Chapter 4
Michel Foucault and Power- Resistance Net

How is it that our society, western society in general, has conceived power in such a restricted, such a poor and such a negative way? Why do we always conceive power as law and as prohibition, why this privileging?

Michel Foucault

Michel Foucault portrays power not as something which is possessed but as something which is exercised and performed through relations of power. In this sense, power is dispersed through the whole social body rather than being seized by a particular person or particular institution. Through the critique of the 'repressive hypothesis', he sets his conceptualization of power in opposition to the model which conceives power as a form of repression or oppression.

As I mentioned earlier, Lacan maps the human psyche or human identity on the basis of mechanisms of repression: the child's desire for his mother is repressed and interrupted by the father. The repression or the prohibition is the first stage to step into the Symbolic realm, the realm of the Father, language,
law, culture or the Other. And the repressed desire is called lack, void, fissure or the Real. In this perspective, identity is constructed through the interaction of the realms: the Symbolic, the Real and the Imaginary. Marxist Lacanism influenced by Lacan's repression theory and the Marxist understanding of infrastructure/superstructure attempts to draw the features of the true political subject, and hence of true political action. In other words, by liberating himself from the repressive law of the Symbolic the political subject strives to approach the emancipatory Real. The same line of analysis – with minor difference – could be seen in French feminists who revisit Lacan's theory of the Symbolic and the repressive realm of the Father to find an emancipatory alternative not in the Real but in the pre-Oedipal stage, namely the Imaginary. On this ground, true femininity or ideal feminine identity could be discovered in opposition to the imposed identity of the Symbolic. The pre-Oedipal, by definition, is considered as a given subrational space of freedom which has the transcendental and essential potentiality of disrupting the masculine, homogeneous and well-policing order of the Symbolic.

We have followed up the common approach in the thinkers who foreground public/private divide: by stepping into the public realm of freedom, bios, the subject would set itself free from the demeaned private realm of necessity and slavery. In these theories – whether identity-directed or distinction-directed ones – there is a vigorous tendency towards going beyond or stepping outside the univocal power which corresponds with domination. And simultaneously in all the above-mentioned models, the formation of the absolute one is unavoidable, whether in the form of the revolutionary proletariat, 'Mystic', 'non-part', 'who', 'maternal body', citizen of bios, or in the form of a uniform strategy for struggle, namely, 'semiotic', 'feminine writing', 'poetic', 'autoeroticism', moving from zoe to bios. From this point of view, struggle corresponds with overthrowing the man or bourgeois as the
chief enemy and villain of history by the proletariat, innocent woman, the oppressed of 'all cultures'. In this sense power is considered in terms of those who have power over those who do not have power, and resistance means seizing power from those who barer supposed to have it.

From the feminist point of view, patriarchy as the power of men over women is the most potent force in all societies, and history is homogeneously under the burden of masculine and phallocentric weight, namely, male dominance. Therefore, in order to be free women need to go beyond the univocal and homogenous structure of power to create their own ways of speaking and acting, and rise against the overarching repression, prohibition and exploitation. Adrienne Rich enunciates it as follows:

Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-social, ideological, political system in which men – by force, direct pressure, or through ritual tradition, law, and language, customs, etiquette, education, and the division of labor – determine what part women shall or shall not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male.  

By now we have addressed how such a polarized oppressor-victim attitude toward power would lead to a univocal approach, rather than plurivocal trends. But it is not the ultimate end of the analysis. Hence, we need to go further and examine how feminism, in particular, among the different regimes of truths resorts to repression as the only tool in its analysis? How is power understood through a reductionist and deterministic interpretation as male domination? How is patriarchy conceived as a permanent, universal and systematic state? How does feminism treat 'woman' as a timeless category which has suffered from a uniform and univocal regime of male power? How does it happen that feminism is led to consider power in such a poor and
negative way and to conceive it as an overarching category, as law and prohibition; in other words, how is it led to understand power in terms of a 'juridical-discursive' model? And finally, can this impoverished concept of power help us to understand the situation of women who, at various stages of their life, resist the obligatory codes, sometimes give up, and sometimes live with them?

Hence, we will visit Foucault's concept of power with the hope that it could help us to deal with the questions practically.

**Political Technologies**

The question of power is central to Foucault's thought. In this respect, *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality* could be conceived as crucial moments in Foucault's evolving concern with the question of power. He argues that since the 17th and 18th centuries, two sets of techniques have emerged: on the one hand, techniques of individualization of power which are labeled as 'anatomo-politics', and on the other hand, techniques for governing the population as a whole which are designated as 'bio-polities'. Foucault grapples with the question of power from a very different angle: *power promotes life, rather than takes life*. From this point of view, 'discipline' is a mechanism of power through which the very atoms of society are controlled in order to multiply their capacities, enhance their potentialities and intensify their performances: it is a positive control over bodies. Through the technologies of anatomo-politics, discipline makes use of the body by maximizing its efficiency. Citing an example of discipline in army, Foucault argues that in pre-modern times, the soldier was recognized by his natural characteristics. In other words, he was considered as a soldier if he simply possessed body with a gun. But in the modern times and with the invention of
the quick-fire rifle, the soldier is exposed to body-training methods to multiply
his skills. Hence, the question is not only a matter of control, but a matter of
creating aptitudes to enhance the subject's motions and preserve his life in the
battlefield. Foucault goes on to describe this modern soldier as follows:

The soldier becomes something of skill, and therefore valuable. And the
more valuable he was, the more it was necessary to preserve him; the more it
was necessary to preserve him, the more it became necessary to teach him
the techniques, the longer his apprenticeship, the more valuable he was. 4

He explains that the individualizing technology of power further
developed the usage of the technology through political anatomy not only in
army, but also in education and in workshops. Foucault argues that the main
ambition of such projects was to develop the mechanisms which would
construct more obedient and more useful subject. In other words, discipline
sought to produce 'docile' bodies which would be manipulable and could be
mobilized by the individualizing technology of power. But these bodies were
not simple automatons or puppets which were subjected to commands.
Discipline was a productive technique and exercised a positive force over
bodies. Discipline, Foucault tells us makes individual. Hence in Discipline and
Punish, he was not concerned with the dubious claim that societies control
their members and render them passive 'puppets' through the 'ideological
apparatuses' or the 'culture industry'. He was concerned with the forms of
knowledge of individuals based on different regimes of truth. Hence,
discipline endows individuals with a certain type of individuality whilst at the
same time it operates over them a subjection. In Discipline and Punish,
Foucault says:
Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.⁵

