Surveying the "literature of imperialism" (the term is from Allen Greenberger's *The British Image of India*, 1969), one comes across various themes and preoccupations in the British representation of India. This chapter looks at some of the problems and issues of Anglo-Indian writing and seeks to locate them in the socio-cultural and intellectual climate of the relevant age. Chapter three will make a diachronic study of the development of British attitudes to India. The attitudes are studied in the context of interpersonal relationships. The literary manifestations of the same forms the basis for such an analysis. The British arrived in India as traders, the last of a host of Europeans – the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French. By 1618 Surat became the headquarters of the English East India Company (EIC). Bengal became the chief trading centre and Calcutta was founded in 1691.

Mughal decline had commenced. This decline attracted a lot of attention from the English. "Its fate was naturally the first object of attention for both Indians and the new arrivals", notes Percival Spear in *India: A Modern History* (1972, 173). The study of this decline coincides with, and probably initiated, the first preoccupation addressed in
Anglo-Indian writing: that of India's backwardness. The early attitude of awe for India's beauty and wealth combined with a feeling of contempt for India's primitivism. India was seen as a disintegrating society. Thomas Roe, ambassador to Jahangir's court, noted this state and wrote:

All in these kingdoms [India] will be in combustion ... Laws they have none written. The kyngs judgement bynds who sits and gives sentence with much patience once weakly both in capital and criminal cases ... He [the king] is every man's heir when he dyeth [since the ruler is owner of all land in the kingdom].

(qtd. in Mukherjee: 9)

Indian culture had stagnated. It apparently was not even a nation. Years later J.R. Seeley in The Expansion of England (1881-82) claimed: "There was no India in the political sense ... The word [India] was a geographical expression, and therefore India was easily conquered...." (161)

The English attributed India's backwardness to the absence of private property. This emphasis on private property as an index of civilisation was derived from thinkers like John Locke (1632-1704), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Montesquieu (1681-1755), and articulated forcefully later on by J.S. Mill (1806-1873).
The Orient's *emotionalism* and despotic monarchies were regarded as the cause of its depraved state. Montesquieu commented in *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748) that the Orientals had a "greater need of a *wise* legislator than the peoples of our own" (235). Francois Bernier, whom Montesquieu regarded as an authority, wrote:

"[It is] owing to the miserable system of Government, that most towns in Hindustan are made up of earth, mud, and other wretched materials; that there is no town which, if it is not already ruined and deserted, does not bear evident marks of approaching *decay*." (qtd. in Mukherjee: 11-12)

Thus the literary works of the age combined feelings of awe and contempt.

As the British position in India stabilised and expanded, their self confidence grew. In their relationships with the Indians, both sides had benefitted, but the British were seen in a better light. As self esteem grew, the early notions of superiority burgeoned into arrogance and contempt for the Indians. Their success in trade and the general deference from the Indians raised such confidence. The Westerner's talents were seen as "original" in the arts, sciences or technology. The Indian merely imitated
this original. Ahsan Jan Qaisar in The *Indian* Response to European Technology and *Culture: A.P. 1498-1707* (1982) makes a similar argument. An illustrative quote from Terry, a traveller, is provided to support this contention. Terry wrote in 1614: "the truth is, that the natives of that monarchy Cthe MoghalsJ are the best apes for imitation in the world..." (Qaisar: 17). Pelsaert the Dutchman and *Orington* the English chaplain also remarked on the Indian ability to imitate and their singular lack of talent in creating anything original (Qaisar: 17-18).

When the Englishmen had been employed by the Indian nobility their [English] talents were eulogised. And when the English hired Indians as servants they found themselves masters to the natives. *This* induced a sense of superiority and was a prologue to the master-slave relationship witnessed later in the heyday of the Raj. This relationship which always granted a *superior-master* status to the Westerner was to inform all other *Indo-British* relationships. It also helped create the hegemonic nature of the Raj. Philip Mason in *The Men Who Ruled India* (1985) quotes Sir Joshua Child (the East India Company director) who, as early as 1685, could write confidently of "the foundation of a large, well-grounded secure English dominion in India for all time to come" (Mason: 20).
Arrogance, self confidence and the desire to acquire wealth marked the Englishman of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. This class of Englishmen consisted mainly of adventurers who were in India to make a fortune. They were the Nabobs whose primary motif was plunder. Shamsul Islam in Chronicles of the Raj (1979) paints the Nabob as a dacoit figure who was unscrupulous and cruel (7). The Nabob was exemplified by those like Robert Clive and Warren Hastings (Michael Edwardes subtitles his book on Hastings "King of the Nabobs", 1976). The Nabob was described by Macaulay as "a gentleman with a tawny complexion, a bad liver and a worse heart" (qtd in Dodwell: ix). Thus even their fellow countrymen viewed them as unpleasant characters.

