CHAPTER II

CAPABILITIES

An old saying about the nature of foreign policy and the dynamics of interstate relations is that a state does what it can and suffers what it must. A state's range of actions are limited both by the definition and fact. The objective it selects, and the tactics it adopts in order to achieve them, can never be anymore than functions of an overall capacity for action in a given situation. The tension inherent in the contrast of absolute ends and sharply circumscribed means making policy making a constant process of compromise and adjustment. The nature and extent of state's capacity to achieve its ends is closely allied to the state's purpose.

The broadest and most useful definition describes state's capability as the capacity to affect changes in the global environment in its own interest. This does not include all actions a state may be in a position to undertake, but only those deemed advantageous to itself.

Change in environmental conditions is obviously the core of the concept's rationale. By means of its capability, a state does what it can; under circumstances beyond its capabilities, it suffers what it must. Change in its broadest term refers to the situational relationship, that are different than they would have been, without application of the state's capability. The concept therefore includes neutralisation of certain forces as well as augmentation of certain others. A state makes its intentions effective in the real world, by the means of its capability. The concept of capability refers to the means aspect of the ends-means continuum, in foreign policy. The policymaker cannot afford vagueness. Though generally the concept is conceived and discussed in abstract, capability judgement in foreign affairs are useful only when made in highly concrete, specific and immediate terms.
National attributes or capabilities greatly influence the means available to a nation in international interaction. Capabilities are directly related to the means at a state's disposal in implementing foreign policy. What is probable and possible relates to the means at one's disposal. This is specially important in gauging the activity of, or reaction towards specific states. Capabilities include any physical object, talent, or quality that can be used to affect the behaviour of others.

Capabilities are crucial to two different aspects of influence. First, for threats and promises to be useful as instruments of influence, they have to be credible. If threats and promises are to be believed, the state should be both able and willing to carry it out. Capabilities are important in that one must indeed be able to carry out what one has promised or threatened. Second, if threats and promises do not work, often punishments must be inflicted – political, economic, or military. States require capabilities in order to coerce others, in order to impose the costs or the pain that will force others to behave, as desired. Here capabilities are needed to influence others by actually imposing costs on them. But by doing so effectively, a state also enhances its reputation, as being willing to carry out threats in a way that get results. If this occurs, than at some point in future threats may not have to be carried out, mere hint of punishment will bring about the desired action. The use of military force is considered to be a failure of influence.

The ability to get others to do one's bidding will differ with the object of one's influence. Influence is always relative. The capabilities of states takes on meaning only when they are viewed in relation to the objectives of the states and the capabilities and objectives of others. In studying a state's capabilities, the first question should concern the capability to do what. The second question should concern to whom. For examples, Indian military capabilities are adequate for a war with Pakistan; if security in regard to Pakistan is an Indian objective, it is basically achieved. The same capabilities are inadequate, however, if India desires the same security from U.S. military power.

It is important to realise that the various elements of influence, capabilities and instruments, can in some degree be substituted for one another and converted into other elements of influence. Some types
of capabilities, like money are specially capable of being exchanged for something else. Wealth, for example can be used to obtain military capabilities or knowledge, or a healthier population. Military capability can be used to influence others to give up territory or resources or simply to take these things by force. Either way, military instruments can be used to acquire wealth. Almost all bases of influence have some ability to obtain other influence capabilities, but the exchange rate can vary a great deal.

The problem of converting one base of influence into another creates many difficulties, where some measure of power is of the essence. Military strength, for instance may have great value in deterrence but not in stabilising a state's exchange rate or dissuading OPEC from raising oil prices.

The attributes of population, area and G.N.P. may be seen as major aspects of a state's base of power. The number of people within the state, the amount of territory it controls and the economic resources goods and services produced on that territory by those people are the bases of power and influence. They constitute a small set of tangible or measureable elements of power and influence capabilities that the state possesses. It would be useful to think of capabilities in terms of quantity and quality, tangible and intangible. Some of the tangible measures of capabilities would include population, area, geography in the sense of defensible natural boundaries as well as defensive depth that comes from a large territory, industrial and agricultural production capacity, size of economy, and various measures of military power.2

TANGIBLE ELEMENTS OF CAPABILITIES

GEOGRAPHY
Geographic factors enter into state's capability in a number of ways. These are size, shape, topography, location and climate. More subtle geographic influences include the nature of a state's frontier, its neighbours, its insular, peninsular or land locked conditions, its penetratability and the distribution of its population over the landscape. Each of these factors may provide an advantage or handicap or have no effect.3
Location

The location of a state in relation to other states is a geographic fact of immense importance. Who is or is not one's neighbour has significant strategic implication and can have considerable impact on national security. It is essential in discussing location and proximity, to look at more than just one neighbour. Geographical features strongly impact other components of capabilities of a state.

During the earlier periods distance was an important barrier but due to changes in technology it is no longer as formidable as before. Today high seas can act as highways as well as barriers, and intercontinental missiles can cross them without any difficulty. Nevertheless, the lack of proximity to one's potential adversary is still of quite some importance because it is difficult and logistically inconvenient to wage a war over great distances even for great powers, but it is no longer impossible.

A state located adjacent to great power is still at a disadvantage as it is compelled to pay more attention towards it's defence than it would have done if not so located. The lack of great and powerful neighbours allowed the United States to choose an orientation of avoidance for most of the nineteenth century, and concentrate it's energies on it's economic development. This would not have been possible had it been located adjacent to powerful neighbours.

Two other locational factors needs mentioning. First sometimes a state is strategically significant primarily because of it's location. The example of Poland between the two wars and Pakistan during the Afghanistan imbroglio are cases in reference. Second certain states because of their location possess or control certain specific geographic features such as a peninsula or a strait etc., which greatly enhances their importance. A state controlling Gibraltar or the Suez Canal is bound to be an important state for those who operate in the Mediterranean.

Size

The second major geographic factor is size. Large size automatically yields certain benifits. It gives a nation's army room to retreat and fight when it considers the circumstances right, as shown by the Russian strategy against Napoleon or the Soviet strategy against Hitler.4 It also allows the location and dispersal of critical population, economic, military and governmental facilities at centres far from it's borders,
thus increasing their chances of survival even against a nuclear attack. Great size if combined with a large population, besides giving other obvious advantages also acts as a deterrent because it is singularly difficult to occupy and then control such a state. A small country possesses none of these advantages and is much more vulnerable to invasion, conquest and occupation, as shown by the recent conquest of Kuwait by Iraq. But it is not a unmixed blessing to be big. Mere space can just as well be a source of weakness, and a temptation to invasion, as a source of strength. An area must be able to support a large population for it to be a positive element, and this capacity depends on factors other than size. Great size can have other disadvantages. There is a point beyond which efficiency decreases. Sheer size can easily multiply the number and complexities of problems with which the state must deal, and this in turn may as well lead to a burgeoning, overbearing bureaucracy. If size means that various nationality groups are included in the population than this could lead to internal discontent and thus a source of weakness. Though great size may have it's drawbacks policymakers seldom feel that the disadvantages equal the advantages. Therefore, other things being equal, if one has a choice between decreasing, maintaining or increasing territory the last almost always will be preferred.

Climate
The third geographical feature affecting capability is climate. Certain points are evident in this regard. There is need for sufficient heat, a long enough growing season, sufficient rainfall, and a soil of a minimum quality in order for a country to produce good crops. Otherwise it will be dependant on foreign sources to keep it from starving. There are in the world that are either so hot or so cold that human beings cannot function optimally, and not much vegetation or animal life is sustainable with the result that these areas can never produce states with large capabilities.

