CHAPTER III

FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND NATIONAL INTEREST

NATIONAL INTEREST

Despite its ambiguity, the concept of national interest remains of central importance in any attempt to describe, explain, predict or prescribe international behaviour. Practishners of international relations agree almost unanimously, that the primary justification of state action is national interest. The disagreement begins when one asks conceptual and substantive questions about national interest. How do we arrive at a generally accepted or standardised definition of national interest? What is specifically in the national interest of a given nation, and its people, at a given time, regarding a given issue? Who decides what the priorities of the state action are going to be, and when and how are they to be implemented? How and by whom are enemies defined? How and by whom are friends designated? What is the role of government when faced with serious internal disagreements regarding national goals and values?

For each of these questions there are responses from both proponents and opponents, seeking to justify their views in the name of national interest. Napoleon said he was acting in France's interest, when he initiated the Russian campaign and later when he mounted the last desperate offensive in the form of Battle of Waterloo. American President Lincoln argued that civil war would be less painful to the nation, then a breakup of the union. Hitler justified his expansionist policies in the name of Germany's national interest. In each of these instances, and in many others, leaders worldwide have always justified their policies in the name of national interest. But how can we evaluate the wisdom of these policies, prior to the test of time? And how is the national interest derived?
Generally, there are two schools of thoughts in the field of international relations, between those who feel that national interest can be arrived at objectively and rationally, and those who view national interest as a struggle between various subjective views and preferences, a struggle in which the national interest is the political outcome.

The father of the first school of thought is Plato, according to him the good of the polis (public good) could be best achieved by the philosopher king, aided by a few highly learned, detached and fair minded advisors. These individuals could make decisions about public good, without getting influenced by selfish pressures.

The father of second school of thought is Aristotle, who believed that public good could be arrived by a process which involves open and continual debate and the expression of various perceptions regarding the collective interest. Decisions which are usually a synthesis of conflicting interests, are shaped by a majority of people keeping in mind the rights and interests of the minority.

Historically, the Aristotlian democratic approach has fared better than the Platonic one, for it has been difficult to find decisions that have been made with scientific precision and rationality. Because hard to gauge decisions have had to be made throughout history, national leaders have come to believe that they must carry out policies, that they think are in the best interests of their country, while letting chance and history be ultimate judges. American President Lincoln said, "I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference."

In reality, national interest might best be seen as a synthesis of the objective and subjective approaches. We find that in nations, regardless of their type of polity, government decisions are made only by a few men and women. These decisions are usually designed to promote the national interest, as is perceived and defined by the decision makers.

In order to intelligently and realistically determine how national interest are pursued by given polities, and which interests are being pursued, we must relate the formulation of interests to several variables, such as qualities, personality, the ideals of decision makers; the types
of philosophies of governmental structures and processes; the customs and cultural styles of different societies; the geopolitical location and the capabilities of the various states; and finally, the types of challenges and pressures that each state faces from neighbouring states, great powers and international organisations.

National interest may be defined as those things that states seek to protect or to achieve vis-a-vis other states. The name refers not to inevitable parts of nation's foreign policy, once they are identified, but rather to all of the practicable items available for inclusion.

National interests can be further subdivided for conceptualisation, into two distinct parts. Namely vital interests and secondary interests. Any nation's initial inventory of possible interests is very broad, and substantial disagreements may exist about which item to be included in the list. Cutting the list of national interests down, to the power and resources thought available to achieve them, is the next crucial step. Like a family all national budget, certain items cannot well be cut, they represent fixed obligations. These have first priority because they are as vital to the nation as food and shelter is to the individual. They represent interests a nation is normally prepared to fight to preserve. Vital interests are in the first instance, predominantly and essentially conservative, that is they always include things that the state already has.

The residue of interests beyond the vital interests are termed secondary interests. Secondary interests are the stuff of diplomatic compromise. One interest can be obtained by giving up another in negotiations.

Vital Interests

Vital interests are defined as those for which a state is normally willing to fight immediately or ultimately. It is characteristic of vital interest that, states do not usually give its alternative serious thought but reject it out of hand. Such vital national interests include for all states, survival, independence, territorial integrity, and the preservation of their prestige. A nation may not be prepared to sacrifice on certain secondary interests for various reasons, and temporarily they may acquire the trappings of vital interest. A state can decide to pursue an extravagant list of vital interests whose achievement is only possible at some
other state's expense, which might lead to violence and war, if they are incompatible with the vital interests of other states. For the example Iraq's forcible takeover of Kuwait in 1990.

Secondary Interests
All other interests besides vital interests are secondary interests. They cover all the different multifarious desires of individual states, that they would like to attain but for which they will not go to war. Secondary interests provide by their nature the pawns available in the continuing game of diplomatic horse trading, in which all powers constantly engage. The great objective in this game is to receive as good concessions as are given. By giving up one secondary interest, a nation may be able to make another secondary interest attainable and realisable.

Appeasement and Aggression
When a state includes in its list of vital interests item that can only be satisfied at the expense of other states, it is behaving aggressively. When a state compromises or sacrifices what it considers to be its vital interest rather than resort to war, it is committing appeasement.

Opposed and Common Interests
Interests are not always achieveable at the expense of another state. Very often both want the same thing, or they want readily compatible things. Where there is no conflict, in what two nations seek in negotiations with each other, we call such national interest as common. To the extent that they find themselves unable to agree, we call their interests opposed.

Two states that are predominantly inclined to consider the other as an enemy, having important divergent interests, almost always retain some common interests. Even during the Second World War the Allies and the Axis powers had retained a few common interests, such as treatment of prisoners of war according to international law, exchange of prisoners lists etc. Similarly states that consider each other the best of friends have many opposed interests in economic as well as political fields. India and the former Soviet Union were the best of friends, yet their interest regarding NPT and Afghanistan were opposed. The friendship of, or agreement between two states lasts only as well as common interest last. The close cooperation between the United States and Pakistan till the dissolution of Soviet Union is no longer is evidence. This is seen
by the changes in American policy about Pakistan's nuclear program and
the Pakistani policy of terrorism and subversion in the states of
Punjab and J&K. Or the earlier case of Stalin and Hitler who had signed
a pact in 1939. This pact lasted only till June 1941 when Soviet Union
was invaded by Germany. Nations tend towards keeping their agreement
as long as common interests last and no longer, although democracies
are as a group more sensitive to the method by which an agreement is
eased into the dustbin. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, friendship
and cooperation which was initially signed in 1971, when it was of great
international interest is now no longer relevant. Pacts and agreements
can be made even with the devil, but when in the opinion of either party,
the agreement has outlived its usefulness it is no longer likely to
survive. This is not an argument against concluding agreements, it is
rather an argument against doing so in the expectations that an agreement
represents the final disposition of a problem.

International power and influence are employed in support of foreign
policy objectives that commonly reflect the national interest. Here
national interest is the composite whole of vital and secondary interests.
Foreign policy involves the use of different resources for achieving
various kinds of advantages from relations with other states. Non economic
foreign policy primarily involves action designed to relate national
purpose to foreign political and military environment; economic foreign
policy in the main, serves the same function regarding the international
environment. However, governments employ political and military means
towards achieving economic as well as political and military ends; and
they use economic means towards serving political and military, as well
as economic ends. They are somewhat interdependent. The complexity of
this subject is further increased by the fact that foreign and domestic
policies and politics are closely linked.

Purpose of Foreign Policy
International transactions serve to relate each society's production
and consumption of values to that of the other. Here the term values
includes the total interaction between one state on one side and the
international environment or all other states on the other. Every exchange
in a trading interaction increases the value received by both the parties.
Had this not been so the customer would not part with the money, neither
the seller with the goods and no "sale" or "purchase" would result. This is not only true of economic interaction but also of influence interaction. Influence is also traded for influence, and sometimes also for economic advantages.) By value here, we mean the totality of interaction between the states-economic, social, political, of influence and power, and so forth. The extent to which the value production and consumption of states are interdependent is effected by the level of technology available, by the level of development that influences income and trade and the feasibility and costs of international transportation and communication; and the policies and capability of the states. Cooperation and conflict are modes of interaction that tend to increase international interdependence. Societies cooperate in order to augment the values available to each. They are in that case pursuing compatible goals. All the participating societies gain, international trade and organised peace keeping are examples of such cooperation. Societies fight in order to gain, or keep from losing value outputs or inputs required for maximisation of values available. In this case they are pursuing incompatible goals. Territorial conquest is a way to incorporate foreign input of labour and natural resources. Domination is a way to tax the value output of other societies. Preparation for international conflict, especially the maintenance of armed forces, absorb part of value output. International cooperation and conflict are frequently interrelated, because societies may conflict on the distribution of value increments created by international cooperation.

The values that government seek to augment or protect through international action are of many kinds: political, economic, cultural and so on. The composition of the list of values will be determined by conditions of demand and supply. First, values are demanded by the members of the society and ranked in terms of marginal preference or utility. Second, there is the opportunity to secure these values by international action, either because they are incapable of being produced at home or because, on the basis of comparative production costs, they can be acquired, wholly or in part, more cheaply through international transactions. The same logic applies to the procurement of other, non-material values, for example, political self preservation, the reputation of leader etc.