The Nabobs plundered India's wealth by any means fair or foul. India provided opportunities which England could never have. In the England of those times wealth marked and provided any social status. Class distinctions were hardening in the England of the time. Edward Royle notes that "social differentiation was well underway by [the] mid-eighteenth century in England" (Royle: 23-4). If these men had stayed on in England progress up the social ladder would have been slow, if at all. These were the men who really furthered Britain's imperial enterprise in India. Nirad C. Chaudhuri actually calls Robert Clive "Clive of India". Joseph
Schumpeter in *Imperialism* (1960) wrote of these early imperialists as follows:

Colonial empires were not conquered by the state but by adventurers, unable to find a footing at home [England!!, or men drawn into exile ... private imperialists. (18-19)

The Nabobs intended to make a fortune in the East, return to England and occupy higher societal roles, such as peerages, members of Parliament that accrued from wealth.

The greed for wealth was not, however, the only motivation for the "private imperialists". The thirst for adventure and the thrill of the unknown, exotic East drove them on. This psychological impetus has been seen as an essential feature of Imperialism by Richard Rorty (1991). Rorty writes:

The love of the exotic ... has been a progressive element in Western culture. The best and most helpful element in the high culture of the West is the Romantic desire to acquire ever new identities. (Rorty: 19)

The adventure fiction of the age, as Hugh Ridley has demonstrated in *Images of Imperial Rule* (1983) reflects the Imperialist tendency of the Englishman of the time. Like
Rorty, Ridley argues that the Eastern landscape was symbolic of the exotic writers' need to escape from the monotony of English life. The land of snakes, fakirs, princes and elephants, thus far "seen" only through literature was now explored in reality. Ridley thus effectively collapses the distinction between colonial literature and colonial enterprise. Nigel Leask in British Romantic Writers and the East: Anxieties of Empire (1973) has also demonstrated how writers like Southey, Byron and Moore combine the elements of adventure-escapism with the pathological "anxiety" towards empire-building.

The Nabob was therefore an adventurer and a Romantic. The psyche of the coloniser has been analysed by O. Mannoni in Prospero and Caliban. Mannoni argues for a "born coloniser" who seeks to fashion a self in the colonies, since he is practically persona non grata at home. Personal tragedies and identity crises had made life difficult in Britain. A good example could be Robert Clive. A schizophrenic with suicidal tendencies, Clive was doomed to failure in England. Yet out in India he became a "hero", who ruthlessly and with clinical efficiency consolidated the British empire.

Mannoni's argument thus helps us to question the very nature of early British colonialism. It was not an accident, nor any philanthropic mission, but was driven by ego, cruelty and greed.
It is therefore no surprise that the Nabobs detested the Indian way of life. Hastings touring Bengal in 1772 found "an exhausted country ... much oppressed" (Edwardes, Hastings: 48). The Nabobs were corrupt and unscrupulous, believing, like Hastings, that "softness of heart was a mortal disease in eighteenth century India" (Edwardes, Hastings: 62). However, the Nabobs were not really liked back in England. Their brash lifestyles and arrogance were despised by the other English (we have already noted Macaulay's comments about them). Dr. Samuel Johnson, for one criticised the Nabobs' character. He attacked the unscrupulous Nabobs for their avarice, seeing Clive and his men as bandits. Johnson's remark on the suicide of Clive is illustrative of his feeling: "a man [Clive] who acquired his fortunes by such crimes that his consciousness of them compelled him to cut his own throat" (qtd. in Boswell 3: 350).

From the mid-eighteenth century things altered. The Company had thus far regarded war as "so contrary to [its] interest" (Moorhouse: 35). But now war became essential if Britain was to retain and expand her influence in India. After numerous wars like Plassey (1757), Buxar (1764), the Mysore wars (1767-69, 1780-84, 1790-92 and 1799) British supremacy was well entrenched in India. The capture of
Bengal by Hastings in 1772 made the British invincible, because Bengal was the most important trading centre in India. From now on the State began to regulate the Company's activities. This was required because a lot of wealth and political stability depended on a planned approach. State intervention in Indian affairs began in 1767 when the British Parliament Acts required the East India Company to pay annual sums into the exchequer. With this "the state claimed its share of the Indian spoil and asserted its rights to control the sovereignty of Indian territory" (Ilbert: 41). The Regulating Act of 1773 appointed Hastings the first Governor-General of India. A Supreme Court was also set up. British presence had shifted its purpose from trade to politics. Michael Edwardes in British India, 1772-1947 (1993), sees this age as a crucial one in the Imperial enterprise. Edwardes believes that the Battle of Buxar (1764) was the pivotal event of the age. He writes:

