CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SURVEY: CARDINAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE
HISTORICAL SURVEY: CARDINAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

India’s foreign policy reflect a traditional policy of nonalignment, the exigencies of domestic economic reform and development, and the changing post-cold war international environment. The historical roots of India’s foreign policy can be traced in her struggle for freedom from British Imperialism. Ever since the first session of Indian National Congress in 1885 held at Bombay its leaders opposed the annexation of upper Burma and in the next session in 1886 it opposed expansionism across India’s north-west frontiers. These initial expressions confirm that the congress leadership lived in a intellectual climate that was “internationalist, not isolationist”. The Kanpur Congress in 1925 adopted a decision for setting up of a Foreign Department for studying international questions and making recommendations on important matters to parent body. This event “marked the inchoate beginning of the foreign policy envisaged by the INC for the Indian people.” The period between 1920 and 1946, may be considered when the “fundamental terms of reference for Independent India’s foreign policy were formulated. Mahatma Gandhi’s influence was the predominant factor in this process. While Gandhiji defined the framework for India’s foreign policy, Nehru fashioned its orientations”.

In 1947, India won independence and joined the comity of sovereign states and thereby qualified to participate as an actor in international politics and relations. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru the first Prime Minister of India left a deep imprint on the foreign policy of independent India. The evolution of India’s foreign policy can be divided into four chronological phases. The first phase was from 1946 to 1954, the second phase from 1954 to 1962 and the third phase from 1962 till mid-80s and the fourth phase from mid-80s to date.

The territorial consolidation of Indian polity, integration of princely states to Indian republic to maintain geographic cohesion were the main concerns of Indian foreign policy during the first phase (1946-1954). Pakistan’s inroads into Kashmir, the ambiguous role of colonial power in relation to princely states of Hyderabad, Travencore, Bhopal and Kashmir compounded India’s worries about its territorial cohesion. India had to define its political and strategic world view in the wake of bipolar world that emerged after World War II. The structuring of relationship with two of its neighbours, China and Pakistan posed further problem for Indian foreign policy.

Indian foreign policy responded to the concern of cold war confrontation by adopting policy of non-alignment, that did not mean equidistance from the superpowers but asserted the right to pursue its own interests free from external domination. It may well be pointed out that non-alignment, like all national policies, “is a

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response which stems from self-interest. Faced with the emerging conditions of the Cold War after the termination of the second great war, leaders and policy planners preferred the course of keeping away from the politics of bi-polar diplomacy. Representing the stand of the country, Nehru made it clear that India would not join the military blocs of either super-power and, at the same time, pursue the path of international peace and co-operation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union strongly desired to entrap her in their military blocs and condemned the course of independent foreign policy as ‘immoral’. Even Stalin felt that “Those who were not with us were against us”. The Chinese communist supreme Mao declared that a country must “lean to be one side or the other, and third path does not exist.” Undeterred by such allegations, Nehru repeatedly affirmed his determination to pursue an independent foreign policy which consisted of two essential features – no-alignment with either of the two power blocs, and examining every international issue on its merit and expressing opinion on it frankly without fear or favour.

As a matter of fact, India “was presented with a challenge right from the very beginning of her independence to choose a foreign policy, in accordance with her national interest, in the context of a world divided between Communism and anti-Communism. India had to take a stand on this issue, because the attitudes of the

8. B.S.N. Murti: Nehru’s foreign Policy, Bombay: Beacon Information and publication, 1953, p.68.
principal powers of the world were bound to be determined by that stand.\(^9\) The critics of this policy showed their unwillingness to understand the implications of this stand and instead identify it with some other terms as ‘neutrality’, ‘neutralism’ ‘neutralisation’, non-commitment’, passivism’ and the like.\(^{10}\) But Nehru refused to identify his concept of non-alignment with any of the so-called related terms. Speaking at the Columbia University in September, 1949 he said: “The main objectives of this policy are: the pursuit of peace not through alignment with any major group of Powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of subject peoples; the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual, elimination of racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which afflict the greater part of world’s population.”\(^{11}\)

The way India reacted to various international issues made the implications of non-alignment very clear. In no much time, it became evident that the course of non-alignment not merely implied keeping away from the military alliances of the two super-power, it also suggested certain concrete courses like efforts for the liquidation of imperialism, end of racialism, check on armaments, strengthening the United Nations and, in short, striving for a better and prosperous new international order. Thus, the term came to have negative as well as positive elements. While the negative

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element envisaged a course of refusal to take sides in any military line-up of world powers as perhaps the hard core or the irreducible minimum of non-alignment, in positive terms, it signified preservation and furtherance of national interest. Highlighting this aspect, Prof. A. Appadorai observes: “India believes in an independent foreign policy, not tying herself with power blocs. She will uphold the principle of freedom for dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination wherever it may occur. She will work with every peace-loving nation for international co-operation and good-will without exploitation of one nation by another. She will cooperate whole-heartedly with the United Nations Organization.”

At global level Nehru’s foreign policy was quite successful and it had valuable contributions to international relations. It was not only successful but was widely acclaimed during Korean war, Vietnamese crisis, West Asian crisis. In 1962 China’s attack on India, revealed that all was not well with India’s foreign policy and it was obliged to shed its idealistic and moralistic overtones. Techniques of India’s foreign policy after 1962 underwent a change, but its basic principles continued to be the same. It became more pragmatic and realistic. During the Shastri era the emphasis shifted to collective decision-making. He made it quite plain that “the policy of non-alignment was to be the fundamental basis of our approach to world problems and our relations with other countries.” During short span of his tenure Lal Bahadur Shastri tried to cultivate friendly and

12. K.P. Misra, the concept of non-alignment, in his ed. Studies in India’s Foreign Policy, Vikas, New Delhi, 1969 p.92.
intimate relations with neighbours like, Nepal, Burma and Sri Lanka as well as the two superpowers. He succeeded in getting military and economic assistance from both the powers and greatly strengthened India’s position. In fact, its stress grounded on “the realities” of international politics, “in practice meaning a greater concern with India’s immediate, concrete problems in her region and a greater sensitivity to external and internal forces”. There was a “distinct change in style, with less eagerness for action and more inclination toward reaction, and with a better balance between internal and external affairs in the approach to politics in general.”

