Chapter–III
MAJOR ACTORS OF AF-PAK CRISES
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In the process of establishing international peace and security, emergence of ‘crisis’ is a the normal phenomenon which is, generally, due to improper management of nation-building activities. Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) crisis is one such example where both nations-states are in a ‘fragile’ state and hence there is a mismatch in their overall perceptions of politico-eco and security issues which in turn is a cause of worry for entire international system.

This and next chapter would concentrate on (a) condition of ‘fragility’ and ‘failing’ (b) why Afghanistan stands on crossroad of its history and (c) what has been the role of Pakistan in Af-Pak crisis.

A failed states by definition is not on ‘expiry state’ but is a state which is trapped in failure, and cannot resolve its fundamental contradictions and is inclined to prefer policies that have little chance of success. In other words, it is a state which is perceived to have failed as sovereign system. Rotberg (2004) defines ‘failed state’ as a state which is very tensed, deeply conflicted, and contested by warring factions. David A. Lake (2008) adds that in a failed state, the

29 A.A. Lahori “what is to Be Done”, The Nation, Dec. 12, 1996.
state neither possesses legitimacy nor exercises monopoly over violence. 31

According to “Fund for Peace” a think tank of USA offers few characteristics of failed states32 (a) there is either a loss of control or monopoly over of its territory, (b) there is a erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions or inability to provide public services or inability to interact with other state as a full member of international community. These characteristic also include ineffectiveness of authority, corruption involuntary movement of population and economic decline.33

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32 Since 2005, the United State think-tank Fund for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy have published on annual index called the Failed States index. The list only assesses sovereign States (as determined by membership in the United Nations). Several territories are exclude until their political status and UN membership is ratified in international law. For example, Taiwan, the Palestinian Territories, Northern Cyprus and Western Sahara are not included in the list, even though some or recognized as sovereign states by some nations. Ranking is based on the total scores of the 12 indicators. For each indicator, the ratings are place on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable) The total score in the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120.

On the other hand a fragile state\textsuperscript{34} is low-income nation-state characterized by a weak state legitimacy with wide range of threats. The fragility of a state could be measured by “Institutional Assessment Index” with\textsuperscript{35} twelve indictors four social, two economic and six political.

Social Indicators

\textbf{The Indicator of Demographic Pressure} means the ratio between population density and food supply and other life-sustaining resources which originates from population’s settlement patterns, its physical settings, it border disputes, ownership pattern of land, access to transportation, control of religious or historical sites and proximity to environmental hazards.

\textsuperscript{34} While many countries are making progress towards achieving the minimum Development Goals (MDG), a group of 35 to 50 countries (Depending on the measure used) is falling behind. It is estimated that out of the World’s seven billion people, 26% like in a fragile states, and this is where one third of all people surviving o less than & 1.25 per day live, half of the World’s children die before the age of five and one third of material deaths occur. Not only are they falling behind, but the gap with other developing countries is widening since the 1970s. In 2006, per capita GDP grew only at 2% in fragile states, whereas it reached 6% in other low-income countries. Projections (for example, world Band 2008) that fragile states will constitute on even larger share of low-income countries graduate to middle-income status. This is a major challenge for development efforts and it has been argued by the overseas Development Institute that fragile states require fundamentally different approaches from the development models exercised in more resilient countries because of the different context of risk. (Manuel, Marcus, “Getting Better Results from Assistance to Fragile States.: ODI Briefing Papers, Overseas, Development Institute).

\textsuperscript{35} ibid
Movement of refugee for internally displaced persons is another indicator which means forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random violence or repression, or food shortages, or disease or lack of clean water, land competition, lack of public housing or some turmoil that can generate larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between the countries.

Legacy of Vengeance is 3rd social indicator which is based on past injustices, including atrocities committed by either ‘Communal groups’ or “specific groups” by state authorities, for political objectives.

Human flight or “brain drain” of professional, intellectuals, and political dissidents is another indictors.

Uneven economic development in terms of inequality, in education, in jobs and in economic status is economic indicator which is measured by groups levels, infant morality rates and levels of life styles.

Poverty is a major Social indicator which is measured by a progressive economic decline of the society in terms of and per capita income, GNP, debt, poverty levels and business failures. Devaluation of the national currency and a growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight also adds to poverty.

This Political Indicator of Deligitimacy of the State arises because of endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to transparency, accountability and political representation and result in loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes.

Deterioration of public services is author indicator which incase disappearance of basic state functions including failure (a) to provide
protect to its citizens from terrorism and violence (b) and to provide essential services like health, sanitation and public transportation. **Violation of Human rights** and emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial military rule is a major political indicator in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are either suspended or manipulated.

**Security apparatus as “State within a state”** means emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militia that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies” and civilians sympathetic to the opposition. In other words, it means “army within an army” that serves the interest of the dominant military or political clique.

**Rise of factionalise elites** along group lines is another indicator which uses aggressive nationalistic rhetoric and result in destructive forms of communal irredentism or communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing”, “defending the faith”.)

**Intervention of external forces** in the internal affairs of the state to identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power. In economic terms is intervention by donors, generating over-dependence to deny on foreign aid.

This backdrop would help in understandably the Af-Pak crisis in terms of their fragility which ultimately culminated into crisis.

**(A) AFGHANISTAN: AT CROSSROADS**

This section would concentrates on (a) Strategic Location (b) Bridge between South Asia, West Asia & Control Asia (c) Silk Route (d) Trade and Energy Transit (e) Arena for Central Game (f) Epicenter of global Terrorism
The political stability of a nation-state, its relation with other state and its ranking in the hierarchy of nations depends on the credibility of its national power (NP).

To understand the nature of Af-Pak crisis, it is appropriate to examine various elements of national power in a recognized method of measurement. Theoretically national-power of a nation-state is calculated on the basis of the following equation

\[ \text{NP} = (\text{SL} + \text{NR} + \text{MP}) + (\text{EV} + \text{MC}) + (\text{S} + \text{W}) \]  

where \( \text{SL} \) = Strategic location, \( \text{NR} \) = Natural Resources, \( \text{MP} \) = Man Power, \( \text{EV} \) = Economic Viability, \( \text{MC} \) = Military Credibility, \( \text{S} \) = Strategic Doctrine, \( \text{W} \) = National Will

Strategic location of a nation-state plays a definite role in its dynamics of national security since (a) it provides inherent strength or

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36 In most of earlier studies National power is equal to Military power. It was Claus Knorr (1956) who included indicator like GNP in the calculation of National Power. Then Clifford German (1960) advocated on another equation of National Power:

\[ \text{G} = \text{N} (\text{L} + \text{P} + \text{I} + \text{M}) \]

where \( \text{G} \) = National power, \( \text{N} \) = Nuclear Capability, \( \text{L} \) = Land, \( \text{P} \) = Population, \( \text{I} \) = International Production, \( \text{M} \) = Military Size. Wilhelm Fucks (1965) proposed another non-linear multivariable index for nation power:

\[ \text{M} = p^2 \text{Z}, \; \text{M} = p^{3/2} \text{Z} \]

\( \text{Z} \) = Energy Production, \( \text{Z}_1 \) = Steel Production

Wayne Ferris (1972) gives six variables; Land Area, total population, governed revenue, Defence expenditure, Value of International trade, Size of Military.

Rays. S. Cline proposes non-linear multivariable to include capabilities and commitments.

\[ \text{Pp} = (\text{C} + \text{E} + \text{M}) (\text{S} + \text{W}) \]
weakness to a nation (b) it determines the level of “national stakes” in existing power equation and finally (c) it offers strategic options.

It is the longitudinal and latitudinal placement with respect to other nations determines its extent of participation in international affairs, its neighbourhood, its geographical boundaries, the type of grand-strategy it is likely to pursue and the role it is likely to play in any armed contingency.

Origin and Geostrategic Significance

Afghanistan or Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a one of 27 landlocked, sovereign state of the world (UN member Since Nov 19, 1946) is usually designated as being located in South Asia.³⁷

The name Afghanistan (Persian : avvonestan) means “land of the Afghans” which originates from the ethnonym : Afghan”. Historically, the name “Afghan” mainly means the Pushtun people, the largest ethnic group of Afghanistan.³⁸ This name is mentioned in the form of Abgan in the third century CE by the Sassanians and as Avagana (Afghan) in the sixth century CE by Indian astronomer Varahamihira.³⁹ A people called the Afghans are also mentioned in a tenth-century geography book, known as Hudud al-alam, where a reference is made to a village: “Saul, a pleasant village on a mountain where lives Afghans.”⁴⁰

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³⁷ According to UN Reports South Asia consists of Nine Nation State-Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Srilanka and Maldives.
³⁹ Encyclopedia Iranica (Online ed.), Columbia University.
Afghanistan is not its original name. Prior to 1774, it was known as **Khorasan**. In the Vedic scriptures as well as in the Zoroastrian Avesta, Afghanistan is known as **Aryana**. The original Aryans came to Afghanistan from Central Asia and from there spread to India and Europe. It is believed that the **major part of Rig Ved, the religious book of the Aryans, was composed in Afghanistan**. It is also believed that the Zoroastrians began proselytizing in Afghanistan, from where the regional eventually found its way into Persia (Iran).  

It is bordered by Pakistan in the South and the East (2430 km), Iran in the West (936 km), Turkmenistan 744 km), Uzbekistan (137 km) and Tajikistan (1206 km), in the north, and China (76 km) in the far northeast. (Map -1)

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41 SV. Salahuddin, “Military in Pakistan and Afghanistan, A Brief History of Causes And Effects
42 ‘Land Area (Sq. Km.)”, World Development Indicators. World Bank 2011.
It is a part of greater Middle East Muslim world, which lies between latitude 29°N and 39°N and longitudes 60° E and 75° E. At 652,230 km², area Afghanistan is the world’s 43rd largest country, slightly bigger than France and smaller than Burma (Myanmar) and about the size of Texas in the United States. It has a population of around 30 million, making it the 42nd most populous nation. 44

Its longest border is the poorly marked Durand Line, accounting for its entire Southern and eastern boundary with Pakistan. The shortest one, boundering China’s Xinjiang province. The border with Pakistan runs eastwards from Iran through the Chagai Hills and Southern end of the Registan desert, then northward through mountainous country. It then follows on irregular northeasterly course, before reaching the Durand Line which was established 1893.45 This line continues through mountainous regions to the Khyber pass area. Beyond this point it rises to the crest of the Hindukush which it followers eastward to the Pamir mountains. The Durand line divides the Pashtun tribes of the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its creation has caused much dissatisfaction among Afghanistan and has given rise to political tensions between two countries.46

43 South Asia- Till the early 20th century Asia was referred to as the orient, till it was subdivided in to Near East (Indian Subcontinent) and the far East. In the Second World War the term South East Asia come in to existence when the establishment of South East Asia command by the allies. After the breakup of divided in to West Asia, Central Asia Republics come in to being Asia was divided in to West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia (or the Pacific Rim), North East Asia and South East Asia.
44 “CIA Fact Book – Area 41”, CIA, 2012,
46 Ibid
Afghanistan is like a tortoise with bowed neck and is strategically significant. There is a gap of 25 miles approximately between Indian border and Afghanistan boundary in North West. Once a buffer state between European countries and Soviet Russia is now an independent shock absorber and buffer state between Muslim countries, Hindustan, European countries and Russians. It has the land route from Pakistan to Iran and Russia. It is considered as a zone of convergence of major geo-political region of Eurasia with its security interactions with Russia, Pakistan and Iran India\textsuperscript{47}.