[the Battle of Buxar marked] the real foundation of British dominion in India ... As a result of the battle, the company ceased to be a Company of merchants and became a formidable political force. (Edwardes, British: 22)

From the last years of the eighteenth century, especially with Hastings, there was a "moral awakening" of Britain, as
Islam puts it in Chronicles of the Raj (10). From now on the chief concerns of the East India Company, George Bearce argues, centred around patronage, commerce and governing India (Bearce: 37). An increasing feeling of "imperial responsibility" prevailed. This responsibility was of uplifting the heathen, savage and backward native. The attitude of responsibility hence led to the civilisational mission which eventually climaxed with the Clapham Sect. Missionaries poured into India in sharp contrast to the previous century. The London Missionary Society, set up in 1795, despatched its first missionary, Nathaniel Forsyth, to India in 1798. After the Charter Act of 1813 the influx increased. By 1851 there were 19 such societies, excluding the unattached missionaries operating from 222 mission stations (Renford: 171-2). The missionaries were to play a major role in the development of Western education in India.

The Conservatives led by Edmund Burke and Pitt (Sr.) continued to have the previous generation's fascination for India. These "metropolitan Orientalists" (the phrase is Moore-Gilbert's) regarded India as "a people for ages civilised and cultivated" (Burke: 111). But the natives were still seen as weaklings and "aboriginals" (Burke: 113). The major preoccupation was therefore the upliftment of the primitive native. Burke wrote:
It will be a distinction honourable to the age that the rescue of the greatest number of the human race [India] that ever were so grievously oppressed from the greatest tyranny that was ever exercised has fallen to the lot of abilities and disposition equal to the task.... (125)

The Conservatives were echoing the theory of Oriental despotism and degradation voiced earlier by Bernier, Montesquieu and Tavernier as noted above. The Conservatives also added another element to the conceptual terrain of thought about the Orient. By rejecting the "oppressive" rulers of India, they justified the "benign" British presence. Since the natives were "weak", "child-like" and "oppressed", the British took it upon themselves to improve their lot. The Orient was the "Other". It was a binary opposition installed within the discourse: the child-like, effeminate, savage Oriental as contrasted with the adult, masculine, advanced Westerner.

This move of creating the "Other" camouflaged and silenced voices raised back in England of England's own problems. England was moving rapidly from an agrarian society to an industrial one. The working classes lived in miserable conditions. Family life had been disrupted due to the work schedules like factory timings, lack of privacy in
homes etc. Women were also recruited for work. This was seen as a breakdown of the private family units - something held dear by the British. V.G. Kiernan suggests in The Lords of Human Kind (1969) that there might have been a guilty feeling in English minds about the changes occurring at home (qtd. in Thornton: 11). These changes entailed a great deal of physical and mental hardship. Before the soul searching for such consequences of "progress" could reach alarming proportions the spotlight was shifted onto the "Other" - the Orient. "By thinking the worst of their subjects they avoided having to think badly of themselves", notes Kiernan (qtd. in Thornton: 11-12). Mannoni, arguing on similar lines in Prospero and Caliban says that colonisation helps to remove the Westerner's inferiority complex as he lorded it over the natives. The presence of an "inferior" helped provide a psychological boost to the Westerner. He could now view himself as a better person.

However the Conservative zeal to reform did not consider tampering with the religious life of the Indians. The Conservative approach to civilising the native was based on a different principle as we shall see. The portrayal of the "feminine" East implied a Western masculinity. From this view developed the later "ma-baap" ("I am your father and your mother") role of the English in India. This role...
was grafted onto and developed along with a certain psychology of the coloniser. Mannoni argues that the coloniser by creating a "dependency complex" in the native helped his own ego, identity and eventually his social status. Any and all relationships of the native with the Englishman gave a superior status to the latter. Mannoni goes so far as to say that the colonialists lived by the "natives' need for dependence" (Mannoni: 66). This dependency complex was at the heart of the coloniser's method after the seventeenth century. The improvement of the native provided a motivation for the British. Their "responsibility" drove them on. However this progress could not be attained without a thorough knowledge of the Orient's customs and religions. Thus the motivation provided by the presence of the "Other" had two dimensions: to study and understand the "Other"; and subsequently civilise it. This was the task of the Westerner in India. By the eighteenth century the Westerner had made the Orient a subject of intensive "study". Supported by establishment of institutions like Haileybury in 1805, British "readings" of India became more popular. India was more than just an adventure. This was a departure from the Nabob attitude. India was a profession, a subject worthy of study, interpretation and analysis. Sanskrit and the Indian languages, customs, climate, topography, Hindu and Islamic laws were taught to future
rulers. The English civil servant was thus to be an official who "knew" the Indian way of life, its history and state of affairs.