He also appointed Pillai Committee in 1965 to look into various issues affecting foreign policy making in India.

**Indira Gandhi’s regime:**

Since Indira Gandhi remained Prime Minister for quite a long period (from 1966 to 1977 and again from 1980 to 1984) her contribution to India’s foreign policy is very significant. The greatest achievement of this period was explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974, breaking the monopolistic position of the nuclear powers, Shimla agreement (1972) and Indo-USSR friendship treaty (1971). Notwithstanding the above achievements of Indira’s foreign policy, it is to be acknowledged that India’s tilt towards the USSR earned her the reputation of having departed from the policy of non-alignment. Secondly, the imposition of emergency and its co commitment excesses also soiled India’s image in the world especially the West. Mrs. Indira Gandhi ushered Indian foreign policy into channels of political realism away from the

romantic illusions and moral idealism which characterized the foreign policy of India during the Nehru era. She extended the content and range of this assertive and realistic Indo-centric orientations in Indian foreign policy by building up India's technological and defence capacities and giving a clear message to all India's neighbours that while India had no aggressive or hegemonistic intentions towards them, India's response to any threats to its unity and territorial integrity emanating from other countries would receive a prompt and decisive response. She followed a two track policy to galvanize India's security and consolidated India's position in the international community. She expanded defence cooperation arrangements with the Soviet Union and her allies, culminating the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August, 1971. She initiated successful policies for augmenting India's capacities in the spheres of space and nuclear technology which have resulted in India's nuclear weapons capacities and the satellite and missile capacities both for technological and defence purposes. The nuclear explosion at Pohkaran in 1974, the first launching of satellites, missiles and rockets for scientific and technological purposes concretized this policy orientation.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 was a source of support and strength during strength during the East Pakistan crisis leading to the creation of Bangladesh. The conduct of peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 was a response to the changed Indian geo-strategic environment resulting form China becoming a nuclear
weapons power from 1964 onwards Pakistan commencing its nuclear weaponisation programme in 1972.

The second track was to strengthen the non-aligned movement and to support the United Nations becoming an important factor to stabilize global political and economic arrangements conducive to India’s geo-political and economic interests.

**Janata government:**

The coming in power of the Janata Party in March 1977 was a momentous event, because for the first time a non-Congress government came in power at the Centre. The overall framework within which the Janata Government worked out its foreign relations remained the same as followed by its predecessors. The minor changes or shifts were more in the form of adjustments owing to the regional and international environment as perceived by the policy-makers.

The changed world environment in the 1970s was marked by the replacement of East-West Cold War by North-South conflict. The agenda of international affairs expanded beyond the traditional issues of security and balance of power to include complex issues of economic interdependence, resource management, global preservation and ecological balance. These emerging issues required multilateral negotiatory treatment and new outlook that could not be tackled with an ideological basis and old techniques.

It must be pointed out that the Janta party leaders recognized that foreign policy was not an issue of party politics
as the domestic policy was. Therefore, they were not interested to formulate a foreign policy which should be completely different from that of the Congress. Differences are not that important in the field of foreign policy because it is always based on elements of continuity and change. There is bound to be some change, but they adhered strictly to the basic postulates and to national consensus because foreign policy should serve national interest.

When the Janata party captured power in the elections of 1977 and Morarji Desai became the Prime Minister, with Atal Behari Vajpayee as his foreign Minister, it was natural that the government would give a new direction to India’s foreign policy. The Janata leaders called it a move towards ‘proper’ or ‘genuine’ non-alignment. The government opposed all forms of colonialism, racialism and violence and instead preferred the course of pacific settlement of international disputes. On nuclear policy it viewed that India would not allow outside inspection of any nuclear establishment built with its own resources under any circumstances. It desired better relations with the neighbouring countries, particularly, Pakistan and China. The meaning of genuine non-alignment lay in according first priority to better understanding and co-operation with immediate neighbours, pursuit of a policy of beneficial bilateralism in general, renewed interest in the commonwealth as a multilateral association and its regional and bilateral benefits and opportunities, and a somewhat different articulation of India’s nuclear policy.

16. M.S. Agwani: “India and the Arab World” in B.R. Nanda (ed.): India’s Foreign Policy: the Nehru, Years, Vikas, New Delhi,1976,p.69
asserted by leaders of the party that "co-existence was not a matter of tactics. Genuine co-existence, as opposed to tactical, was the natural determinant of the conflicting set of trends, forces and ideologies the world is faced with".\(^{18}\) It implied that the essence of genuine non-alignment "lies in the refusal to sacrifice a principle for the sake of convenience by submitting itself to the needs of the day".\(^{19}\)

**Shift towards pragmatism:**

Towards the middle of 1980s the following factors and trends as affecting India's foreign and defence policies can be perceived-

(a) The Cold War was gradually disappearing. US- USSR consensus on international issues required drastic adjustment by India.

(b) Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan tended to increase US and Pakistani influences and options in the Gulf and West Asian regions.

(c) Pakistan's emergence as an assertive and self-assured entity in the South Asian region.

(d) Changed leadership in the Soviet Union and China resulting in gradual accommodation in their attitudes for each other.

(e) Adoption of a more practical approach towards India by China as indicated by Deng Xiaoping to the then Indian Foreign Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee during latter's visit of China in 1979.

