HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - FROM USSR TO RUSSIA

The history of Russian Relations with the Indian sub continent goes back to remote post. It is generally believed that several movements of people from central Asia, the Caucasus and the Black sea region in the hoary past went into the ethnic make up of peoples of the Indian continent. In later periods of history too, there have been contacts and links, and the mutual contribution to man's progress in these parts vestiges of these links and contacts can be seen even now in the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union and in same of the ancient literature of India.

India's political and cultural ties with the central Asian region of the Soviet Union have indeed very closer since ancient times. Recent excavations made by Soviet archaeologists in central Asia show that their existed direct links between the southern part of Central Asia and India as early as the Harappa age and these became particular deeper in the Kushan period. Central Asia's influence began to be felt in India as the Kushans and Shakas extended their sway while Buddhism and other aspects of India's religion, culture and philosophy spread to central Asia.\(^1\)

The friendly visits of the Khwarezm scholar Al Baruni and Abdul Razak, Sawankandi form a notable chapter in the history of these contacts. Strabo a historian of the 1st century B.C. wrote about the flow of Indian goods along the Oxus, across the Caspian Sea, Transcausia and further west along the Black sea coast. Russian account of India from the 12\(^{th}\) and 13\(^{th}\) Century, a Slavonic translation of a Latin tale, described India as a rich country "not on fire" but all "shining in gold." The 15\(^{th}\)
century educated Russians derived their knowledge about India from works coming through the Byzantine and the Balcones. Among the writings of this period about India known in Russia mention may be made of the tales about the Indian Kingdom, besides Kosmas Indikoplov's Christian Topography of the stars and Alexandria which contained some stray remarks about the country.  

The first eye witness account of India is, however, from the 15th century. Fifty years before Vasco de Gama (1498) came to India. A Russian merchant from Tver, Afanasy Nikitin, traveled extensively through the northern plains and the Deccan Plateau. He celebrated for his record of life in Bijapur and Golkonda, called Khozhdence za tri moria (a voyage through three seas). He stayed in India for about seven years 1466–72. On the other hand we get reference of one Bengali merchant Sheikh Bhikhu of Malda, in the book "Statistical account of the district of Malda" by W. W. Wunter published in 1876.

The first Indian envoy came to Moscow to the court of Vasily III in 1533. He claimed to have been sent by the first mugal Emperor Babar. He died three years prior to his arrival in Moscow. The Indian traders hang up in Astrakhan in the Volga basin in the 17th century. From Astrakhan they supplied goods to Moscow and St. Petersburg. Their request for permission to make business trips to Moscow and St. Petersburg was readily granted during the region of Peter the Great (1682–1725) The Tsar instructed the officials to give special protection to the Indian traders settled on the Volga. They got temporary citizenship of Russia and enjoyed the same right and privileges as the Russian merchants. At the time of Napoleon's invasion of Russia, the Indian merchants contributed thirty thousand roubles to the war fund of their second home land.
Tsar Mikhailovich was the first Russian Ruler to make an attempt to establish diplomatic and economic relations with Mugal rulers of India. In 1646 he sent Nikita Sirovetshin and Vasily Tushkanov as envoy to the court of Shahjehan. In 1651 Rodion Nikitin and Ivan Nikitin were directed to proceed to India but all these envoy could never reach Delhi as they were held up on the way by the Persian rulers. Kasinov, the envoy sent to Aurengzab in 1675, also could not succeed in reaching India because tribals in Afghanistan. Only Semion Malenki was able to reach Delhi in 1696 in Aurangzeb's court. He allowed the Russian traders to carry on trade with India.3

Philip Tefrenov was the first Russian to travel to India from western Tibet through the Karakoram Passes (1774–1782). The first abiding Cultural Contacts was affected by Gerasim Lebedev, the father of Russian Indology who visited India for a dozen years from (1785–1797). He considered India to be the very 'cradle of the human race'. He was the first European who not only studied Bengali but wrote plays in that language and stayed them in Calcutta.4 He was the founder of European-style theatre in India under the name of Bengali Theatre on November 27, 1795 at Donitala Lave (presently known as Ezra street), Calcutta's.5

From the middle of the 19th century and continuing across the current century to date these are Russian names galore which attest to be deep interest men of that country took to Indian culture they pass counting, but a few who distinguished themselves in the field of Indian cultural research were: Minaev, Pashimo, Petrov, Kassavich, Zhukovshy, Kararnzin, Oldenburg, Stcherbatsky and Kovalovsky. N.A. Dobrolyubov in his "A Glance at history and present condition in East India 1857", He
mentioned that British rulers of those days always evoked the danger of a Russian invasion of India and kept it as a bogey this despite the fact that such an invasion and across the Himalayas presented so many logistical and other obstacles as to make it absurd. The British used to prevent any coming together of Indian and Russians. Some Russians like I.P. Minaev for instance, saw one thread running through British policy of those days whether it be in Khartoum, Armenia or Sobia, everywhere you can see British interest born out of Britain's sway over India and the consequent feat of losing that away. The Indian people never accepted the British canard about the danger to the security of India from Russia even during the period before the October revolution.

In 1801 the "Mad Tsar" (As famous in history) Paul had hastily assembled an expedition of 23000 Cossacks under Vasily orlov whose task was to march on India by Khina and Bukhara. Napoleon, who was at war with Britain, had made preparation to send a fresh corps to link up with the Cossack expedition. These feet hereby adventure was terminated in mid-course by the murder of Paul and the accession of Alexander, who recalled orlov. Seven years later, in the wake of Tilsit agreement, Alexander himself was cooperating with Napoleon in another scheme also abortive to defeat Britain through the conquest of India. The middle years of the century were worked by British-Russian rivalry in central Asia, as Palmerston strove toward off the threat he perceived in Russian moves in the Caucasus and Afghanistan. Again in 1870's British suspicion of Russian designs on India rose as a distance separating the two states Asian territories shrunk. Alexander II ridiculated the British fears in an interview with the British ambassador in 1876 at the same time that general Skobelev was drawing up plans for invasion of India. According to Mikhil Florinsky "Success in (skobelev's) opinion was
assured to an expeditionary corps 50,000 strong. He believed, moreover that India was seething with discontent and that the mere appearance of a small Russian force on her frontier 'would probably lead to a general uprising in India and to the ruin of the British Empire.' The overthrow of the British power in India, Skobelev mentioned, a might well provoke 'a social revolution' in the metropolis's and will be the beginning of the fall of the England.\(^7\)

From the late Eighteenth century to the years of twentieth century, the British rulers of India lived in consent fear of Russian invasion of India or of infiltration of communist ideology in India so the British rulers of India were not prepared to take any risk and, therefore, it became their fixed policy to oppose expansion of Russian power in all areas adjacent to India.\(^8\)

The congress opposed the Britishers 'Forward Policy' on the north west frontiers for increased expenditure on the pretext of counteracting the Russian threat to India's security at its seventh session in 1891 Dinshaw Wacha refuted the Government's assertion that this policy stemmed from the Russian advance in central Asia.\(^9\)

The British in India continued to harp on the Bogey of Russian advance even after the overthrow of Tsarist rule. As Jawaharlal Nehru wrote "We have grown up in the tradition carefully natured by England, of hostility to Russia. In the days of the Tsars we were told that the imperialism of Russia was for ever driving south, Covering an outlet to the sea, or may be India itself. The Tsar had gone but the rivalry between England and Russia continues and is now told that India is threatened by the Soviet government.\(^10\)
It was British rule in India which brought the shadow of Russia over the sub continent. Because of the so called Anglo–Russian rivalry in Central Asia and on the borders of India. It was traditionally a desirable British policy to create an unfavorable impression of Russia in India. Of all British possessions; India was the most precious jewels of the British crown. As British domination spread in India and finally embraced the whole sub continent, the British government looked with alarm and jealousy on every rival for supremacy inside and outside the Indian frontiers. The safety and security of India became a very important factor in the conduct of British foreign policy all over the globe, particularly in areas adjoining India.