In protecting values, foreign policy is a reaction to external challe-
ges, and in increasing the supply of values, foreign policy seizes opportunities perceived in the outside world. The bulk of outward reaching foreign policy is not a matter of detailed, long range plans, but in a continually changing world, is rather opportunistic. National interest and foreign opportunities are thus interdependent. National interest inspires governments to be alert to opportunities for serving them internationally. National interest becomes concrete as foreign policy objectives, when opportunities are recognised and evaluated as worth pursuing, in terms of expected costs in a particular context. The relationships make it clear that foreign policy objectives are inconstant. The national structure for demand for values, comparative costs in supplying these values abroad or at home, and foreign threats to a society's value achievement are subject to change. 7

There is one particular value that demands singling out, because it plays a crucial role in the international goal striving states. This is power and influence over other states. International power is obviously instrumental in protecting and increasing a society's supply of many other values. This fact tends to dispose governments to build up power not only to meet actual policy needs, for future contingencies that may or may not arise.

**Conception, Content and Implementation**

Making foreign policy, a difficult and complex art. Each of its three phases conception, content and implementation needs careful attention, but conception is more strategically critical. In the astuteness of its perceptions, conception must bridge the gap between a nation's resources, and its desires and the reality of the world outside. By determining objectives, conception yields content and leads ultimately to the tactical questions of how the plan is to be carried out. Conception is thus critical to the whole foreign policy process, influencing not only the choice of objectives, but also the eventual success or failure of the policy itself.

Looked at this way, a conceptual strategy for foreign policy, stands or falls on how well it delineates the assumption behind that policy and relates to what is sought to be achieved and what already exists. 8 If this task is well and truly done, tactical failure in implementation, may still frustrate the intent, but the likelihood of success is greatly
The assumption a nation makes about the international system will decisively influence the scope, as well as the thrust of its behaviour. Thus nations play a variety of roles and the opposition they encounter is to some extent determined by their own choice of actions. It may play vigorous and far reaching roles, they may accumulate numerous enemies as well as numerous allies. There is a range of choice. The minimum role will not eliminate the power problem, but the maximum role will multiply it. Consequently how many enemies one has, is partly a matter of choice. Because enmity or friendship has a relational effect, altered behaviour can change the balance of hostility. This kind of change is possible even where opposed interests predominate. This change occurs even more readily where opposed interests are not predominant. The wise nation will always observe the cardinal principle of the minimisation of enemies, that is it will not collect more enemies than it can conveniently handle at a time.

This would be a useless thought, unless enmity were to some extent controllable. What makes its manipulatable is the principle of counterbalancing national interests. It is the existence of counterbalancing national interests, that permits the minimisation of enemies because they allow a nation a chance to alter policy content and thereby to alter the opposition. To do this well means keeping the principle of past future linkages and third party influences very much in mind, for all parties involved.

To see how these cardinal principles are linked, we must remember two points: the dynamic character of our international system, in which change is incessant and its multilateral nature. Individual nations continually reformulate parts of their foreign policy options as both popular pressures and perceptions of governmental policies alter. Bilateral relations change for this reason, they also change because altered policies of third states make bilateral reassessment necessary. Thus the foreign relations of two states are bilateral only in a partial sense, for they occur within a multilateral framework. Reconsideration of counterbalancing national interests on part of both states, because of their wider multilateral setting, produces a changing mixture of common and opposed interests between those two states. The alteration in this mix, normally gradual over a short period can be far reaching
over a longer time frame.

Each nation assessing its power problem is concerned with its own total power; both as a backing to its foreign policy and its measure of defensive or military capability. In assessing its power problem each state if it is wise, follows a foreign policy strategy designed to maximise its total power resources, while minimizing those available to its likely enemies.

The size and power of this enemy group is most frequently countered by making alliances, it is limited through policies that seek to give likely enemy states pause in focusing their power towards one's own state. In turn, what most effectively gives such enemy states pause is to effectively neutralise these other states that might drift or be pushed into coalition with them.

This deadly serious game for high stakes must be played by all the states, but their ability to play well will not be equal and will not necessarily be commensurate with their individual national power. Thus results from foreign policy although based initially on the power available as backing, depend ultimately on total strategic conception with which states engage in international relations. As "the road to hell is paved with good intentions", it is not enough in world affairs to want peace and progress. One needs to know realistically how these goals are won or lost, and also to know how to keep one's enemies down to safe proportions by careful attention to counterbalancing national interests of nations that may be tempted to make common cause with the foe.

Once foreign policies is formulated its implementation and interaction on bilateral and multilateral scale produce the main content of foreign relations as such. For purposes of analytical convenience, these relations can be divided into five functional, institutionalized areas: diplomatic, legal, economic, military and world organisational relations.

POLICY PROCESS

The entire foreign policy organisation of a state exists for the purpose of making and executing decisions to advance the state's interests. Because the basic ingredients of decision making process are substantially
identical in any government we shall study the process of policy making.

Foreign policy decisions can be conceived as flowing from the appreciation of the fluid and only imperfectly perceived situation by the policy makers. In this effort the criteria of national interest and purpose is used which arises from their social milieu and professional background, modified by the peculiar institutional setting. Although this concept has deep social roots, its expression in any decisional situation is undertaken by the responsible decision makers.\(^\text{12}\)

Thus the steady input of information to the decisional hierarchy undergoes constant evaluation and analysis, as foreign policy personnel attempt to determine the events which effect the nation and thus require decisions and possibly actions.\(^\text{13}\)

The bulk of activity in the international arena can be considered to be a reaction or interaction, from stimuli arising from the international environment. A sizeable portion of foreign policy consists of actions which is undertaken in response to domestic factors in order to modify the environment in a desired way. The norms of strategy making normally make this matter of lower priority the crucial business of response and adaptation to external stimuli; many of which are actually and potentially hostile. A state's first responsibility is to ensure it's continued existence and effective range of choice, only after it has done all it can to guarantee its participation in the system can it attempt to bend events to its purpose.

Thus, foreign policy is the application of a set of internalized criteria of judgement to the everchanging dynamic external environment, we may conceptualise the problem as consisting of the following steps

1. Establishment of original criteria.
2. Determination of the various relevant variables in the situation.
3. Measurement of the variables by the criteria established.
4. Selection of an objective.
5. Elaboration of a strategy to reach the objectives.
6. The decision to act.
7. The action itself.
8. Evaluation of the action, results of the action, in terms of the original criterion.\(^\text{14}\)

Although this policy process takes into consideration a single problem,
but in actual practice the procedure is never so simple or clear cut. Nations conduct many decisional operation simultaneously. Each analysis has its own set of peculiarities and each effects all the other and in turn is effected by them. Very few decisions go to completion without any modification due to changing circumstances and many enterprises are dropped before completion because time and new concerns have rendered them obsolete. In spite of these practical problems the schematic presentation is valuable because it distinguishes the various intellectual processes involved in the foreign policy decision making.

ANALYSIS OF A SITUATION

Coming to the decision that the situation needs a decision, officials undertake a situational analysis in some depth. It has two purposes. Initially they seek to discover the manner and extent of their involvement in the situation under consideration in order to determine the most advantageous objectives for their governments. The second purpose is to discover the different courses of action that are possible, independent of their desireability.15

Situational analysis generally requires consideration of three distinct factors. They are: the general pattern of forces operative in the decision area that lie beyond the control of any single state; the particular policies being followed by other states, at least the important ones, in the given context; and one's own capabilities for action in view of the first two factors. In theory this analysis is objective and coldblooded as professional skill can make it. However there are many intangible factors that must be weighed by the government but they cannot be more than approximately accurate in this effort.

An objective can be selected only after the situational analysis has been done. This point is of core value in the decisional process. Then, only after the objective has selected can the situation be reanalysed for the determination of the optimum course of action.

It is emphasised that the situational context of the decision is analysed at least thrice. The first analysis stresses on the long term factors in order to develop the concept of interest. The second focuses on middle range aspects in order to suggest objectives. The third analysis concentrates on the short term or immediate variables; which produces
alternative strategies and policy declaration in a narrow sense.

Choice is the key concept in the analysis of the policy, the policymaker must perceive during the process the maximum range of choices. Practically this results in formulating imperative as a set of alternatives for action.

Strategically the state should never put itself in a situation in which there is only one set of action which it can take. As long as a state retains choice of tactics, the opponents must go on devising responses to each one of them. However a lack of alternatives condemns a state to predictable response and of facing predetermined counter-strategy. Decisionmaking as a choice among alternatives is a way of examining all opportunities and of exercising whatever strategic advantages may be derived from forcing uncertainty and risks on policymakers of other states.

The approach to decisionmaking is usually seen in terms of alternatives open to the state in the particular context, together with estimates of the probable outcome of each alternatives. This spectrum of choices from the ultimate agenda of the decisional unit. The alternative selected is that which promises to be of greatest benefit or as often happens, the least loss in terms of the current criteria of choice.

Here it should be mentioned that the range of alternatives seldom a set of bad choices combined with one good choices. But often the real range of choice is fairly narrow and the policy and the interest differential among the various alternatives are relatively small. Selection of one is generally very difficult, specially when pressure of time or administrative necessity rush the decisional process. No state can dispense entirely with alternatives, however obscure their differences may be in a particular situation. Policy cannot be made for long on a ad-hoc basis, nor can any government afford to give up the flexibility that alternative approach contributes to decisionmaking.

In the rapidly moving situation, it is not uncommon for a state to launch a course of action with no clear idea of it's ultimate outcome. However the general line of attack is the result of a choice among alternatives and contains within itself further alternatives. One of these is adopted depending upon the nature of the response to the initial step. In this way the policy is kept abreast of situational change and
with the consequent gain in effectiveness if implementation is forceful. In practice however such extreme flexibility is usually beyond the state’s abilities. Only relatively powerful states can afford to actively manoeuvre with several alternative approaches available, each equally within it’s competence and capabilities.