**Historical Perspective:**

Alexander the great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C. to 327 B.C.). From the third to eight century, A.D. Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the seventh century, Islam spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayjad Dynasty defeated the Persian empire of the Sassanians. In the 10\textsuperscript{th} century, Muslim rulers called Samanids form Bukhara (in what Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan and the complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century. They ruled over the vast Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of Afghanistan.

In 1504, Babar, took control of Kabul and then moved on to India, establishing the Mughal Empire. Babar is buried in the Babur Gardens complex in Kabul. Throughout the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} Centuries,

Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Heart and Western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was army officer in Nadir Shah, army ruler of Persia. He started with association of Nadir Shah, Persian control over Afghanistan started deteriorating.

Dost Mohammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India. This fear led to a British decisions in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838 – 1842). The Second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third Anglo Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated.

He was succeeded by king Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929 – 1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature. Zahir Shah also built ties with the Soviet Government by entering into a significant political and arms purchase relationship.

This period was the height of the Cold War, and the United States sought to prevent Afghanistan from falling into the Soviet orbit. The
United States used aid to counter Soviet influence, providing agricultural and other development assistance.

**Ethnic Profile of Afghanistan:**

Afghanistan *ethnic heterogeneity* has remained a problem thought its history has caused disaffection among major ethnic groups (Map 2). Although its society continues to be ‘tribal’ in nature, but it is gradually showing signs of transformation. This mix of diversities is its characteristic on one hand, while on the other hand, it is also the root cause of many difficulty because these ethnic segments have no common interest and are confronting each other for political power and for social dominance. In fact the term ‘Afghan’ is commonly refers to all those in Afghanistan collectively but strictly speaking it is applicable to that section of population knows ‘Pakhtun’ or ‘Pshtun’ with other Pukhto (or Pasthto) speaking ethnic groups. There are several ethnic groups in Afghanistan which create hindrance in political stability.48

The deference in heredity, language culture, physical characteristics and historical experience demarcate Afghans into different ethnic groups.

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Map 2 Ethnic Groups

- Caucasoïd (Mainly Pushtun, Tajik, Baluch and Nuristani)
- Monogoloids (Mainly Hazara, Aimak, Turkoman Uzbek and Kirghiz)
- Brahui (Modified Australoid)

The Afghan population consists of Pushtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turemens, Balochs, Nuristaris and others. The Afghan National Anthem mentions 14 ethnic groups. 49

49 First Stanza: This land is Afghanistan! It is the pride of every Afghan.
The land of peace, the land of the sword. Its sons are all brave.
Second Stanza: This is the country of every tribe, The land of Baloch and Uzbeks, Pashtuns and Hazaras, Turkmen and Tajiks.
Third stanza: With them, Arabs and Gujjars, Pamiris, Nuristanis, Brahuis and Qizilbash, Also Aimaqs and Pashayis.
Fourth stanza: This Land will shine for ever, Like the sun in the blue sky. In the chest of Asia, It will remain like the heart forever
The Pashtuns are the majority community accounting for approximately 42 percent and are a fierce and proud race. Because of their majority as well as their aggressive racial characteristics they have been the most politically dominant ethnic community in Afghanistan.

They are concentrated in Eastern and Southern parts of the country and dominated the rural society. The Pashtun follow a unwritten ‘ethical code and traditional lifestyle’ called Pashtunwali. This explains their fiercely protective attitude towards the people under their asylum. Nearly all rulers of the region in the monarchical system were Pashtuns. They also made up the majority of Mujahedeen and Taliban in the 80s. A larger Pashtun population resides on the other side of Durand line in Pakistan.

Fifth stanza: We will follow the one God; We all say, Allah is great!
We all say, Allah is great.

50 Ali Ahmad Jalali, Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National army, Parameters Autumn, 2002, pp. 72-86
MAP 3 : Location of Pashtun People

The Tajiks who are about 25 percent of the population form the second largest ethnic grouping. Native speakers of Dari\textsuperscript{51} and not tribally organized have been sedentary townsmen and have held a large share of the country’s material and cultural wealth. More assertive than the Tajiks are the Turko-mongols of northern Afghanistan. They are often found to be working in government ministries and public services. Historically, this group is known for its high educational standards. In Afghanistan a large number of Tajiks serve in Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)\textsuperscript{52} while a sizeable number of them are bureaucrats, doctors, teachers, readers and shopkeepers. Tajiks are mainly concentrated in the northern and central part of the country.

The Hazaras (19 percent) are Shia Muslim, mostly alien and are major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. With strong mongoloid features, they are believed to be the descendants of the mongol invaders of Genghis Khan’s army. They have been considered and treated by the Pushtuns as inferiors. Since the mid 1950’s they have migrated to urban centers to work as labourers. They have also been mostly anti-Pushtun of all ethnic groups of the country.

\textsuperscript{51} Pashto and Dari (Persian) are the official language of Afghanistan making bilingualism very common. Both are the Indo-European language from the Iranian languages sub-family. Dari is the native tongue of the tajiks, Hazaras and Kizilbash. Pashto is the native tongue of the Pashtuns, although many Poshtuns. Often use Persian and some non-Pashtuns are fluent in Pashto. (“country profile : Afghanistan” Library of Congress Country Studies on Afghanistan, August 2008)

**Uzbeks** emerged in Central Asia as early as the 3rd century B.C. when nomads (possibility Hun descendents) began invasions. Uzbeks genetic studies indicate Turkic Mongoloid ancestry. Uzbeks form about nine percent of Afghan population and reside in northern areas of country. They are known to be an advanced ethnic group due to higher educational standards. The Northern alliance (NA) which spearheaded the campaign against the Taliban had a liberal contribution from the Uzbeks.

Distribution is given in fig I

Afghanistan is 42%, Pashtun 27%, Tajic 9%, Hazara 9%, Uzbeks 4%, Aimag 3%, Turkey 2% Balochi and 4% other.\(^5^3\)

There are five major tribal groups: the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlanri, Sorbani, and Ghurghust. The Durrani and the Ghilzai are the tow most influential

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a. **Durrani**: The Durrani tribal confederation, mostly concentrated in Afghanistan, has traditionally provided leadership in the Pashtun areas since Ahmad Durrani founded a monarchy in 1747. Afghans regard Ahmad shah as the founder of modern Afghanistan because he united the factional tribes, the past President of Afghanistan, **Hamid Karzai was a Durrani**.

b. **Ghilzai**: The Ghilzai tribal group is concentrated mostly in eastern Afghanistan and has historically been an arch rival of the Durrani. Some of the major **Taliban leaders** today, including **Mullah Omar**, **are Ghilzai**. The Ghilzais are part of a relatively obscure tribal confederation known as the Bitanis.

c. **Karlanri**: The Karlanris, or “hill tribal” are the third largest group of Pashtuns. They straddle the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Waziristan, Kurram, Peshawar, Khost Paktia and Paktika.

d. **Sarbanis**: Although geographically separated, two major groups make up the Sarbani. The larger group, located north of Peshawar, includes tribes such as the Mohamads Yusufzais, and Shinwaris, while the smaller segments consists of Sheranis and Tarins scattered
in northern Balochistan. This faction comprises the traditional aristocracy of the Pashtuns.

e. **Churghushts:** The last major tribal group is the Churghushts. They are found mostly in northern Balochistan and include tribal such as the Kakars, Mandokels, Panars, and Musakhil. Some of the groups, sub – tribes, like the Gaduns and Safis, can also be found in the NWFP.

**Economy:**

Afghanistan is least developed country, one of the world’s poorest because of decades of war and lack of foreign investment. As of 2013, the nation’s GDP stands at about $34.26 billion with an exchange rate of $ 19.91 billion, and the GDP per capita in $1,100. The country’s export was $2.6 billion in 2012. Its unemployment rate is about 35 % and roughly the same percentage of its citizens live below the poverty line. About 42% of the population live on less than $1 a day, according to a 2010 report. The nation has less than $ 1.5 billion external debt and is recovering by the assistance of the world community.

The Afghan economy has been growing at about 10% per year in the last decade, which is due to infusion of over $50 billion in international aid and remittances from Afghan exports. It is also due to improvements made to the transportation system and agricultural production, which is the backbone of the nation’s economy. The country is known for producing some of the finest pomegranates, grapes, apricots, melons, and several other fresh and dry fruits, including nuts.
While the nation’s current account defect is largely financed with the donor money, only a small portion is provided directly to the government budget. The rest is provided to non-budgetary expenditure and donor – designed projects through the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations. The Afghan Ministry of Finance is focusing on improved revenue collection and public sector expenditure discipline.

Da Afghanistan Bank serves as the central bank of the nation and the “Afghani” (AFN) is the national currency, with an exchange rate of about 47 Afghanis to one US dollar. Since 2003, over 16 new banks have opened in the country, including Afghanistan International Bank, Kabul Bank, Azizi Bank, Pashtany Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, First Micro Finance Bank and others. One of the main drives for the current economic recovery is the return of over 5 million expatriates, who brought with them fresh energy, entrepreneurship and wealth-creating skills as well as much needed funds to start a business. For the first time since 1970s, Afghans have involved themselves in construction, Some of the major national construction, projects include the $35 bn New Kabul city next to the capital, the Ghazi Amanullah Khan city near Jalabad, and the Aino Mena in Kandhar. Similar development projects have also begun in Heart in west, Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and in other cities.54

In addition, a number of companies and small factories began operating in different parts of the country, which not only provide revenues to the government but also create new jobs, Improvements to

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54 Economic Growth” USAID, Retrieved 25 September, 2011.
the business-enabling environment have resulted in more than $1.5 billion in telecom investment and created more than 100,000 jobs since 2003. The Afghan rugs are becoming popular again and this gives many carpet dealers around the country to expand their business by hiring more workers.

