CHAPTER - I
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AS SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION AND AS SOCIAL DISTANCE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (from classical to modern)

(A) THE CLASSICAL APPROACH

Ancient civilizations such as Greece and Rome had very little social discrimination based on colour or race and hence little idea of social discrimination. In fact, there was considerable sense of unity and social solidarity in the Roman and Medieval world. But contacts with red and black men that followed adventure into the western hemisphere and the lands of Africa and India took on certain hostile aspects. Coming to the eighteenth century we find that the sciences classified plants and animal into different categories and species. This was followed by infant anthropology making distinctions which were instantly supported by the new philosophy. These distinctions were largely employed by those who had any interest in promoting differences between slaves and masters, and other lines of cleavages accepted by economic groups. Subsequently, the impact of western nations on the Far East countries stirred racial feelings and gave rise to the feelings of racial discrimination. (cf. Detweiler, 1932: 732-748). Tonnis (1887), Tarde (1897; 1898), Ross (1902), Cooley (1906), Sumner (1907), Simmel (1908), Richard (1912), Savorgnam (1914), Neprash (1919), Ellefsen (1922), Delevesky (1924), Park and Burgess (1921), Park (1924), von Wiese (1928), etc. immediately sought to analyze the phenomenon and contributed in various ways to the development of the concept of social discrimination. All these classical writers referred to the phenomenon of social discrimination as social distance.
directly or indirectly, as an element of social structure itself and as a norm about that structure. The concern of all these early writers was with theoretical and systematic analyses of a number of such recurring processes as socio-cultural isolation, social discrimination, social distance, social interaction, social conflict, social competition, war, revolution, adaptation, amalgamation, acculturation, cooperation, dominance-subordination, imitation, social control, etc. All these processes, in fact, formed part of the emergent problems of social solidarity and antagonism, of the age. A summary view of the conceptualizations of some of these classical writers will reveal the nature and direction of their thinking.

Tonnies (1887), although, did not use the term "social discrimination" or "social distance" specifically, yet he dealt with the problems of social isolation, social alienation and grouping cohesion extensively, in his treatment of the differentiation between Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft, which bore out the significance of the phenomenon of social discrimination and social distance in inter-and intra-group relationships. These two states of social relationships represented the closeness and farness between individuals and groups. When from a more personal, intimate and sympathetic relationship we shifted to a formalized and contractual way of social life we exhibited a sense of aloofness, social isolation, impliedly social discrimination and social distance. From the point of view of motivation, observed Tonnies, we had interpersonal and intergroup solidarities and antagonisms generated by "fundamental", "conditioned", "normative", 
and "purposeful" motivations often combined with one another.

In the fundamental and the conditioned motivation the attitudes of solidarity or antagonism were neither purposely planned, nor foreseen in advance, nor did they had any preliminary motives of utility or advantage. They arose spontaneously as a result of certain characteristics of the other party - for instance, a certain appearance, such as colour or some other racial trait; or certain beliefs, such as religious convictions; or certain affiliations, such as one's nationality - or as a result of certain actions and reactions of the parties in the past or the present. The parties had no mutual sense of either solidarity or antagonism before their first meeting; but in the process of interaction, not suddenly, but gradually, such attitudes appeared and finally, in a crystallized form, emerged and became solidary or antagonistic relationships. It is very true of social relationships between higher and lower castes or between lower castes in certain part of India.

Tonnies believed that many persons as well as many nations and groups were in solidary or antagonistic relationship with other persons and groups largely because of past experience, with the attitude thus developed. The parties hated one another because they could not help it. A large part of interstate, international, interracial, interethnic, interreligious and interpolitical group antagonisms were due to conditioned or fundamental motivations.

These ideas of Tonnies relating to group solidarity and
antagonism, the immediate and instinctive sympathy and antipathy, the rational and irrational volition and action paved the way for later theorists to formulate systematic theories of social discrimination or antipathetic social distance.