In other words, the mechanisms of individualizing technologies of power have two main interrelated functions: they promote subjectivity, and at the same time operate a kind of subjection over the individuals. Hence, Foucault's articulation of disciplinary techniques in modern societies has a double echo in his critique of juridico-discursive conception of power. Power, through disciplinary techniques, is not exercised as linear and hierarchically from top to down, it is administered not by judicial authorities or some elite or by a decision-making center; rather it circulates in the form of a chain through a net-like organization and hence, it is operated by parents, warders, teachers, doctors, psychiatrists.... He says:

What is to be understood by disciplining of the society in Europe since the 18th century is not, of course, that the individuals who are part of them become more and more obedient, nor that all societies become like barracks, schools, or prisons, rather, it is that an increasingly controlled, more rational, economical process of adjustment has been sought between productive activities, communication networks, and play of power relations.⁶

The interrelation of these two functions could also be comprehended through the way he grapples with the term disciplinary societies, not disciplined ones. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes how the
disciplinary structures —like the army or the prison— in the 19th century deployed a great number of techniques to produce useful and obedient bodies. He never argued that our societies have become disciplined and people have become completely docile. If the latter were true we would have never faced revolts, opposition, strikes and resistance in our societies.

The second aspect of political technology concerns the power of administering and optimizing the life of the population as a whole, and subjecting it to precise regulations and controls. Foucault calls this power over life as 'bio-power' and its politics as bio-politics. In History of Sexuality, he criticized what he called 'the repressive hypothesis' and argued that what has emerged since the 17th century was not silence and repression, but rather was a proliferation of discourses on sexuality. These discourses were not introduced in terms of a distinction between licit and illicit, but rather were understood on the basis of mechanisms of confession and government of the lives of people. Accordingly, the target of power in anatomo-politics was the individuals right up to their bodies but in bio-politics, power focuses on the population as whole, in order to control birth rate, a rate of mortality, a life expectancy, and a state of health on the one hand, and to produce riches, goods and other individuals on the other hand. In this sense, sexuality becomes central to the relations of power in western societies. Hence, in analyzing the relations of power in sexuality since the 18th century, Foucault is concerned with 'welfare' rather than the repressive hypothesis. He says:

Of course, it had long been asserted that a country had to be populated if it hoped to be rich and powerful; but this was the first time that a society had affirmed, in a constant way, that its future and its fortune were tied not only to the number and the uprightness of its citizens, to their marriage rules and
family organization, but to the manner in which each individual made use of his sex.  

Here, Foucault introduces a new approach to power, that is the power which administers life and exercises a positive force and influence over it. In this way, "life enters into the domain of power". He invites us to view power not in terms of negative concepts of repression, prohibition, censorship, domination and "you must, or you must not" but on the basis of positive mechanisms of production, wealth, efficiency, competency and welfare. He insists that we have to abandon the whole tradition, which conceives power as property, appropriation and privilege. Foucault considers power not as a simple, localized and centralized top-to-down relation of the state with the citizens, but as various relations which traverse all classes and bodies and extend to the very atoms of society. He leads us to study this micro-physics of power in the form of strategies, dispositions, tactics, maneuvers, and functions. Foucault does not deny repression or domination, but he reminds us that they are not the only and sufficient analytical tools for analyzing the complexity of nets of power. Devaluing the significance which is traditionally accorded to repressive techniques, he maps other tools of analysis for examining an 'archipelago of different powers'. He says:

Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or prohibition on those who 'do not have it'; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them, it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This means that these relations go right down into the depths of society.
Juridico-Discursive model of power

Foucault provides a set of historical explorations to explain how the juridico-discursive model permeates power analysis in general. In the West, since the Middle Ages, there had been a struggle between feudal powers and monarchic powers. He shows how the law was an instrument of monarchic power against the feudal system, and later served as an instrument of the bourgeoisie against the monarchy. And in this way, the growth of the state was articulated to juridical thought.¹¹

By the same token, Foucault gives an example of the juridical conception of power in Rousseau's theory of the state. As a social-contract thinker, Rousseau argues that the primitive man abandons the state of nature and steps into civil society, thereby he surrendering his natural rights to the community which is incarnated in the sovereign. And as the only legitimate power the sovereign has to secure the subject's freedom by possessing the armed force and moral force. Hence, as a symbol of law and civilization, the sovereign represses the state of nature and individual interests to guarantee security and freedom. Foucault argues that "a sovereign as social body or, better, a social body as sovereign, is born of the ceding of individual rights, their alienation and the formation of laws of prohibition that each individual is obliged to recognize because it is he who has imposed the law on himself."¹² Rousseau was not the only thinker who analyzed power in the form of representation which is given itself as law or language. Foucault also argued that ethnology, from Durkheim to Levi-Strauss, focused on the study power in terms of rules and prohibition:

What was the problem that would always reappear, perpetually re-worked: a problem of prohibition, essentially the prohibition of incest. And from this
matrix, from this core that is prohibition of incest, we have tried to understand the general functioning of the system.\textsuperscript{13}

This problem also occurs in psychoanalysis. In the Freudian schema, the way that instinct stands versus culture or repression, implies the mechanisms of control through which the sexual instinct develops. By the same token, in Lacan's theory, we have seen how 'law' as the taboo against incest, works through the Symbolic realm. Being suspicious about this moment of thought, Foucault believes that psychoanalysis does not change the conception of power, and still views it in the light of repressive mechanisms. In the same vein, he disagrees with the projects of sexual liberation, because they are based on the false assumption that the power exercised on sexuality is basically repressive: "Something that smacks of revolt, of promised freedom, of the coming age of a different law, slips easily into this discourse on sexual oppression. Some of the ancient functions of prophecy are reactivated therein. Tomorrow sex will be good again".\textsuperscript{14} So Foucault invites us to conceive sexuality not by the polarized understanding of repression and liberation, but rather in terms of complex mechanisms of power. He insists that we must abandon asking "why are we repressed?" Rather, we must pose the question: "why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed?" We need ask, "what led us to show, ostentatiously, that sex is something we hide, to say it is something we silence?" \textsuperscript{15}

But Foucault admitted that he was not the only one who tried to bypass the Freudian theory of repression, and was not the only one who tried to analyze power in terms of positive mechanisms rather than negative and juridical conception of power. He held that Bentham\textsuperscript{16} and Marx( particularly in volume II of \textit{Capita}) analyzed power in the light of its positive functions.
For Rousseau, there was no society at the beginning, and the social body as a society appeared at the point of the emergence of sovereignty; and there was only one power which exercises itself in society, the sovereign power. Marx, on the contrary, shows how from the initial formation of the small regional powers — property, slavery, the workshop and the army— the great State apparatuses were established. On the other hand, these small regional powers do not function in order to prohibit or to say 'you must not', rather they work to produce efficiency and aptitude. Hence, Foucault insists that it would be a misunderstanding of Marx, if we were to read him in the light of Rousseau's principles: "to privilege the state apparatus, the function of conservation, the juridical superstructure, is to 'Rousseau-ize' Marx".  

