Diplomacy is a vital element of foreign policy of a State. Diplomacy consists of techniques and procedures for conducting relations among states, it is the normal means of conducting international relations. Diplomacy represents the accumulative political, economic and military pressures upon each side, formalised in the exchange of demands and concessions between negotiators. Diplomacy is not the substance of policy, nor does it represent the process by which governments formulate foreign policy. It is but one of the ways by which policies are being implemented, day-by-day throughout the world.

Diplomacy is an age old technique. In the histories of Ancient Greece, India and China there are references to diplomacy. Though for most part these tended to be episodic, centred upon particular and immediate problems, and did not possess the permanence that characterise modern day diplomacy. The recognisable modern pattern of interstate relationship originated among the Italian City States of the Renaissance period and then was adopted by other European states and later was accepted World Wide.¹

Foreign policy is what you do; diplomacy is how you do it. In one sense, all techniques for the implementation of foreign policy are, or should be, political. Here we can consider diplomacy to be the central political technique because it involves direct, government-to-government interaction. The foreign policy regarding diplomacy is the direct communication between official representatives of two or more governments. It is direct as it acts upon the people in other governments, who would be able to do things we want their state to do.² In this sense, then diplomacy is the central technique in the implementation of the foreign policy, the only truly direct technique.³ That is, not only is it a technique in its own right, but it is an instrument by which the other
techniques may ultimately influence target states.

The central feature of diplomacy is its communication function. The basis of creating permanent diplomatic missions in the fifteenth century was the desire of the kings and princes to have representatives in other courts to carry out continuous and systematic communication with other monarchs. Most of the legal trapping of diplomacy were established in order to maintain and facilitate communications and reduce misunderstandings and distortions in interstate communications. Such rules as those of protocol, diplomatic immunity, and non interference were established to reduce conflict over rank and status among diplomats, to prevent host governments from interfering with the diplomatic representatives of other governments, and to prevent the diplomats from interfering in the domestic policies of the host state. Such legal rules codified diplomatic interaction. 4

There are five substantive functions of diplomacy. These are: conflict management; solving problems facing two or more governments; increasing and facilitating cross cultural communication on a wide range of issues involving the states; negotiating and bargaining of specific issues, treaties, and agreements; and general program management of the foreign policy decisions of one state toward another. Procedurally, these activities result foremost in communicating the views of one's government and in exchanging information. A diplomat must also try to ascertain the intention and policies of the other state as well as bargain and negotiate with it. After such negotiations result in agreements, diplomacy is often required to implement the agreement reached, lengthy and important talks may be required to decide how such agreements should be executed. 5

Another major function of diplomacy is aimed not at the other party but at the third parties, observing the diplomatic activities at hand. In this case diplomacy is used, not to reach an agreement with the other party, but to influence various other parties through propaganda aimed at undermining the position of the opponent, revealing the opponent's bargaining positions and other confidential information, or taking stances calculated to impress, frighten, or reassure third party observers.

In the past the bulk of diplomatic communication, as well as most important talks, took place between regular diplomatic representatives.
of various states. But in the contemporary time nations have tended to skip over the embassy personnel and ambassadors, and conduct more and more of their business through the use of special envoys and the high level officials such as foreign ministers. More frequent summit meeting between chief executive have also occurred. The development of instantaneous telecommunications have enabled governmental leaders and their foreign ministers to communicate directly and often making many of the permanent diplomatic personnel non-relevant.

Though the substance and content of diplomacy has changed over the ages but the essential functions of diplomacy have remained remarkably unchanged, the transmission of information and viewpoints between governments, the representation of policy positions vis-a-vis others, the protection of the interests of one’s nationals and the negotiations of existing differences of interests and policy aims through the process of finding formulae to accommodate those differences.

Diplomacy functions through a labyrinth of foreign offices, embassies, legations, consulates and special missions all over the world. It is commonly bilateral in character but with the rise of international organisations, international conferences and regional arrangements, its multilateral aspects have become increasingly significant. It may embrace a multitude of interests from the simplest matter of detail in the relations between two states to the vital issues of war and peace.

Diplomacy functions through both professional and non-professional diplomats. Non-professional diplomats may be political leader, or lawyer, or scholar, or artist, or sportsperson or civil servants. For a given time there position may involve in the active conduct of international relations, like the case of an official from the finance department, or the agriculture department or in the defence department might find themselves in an active role of a diplomat dealing with the international monetary fund, or the world bank, or negotiating the sale of surplus agricultural produce or the status of armed forces.

In the past centuries diplomacy was the means by which decisions already taken were implemented. In the twentieth century, decision making is a process which is not separable from the feedback about negotiations which are usually taking place simultaneously at very many centers. A decision over the future of Palastine is tied up with negotiations in
a number of capitals, at the United Nations, and with information being received from a number of other capitals where leaders are likely to react. The operative decisions tend to follow and not precede negotiation.

In a communication system the diplomat who understands the responses of foreign government, who can anticipate their responses, who can judge the subjective estimation of just claims, is valuable in supplying the feedback which leads to altered national goals and policies. The diplomat who does not pursue faithfully his instructions, and does not feedback likely responses, or who is not emotionally or intellectually capable of interpreting feedback and changing goals, is likely to bring about a break in communications.

SIGNALING

Another type of international communication is signaling, the transmission of messages and cues, from policymakers of one country to their counterparts in another. In any communication relationship there are at least four parts: the message, the sender, the recipient and the medium. The fact that all parties and policymakers are unique, that they have different objectives, ideologies, histories, orientations, capabilities, governmental systems etc. cannot be overstressed. All the relevant particular factors must be studied and placed in their proper perspective with respect to the question in hand. What does this have to do with signaling? A great deal. It means that regardless of the structure and the content of the communication between the policymakers, there are bound to be differences in perceptions and understanding because of the differences in situations and the characteristics of the particular sender and receiver.

As a rule one classifies an activity as signaling when the importance of the activity lies primarily in the implications of its message and not in the activity per se; it is signaling when the activity is just the vehicle or medium for conveying that which is more important, certain meanings of cues.

Signaling via actions

Many times policymakers signal their counterparts via actions. For example Israeli raids on suspected guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon in mid
November 1974 immediately prior to the appearance of Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat at the United Nations, signaling Israel's determination not to allow it's future to be determined by U.N. resolutions. The manoeuvres of the American Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean at the time of 1970 Jordanian disturbances signified America's unwillingness to allow the situation in Jordan to deteriorate too far.