"Orientalising" thus accompanied political enterprise. As Edward Said has argued, knowledge precedes governance. Acquiring knowledge of the East was ostensibly to enlighten the West's ignorance of this "dark arena". This attitude is illustrated in Dr. Samuel Johnson's famous request to Hastings regarding his (Hastings's) task in India. Hastings, according to Johnson, would have to

Increase the learning of his country [England] ... examine wisely the traditions and histories of the East ... and that at his [Hastings's] return we [the other English] shall know the arts and opinions of a race of men from whom very little has hitherto been derived. (qtd. in Boswell 4: 69)

This "knowledge" was provided by scholars like H.T. Colebrooke, Charles Wilkins, Robertson and William Jones. These were the real "Orientalists", in Said's sense of the term. An examination of the literature of the age reveals how the knowledge was "formulated" as hypothesis, provided "evidence" and thus became established as "truth", even though it created, in reality, *stereotypical* images of the
East. The knowledge thus provided by "authorities" like James Mill was used by politicians and civil servants to reform India. The entire British approach after the eighteenth century was hence based on such incomplete, even false knowledge. We shall look at the flaws in such authoritative texts as Mill's a little later.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that later British rulers in India laboured under an illusion. The illusion was: that they (the British) were in India because India was weak and backward. This was the notion provided by their "study" of the country. The British alone had the sagacity and resources to improve India's lot. As twentieth century novelists like E.M. Forster and Paul Scott were to show, this was an illusion based on ignorance, and an exaggerated sense of their own importance.

Upliftment of backward India meant Westernising it. Members of the Clapham Sect: Charles Metcalfe, Charles Grant (Jr.), William Wilberforce, Josiah Pratt, Zachary Macaulay, William Bentinck and later Thomas B. Macaulay. "Englishisation" was promoted in three areas: education, technology and religion. This concern with Westernisation in nineteenth century British India was an outcome of Britain's own transformation during the Industrial Revolution. Britain hoped that like herself, even the backward nations could
benefit if their way of life was modelled after England's. Richard Rorty in *Cultural Otherness* (1991) terms this a "culture of social hope" as opposed to a "culture of endurance". Rorty believes that the West was influenced by the hope that science and technology would transform human existence (Rorty: 20-21).

On the religious front therefore, Christianising the heathen was Britain's aim. This was probably the most touchy and controversial area of Indo-British relations of the age, the Conservatives having left religion well alone. The Charter Act of 1813 allowed missionaries into India. The missionary aim was two-fold: conversion of heathens to Christianity, and educating them on Western lines. This approach was to have enormous consequences for Britain.

Westernisation, paradoxically, did not try to collapse the us/them distinction. The Indian Civil Service, for example, indoctrinated its personnel with the idea of keeping their "Englishness" and the dangers of "going native". Britain's pride lay in its overseas deputees, and the deputees ought to live up to Britain's expectations and ideals. The English were to Westernise the native and make him similar to an Englishman. However caution was to be exercised here. The Englishman himself should stay "pure". Thus the opposition of "I/Other" remained.
Much of such indoctrination and idealism was inculcated by the English school system and institutions like Haileybury. The English public school, Kathryn Tidrick notes in *Empire and the English Character* (1990) instilled the "flamboyant cult of manliness" (218). Philip Mason has argued likewise in *The English Gentleman* (1982). Mason writes:

"The student at the public school] learned to do as he was told without question; later he learned to take it for granted that he would be obeyed. He learned to punish and encourage. He learned in short to rule."

(170)

The *system* was thus teaching pupils to be rulers. Its *indoctrination* reinforced notions of Western superiority and native *primitivism*. Future rulers were to subscribe to, and passionately believe in, these formulations instilled by their education. It is no surprise therefore that such schools produced hardened imperialists like Auckland and Ellenborough.

The system also provided a lineage, and thus *unquestionable justification* for continuing the tradition and fulfilling a duty. This generation of imperialists looked up to the largest colonial enterprise before them: the Roman
Empire. They saw themselves as the heir to this ancient Empire. Suhash Chakravarty in *The Raj Syndrome* (1991) writes:

The ruling class in England ... carefully contrived the fantasies of a modern Roman Empire. It was construed that the imperial obligation of Rome had been inherited by the British. This attitude becomes admirably expressed in Kipling's "A British-Roman Song" where he hailed the 'Imperial fire of Rome' as a divine dispensation fallen 'on us, thy son'.