The usual method of testing the validity of the choice is to take initial tentative steps and leave an escape route open if the judgement proves to be faulty. In such a way the state can curtail it’s losses to a minimum while preserving the freedom to strike later on a different tack.

EVALUATING DECISIONS

Throughout the policy process the effectiveness of a state depends upon it’s successful response to the actual situation. As decisions are always made with incomplete and inaccurate information prudence would demand constant evaluation of the situation in connection to the result of decisions and immediate revision of policies that are not producing the desired effect.

Though modern means of communication and transportation have greatly reduced the time to evaluate the response but the modern conditions also complicate the task by moving even more rapidly than the decisions, which are after all made by humans subject to fatigue and ill health. Furthermore the very complexity of foreign policy leads major states to implement their decisions by relatively fixed commitments and long term programmes, both extremely difficult to change even in circumstances of stress. The third factor which makes evaluation difficult is the pressure of foreign policy business. When new problems crowd in on the policymaker it is more likely that these problems will be dealt with than those associated with the agonising reappraisal of earlier decisions.

Although constant evaluation is most important it is also the most difficult. Generally the smaller states with a less margin of error and with a narrower range of concerns, have proved to be more adapt to changing their policies with the changed scenerio.
APPRECIATION OF THE PROBLEM

Decisionmaking begins with the understanding of what the decision itself is about. No policy can be chosen without the appreciation of the problem that the decision has to affect. To begin with probably no two officials of any state see the same set of facts in identical problem terms. Each brings a distinct personality, social values, professional and organizational bias, and the intuitive skill to bear the task and each may have a personal set of information. One significant task for leadership, whether professional or political is to make sure that all subordinate policymakers follow a standard method of problem identification.

Confusion sometimes stems from the fact that the word problem is perceived differently by different people. As strategy is a cautious business, the strategymakers have the natural tendency of conceptualising "problem" as an obstacle to be overcome, and pressures to be resisted. If problem is understood to be a factor in a situation that demands solution, and if it is borne in mind that logically a problem can be as much an obstacle as an opportunity. It is as problematic to determine ways of conceptualising on an unexpected advantage as it is to develop a strategy to lessen the effects of misfortune.

A crucial element in any problem analysis is the early selection of an objective worth a state's effort. This is the essence of strategy defined as a plan for the employment of resources for the attainment of predetermined ends. On the broadest foreign policy scale such a plan may accurately be termed as national strategy. Since all operational decisions are made in terms of postulated goals, the identification and evaluation of all strategic objectives constitute a major step in the process of problem identification. This task is more complex than it seems at first sight.16

Even if the policymakers have a firm grasp on national goals and an adequate comprehension of the situation they ordinarily encounter difficulties in formulating objectives. One set of objectives will be attractive because of their intrinsic desirability while other group has feasibility in it's favour, rarely will a single objective rank high on both scales. The task of the policymaker is thus beset by the opposing constructions of the problem is to strike the best possible
balance between the desirability and feasibility of the objectives the individual perceives, and to act on the basis of this compromise.

**COST-RISK CALCULATION**

The second major factor which affects the foreign policy decision making is the cost-risk factor. No state can count on getting anything free in this world. Furthermore, even the intellectual and physical effort, any policy carries with it some risk of failure. These twin factors of cost and risks constrain and limit the range of choice of the policymaker.

In considering a possible line of action, the decision maker generally assume the worst possible scenario. Then only they can be free to take action. Of course, the worst possible consequences are those that are actually foreseeable in the light of the policymakers supply of information. Cost factors are established in terms of the range of probabilities open at a time. A decision to act really means that the decisionmaker feels that the objectives sought are worth the highest price that anyone will actually charge the state.

Determining the risk involved in the projected course of action, conceptually a second step in analysis, is usually conducted simultaneously with the calculation of cost. Risk here refers to the relative odds in favour of success. Addressing a risk is necessary in decision making simply because unforeseen contingencies that perpetually endanger the peaceful interaction of the states. The evaluation of risk is the acknowledgement of the element of guesswork involved in foreign policymaking.

For each alternative that needs attention, the state establishes an acceptable burden of risks, the amount of failure that it's policy will tolerate. The degree of acceptability of a such type of calculated risk is determined by two sets of interlocking factors. They are the importance of an objective being sought, and the seriousness of the consequences of failure. For important objectives a state will accept greater risk of failure than for a lesser objective.

The factor of cost and risks determine limits within which a decision should be made. No rational policy choice will dictate action on behalf of an objective that might be too costly if the risk of paying the price is beyond the level of acceptance. Thus policymakers find themselves
hemmed in by analytical inhibitions and practical counsels of prudence.

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

Another limit on the policymaker is the domestic considerations or the internal environment and its effect. Regardless of the form of government, any foreign policy apparatus is bound by popular consensus and limited to whatever area of permissibility mass attitudes might allow. The consensus that restricts decision makers may be entirely synthetic and the result of a planned campaign of deceptive mass propaganda. But regardless of its origin or degree of sophistication, consensus plays a key role in staking off areas of free decision the policymaker enjoys at a given time. 18

As long as war remains an ultimate sanction of state policy, and wars are fought by the entire populations, consensus will govern the decisionmaking. No government can do without the support of its populace for long. Mass identification with foreign policy issues, although an enormous source of strength to all governments, is in this sense debiliting factor that often deprives officials of the capacity to follow their best professional judgement. 19

In practice popular consensus imposes varying degree of constraints. Having a wide area of permissibility and dealing with matters of lesser importance, decisionmakers often operate without specific reference to mass reaction. The more narrowly and specifically popular consensus focuses however, the more difficult it becomes for the officials to manoeuvre.

There is an interesting relationship between the dimensions of breadth and intensity of consensus. A broad grant of discretion to government ordinarily implies a relatively low level of mass identification. When a government increases intensity of it's popular support on a particular issue, it pays the price of narrowing it's permissible alternatives as interpreted by consensus. Thus the paradox: the closer to war the situation drifts, the more public attitudes become inflamed, and the less control the policymakers have on the events. In gaining popular support against the worst circumstances, governments often sacrifice their ability to capitalize upon more favourable circumstances. 20

Consensus is most obvious when it is most specific. Periodically, spe-
cially in moments of crisis, mass attitudes will seize upon a particular issue or problem of policy and insist on a position. A mass response to problems does not take into account all the facts, and it does not have all the relevant information, therefore these manifestations are always a source of annoyance for the policymaker. The policymakers try to keep popular attitudes excited but safely just on the level of boiling. When consensus breaks out of control policymakers might ignore or defy the popular demands, but only at their risk and even then, only for a brief period of time.

INCOMPLETENESS OF INFORMATION

Decisions can be made under conditions of certainty, uncertainty, or of risk. In conditions of certainty each action has one predictable outcome, in conditions of uncertainty each action may have more than one outcome but their relative probabilities are unknown, and in conditions of risk each action may have more than one outcome but their relative probabilities are known. Almost all policy decisions are taken under conditions of risk.

Risk in this sense almost has the same meaning as in cost-risk calculation, and for the same reason: foreign policy decisions in the context of incomplete information because the built in time lag between events and decision make it futile for policymakers to wait until they have complete facts. They must act on the information available to them and arrange their decisions so as to reduce the risk to a minimum.

The inadequacy of information available to policymakers manifests itself in two ways. First there may not be adequate data, and second there might be too much information. In the first instance they lack several crucial pieces of information that will enable them to construct a meaningful and valid decision. If the amount of data available is not enough the decisionmakers generally fill it with estimates, extrapolations, or assumptions and go ahead anyway. In the second situation, there is more than enough information but the relevant details may lie buried under an enormous amount of extraneous or only mildly relevant data. Because of time pressure or because they lack immediately applicable criteria of relevance, the policymakers find themselves little better then they would have been without the elaborate accumulation of unsifted
Governments now-a-days constantly exert themselves to improve both the quantity and usefulness of the information upon they must base their decisions. As more areas of human life and actions become relevant to foreign policy, more kinds of information is gathered and funneled into the decision making apparatus. Once swept into the analytical net, the information is gathered, digested, evaluated, correlated, and distributed to all decisionmakers, whose scope of responsibilities make those particular pieces of information useful and necessary for them. The officials who gather quite a large percentage of this data come from the intelligence wing.

The purpose of all this information gathering and processing is to reduce the risk factor in policymaking, that is to minimise the extent to which the outcome of any action is unknown and to amplify what is known of their probability of occurrence. An effective substitution of knowledge for pure guesswork is a net gain, and every government is convinced that there is enough scope for improvement and therefore a major effort is made to gain information.

**PRESSURE OF TIME**

Another factor that affects policymaking is the constraint of time. Modern technology has speeded the pace of the world. With improvement in transportation and communication, events occur more rapidly then the past, and they reach the decisionmakers in much shorter time. This combination of forces burdens the decisionmaker's task. Responsible officials lack the time required to analyse the information obtained about the various situations, compare alternatives, and make choices. They have to deal with most issues in a summary manner. The best they can do is to conserve their analytical skills for the really vital issue. But even in this they face difficulties that sometimes even crucial issues are difficult to identify, and they may slip by as just another problem. 21

In an attempt to cope with the ever increasing information flow, governments have increased their decision making outfits, but this has resulted in bringing more rigidity in bureaucracy and has proved to be self defeating. Lateral communication within the bureaucratic structure and the need for clearances and concurrences often slow down the pace of informat-
An unfortunate consequence of the pace is that most policymakers tend to lose the process of reflective thought. As there is not enough time for just thinking many of them lose the quality of perception and flexibility which is essential for them. Individuals under pressure tend to make decisions that will clear their desks for the next problem. Being prudent they prefer to make minimum commitments and extremely cautious responses, to follow precedents closely, and to interpret their controlling directive as narrowly as possible.