**Subtle Signaling**

Much of the time however signaling occurs more subtly. If negotiations should be sought in a particular case the diplomatic rank of the negotiator and the location desired may be signals of the importance the parties attach to the talks. In authoritarian political systems physical proximity of the individual to the chief policymaker on formal public occasions often is a reflection of the various individual's relative importance and influence. Unusual spectacular occurrences can be signals too in early 1974 following the U.S. President Nixon's talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Washington and Moscow issued a positively worded communique. A communique following the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister was a highly unusual occurrence and it's issuance, on this instance was a clear indication of the importance both parties attached to maintaining a positive bilateral relationship, of their commitment to detente. 12

Another interesting instance is when following Nixon's visit to China in 1972, the Chinese had expected the U.S. to quickly take concrete steps towards normalising of relations. Among other things, Chinese wanted, America's suspension of relations and abrogation of it's defence treaty with Tiawan, and a total military withdrawal from the island. China felt that little progress had been made in this direction in the succeeding years after Nixon's visit. With Carter Administration Beijing was not sure what to expect. Thus when U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance arrived in China in 1977, the Chinese subtly signaled that they were not pleased with the lack of progress towards normalisation, and they were non committal towards the new administration, and Vance had not yet earned sufficient respect, as Kissenger had done, to be treated with dignity. They did this in a manner of unobtrusive yet unmistakable ways. Mr. Vance was met at the airport by a Chinese official who was not a member of the politburo. Also the evening dinner was held in a room smaller than the one used for Kissenger, there was no orchestra
and the guests at the table were not senior political officials. Finally only a few hours before Vance's arrival the Chinese press agency Xinhua publically restated China's conditions for normalisation. Through the combination of such actions China signaled its attitude very clearly.

Sometimes signals may be unintentional and occasionally the absence of expected activities also communicates. During 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis there was no official statement by the Soviet Government or the C.P.S.U. about the invasion. Also there was a lack of usual signatures of the Soviet leadership - Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny on all official documents in the days immediately following the assault these facts were unintentional but a clear signal that there was confusion and disagreement in the Politburo.

Of course, the absence of expected or usual activities sometimes is carefully planned, a consciously chosen signal from one party to another. Indian Government signaled to U.S. in exactly this manner in early 1977. India had for several years vociferously condemned the existence of American naval base on the island of Diego Garcia and the presence of U.S. nuclear vessels in the Indian Ocean. In January and February a U.S. nuclear task force with the aircraft carrier Enterprise and the guided missile cruisers Long Beach and Truxton were on a routine manoeuvre in the Indian Ocean. The Enterprise could have caused some reaction as it was the part of task force which was ordered in the Bay of Bengal during the liberation of Bangla Desh, as support measure to Pakistan. But instead of condemning the American naval presence the Indian policymakers kept a low profile making as few comments as possible. By refusing to respond in the usual fashion, New Delhi was conveying to the new Carter Administration it's desire to decrease the proportion of conflict in the India-U.S. relations.

**Shrewd Timing**

Many times policymakers seek to add emphasis to their signals by a shrewd use of timing. In other words, not only can what is done be important in signaling, but when it is done. For example, it was no coincidence that the Soviet Union commenced the mid-July 1978 trial of Anatoly Shcharansky for treason and Alexander Ginsberg for subversion just two days before the U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was to begin talks in Geneva with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in SALT II treaty.
The Kremlin choose to act at this particular time, in order to emphasise it's view that what went on inside the Soviet Union was none of America's business; if the United States wanted to make progress on the limiting strategic weapons it would have to stop violations in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R.

The Israelis have often used in their signaling. One of the points of contention between the U.S. and Israel in the 1970s was the legitimacy of Israeli settlements in the occupied territory taken from the Arabs in the 1967 war. The U.S. never agreed with the Israeli practice and considered the settlements as illegal. In late 1978 on the eve of Vance's mission to Israel specifically announced that it felt free to build new settlements in the occupied territory, the announcement was made to put the Americans in their place. Such a statement would have irritated the Americans no matter when it was made, but by choosing to issue it at a time when the talks for the Camp David accord was being carried out, significantly emphasised their determination to independent decisions about settlements on the west bank.

The Meaning of Signal

The meaning of signals is not always as evident as this however, the fact that every act of international behaviour, involves communication in either an implicit or explicit sense does not mean that such communication would be clear and unambiguous. Indeed acts may be interpreted in many different ways and there is no guarantee that the receiver will get the message in precisely the manner and to the extent the sender desires. Here one must deal not only with the structure and contents of communications but also with the elusive quality of intentions. What does the sender of the message really means? When in late 1978 and early 1979 China engaged in a considerable troop build up along it's border with Vietnam it was signalling it's displeasure with the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and it's ties with the Soviet Union, but what could one deduce about a possible invasion? China was more prepared to launch an attack than it had been prior to such activities but whether in fact an invasion would or would not occur was not determined solely on the basis of this signal. If the implication of troops and logistic build up and redeployment were always evident, the Czechs in 1968 and the Israelis in 1973 would have acted far differently than they did.
If the policymaker wishes to have the signals clearly understood, it is essential that pains be taken to prevent the message from being misinterpreted. One needs to empathise with the receiver, visualise the situation in terms of target party's particular characteristics, perceptions, and policies, and as much as possible construct the signal in such a fashion that the target cannot help but interpret it in the desired manner. Sometimes it is necessary for the policymaker to act with this type of care to prevent a third party from interpreting a particular act to be an unfavourable signal when it was not so intended. A good example of such effort occurred at the end of November 1974 when U.S. President Ford went to the Soviet Union for a summit meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev. The conference was held in Vladivostok. The choice of location could have been misinterpreted by the Chinese as signaling an American tilt towards the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute, since that city was a part the territory taken from the Chinese by the Russian Tsar in the mid 1800s. In order to reassure China that the site did not signify a tilt, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger continued on to Beijing after the Vladivostok meeting concluded.

Signaling via Language

The second, and more apparent, means of signaling involves the use of language. Policymakers use language in communicating with their counterparts in a vast variety of ways, ranging from casual conversation to private letters to aide memoires. Three aspects of these communications are specially salient in signaling: the importance of particular words or phrases, the use of code words, and what is not said.¹⁴

Particular Words or Phrases

In diplomatic communication usually great care is taken to choose precisely the right words of phrases. Frequently, laymen fail to understand this, fail to appreciate the fact that policymakers usually labour diligently to select a particular word or phrase that conveys the desired specific meaning. If the layman is really to understand how policymakers usually operate, it is essential that this be recognised. If this does not occur comprehension will be severely hindered. For example, if one skims through the diplomatic communication in a general manner just to get an overall sense of what is being said, it is quite possible that the
person will fail to grasp the real essence of the message.