As the Tsarist Empire expanded in central Asia during the last quarter of the 19th Century and nearly touched the borders of British India, Anglo Russian rivalry in Asia began. Britain on her part developed a tradition of Russo phobia in the conduct of her foreign policy. The image of the Russian Bear walking into the plains of India was a nightmare for the makers of British policy till the signing of the Anglo–Russian convention of 1907. The question of the security of India had indeed become a primary consideration of British policy. In a telegram to viceroy on April 2, 1918 Edwin Montagu the secretary of state for India, sounded a note of warning "The area of war is spreading steadily east wards. It may be necessary, therefore for India to deal with the emergencies which arise in that threat without our being able to reinforce it from the west. I think therefore, that you should take this opportunity to do everything in your power to increase the Indian establishment for war."
The document on India contained in the "Blue Book," edited by K.M. Iroianovskii, he pointed out that a social revolution in the west could not be accomplished so long as western capitalism was enriching itself at the cost of the East. Therefore, India, being the main object of exploitation, would become "The first citadel of Revolution in the East."\textsuperscript{13}

Indo–Russian relations entered a new phase in early twentieth century. The Russian revolution helped to forge new bounds between the national liberation movement in India against the British rulers and the progressive movement in Russia against the Tsarist regime there. So the Indian revolutionaries in Europe had begun to look to the Bolsheviks for help even before the triumph of the October revolution.

Prominent Russian Literary figures like Leo Tolstoy and Maxim Gorky deeply sympathised with the cause of Indian freedom. Tolstoy’s article "Letter to a Hindu" was translated by Gandhiji himself. In which he reply the young Indian revolutionary Tarak Nath Das, Chief editor of Free Hindustan published from Vancouver in Canada, shows how deep was his interest in the Indian struggle for freedom.\textsuperscript{14} Gandhiji looked upon Tolstoy as teacher and named his head quarter in South Africa as "Tolstoy Farm",\textsuperscript{15} In the south African writings of Gandhiji one comes across positive references to the 1905 Revolution in Russia and stability of the general strike action of Russian proletarian for emulation by Indian in their struggle. Maxims Gorky was in touch with Indian revolutionary journalism in Europe before the world war–I and reproduced journal sovremennik information contained in Shyanji Krishna Verma's Indian sociologist. Gorky wrote in defence of Vir Savarkar and condemned the life imprisonment sentence awarded to him by the British authorities as savage.\textsuperscript{16}
The events of 1905–07 and the Oct, 1905 general strike had attracted Gandhi's attention and he wrote "The Russian workers and all other working people declared a general strike and stopped all work. They lifted their job and informed the Tsar that unless justice was done they would not resume work. There is much similarity between the governance of India and that of Russia. The power of the viceroy is no way less than that of the Tsar we too can resort to the Russian remedy against tyranny our shackles will break this very day if the people of India became united and patient, love their country and think. If the well being of the motherland disregarding their self interest. The governance of India is possible only because their exist people who serve (the British rulers) we also can show the same strength as the Russian peoples have done."

Lenin was not only the leader of victorious socialism but also the most ardent champion of national freedom. In fact Lenin was the first Marxist to make a deep theoretical analysis of the new stage of 20th century national revolutionary movement. References to India in Lenin's work occur from the fourth volume of the collected works to almost the last from 1900 to 1923.

Lenin the greatest leader of Russian people figured prominently the condition of India under British rule and the struggle for freedom of Indian people in his thought. Lenin's first reference to India appeared in 'Iskara' in December 1900, with illustrations of repressive policy of British government in India.

Lenin wrote "The most liberal and radical personalities of Britain became regular Genghis Khans when appointed to govern India". Another reason for Lenin's close attention and interest in the problems of
liberation movement in India was that the Indian revolutionary M.N. Roy who was an active member of a special commission on national and colonial questions elected by the Congress. Lenin interest in India, however deepened during the era of the awakening of Asia when popular discontent and movements were suppressed with brutal repressions. In 1908 in his well known article “Inflammable materials in world political” he illustrated his points with the events in India. After the First World War when the Indian national movement assumed a mass character under the leadership of Gandhiji, he started paying special attention to the practical problems of the movement.\textsuperscript{19}

At the very time, one scheme for utilizing unrest on the "Road to India" was proceeding beyond mere speculation. In the fall of 1920, M.N. Roy" approval from Moscow for an attempt to train an army of Indian revolutionaries at Tashkent. Roy was a former Bengali revolutionary who had worked with an emigre Indian revolutionary party in California and had helped to found the communist party of Mexico. According to this plan, an armed Soviet–Indian force would pass through Afghanistan (with the consent of her monarch, recently at war with Britain) to the northwestern Indian frontier.\textsuperscript{20} Lenin had from the very beginning serious misgivings about Roy's plan to organize a liberation army on the northwestern frontier of India. The non-cooperative attitude of Afghanistan was also a big hurdle. Yet because of his tremendous sympathy for the course of Indian liberation, Lenin gave a free hand to Roy to execute his plans. Lenin laid great stress on preparing revolutionary ideological programme and organization before resorting to armed struggle.\textsuperscript{21}
Of the early ‘Soviet Indian Firsters’ of one of the most outspoken was K.M. Troiansvsky. In 1918 he proclaimed that India was to serve as a vanguard of revolution in the east, as Russia had in the west. For Troiansvsky Persia and Turkey were the gates of Indian "Citadel". Lord Curzon within six months of his assuming office as foreign secretary delivered a virtual ultimatum on 8 May 1923 to Moscow threatening to terminate trade relation unless the Soviet government stopped its anti-British propaganda and its "agents" from India.

The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 created an unprecedented situation in world politics. The Soviet state was established with the declared purpose of overthrowing the old world order and replacing it with a new socialist order. During the first year of Soviet Power, Soviet policy as far as Eastern Countries were concerned, was aimed at emphasising the favourable effect of the Russian revolution on such countries as India China and Persia. Stalin as the commissioner of the Nationalities, Wrote in Zhizn National nostei: "The revolution in Russia was the first to rouse the oppressed peoples of the East. The Soviets in Persia, India and China are clear symptoms that the age long slumbers of the workers and peasants of the East is becoming a thing of the past".22 The British government had a keen awareness of this and took no chances in containing the Soviets...... on June 29, 1920 the cabinet decided to appoint a cabinet sub committee with Lord Curzon, Sir Winston Churchill and Edwin Montesquieu as its members, to keep a watchful eye on Soviet Propaganda.23

The Bolshevik revolution and later the various phases of Soviet policy towards India, created a new situation in Indian politics in which
they acted as a catalyst in raising the tempo of Indian nationalist movement, they also posed a new problem for the government which widened the gulf between the nationalist and the British government in India and stimulated the interest of the nationalists in the Soviet Union. Although these was neither evidence of the nationalists in the Soviet Union. Although these neither evidence of Bolshevik or Soviet conspiracy in India nor were these any direct influence of Soviet propaganda and Soviet policy towards India on the policies and programmers of the Indian nationalist movement, the Indian nationalist looked to the soviet union with sympathy admiration and good will.\textsuperscript{24}

At that time Soviet Russia was the only power in the world which, at least in theory, openly proclaimed itself in favour of the end of the imperialist system. Because of this Soviet stand, the colonial question thus became an international issue which the communist parties in various countries, particularly in the imperials countries, promoted and encouraged in order to project it in the colonial countries was particularly marked in Anglo-Soviet relations vis-à-vis India. In spite of the fact that under Stalin, soviet policy towards India was entirely motivated by the interest of Soviet state, India and the Indian nationalist movement became an irritant in international relations during the inter-war years. Undoubtedly, Britain's fear of Soviet propaganda and hostile activities and the wide publicity given to this by the British and Anglo Indian press did help in building the images of the Soviet Union as the only foreign power interested in bringing out the end of British rule in India.\textsuperscript{23}
Although the ideological and diplomatic fusel over period 1917–1947, between Britain and the Soviet Union, had far reaching implications for the powers involved it can not be derived that India's national objectives also derived some benefit from this.

