CHAPTER VII

MILITARY POWER : ROLE OF DETERRENCE AND COERCION

INTRODUCTION

In the International System an overwhelming number of transactions are carried on by means of bargaining, persuasion, or reward rather than violence. The routine issues that make up a large portion of any nation's foreign relations rarely use or even threaten to use force. Nevertheless, recourse to violence has been and continues to be an important characteristic of the international system.

The legitimacy of force as an instrument of foreign policy, although often denounced by philosophers, historians and reformers has rarely been questioned by those responsible for foreign policy decisions of their nations. Some states have traditionally maintained orientations of neutrality, non alignment or isolation, but no nation is "neutral" with respect to its own security, and neutrality does not imply unconditional renunciation of force. Otherwise the consequences could be traumatic, as was the case of the Chinese invasion of India in 1962, which clearly illustrated that every nation, however pious or well meaning, must be fully prepared for armed invasion and thereby provide a deterrent for such adventurism by policymakers of other states. 1

As an Instrument of Negotiations

In the arena of the international system of nations, every state is committed to use all possible means, including force to preserve its existence and other interests it deems vital. As an instrument of national policy, weapons share one important characteristic with all other techniques, their purpose is to achieve or defend the goals of the nation state by influencing the orientations, roles, objectives, and actions of other states. 2 As such weapons are ethically neutral, and we must
distinguish between the goals sought through the use of force and the instruments themselves. The present day military technological development has transformed war from a diversion of princes into a potential menace against the continued existence of life on this planet. In the nuclear age, it has become more readily apparent that the military forces do not exist solely for the purpose of inflicting damage on the enemy; they may also be meaningfully used as a threat to buttress one's bargaining position in diplomacy, or as a means of communicating one's intentions to potential adversaries. Military manoeuvres near borders, putting military units on alert status, and the deployment of forces, even small symbolic units in a conspicuous manner, have frequently been used to add credibility to one's diplomacy. Small nations that are prepared to undertake a policy of punitive resistance may cause more powerful nations to leave them alone. Effectiveness of this strategy can be seen by this example; In 1938, Hitler invited the French Air Force Chief General Vuillemin, to inspect the Luftwaffe's air show, in which there was a demonstration of precision bombing by high speed bombers. The ploy proved to be effective as General Vuillemin became terrified and became the leading exponent of appeasement of the Germans in the case of Czechoslovakia.

Force and the threat to use force have persistently played a part in international relations, and development of military technology has an important impact on the structure and process of the international political system. Nuclear weapons and long range ballistic missiles are not merely quantitatively different from those that preceded them, they also possess qualitative attributes that has made a significant impact on the international system, its member units, and the nature of relations between them. This however, does not imply that conventional weapons have become obsolete, indeed most nation's military forces are limited to such weapons, and even the nuclear powers have found it expedient to maintain conventional forces to deal with limited provocation, as was in the case of Iraq, where the combined forces of many nuclear power nations resorted to conventional warfare, although of a very destructive nature, to attain their ends.

The leaders of both the superpowers have expressed their view that there are few, if any goals that can be served by the actual use of
nuclear arms. Thus the threat of use of these weapons, rather than their actual use, has become of paramount importance.

**AS TANGIBLE IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUMENTS**

A major tangible implementation instrument of foreign policy is the military. Because all international parties operate within an environment of decentralised anarchy, because all have the capacity to use force, because ultimately one's only sure ally is oneself, because of the number of actual and potential conflicts may endanger fundamental objectives, it is evident that in the very nature of things, policymakers will make a large number of conflict oriented decisions related to the protection or achievement of fundamental objectives. And because of the international political world, military strength is the ultimate arbiter of conflict, it is also obvious that policymakers must continuously make judgements concerning the potential or actual use of military force.

But there have been some dramatic changes in the 19th and 20th centuries that make the current policymakers task much more difficult. Due to many factors including the industrial, scientific and technological revolutions, war today has a tendency of becoming total, that is entire populations sometimes become involved, both as participants and targets. The problem has been compounded by the nuclear revolution. The immense destructive potential of today's weapons systems almost defies comprehension. When one analyses these facts one sees why it is imperative that the policymaker be ever so careful when contemplating actions involving the threat or the actual use of the military tool.

In most instances policymakers do act with care, but not always. It is not easy to stay calm and cool when formulating and implementing policies in conflict situations, that may endanger one's fundamental objectives, especially when these policies involve killing, wounding, maiming of real flesh and blood human beings. But the fact that war and/or the possibility thereof raises intense emotions does not negate the need to act rationally. Indeed perhaps it reinforces it. Although policymakers sometimes adopt a very short sighted view and fight a war only to achieve total and complete victory without regard to political consequences, frequently they more productively recognise that military
policy needs to be coordinated with other policy instruments in a manner that will achieve positive political results after the war is over. In other words, they recognise that the world will go on after the termination of hostilities, and they seek to project the consequences of particular alternatives into the future and choose the one that best achieves their objectives with the most favourable overall cost-benefit ratio, whether that be the one that involved total military victory or not.

Political rationality applies across the entire spectrum of uses of the military, and indeed their are many. Although there are various classifications possible, a useful approach which is often used, is to analyse one's options in terms of the level activity and amount of violence anticipated, threatened, controlled or undertaken.

Before considering these different categories specifically, three additional points need to be made. First, the degree to which a policymaker can effectively use the military instrument is greatly affected by his own state's military capability. Thus the particular purpose for which the military instrument may be used by the policymaker in question must be determined in the light of the quantitative, distributive and qualitative components of military capability. Second, in real practise it should not be assumed that in real life the options are as neatly packaged and clearly differentiated as the analysis might seem to portray. For analytical reasons the distinctions are highly useful and they are reflective of the type of thinking that the policy makers very frequently do engage in. But reality is always more complex than one's conceptions thereof, and the categories in practise sometimes tend to blur and shade over one another. Third, because of party uniqueness the various options are viewed, used and reacted to differently by different parties, this point cannot be overstressed. As always it is essential to become situation specific, to analyse specifically who is involved, what their objectives are etc.

Prestige
The first way in which the military instruments are utilised is via the enhancement of prestige through the mere existence of a degree of capability. In this sense there need not be purposive military activity as such; in these situations nonactivity will serve the purpose.