Tarde (1897; 1898; 1903), however, directly used the term "social distance" instead of social antagonism or social discrimination or social alienation. Tarde observed that persons who inter-married, who ate at the same table without a sense of revulsion, who conformed to the same social patterns, and who entertained the same views respecting class distinctions, exhibited a sense of social nearness, regardless of their occupational and other differences. But, when they refused to do so they inter alia maintained social alloneness or social distance. The problem of such social farness or social distance, in fact, arose in course of time, with the technical division of labour and increase in the number of occupations.

The subsequent writings of Ross (1902), Cooley (1908) and Simmel (1908) further went to underline the significance of this phenomenon with reference to the problem of social solidarity and antagonism.

Simmel (1908: 321) laid great emphasis on analyzing the phenomenon of social conflict. Equally important he considered the phenomenon of social farness or social distance and regarded it as inherent in the fundamental forms and issues of life. (cf. Wolff, 1950: 97). Using the term specifically, he saw "social distance" as an objectively observable quantity which
varied from one social structure to another. He commented: "Interpersonal relationships, which constitute the very principle of small groups, conflict with the distance and coolness of abstract norms without which the large group cannot exist."¹

Simmel's conceptualization was best illustrated in his discussion of the "stranger". While dealing with the stranger Simmel actually dealt with the degrees of nearness and farness in social circle and striving to secure acceptance in another, illustrated both nearness and farness at the same time. When he was geographically far from his old home, he might be socially near, especially if he experienced home sickness. On the other hand, when he arrived in a new location and was not at first accepted, he illustrated physical nearness and social remoteness. Thus he represented in himself a union of nearness and remoteness. Even the stranger was near us if we felt that between him and us were similarities of nationality, of social and professional position, or of common personal traits. On the other hand, a person might belong to our own nationality or profession and still seemed far from us simply because he was one out of a countless multitude². (1908: 511). Simmel's study of the "stranger" naturally led to a consideration of "social discrimination" or "social distance".

¹ Simmel's concept implied both socio-structural and cultural elements. It may further be observed that in Simmel's paper on "The Sociological Significance of the Stranger", his concept occupied a central role. (cf. Park and Burgess, 1921).
Like Simmel, Cooley (1906) also did not use the term either "social discrimination" or "social distance" specifically, but implied it in his famous distinction between the "primary" and "secondary" groups. Both in the case of Tonnies and Cooley the dichotomous group types seemed to differ in terms of physical proximity or distance, frequency of interaction (i.e., time spent in interacting with other members of the in-group), and size of the groups. Only within a specifically geographic distance were face-to-face relationships, of the primary group, possible, although modern media of communication like the telephone or the television tended to extend such relationships.

Still further, Neprash (1919), Ellefsen (1922) and Delevesky (1924) viewed this phenomenon, though in social structural sense, yet narrowed it to a consideration of the problem of minority group contacts and the attitudes of majority towards minority and vice versa.

It was, however, Park and Burgees who gave a more systematic orientation to the phenomenon. They conceptualized it in terms of the two most elementary behaviour patterns, viz., the tendency "to approach" and the tendency "to withdraw". According to them, the simplest and the most fundamental types of behaviour

2. In the recent study of the "Stranger", Wood (1934: 7) found that "the new relationships which are formed when strangers meet are not governed wholly fortuitous circumstances, but that they are closely correlated with social relationships that are already present in the group which the stranger has entered. The conclusion is that the newcomer to any group is a stranger to the degree that he does not share the basic sentiments and values of that group. He is rated by the group as an asset or a liability according to how he is adjudged as a help or a hindrance in the promoting of the group's values." (1934:283:284).
of individuals and groups were represented in these contrasting tendencies to approach an object or to withdraw from it. If instead of thinking of these two tendencies as unrelated, they were thought of as conflicting responses to the same situation, where the tendency to approach was modified and complicated by a tendency to withdraw. There was a tendency to approach but not too near. There was a feeling of interest and sympathy of A for B, but only when B remained at a certain distance.