Afghanistan is a member of SAARC, ECO and OIC. It is hoping to joint SCO soon to develop closer economic ties with neighbouring and regional countries in the New Silk Road trade project. Foreign Ministry document says that nation’s “goal is to achieve an Afghan economy whose growth is based on trade, private enterprise and investment. Experts believe that this will revolutionize the economy of the region. Opium production in Afghanistan soared to a record in 2013 with about 3 million people reported to be involved in the business. The government started programs to help cultivation of poppy, and by 2013 it was reported that 24 out of the 34 province were free from poppy grow.55 (Bar Chart I)

Bar Chart I: Opium poppy cultivation, 1994–2007 (hectares)

55 “Afghanistan, neighbours unveil “Silk Road plan”. Reuters 22, September 2011.
Administrative Setup:

Afghanistan is administratively divided into Provinces (uliayats), with each province having its own Capital and a provincial administration. The provinces are further divided into about 398 smaller provincial districts, each of which normally covers a city or a number of villages. Each district is represented by a district governor.

The provincial governors are appointed by the President of Afghanistan and the district governors are selected by the provincial governors. The provincial governors are representatives of the Central government in Kabul and are responsible for all administrative and formal issues within their provinces. There are also provincial councils which are elected through direct and general elections for a period of four years. The functions of provincial councils are to take part in provincial development planning and to participate in mounting and appraisal of other provincial governance institutions.

According to Article 140 of the Afghan Constitution and the presidential decree on electoral law, mayors of cities should be elected through free and direct elections for a four year term. However, due to huge election costs, mayoral and municipal elections have never been held. Instead, mayors have been appointed by the government. As for the capital city of Kabul, the mayor is appointed by the President of Afghanistan. The following is a list of all the 34 provinces in alphabetical order. (Map 4 and Table 4)
MAP 4: Provinces

Table 4  Provinces in Alphabetical Order

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Military Potential:

The Afghan Armed Forces are the military forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. They consist of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Air Force. Being a landlocked country, Afghanistan has no navy. The President of Afghanistan is the Commander-in-Chief of the military, who acts through the Ministry of Defence. The national Military Command centre in Kabul serves as the headquarters (HQ) of the Afghan Armed Forces.\(^\text{56}\)

The contemporary Afghan military seems to have originated in 1709 during Hotaki dynasty in Kandahar. The Afghan military fought many battles with Persia and India during 18\(^{\text{th}}\) and 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century. It was re-organised during by British rule in 1880, AARK’s (Amir Rahman Khan). Its modernization began during King Amanullah Khan’s rule in the early 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, and acquired contemporary shape during King Zahir Shah’s forty-year rule (1933-73). From 1978 to 1992, Afghan Army fought with multi-national Mujahideen groups with Soviet help.

These groups were financed by United States of America and Saudi Arabia and were trained by the Pakistan’s ISI. After the departure of President Njibullah in 1992 as a consequence of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the real Afghan military came under the control of different warlords. It was the period when political control of the country came in the hands of Mujahedeen. This era was followed by the rise of the Pakistan – backed Taliban regime, who modified Afghan military on the basis of Islamic sharia law. The NATO forces invaded and defeated Taliban regime in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (OEF) in the month of Oct, 2001.

The Afghan military was again re-organized by NATO military alliance. Despite early problems with recruitment and training, it becoming effective in fighting against the Taliban insurgency. As of 2011, it is gradually becoming independent from US-led NATO forces. Thus, the Afghan military of 1709 completely lost is original character. It again gained form in 2002 with the name of Afghan National Army (ANA). The original Afghan national Army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era was disintegrated during the 1992-1996

57 “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF), is the current official name used by the U.S. government for the War in Afghanistan, together with a number of smaller military actions, under the umbrella of the Global "War on Terror" (GWOT). The operation was originally called "Operation Infinite Justice", but as similar phrases have been used by adherents of several religions as an exclusive description of God, it is believed to have been changed to avoid offense to Muslims, who are the majority religion in Afghanistan. U.S. President George W. Bush's remark that "this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while", which prompted widespread criticism from the Islamic world, may also have contributed to the renaming of the operation.
Mujahedin Civil War and during Taliban period (1996-2001). The Afghan National Army (ANA is now emerging as a major force in political stabilization in the number of **Kandaks** and is able to operate “Independently with advisors.” The commando forces of the ANA, trained by U.S. Special Operations Forces, and numbering about 5,300 are considered well-trained and are taking the lead in some operations of high-value targets.

The United States has built **five ANA bases**: Heart, Gardez, Qandahor, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kabul. Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for the “Kabul Crops” based in Pol-e-Chacki. The US funds are being used to construct a new Defence Ministry headquarters in Kabul at a coast of about $92 million.

**Role in the Crisis and as Epicenter of Global Terrorism:**

Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in 1970s, when the community party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement. Daoud was overthrown and killed in April 1978, by Military officers under the direction of two PDPA (Khal, or “Masses” faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Noor Mohammad Taraki, which was known as Saur (April) Revolution.\(^{58}\)

\(^{58}\) The Saur Revolution- Saur (the word means “April”) Revolution might help offset the current tendency to view the Afghan crisis as a mere offshoot of the ongoing Super –Power competition in the region. The Communist take-over in Afghanistan made no sense in terms either of the known strength of the local Communists or of the probable Soviet motive. However, the evidence now available on the strategy and tactics of the Afghan Communist movement does provide a fairly cogent explanation for what really happened. King Zahir Shah had withheld legislative
The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham or “Banner” faction of the PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by Taraki and Amin.

Soviet occupation forces numbered about 120,000. They were assisted by Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) military forces of about 25000-40,000 supplemented by about 20,000 paramilitary and tribal militia forces, including the PDPA-dominated organisation called the Sarandoy. The combined Soviet and Afghan forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. DRA forces were consistently played by desertions and its effectiveness on behalf of the Soviets was

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measures governing the establishment of political parties under the 1964 constitution. But he did promulgate a Press law in 1965 liberalizing the publication of newspapers. The Afghan Communist promptly came out with a newspaper called Khalq (“People”). Published by Noor Mohammed Taraki, the paper advocated nothing more revolutionary than land reform and public ownership of certain types of property. However, these ideas were frowned upon by conservative circles, and the paper was banned in May 1966. In 1967 the Khalq group split into two. The breakway faction, headed by Barak Karmal, stared its own news paper, Parcham (“Flag”), in March 1968. Another splinter of Khalq styled itself Shula-e-Javed (“External Flamo”), after its own official organ edited by Dr. Rahim Mahmudi. Both Percham and Shula-e-Javed were banned in 1969. Finally, a faction of Parcham, led by Tahir Badakhshi, assumed the name of Sitam-e-Milli Parcham, (Against National Oppression”). While Khalq and Parcham were known to be pro-Moscow, Shula-e-Javed leaned towards Peking, and Sitam-e-Milli was outright Maoist. Of the first two, the Parcham group had flirted with Daoud in the mid 1970s. But the latter’s drive for absolute power persuaded. Parcham and Khalq reunited to oppose Daoud under the banner of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Jamiyat-e-Demokratiqi-e-Khalq PDPA).22

limited. The Mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistances, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in corporation with Pakistan’s ISI.

The Mujahedin were organized by seven major parties that in early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based “Afghan Interim Government” (AIG). The seven party leaders and their parties (referred to as the “Peshawar 7”) were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan); Sibghatulla Mojaddedi (Afghan National Liberation Front); Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hezb-i-Islam- Gulbuddin, Islamic Party of Gulbuddin); Burhauddin Rabbani (Jamiat Islam, Islamic Soceity); Yurws Khalis (Hezb-i-Islam); Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyat (Ittihad Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan); and Pir Gaylani (national Islamic Front).

In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev become leader, the Soviet replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (Known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai Pashtun and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA.

On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a UN-brokered Geneva accord requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1988, leaving behind the weak Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World.

September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.

On March 18, 1992, Najibullah agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off rebellions by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan.

In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the **Taliban movement**. Many were former Mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict among Mujahedin parties, and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries ("Madrassas") mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.

The **emergence of Taliban** of the Afghanistan scène in 1994 as a force to reckon within and than capturing of nearly eighty percent of the territory, highlighted the significance of Afghanistan. The Taliban were initially welcomed by the war torn population since they promised an end to the prevailing anarchy. However, the subsequent, quest for power and their change in stance from having no political ambitions, to a flat refusal for power sharing pushed Afghanistan into another period of instability. Afghanistan, till Dec 2001, can thereof be described as having been a legally undivided territory of fragmented power.

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60 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

24 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh in British – controlled India, that was set up to train Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational Model.

62 Stoðdon op cit, pp 723-724.
Host of Al-Qaida and its leader, Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban turned into threat of Islamic Fundamentalism faced by the Central Asia states since 1991. The strengthening of links between militant organization like IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), Al Qaida, the Chechen rebels, Uighur separatists and the Taliban, further compounded the security situation in the region. However, till as late as 1996, the tacit approval of USA to the support to Taliban by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued. This had more to do with American views on the Caspian oil reserves rather than any love for the student movement. It is a well-known fact that US state Department was fully supporting the Unocal projects without taking into account the fact that the deal was being struck with an unrecognized government at Kabul. However, once the Taliban’s treatment of women caught the imagination of feminist groups in the USA, the Clinton administration had no choice but to distance itself from Taliban and Pakistan and in the bargain Unocal had to pull out of this 890 miles long, $2 billion, and two billion cubic feet per day pipeline project. The bombings of the US embassies in 1998 further brought USA and the Taliban on a collision course. However, it was the 11 Sep, 2011 attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC), which roused the world community and forced them to deal with the menace posed by Taliban and its associates. Conceptually, the Taliban has been shaped by (a) Afghanistan’s ancient warrior culture (b) the 1979 Soviet invasion and mujahedeen who fought against it (c) civil war and warlords that allowed that followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces in

63 Rashid, Taliban Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, p.174.
1989 (d) madrassa religious ideology (e) Taliban’s initial acceptance as
the hope of peace for a war weary people (f) the movement’s downfall
in 2002 (g) the resurrection of Taliban and the ongoing insurgency.