(Chakravarty: 23-24)

There was however a fear in some quarters about the usefulness of this "legacy". Some like Auckland, Hardinge and Ellenborough laboured under the ideal of their invincibility and the "illusion of permanence", to use Francis Hutchins's phrase. Reformers of the age advocated caution so as to preserve present positions. They approached their endeavours more modestly, admitting that British experience in India had been too short for anyone to ascertain what was best for India (Bearce: 120). People like Elphinstone believed in an inevitable future departure of the British from India. Sir Charles Metcalfe wrote as early as 1829:
Empires grow old, decay and perish. Ours in India can hardly be called old but seems destined to be short lived. We appear to have passed the brilliancy and vigour of our youth, and it may be that we have reached a premature old age. (qtd. in Joshi: 16)

It was to be a perspicacious remark, for within 30 years Britain faced India's first "Mutiny" in 1857.

The caution of some of these "Sahibs" - as the 19th century Englishmen were called (as distinct from the early "Nabobs") - could possibly be explained by their geneology. In contrast to the Nabobs who did not belong to English society's "creamy layer", the Sahibs usually came from old respected families. They were trained to be "gentlemen" - stoic, chivalrous, correct, liberal and hardworking. They were relatively more honest since wealth was not a primary motive for these already rich men. There was more idealism to serve and improve the lot of the "poor" heathens. Most "established" upper-class English families had "representatives" in India. C.A. Bayly in Imperial Meridian (1989) mentions a dozen such respected families who sent their sons or other relatives to India. The Beauforts, Moiras, Cavendish-Bentincks, Fitzroys, Cast lereaghs, Maitlands, Elliots, Macartneys, Edmonstones, Elphinstones,
Wellesley*, Cornwallises, and Fitzmaurices were the more prominent among them (Bayly: 134-5).

The philosophy of his time influenced the ideology and actions of the Sahib in India. The influences came from various disciplines. The "final" ideology or perception may be summed up as: reform and strong Government. The values that helped make this view were: the liberalism of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), James Mill (1773-1836), humanism of Rousseau (1712-1778), Tom Paine (1737-1809), economists like David Ricardo (1772-1823) and Adam Smith (1723-1790), demographers like Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) and the political philosophy of J.S. Mill (1806-1873) and T.H. Green (1836-1882).

Rousseau argued that the savage in his natural habitat was motivated only by his selfish needs. The larger good of the community was never his concern. In such cases, a "social contract" entered into by the State - Government with the people was necessary for the sake of the whole community. This closely paralleled the prevalent British idea that they were in India to provide a just government since the savage natives were incapable of governing themselves rightly. The liberal and Utilitarian Bentham argued that "greatest good of the greatest number" was possible only by legislation. Legal sovereignty was essential for the progress of society.
Reforms could therefore only be implemented after securing political power (Sabine: 611-633).

J.S. Mill (1806-1873) argued that restraining the powers of rulers was difficult. As a solution to this problem he advocated the presence of a legislature whose interest was identical with those of the country. This would mean that members of the Government have no motive for using their power other than in the general interest (Sabine: 630-633). The similarities between Mill's argument and British attitudes in India are striking. The British in India had always argued that they ruled out of unselfishness, for Indian interests alone, seeing her as "the white man's burden", in Kipling's terms.

Liberals like T.H. Green and J.S. Mill stressed the idea of the individual's liberty to perform freely, unless this action caused injury to others. The liberals argued that governments functioned to ensure such a free society where the individual could develop his moral character unrestrained. Education was the most important contributor to social consciousness. Freedom of expression was considered vital for individual development. States, said Green, worked as a positive agency, in Benthamite fashion, using legislation to contribute to a positive freedom (Sabine: 655-663).
The attitudes and actions of English reformers in India may be seen in the context of these views. William Bentinck before leaving for India sought Bentham's blessing and said: "I am going to India but I shall not be Governor-General. It is you that will be Governor-General" (qtd. in Joshi: 18).