Park and Burgess (1921) observed that the accommodations between the above-stated two conflicting tendencies was most flagrantly displayed in the case of race prejudice. This may be likened to the antagonism between clean and unclean castes or between unclean castes in the present day the Indian structure. Accordingly, Park (1924: 339) applied his concept in the study of racial attitudes and race relations. Applied in these areas, his concept focussed attention on two aspects of the attitudes of prejudice and antagonism. It directed attention beneath the overt manifestations of intergroup relations to the stable terms of their accommodation, and it formulated the latter as a readily quantifiable phenomenon. They further observed: "The point is that we are clearly conscious, in all our personal relationships, of degrees of intimacy. A is closer to B than C and the degree of this intimacy measures the influence which each has over the other". Accordingly, this attitude referred to as coming into use "in an attempt to reduce to something like measurable terms, the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterized personal and social relations
Thus, Park and Burgess gave impetus to the quantification of such a phenomenon. Expressed as above, such a concept represented a continuum ranging from close, warm, and ultimate contact on the one hand, through indifference, to active dislike, hostility and rejection, on the other hand. Such a social distance was only true social distance when it was measured along social status, such as citizen and stranger.

This tendency of distance, thus conceived, by Park and Burgess, was composed of four dimensions: normative, interactive, cultural and personal. Two of these dimensions directly touched upon important aspects of social relations - role prescriptions and rates of interaction; and the remaining two derived from the ways cultural values and personal empathy impinged upon the social structure. Over the long run, these dimensions might cluster and coalesce into only one dimension.

Park and Burgess believed that any such concept might

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3. It may be observed here with respect to this definition that Goode and Hatt (1952: 243) visualized some problems when this definition was applied in the measurement of social distance. The problem was about the remainder of the continuum, whether we sought to measure social distance towards a social group, a value, or an individual. In subsequent/researches, they noted the concept had been applied in all the three.

4. In a well-known paper on friendship patterns, Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) traced the relationship between distance in the social system and distance in the cultural system.

5. Whether this coalescence might also take place in the short run was a matter of empirical investigation.
be applied to all kinds of subordinations, exclusions, privacies, social distances, and reserves. Where the situation called forth rival or conflicting tendencies, the resulting attitude was likely to be one of accommodation, in which distance was the determining factor.

Von Wiese (1924: 309) used the phenomenon of such social relationships as a criterion for classifying social wholes. By this he meant the degree of nearness or immediately binding the members (also seen von Wiese, 1933: 160).

Summing up the classical approach it might be said that it was viewed in the wider socio-structural perspective of social solidarity and antagonism on the one hand and on the behaviouristic level on the other. Attempts were also made to quantify this phenomenon so as to make it an observable and measurable unit. To this end, such an attitude was conceived of as the degree of sympathetic understanding and made to represent a continuum ranging from nearness to farness. Besides, the classical writers viewed such a phenomenon on various levels, such as personal, social, cultural, ethnic, national, interactional, horizontal, vertical and spatial. It was also applied to diverse social situations and related to various associative and dissociative processes.

(B) MODERN APPROACHES

With the lead given by classical writers, modern sociologists and psychologists sought to conceptualize and analyze the
phenomenon such social relationships. The pioneer among modern social theorist was Professor Emory S. Bogardus of Southern California University. He made a pioneering work on such relationships and called it social distance. It was after him that several other approaches developed and several other dimensions of this phenomenon were researched and empirically tested. Some of these dimensions are discussed as below:

(I) **Socio-Psychological Approaches**: Bogardus' conceptualization was both sociological and psychological. Following him, many others adopted the socio-psychological approach to the study of this phenomenon.

(i) **Social distance as sympathetic understanding**:

Initially, Bogardus (1925a: 216) conceptualized this phenomenon in the same terms in which it was visualized by Park and Burgess. Accordingly, he defined it as "the degrees and grades of understanding and feeling that persons experience regarding each other". But soon after, under the inspiration of Simmel's writings, he modified his definition to read as: "the degree of sympathetic understanding that exists between two persons or between a person and a group". Elaborating this definition he observed that this "sympathetic understanding" might take the form of either farness or nearness. Where there was little sympathetic understanding social farness existed. Where sympathetic understanding was greater nearness obtained.
Socialization produced nearness.  