Because of the importance of military capability historically, the
possession of a strong military force has often been a mark of international status. This fact has long been accepted by policymakers and is a point not lost on the leaders of nations, the first goal Nasser on gaining power did in early 1950s, was the development of a strong military.

The acquisition of nuclear striking capability is particularly significant means of increasing prestige because of the vast qualitative differences between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. Given the immense destructive potential of even a few nuclear warheads has made even a minimal nuclear striking ability a matter of considerable political prestige.

Possessing a strong military force also enhances one's prestige in the sense of providing a strong negotiating base, of providing a position of strength from which to bargain. Since the end of Second World War until the mid-1960s Soviet Union was clearly inferior to the United States in strategic nuclear capability. During this era no agreements were achieved between these states limiting the construction of strategic nuclear weapons systems. It is only as the Soviets began to attain strategic nuclear parity, and thus were able to negotiate from a position sufficiently strong to allow a compromise that would permit what were perceived to be comparable risks to the party's fundamental objectives, that meaningful negotiations were undertaken and an agreement SALT I finally achieved. Somewhat paradoxically it thus appears that in some cases at least, it is necessary to produce more or better arms before one is in a position to agree to arms control.

Nonviolent Activity

Military forces are sometimes effectively used in a nonviolent manner. Usually this occurs within some kind of negotiating context with each move designed to communicate a particular capability and possible intent to a specific party.

- In most instances nonviolent activity is used coercively in what are essentially conflicts or quasi conflict situations. For example, in early 1957 following the Suez Crisis in which Britain, France and Israel unsuccessfully attacked Egypt, the popularity if Nasser rose dramatically and seemed to pose a threat to many Western oriented Arab nations. One such leader, Jordan's King Hussein was under immense internal pressure to reorient both his domestic and foreign policy to bring them into line with Nasser's. Strikes and riots occurred as he resisted and a series
of incidents developed that seemed to lead to a full scale civil war. United States, interested in supporting Hussein as a counterweight to Nasser, announced that it considered the independence and integrity of Jordan to be vital American interests and dispatched the Sixth fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean. Such gunboat diplomacy proved to be effective and the crisis soon abated. Though actually this was a show of force.

Sometimes a coercive nonviolent show of force does not bring the desired results. Such activity is designed to threaten the target, to warn that unless the desired modification of behaviour occurs actions detrimental to the target may be forthcoming. The specific immediate objective is to produce a certain policy modification without resorting to violence. But the policymakers of the target party have certain objectives they are trying to achieve or protect, and the degree of importance of these objectives will be the determining factor of their response. They will evaluate the threatening action through their own unique perceptual lenses and according to their calculations of the costs and benefits of various alternative responses. Presumably they anticipate certain risks and costs prior to undertaking their present policy, maybe even anticipating this particular threat. Perhaps they have already gone so far that they feel no choice but to continue or maybe they feel the costs enduring the executed threats are less than those that would be incurred by giving in. They may also feel the threatener does not have the capability or the will to carry out its threat.

Except in those situations where the coercive party is overwhelming superior in capability to the target, and/or the target has no allies is this technique safe, otherwise it has considerable risk. When confronted with such activity the targeted policymakers feel pressure to which they respond vigorously. This response could be countering use of nonviolent activity or even resort to force. Clearly the target policymaker's prestige and credibility — both externally and internally — will be harmed if they don't do something and they may well perceive a real threat to their nation's fundamental security objectives.

Even a nonviolent use of military instrument may carry considerable policy-modifying potency vis-a-vis recalcitrant actual or potential adversary. On occasion, however nonviolent activity may occur in a cooperative setting, although there are a number of means of enhancing the cooperative
behaviour that are more appropriate, in some instances military can be fruitfully utilized.

**Limited Isolated Violence**

Moving up the scale the policymaker may conclude that some degree of force or violence would be useful but warfare should be avoided. Thus the operation should remain limited in terms of objectives, targets and duration, and probably would involve a particular incident or a one shot military operation.

The Israeli government has long used limited military operation. Another example of limited violence was utilized by former Soviet Union's military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In this case the objective was primarily to eliminate the regime which was becoming too liberal for Soviet policymaker's tastes. Soviet Union did not expect much military resistance and they did not receive, and the move was successful.

Although there are numerous other instances where limited use of military instrument was utilised, sometimes it works but many times it does not. And there is an additional difficulty. Unless one is in a situation in which the target is overwhelmingly inferior in capability, has no possibility of obtaining external assistance, and/or has no intention of resisting anyway, there is an enormous risk that what begins as an exercise of limited violence will escalate into some type of warfare. It is essential to recognise that the extent to which violence remains limited and isolated depends not just on the initiating party but also in a considerable part on the reaction of the target. Thus while it certainly essential that one plan operations very carefully as to minimise the possibility of violent counteraction, there is no way to ensure that even with the best of plans there will not be significant retaliation, nor that even this occurs spiralling reciprocal escalation will not also soon follow. It is all good and well to speak of managing and controlling crisis and the role of violence therein, but the policymaker of the targeted state may prove to be highly unmanageable. If a policymaker planning to use the isolated limited use of violence is prepared to escalate should events show that it is necessary, then perhaps such a possible reaction may not be of great moment. But if not, if a violent counteraction would require a response that would entail costs beyond benefits one could possibly attain, then the policymaker should engage in limited violence
only with a great deal of caution, because in most instances significant counteraction is a real possibility.

**Limited War**

Sometimes it appears that one can achieve his objectives only with a sustained but limited use of force. Limited war is not a new concept, but with the tendency towards total war and the appalling destruction of modern weaponry the necessity of keeping conflicts limited has gained a new urgency.

Of course, in some sense nearly all wars are limited. Although there are exceptions, it is highly unusual for a party to completely annihilate its adversary with every means available. Despite this there is still an important distinction to be made here. The concept of limited war implies a conscious effort to use the military instrument for rationally defined political purposes and to keep the conflict under control by definitely limiting or excluding certain factors. But as different parties have different perceptions, orientations and objectives the same conflict can be quite limited for one party but relatively unlimited for another.