Topography
A fourth major geographical feature is topography. Topography has an impact on climate. Wind, temperature, rainfall and soil conditions are influenced by the lay on the land, by the relative position of waterways within a country, by the height and location of mountains and valleys, and so forth. Topography also has important internal effects on the country. The location of plains, rivers, mountains, valleys, lakes etc.
will have considerable impact on both transportation and communication. These factors also have extremely important effect on the location, density and unity of the population, the ease of moving military forces from one point to another, and on the pattern of economic distribution and development.

Topographical factors also have a strategic value vis-à-vis other nations and have sometimes set limits to expansion. Great mountains like the Himalayas, the Alps and the Pyrenees have served this function.

**Shape**

The final geographic feature affecting capability is shape. In some cases a state's configuration can be of much significance. The state of Czechoslovakia was created from a portion of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War. A long narrow state it was not very easily defensible, without significant outside support. This led to it's dismemberment according to Hitler's wishes when it found itself isolated after Munich, and that too without a shot being fired.

**POPULATION**

Many of the same type of statements as geography apply to population. Although a large population can be an asset or a liability, it is difficult to become a great power without a large population. A large population is required in order to have enough people to have the range of talents required for the industrial, technological and military capabilities required of a great power. Population must be looked at a number of ways. We must be concerned with the age distribution of the population, the sex distribution, the spatial distribution (density), whether the population is growing or declining, and the like. These factors of the population reveal it's productivity, regenerative capacity, and determine whether enough manpower could be set aside for an effective military force. 5

We should consider both the quantitative as well as the qualitative aspects of the state's population. The quality of human resources available to a state, not of course the inherent quality, but the degree to which the people's capabilities have been developed so that they make a contribution to the state which is proportionate to their numbers.
One kind of capability can be called enlightenment - the extent of higher education and access to specialised knowledge in science and engineering, and the professions. Obviously the military strength depends on a large part to the access to scientific knowledge, building and operating modern weapons requires a degree of scientific expertise that is not easily available to small and poor countries. More broadly speaking a state needs physicians, architects, social scientists, lawyers, and managers as well as others with advanced training and ability. Aspects of enlightenment are closely related to the economic and material development of the state. This is also true for a more basic kind of knowledge. Here we refer to the knowledge necessary to get along in modern life even at a rather low level of sophistication, such as literacy, familiarity with machines, or primary and secondary education. Widespread literacy is both a resource base for the state and a means whereby the government can communicate information quickly to its people. But universal education, even at a rather low level required to produce literacy, is costly and difficult for the poor states to provide.

Another aspect of the population's quality is the health and well being of the people. What access do they have to good medical care? How long do they typically live? How free is the country from various contagious diseases that are now preventable? How evenly distributed is good health throughout the population? Are substantial minorities ethnic or economic with markedly poorer than average facilities? The health of a state's own population is an important base of influence. Military power depends in part on having a healthy population of young people. Here it is important that access to good medical facilities is available to the entire population, regardless of income.

Another reason that possessing a large, healthy and educated population is usually important in its relations to economic strength. A large population is essential for the development of an economic system sufficiently advanced to create enough wealth which is necessary to influence other parties over an extended period of time. And unless a state has a large number of people, it is extremely difficult to develop both the quantity and quality of skills and capabilities that are required by the highly interdependent, specialised, and technologically advanced systems of the industrial world.
A large population contributes to the strength not only in terms of productive capability but also on the consumption side, by creating an actual and potential market for goods and services. Other states will be attracted to the large markets and would be willing to compromise on various issues, just to obtain access to the market.

Another advantage of possessing a large population relates to a state's ability to avoid subjugation after suffering military reverses. A heavily populated state will be harder to occupy and later to control.

Population density and spatial distribution also needs to be examined. Is the country densely populated, thus making it highly susceptible to nuclear devastation

Another phenomenon in the present day world is that of overpopulation. The drawback of excess population is that it breeds chaos and bitterness, providing fertile ground for parties implementing the orientation of indirect opposition via guerilla warfare and propaganda techniques. [Pakistan is at present using this orientation against us.] Economic strength is being harmed, popular support to government jeopardised, and social cohesiveness is decreased.

Finally one must be certain to analyse trends. Demographic factors like all the components of capability, are everchanging, and it is essential to assess in terms of their past, present, and probable future. The world is dynamic, not static, and a useful analysis must take this into account.

All the aspects of the population component - size, productive elements, educational levels, density and spatial distribution - need to be examined not only in terms of their current status but also via a projection of past and present into the future, although such an exercise is imprecise, it is also imperative.

**Natural Resources**

Natural resources are clearly an important dimension of wealth, in the power and influence base of states. The concept of natural resources as capabilities is related to the idea that states with greater needs are most vulnerable to influence from other states that control or affect the resources that satisfy those needs. Natural Resources, such as petro-
-eum or other energy sources, such as coal and natural gas are most common examples. Many other resources are necessary for the industrial capacity of a state, for example uranium, and other nuclear power material and metals related to ferrous metallurgy. Advances in technology can be used to overcome resource deficiency to some extent through the development of synthetics and new industrial processes for refinement and extraction. If a state can be self sufficient, it reduces it's vulnerability to being pressured by others.

Natural Resources along with human power and technology, make the industrial and agricultural productive capacity of states. This capacity is partially measured by G.N.P., but it beyond it. States often do not want to be in a position where they must purchase a great deal of their food, industrial equipment, technology or energy from others. GNP or wealth of a state is also connected with capacity. Production of energy and electric power, steel etc. are also indicators of industrial productivity in general. In regard to wealth, we should also see how much money and resources can be devoted to military capabilities. Finally, we must also be concerned with the quality of the goods, services, and agricultural products produced. One should also be concerned with the question of how much is being produced in proportion to what is needed.

While no one would suggest that a nation that is richly endowed with natural resources will automatically become a great power, it is clear that the possession of large quantities of high quality resources provide a base on which capability can be built.

When analysing the role of natural resources in capability determination the policymaker must keep in mind six basic points. First, it is necessary to distinguish between the mere possession of natural resources and their use. Resources contribute to economic and military strength primarily as they are developed. Minerals for example must be drawn from the earth and processed before they enter into the production process. If a state does not have this extracting, processing and producing capacity it's mineral resources contribute little to the usable strength.

A second point is that a country must also have political control over it's own territory if it is to receive the optimum benifits from it's resources. Policymaker of the underdeveloped countries fear this consequence if they allow the multinationals to enter in such critical fields.
Third all state's resource endowment is unique, no two states have the same quantity, quality and mix of resources. This fundamental asymmetry that exists between various party's resource situation make comparison difficult. The problem is compounded by the fact that it is hard to assess the relative advantage accruing from the possession of one particular resource against the merits of possessing another. Resources, after all, vary in utility according to circumstances, situations and needs; iron is not equal to oil, uranium to alumina, or copper to manganese. Also whatever the situation is at present, it will surely change over time.

Fourth, resources reflect not only potentials but also limitations. A lack of resources will set limits on the objectives one would formulate and in point of fact will eventually set limitations on their achievement. Because of this, obtaining sufficient resources and reducing vulnerability to resource deficiency manipulation are often significant goals.

Fifth, no state is totally self sufficient.

Sixth, natural resources sometimes provide a nation of a ground for the nation's political power that they would not otherwise possess. An example is the oil rich states of the Arabian peninsula. However, the possession of natural resources can also make a nation the object of political activities, which it would otherwise escape. Kuwait is an example of this fact.

INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY

In one sense industrial and agricultural productivity as a capability factor is a function of the preceding two factors of population and natural resources. That is production is the applicability of the human effort to the transformation of resources from raw material to finished goods. Thus the level of industrial and agricultural production is determined in part by the initial resource endowment and in part to the amount and quality of the workforce committed to the task.