**NATIONAL STYLE**

Decisionmakers of any state are materially affected by the national style, the prevailing tradition and the self image of a society that predisposes it's officials to perform their duties and make their decisions in a way considered unique and peculiarly appropriate. Although it is unreasonable to expect an entire people to conform to a given character, the bulk of the society in their individual personalities reflect a certain stereotype.

National style is important in shaping decisionmaking because of its effects on the analytical style or pattern of decision taken by those people. Decisionmakers are unconscious to the extent to which they partake of a larger code of appropriate and socially sanctioned behaviour as they grapple with their special problems. A common style of analysis and decisions form one of the real elements of cohesiveness in all reasonably integrated government structures.

These tricks of national style cannot but modify the decision dynamics each government demonstrates. Consideration of style help explain both deep anamiosities and close associations between pairs of states, as well as many other otherwise perplexing patterns of interactions.

**COMMITMENTS AND PRECEDENTS**

Commitment and precedents set are also a constraint under which the decision makers have to function. No policy is made in a vaccum. It is affected to a great extent by earlier decisions. The state as a whole, the policymaking apparatus, and the individual decision makers are all in different ways bound by the remote and immediate past. Though commitments are sometimes not honoured or precedents not followed but even then they do represent some constraints on the policymaker.
INHERENT PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES

In an effort to formulate and implement a policy that produces maximum results at minimum costs the decisionmaker often is confronted by a number of practical problems not of his making, difficulties that occur with such frequency that they are almost an integral part of the international political scene. When dealing with such obstacles the policymaker needs to be flexible, adjust to their existence to the extent they are unavoidable and uncontrolable, avoid and control them as much as possible, and minimise the degree to which their existence produces negative results. 23

Unanticipated events and snowballing

A major problem for policymakers is that no one can possibly be aware of everything that is going on, have perfect information with respect to the situation at hand, or always be able to accurately anticipate the course and tenor of future developments. Things are made even worse because of the fact that no party has absolute power and much happens that is beyond its control. Many a time developments occur that one could not reasonably be expected to predict, and about these little could be done.

Another problem for policymakers is that at times events seem to just happen and then to develop a momentum of their own. Difficulties are compounded by the facts that the process is often cumulative and a kind of snowballing effect develops. In such circumstances the parties feel that their feasible options have been severely restricted and they have no real choice except to do certain things which they might not very much like. The decisionmakers feel that they are being swept along by events which they are unable to control. When snowballing is mixed with unanticipated events they may have serious consequences which none of the decision makers of the various states involved in the situation could really control. This problem is further compounded if the situation is tense. For example the First World War was declared because of the unprecidented event of the assassination of Crown Prince Ferdinand and the snowballing that took place afterwards even though none of the decisionmakers of the various states involved wanted a war. Though the great tensions then prevailing helped in the outcome because of increased
mistrust of the various parties involved, without the unanticipated event and subsequent snowballing the war would probably not have occurred.

Influence of the Past

Another major practical difficulty policymakers often encounter is the fact that the feasible alternatives are limited by the past and one usually has only a narrow range of options from which to choose. There are several facets to this concept. First, a nation's historical experience influences the content of its policymakers' perception of various features of the international environment such as ethics, law and ideology. A second point is that one's perception of the past significantly influences the content of objectives and the choice of policy implementation instruments as well. Certain options will be eliminated from consideration and certain objectives will just be taken as given. Third, once a particular policy has existed for a while a degree of inertia seems to set in. Operations become routinized and the underlying assumptions are not questioned. Fourth, once a policy is undertaken, those decision makers responsible for its formulation and implementation have a vested interest in its success. Therefore they would prefer to have the existing policy succeed rather than undertake other options, and make effort that it does.24

There are three more ways in which the past limits the policymaker's choice. One is that the execution of any policy inevitably brings about commitment of some of the state's resources for its success. These may be economic, military and psychological as well as political in its broadest sense. It is not easy to suddenly rearrange the allocation of resources. Also once a policy is undertaken, the state inevitably has invested some of its prestige. It is not only the individual policy maker who will lose by failure but also the nation itself. Finally it is assumed that there is some value in having a degree of certainty and stability in foreign policy, sudden changes would tend to produce just the reverse. These influences from the past often combine to produce what has been termed as a policy of incrementalism.

A critically important point is to remember that the policymaker must deal with the situation as it is today, not as it might have been.

Interrelated Events

As in international politics events are interrelated the policymaker
cannot deal with the situations in isolation, as if they were in no way linked to extrasituational developments and were themselves in part a product of preceding events. Indeed in many instances one's situational perceptions and actions are directly and intimately related to extrasituational occurrences sometimes even to the extent of being largely determined by them. And frequently it is simply not possible to begin work on a certain matter until a number of interrelated demands and preconditions have been met. Policymakers seeking to formulate and implement the optimum situational policy thus find their task is enormously more complex, and frequently they have much less control over the number and the types of influencing factors than they would like.

Conditions Precedent
Situations do not just spring out of thin air, circumstances and conditions at any particular time are in part a product of what has occurred previously. Frequently the interrelationship between the present and the past is such that certain developments had to occur before the present parameters could be established, in many instances policymakers had to act and interact in a manner that allowed certain conditions precedent to a particular situation be developed and certain demands be fulfilled.

Differential Effects
Another very practical problem is that all policies produce differential effects. This means two things. First, all policies yield both costs and benefits. There is no such thing as a policy without disadvantages, nothing is perfect. The second is that each decision has an impact on more than one party, and as such affects each party differently. Consequently it is essential when formulating policies to take this into account and try to develop policies that maximize the net benefit-cost ratio.

Insufficient Time
The final difficulty encountered by policymakers is insufficient time. Frequently there is not enough time to carefully go through the various steps in policy formulation, assess the relative merits of different combinations of implementation instruments. Things just happen too fast and decisions have to be made. Sometimes one simply has no choice but to act, whether ready or not.
LEADERSHIP

States act purposefully in world politics, and the essential part of the foreign policy is the process of formulating and implementing decisions. Even though each state's task in the global arena is unique, but they all consider foreign policy of core importance.

Organisations dealing with foreign affairs are roughly identical in all governments. Atop the organisational pyramid stands the chief executive, testifying by their active role to the basic significance of world affairs. The chief executive is directly assisted by those close advisors who deal in foreign affairs in the particular administrative set up of the concerned state. The principal foreign affairs manager in the government at the political level is the foreign minister, who heads the department concerned with foreign policy and is the principal official advisor to the chief executive. In all states other departments participate to a varying degree in the foreign policy decisions. Finance and Defence departments are almost always consulted, economic and commerce departments have also become very important in recent years. This is due to growing economic interdependence leading to a global economy, though at a nascent stage. Legislative bodies also play roles dependent upon their constitutional place, but foreign policy is primarily an executive prerogative, only occasionally inhibited by legislative interference.

The Chief executive

The chief executive - prime minister, president, king or dictator - is a key figure in all foreign policy decisions. According to international practise, the chief executive alone officially speaks for the state in the international relationships. As the political leader, the chief exercises ultimate authority in the area of foreign policy. No institutional arrangements can eliminate or blur this responsibility.

The chief may structure the foreign policy mission in a great variety of ways. He naturally seeks advise and information to guide foreign policy decisions, but may rely on the opinions of subordinates or trust personal judgement and intuition. The chief may function entirely within the official apparatus or may rely more on informal and unofficial sources of recommendations. The chief executives may confine their personal
attention only to issues of massive importance, leaving detailed implementation to the subordinates, or they may intervene into the decisional process in matters of great and short-run impact.

The peculiar function of the chief executive lies in the province of political leadership. Whatever the controlling internal dynamics may be, the chief must somehow translate the prevailing value pattern and operative consensus of mass public opinion into foreign policy terms. Whether a dictator or popularly elected leader, his task is as the visible symbol of national unity to formulate national purposes and give them expression in the form of concrete objectives.25

The Foreign Minister

Foreign ministers in most states have a peculiarly taxing role. They must be specialist and tacticians concerned with the innumerable complexities of day to day decisions. They must also have an appreciation of the internal and external political problems with which their respective chiefs are faced. Simultaneously they must be administrators, policymakers or decisionmakers and advisors. In most cases another task is added to these multiple responsibilities, namely that of high level negotiation. Modern transportation and communications have given the foreign ministers of all leading powers and of many smaller ones a roving commission to travel widely and conduct all important negotiations among themselves, either bilaterally or multilaterally.26

The Ministry of External Affairs

The foreign ministry of each state constitutes a primary grouping of expertise on international matters within the government. Generally speaking, its domestic personnel are relatively few, although some significant increase has taken place in recent years. It is normally divided into subgroups which reflect the nature of tasks, or geographical areas.