On this ground, Foucault says:

A society is not a unitary body in which one power and one power only exercises itself, but in reality it is a juxtaposition, a liaising, a coordination, a hierarchy, too, of different powers which nonetheless retain their specificity. Marx continually insists, for example, on the simultaneously specific and relatively autonomous, in some way impermeable, character of the de facto power that the employer exerts in a workshop, in relation to a juridical type of power that exists in the rest of society. Thus the existence of regions of power. Society is an archipelago of different powers.

Foucault's emphasis on relations of power which are exercised from different points and have multiple forms, sheds a new light on power/resistance analysis. The theoretical implications of Foucault's thought for political studies are especially highlighted when he insists on abandoning the approach to the question of power which involves asking, "What is power and where does power come from?" In contrast, he focuses on the question:
How does power manifest itself? And further asks "How is it exercised and what happens when individuals exert (as we say) power over others?"  

Foucault believes that conceiving power in terms of 'what is power?' leads us to misunderstand it as an a priori substance. Or it misguides us into thinking that there is an a priori headquarter behind the power relations. His refusal of the juridico-discursive conception of power consists in his refusal to identify of power with repression, with sovereignty and with law. Power does involve the absolute right of seizure, i.e., seizure of lives, things, or wealth. In other words, he warns us about treating power as a substance which some have and some do not have. Foucault believes that the sovereign body as a symbol of possessor of power still has a mistaken and crucial role in our political discourses. Hence, he recommends cutting off "the king's head" in political theory in order to analyze power as it is really exercised through power relations. Power does not emanate from just one source. It emanates from everywhere, from different regions of power. Hence, instead of dealing with the question 'who holds power?', Foucault grapples with how power is exercised in different regimes of truth and how the individual is constructed through these regimes and according to different mechanisms. From this point of view, Foucault does not consider the 'modern state' as something above the individuals, but as a structure in which individuals themselves can be integrated and in which they also act. He argues:

I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity that was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their existence, but, on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure in which individual can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality that would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific pattern.
In this sense, individuals and the sovereign are both historical fabrications who act differently in the net of power. With Foucault's thought, one would be far from Marxist thought -not Marx's- and liberal understandings of power and resistance, whose political targets are focused on setting individuals free from the jurisprudential hold. Foucault's approach to power distances itself from the universal slave-master dialectic, in which, the historical struggle is simply based on the polarized and homogenous relations of power. On the contrary, his focus is on the techniques used in power relations. According to this understanding of power, relations of forces and the ways they are exercised are not transcendent to each other, rather they are immanent and inherent in each other:

As far as this power is concerned, it is first necessary to distinguish that which is exerted over things and gives the ability to modify, use, consume, or destroy them – a power that stems from aptitudes directly inherent in the body or relayed by external instruments. [...] for let us not deceive ourselves: if we speak of structures or mechanisms of power, it is only in so far as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others.  

By shifting the focus on the exercise of power, Foucault privileges 'how' rather than the 'what' dimension. He indicates that 'what' refers to essence, source or holder of power, whereas, 'how' implies how power manifests itself, and how it is exercised through the meshes of power, that is, there is no power beyond its exercise. This novel genealogical exploration shows how relations of power are immanent in the exercise of power, in effects, actions, strategies, and bodies and not in mind or consciousness. Power lies in inter-individual relations; power comes from everywhere and power is everywhere. Then, what is significant to know is not to find out who is dominated and who dominates who has power and who does not have power, rather we need to
explore how in each group, each class or each sex, the individual performs her/his role and finds her/his place in meshes of power.

Hence, the main objective of Foucault's historical exploration is finding out how 'we have the habit' of conceiving power in terms of negative mechanisms. Although from the Middle Ages power has been understood in terms of the language, discourse and the vocabulary of law, he also attempts to show that "a whole other series of technological inventions" were involved which are equally important and even more appropriate to analyze 'an archipelago of different powers'.

If, for the time being, I grant a certain privileged position to the question of "how", it is not because I would wish to eliminate the questions of "what" and "why". Rather, it is that I wish to present these questions in a different way [...] To put it bluntly, I would say that to begin the analysis with a "how" is to introduce a suspicion that power as such does not exist. It is, in any case, to ask oneself what contents one has in mind when using this grand, all embracing, and reifying term; it is to suspect that an extremely complex configuration of realities is allowed to escape while one endlessly marks time before the double question: what is power, and where does power come from?

**Resistance in meshes of Power**

One may raise a set of questions against the background of this analysis: How does Foucault map resistance and struggle through the meshes of power? And what is the role of the subject in power relations?

As discussed earlier, the model of power habitually remains within the horizon of juridical domination, restriction and repression. On this ground, there is always a distinction between power and to be free from power. But
Foucault's analysis differentiates between domination and power, offering a novel view on resistance through the relations of power. In other words, resistance does not possess a transcendental and emancipatory character free from power, it is inherent and diffused in power relations, and hence is more frequent than one may imagine.

Far from endorsing conventional conceptions of power, *Discipline and punish* and *The History of Sexuality* focus on bodies of knowledge and institutional sites for constructing and knowing the subjects. What emerges from these texts is that the subject is constructed and promoted within different mechanisms, and not simply dominated by the repressive devices. Once again, the political project of the studies illustrates that the problem is not simply restricting and repressing but rather producing, knowing and promoting a subject as an individual. So, Foucault's project demonstrates how different technologies facilitate the latter process.