This kind of problem is reflected in the Middle East crisis, because for several years after the passage of resolution 242 by the U.N. Security Council, various Arab policymakers said they would be willing to make provisions for the security of all "states" in the area. Some people might have assumed that such comments promised security to Israel, though they did not. Many Arab did not consider Israel to be "state". Uptil recently, when Israel talked of negotiating with "states' or "governments" it was excluding the possibility of negotiations with the Palantine Liberation Organisation since the PLO is neither.

Early in 1968 Radio Hanoi broadcast a statement concerning the effect that a complete unconditional bombing halt would have with regards to negotiations. This statement changed only one word from previous formulations but it was a critical change. Whereas previously most Hanoi statements had said that a bombing halt "could" bring negotiations, now it was said it "would" bring negotiations.

Sometimes word or phrases that appear to be totally innocuous have considerable significance. Following the Camp David Peace frameworks in 1978, Egyptian and Israeli negotiators, aided by American mediation, sought to conclude a peace treaty. A major concern of Israeli policymakers was "linkage", the degree of connection between the proposed Israeli Egyptian treaty on one hand, and the autonomy of Gaza strip and West Bank and the subsequent peace treaties with other Arab States, on the other hand. Israel's position was that all agreements should stand on their own and there should be no linkage. During negotiations U.S. offered a draft treaty that included the words "on the basis" in the clause in the preamble. At the first glance it does not seem that these three words could cause problems, but they did. The Israeli cabinet objected to their inclusion on the ground that such a language could be interpreted to mean that subsequent peace treaties would be concluded on the basis of that treaty and since the agreement provided for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, if that were true and such a linkage existed Israel here would be pledging to eventually completely withdraw from all captured lands. Therefore the three words were rejected.

Before terminating this discussion two important interpretive comments
are in order. First although the idea of policymakers carefully choosing and studying particular words and phrases in most instances, it does not always, there are exceptions. To put it bluntly mistakes are made. In 1947 Truman doctrine was proclaimed in sweeping language that United States "to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes ". Such imprecise broad generalisation as "free people", "aggressive movements" and "totalitarian regimes" were susceptible to widely varying interpretations such statements if uncautiously used would lead to almost reflexive involvement in crisis irrespective of situational specifics.

Other problems that occur when imprecise language is used are that the recipient may be misled, misinterpreting the signal or they may be able to turn the language to their own advantage. When the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953 it condemned the blunders of it's predecessors and the failures of containment. Some people in the East European Russian satellites assumed Washington was making more than the verbal declaration and expected some type of concrete assistance in case of rebellion. As many Hungarians found out in 1956: the signal had been misleading. In 1959 after Khrushchev's visit to United States President Eisenhower used the word "abnormal" to describe the allied position in Berlin. This was the same word which was always used by Khrushchev and it did not accurately reflect America's real view. If the situation was abnormal, then presumably it should be made normal. Eisenhower's slip of the tongue strengthened the Soviet's position and made America task in justifying it's presence in Berlin more difficult.

The second interpretive comment in this, while in most instances great care is exercised in choosing the precise words and phrases one wishes to employ, and in most cases those words or phrases are designed to convey particular messages there are occasions when great pains are taken in choosing a particular word or phrase that is not, in itself precise. In other words at certain times and certain circumstances policymakers deliberately choose words or phrases that themselves are vague or ambiguous. There are situations in which one would not want to transmit a clear signal. Indeed when employing the orientation of limited support or cooperation, indirect opposition, or participatory or minimal non alignment, recipient uncertainty can sometimes be an advantage
in such instances ambiguity and a lack of precision might be useful. The key point at this juncture is that there are certain times when policymakers can rationally choose words or phrases that do not clearly signal, that generalities are not always a mistake. Nevertheless, in most situations employing generalities is unproductive, and therefore it is not usually an advisable idea. As a rule, within a message there are a few key words or phrases that have been carefully selected to signal specific meanings, and both sending and receiving functionaries are very well aware of this.

Code Words

Policymakers when signaling sometimes utilize code words, that stand for or suggest something different from, and more than, they would appear to. The numbers of variations of this theme are enormous, but for analytical purposes however, they can usually be divided into two categories namely: words and phrases used by both situational and non situational parties that have come to have a generally accepted but specific meaning, and words and phrases used primarily by situational parties that have a specific operational meaning understandable in, and primarily relevant to, the particular situation.

There are certain words and phrases that occur with some frequency in international politics, words and phrases whose meaning is evident to both the situational and non situational policymakers, but not to the observers. For example, many times following meetings of leaders communiques are issued and policymakers make public statements characterising the talks progress or lack thereof. A word that is sometimes used in this regard "frank", it is said that the parties had "frank" discussions. To the layman it would appear that the talks had been open, that the participants had been candid and honest with each other. While this is correct it does not portray the complete picture, and as such may be said to be partly erroneous. "Frank" in this context does not only mean openness, candour, and honesty, but it also signals a high level of disagreement and conflict.

Another example is a phrase used in arms control agreements. The SALT Agreement, the NPT, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty provide that the compliance with the various provisions of the agreement will be monitored by "national technical means of verification". Although
the uninitiated may not realise what the phrase denotes, the policymakers know that it refers to the employment of intelligence capabilities located outside the monitored state in a means consistent with International Law. More specifically, one is referring to reconnaissance satellites with high resolution photographic capabilities plus a vast array of electronic devices.

There are code words of a second type, words that are not widely employed either in terms of number of parties using them or to the number of situations to which they are pertinent, but words that are nevertheless utilised with frequency by certain parties with respect to particular situations. Here the words or phrases become a kind of shorthand that is intelligible primarily with respect to a particular subject. Prior to the Sino-Soviet dispute becoming public, for example Chinese policymakers condemned "Yugoslav Revisionism" and the Soviet leaders condemned "Albanian Stalinism" and "dogmatism". They were phrases referring to the Russians and Chinese respectively and the situational parties knew it. The Chinese often use the term "Hegemony" in connection with the Soviet Union's influence in Asia.

If a policymaker is not cognizant of the particular meaning of the code words in specific situations, and if the importance of the meaning is underrated, it is possible that he or she will not truly understand the positions of the parties utilising the words and greater degree of enmity will be produced than is necessary. For example, with respect to producing unnecessary enmity, American President Jimmy Carter's misuse of language in early 1977 is a case in point. In early March in a ceremony welcoming the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in Washington, Mr. Carter wholly unexpectedly endorsed Jerusalem's rights to "defensive" borders. The U.N. Resolution 242 had provided for withdrawal from occupied territories and the right to live in peace within secure and recognised borders, and the U.S. Policy had been formulated to achieve these ends, now nowhere had the term defensible border been used. Policymakers in the Arab world knew that "defensible borders" had long been Israel's code words signifying the right to retain some of the occupied territories. Naturally the Israeli Premier was greatly pleased, the Arabs greatly angered by President Carter's language. Needless to say that the parties were shocked, when just two days later Carter said
that his statement did not signify a change in America's position, that
the question of "defensible" as opposed to "secure" borders was just
a matter of "semantics". This angered the Isrealis and created doubt
of the U.S. President's grasp off middle eastern realities, as they well
knew, such differences are much more than a matter of semantics.