The Taliban mostly consists of Sunni Muslim Pashtuns. Historically, this largest Afghan ethnic group occupied a great swath
of land from central-western Afghanistan through much of the south
and up the country’s eastern border. The region has a long history of
invaders who tried, mostly in vain, to overpower the Pashtuns. Since
Alexander in 326 B.C. many foreign military forces have entered
Afghanistan. Among them were the Persians, Scythains, Kushans,
Sakas, Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, British, Russians, and the most
recently Americans and their NATO allies.

Fiercely independent, the Pashtuns have always depended their
homeland against foreign interlopers. No outside power has ever been
able to subdue them completely. They defeated most of their would-be
conquerors outright or absorbed them into their tribes through the
centuries. The Pashtuns adopted to the military strategies of their
invaders, and then utilized their new tactics and equipment to fight
among themselves until confronted by another external threat. This
military orientation has shaped the Pashtun and Taliban-outlooks: “A
Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war”. The Pashtuns
are inclined not to accept any form of strict authority even at the cost
of discord and insecurity.

The core of the Taliban grew for the Pashtun refugee camps,
(mostly in Pakistan) where a modified version of Wahhabist Islam
influenced some madrassa student (talib) to adopt an
ultraconservative approach to social issues and politics. Theological students fighting for professed rights and freedoms are not a new phenomenon in the region, and these talibs, now formally calling themselves the Taliban, presented themselves as righteous religious students on the march for peace. The Taliban’s claims resonated with the Pashtun people, and their popularity spread rapidly.\(^6^4\)

In November 1984, the Taliban seized control of Kandhar in southern Afghanistan. They gained de facto religious legitimacy among the rural Pashtun when their leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, wore the sacred cloak of Prophet Muhammad in front of a public gathering and declared himself “Leader of the Faithful” (Amir-ul-Momineen). This event, arguably the most important milestone in the Taliban’s history, allowed Omar to claim his right to “lead not just all Afghans, but all Muslim”. It provided the movement with a charismatic leader who was thereafter able to draw upon the mysticism inherent in Pashtun culture.

The Taliban made rapid military progress and by 1997 controlled 95 percent of the country. Despite initial euphoria, the group gradually lost the support of the international community and the Afghan populace because it strictly enforced its extremist version of Islamic law. The Taliban banned television, music, and dancing; prohibited women from attending school and working outside the home; carried out atrocities against Afghanistan’s non-Sunni population; and allegedly supported militant Sunni sectarian groups in Pakistan.

Mullah Omar also interacted with Osama bin-Laden, and the Taliban hosted Al-Qaeda training camps and leaders in areas under their control.\textsuperscript{65}

In Pakistan’s FATA and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pashtuns sympathetic to the Taliban have been at odds with Pakistan security forces. During the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S. used the FATA as launching pads for sponsored mujahideen, making the tribal areas a hotbed for extremism. The sprouting of madrassas, an abundance of modern weaponry, and an influx of Afghan refugees radicalized the environment. After the Soviets departed, many foreign mujahideen (mostly Arabs) settled in the FATA and were absorbed into tribes through marriage. Due to ethnic, religious, ideological, and cultural affinities, the area’s residents viewed the Taliban’s rise favorably. After 9/11 and OEF, radical elements in the FATA mobilized some support for the Taliban and started targeting the Pakistani government because of its support to OEF. Pakistan has since deployed over 100,000 troops to different parts of FATA to counter militants with similar operational signatures loosely aligned with the Taliban’s in Afghanistan. Taliban sympathizers in 	extbf{Pakistan} joined forces to form an umbrella organization called 	extbf{Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan} (Pakistani Taliban Movement). They appointed 	extbf{Baiullah Mehsud} as their leader.

Taliban’s culture is probably the most important factor in the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. Pashtun culture depends greatly on the Pashtunwali code of honor, which predates Islam and is

specific to the Pashtuns. Those violating the code are subjects to the verdict of a jirga. Some of the more important facets of the code include. (fig 3)

Fig. 3 Five most important facets of the code.

(a) **Nang (Honour).** A tribes is obliged to employ every mean possible to shield and protect his honor of his family. The honor of a Pashtun rests on a host of small rules and customs, which, if infringed, demand a restoration of honor even at the cost of one’s life.

(b) **Badal (Revenge).** When someone kills a family member or violates the honor of a woman in the family, revenge is necessary to restore honor. It often leads to a killing. This revenge can occur immediately or generation later if the family whose honor has been violated is in a weak position when the infraction occurs. The Taliban has used badal to result new fighters after civilian deaths caused by coalition bombings and “hard-knock operations.”

(c) **Melmastia (Hospitality).** Hospitality and protection must be offered to all visitors without expectation of remuneration of favor. Any Pashtun who can gain access to the house of another Pashtun
can claim asylum there, regardless of the previous relationship between the two parties. The Taliban use melmastia to obtain food and shelter when they travel within the Pashtun belt.

(d) **Nanawatay** (To seek forgiveness). To preempt badal, the code allows Pashtuns to seek forgiveness from those whom one has wronged. The offering party goes to the house of their enemy to beg forgiveness and make peace with him. Nanawatay is the only alternative to badal. The Taliban does not emphasize nanawatay; it exhorts aggrieved persons to join the insurgency to restore their honor or avenge the death of family members.

(e) **Hamsaya** (“One who shares the same shadow”). Hamsaya is servitude in return for protection from stronger tribes or provision of some goods. For example, it could entail an exchange of military service for land. This practice explains why tribes quickly follow whoever is strongest. It also explains how the Taliban consolidated power so quickly in the 1990s.

Although rivals, Pashtun tribes rally against outsiders if threatened. They are politically well informed and will use alliances and counter-alliances to their advantage – as in the present war.

Given the population density of Pakistan border provinces, the cultural landscape is a crucial consideration for military operations along the border. The British Empire, left FATA autonomous because the region was considered hostile and ungovernable, not only because of the rugged terrain but also because of the intense tribal loyalty among the people. The occasional imperial intervention never ended well. The region retained its autonomy when Pakistan became first
the Dominion of Pakistan in 1947 and then the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1956. And the region remains autonomous to this day.

(B) Pakistan: As a Stimulant of the Crises

Pakistan, is second major actor of the crisis. In other words it has acted as a stimulant in raising the complexity of the crisis. Hence this section “Pak : as a stimulant of the crisis” which would have two sections one Pak Objectives in Afghanistan: (a) Pak Objectives in Afghanistan (b) Strategic Depth (c) Strategic Assets (d) Pliant Afghan Govt. (e) Recognition of Durand Line (f) Frontline State for US War on Terror (g) Fear of Strategic Irrelevance and Second Pak role in the destabilization of Afghanistan (a) Providing moral & material assistance to Taliban (b) Harboring fleeing Taliban, Al-Qaeda Jihadists (c) Undermining Karjai Govt. (d) Treating Taliban, L-e-T, J-e-M, Haggani Network as Strategic asset (e) Arm-twisting Afghan Govt. in granting transit right (f) Preventing emergence of strong Afghan army (g) Keeping Afghan and US dependent on Pakistan (h) Denying any role to India in Afghan reconstruction.

Genesis of Pakistan:

Pakistan did not appear on the map of the world all of a sudden. Four entities have helped in the creation of Pakistan. First comes God. He creates, destroys and recreates the world. He divides and sub divides at his will. When and why he conceived the idea of dividing British India into India that is (Bharat) and Pakistan, only he knows and he will not show his secrets with man. (Philosophical perspective)

After God comes Prophet Mohammad, who laid the formation of Islam.(religious perspective). The muslims believe that Mohammad
was chosen by God to establish the religion of Islam. He might not have had Pakistan in his mind at that time, but he wanted the entire world to convert into Islam, that could not in his lifetime, fulfill the dream of watching Islam spread over the universe but he did leave behind a number of staunch conservative followers who took upon themselves this sacred task.

The third entity is Mohammad Iqbal, also called Allama Iqbal. He was a highly educated man, a renowned poet of Urdu and Persian and a fiery propagator of Islam. He had studied at the University of Cambridge. In the beginning of his political career he was secular-minded and advocated the unity of Hindus and Muslims, but later on he became an Islamic fundamentalist. In 1930 in his presidential address at the annual session of Muslim league, for the first time, he brought in the concept of Pakistan where, as he visualised, the Muslims would live in full freedom.

The last entity giving Pakistan a distinct place on the map of the world was Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He was born in Karachi, studied in Britain and practiced law at the High Court of Bombay. He joined the All Indian Congress in 1906 but left in 1920. While still in the Congress, he was attending the meetings of All India Muslim League for the Muslims. He became President of the league in 1940. He found it convenient to advocate the cause of the Indian Muslims who chose him as their leader, an enigma.66

Geo-Strategic Location:

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is situated between 24.50 and 36.75 latitude north and 61 to 75.5 longitudes east with 796,096 sq km area. Pakistan is world’s 36th largest country in the world and is located in the mountainous region adjoining Central Asia and the middle east. Afghanistan, Iran, China, India are its neighbour with about 6,774 km (4334.1 miles) land border and coast line of about 1046 km.

With Afghanistan Pakistan has deep historical and geographical ties because they are linked together in religious, racial and cultural beliefs. They are separated by Durand Line which was fixed in 1893 by British government and is about 2250 km. With Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan enjoys brotherly relations. They cooperate in “define matters” and in economic policies. The boundary between them is 912 km which was settled in 1957.

With Republic of China Pakistan also maintains friendly relations by similarities of views on ‘Silk Route’. The China boundary meets Afghanistan area at ‘Wakhan’ which separates Pakistan and the Muslim Republic of Tajikistan.

With India Pakistan has “hot-cold” relations right from the days of partition, particularly on the issue of “Jammu and Kashmir”, Their land boundary is about 2912 kilometers long. Pakistan’s coastline is Arabian Sea which is about 1046 km long and links Pakistan with the Arab countries.

Geopolitically, Pakistan is situated at the center of the Islamic countries of Africa and Asia. It is linked to these muslims states through land and sea routes. It is not only ideological background, but
also its geographical certainly necessities that Pakistan help support the unity of muslim world. Prior to the cessation of East Pakistani it was the largest Islamic state and was in the vanguard of the movement for Islamic Unity.

Pakistan is facing three contradictions since 1947- and even sometime its very project emerged during the Raj. Primarily, there is the tension between a unitary notion of the Muslim Nation state that is Pakistan and the diversity of the country in ethno-linguistic terms. This tension was there before partition and it has remained after partition with at least three provinces that never reconciled themselves fully with the Pakistan : Bengal – Bengalis went in 1971, and the Baluchistan, which has been reputedly on the warpath.