Britain in the Zenith of her power, should ever, have felt that Soviet Russia would usurp or liquidate her Indian empire. As there was in fact no evidence of a "Soviet conspiracy" seriously challenging Britain's overlord ship of the Indian sub continent. Two possible explanations could be advanced for understanding Britain's fear of a "Soviet conspiracy." Firstly the virulence of Soviet propaganda against Britain and the British Empire was so staggering and various shifts and balance of Soviet policy towards India were so novel that they tended to cloud the vision of successive British government, particularly the conservative governments.26

During the World War II Indian freedom fighters took major steps for the development of friendly ties between India and the Soviet Union. On Nov. 17, 1941 All India Conference of the friends of the Soviet Union held in Calcutta under the chairman ship of Mian Ifikharuddin, President Punjab Provincial Congress committee and an all India committee of the friends of Soviet Union was formed.27

Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union brought Britain and the Soviet Union together and thus the old basis of Soviet Policy towards Britain vis-à-vis India was no longer valid. After Stalin's ascendancy, the ideological interest in India completely degenerated into an extra hand of Soviet diplomacy in Anglo Soviet Relations. A very characteristic
example of this degeneration was the complete silence of Stalin and Moltov in the war time allied summit meetings and in the Anglo–Soviet conference over the political crisis in India. 

The Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union marked only the beginning of an era of personal diplomacy in Soviet Indian relations. Nehru's trip to Russia in 1927 had resulted in this observation, "ordinarily Russia and India should line as the best of his neighbors with the finest point of friction is there any reason why we in India should inherit the age old rivalry of England against Russia. That is based on the greed and covetousness of British impeartism, and our interest surly lie in ending this imperialism and not in supporting and strengthening it." The Indo Soviet Contacts which began in 1946 at the Paris peace conference developed further at the San Francisco conference where India played an independent role especially on the colonial question.

Even during the period when relation between USSR and India were not particularly warm, there was considerable cooperation and understanding between them in United Nation, especially on question relating to the admission of People's Republic of China and condemnation of the policy of apartheid pursued by South Africa. As Indian demonstrated in the UN and elsewhere that its policy of non alignment was truly independent and projected itself as factor for peace in Korea and Indo–China earlier Soviet mistrust of its intentions began to give way to a new understanding of its important role a bridge between the East and the West.

The Asian relation conference held in New Delhi in March–April
1946 was attended by fourteen delegates from Asian republics of the USSR, Jawaharlal Lal Nehru who inaugurated the conference welcomed the Soviet delegate as "delegates from the Soviet Republics of Asia" which have advanced so rapidly in our generation and which have so many lessons to teach us.\textsuperscript{30}

When India and Pakistan became independent, many in the Soviet Union failed to group the significance in this historic development. The most of the writings of this period both states were treated as Anglo–American colonies. The existence of foreign capital in the two states and their continuation in the British Commonwealth of Nations was considered of proof of their vessel states.\textsuperscript{31}

According to the K.P.S. Menon relations between India and the Soviet Union after independence may be divided into two phase are passive and the other active. The active phase in his opinion began in 1955. A period of Transition may be marked from 1953 to 1955. The establishment of diplomatic ties between India and USSR did not lead to an immediate development of close economic and cultural relations. There were many psychological barriers to be crossed. He wrote ‘Some Indians’ still suffered from the fear, relic of British days, that the USSR was out to turn the world red by hook or crook and many Russians thought that India was nominally free, she was economically bound hand to foot to the chariot of Western imperialism.\textsuperscript{32}

During the Nehru era the foundation for friendly co–operation in political and economic fields between India and the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries were laid. And by brick by brick the edifice was
raised with a view to strengthening the country's sovereignty and independence. Nehru created the edifice of enduring friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Nehru and India's friendship with Soviet Union are mentioned in the same breath. Nehru once wrote "Socialism in the west and rising nationalism in the eastern and other dependent countries opposed this combination of fascism and imperialism.... inevitably we take our stand with the progressive forces of the world which are ranged against fascism and imperialism." Before independence Nehru as a minister of External Affairs in the interim government had earlier stated in the Central Assembly on March 14, 1947 that he expected to send an economic mission to Russia to study the working of the Russian Five year plan soon after the diplomatic mission were exchanged.

The diplomatic relations between India and the USSR had been established on April 13, 1947 even before the formal declaration of India's independence, was significant. Jawaharlal Nehru, talking to an Indian diplomat about to take up his assignment in Moscow, told him, "You are going to a friendly country from whom we have been kept apart by foreign rule. We have to make up for the lost time and strengthen our links with the Soviet Union there is no conflict of interests and there should never be." India established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union on 13 April 1947. The first Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union was on 25th June 1947, Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit. She presented her credentials at the Kremlin on 13 August 1947. Moscow announced the appointment of K.V. Novikov as its first Ambassador to India on October 23, 1947.
When India's second Ambassador to the Soviet Union Dr. Radhakrishnan, met Stalin on March 5, 1952, he was glad to note that his discussion with the Soviet leader showed "Friendliest interest in our progress and It may say that never was there the slightest suggestion, implicit or explicit, that we should live with the Soviet Union."

The sky of Indo-Soviet relations had cleared up by February 1955 and the bright sun of friendship began to rise. Jawaharlal Lal Nehru's first visit to USSR as the Prime Minister of India in June 1955 opened a new chapter in the friendly relations between the Indian and the Soviet People. The Soviet trip made a tremendous impact on Nehru who expressed his gratitude to his hosts by saying, "I am leaving my heart behind." The Western press did not take kindly to Nehru's visit to USSR. The New York Times warned Nehru that he might be "skillfully mouseterapped" in Moscow.

In one sense, pattern of Soviet involvement in South Asia began to evolve long before the break of the British Colonial Empire on the Subcontinent. In sought the internal communist movement, the USSR had relations with communists in several of the countries of the region. The debate between Lenin and the Indian communist Manabendra Nath Ray, concerning the proper role of the communist party in the third world national liberation movement were understandably followed closely by communist parties in South Asia. It was not until India had shown independence in its foreign policy by taking an anty-west stance and supporting China in the Korean War that the Soviet's recognized India's independence. Particularly the death
of Stalin and the initiation of Khruschev’s peaceful coexistence had opened the doors of Indo–Soviet friendship. The first important show of Soviet support came when in 1957 the Soviet Union had continuously vetoed all Western attempts at the Security Council meetings for holding plebiscite in Kashmir, since then there was no looking back.

This was followed by the historic return visit to Khrushchev and Bulganin in November 1955. The Soviet leaders extended their countries wholehearted support to India against Western Colonialism, and in a Calcutta Khruschev expressed the hope that "Sooner or later Goa will free itself from foreign rule and will become an integral part of the republic of India." Bulganin declared that "There is no justification for the Portuguese colony of Goa to exist still on the ancient soil of India. It is a shame on civilized people."41

When the Indian forces liberated Goa from the Portuguese colonial yoke, Pravda flashed the news with banner headlines. Portuguese colonialist are ousted from India, Indian forces liberated Goa, Daman and Diu. When the Indian forces marched into Goa, Brezhnev the president of the USSR was in Bombay. He supported the Indian government action in a speech. He termed it "a completely lawful and rightful act." When the western powers brought forward a resolution in the Security Council to censure India the USSR blocked it with prompt veto.42

The joint declaration released by Bulganin and Nehru, at the conclusion of the latter’s 1955 visit was in the same spirit of good neighborliness and any imperialism. It pledged that Soviet–Indian relation would be guided by the fine principles of peaceful co-existence
under the aegis of which there is ample scope for the development of cultural, economic and technical co-operation between the two states. When tribesman from the Northwest frontier invaded Kashmir in October 1947 with the aid and convenience of Pakistan, the Soviet press fully expressed the imperialist mechanism behind it. Pravda in 3 November 1948 reported that the 'Muslim Army' which invaded Kashmir was organised by a British General.