What is Not Said
A critical but often underrated task of the policymaker is determining
the significance of what is not said. One must be careful about generali-
sing about the meaning of a particular message and not automatically
infer that certain things were meant even though they were not said.
Sometimes one discovers that what is not said is the most critical message
in the particular communication. For example the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242 provides that Isreal shall withdraw from territories
occupied in the 1967 Arab-Isreali war. It does not provide that Isreal
shall withdraw from all such territories or from the territories.
This omission was deliberate.17

In 1976 in his speech to the 25th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.
General Secretary Brezhnev said that Soviet relations with the socialist
countries would be in the spirit of true equality. If problems arose,
they would be resolved in the spirit of friendship, equality and coopera-
tion. The fraternal socialist states with whom this would be followed
were - Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, North Korea, Cuba,
Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Notice the
omission of China and Albania from this list. This was a clear indica-
tion that relations between Soviet Union and China had in no way improved.

When one is studying a policymaker's communication, then it is not
enough just to carefully examine particular words and phrases used,
and analyse the message in context, and determine the meaning of the
various code words used. It is imperative that one goes further, and
the communication is analysed with respect to what was said and what
omitted and the operational implication of those omissions.

Communication is an important part of the policymaker's arsenal.
Both Propaganda and Signaling are extensively used, and many times with
considerable effectiveness. In our above discussion for the purpose
of analytical clarity a distinction is made between language and action.
Though in the world of International Politics, much of the time such
a distinction is artificial, and even it is not it is not always of
great value. Both as receiver and sender policymakers deal with a com-posite of communication, a composite that contains a mixture of action
and language. Thus for the policymaker and analyst alike usually it
is productive to consider language and action together, as one entire
integrated whole.

PROPAGANDA

Faced with diminishing usefulness of outright physical coercion, and
the increasing influence of a better informed "General Public" in all
states, states have turned to other more refined means of achieving
their goals in international relations. One of these alternatives in-
volve the attempt to influence or persuade general population of other
countries. If successful the leaders of the target state will be hampered
in defining their objectives, to the extent the general public is convin-
ced against such aims. In a wider sense propaganda can be used to convince
one's own populace. Communication targets may either be domestic or
foreign.

Many a government makes use of every kind of communication media
available to it to rally the people of it's country in support of it's
policies. All governments do this to some degree, even dictatorships
and emerging new nations, where the mass media is not very well developed.
Policies will be effective internationally only to the degree that they
are known to have the support of the public at home. Even authoritarian
regimes must be able to demonstrate support from their people in order
to put impressive fronts or facade during crisis with other governments.

When propaganda is directed at foreign public, two types of results
or consequences are sought. In cases where the policies of other govern-
ments oppose the purpose of the state employing propaganda, the technique
or method choosen are designed to create internal opposition and dissession,
thus weakening or fragmenting the domestic support for policies
which might otherwise enjoy support. For example the Pakistani Propaganda
on the issues of Punjab and Kashmir aimed to fragment support along
communal lines. Propaganda can also be used to influence foreign public
of a state friendly to the policymaker targeting the propaganda.19 This
is done to help cement the prestige and reputation of a friendly government. The method, used could be appropriately timed declarations, state visits, the granting of economic aid or any other policy moves known to be popular in the targeted state. Thus we see that the use of psychological methods or the communication approach, can be offensively or defensively used. A state will make use of them not only to create positive support, but also to neutralise negative effects that the use of similar policies by other states might have, in the absence of this effort of counterpropaganda. This in turn brings on further counterpropaganda, and thus a never ending process is initiated which may result in losing sight of the original purpose.

Political communication and systematic use of psychological methods are not entirely new developments in the field of international relations. For example Bismarck made use of it, but after the Second World War we find an extension and refinement of such methods, it has now become highly sophisticated in it's orchestration of techniques which are often both powerful and subtle.

The new and novel developments in the scientific field has vastly improved technological means of communication, permitting far greater scope for application of psychological methods.

But perhaps the most fundamental development lies in the field of politics itself rather than science, in many countries the conduct of foreign relations has become "Democratized", in the sense that the public is involved in it in some way or another. The public at large obviously cannot expect to participate actively in the decision making process which operates at a great speed, expertise and confidentiality, but it certainly became increasingly influential in setting general directions and tolerable limits within which policymakers can conduct the affairs of the state. This therefore propagates the use of direct propaganda techniques for influencing the beliefs and actions of masses, across international borders.

However much advanced methods of communication become, they are by themselves, probably unlikely to replace other methods of projecting policy in the international arena. The political instruments, the use of economic means, and even the employment, actual or potential, of force will always play a significant role. Psychological approaches
can only facilitate or hinder the achievement of results, but they cannot substitute for other ways in which a state attempts to gain its ends. Communication can be thought of as supplementing and facilitating other policy means rather than as a substitute for them. They can very much help attain ends if skilfully combined with the use of other methods of achieving objectives.

**BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS**

Bargaining is another vital instrument of the foreign policy of a state. In seeking to achieve objectives, realise values, or defend interests government must communicate with those whose action or behaviour they wish to deter, alter or reinforce. In the present day world there are many occasions and a variety of ways for communications which may be employed for conveying hope, threat, wishes and bribes to others. At press conferences, political rallies, banquets, government officials make statements directed not just to domestic audiences but to foreign governments as well. Nevertheless, most official attempts to wield influence abroad are carried out through formal diplomatic channels or by direct communications between foreign ministers and heads of state.

The subject of inter-state communications include definition of a state's objectives, rationalisation for them, threats, promises, and holding out possibilities for concluding agreements on contentious issues. The function of the diplomat is not so much to formulate his state's goals as to explain them abroad and attempt to persuade others to adjust their policies to conform to these objectives. A diplomat is partially successful when he can get the host state to see a particular situation as his state sees it. The diplomat would be considered fully successful if he is able to alter and maintain the actions of the host state in a manner favourable to his own state.20

Generally during the process of communication, the policymakers on both sides will reassess the objectives in the light of changing circumstances and the response from the international arena. Such reassessment may be a concession or a redefinition, or a change in emphasis on the various parts. Diplomats then convey the modified objectives to policymakers of the other states, and the whole routine continues until consensus is reached through bargaining, or until it is imposed by force,
or until one state withdraws from its original stand if it meets what it considers to be, too much opposition abroad.