Developments in British policy in nineteenth century India were therefore governed by such liberal-humanitarian-Utilitarian views. Import of slaves was banned in 1811, possibly as the extension of the right to freedom. In 1832 purchase or sale of slaves between one administrative district and another was prohibited. The abhorrent customs of human sacrifice and female infanticide were duly banned. Thuggee, the barbaric cult of murder-robbery had always revolted the British. Between 1831 and 1837 the army and the police intensified their campaigns against Thuggee. Liberalism's advocacy of the freedom of expression manifested itself in the introduction of the Free Press in 1836. William Bentinck introduced a legislation banning Sati in 1829. In 1823 Raja Ram Mohun Roy had requested the then Governor-General Lord Amherst to set up a college suitable to a developing India. Roy envisaged the college's function thus:

[as] promoting a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction embracing natural philosophy and the
Macaulay's Minute on Education (1835) dismissed Persian and Sanskrit learning as useless. This marked the entry of Western education in India. In 1854 Charles Wood's despatch recommended the setting up of a Department of Education. The Universities of Bombay, Calcutta, Allahabad, Madras and Lahore were set up between 1857 and 1887. The aim was to set up a native ruling class "Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, opinions, in morals and in intellect" (Macaulay: 116). The other reason for educating the Indians was, as Gauri Vishwanathan's essay in The Lie of the Land (1992) argues, to cut British expenses by recruiting natives to work for the government: "Teaching was subordinated to the larger educational enterprises: working more for bureaucratic selection" (Vishwanathan: 29-41).

Western-educated Indians however caused more problems for the British. Eventually, the Westernised Indian had a love-hate relationship with the Englishmen. In literature the "Babu" became a character for ridicule, and his relations with the British seems to alternate between grovelling passivity (Hurree Babu in Kim) and angry rebellion (Dr. Aziz in Forster's A Passage to India). George Woodcock in Who Killed the British Empire? (1974) believes that Western
education of Indians contributed a great deal to the Empire's downfall. Woodcock comments: "One cannot rule indefinitely according to Curzon and teach according to Milton and Shelley" (327). The education of the Indians provided access to the ideas of freedom, fraternity and democracy as expressed in the texts of the British liberal thinkers. This awareness also brought to the Indians' notice the discrepancy between theory and practice. They realised that the British government in India did not adhere to the principles advocated by its own thinkers. This awareness sparked off dissension.

With the Benthamite turn in English political-social-legal philosophy, Utilitarian thinking influenced British policies in its colonies. Eric Stokes in The English Utilitarians and India (1982) says that the reform movement was the joint result of the merchant, the manufacturer and the missionary (47-8). We have already noted the rapid expansion of the missionary strength in India. The merchant class was driven by the lure of wealth. The manufacturer found India a rich source of raw materials and a market for British products. Fieldhouse calls the post-1860s phase the "second imperialism" when laissez faire economics, policies like "imperial preference" and extensive expansion marked the Raj (Fieldhouse: 5).
The Britisher was now a "competitionwallah", as G.O. Trevelyan called him. The "competitionwallah" was a civil servant who had to pass an exam to get into the Indian Civil Service. The manufacturer, merchant and the civil servant decided that if there was a technological revolution in India on the lines of Britain's own industrial revolution, the English would make a fortune. Simultaneously, the missionary would be trying to induce "moral" upliftment of the natives. This is what Lugard called European Imperialism's "dual mandate": Europe's own industrial class's benefit and the native race's progress to a higher plane (qtd. in Betts: 119). The "competitionwallah" had thus moved farther than the Nabob, a mere plunderer, and the Sahib who was the complete, idealistic English gentleman. It is in this age that technological progress, on the lines of Britain's Industrial Revolution begins. The Railways, Post and Telegraph, industries, all began to take root and expand.

The Mutiny of 1857 changed British perceptions radically. They had expected gratitude for their contribution to India's "progress". It was forgotten that "progress" had destroyed Indian handicraft industry, created class barriers among Indians by the industrial-trade setup. The caste system, which provided a support to the Indian, was
vigorously attacked by the British. Anti-missionary feeling also gathered momentum. By 1857 there were 200,000 Christians in India, as Michael Edwardes notes in British India (131). Disaffection among sepoys, the Zamindars and the poorer Indians spread.

The Mutiny aroused feelings of betrayal in British hearts. Their god-like images, the "ma-baap" role, their technological-educational mission had all been rejected by the Indians. The concept of the native as an "innocent" disappeared, to be replaced by a view of him as treacherous and ungrateful. The child-Indian had turned against the parent-Englishman. The violence of the Mutiny upset British expectations of a glorious empire in the East.

An understanding of the psychological root of the Mutiny may be gathered from Rollo May's work Power and Innocence (1972). May first provides the etymology of the word "innocent". It is derived from "in-nocens" or "not harmful". The Englishman viewed the native as innocent and child-like. The father image of the ruler had a "nutrient power" as of the parent over the child (May: 109). This made the child's violence inexplicable to the British "ma-baap". Rollo May argues that such aggression was the result of self-assertion being blocked over a period of time and marks a movement into positions of power, into another territory, and

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therefore self-definition (May: 40-43). The Mutiny can therefore be seen as the Indians' first expression of their desire for independence. It was the first move towards taking the power of government away from British hands. The Mutineers had actually re-installed Bahadur Shah Zafar as Emperor at Delhi.