A foreign officer, has a dual mission: to communicate with the states personnel abroad and with foreign diplomatic missions in its own country. In performing this dual role, the foreign office personnel may a vast number of policy decisions at all but the highest level of importance. The foreign office also acts as source of policy recommendations that flow upwards to higher decisional levels: the foreign minister, the cabinet, and the chief executive. In this respect, foreign office bureaucrats often, by defining alternatives, selecting and rejecting data, materially influence the ultimate decision.
Role of Personality in Leadership

A political leader's personal characteristics will not have a large effect unless the leader has some general interest in foreign affairs. Interest acts as a motivating force. One consequence of interest in foreign policy will be increased attention to the foreign policy making process. The political leader will want to be consulted on decisions and will want to be kept informed about what is happening in foreign affairs.

If the leader has an interest in foreign affairs, a second personal characteristic of importance is his training or expertise in foreign affairs. A leader with little or no training in foreign affairs has no personal expertise to draw upon. He has no previous experience to suggest possible alternatives or a plan of action. As a result, his natural problem solving predispositions come into play. The leader with training, on the other hand, has some knowledge about what will succeed and what will not, in the international arena. As a consequence of his experience he would have learned to match a strategy to a specific issue and target nation. In effect, the leader with training has a wider repertoire of possible foreign policy behaviours to consider than a leader with little or no training.

A third personal characteristic is general sensitivity to one's environment. Sensitivity to one's environment indicates the extent to which an individual is responsive to incoming stimuli from objects in the milieu in which he operates. How important are incoming stimuli from the environment to the leader determine what he will try to influence his government to do? The less sensitive the leader is to his environment, the more fixed impact of his personal characteristics on foreign policy, the less likely the leader is to have cause to change his goals and attitudes or the foreign policy strategy currently in use. The more sensitive the leader is to his environment, the more likely he is to accommodate himself to new information and to the necessity for change suggested by the environment.

Interest, training, and sensitivity to the environment act as filters on the relationship between a leader's personal characteristics and his state's foreign policy. These three variables indicate how much
attention the leader will pay to foreign policy problems, how large a repertoire of possible foreign policy behaviours the leader is likely to have, and how consistent the foreign policy will be.

These filters influence the relationship between four other kinds of personal characteristics and the foreign policy making. The four types of personal characteristics that seem most relevant to foreign policy making are a leader's beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal styles.

Beliefs represent the leader's fundamental assumption about the world. Such beliefs can be very general, for example a leader's notions about his ability to control events in his life or they can be more specific for example, a leader's notions about his ability to shape political events for his state.28

Motives of leader's refers to the reasons why they do what they do - the desires that activate them. One motive is need for power. The primary motivation for political activity is emotional insecurity or low self esteem, and these are compensated for by a desire for power. A higher a leader's need for power, the more forceful and aggressive his government's foreign policy is. This can be validated by observing the actions of Iraqi President Saddam Hussain who was an neglected orphan which led to the emotional insecurity and the need for supreme power. The other motives that may be relevant to policy making, are the need to achieve, need for support or approval of one's ideas, need to be independent and need for structure.

Decision Styles mean the methods preferred by a leader in making decisions. The following five elements comprise decision styles - confidence; openness to new information; preference for certain levels of risk and sizes of stakes involved; capacity for postponing decisions without anxiety and adjusting to uncertainty without mental stress. Other possible components of decision style include - preference for compromise; preference for optimising as opposed to satisfying mode of decisionmaking; and preference for planning as opposed to activity. Basic character pattern carry with them distinctive decision styles of flexibility, compulsivity, compliance and withdrawal.

Interpersonal style is concerned with characteristic ways in which
a leader deals with other policy makers. Paranoia or suspiciousness is one way of dealing with others that has often been attributed to politicians. Machiavellianism is another interpersonal style often attributed to leaders. Another is warfare personality, which is characterised as being highly suspicious, as defining all but his favoured associates as enemies, and as thriving on manipulating others. Alternative ways of dealing with others that might be leader's means of persuading is sensitivity to others, is sense of political timing and whether or not he is task oriented or person oriented leader.

Two aspect of foreign policy seem to be affected by the leader's personal characteristic: the strategies that the government employs in its foreign policy and the styles in which the foreign policy is made and executed. Foreign policy strategies are a government's basic plans of action, such as adopting a generally cooperative or competitive stance towards other states, acting alone or in concert with other states, deciding to commit or not to commit resources to other states engaging in bilateral rather than multilateral agreements, and emphasising certain self interests over others. Styles of foreign policy are the methods a government chooses to use in making and executing its foreign policy for example - the channels used for announcing policies, the particular skill and resources used in implementing policy, the tendency to use words instead of deeds, the use of personal diplomacy, the relative involvement of bureaucracy in foreign affairs. In effect, strategies focus on content or substance of foreign policy, whereas styles focus on the means of making and executing foreign policy.

Because beliefs and motives suggest ways of interpreting the environment the political leader is likely to urge his government to act in a way consistent with such images.

One additional point, the high level policy maker is likely, whenever possible, to appoint policy making personnel with beliefs and motives similar to his own, helping to ensure that his interpretation of political reality permeates the official apparatus.

In relating the two types of personal characteristics - decision style and interpersonal style it has been assumed that a leader will generally engage in similar behaviour regardless of arena. Thus the political leader's preferred methods of making decisions and interacting
with others will carry over to his or her political behaviour. Style is probably one of the first difference noted when Chief Executives change. Each new Chief Executive tries to make himself comfortable in his role. For example, one Chief Executive may focus foreign policy making within his own office, while his predecessor may have been willing to let the bureaucracy handle all problems except those of crisis proportions. One Chief Executive may be given to rhetorics; his predecessor may have wanted action.

In conclusion we may say that beliefs and motives form the basis for a leader's views of the world, in turn also effecting his choice of strategy. If the political leader is a Chief Executive and the situation is one in which he is in a position to influence other foreign policy makers in his government, his views of the world will shape his government's foreign policy strategy. Similarly the leader's decision style and interpersonal style form the basis for his personal political style, which influences the way he behaves in his attempt to make foreign policy. Here again, if the leader is the Chief Executive and he is in a position to influence other foreign policymakers in his government, his personal style will affect his government's foreign policy style. Thus we have the high level leader's views of the world affecting his government's foreign policy strategies, and his personal style affecting the style of foreign policy making.

**DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON POLICY FORMULATION**

International relations and domestic politics cannot be separated into vacuum sealed compartments, neither having effect on the other. Generally all decisions are taken within a vortex of internal pressures and policy makers often do not have the freedom to just go ahead and make whatever decisions they feel would be best. In most situations the official policy maker is only one participant in the policy making process. A variety of other parties are also involved, each attempting to influence the course of action. A staggering quantity and variety of mutual interactions occur yielding a very hazy web of complex, reciprocal relationships.

Because in all political systems the leadership needs some degree of domestic support policymakers often attempt to build a coalition that will provide a consensual base for themselves and their policies.
The major groups and individuals who are needed and who are in position to provide the requisite support thus become the target of a wide range of requests, promises, threats, and demands. At the same time the policy makers are wooing these elements they are also returning the favour. Each policy influencer makes certain demands and expects a certain amount of satisfaction as the price for its support. If a particular policymaker is unwilling or unable to provide this satisfaction the policy influencer may not give his support.30

As we already know, all international parties are unique, each possessing a blend of characteristics that to some extent sets its apart from every other. This means that the domestic influences on policymakers are different in varying degrees in every case. Consequently our discussion is highly focused and selective. Furthermore the analysis can only present hypothesis and generalisations that can be productively utilized as guidelines in the requisite separate examinations that must be undertaken in each specific case, because commonly accepted all embracing conclusions do not exist.

Public Opinion

One of the first major types of policy influencers is public opinion. Before analysing this fact, it is necessary to make the distinction between the general public, attentive public and opinion elite. The term general public refers to all the people within a society. The attentive public, is a much smaller group which is made up of informed citizenry that constitute the primary non governmental audience for foreign policy discussions. The opinion elites are the articulate policy influencing core of the population that gives some kind of structure to policymaking discussions and provides the effective means of access to those in charge.

In analysing the influence of public opinion a very important consideration is the nature of the political system. Broadly speaking, the distinction of governmental systems is of authoritarian type and the democratic type. In every situation while seeking to ascertain the impact of public opinion, one should seek to determine the location of the system in question, on the continuum from authoritarian to democratic.32

Basically authoritarian system are characterized by the vast and stringent control of society by the government, very little competition, low level of popular participation, either a single political party or non at all, usually a very powerful and influential internal police
force, intensive and extensive control of activities of individuals by the government, and control of the structures of the society by a relatively small number of people. In a system that is more democratic the government control everything, competition and popular participation are fairly extensive, political parties are allowed to operate with relative freedom, police forces are limited by law, individual rights are protected and there are relatively few restrictions on individual activities, power tends to be somewhat diffused, and the governors themselves operate under certain limitations.

Authoritarian System

Usually in authoritarian systems, public opinion plays almost no role in policy determination. Because the government controls the media the people hear and see primarily what the government wants them to, seldom do they make any serious demand. To the extent that the general public is involved at all in policy participation is largely reactive or responsive. This does not mean that the public never exercises any influence even if the policymakers seek to prevent it, the people under authoritarian systems are becoming somewhat more aware of the international realities.

Democratic System

In democratic systems public opinion is more significant, and they have some impact. First, usually the general public has some notion about the policies, methods, and objectives it will tolerate. Although these notions are usually somewhat vague and amorphous they do exist and at some point they provide a set of boundaries which a policymaker will transgress only at considerable risk.