Objectives, and diplomatic bargaining strategies, are thus subject to constant reformulation on the basis of information and assessment of its diplomats abroad, and by various acts and signals states make to each other. If common interests are predominant in case of a particular problem, the policy formulation and implementation on it may take a very small amount of time and effort. On the other hand if opposed interests predominate, the process may involve long periods of time. For example the dispute involving Kashmir between India and Pakistan which is no where near a solution inspite of armed conflicts in 1948,1965 and 1971 and a low intensity conflict since 1988 till date.

Direct negotiations among opponents are as old as conflicts between organised societies. Bilateral discussion between special emissaries or professional diplomats have been the historical rule, but since many conflicts involve more than two parties, multilateral conferences have become more useful and are being used extensively. 21

The essence of the bargaining process involves the establishment of commitments to essential positions, determination of areas where concessions can be made, commissioning of credible threats and promises even if only bluffs, and maintaining patience. 22

Bargaining strategies and tactics are varied and complicated but a few conditions can be postulated that would aid an agreement. These are, the issues or objectives under contention are specific and carefully designed, rather than vague and symbolic ; the parties avoid the use of threat ; that they have some common interests on other issues than the one being bargained ; the issues are defined in such a way that payoffs can be arranged for both sides, or that the rewards for both the parties increase through cooperation.

As each side presents it's conditions and demands, each side must try to figure out how far to push the demands and how far to push the opponent. When to make consensus and when to dig in. A leader's reputation for bluff, standing fast, telling the truth, and honouring commitments all together make a state's bargaining reputation.

For successful conflict resolution, the parties involved must be willing to confront the issues in conflict in a rational atmosphere
of mutual respect and open communication. They must try to identify the issues involved in a realistic manner and not merely to establish favourable conditions for the bargaining process.

If the two parties want to reduce the amount of tensions and mistrust prevailing between them they must use the idea of fragmentation. This simply means that problems should be broken down into smaller parts. Little issues should be kept little, and not linked to larger ones. This raises the probability that some issues will be settled, enabling the parties to see that they can resolve issues peacefully, that can successfully reduce hostility and conflict between them. Once an atmosphere of cooperation, goodwill, and success has been established the tougher problems shall be more likely to be solved. This is the process currently being used by India and China to resolve differences between. The real problem of the border issue has been shelved by mutual consent while smaller issues are being tackled. After the visit of Premier Le Peng sometime back in early 1992, substantial progress seems to have been made.

**Power and Negotiations**

Negotiating can be viewed as a means of resolving disputes managing relations and mutual decisions. Generally the concept of power in negotiations is not given it's rightful place. Negotiation analysis is concerned with explaining outcomes. Explaining outcomes involves searching for causation; and explanation of causation involves the concept of power.

Power should be defined as: power is the way in which Actor A uses it's resources in a process with Actor B so as to bring about changes that cause outcomes preferred by "A" in it's relationship with "B". (Also see page 21 for detailed explanation of the concept of power)

This definition proves particularly useful in analysing power in negotiations for several reasons. First, it describes power as a causitive process. Second, this definition is relational and no concept of power is of any use as far as negotiations are concerned if it does not cover the relational aspect. Negotiations imply a relationship and they also imply reciprocal power.

This definition allows a structural conception of power (resources) and a behavioural concept of power (ability). Neither alone is significant for analysing power in negotiations. Emphasising resources alone does not explain the movement which is the essence of the negotiation process.
Similarly, emphasising actor's skill and ability does not place the negotiation in the context of the overall relationship of the actor, and focuses on isolated moves and tactics without looking at the source of these moves or the underlying the capability to perform certain tactics. To be useful in analysing negotiations, a definition of power must allow for both the structural and behavioural components of power.

The structural component of power describes an actor's resources, potential capabilities and generalised position from which to actualise these capabilities. Structural power allows one to determine the relative positions of the actors.

Aggregate structural power refers to an actor's resources, capabilities and position vis-a-vis the external world as a whole. Aggregate structural power is defined as the actor's total resources and possessions. In case of a state, it means total resources - demographic, economic and military, along with social cohesiveness, the stability of political process decision making, and national spirit.

Aggregate structural power is not only concerned with identifying national resources. It is also concerned with national potential, generalised ability to actualise resources. The actualisation process has two related aspects. One, the conventional inventory of the elements of power and second, the national strategy. National strategy is the art of using power for the attainment of goals in competition.

Whereas, aggregate structural power is concerned with an actor's capabilities and position vis-a-vis the external environment as a whole, issue-specific structural power is concerned with an actor's capabilities and position vis-a-vis another actor in terms of a specific mutual issue. Issue specific structural power, which focuses on power structure of a relationship, is particularly relevant component of power for the analysis of international negotiation, since negotiation presupposes at least two actors and at least one issue.

Another aspect of negotiations is interdependence. Since in negotiations each actor is dependent upon the other to the extent that each can unilaterally withhold agreement, prolong the process or even end it. An interdependent relationship implies that both parties would incur costs if the relationship were broken. But it does not imply that each actor would incur equal costs if the relationship were broken, that is, it
does not imply that each actor is equally dependent upon the other.

According to the interdependence paradigm the balance of power within the issue area will determine the outcome of interaction in that issue area, despite the aggregate balance of power between the actors. Different issue areas often have different political structures that may more or less insulate from the overall distribution of economic and military capabilities.

Negotiation relationship is not static and each actor continually tries to increase its power, or decrease its dependency by a number of means. These are: 1) developing better alternatives to the relationship; 2) reducing the other actor's alternatives; 3) improving its ability to deliver outcomes to the other actor; 4) building up the value of its product, and 5) reducing the opponent's ability to carry out 3 and 4.

Power balance of an issue-specific relationship is determined by three variables: alternatives, commitment and control.

Alternatives denote each actor's ability to gain its preferred outcomes from a relationship other than with the opposing actor. Alternatives also explain why one actor may be able to achieve much of its preferred outcome by not negotiating or by stalling the negotiations.

Commitment refers to the extent and degree to which an actor desires and/or needs its preferred outcome. Commitment is based on the values the parties attach to the various possible outcomes. Commitment, like alternatives, is a two edged sword. On the one hand, greater commitment implies greater dedication to achieving preferred outcome. Behavioural power would be, in this case, all the more directed and tenacious. On the other hand, greater desire or need for a preferred outcome would mean that the source of that outcome would have that much more leverage in the relationship.

Control, is a determinant of the issue power balance, is defined as the degree to which one side can unilaterally achieve its preferred outcome, despite the cost involved in doing so. In the case of negotiation we cannot speak of total unilateral achievement of outcomes because unilaterial achievement is not compatible with the concept of negotiation. But we can speak of one side's ability to gain a greater share of its
preferred outcome than its opponent does.