The Western powers on the other hand, favored internationalization of the Kashmir question, seeking an opportunity to fish in troubled waters. It is now known from the account of A Campbell–Jhonson, Lord Mountbatten's press secretary, that it was none other than the British–Governor–General of India himself who devised a new stratagem to embroil India in a protracted dispute with Pakistan in UN. The plan to bring in the UN was finalized by Mountbatten's adviser, Lord Ismay. Campbell–Jhonson recalls Mountbatten's personal secretary Ronnie (Captain S Brookman) having told him that "We have to get inside the problem or we will have no influence at all." 44

In 1952 the Soviet representative, Jacob Malik, outlined in detailed his country's view on Kashmir when the security council took up the second report of the UN mediator, Dr. Graham, on Kashmir Malik said the main reason why the Kashmir question had remained unsettled for four years was that the Anglo–American powers had made proposals of the annexationist, "imperialist nature" to impose their own solution on Kashmir. 45
Khruschev's assurance of support to India on the issue most crucial to his national pride. Speaking in Kashmir he declared that the political status of that area was a matter to be determined by its people, but he added his conviction that already the "people themselves have decided that Kashmir is one of the states of the Republic of India".46

The Swaz cizes revealed the common approach of India and the Soviet Union towards the predatory character of western colonialism. Nehru's reaction to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in Oct. 1956 was prompt and sharp. The USSR also sharply reacted to the western power's attack on Egypt, condemning the aggressive action of Israel, Britain and France and warning them of "the dangerous consequences". At the London proposal Soviet Union Foreign minister Shipilov termed the Indian proposal 'a plan for adjustment and peaceful settlement of the Swaz problems.'

The Soviet Union signed trade pacts with India in 1948, 1949 and 1951, agreeing to supply wheat in exchange for tea, tobacco, jute and other primary products. Yet volume of trade between the two countries is insignificant. In 1952 India was among the 42 countries which participated in the International Economic Conference held in Moscow. Negotiations for Soviet assistance in building a steel plant began in Sept. 1954. An agreement was signed for a plant at Bhilai in M.P. in February 1955. In the decade following the first agreement for assistance, in the contribution of the Bhilai plant in Feb. 1955, the Soviet Union extended credit for the Ranchi heavy machine plant, the Corba coal mining project and the Neyveli thermal power stations in 1957, drug and pharmaceutical projects at Hyderabad, Singrauli power station, Baroni oil refinery and
Haridwar Heavy Electrical plant in 1959. The Koyal Oil Refinery, Bhakra Right Bank Hydro Electric Power Station, Kothara Coal washery and Ankleshwar and Bombay Oil Exploration and production in 1961. In addition to rushing the Bhilai plant into production prior to Raurkela and Durgapur plants, the Soviet sought propaganda impact by trumpeting the favourable terms of the Russian loans 2.5% payable in rupees over twelve years, as opposed to western rates of (4.5% and 6.3%), the maximum enlistment of Indian Industry and training of Indian Personal (many in Soviet Union) and the absence of Soviet demands for participation in management or profits of the Bhilai Plant. 47

When the Bhilai steel plant was officially commissioned in February 1959 Pravda carried a long article on Indo–Soviet friendship, and when the plant's second furnace was commissioned towards the end of 1959 Khruschev sent a message to Nehru expressing his hope that "The future Soviet Indian economic and technical cooperation, which was born at Bhilai, world grow on all sides.

When India's third five year plan was facing an acute shortage of foreign exchange, the Soviet Government sent a delegation of experts in February, 1959 and offered a fresh credit of 1,500 million roubles. On his visit in Feb. 1960, Khruschev went to the Bhilai Steel Plant and the Suratgarh state farm in Rajasthan for which the Soviet Union had gifted equipment. In August 1960 Soviet Union offered a further credit of 500 million Roubles to India. In Jan. 1965 Soviet Union signed an agreement extending a credit of Rs. 116.7 crore for the Construction of another steel plant at Bokaro. 48
The Soviet support was not so forth coming during the Sino–India war, of 1962. For one thing this war had unfortunately coincided with the historic Cuban missile crises which had pushed the world to the brink of a thermonuclear war. According to the Soviet leadership was much too preoccupied with forgoing unity with various communist states, including China.

The Sino–Indian Border conflict of 1962 put Indo–Soviet friendship to an acid test. The simultaneous eruption of the Cuban crisis further complicated the Soviet Union's difficulties. On 25 Oct, 1962 Pravda published an editorial which spoke of the 'notorious McMahon line' and supported the Chinese proposal for ending the conflict, describing them as "constructive". Editorial caused a near storm in India. Written after the Cuban blockade came into effect, it aimed at seeking China's cooperation in the biggest post-war confrontation with the USA. As the Cuban missile crisis passed, the new Soviet stand surfaced in the form of an editorial in Pravda on 5 Nov., 1962 in which almost amounted to ordering China to stop fighting India. It declared Bloodshed cannot be allowed to continue.49

General R. Mac Farquhar has shared an interesting analysis on the timing of Sino–Indian war. "Khruschev's restraint in the Sino–Soviet dispute in the summer and easily autumn of 1962, his modest tilt of Beijing and away from New Delhi and his cordial treatment of Ambassador Lio Xiao, probably has less to with a change of heart on the Sino Indian border issue and more to do with his anticipated corporation with the United States. Khruschev needed to face Kennedy with a united communist bloc behind him. The Chinese had not wanted a two front war in the summer of 1962; Khruschev did not want to have confronted both
America and China in the autumn. He anticipated provoking this confrontation in early November. After America's mid term congressional elections.  

Kosygin in his speech at the Kremlin reception for Shastri when the Soviet Union striving to improve its relations with a third country this does not have to be the cost of Soviet Indian friendship.  

In Feb. 1964 when Pakistan again raised the Kashmir question in the Security Council, the Soviet delegate in his speech while stating clearly his country's position "that the question of Kashmir belonging to India has already been decided by the Kashmiri people?" In Sept. 1965 when a big armed conflict flared up between India and Pakistan, Kosygin sent message to both Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri pleading for the immediate cessation of military operations. Pravda statement of 24 August 1965 and in the speech of the Soviet delegate in Security Council on 4 September 1965, Kashmir was referred to as "The Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir". A Tass statement of 7 September 1965 offered Soviet "Good offices" to both India and Pakistan if they deemed them useful to restore peace in the area.

The Chinese through their note of 8 September to India tried to instigate Pakistan by holding out a threat to India, the Soviet Union Condemned the Chinese action. Brezhnev's warning of 11 September against "third force" who tried to benefit by the aggravation of India Pakistan relations and "sometimes added fuel to the fire" was clearly addressed to China. Brezhnev said, "Bonds of friendship which have already became traditional exist between us and India, we are accustomed
to appreciate and respect India's peace loving foreign policy, her fidelity to the principles of non alignment, national freedom and friendly international cooperation.\textsuperscript{52}

The Tashkent meeting finally took place from 3rd Jan to 10th January 1966. The choice of Tashkent as the meeting place was accepted happily. The conference between the Indian and Pakistani leaders took place on an Asian soil in an ancient city whose history and culture are indissolubly linked with those of the two countries.\textsuperscript{53}

Many circle in the west, as well as the Chinese were obviously not happy at the Tashkent meeting. \textit{The Daily Telegraph} 13 Sept. 1965 of London wrote "it is as least odd and thought provoking that when two commonwealth countries fall out." It is Russia which steps forward as an intermediary. \textit{The Guardian Commented} (13 Sept. 1965) Their (Western Power's) detachment has been fatal, had they given their backing to either India or Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute might have been settled long ago, and they would not have incurred the hostility of both sides by their naturality they have driven Pakistan into the arms of China, and they met yet drive India into the arms of Russia. British journalists covering the Tashkent meeting were openly skeptical about its success. One of them is said to have remarked to a Soviet journalist "we tried to reconcile them for 250 years, and in vain; but you are hoping to do this in two or three days." China which had desired the dispute between India and Pakistan to be prolonged called Tashkent "a neo-colonialist gathering" and belittled the significance of the declaration.
The Historic Tashkent declaration signed on 10 January 1966. According to that all armed personnel of the two countries were withdrawn before 25 February 1966 to their position they held before 5 August 1965.54

The USSR had a highly successful venture into South Asian crisis diplomacy at the Tashkent conference which settled the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Although Tashkent was the high point of Soviet diplomacy in the region. The USSR would continue to try to play a role in crisis diplomacy in 1971, although with much less success.55

The idea of collective security in Asia mooted out by Brezhnev in his speech on 7 June 1969 at the Moscow world conference of communist and worker's parties, has nothing to do with Sino–Soviet rift nor does it aim at establishing a rival military bloc in Asia. In fact the idea of collective peace and military blocs in Asia is not even entirely Soviet in origin, for it has found its echo in the various international statements and political declarations of such Asian countries as India, China, Ceylon and Malaysia in the Postwar period. Brezhnev's concern for Asian security is fully shared by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. In her speech at the Soviet–Indian friendship rally held in Moscow on 14 July 1966. She said, "It is hardly surprising that the focus of danger and of international insecurity has moved away from Europe to the developing world, the so called "Third world" of Asia Africa and Latin America.56

It is rather strange that when the Soviet Union began to display a keen interest in the establishment of a system of collective security in Asia, Peking instead of extending support to, it condemned it as anti-
Chinese conspiracy.