For example although for United States Vietnam was a limited conflict, but for the Viet Cong policymakers it was a struggle for survival, thus unlimited.

Generally in a limited war situation the policymaker is only seeking certain carefully defined and restricted political goals. Limited wars are not fought to achieve total victory nor are they designed for massive territorial acquisition. The Prussian Prince Bismarck, was a practitioner of limited war par excellence. After defeating Austria in the Seven Week War in 1866, he refused to annex many of the captured territories. His prime purpose was a demonstration of force and superiority.

Frequently the element of prestige is of importance in limited warfare decisions. For example preservation of prestige was one of the major reasons for America's military opposition to North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. So also is the recent destruction of Iraq by joint response of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council for annexing Kuwait. Domestic regime prestige needs also may lead to limited war operations; perhaps the chief policymaker's internal support is eroding and a foreign policy success will restore it. But prestige induced limited warfare frequently produces a highly volatile situation. Unless the attacker is successful prestige will be harmed rather than helped and inevita-
bly this will produce pressures to broaden one's objectives and delimit operations.

A very important factor is achieving limited objectives via a limited application of force is clear communication. The policymaker must make sure that the other party knows his objectives are limited or else there could be a counteroffensive. For example, in 1979 the Chinese attacked Vietnam, but had made it evident that they did not intend to acquire territory but their goal was punishment to Vietnam. Bismarck used these tactics very effectively. These people succeeded because the outsiders who might have become involved did not do so as they were aware that the militarily superior party in each situation sought only some limited goals. Goals that did not significantly endanger these outsider efforts to achieve or protect fundamental objectives.

But such clear communication is not always possible and when the message seems clear the recipient may either misperceive or simply not believe it.

Policymakers also seek to limit the means employed and deliberately exclude the use of certain weapons systems, the assumption being that the adversary will recognise that mere destruction is not desired and that survival is not the issue.

One may also seek to limit the participants. Indeed, a major reason for limiting objectives and excluding certain means is to avoid provoking others into participation. Sometimes one has a eye on a specific nonparticipation of a party. The concern may also be more general. Although one cannot say there is a precise relationship between the intensity of warfare and the number of combatants, it is usually true that other things being equal, the fewer the number of participants the more controllable the situation becomes.

Another way to control a conflict is by limiting the number of targets. The less vital is a particular target is to the state's survival the more the policymaker of that state can tolerate its being attacked and vice versa. This type of limitation may refer simply to declaring certain geographical areas off limits. For example in the Korean war the Chinese enjoyed what became known as the privileged sanctuary, in that United States did not attack the Chinese state itself. Similarly America was allowed the privilege of not having its troops and supplies coming from Japan from being attacked by China.
Sometimes the participants seek to make use of targeting, in order to apply pressure to another belligerent. In the Vietnam conflict United States started to bomb Hanoi's privileged sanctuary in the north, and then it began in terms of areas near the demilitarized zone. When America was not able to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table on the terms desired by Washington, it increasingly chose targets that were more vital to the Vietnamese war efforts such as port facilities in Haiphong, steel complexes etc. But these too proved useless.

A policymaker choosing to engage in limited warfare is embarking on a highly risky venture, one with scarcely predictable results. For Example in late 1978 Idi Amin's Ugandan Army initiated limited offensive against Tanzania. Spurning all efforts of mediation, the Tanzanian's counterattacked and drove the invaders out. Not satisfied with restoring status quo they invaded Uganda and forced the Ugandan dictator to flee from his country. It is fine in abstract of talking about limiting warfare and managing crisis but in the real world the task is extremely difficult. Of course in some instances it could be done. But given the risks prudent policymakers will deliberately choose to undertake limited warfare only with great circumspection, and they will do so only after a careful analysis that the objectives are worth taking such high risk, and no other means yields as favourable cost-benefit calculus with respect to attaining the desired outcome.

DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE

Display of arms includes all those activities that demonstrate a state's military capabilities to outside observers: nuclear explosions, war games, military manoeuvres, especially those near the borders of the states to be impressed, air shows, setting world records for speed or height or precision of any weapon, military parades such as those in Moscow's Red Square on May Day, and sailing fleets around the world or into troubled spots. Navies have been used to indicate that a state's military power is mobile and can bring troops and firepower into every corner of the globe. Such activities as the mobilization of forces or putting forces on high readiness alerts can also be used to communicate to the opponent the seriousness of the situation. Here a state is not so much interested in demonstrating its capabilities as its willingness to use them in a critical situation; both are necessary to make threats credible.
It has been found that limited use of force often has utility in stabilizing a worsening situation, to gain time and even to defuse domestic demands for more drastic action. On the other hand, the use of military force short of war did not produce long term benefits. It was best used for deterrence, not compellence - to support existing friendly regimes rather than to change governments and their policies.

The use of nuclear weapons has no political utility, either the state that uses them is also destroyed by the retaliatory attack or the devastation is so great that there is no territory, wealth or population to be gained after the use. Nuclear weapons are of no actual use against guerrilla operations or terrorists, nor can they be used to seize territory. Except as a tool for threatening and enhancing prestige.

War was always a risky and unpredictable business, but in this present age of nuclear weapons, it has become even more risky. If ever nuclear weapons are used the costs of war would far outweigh any possible benefits. Given the complex and vital interdependence of modern society, where time and distance have lost their significance, the main value of nuclear weapons lies in their nonuse.

On the other hand, the actual use of threat of use of conventional military force against nonnuclear powers, retains value. Force and threat of force continue to be important characteristic of the present international system. War has been ubiquitous throughout history, and the use of war as a foreign policy tool continues to the present day. The legitimacy of force and its threat is maintained in a number of ways. The U.N. Charter permits states either individually or collectively in alliance to use force for self defence. The collective security function of U.N. is based on the threat of collective force of the U.N. membership against transgressors of international law. Such staunch neutrals as Switzerland and Sweden base their neutrality on strong military establishments. Their military strength is form of display to deter any would-be aggressor.