Eventually the British began to accept their share of responsibility for the Revolt. They realised that their policies may not have been entirely blameless. Thinkers were locating the Indian problem within Britain's own policies and attitudes. Karl Marx in The First War of Indian Independence (nd) said that the Mutiny was "only the reflex, in a concentrated form, of England's own conduct in India" (94). Such a criticism provoked a rethinking of approaches to India on the part of the British. The British began to reconstruct and revise their policies.

There was however no question of relinquishing India. Leaders like Canning and Disraeli realised that Britain could not afford to lose India. Joanna Trollope in Brittanica's Daughters (1983) quotes Disraeli:

There may be grave questions as to the best mod* of obtaining wealth ... but there can be no question that the best mode of preserving wealth is power. (20)
Britain intended to alter its attitudes and make structural changes in administration; in short do anything to retain its most valuable possession.

Structural changes resulted from a marked distrust of the natives, "the mutiny mentality" as Charles Allen describes it. There was a radical centralisation of authority. The army, where the revolt had begun, was restructured since its potential as a centre of dissension was finally recognised. Karl Marx had written;

In creating a native army of 200,000 men kept in check by an English army of 40,000 the British simultaneously organised the first centre of resistance.... (42)

The English realised this tactical error in 1857. Before the revolt the proportion of European troops to Indian sepoys was 1:9. By 1863 there were 62,000 British soldiers and 125,000 Indian. A 1:2 ratio was carefully maintained in Bengal, and elsewhere it was 1:3 (Moorhouse: 106). Brahmins and Rajputs were kept out. Recruitments were communal. In sharp contrast to earlier attitudes (as expressed in W.D. Arnold's Oakfield) the officers tried to get better acquainted with Indian soldiers (Spear, India: 278).

The East India Company was held responsible for the disaster. In 1858 a Bill transferred power from the Company
to the Crown. In 1873 the East India Company was formally dissolved. The "New Imperialism" had begun. The "New Imperialism" had a double feature. It was more hardened, Imperialist and discriminatory than the previous age - a direct result of 1857. It was also more avaricious, necessitated by Britain's move towards acquiring a position of global economic supremacy. Lenin in Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1939) has argued that this rapid Imperial expansion coincided with Britain's progress towards a capitalist economy (Lenin: 22). The Victorian Age therefore saw a resurgence in British confidence.

This confidence resulted in a more discriminatory attitude, as noted before. The "Otherness" of the Orient was emphasised. The language of racism was now forcefully articulated. This language first emerged from the scientific community. The discourse of racism had its origins in the biological sciences, specifically evolution theory and anthropology. Post-1857 years of British rule were influenced by Darwinian theories (Origin of Species appeared in 1859). Anthropological and ethnological studies were developing fast. Christine Bolt in Victorian Attitudes to Race (1971) points out that all theories contributed to the essential notion that the Indians were inferior. They offered "scientific" evidence to support their claim. James Hunt in
his annual address to the *Anthropological* Society of London

noted:

Statesmen may ignore the existence of race antagonism: but it exists nonetheless. They may continue to plead that race subordination forms no part of nature's laws: but this will not alter the facts.... (Bolt: 4)

The *Journal* published by the *Anthropological* Society of London claimed:

Everywhere the inferior organisation makes way for the superior. As the Indian is killed by the approach of civilisation, to which he resists in vain, so the black man perishes by that culture to which he serves as a humble instrument. (qtd. in Bolt: 20)

Social Darwinists like Houston Chamberlain (1855-1927), Karl Pearson (1857-1936) and the rise of Fascist and Nazi ideologies made emphatic demands for racial "purity". They rejected any possibility of miscegenation as a cultural contact. There was, on the European front, a tendency to isolate races to maintain their pure identity. The British antagonism towards their subject races, their increasing aloofness, emphasis on "Englishness" therefore is no
surprise. The "Other" was inferior, animal-like, subhuman; and the British superior, and civilised. This meant that "scientifically", racism was "proved" true. The discourse helped the rulers to rule over the "savage" native in an inhuman manner because the "animals" required such harsh treatment. James Morris in Pax Britannica (1984) expresses this view: "But in an empire so firmly based upon racial differences it was inevitable that people were sometimes treated as less than human" (143). The English fear of miscegenation, contact with Indian at intimate levels, or even of official relationship was reflected in their reactions to the Ilbert Bill (1883) and the Bengal Tenancy Bill (1883).