By the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, India's relation with Socialist Countries, particularly with the Soviet Union had started influencing international politics and relations in a meaningful way. Through the foundation of these relations had been laid by Nehru, it was left to Indira Gandhi to widen and strengthen this base. The post Nehru period had seen a number of international crisis which had brought the world to the brink of catastrophe at times. In the fast changing international situation, Indira Gandhi had put India on the world map, not only as the leader of non aligned movement but also as an ending anti imperialist leader and a crusader in the cause of world peace and peaceful coexistence of the various social systems on our planet.  

Washington had became very bitter about the foreign policy of Indira Gandhi, in the late sixties particularly after her firm stand on US invasion of Kampuchea and its support to Israel. It appears that a policy of "Vietnamisation" of Indian sub continent was conceived after the American debacle in Vietnam.

Indira Gandhi has visited the Soviet Union quiet a number of times, with her father, Nehru when he was alive and by herself in 1963. However her first visit to the Soviet Union as Prime Minister was in 1966. Between 1966 to 1971 she paid six visits to Soviet Union and every visit led to the consolidation of friendly relation between the two countries. Her sixth visit to the Soviet Union and other countries took place in the end of October 1971. Between 1969 to 1971 many changes had taken place. Indira Gandhi had grown into a national leader in her own right. Her unquestioned supremacy in her own party had been established. This enables her to speak on behalf of India with greater self
confidence than most leaders of other nations. She was visiting the Soviet Union at a time when the country was facing enormous difficulties of varying nature. During this visit, she discussed with the Soviet leaders the possible convergence of America and Chinese foreign and economic policies and their impact on the situation in Asia.  

The Soviet Union was the first big power to realize the gravity of the situation of 1971 and to see in at a major threat to peace and security in South Asia. The most shocking was that the western countries and their allies in the region kept their lips tight in spite of the fact that between March and May about 1.45 million refugees had already crossed over to India from war revenged, Bangladesh. At a time when both Peking and Washington were trying to condone the blood bath in East Bengal as an internal affair of Pakistan, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, in his letter of 2 April to the Pak president Yahiya Khan, appealed to "stop the bloodshed and repressions against the population in East Pakistan".

A Pravda article "The crisis and its consequences" published in its issue of 1 May informed the readers about the non-stop bloodshed in East Bengal and expressed Soviet people's serious concern over such events.

A full-scale real war was broke out between India and Pakistan as a result of surprising Pakistan attack on Indian airfields on the evening of 3 December 1971. In the United Nations the Soviet Union took a realistic approach to the question of establishing peace in the Indian subcontinent on the basis of "a simultaneous ceasefire and a political settlement". It vetoed the Peking support US resolution in the Security Council on December on 6th December. The Soviet Union exercised its second veto to block another resolution in the Security Council backed by United
States. The United Nation General Assembly on 8th December passed a
resolution sponsored by Argentina calling upon India and Pakistan "to
take forthwith all measures for an immediate ceasefire and for the
withdrawn of their armed forces," from each other's territory. The Soviet
Union along with eight other socialist states was among the eleven
nations which vetoed against the resolution. On 13 December the Soviet
Union used its veto for the third time to prevent the passage of a
resolution moved by the United States calling for ceasefire unrelated to a
political settlement. The Soviet delegate accused the United State of
being "more interested in getting another Soviet veto then in finding
formula to end the war." The Polish resolution which urged that Pakistan
should take steps for a peaceful transfer of power in the "eastern theatre
of conflict" to the lawfully elected representative of the people, headed by
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was supported by the Soviet delegate as "the
correct approach". At the most critical juncture in the Indo–Pak conflict
when President Nixon in his letter to Mrs. Gandhi hinted as US military
commitment and treaty obligations to Pakistan and resorted to discredited
Gunboat diplomacy by sending the seventh fleet task force to the Bay of
Bengal, Moscow was reported to have assured India that the Soviet Navy
would not allow the US fleet to intervene in Bangladesh. In fact the
Soviet warships followed on the heels of the US nuclear powered Carrier
"Enterprise". The Soviet army paper Krosnaya Zy Zvezda (on 16
December 1971) in an article "The Indian Ocean is not an American lake"
warned that US Gunboat diplomacy could further complicate the
situation. The fear of Soviet action is also believed to have acted as a
decisive factor in preventing China from directly interviewing in the
Indo–Pak conflict. The Soviet continued to support India's stand on
Bangladesh at the UNO, and the United States ordered its 7th fleet to
March into the Bay of Bengal apparently to rescue American citizens bit
actually pressurise India for withdrawing its troops from Bangladesh. The
Soviet delegate at the Security Council warned military cooperation in the
area. Many western analysts at the time viewed the treaty as a warning to
Pakistan not to intervene in the refugee camps in India. Some also saw it
as Soviet recognition that whatever influence over Pakistan wielded at
Tashkent had deteriorated and therefore the USSR would now shift
completely to India in its pursuit of the South Asian policy. The treaty
was seen as denoting.\textsuperscript{65}

According to People's Daily from China the Soviet had "stage
managed" India's long planned scheme to annex East Pakistan. The
Indians carried out this plot by encouraging secessionists "cooling up" the
so called "Government of Bangladesh" and injecting this "Puppet regime"
into East Pakistan by "Open direct invasion" into East Pakistan. India's
"naked aggression" was covered up by "absurd prefect" arrogant in the
extreme. The so called refugee question was simply a product of Indian
interference.\textsuperscript{66}

Soviet at least played an essential role in India's victory over
Pakistan while their American and Chinese rivals had both lined up on
the side of the loser. In the eyes of India (and much of the rest of the
world) the first encounter by the new Washington–Peking alignment had
ended in defeat. One Soviet official at the United Nations crowded "This
is in the History that the United States and China have been defeated
together."\textsuperscript{67}
In the face of a crisis of such a magnitude it was the Indo-Soviet friendship which completely turned the tide. In her characteristic style, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi her quiet and behind the scene diplomacy sprang a surprise on the entire world by signing the treaty of peace friendship and cooperation between India and the Soviet Union on August 9, 1971. D.P. Dhar who had gone to Kashmir, after giving up his ambassadorship to the Soviet Union returned from there to make a trip to Moscow, even then the few could know why he was there. Then came the announcement from Moscow of Gromyko's visit to Delhi.

The treaty put the relations between the two countries on a solid political and legal basis and reflected the aspirations of the people of the two countries for broad, multisided cooperation for ensuring economic and social progress, peace and security of people of the biggest socialist and the biggest non-aligned country in the world.

The treaty was signed on August 9, 1971 valid initially for twenty years, the treaty is automatically extended to successive five year periods unless either party declares its desires to terminate it. It is in this sense that the treaty even in its fledgling phase underscored the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's assertion during its signing, that it is a document of 'great international importance contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and else where.'

In the Parliament Swarn Singh described the treaty as "in essence a treaty of peace against war", explaining the provision for mutual consultation under Article 9 of the treaty he said "This should act as a deterrent to any power that may have aggressive design on our territorial
integrity and sovereignty."