Central to Foucault's analysis of sexuality in *The History of Sexuality* is a critique of 'the repressive hypothesis' as a deviation from the miscellanea of power. Since the 17th century, sexuality has operated through mechanisms of confession and mechanisms for governing the of intimate lives of individuals. In this sense, sexuality is caught in relations of power. He argues that power "must not be sought in primary existence of a central point [...] power is everywhere; because it comes from everywhere". His understanding of the points of power is strictly articulated to the points of resistance in the social body. In other words, resistance is not transcendental to power; rather it is immanent in it: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power". Accordingly, Foucault clarifies that we should give up looking for the headquarters, for example a sovereign, which presides over the mechanisms of power. When power relationships pass through institutions and
apparatuses, the points of resistance traverse the individual body and the social body. In this sense power and resistance are articulated to each other. Moreover, power is not evil by nature, as Foucault says: "The power that one man exercises over another is always perilous. I am not saying that power is evil by nature." On the other hand, resistance is not innocent and it could be 'savage', 'violent', or 'interested' or 'sacrificial'.

Besides, Foucault's insistence on the heterogeneity of power relations, has important political implications. In other words, he shows that arenas of struggle are as multiple as the forces in the battlefield. The forces engaged in the struggle are not necessarily of a particular class, gender or identity whose end object is to overcome a dominating class or an exploiting gender. This novel formulation of power opens up the multiple ways of conceptualizing the issues of power, subjectivity and resistance, which are quite different from the Marxist ideology or feminist theory. Thus, rather than locating power in centralized institutions, such as government, police or army as Marxist thinkers do, or rather than conceiving power as an overarching concept of patriarchy as feminist theorists do, Foucault draws our attention to the exercise of power through the acts of individuals and institutions. In this sense, the ultimate end of politics is not any more to dominate the dominating class or annihilate the chief; rather it is promoting subjectivities and enhancing their capacities. So freedom does not fit into a linear and object-directed paradigm based on the master-slave dialectic.

In Foucault's thought, there is no room for a macro-ideology leading to a meta-truth or any universal form of resistance. Hence, considering power, in terms of evil capitalism, the repressive patriarchy, or the law of the Father, which is exclusively in the hands of given decision makers would be simplistic and reductionist. By turning away from long-term strategies in the form of a macro-pattern which considers power as homogenous (for example the
sovereign or the Father) Foucault emphasizes on the endemic and heterogeneous nature of power which is exercised through micro-level tactics: the diversity of forces which are exercised by warders, doctors, teachers, parents, students, and men and women as such. On this ground, he does not deny the strategy with a wider scope of objectives, but he argues that all macro-strategies come into play with micro-tactics. In other words, Foucault outlines a mutual relationship between them as one cannot imagine any strategy without the play of tactics in the political or social arenas. Challenging the grand theories which consider the father as a 'representative' of the Sovereign, or consider the family as a minimal society, Foucault rather focuses on the insular and heteromorphous mechanisms of power.

No "local center", no "pattern of transformation" could function if, through a series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy. And inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if did not gain support from precise and tenuous relations [...]. Thus the father in the family is not the "representative" of the sovereign or the state; and the latter are not projections of the father on a different scale. The family does not duplicate the society, just as society does not imitate the family. 30

Then, Foucault's conceptualization of power sketches a new understanding of resistance: "Where there is power, there is resistance, [...]. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network". 31 Unlike the critics who believe that there is no room for resistance in Foucault's thought, Gilles Deleuze puts a radical emphasis on resistance in Foucault's works: "the final word on power is that resistance comes first". 32

Undoubtedly, Deleuze does not suggest that there is a hierarchy in power relations, in which 'resistance comes first'. Arguing that everyone is in power and there is no escape from power, he believes that resistance is not exterior to
power and it is a force in itself. In other words, resistance could exercise as resistance in so far as it acts in power relations. Power is conditioned to resistance, and resistance in its own turn is conditioned to power: power-resistance is a two-way relation. The implication of this analysis indicates that a force in a particular relation, could be viewed as a controlling force, and on other occasions could be viewed as a resisting force. Force affects and at the same time is affected by other forces. Hence, 'resistance comes first', since power is exercised over a force, because there is resistance, and finally it is exercised because there is a relation and power cannot act beyond the relation. This is Foucault's physics of power. Therefore force in power relations has a fluid character, and it does not have a stable and permanent position. This is quite far from a dialectical understanding of power as there is no force, class or gender which is a victim throughout history and in all political struggles. One could dominate, as well as be dominated, since power "passes through the hands of the mastered no less than through the hands of masters". The woman in "Death and the Maiden" could be the object of violence, and at the same time, the subject of torture. Robespierre could be the emancipatory subject, as well as the subject of Terror. But the lack of a fixed identity and the mobile nature of power relations do not close the possibility of action; rather they open up variable tactics and multiple strategies of struggle.

In opposition to Foucault's conceptualization of power, the juridico-discursive model of power envisages a one-way and homogenous struggle, represents resistance as simple as overthrowing the chief enemy. But in practice, the complexity of power-resistance points, diffusion of singularities in the power realm and their variable nature make the field of war sophisticated and heterogeneous. In Foucault's philosophy, there is no room for a permanent enemy across all ages and no universal victim for all times; hence one needs to outline the map of war according to power relations.
prevailing locally and historically. Power, in this sense, is not any more a political structure, government, a given social class or a certain dominant sex or gender; rather it is a human relationship which could involve any economic or even amorous relationship. On this ground, Foucault elaborates the possibility freedom through the power relationships; in other words, power acts over resistance since resistance comes first.

Hence, in responding to the view that "if power is everywhere, there is no freedom"[^34], he replies:

Thus, in order for power relations to come into play, there must be a certain degree of freedom on both sides. Even when the power relation is completely out of balance, when it can truly be claimed that one side has "total power" over the other, power can be exercised over the other only in so far as the other still has the option of killing himself, of leaping out of the window, or of killing the other person.[^35]

**Ethics**

To Foucault, the concept of power is not confined to the forces which are in play outside the individual. Hence, the real question is how the forces within man compose with the forces from outside, and from which what form or forms could emerge. Foucault like Nietzsche pays a close attention to the inside forces. Deleuze says: "Nietzsche said that man imprisoned life, but the superman is what frees life within man himself".[^36] In this sense, freedom relates to the relation of self with self, ethics, or the art of existence.