Since the Second World War force has become a principal tool used by nonstate actors to challenge established governments for the control of a state or a region that hopes to become a state of its own. The use of force by nonstate actors is one of the variety of challenges to the state in the contemporary system. The main forms of contemporary violence are guerrilla warfare and terrorism, both basically have a long history,
what is new about them is the changing pattern of international conflict. Both are revolutionary activities challenging the rule and authority of governments. Thus conventional military force is useful for both the government and the challenger. Outside parties often gain influence through military capabilities by providing aid either to the government or to the guerrilla or terrorist group. Governments may provide support for other governments by supplying equipment, advisors or expertise of handling unconventional tactics of the challenger.

INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION

Patterns of actions and reactions among states invariably defy rigid categorization as peaceful or warlike. In the majority of cases, relations between governments are dynamic. They vary over the time on a scale ranging from mutually advantageous cooperation all the way to hostility and declared war. The end of the scale leading to conflict, contains a number of stages that are preliminary to war, during which one foreign policy elite employs nonmilitary methods to influence the behaviour of another. Under this heading we can include economic and psychological warfare, destabilising schemes usually employed to weaken unfriendly governments, and whatever higher on the scale towards war, covert penetration through, among other things, bribery or blackmail of the target state's key decision makers. The decision to resort to conflict or to seek compromise is based on the assessment of capabilities and intentions of other governments. Therefore policymakers place a premium on accurate intelligence in formulating such decisions.

Intelligence

The collection and evaluation of information is the first function of foreign intelligence service. Second is the development of a counterintelligence system capable of frustrating the information collecting efforts of other states. Both active and passive intelligence operations are tacitly accepted dimensions of international relations. The third functions being covert actions which at times may overshadow the ongoing collection and counterintelligence efforts. Covert actions are designed to influence the internal and external policies of other states. Administratively and operationally most governments separate intelligence activities from "unadmitted operations". ¹²
About 90 percent of all intelligence is collected overtly, through such means as diplomatic reporting, the content analysis of foreign media and a careful monitoring of scientific and technical journals. Even in a closed society it is possible through the assembling of different pieces of publically available information to compose a reasonable portrait of a political system's capabilities and the intentions of its policymaking elites. Supplementing overt collection efforts are covert efforts, and of these classical espionage is the oldest. Kautilya advised his prince to utilize vast number of spies as a first line of defence against foreign and domestic enemies. Subsequent rulers have never failed to heed his advice.

To neutralize the collection efforts of foreign intelligence services, every government seeks to perfect a protective shield of counterintelligence.

The intelligence mission of any state has three components: collection and evaluation of information, counterintelligence and covert action. Since each of these has its own purpose and set of operational principles, the typical intelligence organisation tends to be divided into three distinct hierarchies of activities which are joined administratively only at the top.

Intelligence organisations generally face two types of problems. First, arises from the sensitive nature of intelligence work, which requires rigid compartmentalisation of its various wings. Presumably coordination at the top will prevent duplication of efforts or worse the unwitting thwarting of one group's plans by another group. Unfortunately the span of control exercised by the top most officials is often so limited that synchronised operations are nearly impossible. Second, is the dominant influence of political environment on estimates presented by intelligence analysts.

The political predisposition with which information on the capabilities and intentions of other governments is evaluated greatly effects the nature of intelligence forecast. Often identical information is treated in widely varying fashions by different intelligence agencies.

The organisation of intelligence service requires the application of principles other than the basic administrative theories of line and staff relationships and the criteria of efficient management that are
concerned with program budgeting. This organisation should achieve a balance between two needs. First, the need to prevent subordinate units with competing with one another or deviating from national policy. Second, the necessity to reduce the impact of political environment on the analyst.

To meet the first need, adequate control of intelligence structures, policymakers and intelligence officers must interact continually. Accountability after the fact is insufficient to meet this requirement. In a constitutional democracy, responsible leadership must exercise its mandate from the electorate and involve itself in the formative stages of covert action so that the decisions regarding political warfare are outcomes of the political process and not the result of bureaucratic schemes.

To meet the second need the various agencies of the government should possess an inhouse intelligence capability so that they utilise information collected by a central agency to produce their own interpretation of political, economic and military situations. The cost of such diversification is a degree of duplication; the benefit is the pluralist approach to the analysis of foreign policy options. Covert Action

Covert action can be defined as any calculated and secretly applied effort to alter the course of events in the target state. Kautilya in his Arthashastra wrote in fourth century B.C. about covert actions. He revealed himself as a master of intrigue when he detailed the types of poisons suitable for the elimination of hostile rulers, urged religious figures to include carefully fabricated "disinformation" in their prophecies and repeatedly stressed the exploitation of human greed in any campaign to create disaffection among the ranks of enemies. Over two millennia have passed since Kautilya set down his precepts of covert action, yet his treatise for covert warriors continues to exert considerable influence.

The success of a campaign to influence the behaviour of the target state derives from an effective utilisation of hard intelligence, that is hard intelligence collected from reliable sources and confirmed by subsequent analysis. Due to the secrecy with which it is conducted and the security that is needed, covert action requires compartmentalisation of the action agencies involved. This way the penetration of one agency by a foreign agent will not compromise the work of other agencies. From that point on, the effective coordination of operations in the field
becomes exceedingly difficult.

A scenario of covert action escalation would generally follow this pattern:

Stage 1: Political advice is extended to friendly politicians in another country and their actions are supported. This support includes some payment to selected individuals in and out of government.

Stage 2: Planned penetration of political parties, trade unions, student groups, commercial organisations and the media begins. A campaign of propaganda from controlled sources is launched.

Stage 3: Diplomatic sanctions and pressures, and economic sanctions in the form of boycott and embargoes are begun. Alert orders are issued to the military forces in the area and deep cover intelligence agents start to carry out prearranged assignments.

Stage 4: Paramilitary action such as sabotage and staged demonstrations are carried out by covert agents designed to replace the incumbent government with another government more responsive to the policy needs of the intervening power takes place.

Covert action can be limited in the earliest stages but the subsequent phases become highly dangerous, as they involve activities like inciting popular unrest, training and equipping native forces for a coup d'etat and even removing leaders through kidnapping and assassination. The benefits from such actions are far from certain. Public disclosures of covert actions tend to expose their sponsor to international and possibly domestic outcries. The result is a loss of credibility on the part of the government carrying out the campaign.