Human relationships are dynamic, not static. Therefore, Bogardus felt that nearness might turn into farness at any moment. If anyone person found that he could no longer trust a friend, social coldness was at once experienced. If a stranger manifested dependable and likeable traits, then nearness developed. In general, we kept strangers at a distance. Only gradually the change from farness to nearness occurred. Once nearness was established it might gradually or suddenly shifted to farness. Too much nearness caused persons to grow tired of each other and to move gradually into farness relationship. Thus, every such social relationship might have twofold aspect. It might be viewed from A's point of view or from B's. 'A' might feel near to B, whereas B might feel far from A. At any rate there was almost always a "social aloofness differential", that is, A felt a little closer to B or farther from B than B felt with reference to A. The differential was the difference in the distance reactions of each of two parties toward each other.

Social relationships of distances, according to Bogardus, were of two kinds. One was due to faulty perception and communication. The other was a recoil from acquaintance and intimacy in which differences in attitudes, sentiments, and beliefs were discovered and in which conflicts were developed. Conflicts thus...

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6. Banton (1960: 171) also elaborated on this definition and stated that sympathy referred to feeling reactions of a favourable responsive type, whereas understanding involved knowledge of a person which also led to favourably responsive behaviour.
arose from an absence of knowledge of the other person's attitudes, or from a feeling or an awareness of difference.

Viewed from an individual took on the characteristics of his group or groups. His traits were not distinguished from his group's tastes. "All Chinese look alike to me" -- when they were socially aloof. On the other hand, a person upon close acquaintance revealed his individuality, or his distinguishing marks. But this individuality might produce either favourable or unfavourable attitudes. Intimacy might lead to arousal or disgust or to ennui caused by repetition or tiresome stimuli. Where there was no caste system, individuals were continually getting "out of place" from the standpoint of somebody, and hence arousing unfavourable reactions on the part of "somebody". Where there existed the caste system, as in India, individuals either felt as near to each other from anybody's standpoint or felt far away from the standpoint of another under certain given situations.

Social relationships as typified as social distance (Bogardus, 1926: 209) was a measure of actual or potential social conflict. It revealed the location of actual or incipient social problems of social discrimination.

All such social problems might be thought of in terms of social distance, and applied in terms of the principles involved in the necessary decreasing of social distance. Social distance accounted for the rise of misunderstandings and hence for the real underlying factors which created such social problem of
social nearness or social farness.

Causes of social farness were found in unfavourable personal experiences. These generated what were relatively lasting negative sentiments. Nearness originated in favourable experiences. Unpleasant sense impressions personally experienced in childhood and adolescence were many. Sometimes fear was roused; and then disgust. Fear was the more dynamic and predominant factor. In either case there was a sensory image that was often described as "horrifying". The fact that these images were experienced in childhood gave them a more or less permanent character. (Bogardus, 1926; 204).

Derivative experiences, hearsay reports, traditions were also causes of social farness. In fact, derivative experiences might be as effective as direct ones, especially if the sources were closely identified with one's own personal life.

A large grouping of materials offered by life history data of the persons expressing the greatest social farness reactions was composed of traditions and accepted opinion. It was clear that hearsay evidence coming from both one's personal friends and relative strangers was widely influential in creating social farness. (Bogardus, 1926; 202).

Social farness was deliberately fostered, sometimes in order to maintain status, sometimes to keep oneself or the group in power, sometimes to maintain self-respect. Both persons and groups would fight for status.
Social farness was deliberately maintained by an autocratic society. The people in authority maintained personal "reserves" and social conventions which hindered the rank and file from becoming intimate with them, and from entering imaginatively into the minds of the leaders. Democracy, on the other hand, theoretically strived to overcome the factors which created or supported social farness. (Bogardus, 1926: 210).

Social farness also resulted from the maintenance of social status, that is, of the status quo in social relationship. By keeping others at a distance a person maintained his standing among his friends. One could more easily bear the loss of almost anything in life than loss of social status, hence, the raison d'etre for maintaining social farness or distance. (Bogardus, 1925: 217).