On the Indian side, the response to much aggressive "Englishing" was the rise of militant nationalism. Dayanand Saraswathi (1824-1883) and Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) were the chief leaders. Ashis Nandy in The Intimate Enemy (1989) argues that this development was out of necessity. Cultural co-optation in the encounter requires identification with the aggressor according to Nandy. Indians like Vivekananda saw their salvation in being more like the British. They therefore resurrected the militant ideology in the traditional Indian concept of state craft (Nandy: 7). The militant nationalists hoped to gain freedom and recognition
from the British by their "Britishness". In becoming like the British, it was hoped, the Indian identity would be respected and acknowledged.

The founding of the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885 was an important step in the progress towards India's self-assertion. This move, initially regarded as a "safety-valve" by A.O. Hume (one of the INC's founders), was not popular with the other English. However, self-confident men like Curzon had doubts as to the degree of threat posed by the INC to the British empire. Curzon wrote to Lord Dufferin: "In my belief the Congress is tottering to its fall, and one of my great ambitions while in India is to assist it to a peaceful demise" (qtd. in Spear, India: 318). According to Spear, Curzon did India a favour, by "transforming nationalism from a set of individual opinions into a nation wide movement" (316).

The Curzon kind of self confidence led the English to reject everything Indian in order to retain their Englishness (Greenberger: 15). It also meant that a rapprochement between the two races was ruled out. Kipling's view that the East and West cannot meet illustrates this attitude. In the twentieth century writers like Paul Scott, George Orwell and E.M. Forster blamed the English for their insularity which prevented any real mixing of the races. Trenchant
criticism of the Raj and its perpetrators began to a limited extent with Kipling and moved to more overt expression in Forster and Scott. Even if post-1947 writers like Farrell, John Masters and Paul Scott felt nostalgic about the loss of empire, they did not flinch from apportioning the blame between English policy and personality. These writers with their critique combined with a sense of loss for Britain's erstwhile empire mark the climax in the "literature of Imperialism".
NOTES

1. John Locke had argued that society and government were formed mainly to protect private property. Montesquieu, the French thinker, placed the cause of Oriental primitivism with the despotic rulers, material poverty and the general Eastern climate. In *The Spirit of the Laws* Montesquieu illustrates Edward Said's argument in *Orientalism* that both the hypothesis and "proof" of Oriental backwardness was provided by the same paradigm. Montesquieu, quotes the travelogues of Jean Baptiste Tavernier and Francois Bernier as "proof". Tavernier wrote: "A hundred European soldiers would have little difficulty in routing a thousand Indian soldiers" (qtd. in Montesquieu: 234-5).

2. The newly rich Nabobs returned to England, acquired land and became part of the landed gentry. They usually had blacks or Indians as servants, a legacy of their days in India. This was seen as fashionable and allowed the "rich planter or Nabob to maintain in the home community the standard of living which he had enjoyed overseas, without the cost of English servants" (Royle: 76). Col. Mannering in Sir Walter Scott's *Guy Mannering* (1815), Robert Clive and Warren Hastings are examples.

3. Some idea of the "condition of England" during its industrialisation can be gauged from Patrick Colquhoun's
Colquhoun calculated that 67% of the total population of England and Wales were of the lower orders and commanded a mere 24.9% of the total income (Royle: 81). A study of the consequences of industrialisation such as alienation, disrupted family life, religious dilemmas, psychological trauma, sexual repression can be found in Trevor May's An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1760-1970 (1987).

4. Raymond K. Renford in The Non-Official British in India to 1920 provides statistics to illustrate the rapidly expanding base of Christianity in India. The 4000 Indian Christians in the Punjab in 1880s grew to 163000 by 1911. In Uttar Pradesh the Methodists grew to 104,000 between 1901-1911. India also boasted the largest number of foreign missionaries at work in any non-Christian country - 5200. Renford says that there was growing missionary influence upon Indian society and the government in this country (Renford: 196-97).

5. Daniel R. Headrick in The Tools of Empire (1981) points out that technological progress in colonies was both necessitated and facilitated by British imperialism. The search for raw materials, then markets, the availability of wireless, armaments, transport were results of Britain's own industrialisation and in turn helped their penetration into and across colonies. A similar study is undertaken by Zaheer...
Baber in *The Science of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilisation and Colonial Rule in India* (1996). Baber explores the interactions which helped transmission of scientific knowledge between India and other civilisations. He also analyses the role of scientific development, especially in the nineteenth century, in the consolidation of British empire in India.