As such the Indo–Soviet treaty is not directed against any other states and sets before itself the object of attaining security through friendship and cooperation. An idea which Jawaharlal Nehru advanced as far back as December 1958 in his reply to debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha, Nehru said, 'security can be obtained in many ways. The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true; it is equally true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else". 70

The 1965 Indo Pakistani war and the Tashkent conference in February 1966 had led to some interesting innovations in Soviet, Chinese and American Policies in South Asia, based primarily on their perception of the political and strategic environment in the sub continent in the post Tashkent period. The most apparent changes in regional policies during 1966 to 1971 were made by Moscow and Washington, but Beijing also began subtly and indirectly redefining its role and policies south of the Himalayas (for) the Soviet Union (which) had initially become involved in South Asia in the mid 1950s in order to forestall and counteract US intervention in that region through Pakistan's membership in US sponsored military alliance systems and through massive American economic aid programmes to India. India was critical state in the sub continent it had (thus) a basic objective to prevent any serious disjuncture in its relationship with USSR. Mrs. Gandhi's proposal for a treaty between the two states, Moscow considered such a treaty an important step in the direction of an Asian endorsement of Brezhnev's June 1969
"Asian mutual security" proposal, which was an integral part of the Soviet Union's containment of China's policy. A broad agreement on the proposal Indo–Soviet treaty was reached during negotiations conducted by the Indian ambassador to Moscow, D.P. Dhar, in mid 1969, and it is probable that the treaty would have been signed in the first half of 1970, if the political situation in India had permitted. For its part Moscow informed New Delhi in April 1970 that Soviet military aid to Pakistan was being suspended, though in fact some arm shipments to Pak continued through 1970 and into 1971.71

Indian critics of the Indo–Soviet friendship pact are not wholly unjustified in viewing it as the first step in a new cold war in Asia following the importance in Sino–American relations and the prospect of precisely the reverse, a relaxation of the tension that has made Asia the most crisis prone to them also for The Moscow New Delhi pact drives the wedge if Sino Soviet rivalry deep into the heart of Asia, through of course having different interests the two sides will have had different motives. On signing the pact Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union was not motivated by temporary factors. There is every reason for believing his claim that the Bengal crisis has not been instrumental in leading to the agreement as far as Moscow is concerned. There can not even be certainty as the Moscow considers the danger of a war between India and Pakistan to be as grave as India evidently feels (and necessary must feel to be) the case ....... it has not been Pakistani President Yahiya Khan's blood and thunder speeches that set Mr. Gromyko heading in the direction of New Delhi.72

The Soviet Union knows it very well that the tension in relations
between India and Pakistan only creates favourable conditions for interference by outside power in an area so close to its border and hence vital for its security. Being a power bulk of whose territory lies in Asia and a sizeable number of whose people are ethnically and affairs of Asia, particularly South Asia, which is its next door neighbor, is understandable. Moscow has since the very outset recognized the geopolitical importance of the Indian subcontinent because of its large territory, enormous human and natural resources and vital geographical location. Its altitude to the area has been radically different from the attitude of the USA and certain western powers (which China has also come to share of late). Unlike them the Soviet Union does not visualize the subcontinent only as an arena for the balancing game of the great powers and concedes it an important role in Asia and the world. Marx it may be recalled “India not a poor country but a country of poor people” the other difference in the approach of the Soviet Union and the Western power is that the former has looked upon the people inability this region as essentially one ethnically, culturally and historically.

Soviet Union's interest in peace and stability in an area close to its southern borders still remain pivotal to its foreign policy and good relations between the “blood brothers” India and Pakistan are vital for attainment of peace and stability, but a marked difference in the situation obtaining in 1965 and the one in 1971 precluded the Soviet Union from following A Tashkent type initiative. The balance of power approach was reflected in president Nixon's report to the US congress on 25 February 1971 which reserved Washington the right to lay down the pattern of the subcontinent's relation with the outside powers under the protect of preventing "pre dominant influence" of any of them. Again, in
a similar vein, the President's "state of the world" message to the congress on 9 Feb. 1972 made the offer of a serious dialogue with India depend upon India's interest in maintenance of balanced relationship with all major powers" Even of his latest "state of the world" message of 3 May 1973, President Nixon reported the same old stand his characterization of India as a "major power" now withstanding the reiterated the United States so called "natural concern" at India's exclusive ties with major countries and threatened intervention if "any side power" acquired a special position in the area. Washington's chorus of "balanced relationship" of the sub continent with the outside world has now been joined by Peking., By the Nixon–Chou communiqué both the USA and the China sought to abrogate to themselves a superior role in ordering the affair of the region. But in their statements Soviet leaders have been again and again emphasising the inalienable right of the states of the area to determine their pattern of relationship with the outside world and solve their intra–regional problems through their bilateral efforts without outside interference. Such an approach is more conductive to peace that the outdated balance of power approach which more often leads to an unbalance rather than a balance and results in conflict. 

Between 1972 and 1977, two historic visits took place; Leonid Brezhnev came to India in November 1973. In the course of his visit among the important document which was signed between the two countries were: an agreement on the further development of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries and a protocol which mapped out a series of concrete steps to be taken for the implementation of this agreement. In September 1972 an agreement on the creation of an intergovernmental Soviet–Indian Commission was signed. The raising of
Soviet-Indian economic relation to a new higher found its reflection in the result of summit talks during the official visit of Brezhnev to India in 1973. The visit was another link in this chain of story ties that had been established. Indira Gandhi while addressing a meeting of the Indo-Soviet cultural society in Delhi on 28 Nov., 1973 said that India and Soviet Union were linked by close ties of friendship and their friendship was helping India to defend her national independence. Lenin and Jawaharal Lal Nehru stood at the source of this friendship.\

In July 1976 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the Soviet Union again and this gone a new stimulus to economic coordination between the two countries. In the mid seventies, India and Soviet Union started considering the proposal to have joint ventures in third countries. A Soviet team of experts headed by heavy industry minister Goldin specially came to India to identify the areas where collaboration could be started.

The durability of Indo Soviet ties was manifest when the Janta Government came into power in 1977. They talked (Janta leaders) about the "genuine non alignment" giving the impression that they intended to distance India from the Soviet Union but in effect Morarji Desai signed significant economic agreement with Moscow which were not exactly an indication of moving away. With the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980 relations continued to have all around developments.

President Brezhnev's visit to Delhi in December 1980 promoted the relationship further in variety of directions. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi paid a three day visit beginning September 20, 1982. At the
political level Mrs. Gandhi and Brezhnev under lived the importance of Indo–Soviet friendship in the interest of peace in Asia and the world. Arkhipov during his visit to India in May 1983 offered the most sophisticated technology that the Soviet Union had ever believed to have been reinforced by Marshall Ustinov during his visit in March 1984.\textsuperscript{76}

Gorbachev's 1986 visit to New Delhi was meant to set the tone for the future of Indo–Soviet relations under the new thinking. That the Soviet delegation was exceedingly well received and that they were generous in bestowing economic assistance on India is obvious. In many ways, the international forces which supported his long-standing relationship continued to plague the region. China and India had not solved their border dispute; India's chief security worry, Pakistan, was being armed to the teeth by the United States; and Indo–American relations were still uneven. Indeed one month before border talks resumed in July 1986 a major Chinese border incursion into Arunanchal Pradesh was reported.