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While older multilateral organizations and arrangements were losing their unity and sense of purpose (like G-77, UNCTAD, the Non-aligned Group), new centripetal forces were at work resulting in regional and sub-regional groupings being formed for technological, economic and commercial cooperation, their objective being to fashion durable framework for peace and security in their respective.

The potentialities of mechanisms of socio-economic management and development conceived and operated since the Nehru era had leveled off. Comparative inadequacies of somewhat similar systems in the Socialist countries-particularly in the Soviet Union and China, were noted. India had to change gear and reorient its methods of socio-economic management to overcome internal socio-economic stagnation.

Regardless of the factual situation of Indian commitment to principles of non-interference and peaceful co-existence, regional perceptions of India were about India harbouring hegemonistic and regional power ambitions.

At the end of the fourth decade after independence, India was facing potent centrifugal pressures in Punjab and the North Eastern States. There was a tangible emerging internal threat to India's internal stability and security.

Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons capacities changed the South Asia military balance.
Apart from Pakistan, India’s neighbours like Nepal, and Sri Lanka are forging political and defense relationships with US, China, Israel and other countries due to their perceptions about India.

Rajiv Gandhi initiated clear-cut policies and a measured response to these challenges and trends. He opened up lines to the U.S. and Western countries, while sustaining requisite level of relations with the Soviet Union; he embarked on the path of greater diversification. Signals were sent to China indicating India’s willingness to normalize relations and resume personal contacts with Zia-ul-Haq and Jayawardene, Presidents of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, respectively, with whom India’s relations were passing through a critical phase. Rajiv Gandhi took particularly active steps to establish greater understanding with the leaders of South Asian countries. He availed every opportunity to set the stage for improving the climate of bilateral relations with each country. 20 The idea behind it was that the success of its foreign policy will be measured with the success of its achievements, in improving relation with neighbours. He was firm where the country’s national interests were concerned without being abrasive.21 Rajiv Gandhi moulded the defence and foreign policy into one single theoretical framework with four overriding objectives;

(a) Stability at home,
(b) Modernization of economy,
(c) Friendliness with neighbours, and
(d) A congenial global environment.

20. Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, 1985-86, No.9...
While speaking at the National Defence College in October 1985 he spelt this strategic foreign policy of India. He identified “3 bases” for India’s national security—

(a) The Domestic base- “Strength, Unity and Cohesiveness,”

(b) Regional base- “friendly co-operative relations with neighbours, no Indian hegemony, settlement of differences through dialogue so that they don’t lead to conflict,” and

(c) World environment.

He proposed a new time-bound initiative for nuclear disarmament, arms control, and reduction in strategic arms, aimed at their elimination by the first decade of the 21st century. He started liberalization of the economy. He expedited the creation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), proposed by Bangladesh while participating in its first summit at Dhaka in December, 1985. He was prompt in visiting Pakistan to meet Benazir Bhutto after the restoration of democracy in the country in 1988, and then again in 1989, resulting in the signing of the important Indo-Pakistan agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities. He put forward a number of proposals to enhance economic and cultural cooperation, and people to people contact between India and Pakistan to build an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. He assured the Sri Lankan President that India’s support to Tamil aspirations was matched by an equal commitment of India to Sri Lankan unity and territorial integrity. His last significant contribution to safeguarding India’s security was his visit to China in December, 1988, where the discussions with Deng Xiaoping commenced the important and gradual process of normalization of relations between China and India.
Narsimha Rao:

Narsimha Rao assumed office at a time when the world had undergone complete change due to breaking of ideological barriers, the end of cold war and adjustments in power equations due to disintegration of Soviet Union. Serious economic realities and domestic turmoil necessitated to make new adjustment and adoption of new orientation to the foreign policy. He laid greater emphasis on economic diplomacy and he openly declared that his office would use foreign policy as a dynamic instrument for promotion of national interest in the changed global context. This constituted a clear departure from traditional foreign policy.

The most important event in this connection is the declaration of Prime Minister Rao at a seminar on ‘Panch Sheel and Global Diplomacy’ held in Delhi on 27 June, 1994. He has introduced five new principles to meet the requirements of the post-Cold War era. There are:

1. **Middle Path:** It implies adherence to the revised canon of mixed economy. It desires that while new methods of economic management must be introduced, we must never lose sight of those who cannot keep up with the pace of the fore-runners. This way has been proposed to ensure that vast segments of people are not left out by the rapid economic and technological changes.

2. **Back to the Village:** It would stop alienation of the villages. It is in our villages that India’s heart beats, where the green revolution has been engineered, and where the common man creates the wealth and artistry of India.
3. Model Village: It means that each village should be viable as an economic unit so that it becomes like a model of its own.

4. Technology and Tradition: We should realize the need for harmony between the traditions of the country and the relevance of modern technology. All technological achievements must be appreciated and adopted for the economic and political modernization without destroying the value of the traditions of the country.

5. New World Order: The way of peaceful coexistence should be strengthened more and more in consonance with the five principles of India’s foreign policy as enunciated in 1954 (called Panchsheel). This is a holy doctrine that must be firmly established in the ideology of the coming century.

Some of his most impressive achievements which deserve to be recalled are as follows:

- Initiating India’s economic reforms and market liberalization policies that today provide the mainstay of India’s sustained high rates of economic growth which provide an index of India’s power potential.

- Rao was the real architect of the transformation of the Indian economy. He provided the bold political decision that was translated into policies.

- The India-Israel strategic partnership was given its initial impetus by him. The dividends of this became visible during the Kargil War.

- Rao reclaimed Myanmar from a Chinese strategic embrace brought about by the ‘democracy crusades’ of his predecessors.
• India's improved relations with the United States were brought about in Rao's tenure and so also with China with border CBMs.

• If information leakage had not taken place Rao was well on the way to carry out nuclear weapons tests during his tenure.