By mapping the question of how one could govern others if one could not govern oneself, Foucault bridges the gap between inside and outside and private and public. Hence, `governmentality' is a term Foucault has used to describe the various techniques by which the state controls and improves the
condition of citizens. But it also indicates the series of practices – 'technologies of self' and 'art of existence' – through which an individual comes to recognize himself as a subject, in other words, he gives meaning to his activities and interprets his experiences. In this way, politics extends from anatomo-politics as the concern with the individual to bio-politics as the concern with a population as a whole. Foucault thus develops the notion of governmentality through the mutual relation between the individual and the society; that is, he links the emancipatory capacity of the individual for self determination and agency with social structures and obligatory codes. In this respect, Deleuze says: "The obligatory rules for power must be doubled by facultative rules for the free man who exercises power". Hence, "take care of yourself" as an ethical task corresponds to "make freedom your foundation, through the mastery of yourself". Here, Foucault illustrates how the notion of autonomy is connected to political or social struggle. It is also important to note that Foucault sees the 'care of self' not as a discovery of essential nature, but rather as an invention and reinvention of self, an aesthetic invention of life: "What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become something that is related only to objects and not to individuals or to life. [...] But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not our life?"

The subject is constructed in mechanisms of power and through the play of freedom and power. But he can simultaneously resist the obligatory codes of power—not by going beyond the power — but through the "models he find in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group". It means that beneath the codes, the subject could make his life 'in an active fashion' and seek his freedom without being dependent on them. In the light of 'governmentality', one can conceive the new modes of subjectivity, new kinds of becoming – far from a fixed identity –
and also novel ways of resistance which are not possible in old struggles based on a juridico-discursive understanding of power:

I do not believe that the only possible point of resistance to political power – understood, of course, as a state of domination – lies in the relation of the self to the self. I am saying that "governmentality" implies the relationship of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of "governmentality" to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other. [...] Thus, the basis for all this is freedom, the relation of the self to itself and the relationship to the other. Whereas, if you try to analyze power not on the basis of freedom, strategies, and governmentality, but on the basis of the political institutions, you can only conceive of the subject as the subject of law. One then has a subject who has or does not have rights [...]. On the other hand, I believe that the concept of governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others – which constitutes the very stuff [matière] of ethics.41

To Foucault, freedom is an ethical issue which involves the individual's ability to define himself, his pleasures, his relations with others, and finally make freedom his foundation through mastery of the self; to govern oneself and others. In other words, "freedom is the ontological condition of ethics"42. Hence, by developing the concept of 'care of the self' and its relation with political life – as we have seen in the case of Alcibiades— Foucault makes a clear distinction between liberation and freedom. Accordingly, he is asked whether such mastery over self is a sort of liberation.43 Foucault argues that by focusing too much on liberation one may risk falling back on transcendental human nature which is assumed to be repressed or alienated through historical, economic or social processes. Hence the main target of the liberating process
is to liberate repressed nature. Although not dismissing or denying liberation, as it may pave the way for freedom, he contends that liberation per se, does not give rise to happy human being. One can revolt against tyranny; or one can liberate himself from the colonizer, but it cannot be called 'freedom'. Thus, to Foucault, we can easily say that we should liberate our sexuality; but the true questions are: what is sex, what is pleasure and what is our erotic relation with others? These are ethical questions which relate to the `aesthetics of life' and presuppose freedom. In this respect, Foucault says:

> Taking sexuality as an example, it is clear that a number of liberations were required vis-à-vis male power, that liberation was necessary from an oppressive morality concerning heterosexuality as well as homosexuality. But this liberation does not give rise to the happy human being imbued with a sexuality to which the subject could achieve a complete and satisfying relationship. Liberation paves the way for new power relationships, which must be controlled by a practice of freedom. 44

To him, freedom is the condition of ethics, it is a reflective process, work of self on self, through which one attempts to develop and transform oneself to attain a new mode of being which is free from regulatory and obligatory codes. And it could be done even at the expense of life itself. Foucault's understanding of the subject, his concern with the development of individuality, its construction as a subject within power relations, the exercise of power or domination over the subject and the possibility of resistance challenge many of the traditional and evident ways of conceiving agency and freedom. Hence, freedom can no longer be understood as an inherent capacity of the subject. Or it does not correspond only to the citizen's action in the polis by leaving behind his zoe features. Freedom is the individual's possibility of reflection on 'inside' and 'outside', 'private' and 'public'. Freedom is the
possibility of becoming, is the possibility of deterritorialisation of the accepted realms in order to make our life beautiful.

By addressing the Iranian revolution, Foucault points out his views on the issues of freedom and liberation, and deals with the role of intellectuals in facing the emergence of historic events, like revolutions. In the beginning of "Is it Useless to Revolt?" Foucault says:

Last summer the Iranians said: 'we are ready to die by the thousands in order to get the Shah to go'. Today, it is the Ayatollah who says: 'let Iran bleed so that the revolution may be strong'.

In this article, Foucault responded to some critics who questioned him for his initial justification of the Iranian revolution. They argued that the harsh features of the theocratic regime of Iran discredit the views of those (like Foucault) who had sympathy for the revolution and for those who struggled to overthrow the Shah. Foucault on the one hand defended himself by saying that:

There is certainly no disgrace involved in changing one's opinion; but there is no reason to say that one's opinion is changing when one is against the punishments today, when one was against the torture of the Savak yesterday.