The general public can also be influential in positively marking out at least the general direction that the policy should take. This delineation also is somewhat imprecise and vague, but that does not detract from the reality of its existence. For example the Japanese public has acted as a strong stimulus to government policymakers in the recent years towards the end of obtaining greater policy independence from the United States yet retaining the security of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

The general public plays another role to the extent that it provides support for governmental policies. Support is most pronounced when
there is strong national consensus which policymakers both clearly perceive and agree with. The degree of support is important in a crisis situation, and often at such times it is clearly pronounced. In non-crisis times people are more involved in their daily life and neither strongly support or oppose particular policies, but in times of crisis the general public often rallies behind the leader.

But, there are times when the general public does not give it's support in a crisis. It seems that the level of support is related to the attributes of the crisis, perceived importance and duration. If a crisis is long lasting and if the objective is perceived to be out of proportion to the time, effort, and resources expended public support seems to decrease. Policymakers thus must remember that there is at least a danger that unless a crisis is swiftly resolved, or at least considerable progress can be shown to have been made towards it's resolution, public support will have a tendency to wane. Obviously this fact puts pressure on the policymakers to at least give the appearance of success, and this in turn often leads them to deliberately deceive the public.

In each of the cases discussed above the attentive public and opinion elites successfully summarized and articulated the opinion and feeling of the general public. In these situations what seems to exist is a two step, two way process. Attitudes flow from the masses to the opinion leaders and then to the policymakers, and vice versa. Information is filtered, interpreted and transmitted in both directions with key elites, including the mass media, acting as a conduit and mediator between the policymaker and the public at large.

Despite the fact that public opinion can have considerable impact in relatively democratic systems, as a general rule it is not very important. Most of the time the people are primarily concerned with domestic matters and are ill informed about foreign policy issues. In addition, inconsistency of views, contradictory ideas, lack of coherence and direction abounds. Actually instead of influencing the policymaker the masses usually looks to him for guidance. In most cases the public is more of a follower than an influencer. Although there are some kinds of exceptions, but usually the policymaker is relatively free to make the policy.

The public's dependance on the policymaker, rather than vice versa often leads them to manipulate the public mood instead of being guided
by it. In democratic as well as authoritarian systems public opinion often is used as an active and manipulative resource.

Political Parties
The second major type of policy influencer is the political party. Once again the distinction between the democratic and authoritarian systems is relevant. 36

Authoritarian Systems
In authoritarian systems there is usually just one political party, and it supplies almost the entire policy-making personnel. In such a set up, the policy influencers belong to various factions within the party, each with its own power base, interests and commitments. Also the influence of the political parties varies from state to state. In Communist China for example the party is very influential. Whereas in Egypt, for years there was only one party, but it was not very influential. Generally it acted as an arm of the leadership instead of being an influencer of foreign policy, and usually was little more than a facade behind which decisions were made.

Democratic Systems
With respect to more democratic systems too, the level of influence of political parties varies from state to state. For example in post Second World War Japanese politics, the impact of political parties on foreign policy process has been considerable. The Liberal Democratic Party is a party without a very strong popular base. Party leadership was recruited from various distinct factions each having its own independent source of finance, promoting its own candidates, and regularly discussing matters of strategy and policy. These factions existed primarily for the purpose of gaining and using power and no policymaker could remain in power without responding to their demands. Reciprocal self interest was the glue holding them together. Within the party there is a continuous process of bargaining, which resulted in a policy based on compromise in order to accommodate various factional demands. This often is stifling to initiatives. 37

In the former West Germany the political parties had influence but not to the extent that the Japanese system has. The mere fact that the system is democratic gives one little clue as to how important a policy influencer the political parties in that system will be. In some they
are very significant, in some moderately so, and in some they hardly matter. When attempting to ascertain their influence one must proceed on a case by case basis, carefully analysing the specific facts before reaching any conclusion.

Interest Groups

Another major category of influencers are interest groups. An interest group is an association of individuals, external to major policymaking positions, who are tied together by a more or less common set of interests and one of whose objectives is to influence the policymaker with regards to specific policies that would advance these particular interests. These organisations are often economic in nature, but this is not a requisite and various professional, ethnic, social and occupational groups exist.

Authoritarian Systems

Generally fewer independent groupings are allowed to exist in most authoritarian group of states than in their democratic counterparts. For this reason one can assume that they are relatively less important. But although fundamentally correct, this obvious conclusion is somewhat misleading. Even though formal independent groupings are fewer, a myraid of independent groupings exist and people with common interests do work together to achieve common objectives. As defined in this manner interest groups exist in Authoritarian States too. Economic Managers, technocrats, cultural intelligencia, scientific community, the Police, the Armed Forces compete for supremacy with the party and governmental bureaucrats. Instead of a process of competition and accomodation such as occurs in democracies, however the objective in this case sometimes is the attain-ment of dominance and the elimination of rivals. Because of this the composition of various governmental organs often tends to reflect the mosaic of power relationships in existence at a given time.

In authoritarian system the policymaking apparatus is centrally controlled and directed, and thus in many ways it is relatively impervious to pressure. Nevertheless, policymakers are sometimes forced to depend on outside sources for certain kind of specialised information, a certain degree of expertise, and some cooperation in the implementation of decisions. Because often there are groups that possess these special characteristics, they may have the opportunity to exercise some influence.
rally speaking, the degree of influence will be proportional to the policymaker's dependance for information and advice on such outside sources, his need for their expertise in handling various matters, and the extent to which their cooperation is necessary for the effective implementation of the decisions.

Another aspect of interest group activity in authoritarian systems is the fact that various groups often struggle to advance their special interests by taking control of the organs of the policymaking apparatus. In this the objective is not to influence certain specific policies but rather to attain decisive influence within the policymaking organs themselves.

The policymakers in authoritarian set ups, thus find themselves subject to two kinds of interest group stimuli. First the traditional demand support relationship based on reciprocal need and advantage. The second concerns the matter of competition for control of policymaking apparatus, and in these situations one must always be aware of the power dynamics of group politics.

Democratic Systems

With respect to more democratic systems it is useful to distinguish between those in which the policy making is relatively centralised and those in which it is not. Britain and India both provide us with an example of systems where decisionmaking is considerably centralised, while the United States is a prime example of decentralised and somewhat fragmented foreign policy making apparatus.41

As in the former type of system as prevalent in India and Britain because of their parliamentary system and fusion of powers, policy is primarily made by governing political parties rather than via a kind of interplay of bargaining and compromise. In this kind of a situation there is precious little room for interest group influence, external to the party structure. A wide variety of groups do seek to influence policymakers both at the executive and parliamentary levels, but they do so primarily by working through and in connection with the parties themselves. Because the parties have different but somewhat overlapping bases of support, some groups are much more influential with one party than another. But even with respect to the key point remains: seldom can a group compel a policymaker to depart from the accepted party line.
and this is true even for important supportive groups. The group's influence exists primarily within the confines of the party structure and is limited to attempting to persuade the party leadership that what is good for the particular group is good for the party and the country.

In the latter type of systems as prevalent in the United States decision making is much more diffused. Because of the systems of separate institutions with an intermingling, checking and balancing functions and power, decentralised political parties, and a variety of other structural features. In the U.S. decisions are made in a variety of places and circumstances, by a number of different individuals, groups and coalitions. In such a fragmented system there are a multiple multitude of points at which one may gain access to the policymaking process. Interest groups investigate these, constantly seeking access to the key policymakers. Because these groups have sometimes significant financial resources, occasionally can be important in an electoral contest, sometimes can provide valuable information and assistance, and sometimes are in a position to apply coercive pressure, policymakers on certain issues may be very sensitive to group viewpoints. For example various Zionist organisations, play a significant role in the American foreign policy.

However, these examples are the exceptions rather than the rule.

Generally, interest groups are not very influential with respect to foreign policy issues. Some of the reasons why interest groups are not significantly influential, is because policymakers generally do not have their decisions impacted in a major way by the interest groups. There are several reasons. First, most major group such as Chamber of Commerce are large organisations composed of many members who are also members of other groups. Because of this overlapping membership individuals have competing loyalties and most of the time the group's leader cannot possibly influence their membership sufficiently to have them act as a cohesive body. Second, there are a myraid of group line ups on opposite sides of various issues. For example with respect to foreign trade there are certain groups that tend to be protectionist and others that tend to be oriented towards freer trade. Many times this competition has an offsetting effect as the groups neutralise one another. This allows the policymakers to pick and choose. Third, most interest groups are concerned only with a few problems and are not operational a good share of the time. Thus policymakers are simply relatively free of interest group pressure on many issues. Also, there are so many competing elements
of the time. Thus policymakers are simply relatively free of the interest group pressure on many issues. Also, there are so many competing elements within the policymaking process that even if interest groups should happen to be united and cohesive on some issues they might be offset or relegated to subsidiary importance by other factors. Furthermore, whereas interest groups are often important in domestic politics because of their capacity to provide critical information, on foreign policy they simply do not have any such information to give. Finally on some issues perceived to have significant relationship to national security, interest groups sublimate their special interests to the national good.

The net result of all this is that in most situations the policymaker's decisions are not significantly shaped by interest group pressure. Although this is a fact, and an important one, it is essential not to overstate the point. Though there are exceptions, such as in issues having focus on economic-political issues that are perceived to have a major domestic political impact, such as energy problems etc.