Nevertheless politicians policymakers justify covert operations by pointing out that the international system remains a primitive one incapable of affording peace, stability and security under global rule of law. Hence, governments develop standing armies. The employment of military force in the cause of self defence is guaranteed by the U.N. Charter and the international law recognises war as a legitimate weapon under certain conditions. Once war is accepted as an instrument of policy, the rationale for covert action becomes evident. In its abstract form, war is unrestrained use of violence, whereas covert operations are a controlled form of physical and psychological violence which is directed against specific foreign personalities or publics.
Propaganda has been defined as a process involving a communication whose intention is to change the attitudes, opinions and behaviour of a target population using spoken, written and behavioural symbols. By applying this definition, we find that propaganda like diplomacy, intelligence operations and war becomes one of the standard methods used by states to secure power, to maintain power and to apply power in their efforts to promote their national interest.

States and in many instances nonstate actors such as multinational corporations, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organisations, terrorists movements and religious organisations employ in varying degree and effectiveness public information agencies and programs. The objective in each case is to project as positive and convincing an image as possible about themselves while seeking to influence foreign governments directly or through their populations about the rightness of their causes.

Propaganda could be of different kinds varying from cooperative to conflictful types, which could be termed as white, gray and black propaganda. White propaganda denotes cooperative and straightforwards campaigns. Gray propaganda is utilised when the relations of governments has started to deteriorate and selective reporting is done in order to discredit the government in power. The third type of propaganda is black propaganda which can also be termed as psychological warfare.

When war and actual hostilities break out, diplomacy and formal negotiations recede and warriors take over. It is at this level of tense relations that black propaganda is employed. In an effort to demoralise the population of a target state and to isolate the enemy government black propaganda is produced and this product can best be equated with verbal and audio-visual weapons. Here the communicators often hide their true identities and produce forged, and fabricated documents attributed to enemy sources which is designed to create confusion and chaos in the ranks of the enemy. Typical of such efforts are leaked documents alleging the intentions of a target state's leading figure to purge an important deputy and forecast dire economic developments including the prospects of large scale unemployment, food scarcity or ethnic unrest etc. Black propaganda and covert operations agencies generally work hand in hand.

In times of war black and gray propaganda assume a dominant role,
censorship and other kinds of manipulation of communications becomes a way of life, truth is among the first casualities. The objective of psychological warfare, like all warfare is to divide and demoralise the enemy and break his will to resist. Typical psychological operations in times of war are radio programs that are broadcast to soldiers fighting for the enemy side. Usually a soft appealing voice, speaking directly to the troops warns them that while they are suffering and dying at the battlefield, privileged men back home are enjoying the pleasures of life. Constant attempts are employed to separate the evil government from the good people of the target state. Recently this techniques was quite successfully by American against Iraqi forces in 1991.

**ECONOMIC WARFARE**

Since classical times commercial relations among states have constituted one of the primary sources of conflict. Mediterranean trade routes was one of the key objectives of the Roman Republic's ultimate successful efforts to destroy the Carthaginian maritime empire in the third century B.C. In contemporary world politics, the methods of statecraft that are used for the pursuit of economic objectives are varied and for the most part the fall short of violence. Nonviolent yet coercive means of self help include the tactics of boycott and embargoes. A boycott is a refusal to purchase goods and services from another state until a specific political conditions have been met.

An embargo in a broad sense is a seizure of foreign state's carriers and goods found within the territorial jurisdiction of another state, as well as the prohibition of the sale of specific commodities to nationals of the offending state.

Economic warfare in the forms of boycotts, embargoes and blockades usually is a means of goal attainment available to major actors in international system. Consequently great powers may succumb to the temptation to use this weapon indiscriminately against smaller states, on the assumption that the latter are defenceless. Historically however, small states whose governing elites have been cohesive and committed to a policy of self preservation have show themselves quite resourceful in resisting attempts at economic coercion.
In the twentieth century the growth of terrorism is related both to the changing nature of international relations and to the transnational politics of contemporary world. Terrorists have emerged as volatile actors in world politics who enjoy several advantages over their inevitable adversary, the state. The disturbing message of terrorists are generally concise and easy to comprehend, and transmitted by the world media. In contrast the objectives of the state, like the state itself are often confused, conflicting, uncertain and difficult to reduce to unequivocal messages. The terrorists capability to communicate specific demands and ideas almost always exceeds the capabilities of the state except in time war, an uncommon moment of consensus within a state.

The terrorist's success has either been a function of bleeding the patience and morale of the home state, such as the IRA or the LTTE, or affecting the consciousness of the world community, as with the case of PLO. Terrorist's capability is a product of extrinsic factors, not the intrinsic strength of a popular movement as in the case of National war of independence. The combination of high media visibility and a capability basis upon extrinsic politics has made the terrorist a more believable and potent adversary. Another reason is that unconventional violence is very difficult for the armed forces to detect and combat, but relatively cheap to carry out. It creates disproportionate feelings of insecurity and psychological fear in the population.

While the terrorist's capabilities flow from extrinsic considerations the objectives of terrorist groups in several parts of the world cannot be separated from the political environment where they have developed.

The needs and objectives of the terrorists are limited, their mobility high and the system may seek to disrupt technically advanced and vulnerable. The emergence of terrorist groups as actors is less a function of their capabilities and more a response to the vulnerability of the global system. The highly integrated institutions in the global system are vulnerable to minor disruptions which can produce widespread damage or fear. The demand for self determination and the struggle against internal political oppression or external exploitation form the basis for the terrorist groups.

As important as the role which the terrorist will perform in politics
among nations, is what the response of the state will be to terrorism. How will states react to other states who permit their territories to be used as sanctuaries? Will states equal the terrorist raids of their own, as is the case of Israel? Is there a role of international law in the conflict between the terrorist and the state.16

The plans of the terrorists are not desultory acts of tactical violence. Terrorism reveals strategy and tactics. The strategy is contingent upon the environment where terrorists operate - whether urban or rural, regional or international. The target and audience of terrorism is determined by the capability and objectives of the terrorists at a given time. Terrorists that are relatively weak, attack a symbolic target - person or object rather than the seat of power. As terrorism becomes the revolutionary movement, the targets become less symbolic and more pragmatic. Terrorists recognise the inherently restricted nature of their operations as well as the limited outcome of their activity. Accordingly they transfer the stage of conflict to a larger arena and involve a new set of actors to maximise their options and alter the predetermined outcome.