Production levels are obviously more relevant to capability than resource potentials, whatever is produced is available for utilisation. Particularly relevant in dealing with productivity are such consideration as availability, convertability of facilities, and lead time. These
quality interpretations of productivity provide estimates of what the state might be doing at some point in future.\textsuperscript{10}

A prime element of capability is economic strength. Traditionally it's importance was due to it's close association with military capacity. In this respect the degree of industrialisation is critical. According to Morgenthau, "The technology of modern warfare and communications has made the overall development of heavy industries an indispensable element of national power...."\textsuperscript{9} This however, is an oversimplification as the scenario of modern warfare has changed the entire complexion of the issue. For the development of nuclear strength one could argue that the relative degree of industrialisation is important but not determinative because a moderately developed economy with technological expertise and a solid financial base might be sufficient. Even more significant is the fact that many uses of military instrument are for various types of limited and sublimited war. These activities often do not require a high level of economic development.

Economic strength today is critically significant in it's own right. The mere existence of a powerful economy exercises an influence because of it's potential impact. Similarly it's immense productive capacity automatically makes it a potential threat to competitors.

Beyond mere existence however, lies the realm of economic policy techniques. States often use economic tools to achieve their objectives, and the stronger the economy more varied and credible the options. One cannot effectively promise financial assistance if it cannot be given, nor can one threaten deprivation without the strength to deprive.

\textbf{Agricultural Capacity}

A major component of economic strength which often receives insufficient attention is agricultural capacity. One can view the process of economic development as a shift from agricultural to an industrial economy. This shift cannot be accomplished until a major portion of labour strength is utilised in the industrial sector. If a state is not self sufficient or nearly so in food production it is at a great disadvantage relative to those that are.

When analysing agricultural capacity, where to begin is a problem. First question is whether it is self sufficient in food production. A
serious deficiency in gross agricultural capacity poses a number of problems. Internally it requires such policies and resources that disproportionately emphasize one sector of economy at the expense of others, however the policymakers have little choice. Externally such states are compelled to negotiate with commodity supplying states from a position of relative weakness. Operational capability is certainly minimal in such circumstances. In war time a severely deficient food producing state is highly vulnerable to adversarial pressures.

The second facet of agricultural capacity is productivity, efficiency and the level of output per-acre, worker, capita etc. Many states are able to produce enough food for their population but only through over-employment of resources in agriculture. This is a major problem of under-developed and poor countries.

While analysing the question of insufficient absolute production and low productivity one must also look at the probabilities of change. To what extent is the country capable of increasing food production? Is the climate such that this could occur? Through the use of various fertilisers, irrigation schemes, better quality seeds, better management and the application of higher level of skill, knowledge and technology is it possible for these states to overcome their agricultural problems.

**Economic Development**

The real key of economic strength lies in economic modernisation and development. Highly modernised economies are characterised by a high degree of economic differentiation, a complex division of labour, highly organised and standardised production system, high level of productivity, and high levels of total outcomes.

How does one determine the degree to which a particular economy is developed? Though there are several indicators but each has its own difficulties.

The first standard is Gross National Product (GNP) which indicates the total output of an economy at market prices, thus being a measure of production, not potential. As such it reflects total output in all areas and all changes in consumption and investment. Military and other Governmental expenditure are also reflected. Relative GNP provides a useful plane for comparision because they indicate comparative magnitudes...
of strength and limitations of a particular country's capability to support internal and external commitments.

There are several difficulties in using GNP data. First, unpaid labour such as in households and the value of goods exchanged via barter is not included. Second, GNP figures are based on monetary values, they may not reflect the true contribution of any particular segment of the economy to that of the country's political commitment. Third, when one is comparing economies it is difficult to translate prices from one economic system to another because of the nature of the different systems and currencies. Prices may be artificially set and the official ratio between currencies may not reflect their actual value relationship. For example the rupee rouble exchange ratio, presently. Fourth, states have different economic data systems and converting individual state data even if it is available, to common categories and concepts is a difficult task. Thus methodological errors may occur and the resultant product may be somewhat inaccurate. Finally, because currency values fluctuate, inflationary and deflationary factors may skew results. Though inspite of these difficulties it is possible to develop common data bases and make comparisons that are meaningful.

One must not only analyse current GNP but also trends and changes. Four features of today's world are especially important. They are, first, growth rate of certain developed economies has slowed down. Second, major oil producing nations of OPEC have achieved high growth rates though they have slowed down considerably now, but still are among the higher ones. Third, Japan's GNP is continuing to advance very rapidly more than any other industrialised nations. Finally many of the poorer states are developing faster than the industrialised world.

The second major indicator is the Gross National Product per Capita. Two points are specially pertinent here, first the immense gap between the rich and poor is actually increasing despite the fact that less developed nations are growing. One reason of this is they are generally overpopulated. Second point is that even within the general category of developed nations there is significant disparity in GNP per capita.

The third major standard of economic development is energy production and consumption. This indicator includes all energy sources: oil, coal, solar, hydroelectric power and natural gas. No nation can develop and
operate a modern industrialised economy without a large supply of energy. Here too, both the gross as well as the per capita figure should be analysed. Another important factor is the degree to which a nation produces enough energy to meet its domestic needs. If it does not and is heavily dependent on any energy import like Japan, it is extremely vulnerable.

Another significant measure of economic development is steel production. Steel is the basic ingredient in nearly all heavy industrial and military goods. To some extent steel production has flexibility as it can shift easily from civilian to military uses and vice versa.

The final indicator is the percentage of the state's labour force engaged in non-agricultural work. If the majority of labour force is involved in producing enough food there would be insufficient resources left for industrialisation.

Another issue of primary importance in analysing economic capabilities is who gets what part of the pie? What sectors of the economy are emphasized, what are the state's priorities and how are economic resources in the form of land, labour and capital allocated? Policymakers in all nations are confronted with incessant demand from a wide variety of sources and have insufficient resources to meet them. Therefore, decision must be made concerning which demands are to be met and which are not, and the degree to which those demands that are to be met shall be satisfied.

Another allocation question concerns government expenditures. While analysing this factor we are concerned with the relationship of the government expenditure to national economic output, the role of government in controlling and directing production, the wisdom with which it participates in and manage the economy, the extent of participation and management, and the degree to which government expenditure are allocated to military purposes.

The statistics of military allocation provides some indication of the general scale of the country's military efforts. The rapidly increasing costs of not only direct participation in warfare but also the maintenance of large military force, of research and development, creating sophisticated weapon system have become so prohibitive that many nations are finding it unsupportable.
Finally, while it is true no single component of capability is the only determinant of national power, economic strength is obviously a critical element. Second, one must remember that economic capability is significant not only because of its impact on the state's potential for military activities, but also in its own rights.

**MILITARY CAPABILITY**

Military capability, the last tangible element of capability, is perhaps today the most prominent and controversial of all capabilities. One must analyse capability with respect to the specific policy content in which one is operating, and assess the capability in relation to the particular objectives and conditions thereof. There are many situations in which the utility of military power is much less than one would expect from mere assessment of its components. Despite this fact and while not underestimating its importance, the policymaker must recognise that the essence of the existence of independent states is their capacity to make their own decisions, and these decisions often involve judgements about the potential or actual use of military force. In the decentralised anarchical international system military force has been and remains the ultimate arbiter of conflict. Moreover the military policy instrument can be usefully employed in a number of situations in various ways other than total combat, and they would like to have the capacity to optimise these other usages as well. Whether we like it or not it is a fact that wars of various kinds do occur, statesmen frequently employ military strength and policymakers sometimes choose to risk or engage in hostilities. Military strength is and will continue to be a vitally important building block for the operational exercise of capability.

**Quantitative and Distributive Aspects**

Part of the policymaker's assessment of military strength involves a consideration of quantitative and distributive factors. Here we are concerned with the size of forces, the number of bases, the types and number of weapons and so forth. We are not concerned with absolute figures but rather with comparing the strength of the country's forces. While making such comparisons one should be theatre specific and not include data that is irrelevant. But such figures are far from the whole story.
When analysing the quantitative factors one must develop meaningful categories. For example, as one gathers data on air forces, it should not be just how many bombers but also, how many what kind? Therefore it is necessary to specify both the performance characteristics and the mission to be performed; otherwise one may be comparing apples with oranges.