In contrast, Sindhi nationalism has been defused, for political reasons. With the rise to power of Z.A. Bhutto (and then Benazir Sindhis have seen that they could reach the top echelon of the state-somewhat like the Punjabis before them. There was no need to be separatist anymore. There is one last group epitomizing the tension between the Pakistan and the resilience of ethos-linguistic centrifugal forces, and that is the Mohajirs. The founding – father of Pak came from their ranks- and now they are fighting against it, up to a point. They want a very distinct territory and identity to be recognized, with Karachi as their stronghold- but they are not separatist. The Mohajirs, the originators of Pakistan, wanted it in order to retain their power and privilege. They could not accept the numerical superiority of the Hindustan demanded a separate electorate and then a separate state. They got their separate state but then, ironically, the Mahajirs remained in a
minority they were only 7 percent of the Pakistani population in 1947. They prefer to play with the mainstream parties, allying themselves with whoever is in office—either the PPP or the PML (N).

The second symptom is much more well-known and that is the tension between democracy and authoritarianism the ten or eleven year syndrome with civilian governments overturned by army coups (Charts A).

**Table 5: Pakistan: Military Rule of People’s Power**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Nature of Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-58</td>
<td>Paramilitary Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-71</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Ayub Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Yahya Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-77</td>
<td>Parliamentary democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-88</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Zia-Ul-Haq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-99</td>
<td>Parliamentary democracy (Pm-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2008</td>
<td>Militarily dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Pervez Musharraf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-till date</td>
<td>Parliamentary democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Heads of State of Pakistan\textsuperscript{68}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Ali Jinnah</td>
<td>Governor General</td>
<td>Aug 1947-Spt 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khwaja Nazimuddin</td>
<td>Governor General</td>
<td>Sept 1948-Oct 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghulam Mohammad</td>
<td>Governor General</td>
<td>Oct 1954-Aug 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskander Mirza</td>
<td>Governor General President</td>
<td>Aug 1955-Oct 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Yahva Khan</td>
<td>Chief Martial Law Administrator/President</td>
<td>Mar 1969-Dec 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto</td>
<td>Chief Martial Law Administrator/President</td>
<td>Dec 1971-Aug 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaudhry Fazal Elahi</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Aug 1973-Sept 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Zia-Ul-Haq</td>
<td>Chief Martial Law Administrator/President</td>
<td>Jul 1977-Aug 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghulam Ishaq Khan</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Aug 1988-July 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washim Sajjad</td>
<td>Acting President</td>
<td>Jul 1993-Nov 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farooq Leghari</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Nov 1993-Dec 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafiq Tara</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Dec 1997-Jun 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pervez Musharraf</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>June 2001-August 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mamnoon Hussain</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>July 2013 -till date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Chief Executive of Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khwaja Nazimuddin</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Oct 1951 - Apr 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Ali Bogra</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Apr 1953 - Aug 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaudhri Mohammad Ali</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Aug 1955 - Sept 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Suhrawardy</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Sept 1956 - Oct 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Chundrigar</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Oct 1957 - Dec 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firoz Khan Noon</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Dec 1957-Oct 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohd Khan Jenejo</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Mar 1985-May 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benazir Bhutto</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Aug 1988-Aug 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi</td>
<td>Caretaker Prime Minister</td>
<td>Aug 1990-Nov 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawaz Sharif</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Nov 1990-Apr 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh Sher Mazari</td>
<td>Caretaker Prime Minister</td>
<td>April 1993-May 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawaz Sharif</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>May 1993-July 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moeen Quereshi</td>
<td>Caretaker Prime Minister</td>
<td>July 1993-Oct 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benazir Bhutto</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Oct 1993-Nov 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69 On June 20, 2001, Musharraf assumed the title of the President of Pakistan. He was chief executive from (October 12, 1999 to November 23, 2002) de facto till 14 Oct, 1999.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meraj Khalid</td>
<td>Caretaker Prime Minister</td>
<td>Nov 1996-Feb 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawaz Sharif</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Feb 1997-Oct 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pervez Musharraf</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>Oct 1999-Oct 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zafarullah Khan Zamali</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Nov 2002-June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shujaat Hussain</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>June 2004-Aug 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohd Mian Soomro</td>
<td>Caretaker Prime Minister</td>
<td>Nov 2007-Mar 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousaf Raza Gillani</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Mar 2008-June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raja Pervez Ashraf</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>June 2012-March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawaz Sharif</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>June 2013-till date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first part is that even when democrats are in office, there is no democracy. Firstly because the army is so overwhelmingly present that they continue to shape the country’s policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, Kashmir, etc. and secondly, because many of the civilians elected to power have no democratic culture. They are in the mould of Jinnah who was more viceregal-parliamentary democracy was not his cup of tea, he preferred the presidential system as did Bhutto who was not a democrat either (as evident from the way he rigged the 1977 elections). Nawaj Sharif has not been a democrat either when he had a clear majority in 1997-99. He showed, then, that he was not for the freedom of the press and independence of the judiciary.

Besides, military rulers and party leaders are both part of the same establishment Nawaz Sharif for instance, has been the creature of Zia.
The military rulers picked him up and made him Chief Minister of Punjab in 1985, to begin with. So there is a real symbiosis between these two milieu of course there are true democrats in the country—people who have gone to jail for their beliefs, but most of the mainstream politicians have to do something with the military establishment and vice versa. The sons and daughters of many military top brass are joining politics. The sons of Zia and Ayub Khans have become ministers. Because there is such a civil-military nexus, the question arises: who is the opposition? That is why I focus on the judiciary this time, because for the last five years or seven since, Iftikar Chaudhary took over as Chief Justice, the judiciary has emerged as a real counter power. And the chief justice attacked both the military and civilian rulers-Aslam Beg, Pervez Musharraf and Asif Zaeedia.

The issue that concerns Islam was the conception of Islam. Even before partition there were two conceptions of Islam among the promoters of Pakistan. The Muslim League of the early 20th century defined Islam as Muslimhood—a Cultural marker-more than as a religion. It represented a community that left a Hindu threat but it has no theocratic approach. On the other hand, the Ulema who had been trained in Deoband—or elsewhere—who took part in the Khilafat movement offered an alternative vision of Islam that was transnational and theocratic because they wanted a regime in which the Ulemas would have a very important role to play as the guardian of morality, as judges. This is what they asked for after Pakistan was created. And the fundamentalists of the Jamaat-e-Islam joined hands with them then. For ten years or so in the beginning of Pakistan there
was some hope that the secular project would prevail. In 1953, for instance, the Jamaal’s anti-Ahmadiya movement was repressed. At time when Nehru was arresting RSS leaders for fanning communal hatred, Pakistan was doing much the same. Ayub Khan, a modernist followed the same pattern. The turning point came in 1969, when the other vision of Islam started to enter the public sphere with Yahya Khan. Then came Bhutto who bowed to the Islamist’s pressures for domestic and geopolitical reasons. He wanted to torpedo the Pashtunistan project of Daud, the new master of Afghanistan, by supporting Islamists such as Masood, Rabbani, Hekmatiyar, Haqquni. He asked that these people be trained by the ISI.

**Military in Pakistan’s Politics:-**

Since its inception, Pakistan had to struggle for “nationhood” and “statehood” with reference to nationhood. Pakistan had no civilisational claims for itself as Pakistan shared common history with India. For its statehood to survive, Pakistan needed reliable institutions. It is these circumstances which provided importance to its Army vis-à-vis other civilian institutions. Initially, the relations between governing political class and of military establishment were of equal partnership. The preservation of its statehood against “imagined threats” from bigger and powerful India became the motivating free for its dominating posturing is foreign policy mechanism.

After first Indo-Pakistan War (1947-48) political ability of Pakistan come under shadow. The result of the war, offered military multiple roles in Pak’s political and primacy was accorded to “national
security” to enhance, military capability. This ascendance of the army had far-reaching, internal an external implications. In addition, political uncertainty, factionalism, Centre-province tensions, domestic disturbances, and law and order problems, cemented the foundation of the involvement of the Army in the country’s internal affairs and it gradually extended its role to influence political developments and the direction of the polity.

The Pakistan Defence Council, in its first meeting on 5-6 September 1947, outlined the aims and objectives of the military. Headed by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, the meeting charted out the internal and external functions of the army. Internally, the functions were to assist the civil government in maintaining law and order and to support the political authorities in the tribal region. Being short of resources the Army’s external role, as phrased in the British imperial defence terms, was to prevent aggression by a minor power, while preparing itself to define itself against a major power. It was, thus, entrusted with the task of defending the nation’s long borders with India on the cost and around 1,350 miles with Afghanistan on the West. Its border with Iran did not figure at that time in its border strategy.

In fact, developments in the last days of partition and in the immediate post-partition period generated “acute of insecurity” for

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70 Ibid., p63.
variety of reasons. Pakistan decided to address its security concerns by strengthening its military and making alliances with external powers. The early death of Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali’s assassination created a crisis situation. In audition weak civil institutions, fragile coalitions or alliance, victimizations of opposition leaders by the government and the vested interest of the ruling elite acted as an open invitation to the military to get deeply involved in the Pak’s domestic affairs.

In Pakistan, the military is the dominating force guarding the “territorial integrity” of the state as well as controlling the political stage. The military has enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the Pakistani politics and society owing to primarily, the threat perception of the state. The military in Pakistan has managed to sustain complete financial autonomy for itself and has remained the elite class of the society. The Pakistan Army emerged from the British Indian Army and has become most powerful Institution of Pakistan. The Army has ruled Pakistan directly for over 30 years and developed reputation of the guardian of not only military and strategic but also social and political interests of Pakistan. This self-built manage the country and has progressively led the country into the mire of maladministration.\(^{73}\)

Pakistan has been ruled for more than 30 years by the Army. Although, the Pakistan military is seen as the most influential forces in the country, in practice it the army which has been a strong players at

\(^{73}\) Shalini Chawal’s dissertation “Pakistan’s Military and the Counterinsurgency Strategy” presented in Dept. of Defence & Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, 2011, p32.
the political front. The Pakistan Air force and the Pakistan Navy have been nominal players. Democratic regimes have been short lived in Pakistan and it has been a combination of factors leading towards the military intervention frequently. Weak democratic structure of Pakistan, lack of effective leadership and overpowering military has never allowed the democracy to surface in Pakistan. Stephen Cohen very rightly said: “One military intervention in the fifty years could be seen as an incident and two as on aberration, but four spells of military rule indicate deeper systematic problems.”