PERCEPTIONS

Foreign Policy decisions are made by people acting either as individuals or as part of a group. The individual foreign policy decisionmaker is surrounded by several layers of environment, or context, that affects the choices, possibilities, and probabilities open to the decision maker. Both the external environment and domestic environment constraint and limit what the policymaker is able to do or is likely to do in a number of ways. The resources and the capabilities of a decisionmaker's country, its people and territory, are vital to the state's foreign policy orientations, objectives, and the choice of tools by which to influence the others. Capabilities and characteristics of a state are intimately involved in the power and influence a state possesses and thus decides, what a state is able and likely to do.

There are several types of relationships between an entity and its environment. One of these is cognitive behaviorism referring to the simple and familiar principle that a person reacts to milieu as he perceives and interprets it in the light of past experiences. Individuals have perceptions and images of the world. What is actually "out there" is of less importance than what the decisionmaker thinks is out there.
The possibilities and probabilities provided by the domestic and global environment, will be utilised to the extent they are perceived and understood by the decisionmaker.

A number of constraints are derived from the perceptions and images individuals in the government have. This influence and constraint on the behaviour comes from within the individual, as a pressure to see the world in a particular way. Our concern here is with those things that effect, how the individual perceives the world and how he makes foreign policy decisions. We are concerned with inclination or willingness rather than opportunity. What makes an individual or a small group of individuals who make foreign policy willing to decide on a course of action? What influences their perception of their opponents, the situation or themselves?

These influences can be divided into several basic groups. One of the important characteristic of individuals who help make foreign policy is their position within the government. Where a person fits in the government and what duties, responsibilities, and loyalties are connected with that position will affect the individual's image of the world and his or her foreign policy decisions.

Just as a government does, individuals must process information—a vast incoming wave of signals, facts and noise. Just as a government an individual cannot process, handle, and understand all available information—especially a high level individual in the governmental position. As do all organisations, individuals must screen some of the information directed at them by the environment. Some information is ignored, some is altered so as not to upset existing views or beliefs; some is looked at quickly and either thrown or buried. Many of the psychological processes that we all use are designed specifically for this screening process. Governmental organisations do the same thing. Bureaucracies may similarly be used to screen information. One's role may be used as a way to be involved in some things and not others, to ignore or tilt the flow of information, thus creating a bias. The lines between psychological and organisational screening may sometimes be very fine.

Both role organisational factors, and individual psychological factors affect how people make decisions. These are then implemented in some form or another as foreign policy events, which have consequences for
the global system. The real world becomes important at this point, because when an action is taken only then it becomes clear how different the real world is from the decision maker's image. The world then provides feedback - information on the consequences of one's actions - giving the decisionmaker a chance to reevaluate their policies, decisions and images and change them if necessary.

Foreign policy is a process involving choice and choosing from the various courses of action, it is a continuous process. Decisionmaking focuses on the people involved in the foreign policy process and on the part of the process that deals with choosing from the various courses of action available. Not choosing to make a decision is also a decision.

Charles Lindblom speaks about an ideal model of decision making. He says that faced with a given problem, the rational policymaker first clarifies his or her values, goals and objectives and then refers to them in some particular way. Then the decisionmaker lists all important possible ways to achieve these goals. Then the decisionmaker investigates all the important consequences of each alternative identified in the previous step. Now the decisionmaker compares the consequences of various alternatives. Finally, the decision maker chooses the decision or policy alternative with the consequences that most closely match the goal. As the ideal decision is made by looking at all the alternatives and their consequences, which of course requires perfect information. However in real situations there are time limits for making decisions, and there are limits on the material and human resources that can be spent on acquiring information needed. There will always be a trade off between the time and resources devoted to gathering more information and the need to take action in the global arena. In the end, one can never be sure that one has all the relevant information. In international politics specially, there is a great deal of secrecy about a state's capabilities and intentions, as well as uncertainty over and just plain ignorance of events, capabilities and intention.

Both individuals and organisations set up screens to filter information. This is one of the important effect of having the government broken up into various organisations- these organisations will often pass along only information that is beneficial to them and not the information that might be relevant. Because of individual psychological screens and organisational screens, decision makers do not have perfect informat-
ion but only a collection of selected data. The psychological screens are interesting because, along with problems in processing information, they may lead decision makers to ignore or fail to grasp the significance of important information they do have.

Charles Lindblom studied how people make decisions and said that people simplify the world not by looking for grand solutions but by muddling through. Lindblom observes that decision makers often work in an incremental manner as one way to cut down on uncertainty and risk, to rely on the familiar to reduce the number of alternatives to be examined, and to reduce complexity of an analysis. That is instead of grand decisions that review the total situation as it existed, a decision maker makes small changes that are only slightly different from decisions and actions already taken. This incremental approach is based on taking routine, small steps in order to cut down on the costs of decision making and the costs of making mistakes. Incremental decisions are thus described as remedial, they can be easily reversed or changed if they prove wrong. Similarly, they are serial in that they build on what has gone before and what is presumably acceptable. They are also exploratory in that one can move into new policy areas to explore new avenues and still pull back if they look to be costly or ineffective. Rather than through grand decisions or grand alternatives, policy changes seem to come through a series of slight modifications of existing policy, with new policy emerging slowing and haltingly by small and usually tentative steps, a process of trial and error in which policy zigs and zags, reverses itself and then move forward.

This incremental method of decision making can nevertheless have some negative aspects. Just because the steps are small and easy to reverse if necessary, it is possible after a time to find oneself deep in the policy that was never intended. For example the boggling down of America in Vietnam or for that matter the Afghanistan imbroglio of the Soviet Union.

In addition to the intellectual process there are also mechanical and social processes of decision making. In the social process there is an active social interaction among several decision makers that result in the decision produced. The governments including the portion involved in the foreign policy process are made up of many parts — both intellect-
ual organisation. Because of this, decisions are not the product of a rational intellectual process but of the interaction, adjustment and politics of people and organisations - social and quasi-mechanical processes. Foreign policy emerges from the normal political process of bargaining, compromise, adjustment, arm twisting, favour trading and so on.

What we have then is a process where each individual player is trying to act in a rational way. Each player - the president, prime minister, foreign minister, foreign secretary, advisers, legislators, generals, cabinet ministers try to set goals, assess alternatives, and make choices through an intellectual process. Each brings some information into the process along with the individual goals, alternatives and calculations of consequences. With all these people participating, most of what should be considered is put into the process. Each participant sees a different face of the issue under consideration, each has different stakes in the game, and each takes a different stand.

We can think of organisations and individuals as having to react to the environment - to steer through it by learning. Learning involves the receipt of information and the use of the information to help us steer. This is the concept of feedback. How much of this information gets back to us, how it is screened on the way both by the governmental organisations and by the individuals will effect our image of the world and how we behave in it. Information and images are so important because it is only through feedback that policymakers are able to steer their states through the troubled waters of the international system.

We can think of the role of an individual as the interaction of the individual and the political system. They come together in a role - the expectation of that system working on the individual. The individual however, also must perceive and interpret these expectations. So although the role may constrain what an individual might do, it also has to be interpreted by the individual in light of that individual's personality and idiosyncracies.

For any position within a government, an individual comes into a situation where there already exists precedents, or the behaviour of previous individuals who held that office. Role and individual elements are mixed in a complex fashion. A strong personality may overcome the constraints of precedent - someone unabashed to innovate or shock or to take political risks. Others may find it comfortable to tread on
Members of different organisations see different sides of a situation, depending on how that situation affects their organisation. An individual's priorities and self interests are seen to derive a large measure from his or her organisation's self interests. This means that each organisation within a government has a narrow range of interest and priorities. The mission of that organisation requires capabilities - the organisation needs money and people to get these, the organisation needs influence within the government, especially on budget decisions, and decisions that distribute new programs and responsibilities to government organisations. Each organisation - and subgroups within that organisation - sees its interest as being similar to and necessary ingredient of some national interest. They define the reason for their organisation's existence in terms of essence - what missions an organisation should have. 47

Organisations are deeply concerned with organisational health - the protection of essence defined in terms of budget allocations and human resource allocations. Organisational health can also be protected by demonstrating how successful the organisation is. One reason why organisations follow standard operating procedures is to cut down uncertainty and risk. Organisations behave incrementally for the same reason. But, and this is crucial for us, the protection of the organisation also entails providing information to policymakers that show the organisation in the best light. This involves withholding or favourably colouring information that would embarrass the organisation in order that top level decisions are implemented in a way that meets the best interests of the organisation, and not necessarily in the spirit of the decision handed down to the organisation for implementation.

The longer a specific role exists, the more precedents are set, and the expectations of people holding the role become more widely held by other members of the government. Thus as an institution becomes older and more complex, it is more difficult for an individual to shape a new role in that institution. As we have already noted that new positions in a government provide much more leeway for an individual to shape a role rather than be constrained by it. But also, the higher the role in the government hierarchy, the less the role influence on the individual.
The higher one goes, the fewer superiors one has and the more likely one is to be confronted with new or unexpected situations. Such situations are also more open to individual influences than those of a role. However, the impact of role also depends upon the individual's personality and especially his or her political skill. Much as the power derived from an individual's position in government, or role, but this power can be expanded or reduced on the basis of the personality and skill of the players involved.

**Perception and the Individual**

In order to understand the role of perception we should realise that firstly, foreign policy is made and implemented by individuals. Second, individuals can make a difference in the foreign policy process of a given state – prime minister, president, foreign minister, revolutionary leader and dictators – can strongly influence the foreign policy process of their own states and of others, and finally how they see the world, this is something what human nature or the individual factor. The unique characteristics of any individual that effect his decision making and behaviour include values, personality, political style, intellect and experience. They work together, creating the individual's set of images about the world or his belief system.