Gorbachev's visit to India in 1986 from the Indian perspective, the visit of the Soviet leader came at a most welcome time the visit allowed the two countries to reaffirm their long–term commitment and sent the message to India's foes that the new thinking and perestroika would not weaken the Indo–Soviet relationship.\textsuperscript{77}

That system of trade also worked to make the USSR India's major aid and trade partner. Economic assistance had often came in the form of project aid for large, industrial projects (the earlier example is the Bhilai
steel plant) As Indian priorities shifted into the energy sector, Soviet aid followed so that some of the major projects decided on 1986 were Tehri Hydro electric power plant, the Jharia Coal mines, and oil exploration in West Bengal. Soviet credits to India made indeed the USSR's largest debtor, with a debt of 907.5 million rupees in March 1990. Under Gorbachev USSR encouraged joint ventures with the Soviet Union. Given the extensiveness of the Indo Soviet economic relationship, India might have enjoyed some advantage in establishing joint ventures, especially when compared with other third world countries. That both countries valued there contacts was re-emphasized by their decision to continue the 1971 treaty of peace and friendship which was scheduled to terminate in 1991.78

In some ways, Soviet policy in South Asia in the early 1990's appeared remarkably similar to its policy in the early 1970's. The USSR continued to have close ties to India and Afghanistan; relation with Pakistan were very tense and there were cordial but limited relations with the peripheral countries. The regional balance of power looked very much as it did in 1971.79

Since the 1960's Soviet Union had been number one arms supplier. One of its main objectives has to increase Indian reliance on the USSR for hardware and expertise. Under Mrs. Gandhi in the 1970's the USSR's percentage of India's total arms import reached 80%. While India was clearly an important client to Moscow. It is also true that Indian received highly favourable terms on arms provided and had been offered licensing arrangements to some of the USSR's more advanced weaponry. India had not become self sufficient in arms production by a long shot, but with a
large and well educated research establishment, access to Soviet and other Western European technology, and a developing industrial base, India was in a not altogether unattractive position. Thus when India began efforts to diversify arms supplies in the late 1970's and easily 1980's negotiating with the French for Mirage aircraft and licensing agreements, Moscow saw its position in New Delhi threatened. The USSR offered India highly concessionary deals on their most advanced weaponry, including licensing agreements, even to the then unfinished Mig-29.

The year 1991 proved to be historic. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic founded in 1922 following the October of 1917 was dissolved. The Russian State collapsed twice in the twentieth century. In 1917 the Russian Empire disintegrated while it was fighting and losing a foreign war. The Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, in peacetime several decades after it had one of the greatest wars in Russia's long history of war. The first state collapsed before the communist took power, the second, when it was under communist rule.80

This year 1991 will be remembered in the history of world civilization as the year of the disbandment of the 'first successful socialist experiment' in human emancipation owing to the inherent limitations of the external conditions under which that experiment began.81

The post Stalinist Russia has produced two mighty men of destiny - Khruschev and Grobachev. Mr. Gorbachev, who presided over the Soviet Union for seven years, can easily be reckoned as one of the greatest personalities of the twentieth century. He dominated the political arena from 1985 to 1991. Although he ushered in a revolution with his
"Perestroika" means restructuring and 'Glasnost' means openness, throughout Europe, elimination all traces of communism, he fell a victim to those theories in his own country, when he made an attempt to grant more liberalisation to the various republic constituting the Union. Mikhail Gorbachev worked another impressive miracle. The cold war ended without a major bloodshed. Naturally this is solely Gorbachev's achievement. The post Soviet Russian Foreign Policy was initially an extension of the policy pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev in the last two years of his leadership. In his effort to build the common European Home, he advocated the deideolisation of Soviet Foreign policy but largely maintained old economic and military relations with the developing countries. At the same time the Indian foreign policy also came for a review because of the end of the cold war and adoption of the policy of economic liberalisation by P.M. Narsimha Rao. In June 1991 when he assumed the country's leadership problems were mounting in Indo–Soviet trade relations because of erratic supply of Soviet goods. However without this tactical collapsed in such a relatively peaceful manner. Everything in 1991 turned topsy-turvy: The drawn out Perestroika surreptitiously melted away to yield in the political vocabulary to the threatening world – "Coup". Throughout the years destiny staged its own Cap roses. The scale of history teetered from freedom to dictatorship and bakes Armour rolled into Moscow twice. The year which began with bloodshed in Vilnius and continued with more bloodshed in Karabakh and Ossetia climax with bloodshed in Tbilisi in December 1991. Lithuania had been the first of the Soviet Republics to declare independence in March 1990 and during the coup. Its two Baltic
neighbors followed suite, Estonia on 20th August and Latvia on 21st August, within weeks their independence had been recognized by the international community. The second largest of the Soviet Republics, the Ukraine declared itself an independent democratic republic on 24 August, Moldavia followed on 27th August and Azerbaijan on 30th August. The Uzbek parliament voted similarly on 31 August, Kirgizia declared itself in independent, sovereign and democratic state on 1st September, Turkmenia voted accordingly on 27th October, after a referendum in which (as in Armenia) the idea of independence, received overwhelming popular support. Kazakhstan voted for independence on 16th December leaving Russian. By the end of year, as the only republic that had not adopted a declaration of this kind. (Russia did however adopt a view state symbol – a version of the imperial double headed eagle). On 8th at a country house in Belorussia the leaders of the three Slav Republics met and concluded an agreement establishing an entirely new entity, a common wealth of independence states with its administrative headquarters in Minsk, the new common wealth was out a state, but it would none the less provide for uniting control of Nuclear arms, a single currency and a single economic space; the USSR as a subject of international law and a geo-political reality was declared no longer in existence, and the three republics individually announced the 1922 treaty through which it had originally been established.\footnote{\textit{Republics are in the process of dissolution.}}

While Russia is passing through a transition from a dictatorship to a democratic set up, its erstwhile vassals in Central Asia are caught up in a medley of conflict then there is still weak movement for democracy struggling against the old communist apparatus which is refusing to release its hold on power even while pretending to break loose from its
discredited ideological moorings.  

The emergence of the independent republics also heralded the end of the political and economic structure created in the erstwhile USSR on socialist ideology. After the formation of the commonwealth, President Gorbachev, who had all along advocated the presentation of the Union, relinquished his past, thereby making the end of a phase in domestic and international politics which was begun by him in April 1985.

However with the declaration of independence by Ukraine in December, it became clear that these structure which presumed the existence of a Union would not survive, on 8 Dec, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed an agreement in Minsk creating a commonwealth of Independent States, which was later joined by the Republic of Armenia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstani and Kirghizstan on 21 December at the Alma Ata summit.

The 9 + 1 agreement of April 1991 had committed all of the republics concerned, as well as the Soviet President, to the conclusion of a new union treaty within three months. After an extended process of negotiation Gorbachev was able to announce on 24 July that the nine of the republics had reached agreement on a new treaty of this kind, bringing into being a "Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics in the place of the overcentralised association of the recent past.  

As published in the Central Press, it specified that defence foreign policy energy, communication transport and budgetary matters would be decided jointly by the Centre and the republics, but that in all other matters republican laws would have precedence over phase of the union
as a wholes.\textsuperscript{89}

The new commonwealth declared itself open to other Soviet republics as well as to states elsewhere that shared its objectives, and on 21 December in Alma Ata a further agreement was signed by the three original members and eight other republics Armenia, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan, relations among the members of the commonwealth were to be conducted on a multinational basis, but it was agreed the concept of a single economic space. USSR as such was held to have ended its existence but the members of the commonwealth pledged themselves to discharge the obligation that arises from the 15000 or so international treaties and agreements to which the USSR had been a party. In a separate agreement the heads of members states agreed that Russia should take the seat at the United Nations formerly occupied by the USSR, and the framework of interstate and intergovernmental consultations were established.\textsuperscript{90}

The Alma Ata declaration of December 21 states that the commonwealth is neither a state nor a super state. At the same time, it says that allied command of the military strategic forces and a single control over nuclear weapons will be preserved.\textsuperscript{91}

After declaring themselves as independent, the republics choose Mr. Boris Yelstin as their leader. Mr. Yelstin is a president of the largest Republic of Russia. The Russian flag has replaced the Soviet flag at the Kremlin and Yelstine has been authorize by all 11 independent republics to deal with other countries and represent the 'common wealth' at all international forums.
The leaders agreed on the principles of common tariff and transportation system, and agreed to reconstitute the existing state television and radio monopoly as commonwealth wide broadcasting network.

Under the agreement, each state in the commonwealth will be allowed to have its own army, states may also opt to let the commander of the common wealth's joint nuclear forces control former Soviet troops on their territory. Azerbaijan, Maldivian and Ukraine have said they want to form their own armies. The rest of the member states including Russia, will take part in the United Command over the troops.

The existing mechanism agreed upon the Alma Ata on Dec. 21 envisaged the nuclear button in the hands of the Russian president, Mr. Boris Yelstin, the use of which needs the approval of the president of Russia the Ukraine and Kazakhstan four states with nuclear weapons on their soil.  