India's main determinants of its foreign policy rested on the two determinants of national security interests and economic security interests. Rao distinguished himself in achieving these objectives. This has to be viewed and appreciated in the context of the complex international security environment then prevailing. The USSR had disintegrated and India had lost a countervailing power on which it had traditionally relied upon.

**Look East Policy:**

India's new "Look East" foreign policy was a Rao's creation to integrate India with the vibrant economies of East Asia and South East Asia. India's "Look East" policy, first enunciated in 1992, had its genesis in the end of the Cold War, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having lost the Soviet economic and political support on which it had relied, the Indian government embarked on a program of free market restructuring at home and sought new markets and economic partners abroad. India also began to look for alternate energy sources after US-led Gulf War on Iraq in 1990-91 destabilized the Middle East.

The "Look East" policy was aimed at developing closer relations with the so-called economic "tigers" of South East Asia. In 1997, India became a full dialogue partner of the region's main grouping—the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). After coming to power in 1998, the BJP-led government in New Delhi continued
the orientation to ASEAN despite the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the “tiger” economies.

At the ASEAN summit in Bali in October 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee spelled out new initiatives for economic cooperation, including air and road links. To demonstrate the close relations he proposed an India-ASEAN motor rally from South East Asia through Burma to India. He outlined a program of free trade agreements with the countries of the region. The Indian prime minister signed a deal with Thailand to slash tariffs on a range of goods and offered closer intelligence and military cooperation.

Yaswant Sinha, then the foreign minister, spelled out the strategy in a speech at Harvard University. “In the past, India’s engagement with much of Asia, including South East and East Asia, was built on an idealistic conception of Asian brotherhood, based on shared experiences of colonialism and of cultural ties. The rhythm of the region today is determined, however, as much by trade, investment and production as by history and culture. That is what motivates our decade-old ‘Look East’ policy.”

The fact that the speech was delivered in the US was significant. Under the Vajpayee government, India developed closer strategic and economic relations with Washington. Singh’s remarks were a further assurance that there would be no return to the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Cold War days when India played a leading role in the so-called Non-Aligned Movement. Clearly India was looking for the backing of Washington, which is also seeking to block China’s links to ASEAN, as it pursued its aims of closer ties in South East Asia.

Defeating the BJP in last 2004 election, the Congress-led government has made no sharp breaks with previous policies. The
new foreign minister Natwar Singh told the India-ASEAN business summit in New Delhi in October that "Look East" was "more than a political slogan or a foreign policy orientation." At the ASEAN gathering the following month, he enthusiastically proposed exploring the possibilities of a broad "Asian Economic Community" and signed an agreement for an ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace Progress and Shared Prosperity.

Part of the expected pay-off for India is economic. India has trade agreements with most ASEAN countries and the region currently accounts for $US13 billion or about 10 percent of India’s total foreign trade. India is hoping to take advantage of ASEAN plans for a single market and to nearly treble its trade with the region to $30 billion by 2007.

India is also seeking strategic relations in South East Asia. In its maritime doctrine, the Indian navy shifted its doctrine from defending the country's coastline from rival Pakistan to declaring the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR), from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits, to be its "legitimate area of interest." India is in the process of acquiring nuclear submarines, the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov and 16 MiG 29 K ground attack/interceptor aircraft as part of this strategy. India wants a major role in policing the international sea-lanes through the Indian Ocean and has already forged agreements with Malaysia and Indonesia regarding naval patrolling of the western end of the strategic Strait of Malacca.

Collapse of Soviet Union:

The 1990s was a period in which Indian diplomacy had to adapt to extraordinary changes at home and aboard. At the turn of the decade, India was traumatized by the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the consequent imbalance in world politics. India also had to cope with the new wave of economic globalisation in 1990s. Mr. Gujral steered India's foreign policy at crucial junctures in 1989-91 and again during 1996-98. Mr. Gujral has admitted himself “it fell to my lot to orient our foreign policy during the period of bewilderingly rapid changes wherein one kind of world was ushered out and another kind was ushered in”. At the turn of the 1990s Mr. Gujral had to deal with the end of the Cold War, the impending collapse of the Soviet Union and the American war in the Gulf to vacate Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, when he took charge in mid-1996, India's nuclear debate was in full flow and Mr. Gujral clinched one key element of it, by refusing to give up the right to test nuclear weapons. He resisted considerable pressure from the United States to join the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or at least not oppose it. Mr. Gujral's rejection of the CTBT paved the way for India's tests in May 1998.

**Gujral Doctrine:**

"Gujral doctrine", as it has come to be termed, is based on five simple principles. First, with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust. Second, we believe that no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country of the region. Third, that none should interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourth, all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. These few simple ideas, if implemented, will result in a positive impact on the security situation in our region and a fundamental recasting of South Asia's regional relationships and our role in the world.
BJP/NDA GOVERNMENT IN POWER:

The latter half of the 1990s till 2004 witnessed a BJP Government in power. Its tenure coincided with the post-Cold War era, the major rise of United States unilateralsim and the new American policies of pre-emption and military intervention in global affairs without restraint. The BJP government continued with the overall general direction of foreign policies of the Narasimha Rao Government. In security matters the BJP exhibited different strategic culture and strategic vision.

The BJP/NDA administrations of 1996 (for two weeks), 1998-99 and 1999-2004 pursued a foreign and national security policy decisions which can be characterized as “strong at home, engaged abroad.” Evidence for the first part of this characterization includes the Pokhran nuclear tests of 1998 which made India the world’s sixth declared nuclear weapons state, the development and testing of a variety of ballistic missiles capable of covering ever longer distances, and a steady increase in defense spending on both internal and external security organizations. Being strong at home also meant establishing a National Security Council (NSC) complete with its own secretariat and headed by a National Security Advisor who acted as the government’s civilian focal point for all matters pertaining to India’s overall security. The second part of the strong at home, engaged abroad foreign and national security policy of the BJP/NDA administrations deals with their conception of India as a major player on the world stage. One part of this policy saw the government continue the country’s historical participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping duties, Engaged abroad also meant
building on the close defense ties with Russia dating back to 1971 to agree the purchase of an aircraft carrier, nuclear-capable bombers and antisubmarine helicopters, as well as purchasing and/or jointly building hardware from western suppliers, Hawk training jets from the United Kingdom and Scorpene submarines from France. In a notable new development, the BJP/NDA administration built a close defense relationship with Israel, and the latter will now supply India with the American-designed Phalcon airborne early-warning radar system and Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile system, after Russia, Israel is now India's largest supplier of defense materials.