But it is not just a question of self-defense, bit of his philosophical stance. Foucault believes that his duty as an intellectual is not representing the conscience of humanity, or acting as a strategist who is supposed to analyze events in terms of grand necessities, to predict the future of the revolt, to lay down the law for the people who risk their life in struggle, to address everything in the light of 'true' and 'false' and finally to tell people what to do.
Rather, his task is to observe how various forces act on each other, to watch out how the forces deploy their political and social actions, to appreciate people who risk their life in order to struggle against a certain way of being governed, to pay attention to the singularities emerging through the history, "to see how far the liberation of thought can go toward making these transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out, and sufficiently difficult to carry out for them to be deeply inscribed in reality"\(^47\), to hear the voices of protesters who, by non-violent action, may say 'where is my vote?' and finally respect their liberating actions and their insistent resistance against the Absolute. But at the same time, he is unsure that it is freedom in its strict sense, "a final liberation coming for every man."\(^48\), or a counter-discourse which does not produce the same power relations any more. Intellectual's ethical task is not easy at all. Foucault says:

It is 'anti-strategic': to be respectful when something singular arises, to be intransigent when power offends against the universal. A simple choice, but a difficult work. It is always necessary to watch out for something, a little beneath history, that breaks with it, that agitates it; it is necessary to look, a little behind politics, for that which out to limit it, unconditionally. After all it is my work. I am neither the first nor the only one to be doing it. But I have chosen to do it.\(^49\)

**Genealogy**

Foucault's concern to see what is our current 'truth', what forces we must confront and how we can resist the obligatory codes lead him to genealogy, a historical-philosophical approach. From this perspective, he as a genealogist and not a historian did not write the history of mentalities, rationalities, behaviors or institutions, rather he wrote the history of conditions in which certain things become seen or omitted. He wrote the history of emergence of
conditions which govern the relations of forces. He envisaged how production of knowledge is bound up with historically specific regimes of power, and how every society has its own regime of truth which is normalizing and regulatory. He analyzed historically "how effects of truth are produced within discourses that in themselves are neither true nor false." Hence, he did not write the 'true history', rather he wrote how historical events are considered as 'true' or 'false'. Opposing the genesis-oriented approach to history and challenging the linear historical analysis, based on the successive levels of events, Foucault wrote the history of singularities, discontinuities and ruptures by bringing them into light, and showing how in certain moments they change the existing order of things. He wrote about the non-discursive conditions of emergence of discourses. He says:

My problem was not at all to say "Voilà, long live discontinuity, we are in the discontinuous and a good thing too," but to pose the question "How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?"

The genealogist investigates into the condition of emergence of forces, the strategic inventions in struggles, their strategic effects and values, and does not write a linear history based on an overarching model of power, law or language; that is he writes "the history that bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than of language — relations of power, not relations of meaning." Thus Foucault draws attention to the conditions of emergence of the modern prison in western societies, by arguing that the aim of the prison is not eliminating crime, but producing delinquency. He shows how the human body
is inserted in certain regimes of truth via operation of power and knowledge, and how sexuality is the result of a productive 'bio-power' which focuses on bodies, inciting and exacting various effects, and finally argues that power and sexuality are not distinct:

We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says not to power; on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality. It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim [...] to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance.53

To Foucault, the real or 'effective' history is the permanent struggle between different forces. And the task of the genealogist is watching out the alignment of forces and looking for the emergence of the regimes of power to find out how these regimes act upon each other through the social body and through the human body as well. The genealogist is not seeking the origin of the truths lying behind the things to disclose the treasures buried in the genesis. He does not seek to remove the mask of the things to reveal their essences or true identities. In opposition to the historian, he attracts attention to the eruption of the events and studies the masks themselves rather than the things behind them. Genealogy "must be sensitive to their [events] recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Hence, when he was asked whether there was something innate or natural about sex, or whether it was acquired, he simply replied that it was not the object of his work: "It's not my problem."54

But Foucault develops his problem in The History of Sexuality by challenging 'the repressive hypothesis'. In effect, Foucault's critique of
juridical concept of power reaches its culmination by raising doubts concerning what he calls the "repressive hypothesis". The central feature of his work in *The History of Sexuality* is analyzing sexuality not in terms of repression, non-recognition and censorship as the psychoanalytic model seeks to do, rather it draws attention to the proliferation of discourses on sexuality, to a growing concern with the welfare of the population and its related technologies. In this sense he argues: "I will try, where sexuality is concerned, not to envisage power from a juridical point of view, but from a technological one." By criticizing the prohibition model he does not suggest that there is no repression or domination in history. Rather he attempts to show that the 'repressive hypothesis' as a grand narrative cannot be the only analytical tool for power relations, and hence, it could be misleading.

Foucault mainly criticized the repressive hypothesis regarding sexuality and argued that rather than silence and repression, what has occurred since the 17th century in western societies has been an explosion of discourses on sexuality. Sexuality, in this sense, should be understood in terms of the mechanisms of confession and the government of the lives of the population as a whole. He argues that it is leading to look for a chief decision maker determines the rationality of power. There is no totalizing rationality of power which presides over the whole disposition of sexuality. He also maintains that there is no discourse of power on one side and a discourse counter to it on the other side. In other words, discourses are tactical elements in power relations; hence, there is no dominant discourse on sex on the one hand, and a dominated discourse on the other hand:

> Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. [...] discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power but also a hindrance, a point of resistance and a starting point.
point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.  

Feminism versus Foucault

Most feminists are neither content with Foucault's response nor with the way he develops the concept of power. They have been convinced that patriarchy — as a totalizing male power and discourse — has manipulated and controlled female sexuality and female identity throughout history. In the same vein, we have seen how for psychoanalytically inspired feminism, female sexuality is repressed by the Symbolic law in which woman is considered as a devalued 'other'. Hence, in developing its emancipatory strategies, it could not avoid outlining the strict distinctions in terms of oedipal/pre-oedipal, female imaginary/male symbolic, the semiotic/ the symbolic. In Irigaray, phallocentrism is responsible for considering woman as the 'other' and conceiving man as the 'master' signifier of the symbolic order. And in the final analysis, true female subjectivity is buried in the thick soil of patriarchy, and struggle would have to excavate authentic female subjectivity from the satanic soil of male dominance. In Cixous, women in all cultures are subordinate to the general hierarchies, general structures which regard women as passive, and femininity is associated with powerlessness. The history of phallocentrism is responsible for the fact that 'women' have been forced to 'inhabit the place of silence'. And finally in Kristeva, it is maternity and poetry that could help to lift the burden and socio-symbolic contract from women's shoulder. By reviving the repressed imagination women should liberate themselves from the chains of the symbolic. In other words, there is something
given', 'innate' and natural about female sexuality which needs to be discovered and liberated through the feminist emancipatory process.