When analysing the forces in being one must also analyse the distribution among various branches. How large, for example, is the army as compared to the navy and the air force? A significant concentration of personnel in any branch has direct and obvious implications for capability and strategy.

When analysing various state's armed forces the problem of comparability arises. Not only are there differences in distribution of personnel and weapons among branches, the mix within each branch is considerably different. How does one compare bombers and missiles or armed and infantry divisions. Even when trying to compare like categories one finds equivalence hard to determine. For example if one is comparing armed divisions, we find divisions are structured differently in different nations. Obviously simple comparisons by the number of divisions would be extremely misleading. It is essential that one knows the way states structure their various divisions etc., if comparisons are to be meaningful.

Because all nations face different problems, operate from different perspectives, and proceed on the basis of different assumptions, the problem of developing useful categories for comparison is complicated even further.

Qualitative Factors: Personnel

It should be obvious that the policymakers should not halt the analysis after examining the quantitative factors, qualitative factors are also vital. Before commencing the discussion on qualitative factors, two things should be kept in mind. First, the distinction among factors to be discussed imply a degree of separateness that is somewhat beyond that which actually exists; the factors are interrelated. Second, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative features is also somewhat artificial. As we have discussed above, one cannot discuss quantitative features wholly separately from qualitative considerations; and the...
reverse is equally true. Thus, while it is highly useful for the purpose of clearthinking to analyse the categories separately, it is essential to remember that in the real world they are always somewhat interrelated.

For purposes of analysis, qualitative considerations can be usefully subdivided into categories of personnel, the level of technological development, and leadership. The quality of the troops involved in a particular conflict may be decisive. For example, the success of Vietnam against the immensely superior firepower of the United States in the Vietnam war. Vietnamese army's skill, there propensity to harmonize with the population, their ability to make use of the geographical factors, their high moral and dedication, and their ability to gain critical information allowed them to neutralise the United States vast technological advantages.

Qualitative Factor: Technological
Another major component of military capability and strength is the level of technological development and sophistication. Although other factors also are important and in some kinds of conflicts can partially offset technological superiority, it is equally true that wars have often been decided by technological superiority and policymakers clearly would like to have technological supremacy. Enormous funds are spent today on R&D, testing, producing and deploying highly advanced weapons, support and control systems. All policymakers will like to have the technological advantage. And the present day weapon systems have such devastating firepower that it is mind boggling.

When analysing the strategic nuclear relationship in an effort to determine whether essential equivalence exist, things are even more complicated than conventional military. Several other factors also have to be considered. On is the target vulnerability. Another aspect is payload or throw weight, the weapons and the penetration aids carried by the delivery vehicle.

Qualitative Factor: Leadership
The final qualitative aspect of military capability is leadership, this encompasses many factors. It involves the degree to which the leaders are able to bridge the gap between regular soldiers and officers and
between various branches of the armed forces as a whole. It concern the quality and appropriateness of the military training programme. It includes the efficiency and the capacity of the staff and the command, control and communication system and structures. It involves the degree of receptivity to innovation and change, flexibility in terms of strategy and tactics, the capacity to analyse and correctly assess the impact of military information, and the extent to which leaders are able to produce vigorous sustained action by both frontline and supporting elements. Finally, and crucially good leadership involves a correctly anticipating and visualising the scenarios most likely to occur, the type of hostilities in which a party is most likely to be engaged, and subsequent preparing of one's forces adequately and appropriately for those kinds of contingencies, and then following through with appropriate execution. 15

The problem of correct strategy is becoming more and more difficult to solve during the myriad of types of conflicts that are possible and the fact that no country has unlimited sources. It is virtually impossible for the policymakers to be prepared to meet all contingencies and develop appropriate strategies to meet all possible types and levels of conflict. One can never foresee the future, what kind of hostilities will occur where and under what circumstances, and once the shooting starts its very difficult to predict what will happen anyway. More than this no party has sufficient resources to prepare fully, for all eventualities. The best policymaker can do, is carefully analyse the likely contingencies, rank them in terms of importance and probability, and then, on this basis, allocate resources and devise what seems to be the appropriate strategies. Hopefully one will anticipate correctly or nearly so in most instances. Nevertheless, inaccuracies are to some degree inevitable, Therefore, it is essential that the policymaker’s plans provide a level of flexibility sufficient to at least partially counter unanticipated contingencies. Where this is not done the outcome may be counterproductive.

INTANGIBLE ELEMENTS OF CAPABILITIES

Any state requires more than the mere existence of the resources that make up capabilities. The state must also maintain those political,
social, and economic structures that will permit it to mobilise or use the resources that exist within its borders. The question is one of mobilising those resources to create the instruments of influence and then, using the instruments to achieve the objectives of the state.

GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS:
The first of the intangible capability components is governmental function. The forms, structures and processes of government in a particular state. The central concern in this regard is the degree to which the government can bring the country's potential capabilities to bear on the specific problem at hand, and the efficiency and dispatch with which it can be done. If the policymakers cannot actualise potential capability then such potential might as well not exist. If they bring it to bear but only in an inefficient manner, then they either will be less likely to achieve their objective, or do so only at a disproportionate cost. This is important at any time but may be particularly crucial in short run crisis situations.16

It has sometimes been assumed that policymakers in authoritarian governments automatically possess major advantages compared to those in democratic system. It is postulated that authoritarian systems can act with secrecy, speed, and decisiveness, and are able to shift gears whenever necessary, and are able to use whatever means they consider appropriate. This argument has validity but most of the time the differences between authoritarian and democratic decisionmaking systems, is that of differences of degrees and not kind.17

All governments, for example, require some degree of acceptance by their populace to exist, and so the policymakers are concerned with what people think. This may be less true of authoritarian states.

Another point is that authoritarian governments as well as democracies are composed of peoples and interests that both compete and cooperate in the policy making process, and this can lead to inefficiency, confusion, misdirected policies, and delays in both systems.

Outsiders dealing with a core of individuals who are operating within and trying to dominate an intensively and extensively controlled political system, sometimes fail to perceive the internal factionalism that exists. On some occasion the facade of unity hides a bitter (domestic) struggle
for power.

However, it is still true that democratic policymakers are relatively less free to formulate and implement policies as they desire than are their authoritarian counterparts, and they often find it more difficult to act as rapidly. These difficulties have sometimes led to vast governmental effort to deceive and mislead the populace. But this difficulty can also be an advantage if one assumes that policy more responsive to the public will receive more support. Furthermore, more open systems tend to allow a greater interchange of concepts and data, presumably leading to more informed decisions. Sometimes the monolithicness of authoritarian systems, and thereby the freedom of choice of policymakers in such systems is overemphasised. In a free society any discontent is openly visible while it may appear to be apparently non existant in an authoritarian system even though it is very much there, albeit unperceived by the outsiders and maybe the policymakers themselves. In such a case policymakers of authoritarian states do not have greater freedom in real terms, because if discontent is allowed to grow beyond a critical limit an explosion may occur, with unforeseen results. One must remember that Gorbachov's attempts to reforms led to the situation out of his hand, an outcome he had not foreseen, with disastrous results for the state he led.

While analysing the governments, we should find answers to some such key questions. First, what is the form and the structure of the target government? Though the form of government alone does not dictate the nature of the political process, but it is also true that the particular structure has impact. The second question is, what is the current political situation and what are the actual political processes in the particular state? It is essential that one go beyond the formal institutions of the government and seek to determine who actually holds power, how decisions actually are made, what in practice is the process by which rules are promulgated, interpreted, applied and enforced, and how disputes are really settled. There frequently is a great discrepancy between the official and the real.