He further define the military’s intervention in politics very well:

“The army’s relations with the political process can be characterized as a five-step dance. First, the army wars what it regards as incompetent or foolish avilians. Second, a crisis leads to army intervention, which is followed by the third step: attempts to “straighten out” Pakistan, often by introducing major constitutional changes. Fourth, the army faced with growing civilian discontent, “allows” civilians back into office and fifth the army reasserts itself behind a facade of civilian government, and the cycle repeat itself”.

Army’s role in politics infact has been a key definer for the role of the army in Pakistan. Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies have been by and large shaped by the army key interests. Several factors have driven military into politics including military deep interest to be in power.

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75 Ibid
Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide:

According to Pakistan Census Organisation Punjabsi are the biggest ethnic group with 57% of total population. Their language is mainly Urdu and religion is Islam, which are the two main symbols, of Pakistan nationalism. The Punjabis comprise the largest single ethnic group (60-55%) in the Pakistan Army, which is the largest employer. As an Institution, the Pakistan Army has ruled the country for almost two decades. Likewise, they have the greatest representation in Civil Services. They have also made tremendous gains in business and industry and Punjab province’s soil gives assistance to it. Culturally, the Punjabis are more enterprising and dynamic community.

It would be unfair to claim that all the regions that fall within the territorial confines of the Punjab accept the Punjabi identity. The peoples in Southern part of the Provinces, comprising three administrative divisions Multan, Bahawalpur and Dera Chazi Khan-speak Seraiki language and continue to contest Punjabi identity.⁷⁶

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The people of Seraki region demands a separate province and Seraki identified because modernization development and the democratic process are not in good condition in this region and Seraiki people think separate province is remedy for this.

**Pashtuns:**

Pashtuns in the North-West Frontier Province and the adjoining Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have 15.1 percent of the total population of the country. The Pashtuns are the predominant ethnic group in these areas. They also form a majority across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. Pashtuns also dominated northern parts of Baluchistan, and in past 50 years a very large number of them have migrated to Karanch the troubled metropolis of lower Sindh. Thus, Pashtuns are widely spread in Pakistan and plays a vital role in Pakistan’s internal and external politics.

Why the Pashtuns, who were one of the most ardent followers of Gandhi, became fundamentalist is another story. Walihan’s famous statement sums up Pashtuns identity; He said, “I am Pakistani for the last 50 years, Muslim for 1400 years and Pashtuns for 5,000 years and Pashtuns for 5000 years.

The political bitterness and dissatisfaction between the Pakistani government and the Pashtuns people lad by Ghaffar Khan and his son Abdul Wali Khan lasted for more than two decades. The separate state, Pashtunsistan that would include the entire province of NWFP and the
tribal Areas along the Durand Line. The Pashtuns people feel more near to Afghan-Pashtuns than Pakistan.77

Pashtuns present a classical case of integration through economic modernization and political democracy in the decade of sixties, the industrial development in Karachi and parts of Punjab attracted Pashtuns to seek work there. A significant portion of the unemployed Pashtuns was absorbed by the new industrial activity in their home province, particularly in the decades of 1970s and 1980s has provided them with ample opportunity for employment. In the armed forces (30-35%) Pashtuns are recruited, their numbers in the civil bureaucracy are quite adequate. The Pashtun elite is very much integrated in the economic and political power structures of Pakistan. These developments have gradually dampened the Pashtuns separatism.

Pashtun Nationalists voiced concern about providing hospitality to the Afghan Pashtuns and the role of the conservative religious elements in the Afghan War of resistance. The state in Afghanistan had disintegrated and Pashtuns in Afghanistan depended too heavily on Pakistan to remain an important political and military factor in their own country.78

Baluchi:

Baluchistan. The Baluch tribes have separate territorial domains and
are governed by a tribal sardar. The tribes and sub-tribes have
parochial attitudes and mostly live on a subsistence agriculture or
pastoralism. Baluch percentage in Pakistan’s population is 4% and
their presence in army, civil services, industrial sector is very low.

Baluch people has seen many conflicts with central government
during the past sixty years. The conflicts are for the separate state,
rights development and democracy. They waged and intensive
guerilla war for four years in the Bhutto regime.

In Baluchistan, Baluch face a problem of Pashtun Refugee with
inflow of the Afghan refugees in Baluchistan the interest of the
Pashtuns and the Baluchis have come into conflict. The Balouch rightly
fear that the Afghan refugees are going to life the demographic balance
in favour of Pashtuns, who want to crave out a separate province out
of the Baluchistan and a greater recognition of their numbers in
economic and political structure of the Balochis region.

The Baloch elite continues voice concern about the distribution of
financial resources between the central government and their province.
They want greater shore of royalties from the sale of natural gas, better
deal in allocation of finances for development and greater provincial
autonomy.\textsuperscript{79}

\textbf{Sindhi:}

Sindhis are the only native group, while others settled there after
the creation of Pakistan. Their religion is manly Islam and language is
Sindhi. They comprise 12% of the total population. Sindhi as a group

\textsuperscript{79} Dawn, January 23, 1998.
are very sharp business man and they have good position in Pakistan’s economy. Their presence in other service sector is not very high but they have sufficient space.

The Sindhis from the very beginning resented concentration of the Mohajirs in their province, their monopoly over of the government jobs, state institutions and under favours in allotting than urban properties.

The flow of the Mohajirs and other ethnic groups from the neighbouring provinces has continued. Sindhis fear that they may be reduced to a minority. For decades Sindhi national sentiment has run very high, which is directed both against the Mohajirs as well as the central government of Pakistan. Sindhi people at the present time are not very loud but uneasiness of this ethnic group is very clear. If Pakistan not solves their problems the situations may take a worst conditions.  

**Mohajir:**

Mohajir are the persons who came to Pakistan after the partition in 1947. At the time of independence, the Mohajirs dominated both the bureaucratic as well as the political structure of the new state of Pakistan. Most of the top leadership of the Muslim league, the party that formed the government after independence, came from the Muslim minority provinces of India. The natives had far less power than their numbers. But the question of distribution of power did not

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attract much attention at that time, as the country faced numerous problems of resettlement and readjustment. It has been argued that it was partly the fear of losing out power to the natives that the Mohajir dominated Muslim league did not conduct any elections.\textsuperscript{82} The elite class of Mohajir’s is in good position in Pakistan but lower middle and working class of the Mohajirs faced growing competition for jobs in the industries as Baluchis, Pashtuns began to seek employment in labour sector. Like wise, the Mohajir industrial elite that dominated the modern sectors of the economy like banking and manufacturing also faced competition from new and old Industrial house\textsuperscript{83}.

At this time rivalry between Mohajirs and natives is very intense.

**Pak – Afghan Relations:-**

Afghanistan – Pakistan relations began in 1947 after British India was partitioned into the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan are usually described by Afghan President Hamid Karzai as “inseparable brother”\textsuperscript{84}, which is due to historical, religious and ethno-linguistically connectors by the majority of Pashtun people of Afghanistan as well as trade and other ties.\textsuperscript{85} Both neighbouring states are Islamic Republic and part of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

\textsuperscript{82} Gurunan Sing (2002), Ethno-Nationalism and the Emerging World (Dis) order, Kanishka Publishers

\textsuperscript{83} M.G. Chitkara (1996) Mohajir’s Pakistan, APH Publishing Corporation pp. 27.

\textsuperscript{84} [http://www.bbc.co.uk/News/World-South](http://www.bbc.co.uk/News/World-South) Asia.

Relations between the two countries have been negatively affected by issues related to the Durand Line, the 1978- present war (i.e. Mujahideen, Afghan refugees, Taliban insurgency and border skirmishes), including water and the growing influence of India in Afghanistan. However, two states are working together to find solutions to these problems. This includes possible defence cooperation and intelligence sharing as well as future enhancing the two-way trade and abolishment of cases for diplomats from the two nations.  

Southern and eastern Afghanistan is predominately a Pashto speaking region, like the adjacent Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and northern Balochistan regions in Pakistan. This entire area is inhabited by the indigenous Pashtuns who belong to different Pashtun tribes. The Pashtun were known historically as ethnic Afghans and lived in this region for thousands of years, since at least the 1st millennium BC. The Durand Line border was established after the 1893 Durand Line Agreement between Mortimer Durand of colonial British India and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan for fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence. The single-page agreement, which contains seven short articles, was signed by Durand and Khan, agreeing not to exercise political interference beyond the frontier line between Afghanistan and what was then colonial British India. Pakistan inherited this agreement after its partition from India in 1947.

but there has never been a formal agreement or ratification between Islamabad and Kabul.

The agreement did not put a restriction on the free movement of the native Pashtun people who are used to travelling freely between different places since ancient times, especially during season changes. Due to this and other reasons, the Afghan government has decided not to formally accept the poorly-marked Durand Line as the international border between the two states, claiming that the Durand Line Agreement has been void in the past. This complicated issue is very sensitive in both countries. The Afghan government worries that if it ever ratifies the agreement, it will permanently divide the 50 million Pashtuns and thus create a backlash in Afghanistan. Pakistan feels that the border issue had been resolved before its birth in 1947, and it too fears a revolt from the warring tribes which could eventually bring the state down as it was done to the Persian Empire by the Hotaki dynasty in 1722 or when Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the Pashtuns later to topple the Mughal empire of India. This unmanageable border has always served as the main trade route between Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent, especially for relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan began deteriorating in the 1970s after Pakistan supported rebels such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Haqqanis, and other against the governments of Afghanistan. In April 1978, Afghan President Daoud Khan was assassinated in Kabul during the Saur Revolution. This was followed by the execution of Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April
1979 and the assassination of Afghan President Nur Muhammad Taraki in September 1979. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the United State joined Pakistan to counter Soviet influence and advance its own interest in the region. In turn, Afghan, India and Soviet intelligence agencies played their role by supporting Al-Zulfikar, Pakistani terrorist group responsible for the March 1981 hijacking of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) plane. Al-Zulfikar was a Pakistani organisation “formed in 1977 by Mir Murtaza Bhutto, the eldest son of former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was deposed by a military coup in July...Al-Zulfikar’s goal was to overthrow the military regime that ousted Bhutto. After March 1981 al Zulfikar claimed no further attacks. The Bhutto family and Pakistani military dictator Zia-ul-Haq shared a common enemy as Zia was the one supporting attacks against the Afghan government.