Terrorists commit political crimes through hijacking, murder, kidnapping, while states and multinational corporations commit political crimes through their monopoly over power and wealth. The terrorism of a state is called war, while that of a multinational corporation is called profit.

Terrorism succeed due to overreaction of governments and not because of the skill of the terrorists. Governments fall because of their inadequacy and not due to the capability of terrorists. In many instances it is the reaction of the governments to terrorists that possess serious problems for the future of global politics. Terrorism does not succeed by itself but only when aided by those in positions of authority. Terrorism dramatises injustice, it causes re-examination of political and economic issues and it is less cruel and costly than war. Response to terrorism consists of efforts designed to enhance the security of individuals and buildings and to encourage international initiatives to suppress terrorism. The state should not give in to the blackmail demands.

GUERILLA WARFARE

There is one type of limited war that deserves separate treatment because of its importance today, that is guerilla war. Utilised in furtherance
of the orientation of indirect opposition and limited support, guerilla war are undertaken by a wide variety of states and national liberation organisations. The term guerilla warfare covers a broad range of conflicts and situations, but two elements are always present: there is some degree of revolutionary activity against the existing government and at least initially the tactics are unconventional with an emphasis on mobility, harassment and infiltration. Tactically guerilla warfare is an evasive tactics, avoiding direct combat situations that might drain the military resources of the guerilla groups. Mobility and surprise are the weapons which are primarily used. Guerilla warfare was very effectively used by Mao Tse-tung against the Nationalist army of General Chiang Kaishek.

Since the time of Mao's successful guerilla war numerous other have sought similar goals in more or less the same fashion. Frequently external parties (for their own reasons) provide the guerilla groups with assistance. Economic and military assistance, inflammatory propaganda activities, aid in disrupting the government's decision making system, help in exacerbating ethnic, racial or religious cleavages and conflicts, efforts to enhance the appeal of disruptive transnational factors, highlighting and emphasizing the discrepancies between the people's expectations and the level of the regime's performance, in these and many other ways external parties can be of considerable help to the guerilla.17

But despite the many techniques available, external parties usually cannot initiate and successfully carry out guerilla warfare on their own: revolution is seldom exportable. The basic role of outsiders is one of assisting, of facilitating the insurgent's activities and exacerbating the problems of the existing government. The reason for this limitation is that guerilla activity cannot be effective without some degree of popular support, and this will be forthcoming only if the populace is somewhat alienated from the government to begin with. Although the policymakers of the external parties may be able to magnify internal discontent and provide the discontented with certain capabilities, seldom can they create the conditions for successful insurgency in the first place.18

Successful guerilla warfare is more than a military operation. While flexible unconventional military tactics are an essential component of guerilla strategy, advocacy of politically and socially popular causes,
exploitation of societal cleavages, alienation of the populace from
the government, selective use of terror, in short a broad spectrum of
political and psychological techniques are utilized to obtain a degree
of popular cooperation or acquiescence and destroy the enemy's will to
continue. If the insurgency in in some measure succeeding then, to some
extent these objectives are being achieved. Consequently a well organised
guerilla campaign cannot be effectively countered or controlled solely
by military measures. This does not mean that military counter measures
are not important. They are. The government must be able to inflict,
military defeat to its opponents, be able to demonstrate its military
competence. But to succeed it must do more than this. If it is ultimately
going to halt the insurgency, in addition to achieving some military succe-
sesses government policymakers will have to become responsive to the demands
of the populace and do something to alter the conditions that alienated
people in the first place. Whether or not the policymaker will find such
alternatives palatable in terms of their own personal, regime and percei-
vied national interests, or whether such demands are actually possible
to meet, given the objective conditions of a particular situation are
both question which can be answered on a case by case basis.¹⁹

It is highly probable that policymakers of external parties will
aid national liberation organisations in their guerilla activities. There
are several reasons why this is so, why such activity is frequently percie-
ved to be a quite useful tactic.²⁰
1. It is often possible to keep one's participation relatively disguised,
thus minimizing the risks of direct confrontation and any possible impair-
ment of fundamental objectives.
2. The consequences of failure tend to be relatively small due to relat-
ively small commitment.
3. Such operations are basically inexpensive. The weapons and supplies
required are relatively meager, thus within the capability of all states.
4. Only a small number of participants are required to start and never
does the personal requirement become excessively large.
5. States are much more permeable than in the past and it is difficult
to prevent penetration.
6. Conditions in many countries are ripe for revolutionary activities
and many of the problems seem unlikely to be remedied in the forseeable
future.
INFLUENCE AND MILITARY POWER

Influence or power may also be achieved through the application of force. Throughout history, rulers have used war and violence to prevail in conflict and to overcome obstacles. Military techniques for influence are not limited to war, as we have already seen. 21

There is no doubt that military capabilities are generally coercive or punishment oriented means of influence. However, it is possible to use these capabilities for rewarding others. The most rewarding activity is the use of military aid. States, particularly the larger states may attempt to influence commitment of an alliance, U.N. voting or general political orientation through the aid of military aid. The supply of arm by America and former Soviet Union to various states was done with such a motive. 22

However, influence through providing weapons may only be temporary. Egypt illustrated how a recipient state can turn on its arms supplier when Sadat threw Soviet military advisors and other personnel from Egypt in 1972. A decision of this type is costly if one has to reequip one's armed forces or get technicians and spare parts elsewhere. Spare parts and maintenance linkages provide supplier states with their primary leverage over recipients. Still, the use of aid for influence is far from being an automatic process. Because there are usually at least two or more sources, recipient states are less vulnerable to threats of cutting off such aid. Since military aid can be substituted generally without major difficulty, the ability of powerful states to influence third world nations is quite limited.

