things, therefore, it was impossible for them to work together, and as things were, all our political progress for several decades remained conditional upon their agreement. The result was the vivisection of India, to prevent which I had Left the congress in 1941 and with Gandhiji’s blessings started the Akhand Hindustan Movement The future historians would probably hold public men of our generation answerable for the Partition was accepted. However, according to K.M. Munshi, it was the only possible solution Yes: Partition could have been avoided : M.C. Chhagla.

But according to M.C. Chhagla, it could have been avoided in his autobiography titled roses in December published in the latter half of 1973, he has asserted that Mr. Jinnah used Partition as a bargaining point and with a little tackling of the situation by our leaders he could have agreed to leave this extreme demand. This view deserves consideration.
K.M. Munshi put it as followers: on December, 4, 1963:
Today it is easy to speculate what would have happened if the congress had accepted the Cripps offer perhaps India would have remained undivided. Perhaps she would have emerged through and after the war as a stronger nation. But this is all speculation. Sir Winston Churchill once said during the war those who were searching for scapegoats for British defeat:

If the present tries to sit in judgement on the past, it will lose the future. His wise saying agrees with the maxim of the Indian logicians that, one cannot sit on one’s own shoulders. However Sarat Bose was correct in his assessment when he said, future generation will I am apprehensive censure us for surrendering division of India and supporting parcel of Bengal and Punjab Maulana Azad additionally had asserted that the production of Pakistan could have been evaded. His postulation is worth noting

thus India picked up her opportunity however lost her unity. Another state called Pakistan was called into being. Pakistan was the making of Muslim alliance which was initially established to contradict the congress……..

………… the main aftereffect of the production of Pakistan was to debilitate the position of the Muslims in the subcontinent of India. The 45 million Muslims who have stayed in India have been debilitated. Assuming that one judges the inquiry just from the perspective of the Muslim group, can anyone deny today that Pakistan has been for them an exceptionally appalling and unhappy improvement? actually, the more i am convinced that the creation of Pakistan has solved no problem. One may argue that the relations between Hindus and Muslims had become so estranged in India that there was no alternative to partition. This view was held by most of the supporters of the Muslim league and after partition, many of the congress leaders have held a similar view. Whenever I discussed the question with Jawaharlal or Sardar Patel after partition, this was the argument they gave in support of their decision. If however we think the matter over coolly, we shall find that their analysis is not correct. I am convinced that the scheme I framed on the occasion of the cabinet Mission and which the Mission largely accepted was a far better solution from every point of view. If we has remained steadfast and refused to accept partition, I am confident that a safer and more glorious future would have awaited us….
Can anybody prevent that the creation from claiming Pakistan has not tackled the collective issue, yet made it more compelling and destructive? The foundation of part was hatred between Hindus and Muslims. The formation of Pakistan gave it a perpetual established shape and made it substantially more troublesome of result. The most deplorable characteristic of this scenario is that the sub mainland of India is partitioned into two states, which take a gander at each other with scorn and fear. Pakistan accepts that India won't permit her to rest in peace and will annihilate her at whatever point she has a chance. Correspondingly India believes that at whatever point Pakistan gets a chance. Correspondingly India conceives that at whatever point Pakistan gets a chance, she will increasingly against India and assaults her.

….. it is to the diversions of India and Pakistan that they may as well improve neighborly relations and act in co-operation With each other. Any possible strategy can lead just to more amazing inconvenience, enduring and misfortune…..

……… some individuals hold that what has happened was certain. Others similarly determinedly accept that what has happened is wrong and could have been dodged. (Mr. M.c. We can't say today which perusing is right. History alone will choose whether we have acted sagaciously and accurately in tolerating segment. Indeed, after the omission of a quarter century, it is astonishing to find how right the estimation of Azad was.

Azad sought to show that if the cabinet Mission scheme of 1946 had been accepted by the congress, partition could have been avoided. Azad’s prophecy that east and west Pakistan can’t remain united for more than a few decades also came true. He composed, Mr. Jinnah and his devotees did not appear to understand that topography was against them. Muslims in undivided India were appropriated in an extremely which made it difficult to shape a differentiate state in a combined range. These locales have no purpose of physical contact. Individuals in these two territories are totally not the same as each one in turn in each appreciation, aside from just in religion. It is one of the most stupendous fakes on the individuals to infer that religious proclivity can unite territories which are geologically.

Monetarily, semantically and socially distinctive. The reality of the matter is that Islam looked to secure a social order which transcends racial, semantic, monetary and political boondocks. History has, notwithstanding, demonstrated that after the
beginning couple of decades, or at generally after the first century, Islam was not equipped to unite all the Muslim nations into one state on the premise of Islam alone this was the position in the past and this is the position today, no one can hope that east and west Pakistan will compose all their differences and form one nation. Even within west Pakistan, the three provinces of Sind, the Punjab, the frontier, have internal incompatibility and are working for separate aims and interests. Nevertheless the die is cast. The new state of Pakistan is a fact.