That the United States (US) permitted Israel to sell state-of-the-art defence hardware to India reveals the closeness of the relationship which had developed between the BJP/NDA and George W. Bush administrations, respectively. In Vajpayee's words, the "common values and common interests" of the two countries led them to conduct joint naval and anti-terrorist exercises, in early 2004, the US also agreed to export highly sensitive civil nuclear and civilian space equipment to India.

Perhaps the most surprising manifestation of the engaged abroad foreign and national security policy of the BJP/NAD was its concerted effort to reduce tensions with China, the country which humiliated India in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. This administration had earlier set back decades of slowly improving relations by publicly stating that the threat posed by China was the main reason for its 1998 nuclear tests. However, P.M. Vajpayee reversed course following a visit to Beijing in June 2003 when it was announced that India would acknowledge the Tibet Autonomous region as Chinese
while, in return, China would effectively concede India’s sovereignty of Sikkim, subsequently the two countries conducted joint naval exercises in November of that year.

The BJP/NDA’s strong at home, engaged abroad foreign and national security policy also had a great effect on India’s relations with Pakistan. In 1999, the two nuclear weapons-armed countries fought the Kargil Conflict and, in the spring of 2002, came close to instigating an all-out war over the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament and continued insurgent atrocities in Kashmir. However, following this near-war situation, the BJP/NAD government came to understand that it is in India’s paramount interest to seek a stable, peaceful and secure relationship with Pakistan. This would allow it to develop a mutually beneficial economic relationship with its neighbour, as well as free India for a larger global role. Hence the Indo-Pak “Composite Dialogue” announced at the 12th South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) held in January 2004. This led to a planned roadmap of meetings between the two countries to address issues of concern, including Kashmir and nuclear arsenal confidence-building measures. The warming of Indo-Pak relations also manifested itself in India’s uncharacteristic reticence over revelations that Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, leader of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, had for years been selling nuclear secrets to other countries, and its decision to not oppose Pakistan’s re-entry into the Commonwealth (form which it had been suspended after General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup d’etat).

It can be summed up that in BJP/NDA foreign policy greater intensity was accorded to the build-up of US-India strategic
cooperation, normalizing and enlarging cooperation with China, besides to bring a military adventurist and terrorism proxy-war nation like Pakistan to the dialogue table.

**Security Doctrine of BJP:**

The BJP led government attempted to develop a clear cut national security doctrine with the submission (2001) of Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers- a report reviewing all aspects of national security. The Kargil Review Committee’s recommendations one year earlier had proposed to rectify the failings in intelligence, border security and defense management in the immediate region where the conflict had occurred, were taken also into the consideration in the formulation of the security doctrine.

The Reforming the National Security System suggested extensive reforms in the four areas of intelligence, internal security, border management and the management of defence to maintain law-and-order situation internally and defend its 14,880 kilometres of land borders and 5,422 kilometres of coastline from the multitudes of threats.

The Reforming the National Security System identified China, on its way to “near superpower status by 2020” as a potential threat because of its “wide-ranging defence modernization with a special focus on force-multipliers and high technology weapon systems”, it repeatedly focused on the danger posed by Pakistan. The Nation, foresees the report “will continue to pose a threat to

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22. Reforming the National Security System,p.58.
24. Reforming the National Security System,p.9
India's security... Its traditional hostility and single-minded aim of destabilizing India, is not focused just on Kashmir but on a search for parity... As a result of Pakistan's political and economic instability, its military regime may act irrationally. Pakistan believes that nuclear weapons can compensate for conventional military inferiority, its leaders have not concealed their desire to use nuclear weapons against India".25

The Report continues that the problem with addressing such threats is that Pakistan has instigated non-state actors and employed non-traditional avenues in pursuit of its aims to destabilize India. Its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is accused of direct or indirect involvement with: "Taliban and Jihadi elements. (working) relentlessly for the break-up of the Indian Union"26, drugs, arms and/or people smuggling from Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and/or Pakistan; and "trying to cultivate the border population on outside...through Pakistani nationals, who visit border areas on legitimate Indian visas"27

The Reforming the National Security System has recommended the inclusion of the following factors in the security planning:

- Upgrading the intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities of the Intelligence Bureau.
- Deploying the vast array of central para-military forces only in those duties for which they were originally trained and equipped.

• Creating a separate Department of Border Management within the Ministry of Home Affairs.

• Establishing the posts of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) to provide the government a single source of military advice and administration.

• Establishing a Strategic Forces Command to manage all strategic forces.

• Setting up a Defence Intelligence Agency to co-ordinate the different service intelligence directorates.

The long list of recommendations have justified by the authors as this is the first "comprehensive review of (India's) national security system in its entirety...The apparatus and systems that we had inherited from the British are no longer suitable in this day and age".28. The national security apparatus of India was updated following the recommendations of The Reforming the National Security System. The Department of Border Management has been opened up in the Ministry of Home Affairs with the responsibility for management of all international and coastal borders as well as to develop the border areas. In March 2002, the Directorate of Military Intelligence has been replaced with a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) which combines the intelligence networks of all three armed services to reduce the military's reliance on civilian intelligence agencies such as Intelligence Bureau and Research and Analysis Wing. The most significant development of the National Security System is the establishment of a new Nuclear Command Authority.