Another question policymaker must ask is to what extent is this particular party flexible, able to adjust to changing conditions? Are there
historical precedents that will eliminate or dictate certain options and objectives? Is there a prevailing ideology that is similarly rigidifying? Do the policymakers have their judgments largely determined by role perceptions that do not allow them freedom of activity, or by superior-subordinate relationship that prevent consideration of new ideas. Are the organisational processes such that particular groups have disproportionate influence over the policymakers, to the extent that certain options will never be too realistically considered? Do bureaucratic faction have vested interests in existing policies such a degree that suggested alterations will be thwarted by bureaucratic infighting? Do the standard operating procedures of the foreign policy apparatus stifle creativity and innovation? Are the internal problems viewed as abstract generalised issues of good and evil thus obliterating meaningful concrete distinctions and precluding policy modifications?

Another set of questions concerns the information gathering system. Is it such that adequate quantities of information can be obtained? Are the sources reliable? Is the data obtained accurate and undistorted by misperception and incorrect interpretation? Can the information be communicated to the right people at the right time? Will it be used in an efficient manner so that a rational decision is likely to be made? Do bias and prejudices exist in the system that would prevent certain options from being realistically considered, and in some cases almost ensure that certain other factors will be taken as given? Do policymakers have certain preconceptions that preclude careful consideration of information from certain sources, or automatically eliminate particular policy choices?

Finally, one must seek to determine if the government is organised in such a way that policymakers are able to provide the specific means of policy implementation that are appropriate for given objectives. In other words, to what extent are they able to translate potential into real power or prevented from doing so by the mere nonexistence of correct instrumentalities. For example, suppose a particular country has a highly diversified and highly differentiated modern economy with strong industrial base. This mere existence gives this country a certain potential for action. If the economic strength cannot be utilised via it's contribution to military and economic instruments of statecraft,
however, instead devoted to higher level of domestic consumption, it's contribution to that state's capability is limited.

There is no automatic answer to the question of governmental strength. Only by analysing the specific governmental component of countries under consideration can one determine the degree to which policymakers may be organisationally able to translate capability potential into realiseable power.

BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES

Other governmental intangibles involve the skill and efficiency of the state's bureaucratic organisation. The issue here include the size of bureaucracy, how politisized it is or how protected it is from the political influences, how it is organised and directed, the quality of the people who staff it in terms of education, training, and expertise, dedication to service (or to corruption), and how overloaded they are.

Another question regarding mobilisation and the use of resources goes back to the question of form of government. Are open or closed governments, democratic or authoritarian governments, better able to mobilise efficiently? Which form of government elicit more sacrifice and higher quality contribution from it's citizenry? Which form of government will be better able to deal with other governments? To wield threats and promises with effect? To be more flexible in the dealings. To be more ruthless? Although we do not have firm answers, it is important that such questions be kept in mind.

The effect of influence attempts, based particularly on promises and threats, depends to a large extent not only on capabilities, the ability to carry out the action, but on the perception of a government's willingness to carry out the action. One major intangible, then is, the reputation that a government acquires in it's international dealings. If other states do not believe one's threats and promises, it is irrelevant how much capability one possesses. If a government meaning it's leadership, it's bureaucracy, and it's political system within which they both work - is so inadequate or inefficient that it cannot bring the state's capabilities to bear on a particular international system, then those capabilities remain latent. Capabilities that are not mobilised cannot be used in exercising influence in the international arena.
SOCIAL VALUES

Similar questions can be asked about the social and economic systems of a state. Does the social system, its value, and its structures promote a unified national society effort, or are there major groups that feel alienated from the national society and are not willing to cooperate and coordinate their efforts? What are the values of the social system? Are they more oriented to fairness and a respect for human rights or towards system of privileges? All these will effect how thoroughly, rapidly, and efficiently a society will be able to mobilise resources and present a unified front to the world in support of its government's foreign policy.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIETY

Another important component of capability is what one calls the characteristics of domestic society: the degree of social cohesiveness, and the degree of support that the government receives from its populace.

Degree of Cohesiveness

The degree of cohesiveness can have a significant impact on capability. Generally speaking, the more a society is fragmented the more attention, resources, and efforts are required to deal with the internal problems and consequently the less attention, resources and effort is available for foreign policy pursuits.18

The causes and types of fragmentation are many. One, is the existence of major ethnic, tribal or racial differences, these lead to conflict. Religious differences can also cause disunity. In addition to these and other subnational factors, in some cases elements of the population feel allegiance that crosses state boundaries, such transnational attraction can be terribly disruptive. A number of ethnic groups, tribes, races, and religious groups have been split by various territorial boundaries, and many consider such arrangement to be both artificial and temporary. Indeed, in many cases transnational ethnic, tribal, racial, or religious affinities are major contributing factors and causes of conflict. It is essential that one should not assume that if a group is split transnational loyalties are secondary. The post World War II division of Germany and the development of cold war blocs did not make the Germans give up the desire to be united. And now they have united. The Kurdish 'problem' faced by Turkey, Iran and Iraq is another similar
example. It is apparent that there have been a great number of instances in which subnational and transnational factors have produced societal cleavages that have severely diminished capabilities, doubtless there will be many more.

The key question in this regard which should be asked and answered are:

1. How many and what kind of disunity is there?
2. To what extent its existence divert interest, attention and efforts and resources from foreign policy objectives?
3. How much is the country loosing now, and how much would it add to its capabilities if the problems are solved?
4. Is the fragmentation likely to lead to policy alteration, regime change, or even civil war?
5. Is the country likely to 'solve' the problem or not?
6. How vulnerable is the country to foreign penetration and influence because of this?
7. What should be the appropriate policy response?

**Popular Support**

The degree of societal cohesiveness is related to a larger issue - the extent to which the populace supports the current regime and/or its policies. In analysing this, we first need to answer a number of basic questions:

1. First, and rather obviously to what degree is the general public supportive, indifferent, or apathetic, both regarding this question and in general? Although the influence of public opinion varies from country to country and with time and circumstance, in all states it plays some role and must therefore be investigated.

2. What are the attitudes, political strength, and the level of involvement of the interest factions, groups, and opinion influencing elites, who are in a position to have an impact on the policymakers?

3. How intentionally, broadly and deeply are the various positions, attitudes, beliefs and opinions of particular segment held, and how likely are they to change? If significant changes are likely what will be its net impact?

4. If there is compliance with or support for the particular regime and its policies, is it largely voluntary or is it the product of fear
and sanctions? That is whether the support is genuine or imposed?

5. If prime causes of support are sanctions and fear, to what extent are they really effective, how much diversion of effort and resources from foreign policy pursuit do they require, and to what degree their utilisation causes counterproductive effects in relation with situationally pertinent international parties?

6. If sanctions are freely employed, what is the probability that their targets will be driven into more vigorous opposition, and what would the consequences of that be?

After answering these basic questions the policymaker must then address the issues of the time and relevance. Is the degree of support permanent or temporary. Second, is this the attitude that applies to a broad range of issues or is it highly specific? Finally, one must decide whether the level of support is relevant consideration with respect to the specific situation being analysed.

The importance that popular support for governmental policies, and difficulties when it has been lacking can be amply documented. For example the collapse of support by the Chinese people for Chiang Kai-shek’s government was a significant contributor to Mao Tse-tung’s rise to power. Contrast this situation with the intense support given by the Israeli people to its government against Arabs.

These however are dramatic and extreme cases. Although a guideline of some sort can be followed, which is neither foolproof nor easily operationalised, the following are still useful to the policymaker as a kind of thumbrule. Every government to some extent, responds to domestic demands placed upon it by its populace. The more responsive it is the more likely it is to be supported.

Every government has certain priorities among its objectives. The more important the objective the more intense will be the government’s effort to obtain popular support, and the more critical for that government that it is obtained.

The more the government’s policies and objectives are consonant with the country’s traditions, norms, belief systems, and historical experience, the more likely they will receive support.