Behavioural power is concerned with the behaviour of the actors: the process by which they manoeuvre and use their resources, both aggregate and issue specific to achieve preferred outcome. In negotiations, behavioural power is revealed by the actor's tactics, which are the means by which an actor exercises power. The exercise of power entails the conveyance of a message through some kind of signals, often a combination of verbal statements and non verbal acts.

Examples of negotiation tactics are threats, warnings, promises, predictions, rewards and side payments, punishments, concessions, coalition building, stalling and so on. Negotiation tactics are a means of communication. Specifically, they are the means of communicating preference to the other actor. But tactics are not merely used to communicate preference. They are also used to persuade and pressure the other side to fulfil these preferences. Tactics succeed by altering or modifying the issue power balance, that is, by altering each side's respective alternatives, commitments and control within the relationship. Virtually every negotiating tactic can be seen as a means of increasing the actor's alternatives, increasing commitment to the actor's preferred outcome, or increasing the degree to which the actor can unilaterally achieve an outcome.

The tactic of coalition building, for example, may increase alternatives by forming new relationships, increasing commitment, and increase control by combining resources. The tactics of threats may reduce the opponent's commitment and alternatives as well as affirm the degree of control an actor possesses. Promises of reward may reduce both the opponent's commitment to achieving his or her preferred outcome as well as his or her efforts to seek alternatives to the relationship. The tactics of stalling underscores one side's commitment to a preferred outcome and ability to outlast the opponent.

Tactics, thus, operates at the issue specific level. Their objectives is to alter the issue-power balance, since the issue-power balance determines negotiation outcomes. Indeed, the process of negotiating involves moving from one issue-power balance to another issue-power balance by the mutual practice of tactics.
The tactics must also be communicated at the bargaining table through the interaction of the negotiators. The opponent must be persuaded that a particular tactic is credible, that the opponent's perception of the situation needs to change, and that his or her behaviour must be modified accordingly. Thus, the concept of tactics must also encompass the methods of persuasion that negotiators employ to ensure that their chosen tactical policy works.

Persuading one's opponents of tactic's credibility involves convincing him or her that one has the ability and will carry out the threat, pursue alternatives, or build a coalition. Credibility is in part achieved by the existence of structural power resources. But it may also involve persuasive argumentation at the negotiating table or, if this fails, more direct communication, such as walking out of the negotiations or proceeding to carry out the threatened action. An actor may possess the resources to carry out a threat, but unless he or she can also convince the other side the willingness to do so, the threat will lack effect.

Persuasion is also used to change the opponent's perceptions. The opponent must be persuaded to see that the issue-power balance is not what he or she thinks it is. Changing the opponent's perception can be accomplished by argumentation but may also require less ambiguous communication, such as meeting with one's coalition partners or coercively demonstrating the extent of one's control.

The goal of persuasion is to influence the opponent's behaviour: to continue doing what he or she is doing, to stop doing or to start doing something completely different. In any event, the ultimate objective behaviour is to alter issue-power balance in one's favour.

Tactics must be credible, the other side must feel that they are capable of being carried out. One side's tactical offer of a large financial reward or side payments in exchange for certain concessions is credible only if the offering side is perceived capable of outlaying the necessary financial resources. Similarly, a threat to use military forces is credible only if these forces exist and are deployed so as to appear threatening.

The interrelations of the components of power does not stop here. Aggregate power can partially determine the issue-power balance of a relationship. Alternatives may be more readily available to an actor that enjoys great aggregate resources. Greater control may be available
to the actor with the aggregate resources sufficient to maintain or achieve control. But aggregate structural power must not be seen as an absolute determinant of issue-power. Aggregate resources alone do not determine alternatives, commitments, and control in any specific relationship.

The negotiation process

The negotiation process can be defined as a series of offers, demands and concessions, in which two sides inch towards an agreement. This conception of negotiation process has an intuitive appeal, since it reflects an average person's perception of what happens in negotiation. Each side makes offers, gauges the other side's reactions to these offers, and then makes concessions till an agreement is reached. The negotiation process thus consists of each side assessing, and revising if necessary, it's expectation about what the ultimate agreement will be, based on concession behaviour of the opponent.

According to Zartman and Berman negotiation is a three stage processes: the diagnostic phase, the formula phase and the detail phase.

The diagnostic phase

At some point each side recognises that a negotiated solution to their conflict is possible. The pre-negotiation activity leading to this realisation is termed as the diagnostic phase. It is the phase in which each side explores the costs and benefits of a negotiated settlement.

The actors may also recognise that changes have occurred in the nature of their relationship. The actors may perceive that relative power positions have changed.

In general, two characteristics must be present for the diagnostic phase to end with a decision to begin negotiations. The parties agree that they need a solution and that their decision on a solution must be unanimous. This decision is reached before formal interaction between actors; negotiations as such, has begun. Rather in the diagnostic phase each actor is assessing the possibility that negotiation is in order. Though this assessment may be strongly affected by the course of events, it is essentially an internal decision making process.

At some point during the diagnostic phase, a turning point of seriousness will be reached, when each side perceives that the other is serious about finding a negotiated solution, that the other is willing to "lose"
a little to "win" a little, rather than to win or lose all in a non-negotiated approach. This turning is not necessarily perceived by both sides at the same time, nor it need be formally communicated. Moreover, the turning point of seriousness may need to be renewed several times throughout the negotiations.

The Search for Formula

After the parties have jointly determined that negotiation is both possible and desirable, they enter the formal phase of negotiation. This phase is characterised by a search for general principles or formula. A shared perception of the problem is probably the single most important element of the formula, for without it the two sides would remain hopelessly stalemated.

Another characteristic of the formula is the establishment of a criteria of justice, which often the key element in tying the formula together. In the formula phase, the parties generally are in direct contact with each other: actual negotiations have begun. But this phase is not characterised by the horse trading associated with offer-counteroffer concept of negotiations. Instead of demanding and conceding points the parties are attempting to define points. What exactly is to be negotiated? What are the boundaries of a fair and just solution? What are the underlying principles and shared values that will guide each side's demands and concessions?

The outcome of this phase is the acceptance by both parties to a mutually agreeable formula. Often the formula can only be detected in hindsight, and the parties themselves may not even realise that they have found one.

The Detail Phase

The detail phase consists of a long, tense search for agreements on details to implement the general framework set out in the previous formula phase. It is the phase that most resembles the offer-counteroffer conception of the negotiation process. In the detail phase, the parties send signals (offers and demands), make concessions, exchange points (converge), arrange details, and finally bring the negotiation to an end.

The diagnostic phase, for example may go on throughout the entire course of the negotiations, as contextual events change, the parties may have to renew continually their commitment to negotiations. The
parties may also begin negotiating details before or simultaneously with, arriving at a clearly defined formula. Moreover, the formula itself may be subject to refinement throughout the negotiation process. Even the diagnostic phase is subject to some flexibility. The parties may begin creating a formula before reaching a firm conclusion that negotiation is really possible.