(NCA) responsible for India’s tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The NCA may be seen as the first stage in the development of “an effective and robust command and control (C2) and indications-and-warning systems and infrastructure for its strategic nuclear force commensurate with India’s strategic requirements”\(^\text{29}\)

By the mid-1990s, the search for Indian security strategy was intensified. In fact, after the Cold War strategic realities and compulsions invalidated the strategic doctrines of the nation and it required a well defined set of principles in order to meet the challenges generated by the drastically altered global order. On 16 May, 1995 the Prime Minister Narsimha Rao confessed before the parliament that the country did not have a document called India’s National Defence Policy instead several guidelines were followed and strictly observed. Those can be summed up as:

1. To defend our National Territory over land, sea and air, encompassing among others the inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes.

2. To secure an internal environment whereby our Nation State is insured any threats to its unity or progress on the basis of religion, language, ethnicity or socio-economic dissonance.

3. To be able to exercise a degree of influence over the nations over the nations in our immediate neighbourhood to promote harmonious relationship with our national interests.

4. To be able to effectively contribute towards regional and international stability and

5. To possess an effective out-of-country contingency capability to prevent destabilization of the small nations in our immediate neighbourhood that could have adverse security implications for us.

Defending India, a seminal work on Indian national security by Jaswant Singh (former Indian Army captain, then deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of India, and later Defence and then Finance Minister in the NDA), the author asks:

What, therefore, has been the lasting legacy of the past 50 years? An absence of certainties in security-related issues; no establish land boundaries; an absence of secure geopolitical environment; a devaluation of India’s voice in global affairs and worrisomely, not even a beginning of any institutional framework for conceptualizing and managing the country’s defence.30

Singh’s sentiments were to find prominence when many of his ideas were incorporated into the BJP manifesto for the 1998 general elections.

In the 1998 general elections, the BJP campaigned against the previous United Front administration and the Congress party with an ideology of hindutva that envisaged a great India as a militarily powerful India. Their 1998 election manifesto stated that the “frenetic pace of military expansion and modernization by some of our neighbours” had not been addressed by previous

administrations: “Since 1991, the country’s defence budget has been declining in real terms........from 3.4 per cent of the GDP in 1989-90 to a mere 2.2 Per cent this year”, and it listed numerous defence projects that had been delayed for lack of adequate funds. The manifesto committed the party to a specific list of strategic, organization and deployment options, including:

- The establishment of a National Security Council to “constantly analyze security, political and economic threats and render continuous advice to the Government........(as well as to) undertake India’s first-ever Strategic Defence Review.....”
- A re-evaluation of India’s nuclear policy with a view to “exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.
- Expediting the development of the Agni series of ballistic missiles.

The continuing concerns of the foreign policy are:

(i) India’s territorial integrity remains under threat from Pakistan due to Pakistan claims on Jammu and Kashmir, and from China due to the still-unresolved boundary dispute. In the latter case, the threat is not operational, as it was till the late

32. These included “inordinate delays in the LAC (light combat aircraft), nuclear submarine and guided Missiles”. BJP Election Manifesto’ 98.
33. BJP Election Manifesto’ 98. The pledge to exercise the nuclear option appeared as far back as the BJP’s 1985 election manifesto-although they won only two Lok Shabha seats. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to be Nuclear Power New Delhi : Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000, p.39.
1980s. It remains so, nevertheless, till Sino-Indian agreement is reached on the subject;

(ii) Internal centrifugal forces continue to affect India’s geopolitical unity. There are demands for secession for secession from segments of population in Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern States of India. Incipient separatist aspirations have been expressed by some groups in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Orissa and North Bengal on and off since late fifties and early sixties.

(iii) Adversary relations with Pakistan and China, and military conflicts with these countries have resulted in India having to divert its scarce financial, material and trained manpower resources for defence purposes, thereby reducing Indian capacities to formulate and implement social and economic policies for national consolidation and reconstruction.

(iv) Foreign countries, foreign think tanks questioning the practicability of India’s survival as a united polity because of the religious, ethnic and linguistic diversities in India, has been a recurrent refrain which India had to and has to counter.

(v) Foreign military bases and foreign military presences, including the deployment of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems in India’s neighbourhood, in the Northern reaches of the Indian Ocean and in the Arab and African littoral countries, have been a matter of apprehension to India. End of Cold War has not discontinued this force deployment posture whether it is at Diego Garcia or sea-borne or airborne forces.
(vi) China’s overwhelming nuclear capacities and the presence of nuclear weapons in the Asian and Indian Ocean region have influenced India’s foreign policy planning since 1964.

Since 1991, India is adjusting to the rapidly changing international and internal security environment. Constituent factors and elements of these environment at two levels have led to the reorientation and realignment of India’s foreign policy.

Firstly, the recognition of ground realities at end the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union has to be accorded priority resulted in transforming the two fundamental predications in India’s foreign policy. The relevance of nonalignment as manifested in the nonaligned movement, since its evolution required a re-examination.

Second, the leverage which India has due to its security linkages with the Soviet Union to safeguard its national security and to calibrate the geo-strategic environment around India for this purpose was lost.

Third, the process of globalization and information revolution necessitated India having to qualitatively reorient its economic social and development policies, to be in step with the mainstream of international development in this respect.

Fourth, India had to cope with a new agenda on international concerns which the world powers commenced generating pressures, not taking into account the diversity of individual pressures and the diversity of individual concerns of developing countries, namely, the issue of human rights, environment management, unilateral social
conditional ties stipulated by world powers governing the processes of developmental cooperation.

Fifth, the cold war was not replaced by an harmonious world order but by new patterns of competitions and incipient impulses for world domination by the advanced countries through expansion of security and economic arrangements dominated by United States and by unilaterally stipulated discriminatory regimes on transfer of technologies, international trade, flow of investments controlling the biological mineral and genetic resources of the world, and so on.