During the 1980s, the Durand Line border was heavily used by Afghan refugees fleeing the Soviet war in Afghanistan, including the large number of mujahideen insurgent groups who crossed back and forth. Pakistan became one of the major training ground for the 250,000 multi-national mujahideen fighters who began crossing into Afghanistan on daily bases to wage war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet forces. The mujahideen included not only locals but also Arabs and others from over 40 different Islamic nations. Many of these foreign fighters married local women and decided to stay in Pakistan, among them were radical Muslims such as members of al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood as well as prisoners from Arab countries.
Following the assassination of Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, U.S. State Department blamed WAD (A KGB created Afghan secret intelligence agency) for terrorist attacks inside Pakistan in 1987 and 1988. With funds from the International community through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pakistan hosted over 3 million Afghans at various refugee camps, mainly around Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtukhwa. The United States and others provide billions of dollars in humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. There were no regular schools provided for the refugee but only madrasas in which students were trained to become members of the Taliban movement. When the Soviet Union began leaving Afghanistan, during the Presidency of Mohammad Najibullah, UNHCR and the International community assisted 1.5 million Afghan refugees to repatriate from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

In or about September 1994, the Taliban movement captured the Afghan city of Kandahar and began their long conquest with help from Pakistan. The Taliban claimed that they wanted to clean Afghanistan from the warlords and criminals. According to Pakistan and Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid, “between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan” keeping the Taliban regime in power. The role of the Pakistani military during that time has been described by international observers as a “creeping invasion” of Afghanistan. UN documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in Taliban massacre.
In late 1996, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan emerged and established close relations with neighboring Pakistan. However, the relations began to decline when the Taliban refused to endorse the Durand Line after pressure from Islamabad, arguing that there shall be no borders among Muslims. When the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was toppled and the new Afghan government was formed, President Hamid Karzai began repeating the previous Taliban statement.

The Durand Line border has been used in the last decade as the main supply route for NATO-led forces in Afghanistan as well as by Taliban insurgents and other militant groups who stages attacks inside Afghanistan. In 2008, Karzai became frustrated with this and suggested that his nation may order the Afghan national Security Forces (ANSF) to cross the Durand Line in order to defeat militants hiding in western Pakistan. Leaders in Pakistan became angry and warned against this suggestion by stating that it would not “tolerate any violations of its borders.” Pakistani Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, explained that the Durand Line border was too long to police. The American government decided to rely on drone attacks instead and this began to negatively affect the US-Pakistan relations.

U.S. Armed Forces checked the border checkpoint at Torkham, between Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan. Relations have became more strained after the Afghan government began openly accusing Pakistan of using its ISI network in aiding the Taliban and other militants. Pakistan usually denies these allegations but said in the past that it does not have full control of the actions of the ISI. There have been a number of reports
about the Afghanistan-Pakistan skirmishes, which usually occur when army soldiers are in hot pursuit chasing insurgents who cross the border back and forth. This leads to tensions between the two states, especially after hearing reports of civilian casualties.

After the May 2011 death of Osama Bin laden in Pakistan, many prominent Afghan figures began being assassinated, including Mohammed Daud, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Jan Mohammad Khan, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, Burhanuddin Rabbani and others. Also in the same year, the Afghanistan-Pakistan skirmishes intensified and many large scale attacks by the Pakistan-based Haqqani network took place across Afghanistan. This led to United States warning Pakistan of a possible military action against the Haqqanis in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The U.S. blamed Pakistan’s government, mainly Pakistani Army and its ISI spy network as the masterminds behind all of this.

In July 2010, a Memorandum of understanding (MoU) was reached between Pakistan Afghanistan for the Afghan-Pak Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)\textsuperscript{87}, which was observed by U.S. Secretary of State

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\textsuperscript{87} Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement(APTTA), On June 12, 2011, the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) came into effect. It allows Afghan trucks to carry Afghan exports to the giant markets of India and China, as well as the rest of the world, through the seaports of Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwador. APTTA has the potential to play a vital role in Afghanistan’s economic and regional development by improving the flow of goods outside the country. It will reduce both the cost and the difficulty of getting Afghan exports to foreign markets. Afghan Customs will be instrumental in ensuring the smooth operation of this new transit agreement. The work to fully implement the agreement is ongoing.
Hillary Clinton. The two states also signed a MoU for the construction of rail tracks in Afghanistan to connect with Pakistan Railways (PR) which has been in the making since at least 2005. In October 2010, the landmark APTTA agreement was signed by Pakistan Commerce Minister Makhdoom Amin Fahim and Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, Afghan Ministry of Commerce. The ceremony was attended by Richard Holbrooks, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a number of foreign ambassadors, Afghan parliaments and senior officials. The APTTA allows Afghan trucks to drive inside Pakistan to the Wagah border with India including to the port cities of Karachi and Gwadar.

In November 2010, the two states formed a joint chamber of commerce to expand trade relations and solve the problems traders face. The APTTA agreement has taken effect after several Afghan trucks delivered fruits from Afghanistan to the Wagah border with India in June 2011. With the completion of the APTTA, the United States and other NATO states are planning to revive the ancient Silk Road. This is to help the local economies of Afghanistan and Pakistan by connecting South Asia with Central Asia and the Middle East. The APTTA is intended to improve trade between the two countries but Pakistan often delays Afghan-bound containers, especially after the 2011 NATO attack in Pakistan.

In July 2012, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to extend APTTA to Tajikistan in what will be the first step for the establishment of a

Meetings between the two countries were held in September to discuss and reach agreement on technical details.
North-South trade corridor. The proposed agreement will provide facilities to Tajikistan to use Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports for its imports and export while Pakistan will enjoy trade with Tajikistan under terms similar to the transit arrangement with Afghanistan. Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan is expected to reach $5 billion by 2015. Afghanistan’s economy is one of the fastest growing economies in the World. A 2012 World Bank reports added, “In contrast, Afghanistan’s economy grew robustly by about 11 percent mostly due to a good harvest.”

Pakistan inherited the 1893 agreement and the subsequent 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi after its partition from the British India in 1947. There has never been a formal agreement or ratification between Islamabad and Kabul. Pakistan believes and international convention under uti possidetis juris supports the position that it should not require one. Courts in several countries around the world and the Vienna Convention have universally upheld via uti possidentes juris that binding bilateral agreements are “passed down” to successor states. Thus, a unilateral declaration by one party has no effect; boundary changes must be made bilaterally.

At the time of independence, the indigenous Pashtun people (including members of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement) living on the border with Afghanistan were given only the choice of becoming a part either of India or Pakistan. Recent legal debate on the Durand Line issue has focused on the original nature of the contract between Afghanistan and British India. Some scholars have suggested that the Durand Line was never intended to be a boundary demarcation
sovereignty, but rather a line of control beyond which either side agreed not to interfere unless there were an expedient need to do so. Memoranda from British officials at the time of the Durand Agreement incline towards this view. Scholars suggest that the frontier agreement was not the form of an “execute clause”, which usually caters for sovereign boundary demarcation and which cannot be unilaterally repudiated. Rather, they conjecture that it is of the form of an “executor clause”, similar to those pertaining to trade agreements, which are ongoing and can be repudiated by either party at any time. This is, however, a matter of ongoing debate. Other legal questions currently being considered are those of state practice, i.e. whether the relevant states de facto treat the frontier as an international boundary, and whether the de jure independence of the Tribal Territories at the moment of Indian Independence undermine the validity of Durand Agreement and subsequent treaties.

On July 26, 1949, when Afghan-Pakistan relations were rapidly deteriorating, a loya jirga was held in Afghanistan after a military aircraft from the Pakistan Air Force bombed a village on the Afghan side of the Durand Line. In response, the Afghan government declared that it recognized “neither the imaginary Durand nor any similar line” and that all previous Durand Line agreements were void. They also announced that the Durand ethnic division line had been imposed on them under coercion/duress and was a diktat. This had no tangible effect as there has never been a move in the United Nations to enforce such a declaration due to both nations being constantly busy in wars with their other neighbors.
Because the Durand Line divided the Pashtun and Baloch people, it continues to be a source of tension between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In August 2007, Pakistani politician and the leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Fazal-ur-Rehman, urged Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line. Press statements from 2005 to 2007 by former Pakistani President Musharraf calling for the building of a fence on the Durand Line have been met with resistance from numerous political parties within both countries. Pashtun politicians in both countries strenuously object to even the existence of the Durand Line border. In 2006 Afghan President Hamid Karzai warned that “Iran and Pakistan and others are not fooling anyone.”

“If they don’t stop, the consequences will be...that the region will suffer with us equally. In the past we have suffered alone; this time everybody will suffer with us...Any effort to divide Afghanistan ethnically or weaken it will create the same thin in the neighboring countries. All the countries in the neighborhood have the same ethnic groups that we have, so they know that it is a different ball game this time.”

Hamid Karzai, February 17, 2006

Aimal Faizi, spokesman for the Afghan President, stated in October 2012 that the Durand Line is “an issue of historical importance for Afghanistan. The Afghan people, not the government, can take a final decision on it.”

In July 2003, Pakistani and Afghan forces clashed over border posts. The Afghan government claimed that Pakistani military established bases up to 600 meters inside Afghanistan in the Yaqubi area near bordering Mohammad Agency. The Yaqubi and Yaqubi Kandao (Pass) area were found to fall within Afghanistan. In 2007, Pakistan erected fences and posts a few hundred meters inside
Afghanistan, near the border-straddling bazaar of Angoor Ada in South Waziristan, but the Afghan national army quickly removed them and began shelling Pakistani positions. Leaders in Pakistan said the fencing was a way to prevent Taliban militants from crossing over between the two nations but Afghan President Hamid Karzai believed that it is Islamabad plan to permanently spate the Pashtun tribes. Special Forces from the United State Army have been based at Shkin, Afghanistan, seven kilometers west of Angoor Ada, since 2002. In 2099, the International security Assistance Force (ISAF) and American CIA have begun using unmanned aerial vehicles from the Afghan side to hit terrorist targets on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.