The smaller the discrepancy between the people’s expectation of the government, to the governmental achievements, the greater the support. Conversely the greater the discrepancy the less the support.
EDUCATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL LEVELS

In the modern world, another societal characteristic that has direct influence on capabilities is educational and technological level of development of a state. Industrial productivity, military effectiveness and simple social cohesiveness are all major outputs of the extent of technological and educational facilities dispersed within the state. Level of education is a determinant of the quality of workforce to be found in a state.

Fundamental to educational and technological level is the question of literacy. For reasons of effective consensus building an efficient administration a literate population is necessary if the nation wants to play any meaningful role in international politics. The second basic element here, is the ability to use scientific knowledge and development. It would be an essential skill for using mechanical instruments and scientific techniques which are essential for modern industrialisation. This involves emotional adjustment and acculturation as much as the actual knowledge of skills and procedures.

NATIONAL MORALE

The concept of national morale is a very elusive notion, indicating something about the state of mind of a nation, about how committed the people of the state feel to the policy of government. This is one of the factors which is difficult to measure, yet one of the few constant determinants of capability.

A state has high morale when the government feels itself supported by an active, well informed, articulate and involved consenses. Such a condition requires that politically self conscious people constitute the bulk of the society and they be convinced that the government's foreign policy enterprises are derived from the prevailing mass societal values, and they have confidence in the policymaker's capacity to meet and overcome challenges implicit in the policy.

Thus national morale has a direct effect on the vigour and human dynamics with which officials mobilise and employ the tangible factors in capability. Widespread apathy towards foreign policy restricts...
the range of decision and active disagreement within the public virtually paralyses the government. In this sense morale involves not only the positive features of jest, dedication and confidence but negative features of indiscipline and not having the capacity to endure stress and disappointment.

Shifts on mood and morale do occur and can be traced through public opinion research, this happened both in France and United States during their involvement in Indo-China. In each country as war wore on, support for military involvement decreased and the governmental policy was increasingly challenged.

INTELLIGENCE

A very different but important aspect of a state's intangible capabilities of power and influence are it's capability for collection and analysis of information: intelligence. In the everchanging uncertain international system any government that knows how to get where it wants to go, and if it can reduce the uncertainty of the environment through knowledge of the environment it has an advantage.

Information helps the state to know how to influence other international actors by gathering data about their vulnerability and capabilities. Information that government seek are of three types. In order to utilise the capabilities of a state, decision makers have to take into account their own goals and capabilities for influence and the capabilities and goals of others. This is the first type of information, then, which deals with the goals, plans and intentions of other international actors.

The second kind of information is the knowledge of other's military strength, internal political situation and domestic unrest. Knowing how strong an opponent is helps in knowing how to respond to threats and promises of the opponents and how to threaten, promise and bluff ourselves. The largest part of intelligence work is of this sort.

The last type of information which is equally important is feedback. This means that governments seek information on the effects of their own decisions and actions on others. Feedback permits a government either to continue it's policies and behaviour or to alter them.
The intelligence process involves collection, analysis, interpretation and storage of information as well as the transmission of information to top level foreign policy decision-makers. One reason of placing intelligence capabilities among the intangibles is the unreliability of the process. Information may be lost or distorted within the government, it might be misperceived or disbelieved by the policymakers, or important information may never be collected at all.

**POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**

When looking at the political system of any state we must know whether that system efficiently administers the state's resources. That is what is the quality of the political leadership at all levels, specially the highest levels? Can the leadership achieve and maintain the support of people and their continued loyalty to the nation? Such cases as Israel and the Arabs, and Vietnam indicate the importance of the ability of the state to extract and use national resources.

These intangibles can be crucial. The weaker side does not always lose a war and the stronger side does not always win, examples of the latter case are the French in Indo-China and Algeria, and the United States in Vietnam. Neither do the more powerful states always win a diplomatic confrontation, for example the hostage incident between America and Iran. Intangible such as leadership, belief in a cause and specially the cohesion caused by a threat to survival are important assets for the smaller state in the unequal or asymmetric conflicts. One other factor in war power is willingness to suffer and persevere then the weaker state being willing to fight for survival against a larger adversary, increases it's war power. The larger state although possessing greater capabilities, lacks the threat to it's survival which is accompanied by a lack of will to mobilise resources to pursue and win the war. The structure of the political system of a state is thus one aspect of the mobilisation of resources. Another is leadership. In addition to domestic leadership, leadership also involves the skill with which a state's chief executive manipulates these capabilities in their ongoing attempts to influence other states.
INDIVIDUAL POLICYMAKER

Another component of capability one must analyse is the impact of specific individual policymaker. In reality only human beings make decisions. The state does not take action; human beings act and make decisions in the name of the state. What this means to the policymaker is that the analysis must include identification of the key personnel and an analysis of their specific characteristics.

Particular Characteristics

Ascertaining the particular characteristics of the individual decision maker is an important task because different individuals have different impact upon a state's foreign policy. Obviously, international politics is not just the interaction of the so-called great people. It is also evident, however, that history shows that it does make a difference who occupies a position of supreme influence at a particular time. This can be seen by the impact Hitler made on Germany's foreign policy during the Second World War or the impact of Nehru on Indian foreign policy during the Cold War era. Specific individuals do make a considerable difference.25

One begins the process by identifying key policymakers, by ascertaining the locus of decision. Is there a key decisional unit, or effective authority scattered among several agencies and groups? What are the influence relationships and linkages that exist and how do they effect the present situation? Then within the context of there answers one must find who are those particular human beings who are most influential in that area and whose authoritative acts, for all intents and purposes, the acts of the state?26

The second step involves an assessment of the policymaker's basic personality structure. What particular traits characterize this policymaker's behaviour and how relevant are they to his or her policy making activities? Is the policymaker basically trusting or distrustful? How does this individual react to various kinds of stimuli? Is the particular person's personality such that everything must be interpreted in all or nothing terms? Is the particular individual impatient with those who disagree and will this lead him to ignore or even oppose policymakers whose help is needed? These, and questions of a similar nature are
highly pertinent. In the real world policymakers always have certain perceptions of the personalities of their counterparts, whether formed deliberately or not, and these perceptions influence both policy formulation and policy implementation. 27

Previous Experience

Another cluster of factors one must analyse can be combined under the label of previous experience. This could involve anything from childhood and teenage experiences to social background and level of education, up through and including previous policymaking activities. It is important that one seeking to understand a policymakers current behaviour have some knowledge of that person's early experiences. A person's educational experience may also be pertinent, example, most of Henry Kissenger's diplomacy flowed from ideas and theories developed first as a student and then as a professor.

The simple fact of being alive in a certain time period and drawing lessons from the events of the day can also be important. Finally, personal involvement in specific historical situations may do much to shape one's later outlook. As an Egyptian soldier in 1948-49 Arab Israeli war, Nasser felt humiliated by the inadequacy, inefficiency and corruption that characterise the Egyptian army's performance. He resolved that if ever he had a chance he would remedy these deficiencies. After he took over the government in early 1950s be sought to build up the Egyptian military strength and prevent any slights to Arab dignity.

Another example is, Ho Chi Minh's attitude regarding the futility of negotiating an agreement with the United States to end the Vietnam war certainly was influenced by his earlier personal experiences. On March 6, 1946 Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam signed an agreement with France. Although a portion of that agreement provided that there should be a referendum in Indochina concerning the territory's future, the French quickly violated this provision and set up puppet government. Then in 1954 Ho was a party to the Geneva accords that ended the Indo China war. On the basis of these accords it was expected that free elections would be held throughout Vietnam within two years. Ho undoubtedly the most popular man in the country at the time, expected to win these election but he was foiled because they were never held; the
Saigon government refused to participate. In light of such experiences it was inevitable that the Vietnamese leader was suspicious, sceptical and exhibited great care during negotiations.