Sixth, Indian had to define its position and find its place in the new regional groupings and politico-strategic security arrangements being put in place after the end of the Cold war.

Seventh, India had to develop new equations with the emerging power centers of the world like North America, Western Europe, Japan, China, Russia and ASEAN.

Eight, India, had to forge relations with newly emerging countries like South Africa, Central Asia, the former European and Eurasian Republics of the Soviet Union.

Lastly, India had to diversify its defence and economic cooperation with various countries in conformity with new power equations emerging in the world in the context of orientation of polices of different important countries. Over and above all, India had to cope with comparatively volatile and uncertain political and economic situations in its immediate neighbourhood in South Asia. Major policy decisions, such as the one to go overtly nuclear in 1998. Can be attributed to this consuming desire to be seen as a
great power. For years both Indian and foreign analysts have expected that by the early 21st century India would become a major projector of power and influence throughout Asia. Indeed, the most recent evidences suggests that the India government has now opted for a 20-year program to fulfill that goal and become “a world power with influence spreading across the India Ocean, the Arabian Gulf and the four corners of Asia”.

A major byproduct of this intended rise to global status would be to leave Pakistan trailing behind as a minor regional power that could no longer threaten India’s vital interests. Thus this program builds on the same psychological drive that has long animated much of India’s thinking about regional security issues throughout the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee directed planners to craft defense strategies that extend beyond South Asia and transcend past sub-regional mindsets. India’s expanded security perspectives, he claimed, require such fresh thinking about projection power and influence, as well as security in all these directions. India will seek more defense cooperation with states in the Persian Gulf, Southeast and Central Asia. Presumably going beyond intelligence-sharing about terrorist activities.

Ten-year military buildup

While India formally eschews offensive military projections, it is Beyond those policies, all the Indian military services are currently missiles by improving communication and surveillance systems. “India’s Strategic Vision”, envisages cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius and Vietnam. And it comports with Vajpayee’s directives. However, it cannot be carried out given India’s
lack of fast long-range aircraft with aerial refueling capabilities, Airbrone Early Warning and Command Aircraft (AWAC), attack helicopters and a carrier in addition the existing India Naval Services Virat carrier. Many, observers, have recently begun to observe China’s rising economic and military capability across East Asia and its increased ability to shape policy outcomes desirable to Beijing. India now clearly aspires to a similar status and capability and apparently is willing to invest the resources necessary to acquire them.

Moreover, at least in Southeast Asia and in the waters adjacent to the straits of Malacca, India is prepared to assert its interests to counter the rise in Chinese interest there. All these shifts in the geopolitical capacity of major actors suggests that not only is the war on terrorism a central geopolitical and geo-strategic concern of these times, but also the likelihood of India-China rivalry across much of Asia, whether it is muted or overt, will be no less of a dominant story in the years to come.

Dramatic Surge in the Military Budget

The BJP government also secured a 27 percent increase in India’s latest military budget. In terms of New Delhi’s intentions and future conventional military capabilities the increased spending has several implications:

- More aggressive defense of national interests: India’s national security policy is being shifted toward more aggressive defense of national interests, territorial integrity, and sovereignty independent of what specific adversary the nation might have to confront. India would be significantly less accommodating
when another power threatens its national security. Strategic
defense will remain India's preference, but the focus may be
shifted from "defensive defense" to "offensive defense"—meaning
that preventive strikes against a perceived or real aggressor
could be launched before the aggressor could be launched
before the forces of that country would be able to invade Indian
territory.

• Enhanced conventional military capabilities: New Delhi wants
its armed forces to have the capability to repulse by
conventional means any attack by not only an equal or inferior
potential aggressor, such as Pakistan or international Muslim
radicals, but also a superior force, such as China or even the
United States.

• A larger military role in Asia: India is actively asserting a larger
military role in Asia aimed at gradually squeezing the forces of
outside powers (the United States, China, Britain, Australia,
etc.) out of South Asia and the broad oceanic areas
surrounding India and its islands that are considered to be of
vital importance to national security. If the trend of larger
military budgets continues, coupled with the growing Indian
economy and high-tech sector. India may have the following
conventional military capabilities by approximately 2005-06:

• Indian strategic power could be projected throughout the India
Ocean and neighboring waters of the Pacific Ocean, such as the
South China Sea, by deploying several Russian-built advanced
nuclear submarines with missile-launching capabilities, two or
even three more aircraft carriers with advanced Russian made combat planes on board, and other modern combat ships.

• Ballistic missile capabilities (with conventional warheads) may encompass the whole territory of Pakistan and Afghanistan vital regions of China, Southeast Asia, the Middle East (to Turkey), former Soviet Central Asia. And most of the Indian Ocean. The operational tasks for those Indian ballistic missile forces could be threefold: (1) to hit any important target in Pakistan and most of China; (2) to hit any anti-Indian terrorist bases in the Middle East, Central Asia, or Burma; and (3) to inflict impermissible losses on the naval and the land forces of “outside powers” operating in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and other regions surrounding India- in case of their attack on India.

• India’s military would secure even more superiority over Pakistan and a guaranteed victory in possible conflicts with Pakistan or Pakistani-backed Muslim guerrillas and make it impossible for China to achieve any meaningful success if it decided to invade to invade India. Such dominance could be achieved through acquisition and deployment of the following: advanced tank forces; modern artillery and tactical rockets; sophisticated command and control system as well as communications and intelligence-gathering systems with space-based components; new and upgraded aircraft; and a renewed arsenal of small arms, ammunition, and other military equipment, Many of the required arms could come from Russia and to a lesser extent from France, Israel, and possibly Britain
and the United States. Many weapons systems will be produced in India, either by indigenous companies or under license agreements.