It is also discussed that the oppression of women is legitimized on the basis of biological differences between male and female bodies as the female body is considered inferior to the male body, leading to a series of mechanisms of female subordination and male dominance. Accordingly, some feminists believe that Foucault does not pay enough attention to the gendered nature of disciplinary techniques vis-à-vis the female body. They argue that Foucault is indifferent to sexual difference and his theory refers to a desexualized subject, and hence, he is accused of 'gender blindness'. Sandra Lee Bartky, for example, contends that Foucault is "blind to those disciplines that produce a modality of embodiment that is peculiarly feminine. To overlook the forms of subjection that engender the feminine body is to perpetuate the silence and the powerlessness of those upon whom these disciplines have been imposed".58

Foucault repeatedly argues that he never denies the repressive mechanisms which could lead to domination or silence. But he points out that in the case of asymmetrical relations of power which may be imposed on women, the possibility of resistance is not dismissed:

In a great many cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom. To take what is undoubtedly a very simplified example, one cannot say that it was only men who wielded power in the conventional material structure of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; women had quite a few options: they could deceive their husbands, pilfer money from them, refuse them sex. Yet they were still in a state of domination insofar as these options were ultimately only stratagems that never succeeded in reversing the situation. In such cases of domination, be they economic, social, institutional, or sexual, the problem is knowing where resistance will develop.59
Hence, he thought that it would be very simplistic and reductionist if we considered repression as the only point of departure for analyzing power. In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault has explained how through the different practices of power relations, unrepressed sexuality is possible. He attacked a particular theory of sexuality in terms of the repressive hypothesis, namely a deterministic theory of power which bears on sexuality only in the forms of prohibition, censorship or domination. Moreover any theory based on gender domination or "class domination generates the idea of liberty"$^{60}$ which corresponds to the theory of liberating the essence or origin. On this base, Foucault problematizes the natural status of sexuality and hence, maps the construction of sex and sexuality through different dispositions of power. Accordingly his theory of the body and sexuality is radically anti-essentialist. To him, power and sexuality are not distinct; rather sexuality is a result of the productive 'bio-power'. He disrupts the binary distinction between the 'natural' and 'cultural' that is inscribed in the sex and gender distinction. He insists that it is impossible to see the materiality of the body outside of its cultural signification. Foucault challenges, in this way, the sexual liberation which tries to liberate the innate sex from the repression of culture and civilization. Revisiting sexuality in the light of promotion and not repression, he posits a different tool-box to analyze power as positive and technical. So by emphasizing the need to investigating these positive mechanisms, he conceives the 'repressive hypothesis' as inadequate and reductionist.

Moreover, could political thinkers like Foucault who, by organizing GIP (the information group for prisons) worked on the real problems of prisoners, problematized the penal system and struggled to make prisoners themselves speak, be blind to repressive mechanisms? How could he be indifferent and blind to women's problems, when he participated in GIS (information group
concerning health) which works in favor of the legalization of abortion initiated by the women's liberation movement?\textsuperscript{61}

Then, we need to repeat that Foucault does not dismiss repression altogether, but he insists that it is not an adequate tool to analyze power and to launch struggle. In the same vein, he argues that the women's liberation movement should not lay claim to the specificity of their sexuality, seek to liberate it and invoke to the rights pertaining to it. They have to get rid of certain stereotypes of femininity which have been used in the lesbian movement, the strategy from the past: "This strategy has been based on their oppression. But now, may be, these tools, these weapons are obsolete".\textsuperscript{62} Not denying the importance of gender relations, Foucault seeks to problematize the polarized and hierarchical relation between dominated woman and dominating man, an oppressor-victim duality in which multiple subjectivities are ignored and become invisible. He maintains that gender or identity are fluid concepts as people occupy certain subject positions and play variable roles in power relations, and in the process construct different relations with oneself and with others. On the same ground, 'subject' is not a substance; rather it is a form. He argues:

It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself. You do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfill your desires in a sexual relationship. Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms of subject, but we are not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case, one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship to oneself.\textsuperscript{63}
Then he attempts to show the diversity of discourses of gender across the social, political and cultural boundaries, and sketches the variety of subjectivities which could be designated by the fluid concept of gender. His understanding of fluidity of gender is too far from Moruzzi's concept of mask in which there is a fixed _zoe_ behind the stable _polis_, there is a permanent mask behind the essence. In Foucault's thought we are confronted with different masks — and no essence — which interact with each other, and through their interaction a new mask is made each time. In other words, no specificity could be revealed at the expense of hiding the other. The political implications of Foucault's philosophy do not lead to a uniform strategy of _wearing a mask_ throughout history and for all struggles. Hence, being a gay, for example, in some site could be viewed as a superior or even a revolutionary identity, and in another could be considered as 'abnormal'. A gay person would reveal his identity in order to gain some benefit in certain power relations, and would hide his identity in order to avoid being hurt in another. One could be a victim in one site and an oppressor in another. There is no minoritarian gender in all discourses which is repressed permanently. In this sense power and resistance, are immanently interrelated: a subject could act through the net of power, and at the same time could reflect on it and resist it. In other words, power and self could reciprocally act on each other and could be changed over the course of life. Accordingly, Foucault says:

But it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power. In defining the effects of power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power, one identifies power with a law that says no [...]. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as
a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression.  

But for most feminists, patriarchy still continues to be a universal and systematic state of male dominance; namely, it is still the readily available tool for feminist theory, and the short hand descriptive model which analyses power in terms of a juridico-discursive conception. Hence, they still lay claim to the feminine identity, to the specificity of their sexuality and to the rights pertaining to it. More importantly, other analytical tools which do not investigate power in terms of repression are conceived by them as a disruptive approach which 'perpetuates the silence', undermines feminist action and makes their struggle fragile and vulnerable. On the other hand, by considering power as a negative conception of the juridico-discursive model which says 'no', feminist thinkers reduce resistance and struggle to a one-dimensional strategy of saying 'no' to the so called totalizing male power, the reductive approach to the resistance which, to Foucault, is "the minimum form of resistance". By the same token, Marxist feminism by viewing dieting, cosmetic surgery and other modes of beautification in the light of an overarching male ideology, consumer culture or the "anorexic paradigm", fails to see the possibilities of individual techniques of self-stylisation, self-expression, self inventions. Hence, Susan Bordo as a theorist of the anorexic paradigm argues:

Consumer culture continually excites and encourages us to "let go", indulge in our desires [...]. But at the same time, burgeoning industries centered on diet, exercise, and body enhancement glamorize self discipline and code fat as symbol of laziness and lack of will power.
On this basis, quite astonishingly Bordo deduces that if a girl transforms her body into a 'tiny' body, she acts according to the rules and demands of the consumer culture, and hence it would be disappointing. But if she transforms it to the manly and broad-shouldered style, she deserves to be appreciated:

I'm grateful that there's a whole new generation of female athletes to provide inspiration and support for girls like Cassie. That our icons and no longer just tiny gymnasts, but powerful soccer, softball, and tennis players, broad-shouldered track stars. 67

But as a Marxist feminist, she should not forget that consumer culture or culture industry in order to satisfy capitalist greed and in order to fulfil the various demands of the consumer market produce tiny bodies as well as broad-shouldered ones! Besides, what is the universal measurement to determine which one is 'truer' than other? Hence, by dictating the conventional ways of struggle and denying the innovate ways of resistance and the possibility of women's empowerment in the complex relations of power, feminists overlook the relation of self with self in Foucault's concept of 'aesthetics of life', and finally neglect of the necessity of individual choice and the possibility of local, regional and discontinuous struggles apart from any universal program or long-term strategy. By considering history as a black and white clash between master-slave, man-woman, evil-angel and hence conceiving man as their potential chief enemy, the feminist thinkers would lose the possibility of viewing man as a possible friend. By unearthing the 'true' feminine identity and determining what we should do on the ground of what we essentially are, they prevent women from exploring the unexplored roads of becomings. By reducing politics to a certain definition of playing a
role in 'public', they prevent women adventuring in the very intimate aspects of their lives. In this sense, happiness and freedom are reduced to deterministic definitions which are formulated and prescribed by the intellectual. The implications of such prescribed emancipation lead back to the mother of feminism, Simone de Beauvoir. She believes that if a 'housekeeper' feels happier than a 'working woman', that is not enough. To be happy, to de Beauvoir, needs to be evaluated in terms of certain definition of liberation, and the fortunes of individuals should be defined 'not in terms of happiness, but in terms of liberty'.68 Accordingly, by offering a long-term strategy, a universal remedy, in the form of a feminist program, the feminists fail to recognize the fluid tactics of struggle in the fluid nature of power relations. Viewing woman as eternally dominated and regarding any other analysis as taboo, feminism treats 'woman' as the way Israel treats 'Auschwitz'. No one denies repression or massacre; but treating it as the only starting point of analysis and the core of politics leads to the creation of a new Absolute, a new repression and a new massacre.

On the other hand, if patriarchy is always with us, if it could not be overthrown throughout history, if we all are locked in the victim-oppression relations of power, if the balance of power has never been disrupted and if male-dominance is omnipotent, what is the place and role of resistance in relations of power? Moreover, how could the general descriptor of male-dominance respond to the situations of those men who resist the obligatory codes of society and distance themselves from the dominant positions, and the situation of those women who actively embrace the obligatory codes? And can feminism really create a counter-discourse and constructing a new subject by resorting to the grand narratives of 'law', 'ideological apparatus', 'culture industry', 'patriarchy' or 'anorexic paradigm' in which subjects are completely
manipulated by or integrated into the system? Or would it simply reinforce the existing order by re-creating the same subject and the same law?

Then, instead of asking who 'has power/who does not have it', feminism needs to respond to the following questions:

How do some women or some subjects in certain relations of power cooperate with the power apparatus while some resist it? How did it happen, for example that a Pakistani mother-in-law with the help of her daughter poured acid on the face of her daughter-in-law? How women in some situations are more active than men in exercising violence? And finally why does feminism still insist, 'with so much passion', that women are repressed?

I think feminism should answer the questions for once by going beyond the conventional answers and repeated justifications that some women are awake and some are not awake, some are alienated and some are not, or probably some is gender in itself and some is gender for itself. Perhaps they may deal with the questions, for example, in terms of individual ethics; or even individual interests in different relations of power, as Deleuze argues: "how is it that people whose interests are not being served can strictly support the existing power structure by demanding a piece of the action?". Feminism should also think of other practical and real answers in the endemic situations of their lives, otherwise they may "betray a number of operations that deserve to be severely denounced".

Here, we are compelled to ask the alternative Foucaultian question: How is it that feminism has conceived power in such a restricted, such a poor and such a negative way? Why does it always conceive power as law and as prohibition, why this privileging?

In pursuing the question we may reply that feminism like psychoanalysis or ethnology has the 'habit' of thinking only in terms of the juridico-discursive model of power. We may also say that by considering one and only one enemy
in the realm of power, feminism could map its strategy of struggling a much more simplified manner than conceiving it through the mobile nature of power relations in which friend may change to enemy and enemy may turn to friend. In other words, outlining a long-term program is easier than evaluating day-to-day tactics according to the changing and local nature of struggles. In a pessimistic vein, we may even say that by projecting the Absolute through a black and white struggle, feminism could be acting in a self-serving way. Definitely, the range of possible answers would not be restricted to these ones. And one may further problematize and re-problematize the questions and answers. But one thing is certain:

"Isn't this difficulty of finding adequate forms of struggle a result of the fact that we continue to ignore the problem of power?" 72

Notes

4. Ibid., p. 160.
10. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.27.
12. Ibid., p. 155.
13. Ibid., p. 154.
15. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
16. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was an English jurist, philosopher and social reformer. He is also well-known for the idea of Panapticon.
18. Ibid., 156.
20. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 337.
27. Ibid., p. 95.
31. Ibid., p. 95.
32. G. Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 89.
33. G. Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 71.
35. Ibid.
36. G. Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 130.
37. Ibid., p. 101.
41. Ibid., pp. 299-300.
43. Ibid., p. 282.
44. Ibid., pp. 283-284.
46. Ibid., p. 133.
47. M. Foucault, "So Is It Important to Think?", Power, p.475.
49. Ibid., p. 134.
51. Ibid., p. 114.
52. Ibid., p. 116.
64. M. Foucault, "Truth and Power", Power, p. 120.
66. Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight, p. xxi.
67. Ibid., p. xxviii.
69. Gilles Deleuze, "Intellectual and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze".
70. M. Foucault, "Intellectual and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze".
71. In "Meshes of Power", Foucault says: "how is that our society, western society in general has conceived power in such a restricted, such a poor and such a negative way? Why do we always conceive power as law and prohibition, why this privileging?". (p. 154).
72. M. Foucault, "Intellectual and Power: A and Conversation between Michel Foucault Gilles Deleuze".

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