Some of the data on individual idiosyncrasies may be difficult to obtain, and once obtained they may be difficult to interpret. We require biological information, data on their world views, their values and opinions, data on their personality, and their styles of behaviour. In particular we need to know how these factors are used to form images and then how the images work.

In the ideal decision making process there are three steps. First, there has to be some sort of stimulus from the environment a trigger event. The stimulus then has to be perceived in some way. Perception being the second step which is a process by which an individual selects, organises, and evaluates incoming information about the surrounding world. And finally, interpretation of the perceived stimulus is the third step. The point to be noted here is that both perception and interpretation depend heavily on the images.

Our images affect our perceptions in a number of ways. Initially a person's values and beliefs help determine his or her attention -
what is selected as a stimulus and what is actually looked at and attended to. Then, on the basis of previous attitudes and images, the stimulus is interpreted. An open image means that new contradictory or modifying information is incorporated into the existing images, thus changing them to "fit reality. A closed image is one that, for a number of psychological reasons, resists change and thus ignores or reshapes contradictory information; or selects only the little bits and pieces that might be used to support the image already held. But whether open or closed, images are screens. Each of us is attentive only to part of the world around us and each of us has a different set of images for interpreting the incoming information. Perception, based on images is a selective process. A belief system is a collection of beliefs, images or models of the world that the individual hold; it is composed of more or less integrated set of images which make up the entire relevant universe for the individual. They encompass past, present, and the expectation of future reality, and value preferences of what ought to be. Thus belief system performs some very important function for the individual; it helps orient the individual to the environment, organised perception as a guide to behaviour, help establish goals, and act as filter to select relevant information in any given situation.

Even if one obtains perfect information about alternatives and consequences, problems of perception makes meaningless the notion of an ideally rational choice of alternative. For all the information, only some of it will be selected or perceived. The interpretation of information will depend on the individual's belief system and images. The idea of "rational decision" is not very clear because if two or more individuals in the same situation, receiving the same information, make different choices because they see and interpret information differently on the basis of different images.

Misperception means that images are screening out important signals by either ignoring them completely, interpreting them incorrectly, or changing the information to fit existing images. Images act as intervening variables, mediating between the incoming information and the behaviour based on that information.

In order for decision makers to act at all in a complex world of information overload, they must use screens including the perceptual ones. Keeping this in mind, what are some of the major reasons and ways
in which decision makers perceive the world selectively? People try to achieve cognitive consistency. This means that the images they hold do not clash with or contradict each other. Sometimes new information forces an image to change so that it contradicts other images; this often happens when an information contradicts a negative stereotype of a group of people or an enemy. Rather than change one's image and causes a reappraisal of others, a person may simply ignore or reshape new information.

Another mechanism that influences selected perception is evoked set. People perceive and evaluate the world according to what they are concerned with at the moment. The use of historical analogies, though often perfect, also leads to selective perception—looking for those details in a present episode that will look like a past one, while ignoring the important differences. Another related process that affects perception is the process of wishful thinking the influence of fears and desires on perception. We often see either what we fear or what we wish the case to be.

These two observations are directly related to the more substantive perceptions common in foreign policy. An important one is the tendency for decisionmakers to see other states particularly adversaries or competitors, as more hostile than they are. Again perception leads one to select the information that supports hostility or to interpret behaviour as being hostile. Because others are seen as more hostile, some of the phenomenon related to the image of an enemy takes place. One sees the behaviour of other states as more centralised and coordinated than it really is. One ignores or underestimates the role of chance, mistakes and particularly, the influence of bureaucratic policies when looking at the behaviour of other states. This result derives from the view that a state is a monolithic, rational and single minded entity. When others act in the way you want, the tendency is to overestimate the influence that you had on the opponent's behaviour. On the other hand, when the adversary does something undesired the tendency is not to say, "It seems I have no influence with him", but to find other, usually internal forces to explain the behaviour. For example when United States was unable to achieve a strong stable state in South Vietnam, it was considered not due to the failure of America or the lack of will and
capability in the South but to external intervention of the North.

One major factor in perception is the existence of scapegoat — an excuse for failures we cannot admit. An enemy acts as a scapegoat in that it is accused of the things that one dislikes in oneself. The accusation is used to justify one's own behaviour which is similar to that of the opponent. In foreign relations an enemy is usually seen as being aggressive and seeking domination and conquest. Being able to crusade against such an enemy brings great psychological satisfaction. One can ignore one's own behaviour and preserve one's self image because no matter how badly one is behaving, the object of that behaviour is an even more evil enemy.

Having an enemy allows one the satisfaction of recognising one's own moral superiority — of having a cause and being needed by that cause to oppose and defeat the enemy as well as having the satisfaction of being able to hate and kill without being bothered by one's conscience. Having an enemy permits one to see the world in easy black and white images — clear cut distinction of good and evil.

But the image of the enemy also distorts the view of the opponent. By seeing the opponent as something evil, there is a lack of empathy the inability to see the world as the opponent might see it. This gives only a very incomplete view of the situation and a dangerous one at that, by not seeing how virtuous behavior may appear to the other party and how it may worsen the situation. In addition seeing one as an enemy often screens out the conciliatory, cooperative or tension reducing behaviour of the opponent. Ignoring this may result in ignoring chances to stop a war before it starts or to end a war already begun.

Psychoanalytical studies reveal that leaders having aberrant personalities have considerable impact on policy. Studies of Hitler, Stalin, Woodrow Wilson and Saddam Hussein reveal basic personality disturbances. Though extreme personality disturbances are rare among leaders of large democratic nations, specially under normal conditions where a potential leader has to work up his way through the party organisation over a period of time. People who think and act peculiarly will be weeded out of the system long before they reach the top. 54

A person with severe personality disturbance is likely to spend great amount of energy coping with the psychological problems. Therefore
he shall not be able to perform all his work and responsibility. During times of great political and social upset however, a person with unusual personality characteristics may achieve power when normal people are unable to cope with their social problems. The example of Winston Churchill is a glaring one.

In nations where ascension to power is more routine, the range of personality types found in office is substantially narrower. Even so there are enough variations to warrant the use of psychoanalytic technique to study foreign policy decision makers. Just as all people take out their emotions, frustrations and personality quirks on the world around them, decision makers will also displace the private personality drives they have on to the world around them. In their case this world is also the world of diplomacy and foreign policy decision making.

If we look at foreign policy and foreign policy decision as the product of human behaviour, then it would be foolish to overlook the fact that decision makers are physical beings influenced by physiological and possibly their genetic heritage. On a very simple level, whether information is received and the degree to which it is understood and interpreted depends on the physical ability of the individual. Thus the physical as well as the mental health of decision makers can affect foreign policy and the decision making process. The strain of high public office is great which effects the health of the leader. Human physiology is built so that in a stressful situation the body is geared for fight or flight. All the physical reactions that accompany a situation of high stress - increased heart beat, the pumping of adrenalin, movement of blood to the muscles - are directed to getting the body ready for combat or for running away as fast as possible. The stress that builds up in the body is released by these physical actions. The foreign policy maker of today reacts to stress in exactly the same way physiologically but not behaviourly. He does'nt go running in circles around his office but sits and talks or broods. Physical stress is not released as it was supposed to be which impairs health of policymakers. In addition such stress as that during a crisis broadly affects the performance of people - how they see the situation to be decided, how they narrow the number of alternatives they see available, how they may decline
in their level headed thinking, and so on.

A crisis can be defined as a high threat situation, that was not anticipated and that requires action in a short time. This is exactly the type of situation that places a decision maker under most stress. The important point is, that a crisis situation will effect the decision maker's perceptions differently from a non crisis situation. The decision process will tend to be different, and the psychological constraints, will also be different.

Quite often, because of time pressure, a crisis is a period of information overload for the decisionmaker - messages come in from observers on the spot, from aides who have been asked to find out what is happening, from ambassadors etc. The combination of stress and information overload will usually lead the decision makers to overreact or underreact. Again this comes down to screens and psychological processes, that set up those screens. Any distortion thus caused in the world view will reduce the decision maker's capability to interpret and the quality of interpretation. A crisis caused by high threat is also a situation of high involvement.

During a crisis, communications tend to become shorter and more stereotyped, as stress increases. Stereotypes not only distort but tend to cast things in black-white images and to foster the creation of and maintenance of the evil image of the enemy. Not surprisingly then crisis can lead to overperception of the level of hostility and violence of one's opponent: in other words, one sees hostility where it does not exist. On the other hand, one underperceives the hostility and violence in one's own actions. Perception of anxiety and fear are likely to increase in a crisis situation which may even lead the decision makers to somewhat ignore capabilities. There is a desire to break tension by any means - even war - could lead to ignoring the strength of one's state, one's allies, and one's opponents. As crisis grows decisionmakers increasingly feel that their own range of alternatives becomes more restricted. The crisis therefore cuts down their perception of alternatives. At the same time, the decisionmaker perceive the alternatives of their opponents as expanding.

As crisis situations can have these type of effects on any individual, it is advisable that policymakers keep this fact in their mind while
making important decisions, in a crisis situation. This is especially so because crisis situation are most likely to call forth intellectual processes rather than social ones because only a few people are involved in working out a solution and as such the decisions will be based on the images of the world held by each of them. The extent to which their world image is distorted would to that extent impact on the quality of decisions made.