Concept of Role

Another component of a policymaker’s makeup is his or her concept of role. What does this individual believe are responsibilities and powers of whoever occupies this particular position; what role is he or she supposed to play.

What are the factors one must investigate in this regard. First, it is important to look at history. In most cases, previous position occupants will have established certain norms and precedents and the reactions to various activities will be on record. Although the record of the past will not necessarily be controlling, what has happened previously will place certain pressures on the policymaker. Second, it is necessary to determine who the relevant others are and what they think because the policymaker’s role concept is partly determined by what such relevant others do or do not expect.

An important point to note here is the role expectations tend to become more set as a person occupies a particular position for a considerable length of time. Precedents become established, procedures become routinized and there seems to be less room for individual initiative. As these expectations become more deeply entrenched and widely shared, particular individuals and groups develop an interest in maintaining the status quo and it is difficult for change to be effected. The individual policymaker’s freedom and influence in such a situation may be very limited.

It clearly is necessary, for one to investigate and determine the extent to which, and in what ways, particular policymakers will feel constrained to do or not do certain things simply because of the concept of role they hold regarding the positions they occupy. But it is important not to go overboard in this regard, to keep this issue in perspective. In the first place policymakers are subject to a whole range of influencing factors. Role concepts, while important is only one of them. Second even in terms of role concept there are several qualifying features. For one thing, every individual brings to a position unique blend of charact-
eristics, views and experience. Consequently each person will perceive and evaluate the various factors differently, have a somewhat different role concept, and react to the constraints in his own unique fashion. Alsoprecedents and other's expectation do become established, some times they change. Furthermore in a fluid or new situation there may not yet be set role expectations; no precedents or guidelines may yet have been established. Finally although it is a matter of degree, in certain highly authoritarian systems key individuals may operate in a policy making context that is relatively devoid of established procedures or constraint imposing influencers.

Physical and Mental Health

The next factor to be investigated are physical and mental health. Sometimes one forgets that it is the people that are being dealt with and people have stresses and strains, get tired or get sick. The strain of responsible policymaking positions is immense and the deterioration of public leader's health has often has significant impact. In the 20th century Nehru, Stalin and Mao, Wilson and Roosevelt, died while in office, and many others.

Any number of times a deteriorating physical condition or mental state has had an impact on policymaking. For example American president Roosevelt was seriously ill at the Yalta conference in 1945. Although the precise degree to which this sapped his energy and hindered clear thinking in his negotiations with Stalin is not determinable, there is little doubt that it has some influence. British Prime Minister Eden was in ill health during the Suez crisis. On the eve of the First World War Franz Joseph the Emperor of Austro-Hungary was an exhausted nearly senile old man. Between the time of assination of Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo and the commencement of hostilities he was incapable of really understanding what was happening and what the consequences of various alternative policies likely would be.

What all this means is that when one is analysing capability component of the individual policymaker it is essential to investigate the specific person's physical and mental health. To what extant is the particular individual unable physically or mentally to handle the complexities, the stresses and the energy demands. To what degree is this person
prevented from doing clear thinking the job requires? In what way and how much will his or her physical and mental difficulties accentuate particular personality traits that hinders rational policymaking? It is evident to the extent that a policymaker is physically or mentally incapacitated that individual is less able to effectively do the job than if he were well and more susceptible that person is to being influenced by his or her opposite numbers. 29

Knowledge and Skill

An individual policymaker's particular characteristics, previous experiences, concept of role, and physical and mental health are all important and one seeking to ascertain that person's impact on capability must investigate them thoroughly. But they are not the whole story. To complete the analysis one must study the factors of knowledge and skill.

Knowledge as used here refers to the breadth and depth of one's understanding of the principles of international politics. Does the particular policymaker know the characteristics and roles of the various units involved in international relations. Is this person cognizant of the fact that international politics in general, and the relations of any two parties in particular are a variable mix of conflict, competition and cooperation? Is the policymaker aware of the essentiality in the policy formulation process of first determining who is involved and who holds the key to a particular situation? Does the policymaker understand the full range of alternatives and the advantages and disadvantages of each? Does this person realize that not all negotiations are designed to achieve agreements and that not all agreements are designed to permanently solve problems? This list could go on and on.

Skill in policymaking is also very important. What we are analysing here is the policymaker's ability to formulate and implement policy optimally, to what extent this person could maximise the net achievement or protection of the appropriately prioritized objectives at the minimum net cost, given the context and circumstances in which he is operating? This involves a number of considerations, few are mentioned here. When using external means of increasing capability and seeking to induce opposition alliance dissolution, does this individual skilfully alter the target's cost benefit calculations in such a way as to encourage
fragmentation or are the alliance partners driven together by the crudeness of his effort? Does this individual's words and actions continually signal something different from that which is intended? Is this person unable to discern nuances, unable to distinguish between meaningful and trivial? In particular cases does this party fail to give sufficient weight to the specific tangible factors like geography or economic strength? As with respect to knowledge, here too the list could be endless.

The knowledge and skill of the individual policymaker are very important. There is much in international politics, of course, that is beyond any individual policymaker's ability to control or significantly influence. Furthermore, he or she perforce represents a particular party with certain characteristics amid a number of choice-limiting constraints, and does so in a situation that always is somewhat uncertain, complex and unmanageable. But the individual policymaker still has considerable leeway, and the choices that are made frequently can have an enormous impact on the situation's outcome. The broader, deeper, more precise, and more sophisticated one's knowledge, and greater the skill with which he operates in formulating and implementing policy, the higher the probability that his or her party will be able to achieve or protect its objectives and to do so at the lowest possible cost.

Party Uniqueness
Another capability component the policymaker must analyze is party uniqueness. Every international party has a unique blend of features, a composite of attributes that is different from each and every other. International parties are not interchangeable homogenous entities that can be easily categorized, and they cannot be usefully analyzed in simple, mechanistic ways. The policymakers who fails to recognize party uniqueness the particular characteristics and the perceptions of the specific parties and the policymakers in the specific situation, will have at best moderate success, and more likely will be ineffective.

Parties differ enormously in their particular features, in geography, natural resources, population, economic strength, military capability, societial characteristics, ideology, governmental systems, and so on. Because of this, different leaders will not perceive issues related
States vary enormously in natural resource endowment, needs, and vulnerability. Some parties have major strategic and general military capability, some only limited war strengths, some are weak in nearly all military spheres. Obviously, there are immense variations in the level and rate of economic development. The difference in these and other features contribute to the development of particularized objectives, different party priorities and perceptions of what is important and what is not, divergent perceptions of what is or is not ethical, varying assessment of what other's objectives are or are not, and so forth.

Perhaps the most salient of all aspects of party uniqueness, however, are historical experiences and the policymaker's perceptions thereof. Every party's historical experiences are different from the historical experiences of every other. India was invaded by China in 1962, Brazil was not. Soviet Union was invaded by Germany in the Second World War, the United States was not. Japan is the only country who has suffered a nuclear attack, and so on. Sometimes, of course, even though there are a number of unique specific experiences there are similarities in terms of categories of particular action. Several states may have thrown off the shackles of colonialism and became independent, a number of parties may have launched guerilla war operations, etc. This leads to a tendency to stereotype and categorise. But two points are important here. First, though actions may fit into like categories they will still have specific dissimilar, unique properties. Second, and of crucial importance, no party will have the same historical composite as any other; it is the totalities of the party's unique historic experience that must be evaluated. While specific developments have more or less importance, within a party's total historical experience, they are but a part of the mosaic and must be viewed as such.