But formula detail is meant merely as a framework for better understanding what is in reality a complex and fluid process. And for this purpose, it is considerably more useful than the offer counteroffer theories. It provides a guide to what happens from the very beginning of the process to it's end.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

International Cultural Relations is a neglected and underrated concept of International Relations. If a long term view of International Relations is taken we find that cultural changes are the most pervasive and irreversible element in human history. For example of Latin and Roman ideas of law, governance, civic and architectural design, military strategy and organisation, agriculture and trade was crucial in moulding the history of Europe from Byzantium in the East to Britain in the west. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of the tenacity of cultural imprints on history is the way in which the cultures of small, politically and militarily powerless societies can survive for centuries, even under conditions of rapacious colonial domination and subjection by a more powerful civilisation.

Cultural Relations are of great importance today. It is generally accepted that the essential third dimension in relations between states after politics and trade are cultural relations.

Cultural Relations and Cultural Diplomacy

These two terms are often used as though they are synonymous. Both apply to the practice followed by states of interrelating through their culture. Both have acquired greater currency with the recognition that culture is the expression of national identity and therefore a factor in international affairs. Culture lends impetus to the quest for convergence between conflicting national interests, it has a particular part in
conventional barriers that separate people, by promoting understanding between them. Culture represents a dimension in international attitudes where alienation between nations yields to familiarity and a feeling of common humanity.

Cultural Relations have a wide reference going beyond the actions of governments and their agencies. Cultural Relations can be conducted on the initiative of private as well as public institutions. Cultural Diplomacy is a narrower concept, it is essentially the business of the government. Cultural Diplomacy as an aspect of diplomacy is normally carried out abroad by the diplomatic staff. It is closely aligned to the official policy and national interests. Its ulterior purpose can also be political or economic. This however, may or may not be perceptible to the target state, depending on the tact and restraint with which it is executed. Cultural Diplomacy seeks to impress, to present a favourable image, so that diplomatic operations as a whole are facilitated. Typically, it would be cultural diplomacy for a state to dispatch it's national opera company, with a galaxy of international stars, to perform at a prestigious foreign festival, or to mount a series of image building lectures in a foreign capital, followed by lavish diplomatic receptions, for an invited audience. Both activities would be designed to rebound to the credit of the sending nation, they might even be timed to further some particular diplomatic end.

The purpose of Cultural Relations is not necessarily, to seek one sided advantage. At their most effective, their purpose is to achieve understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit.

Some governments look for return on the investment of funds in Cultural Relations in terms of immediate national advantage, whereas the real return is in a long term relationship, which produce and propagate understanding and encourage cooperation. It is because these relationships can flourish only if they are not subject to politics - that cultural relations work best when conducted by organisations that enjoy an appropriate degree of independence from the state machinery.

The component parts of cultural relations comprise the arts, libraries and information services, language teaching, science and technology, social structure, exchange of students and professors, links between
communities and institutions, and educational aid and training in the developing world.

The meaning of culture in its narrower sense embraces all that which is concerned with the intellect and the arts, and in a broader sense that which extends to a way of life and the values that it manifests. The purpose should be not only to present learned and artistic accomplishment but to represent the vital substance of a nation. Past glories are a powerful ingredient, but over concentration on them would lead to a heritage obsession. The living element would be missing.

The motive force behind international cultural relation works, whether of a responsible ministry or of a non governmental agency, is expressed in the external cultural policy. Clearly external cultural policy cannot be practised in abstraction, it's validity will depend on the vitality of the domestic scene, of internal cultural policy. The two should ideally interlock.

Cultural Relation work is a long term process. Culture is not a quick wonder cure for trouble spots. But as part of the pattern of relationship between states cultural relations create an atmosphere that is favourable to peace. This it does by the transfer of valuable skills and experience, by the reduction of negative images, by revealing people to one another as they are rather than as stereotypes. The work of cultural relations is, of course much more directed at particular groups, at target appropriate to the activity - at elites. Its bearing on the promotion of peace is through them and through the multiplication which they provide in their capacity as intellectuals, writers, artists and people of influence in their social milieu.

Cultural relations also constitute an alternative channel of information and expressions and relieve mass insecurities by symbols of hope and understanding. In this sense, cultural relations act as a mechanism of social adjustment which is necessary for social elite dominance. The contribution that cultural relations makes to peace is a cumulative one and is achieved through promoting.

Cultural representatives abroad operate their programs that further positive understanding in accordance with the subjective requirements of the host country. This will best be accomplished in partnership with local institutions.
The exchange of persons is probably the most enduring means of increasing understanding; that is the reason why it rightly takes up a large part of the resources of cultural agencies. Mostly, it is directed at key persons in priority areas. The careful identification of target groups is essential; so is tact and restraints. International "goodwill" and "understanding" appear to have the same relationship to human effort that happiness does. They are rarely achieved by direct assault. They are more usually bye-product of activities in which people work together for other reasons, that seem to them good and sufficient in themselves. It is by doing things together - by cooperation - that understanding is one, whether between compatriots or people of different states, rather than by protestation.30

As a Support for Coventional Diplomacy

Activities arranged by cultural agencies create a favourable impression on foreigners in leading positions, either directly as with high culture, or indirectly through the reputation built up by more routine operations in their countries such as language classes, libraries etc.31

Although cultural relations are a minor form of diplomacy, at the same time the entire foreign policy process is itself subordinate to larger cultural dynamics. Sometimes cultural relations achieve a topical, dramatic effect in breaking down barrier between countries. For example the case of Ping Pong diplomacy of 1971, which was used as a diplomatic instrument by China.

Cultural programs can create a more favourable and constructive basis for political and economic relations. It has been found that political independence is somewhat rapidly accomplished, economic independence takes longer but given reasonable conditions also follows, what takes longest of all is cultural independence - the assertion of cultural identity. National identity is reinforced by cultural identity.

The ideology that trade benefits flow from cultural relations was most strongly held in Britain then elsewhere, it was the prime reason for the creation of British Council in 1934. Sir Anthony Parson said in fiftieth anniversary lecture that "If you are thoroughly familiar with someone else's language and literature, if you know and like his country, its cities, its arts, its people, you will be instinctively disposed, all other things being equal or nearly equal, to buy goods
from him rather than from a less well known and well liked source, to support him actively when you consider him to be right and avoid punishing him too fiercely, when you regard him as being in the wrong."