Another way of rewarding states with military capabilities is to promise adding one's capabilities to theirs. This is a main feature of alliances. Although this form of influence, adding one's military capability to another's, involves the threat or use of force, it is not directed at the state being influenced. Most incidents employing the military tool of foreign policy, however, are based on the exploitation of the use or threat of using force. Force is coercive, it is the ability to destroy or kill or take away, to occupy and control through violence. As such force directly affects the distribution of security, political control, status and wealth in the international system. Force is used because decisionmakers expect to benefit from the new distribution expect-
ed after it has been used. States are influenced by threat of force because they fear what they will lose if others use force. The military technique of influence should be seen as another means of the various political ends and not an end in itself. The objective of using force is the same as that of the use of any other technique, influence to achieve objectives.

This view of force was most powerfully argued and popularised by the Prussian officer and military historian Karl von Clausewitz. According to him war could not be separated from the political ends of the states and indeed must be subordinated to those ends. His famous dictum read as follows: "War is therefore a continuation of policy by other means. It is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation... a conduct of political intercourse by other means".

The political utility of force comes in two forms, its actual use and its nonuse. The actual use of force involves both power and influence. Brute force is used where an obstacle is overcome simply by destroying it. In such situations influence is not the object. However, in most situations where force is used, influence is the aim. Here the force is meant to hurt the opponent; the aim being to break the will of the opponent to resist any further.

The threat of the opponent is that one will use one’s weapons if the opponent performs more specific behaviour; one will refrain from using them as long as the opponent refrains from that behaviour. The ability to influence an opponent away from taking some action requires diplomacy; the deterrer must make clear to the opponent just what actions are forbidden and what will happen to the opponent if those actions are taken. For the threat to be credible, the deterrer must also demonstrate to the opponent the military capabilities and willingness to carry out the threat. Although deterrence has been employed throughout history, it has taken on crucial new importance in the era of nuclear weapons.

Beyond the threat of force other techniques exist for the nonuse of the military capabilities. These techniques are directed at influencing other states in the manner of potential influence. The aim is to convey to others the capability one possesses to influence their view of the world and their means. The possibility of such military resources being employed against them becomes enough to influence others from taking certain actions, raise certain issues or defect from alliances. This
is what potential influence is about. It may be implicit or it may be explicitly achieved through the display of military capabilities, to impress others with one's military strength and to achieve status and prestige as a powerful state. In the contemporary world nuclear weapons are the most obvious element of military capabilities used for prestige or status.

DETERRENCE

Deterrence is the capacity of modern weapons to dissuade another state from initiating warfare, is one of the pervasive doctrines of new military era. This notion has always been part of the military lore but the peculiar qualities of the new techniques make deterrence more significant than even before. Deterrence attempts to persuade an opponent to refrain from initiating certain actions, such as an armed attack, that is viewed as highly dangerous by making him fear the consequences of such behaviour. It tries to convince an adversary that the costs and risks of a given course of action that he might undertake will far outweigh any possible benefits.

In this kind of persuasion, the relationship between the deterrer and the deterree is clearly psychological rather then physical. Deterrence tries not to destroy an opponent or to physically restrain him, but to effect his motivation and will. The strategy attempts to persuade him that his interests would be best served by not embarking on a particular course of action. Deterrence attempts to influence his future behaviour.

Components

Some of the requirements of effective deterrence are, first, the policymakers must act as rationally as possible. There must be a careful analysis and accurate evaluation of the capabilities and intentions of the relevant parties. Different national perceptions must be taken into account, careful precautions must be taken so as to prevent organisational inefficiency from disrupting planned policy and the costs and benefits from each potential decision must be accurately calculated and balanced. If rationality is not present no system of deterrence can be guaranteed to be effective. If states are headed by people who are trigger happy, careless, power hungry, unstable or whatever, or if there is not careful control over subordinates and they undertake senseless activities, deterrence may be unworkable.
There are a number of other difficulties with respect to this requirement of policymaker's rationality. First, quite clearly there is no universal agreement as to what is and is not rational in a particular situation and what rationality would deter one individual might not deter another. Different national perceptions, of course would loom large in this regard. Second, in time of crisis when need for rationality is most evident, its existence may be least likely. As policymakers find themselves confronted with conditions that could endanger fundamental objectives, they become less rational than they would be in less stressful situations. Third, in certain situations, such as one involving the opportunities to cripple most of potential adversary's strategic forces in a surprise attack with some of one's missiles while holding others in reserve to deter retaliation, it might actually be rational to initiate hostilities. Finally, no matter how rational policymakers are, the possibility of war by accident, miscalculation or unauthorised use still remains and it is unaffected by deterrence consideration. While it is certainly true that rationality is an essential component of deterrence, the common sense view that because nuclear war would be horribly destructive no rational person would launch it, glosses over a number of very complex and real problems.

Second component of deterrence is credibility. This involves several elements. First, in order for credibility to be established one must have the military capability to inflict what is considered by the deterree to be an unacceptable level of damage. Second, credibility requires the capacity to communicate the extent of one's capability to the deterree. Obviously, a state will not be deterred on the basis of second state's military strength if it is not aware that the second state has the strength. Usually such communication is relatively easy.

The third component of credibility is willingness to use power. One's threat to carry out an activity that will bring about unacceptable damage must be believed by the target of that threat; otherwise there would not be a deterrent effect. The target must think that the threatener is willing to do what it said it would. Simply because a party has military strength does not necessarily mean that it is willing to use it. Once again communication, in this case communication of willingness is terribly important.