**High Technology Serves National Security In India:**

The favorable conditions under which India is striving for world power status are well described by the monthly intelligence reports submitted to the Joint intelligence Committee of India. Those reports emphasize that India has the best scientific and technical capability in the Third World, ranks third in Asia in nuclear power, and seventh in the world in space technology. The reports also note that India Plans to build a spacecraft that could be used about 100 times and launch a manned space mission early in this century. India will not resume nuclear tests. At least for a while. But the tests conducted in 1998 have given enough scientific information for Indian specialists to improve the country’s nuclear weapon. India will continue building an Inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of over 8,000 kilometers and will likely achieve that goal within a few years. Development of the polar satellite Launch vehicle (PSLV) will be accelerated and integrated with the reentry technology already developed in India’s intermediate range ballistic missile, the Agni.

India is also working out new information and communications policies. Representatives from the armed forces must now be included in any Indian delegation on information and

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35. Building India's ICBM, Deccan Chronicle, April 14, 1999.
A thriving democracy with top-notch high-tech talent, minimum censorship of information technology, and widespread use of the English language, India is well placed to be a first rate economic power in the 21st century. Also, India interacts with the India Diaspora in the West to find solutions for integrating information and related technologies into the mainstream of life in India.

However, India's most ambitious program is space exploration. The country is poised to become the fourth space power of the world after America, Russia, and China. But with the deterioration of Russia's space program and possible (albeit, mostly unconfirmed) Chinese failures in space, India could become, within this decade, the number two space power, behind only the United States. India plans to compete for foreign commercial clients and has some advantages in that competition. For instance, Indian booster rockets are considerably cheaper than U.S. launchers. The service time of an average Indian satellite is twice as long as that of its Russian counterpart. Cooperation in space research, both commercial and academic, will be expanded to France, the European Space Agency, Russia, and other countries. The military component in India's space efforts will be increased, although not dramatically, and the Indian Space Research organization will pursue closer cooperation with the Indian armed forces and the defense Research and Development Organization.

The major goal in providing the military with various satellite services for 2000-05 will be launching and maintaining more communications issues.\textsuperscript{36} Col. Omkar Yadav, Department of Defense, New Delhi, July 1999.
advanced early warning and surveillance satellites in order to prevent a repetition of what happened during the intrusion of pro-Pakistan Islamic militants through the line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir in 1999. On the occasion, guerrillas penetrated Indian-held territory unnoticed.\textsuperscript{37} India is planning to build and deploy a multiple dual-use aerospace system (similar to the U.S. space shuttle) and is also interested in working with the Russians on the project. The Defense Research and Development Laboratory is to work on the aerospace system between now and 2019.\textsuperscript{38} In addition, India is working on and plans to launch its first manned spaceship in a few years, most likely between 2006 and 2012.\textsuperscript{39}

The most extensive military dual-use program will develop, produce, and deploy new generations of satellites. The first in the new series of earth imaging satellites with advanced equipment Cartosar-1.\textsuperscript{40} The satellite will give more information to the military than is available from Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS). IRS-6 a satellite similar to Cartosat-I is getting ready for launch.\textsuperscript{41} Nevertheless, both of these highly sophisticated satellites will not be used solely for military purposes. The Indian National Security Advisory Board calls for creation of space based high resolution satellites to provide early warning so that the survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command, control communications, computing, and intelligence and information (C4I2) systems is

\textsuperscript{37} Vice, Marshal Samir K. Sen. Air Force, New Delhi, India, October 1999.
\textsuperscript{38} "Defence Research and Development Laboratory Result, "Times of India, July 19, 1999.
\textsuperscript{39} Discussion with Vice Marshal Samir K. Sen.
\textsuperscript{40} "Cartosat-1 to Help Defence Forces," Hindustan Times August 2, 1999.
ensured. New space lunching sites and other ground facilities will be created during the next two decades. The launching station on Shriharikota Island (between Lake Plicate and the Bay of Bengal, 68 miles north of Madras) recently got one more launching pad and follow-up reconstruction is under way there are calls in India to prepare an affordable long-term plan to build space based surveillance assets, theater surveillance with unmanned air vehicles, stand off platforms stealth capacities, precision guidance systems, and anti-missile defense.

**India’s National Goals and National Security Interests**

The BJP leadership is likely to pursue six goals:

- Making India in this decade one of the four world powers, with the United States, China, and the European Union. Specifically, the government will use India’s rising political, diplomatic, economic, military, and moral authority to achieve that goal and to get formal recognition of world power status, which would include India’s becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

- Asserting India’s independence while striving to build equal and mutually beneficial relations with the United States. If Washington applies pressure on the country, New Delhi will try to minimize the confrontation; if the United States continues to apply pressure, Indian leaders are prepared to strengthen strategic and defensive cooperation with traditional allies (Russia) and possibly with new allies (e.g., China).

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42. *India Spells Out Draft N-Doctrine*, Hindustan Times, August 18, 1999.
43. V. Malik, "*Army in 21st Century*, "The Pioneer (India), February 13, 1999."
• Maintaining the territorial integrity and unity of the country under any circumstances, which means few, if any, concessions on the Kashmir issue.

• Preserving and defending the uniqueness of India’s civilization and culture under any geopolitical circumstances and by any means necessary.

• Acquiring sufficient military and nonmilitary means to repel any aggressor. In pursuit of that goal, India will maintain strategic superiority over Pakistan, gradually reach strategic parity with China, and eventually achieve the means of inflicting impermissible losses on the United States should it attack India.

• Maintaining a minimal nuclear deterrent despite any U.S. or international pressure until the official members of the nuclear weapons club agree to destroy their own nuclear weapons.

Indians see the beginning of the 21st century as a breakthrough for their country. India’s national goals are extremely ambitious, but a majority of them are likely to be achieved.