There are direct cultural exports, such as books, the arts, and movies. Tourism is a burgeoning industry which several countries deliberately further by their cultural representatives. Knowledge of a country's cultural attractions is a prime incentive for tourists. Culture serves as an invisible export. It is through constant interaction, positive or negative with other people and nations that social and cultural development is able to take place. Every culture needs constant challenges in order to avoid fossilization and decadence.

**Aims, Analysis and Evaluation**

A state's external cultural policy has as its aim the support and enrichment of its foreign policy. In supporting cultural exchange, the ultimate objectives are to contribute to the advancement of world culture and human welfare, to deepen understanding of the country abroad and promote mutual understanding among states, and to encourage friendship and goodwill between the peoples of the world.

In operating abroad, it is one of the most important duties of cultural representatives to mediate between their own culture and that of the host country. They are called upon to supply a variety of information and advice, which facilitates access to their country's institutions. The quality of their response will depend on their understanding of the local sense as well as their familiarity with the facilities at home.

It is a besetting problem that cultural relations work does not lend itself to evaluation. Evaluation is practicable within limits, the effects on mind, sensibilities and attitudes will be perceptable (although unlikely to be fully perceived) in years to come rather than immediately. The justification of investment in Cultural Activity must therefore include an element of faith. That faith is more likely to be forthcoming in societies where there is a traditional belief in the importance of culture and of devoting public resources to it; elsewhere it has to be cultivated and propagated by people of conviction.

It is prudent for cultural agencies to foster public support of their work. Their prime target for persuasion therefore, outside government
and opinion moulder will be those elites that are both the immediate beneficiaries and the predestined carriers. The proximate target will be public opinion at large. Publicity has it's own place in cultural work, both at home and abroad. It's techniques are instructive for a way a country should present it's image to others, and for those concerned with the profile. No modern can state can afford to pursue a foreign policy without a goodly measure of public relation work. Artists and Scientists in their way are indispensable ambassadors of the spiritual substance of our nation and our political order.

Cultural work bears fruit only in the medium and long term, very rarely in the short term, and it operates essentially by people and through people, with all the fortitudes and imponderables that it brings with it.

ALLIANCES AND PACTS

The underlying rationale of alliance formation is that the policymakers feel that the objectives of his state cannot be achieved, or achieved as efficiently without outside help. Therefore an attempt is made to add the capabilities of one or more other parties in pursuit of the said objectives. The assumption is that collective and cooperative behaviour backed by increased strength will maximise the attainment of specific goals at the minimum possible costs.34

Sometimes it is simply not possible to achieve one's goals without outside help. For example there was no way that Britain could have been victorious in the Second World War without the help of the Soviet Union and the United States. For years the major oil producing states could not, individually break the grip of multinational corporations that controlled the global oil market, it's price and production level. To remedy their problems in 1960 they formed the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries - OPEC - with very satisfying results.35

There may be a situation in which one believes that an objective may be obtainable but the cost of unilateral activity would be too high. The United States could have taken on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, specially in the backdrop of the collapse of the power of the other superpower the Soviet Union, on a unilateral basis. However by going to tackle through an alliance the United States reduced it's cost both economically
as well as politically:

Whether a policymaker decides that an alliance should be formed or not is a decision of policy, not of principles. As such various different types of alliances could be fabricated—different types for different purposes—relative loose diplomatic coalitions, economic trading blocs, bilateral and multilateral military arrangement. Alliances differ in terms of subject matter, parties, geographical scope, and the nature of commitments undertaken, duration, degree of integration and commonality of interests.

Military Alliances are formed due to a perception of threat. It is clear for example that one of the factors leading to the formation of NATO was the perception of a threat from the Soviet Military might to Western Europe. Although it is sometimes assumed that military alliances are always defensive and deterrent in nature, this is not necessarily so. The Tripartite Pact concluded between Italy, Japan and Germany in September 1940, prepared the way for war with the United States. Obviously joint planning and execution is advantageous for offensive as well as defensive actions.36

There are times when alliances are concluded for less obvious reasons. Perhaps a particular regime decides that greater domestic support is needed for certain programs. The spectre of invasion is now needed in order to rally the people behind the government; concluding an alliance could be the consumation of this illusion. Whenever Pakistani government feels that it lacks the support of its masses the spectre of a hostile India is always used to aid the politicians to achieve control over the masses again. The Pakistani politicians decided to enter into an alliance with the U.S. called CENTO partly because of this reason, and partly for economic advantages it expected to come its way by signing that pact. American weapons flowing into Pakistan as a result of the pact were given by the U.S. to contain the might of the Soviets and Communist China, but were always used by Pakistan against India.

Finally a policymaker may seek an alliance for non alliance effects. Perhaps the situation is such that more important objectives may be sought in the future, and it is expected that an alliance will create a benificial relationship and that will be helpful in their achievement. Or it may be that not only more important objectives are sought but
but also a wider range of cooperative action, and this is aimed to be just the start. Or lastly perhaps, an alliance may be concluded for the anticipated impact on third parties.

It is generally assumed that alliances make new commitments and add emphasis on existing ones. Another presumed effect of alliances is to add precision or clarity in a situation.

When calculating whether to seek an alliance or not one must also recognise the possible disadvantages that might accrue. It must be remembered that states have a wide range of objectives only some of which are common. Others may be complementary, some are divergent and some hostile. When joining an alliance either common or complementary objectives are sought and the alliance is presumed to help in their achievement. Non common objectives may be temporarily submerged or placed under low priority, but they may reassert themselves as conditions change. It is possible that a fall out among allies, as non common objectives come to a fore, may be more serious than if the alliance never existed.

Another problem is that alliances sometimes foster unrealistic hopes of the degree of cooperation that will ensue. U.S.A. was chagrined at the attitudes of the NATO allies on the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, but as every party views the situations in its own way this was bound to happen. Because of differences in perceptions states contribute different amounts to an alliance based on their assessment of it's worth and willingness of others to contribute, and this too can fuel differences among friends.

Another potential disadvantage is the lessening autonomy that automatically ensues, following alliance formation. The policymaker must remember that once a party joins an alliance it's options are more limited, new obligations have been undertaken, resources expended, prestige involved etc. Even in non obligatory situations there may be pressures from alliance members to act in certain ways in interest of alliance solidarity, nevertheless though sometimes difficult, usually these problems can be handled without producing major negative consequences. But there are other contingencies in which a state's alliance obligations may constrain choice severely, possibly even drawing one into an unwanted conflict.

Finally alliances targeted on specific states quite naturally worsen
relations with those states, and the net impact of this worsening may be more negative than positive. The tension level between the states will certainly be raised, and the possibility of hostility may increase. Because one is trying to increase relative capability, although the actions do not inevitably produce counter-actions they certainly provide incentive for the target to attempt the accomplishment of the same thing, whether internally or via formation of a counter alliance.