But there is more to it than just the party's actual experience, important as that may be. Of critical significance is how its policymaker perceives that experience. What policymakers see in the present and visualise or anticipate for the future is, to a considerable extent, a reflection of what they perceive to have been past. In this sense, what actually happened is less important than what they think did.
perceptions of their party's specific and total historical experience will effect policymaker's view of the operational principles of international environment within which they work, influence the determination of the content of priority among and linkages between objectives, affect the ascertainment of capability (specially one's assessment of willingness to use power and party responsiveness), impact on one's views of the utility and specific use of various policy implementation instruments such as foreign aid, negotiations and the military, affect policymaker's perception of the degree of threats and deterrents in particular situation, and so on. Indeed almost everything policymakers do, in some ways will be affected by their perceptions of their party's unique history.

Another point and one that cannot be overstressed, is that because of different histories and perceptions thereof, the same issues will not be perceived in the same way by the policymakers of different parties.

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC POSITIONS
The final element of capability is the state's international strategic position this is the role played by a state in the international politics. The state's own policies and strategies contain factors which contribute towards a capability of a state. In a peculiar and paradoxical way, the very objectives which a state selects for itself, and the way it interprets the situation in which it must operate has a major influence on it's capabilities to achieve those objectives and to function in that situation. A state's international strategic position to a great extent is determined by itself, a state is to a large extent the architect of it's capabilities.

FUNCTION OF CAPABILITY
Capability redefines itself to some extent when it is actively committed to the service of state's objectives. In the global system, a state can achieve it's purpose only by gaining the assent of it's fellows. In the absence of an effective international governing body, ratification of state's decisions depends upon the informal and unstable mechanism of consensus. The entire structure of state interaction stems from this basic operating requirement.
The assent of other states may be stated or tacit, voluntary, uninvolved or grudging. It may be extended after a relatively simple process of explanation and persuasion, or only after a struggle of will and power. Regardless of its source, nature, extent or durability, this consensus alone makes possible the accomplishment of a national objective. A state's foreign policy is directed and it's capability is committed to the winning of this contest.

The achievement of an objective is really a creation of favourable state of affairs which other states are willing to accept. Policymaking is really a judgement about how much effort a state must make to gain sufficient assent or acquiescence from other states involved in the situation. Conceiving capability as a measure of a state's ability to command and win agreement with it's purpose gives focus and point to the concept and highlights the way in which it is actually used in policymaking.

A state's ability to persuade other states to agree to it's designs is demonstrated in two different ways. A policymaker may be able to obtain the consent of another government in an atmosphere of agreement. Consent may be given freely for any variety of reasons; the other state may approve of the projected action, it may be uninvolved in the question or neutral towards it, or it's disagreement may be so negligible or small as not to matter. Possibly commonly desirable approval, may be forthcoming, after some measure of positive inducement; the promise of some direct benefit, a modification of policy in some other area, or some other quid pro quo. In any of these situations absence of conflict and mutual adjustments of positions is the significant dimension. The aspect of capability involved here is of influence. The state is able to gain adequate consensus by various persuasive and/or harmonising devices without calling into question issues of power or force.

When consent must be won for policy purposes in the context of conflict and disagreement between states, another dimension of capability becomes operational, that of coercion. This is the province of power struggle as each state attempts to bend the other to it's will. The forms of coercion are infinite, ranging from the mildest argument through a
long threat-pressure continuum of physical force, the ultimate coercive method. At whatever level coercion is employed, its purpose is always the same.

Influence and coercion are equally genuine and efficacious manifestation of state's capability. Since conflict is more exciting and newsworthy climate of human relationships than harmony, the coercive aspect usually receives greater attention, and is often taken mistakenly for the entirety of the phenomenon. Yet operationally policymakers spend a vast amount of their time and effort, manipulating such influences, as they may possess, and resorting to coercion only as a last alternative. It costs less to win consensus by influence. Fewer undesirable aftereffects are produced, and results tend to be longer lasting. Policymakers with only coercive forms of capability available to them are unfortunate, as their choice of policy is sharply restricted by, the relatively high cost of engaging in coercive methods.

Although it is possible to define power much as we are using the term capability, power has come to symbolise the capacity of a state to coerce others or to avoid any coercion by them. Such an emphasis on coercion leads to the concentration on the most obvious form of coercive capacity — military force.

The concept of power contains another inbuilt trap. Capability is always the ability to do something, to act purposefully in a situation. Power should mean this also, however, power often becomes a status to which states aspire.

CAPABILITY JUDGEMENT

A capability judgement in a policy context, is the analysis of the opportunities and limitations, implicit in the operational environment of the state concerned. The end result is the formulation of a range of possible actions by the state. The key idea in any capability judgement is the possibility. Capability provides the state with the resources for action, but in no way predisposes the state to act in a particular way among those alternative possibilities. The choice among the alternatives is a value choice, while capability judgement only spells out the viable alternatives available.

The policy context dictates the specific elements of capability that enter into the analysis — while the capability judgement establishes the parameters within which operational decision must be made.
capability judgement, in a way, lays out the boundaries within which the policymaker is constrained to operate.

Capability judgements are really an exercise in the determination of relationships. No capability judgement is of real use except in comparison with judgement of capabilities of the other states. Governments spend at least as much time and effort in the attempt to judge the capabilities of other states as of their own.

It is critical to strategists to have an appreciation of the range of action open to other states, particularly those with which they are directly involved at the moment. If they can sense the parameters of action accepted by their opposite numbers in the other government, they will have a great advantage in developing their own policy. As a result a major focus of political or strategic intelligence work in contemporary world is one devoted to the development of elaborate formulations of capabilities of all other states.

The method of reaching a capability judgement about another state is not radically different in nature from that used in one's own, but is of course, a more difficult task. Information on which the judgement is based is much more fragmentary and difficult to obtain, since no state is eager to provide other states with the necessary information about it's capabilities. Capability analysis, inspite of it's total emphasis on possibilities, still requires interpretation and evaluation of data, and no two states interpret data in quite the same way. For capability judgements to be of maximum use in devising strategy and tactics, therefore, the state must somehow also determine how other state's policymakers view their own situation.

Since a capability judgement is an estimate of the opportunities and limitations intrinsic to the decisional milieu, there is inevitably a gap between the environment as the analyst sees and interprets it, and as it exists in reality. Policymakers, subject to all perceptual and behavioural limitations of any human being, must act on the milieu as they they perceive it, in full knowledge that many factors of the situation are unknown to them and will serve to modify and possibly upset whatever capability judgements they may make.

Capability is only a useful concept, and capability judgement can
only be made meaningfully, in terms of specific set of policies under analysis and evaluation. If capability makes sense only in terms of a policy context, it is also true that the concept is useful only within a specific situation. This is partly because the open courses of action and the opportunities and limitations regarding capability, exist only within a concrete context. The measure of a state's capability of influence and to coerce agreement is also a function of a particular situation in which it is operating.

Specifically a state never has more than a fraction of its total theoretical and actual capability, available for its immediate purpose. An overall favourable capability position, a relatively large sphere of freedom of action within a state's general policy, may not translate into an equally high range of capability in a particular situation. A small and ordinarily relatively weak state may, in an appropriate situation, have greater capability not only to influence a larger one but also to coerce it.

Certain forms of capability, whether influential or coercive, are appropriate to the peculiarities of any particular situation, while others are irrelevant. The actual capability a state enjoys in a situation is determined by which of its available forms of action are effective in dealing with the situation, in view of the policy the state is pursuing at the moment. In this way the actual outcome of most international confrontations, especially those cast in an atmosphere of disagreement and attempted coercion, tends to be less a reflection of any generalised power relationship than a function of time, place, and policies being carried out by the respective states.

Capability is a highly dynamic concept. Making a capability judgement involves correlating a broad variety of factors within a state, in respect to an international situation, all elements of which are moving at a different speed. Any final conclusion about relative capabilities, no matter how up-to-date the information on which it is based, is obsolete by the time of its formulation. To make such an analysis applicable to an existing situation, it is necessary for the policymaker to predict the trends and variables, both in his own state, and with regards to all others involved.

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