The Russian President Mr. Boris Yelstin declared on 25 December 1991 that the control of all the 27000 nuclear weapons of the defunct Soviet Union would now be under his control, thus alleging global anxiety over their accidental use of possible proliferation. He gave this information in an interview to the Cable News Network (CNN) shortly before the nuclear Briefcase (known as 'Yadormy– Chemodan') containing the launching code for the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal were handed over to him by the last Soviet President Mr. Gorbachev.  

The CIS is currently pursuing the policy of "wait and see". The CIS on the whole will pursue a flexible policy, watching the foreign policy
trends of the USA, the EEC, Japan and India and adjusting their posture accordingly. The foreign policy of the CIS will avoid hard positions. It will lack dogmatics. India should emphasize economic and cultural aspects of policy. In dealing with the states of the commonwealth. India also should draw them into the net of nonalignment, so that they may be served from the spheres of American hegemony. India has already recognized all the eleven republics including Georgia.

It was revealed on 10th March 1992 that a new Russian army is in the process of being created to provide greater security to the CIS. However this does not preclude armies. Russia has so far pressed for preservation of united armed forces which replaced the Soviet Union last December, but Russian officials have said they would sanction formation of a separate army if other republics took the same step.94

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the biggest event of the century, threw up new challenges before India; especially in view of the special relationships between them was the past four decades. The future role of the post Glasnost Russia needs time to firm up and settle into its policy course. Under the existing conditions, Indo-Soviet relations are getting free from empty rhetoric's, euphoria and the assurance of "emotional love" and "special ties".

The Indo-Russian honeymoon is over and India has to forge closer links with the European community, Japan and United States. Indian security demands today more effective diplomacy than at any time in the past 43 years.95

Yelstyn emphasising that Russia was a powerful “Eurasian Estate”
that attached great importance to the Asia Pacific region he stated that "relations with India were a priority avenue of Russia's foreign policy". He reiterated that India and Russia were entering a new phase of relationship without any political hypocrisy, based on the coinciding of basic interests.

Notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indo-Russian relations have continued to grow in countered intentions. In the past India had relied on the Soviet Union as the most reliable strategic partner and weapon supplier. In today's context, Russian defence companies are seeking to supply any armament from basic to the highly sophisticated once and India sees Russia as a source of supply for defence equipment. The export controls, non proliferation policies and unreliability of supplies and denial of key military technology to India by the West make Indo-Russian defence cooperation a long term stable.  

The Prime Minister of India Mr. Narasimha Rao has classified that India's policy towards the Russian States had not undergone any fundamental change but the country will have to deal with the commonwealth. Mr. LK. Gujral the former Indian Ambassador to USSR in 1978 said in April, in 1992 that the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union are not looking towards Iran or West Asia, contrary to the common belief in India. He pleaded that there should be no panic reaction to events in the region from a country of the size of India. He said India's foreign policy towards the former Soviet Union was based on relations between the two peoples. This was the right policy; he said adding that the region should continue to be high on agenda in the
country's foreign policy. 97

Russian President Yeltsin's visit to India in January is widely expected to give a fresh impact to bilateral relations which went into a temporary hiatus following the Soviet Union's disintegration and the consequent internal problems faced by Russia. The main item on Yeltsin's agenda during the visit is probably going to be the signing of a new Indo-Russian Treaty which will replace the 1971 Treaty of peace—friendship and cooperation between India and the then Soviet Union. While the main clause of treaty were more or less finalized during the foreign secretary J.N. Dixit visit to Russia.

Military supplies from the Russian Federation will not cease but the new republics will pay more attention to Pakistan in whose favour Russia voted in December 1991 to make South Asia a nuclear free zone. The Indian Foreign Minister had to rush to Moscow to probe in depth of the Russian intentions. India was assured that the traditional friendship of nearly forty four years will continue between the two countries.

Reciprocating the Indian warmth towards the new Russia. The Russian Ambassador in India stated that Indo-Soviet relations will "continue to prosper irrespective of what the form of the governments". Speaking on "Soviet Perestroika and Indo Soviet Relations". Mr. Isakov said the "Indo-Soviet friendship was not a passing phenomenon". He said history has showed that Indo-Soviet friendship was not artificially created. It was time tested and a change in government either in Moscow or New Delhi would not change the course of relationship. 99 When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Pakistan came to the conclusion that the four Muslim
majesty states of Central Asia would be inclined to Pakistan. This has not materialized. The tantalising dream of creating an Islamic commonwealth incorporating the regions of South West and Central Asia has been inherent in Pakistan's foreign policy since the Zia days.

Today India is the strongest political, economic and military power in South Asia. Even the US is becoming conscious of this new emerging reality. The main difficulties have been encountered in trade and this is mainly due to the internal economic chaos in Russia. The crux of the issue is the question of Rupee rouble parity. There may be some transitional difficulties in economic sphere of Indo-Russian relations but the two countries have enormous flexibility and resourcefulness to tide over there problems of adjustment.  

Another question gains importance that how would greater Sino-Russian rapprochement influence India's relation with New Commonwealth of Republic in Russia, in fact, the prospect of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement have compelled India to normalise its relation with China. India can no longer take the Soviet support for granted in case of conflict either with China or with Pakistan.  

The vastly changed international scenario as also the circumstances prevailing within the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union provided an entirely new setting for the first 38 years visit to Moscow by a General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. In a world that has ceased to be bipolar, this summit meet of the two giants was strikingly different in significance. The Sino Soviet relations were normalised in 1991. In this development going to affect the Indo-Soviet relations. At
the movement Moscow is according a greater importance to its relation with China which in turns means China is supplying much of the range of products to Moscow that India has traditionally provided. Is this an ominous sign for India? The disturbing fact of Sino Soviet nominalization is in their defence transactions side by side with economic exchange and trade, military contacts have also registered a steady increase, climaxing in the April 1991 visit to Marshall Dimitri Yarov. The first Soviet Defence Minister to visit to PRC and subsequent announcement by a spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Minister, the China and the Soviet Union not pose a threat to each other any longer. This was followed by an agreement of one of the largest ever arms purchase by China, a squadron of 24 Sukhoi, SU–27 Flanker all weather counter air fighter, supersonic aircraft. The Su–27 represents a technological leap of nearly two generations and is obvious going to enhance China's air defence and power projection capabilities tremendously. As a corollary to this movementous development India view will have to turn to the USA for the vital supplies of the modern military hardware. In December 1991 a high level Indian delegation (including Foreign Minister) did visit Moscow, but they were assured that the flow of military weapons to India would continue, but after the formation of CIS it to doubtful if this assurance would be translated into concrete terms.¹⁰²

If the triangular relationship between India, China and the New Russia develops positive overtures than this could in course of time pose a strong counter beckoning factor. When Sino Indian nominally gathering momentum, the United States can no longer play the Chinese Card against India. China is also wooing Japan – already Japan has more
capital investment in China than in the USA. The expanding political and 
economic understanding between China and Japan, with China also 
cultivating Korea.  

The third world countries are dismayed as the collapse of the 
Soviet Union leaves. The United States as the only superpower without 
any restraint to mussel the democratization of international politics. The 
Western Europe too, is uneasy as the wild men in White House may 
attempt to raise the scepter of Economic hegemony of the United States. 
Japan could help check the wallstreet barons and this increases the 
prospects of Japan forging stronger link with the EEC.  

George F. Kenon, the greatest expert on Russian affairs said some 
years back, said the great Americans, If and when the United States 
becomes overwhelmingly strong Russia will not disappear. The existence 
of Russia is a necessity for “American Prosperity”. The Gulf war of 1990 
proved that the United States can be effective power only in concert with 
other nations. Single handed Uncle Sam is helpless giant. France in 19th 
century and Germany in 20th Century tried to gain world hegemony but 
both Hitler and Napoleon failed. It is unlike that President Bush will 
succeed where the previous giants of world politic had failed so 
miserably. The US can retain its predominant position in world policies 
towards the Western Europe. On the diplomatic arena the United States 
would like India to act as a breakwater against the future moves by a 
resurgent Russia allying with France and Germany to form a counter 
weight to the United States.  

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FOOTNOTES


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98. Ibid; page 217.

99. Ibid; page 154.

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103. Ibid; page 215.