A critically important fact to note is that credibility depends on the
beliefs and perceptions of the target of the deterrent policy, that is the deterree. It is not what the deterrer thinks is important that will be decisive, but the thoughts and ideas of the deterree.\textsuperscript{25}

The final component of effective deterrent is stability. What makes for a stable deterrent relationship? Not overwhelming superiority. While party A which has no desire to attack party B but has enormously superior striking capability in comparison to B, may consider such a situation to be highly safe and stable, from B’s perspective the situation may be highly dangerous and because B may see things in this manner the result is instability. Even if in objective terms, the parties’ force is comparable, if one party’s perception is such that the other would strike first if it could successfully do so the situation again would be unstable. Perhaps that party indeed would attack at an appropriate moment, or maybe the policymaker who felt that his state was the likely target would launch a preemptive strike to avoid the perceived adversary’s possible first attack. After all when terrible weapons like nuclear armaments are available the one that strikes first just might be able to destroy the other side’s forces and avoid retaliation. What appears to be necessary to remedy this stability is to have a situation of mutual retaliatory invulnerability, a situation in which both parties know that their retaliatory forces could withstand the first strike and respond by delivering an unacceptable level of damage on the attacker. When both parties have this capability and each knows it, the situation seems to be relatively stable.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Perspective}

Strategic deterrent policy is designed to enhance the protection or achievement of one’s fundamental objectives by the effective nonuse of military force. To this point we have analysed the elements of deterrent theory, practise and the doctrine, examining it we find that it is essentially a bilateral relationship focusing on weapons systems changes and relationships and various perceptions thereof. While such an analysis is important and certainly it is necessary part of any productive study of deterrence, by itself is incomplete. Deterrence policy is an important part, but only a part, of the overall foreign policy of a given state, and needs to be examined in the overall context if it is to be kept in perspective. A number of specific points are especially pertinent.\textsuperscript{28}
First, no situation is truly self contained, and no relationship is completely bilateral. Situational policymakers often are greatly influenced in their situational actions by nonsituational actors and conditions. With respect to deterrence what it means is that whether or not a party is deterred may well be significantly influenced by factors external to the bilateral strategic relationship. For example whether the Soviet Union is deterred from attack by America may be as much a reflection of Soviet-Chinese relations and interactions as it is American-Russian nuclear capability factors. This point has a second implication: situational actions always affect nonsituational actors, and may in fact be designed with that in mind.

Another point of importance here is that all parties are different. Assumptions of, and discussions concerning, the probable impact of particular weapons systems and/or doctrinal changes sometimes occur in a kind of antiseptic vacuum that ignores the very considerable differences between international parties. The result often is highly distorted picture. It does make a difference who is involved. Each party is unique, and the uniformity of behaviour in response to certain stimuli that is posited in such discussions simply does not exist. No two parties face the same strategic situations, and no two view the situations in the same manner. Therefore, the conclusion is that the reactions to particular stimuli definately are party specific and variable, and they can differ immensely with the party and the situation.

Third, parties act for many reasons, not just as a result of policymaker's perceptions of capability relationships. Obviously many factors enter into such decisions. Certainly a nation's overall strategic circumstances are important, as is the entire matter of whether policymakers believe that their objectives can be served by war. The degree of support or isolation from allied assistance can also be critical. Other factors such as the general state of bilateral relations, the bilateral and overall international tension level, the possible influence and impact of third parties, other objectives and priorities, internal regime needs, ideological considerations, sheer matter of will power, and so on, could be influential in determining whether or not a war will be launched in a particular case. While capability relationships are important and significantly enter into deterrent and hostility-initiation calculations, they still are but one factor among many.
ARMs CONTROL

Operating in the decentralised anarchy of international politics where force is the ultimate arbiter of conflict and the nation's only sure ally is itself, people in responsible policymaking positions have generally given short shrift to suggestions and plans for broad and general disarmament. They know that, in fact, with the world being what it actually is, all international parties will feel the need to maintain a certain level of military capability and all parties will utilise the military policy instrument in a number of ways. At the same time policymakers are also cognizant of the enormous dangers posed by nuclear weaponry and some have felt that certain advantages could be obtained and cost reduced and baneful effects minimized if in certain situations arms in some way could be controlled or limited. But because of the decentralized anarchical international system the importance of military strength in achieving and protecting fundamental and middle range political objectives, policymakers have quite naturally gone very slowly and with great caution in voluntarily limiting their capability. Consequently, they have been able to negotiate agreements with their potential adversaries in only a small number of cases. Yet because they have been able to do so at least on occasions, arms control has sometimes been perceived to be productive means of policy implementation in certain contingencies.29

Because of the importance of military strength, agreements directly limiting or controlling the numbers, types and attributes of major weapons systems especially those of strategic nature, have been the most difficult kind to achieve. Other more narrowly focused arms control agreements have proved somewhat easier to obtain, agreements concerning discreet issues perceived by policymakers to be somewhat less central to the protection or achievement of fundamental objectives.30

Since Second World War some agreement on discrete, less central issues have been achieved. In 1959 treaty to demilitarizing the Antarctic was signed, which was ratified in 1961. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. In 1967 the Treaty on Principles governing the activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, including Moon and other celestial bodies was signed. Then in 1971 an agreement was reached Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean floor beyond the party's coastal seabed zone. U.S.A, U.K. and U.S.S.R signed a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in
Testing in Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water, but China and France have not signed and continue to test nuclear devices under water.

Besides these major agreements Soviet Union and United States have signed a number of agreements, even more in the 1980's and the early 1990's.

One of the agreements which continually receives widespread media coverage is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in July 1968, and came into force in 1970. According to this treaty each nuclear weapon nation agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons to any non nuclear nation, nor in any way assist a non nuclear nation to acquire or manufacture such weapons. Conversely non nuclear states agree not to manufacture, control or acquire such weapons. But associated with treaty there are a few major problems. First, two nuclear states France and China have not signed the agreement. Second, our country's stand has always been that the treaty is unfair and unequal so we have not signed it. Third, and even more important than these two factors is that all nuclear reactors, including those designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, produce plutonium as a by-product, which can be used instead of uranium to fabricate nuclear weapons. This could enable a state having chemical reprocessing plant to utilise spent fuel for the manufacture of weapons grade material. Like the case of Pakistan, Iraq or Israel.32

Further complicating the problem of arms control is the fact that the impetus for acquiring weapons may arise not only from external sources such as the policies of adversaries or general international tensions. Technological developments also create pressures for acquiring new weapons as they affect the fundamental objectives of a state. In addition, decisions about defence policies are often more heavily influenced by bureaucratic and other internal political considerations than by the state of international politics.

Another obstacle to substantial arms control agreement is the problem of verification. As weapons become more powerful and as the perceived ability of adversaries to alter the existing military balance in short span of time increase the need for verification which however becomes even more difficult to accomplish. Finally only under conditions of stable deterrence which contributes to heightened confidence in deterrence and arms control can a genuine reversal of global arms race be achieved.