The border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan has long been one of the most dangerous places in the world, due largely to very little government control. It is legal and common in the region to carry guns, and assault rifles and explosives are common. Many forms of illegal activities take place, such as smuggling of weapons, narcotics, lumber, copper, gemstones, marble, vehicles, and electronic products, as well as ordinary consumer goods. Kidnappings and murders are frequent. Numerous outsiders with extremist views came from around the Muslim world to settle in the Durand Line region over the past 30 years. While most of the time the Taliban cross the Durand Line from Pakistan into Afghanistan and carry out attacks inside Afghan cities, sometimes they cross from the Afghan side of the border and attack Pakistani security forces. Recently, 300 Taliban militants from Afghanistan’s territory launched attacks on Pakistani border posts in which 34 Pakistani security forces were believed to be killed. It is also
believed Swat District Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah is hiding somewhere inside Afghanistan. In June 2011 more than 500 Taliban militants entered Upper Dir area from Afghanistan and killed more than 30 Pakistani security forces. Police said the attackers targeted a check post, destroyed two schools and several houses, while killing a number of civilian.

The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan are both trying to extend the rule of law into the border areas. At the same time, the United States is reviewing the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) Act in Washington D.C., which is supposed to help the economic status of the Pashtun and Baloch tribes by providing jobs to a large number of the population on both sides of the Durand Line border.

Much of the northern and central Durand Line is quite mountainous, where crossing the border is often only particle in the numerous passes through the mountains. Border crossings are very common, especially among Pashtuns who cross the border to meet relatives or to work. The movement of people crossing the border has largely been unchecked or uncontrolled, although passports and visas are at times checked at official crossings. In June 2011 the United States installed a biometric system at the border crossing near Spin Boldak aimed at improving the security situation and blocking the infiltration of insurgents into southern Afghanistan.

Between June and July 2011, Pakistan Chitral Scouts and local defence militias suffered deadly cross border raids. In response the Pakistani military reportedly shelled some Afghan villages in
Afghanistan’s Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, and Khost provinces resulting in a number of Afghan civilians being killed. Afghan sources claimed that nearly 800 rounds of missiles were fired from Pakistan, hitting civilian targets inside Afghanistan. The reports claimed that attacks by Pakistan resulted in the deaths of 42 Afghan Civilians, including children, wounded many others and destroyed 120 homes. Although Pakistan claims it was an accident and just routine anti-Taliban operations, some analysts believe that it called have been a show of strength by Islamabad. For example, a senior official at the Council on foreign Relations explained that because the shelling was of large scale it is more likely to be a warning from Pakistan than an accident.

**Durand Line:**

The Durand Line refers to the 2,640 kilometers long porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was established after an 1893 agreement between Mortimer Durand of British India and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan for fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence as well as improving diplomatic relations and
trade. It is named after Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat and civil servant of colonial British India. Afghanistan was considered by the British as an independent princely state at the time, although the British controlled its foreign affair and diplomatic relations.

The single-page agreement which contains seven short articles was signed by Durand and Abdur Rahman Khan, agreeing not to exercise interference beyond the frontier Durand Line. A joint British-Afghan demarcation survey took place starting from 1894, covering some 800 miles of the border. The resulting line later established the “Great Game” buffer zone between British and Russian interests in the region. The line as slightly modified by the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1991 was inherited by Pakistan following its independence from the British in 1947 becoming its modern border with Afghanistan. The Durand Line cuts through the Pashtun tribal areas and further south through the Balochistan region, politically dividing ethnic Pashtuns, as well as the Baloch and other ethnic groups, who live on both sides of the border. It demarcates Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan of northern and western Pakistan from the northeastern and southern province of Afghanistan. From a geopolitical and geostrategic perspective, it has been described as one of the most dangerous borders in the world. Although recognized internationally as the western border of Pakistan and shown as such on global maps, it remains unrecognized in President, the Durand Line is “an issue of historical importance for Afghanistan. The Afghan people, not the government, can take a final decision on it.

**Historical Background:**
The area in which the Durand Line runs has been inhabited by the indigenous Pashtuns since ancient times, at least since 500 B.C. The Greek historian Herodotus mentioned a people called Pactyans living in an around Arachosia as early as the 1st millennium BC. The Baloch tribes inhabit the southern end of the line, which runs in the Balochistan region that separates the ethnic Baloch people.

Arab Muslims conquered the area in the 7\textsuperscript{th} century and introduced Islam to the Pashtuns. It is believed that some of the early Arabs also settled among the Pashtuns in the Sulaiman Mountains. It is important to note that these Pashtuns were historically known as “Afghans” and are believed to be mentioned by that name in Arabic chronicles as early as the 10\textsuperscript{th} century. The Pashtun area (known today as the “Pashtunistan” region) fell within the Ghaznavid Empire in the 10\textsuperscript{th} century followed by the Ghurids, Timurids, Mughals, Hotakis, and finally by the Durranis.

Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, British diplomat and civil servant of colonial British India. The Durand Line is named in his honor. In 1839, during the First Anglo-Afghan War, British - led India forces invaded Afghanistan in 1878, during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, withdrawing a couple of years later after attaining some geopolitical objectives. During this war, the Treaty of Gandamk was signed, ceding control of various frontier areas to the British Empire.

In 1893, Mortimer Durand was dispatched to Kabul by the government of British India to sign an agreement with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan for fixing the limits of their respective sphere of influence as well as improving diplomatic relations and trade. On
November 12, 1893, the Durand Line Agreement was reached. The two parties later camped at Parachinar, a small town near Khost in Afghanistan, which is now part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, to delineate the frontier.

From the British side, the camp was attended by Mortimer Durand and Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum, Political Agent Khyber Agency representing the British Viceroy and Governor General. The Afghan side was represented by Sahibzada Abdul Latif and a former governor of Khost province in Afghanistan, Sadar Shireendil Khan, representing Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. The original 1893 Durand Line Agreement was written in English, with translated copies in Dari or Pashto Language. It is believed however that only the English version was actually signed by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, a language he could not read and understand.

The resulting agreement or treaty led to the creation of a new province called at the time North-West Frontier Province now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, out of areas from Afghanistan which are currently controlled by Pakistan and includes the FATA and Frontier Regions. It is also included the areas of Multan, Mianwali, the Behawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan. These areas were part of the Afghan Empire from 1709 until the 1820s when the Sikh Empire followed by British invaded and took possession. They were annexed with the Punjab Province of Pakistan as late as 1970, after the one unit of Pakistan was dissolved by President Yahya Khan, resulting in a shrunken NWFP (now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).
Contemporary Era:

Pakistan’s largest intelligence agency (ISI), which began with the birth of the nation has been heavily involved in the affairs of Afghanistan since the late 1970s. During Operation Cyclone, the ISA with full support/funding form the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the White House in the United States recruited huge numbers of mujahideen militant groups on the Pakistani side of the Durand line to cross into Afghanistan’s territory for missions to destroy the Soviet-backed Afghan government. Afghanistan KHAD was one of two secret service agencies believed to have been conducting bombings in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP) during the early 1980s. U.S. State Department blamed WAD (A KGB created Afghan secret intelligence agency) for terrorist bombings in Pakistan’s cities in 1987 and 1988. It is also believed that Afghanistan’s PDPA government supported leftist Al-Zulfiquar organization of Pakistan, the group accused of the 1981 hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines plane from Karachi to Kabul.

After the collapse of the pro-Soviet Afghan government in 1992, Pakistan obviously being aware of article 2 of the Durand Line Agreement, where it mentions “The Government of India (Pakistan) will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan,” created a puppet state in Afghanistan run by the Taliban. According to a summer 2001 report in The Friday Times, even the Taliban leaders challenged the very existence of the Durand Line when former Afghan Interior Minister Abdur Razzaq and a delegate of about 945 Taliban visited Pakistan. The Taliban refused to
endorse the Durand Line despite pressure from Islamabad, arguing that there shall be no borders among Muslims. When the Taliban government was removed in late 2001, the new Afghan President Hamid Karazi also began resisting the Durand Line. Pakistan’s regime, dominated by military, has undergone a slower but equally bloody meltdown. The military has refused to allow a genuinely representative government to take root. In 2007 Musharraf, after massive public demonstrations, suspended the constitution, racked the senior judiciary, imprisoned more than twelve thousand lawyers and members of civil society, and muzzled the media in an attempt to stay in power and ensure that any election favoured him rather than the opposition. The country is best by a major political crisis and the spread of Islamic extremism now sees its chance to topple the state. Musharraf’s plunge from hero to villain was compounded by the assassination of country’s larger-than-life opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto, in December 2007, followed by a wake of suicide bombings and mayhem.

Across the five independent states of Central Asia-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan dictatorship have ruled continuously since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The lack of basic political freedom, grinding poverty, huge economic disparities and an Islamic extremist political underground are set to plunge Central Asia, despite its oil and gas reserves, into ever greater turmoil.

The consequence of State failure in any single country are unimaginable. At state in Afghanistan is not just the future of President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan people yearning for stability, development, and education but also the entire global Alliance that is trying to keep Afghanistan together. At stake are the futures of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union, and of course American’s own power and prestige. It is difficult to imagine how NATO could survive as the west’s leading military alliance if the Taliban are not defeated in Afghanistan.

What is at stake in Pakistan is even greater. A nuclear armed military and on intelligence service that have sponsored Islamic extremism as an intrinsic part of their foreign policy for nearly four decades have found it extremely difficult to give up their self-destructive and double-dealing policies after 9/11, even under the watchful eye of the CIA. The recent blowback from these policies is now treating the state, undermining the army, decapitating the political elite, and drowning the country in a sea of blood. In 2007, there were 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan that killed 640 people.

America’s interest in Musharraf and the military, rather than of the Pakistani people and the development of state institutions and democratic process, has created hatred for the U.S. Army and America, which has penetrated all classes of society. Ninety percent of the $ 10 billion aid that the United States has given to Pakistan since 9/11, has gone to the military rather than to development. Moreover, anti-Americanism has lit Pakistani society’s core values, undermining people’s understanding of democracy, secular education,
modernization, and civil society—because all these facets—because all these facets of society are deemed to be American. When the Bush administration continued to back Musharraf in late 2007, despite the general’s rampage against the judiciary and civil society, Pakistan’s middle class was over taken by feelings of anti-Americanism, making it impossible to persuade Pakistanis to resists the extremists. Neither was it possible to convince people that the struggle against extremism was not just against America’s war but also against Pakistan. Being the fifth largest country in the world. Pakistan’s society is riddled with deep ethnic, social, and economic fissures. Quite apart from the Islamists, three are grave dangers of secular separatist movements in the provinces of Balochistan and Sindh that could divide the nation, just as ethnic nationalism did in 1971, when East Pakistan became an independent Bangladesh. With such threats, it not surprising that experts are worried about Pakistan’s Nuclear arsenal.

Thus comes the core of the crisis i.e. FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in IVth chapter.