(ii) Social antipathy or distance as different degrees of sympathy and antipathy

Mannheim (1933) maintained that social farness as a social phenomenon was produced by agents who were interested in maintaining social farness between themselves and others. He (1957: 44) observed that people who did not belong to our group did not fall in the realm of our primary contacts. We did not consider them as real individuals, but we categorized about them. This

7. The close relation between social farness and personal status had been emphasized by Runner (1948) who had diagrammed distance relationships of adolescent girls in the form of concentric circles.
meant that we classified them in terms of "different degrees of sympathy and antipathy". Internal sympathetic contacts and group egotism within and without the group resulted in a double standard of feeling, thought and action: good-will, cooperation and trust between the members of the group, but hostility and suspicion toward the members of other groups. Here lay the roots of attitudes social farness or distance between any two given groups. Thus, according to Mannheim (1957: 47) in every kind of social contact, an attitude of social distance was implied — distance signifying an external or spatial distance, and an internal or mental distance. The whole variety and diversity of social and cultural life would be inexplicable without such a category of distance. Distancing was at the same time, one of the behaviour patterns which was essential to the persistence and continuity of an authoritarian civilization. Democracy diminished distances, as we expected with its advent in India. Prestige was thus largely a matter of "distance". In fact, the word 'distance' originated from our direct experience of spaces. The evolution of mental distancing from spatial distance was clearly demonstrated in the case of "fear". During the process of differentiation more complex types of distancing emerged from the fear distance; for instance, the power distance. The conventional distance which had grown up in a society strictly in response to the need for personal safety, had developed in many societies into a symbol of power relationships and into a fixed impression of the hierarchy of social rank.
(iii) Social "aloofness" and "unapproachability" as social distance

Hiller (1933) conceived of "aloofness" and "unapproachability" of persons in terms of social distance, especially those of different social strata. Thus, he referred to it as difference in rank, prestige, power and renown. It also involved superordination - subordination as well as gradations in approachability.

(iv) Distance between peripheral and central and as different degrees of intimacy and termed as social distance

Lewin (1948) felt that a feeling of social distance could be defined in two ways. One way was to think of it as a distance between the more "peripheral" and more "central" (intimate) regions of the individual. The other way was to visualize it as different degrees of intimacy of the situation which the person was willing to share with the other. The second way was a sociological expression of the term while the first was rather psychological.

(v) Social avoidance as a norm of social relationships of distance

Triandis and Triandis (1961, 1966: 207-216) conceptualized this phenomenon of distance in terms of the norms of avoidance. This feeling was indicated by a person to exist between himself and another by means of endorsement of certain statements. In every society, certain kinds of people had norms of avoidance of persons who were different from themselves with respect to such characteristics as physical type (race), belief system (religion
or political philosophy), occupations, nationality, and so forth. Avoidance might involve exclusion of persons with such "undesirable" characteristics from the "friendship circle", the neighbourhood, the occupational group, the place of work, and sometimes from the country. The degree to which individuals were willing to accept people who differed from themselves into their own social group might be considered as a measure of their "social distance" from these outgroup persons.

(vi) Degrees of integration and disintegration of men termed as social distance

Preber and Calvey (1947) thought of such social relationships of mutual distance in terms of the degrees of integration or disintegration of men, hampering amalgamation and assimilation. Persons might be physically or psychologically close to one another yet socially apart. Precognition of such social relationships understood as social distance was part of one's training, usually the result of attitudes and habits acquired during childhood. Before amalgamation or assimilation was possible these social distances had to be overcome. Persons of ethnocentric opinion or the notion that "we" were superior to all others, demanded that all other people were to be judged by "our" standards.

It was evident from the above that the variety of socio-psychological approaches emphasized the degrees of sympathetic understanding, the degrees of sympathy and antipathy, aloofness and unapproachability, degrees of intimacy, distance between
peripheral and central, norms of avoidance, degrees of integration and disintegration of men, etc. as various dimensions of social relationships generating social distance. Although measurements were developed to quantify such a phenomenon, yet the fact remained that such behaviouristic approaches rendered expressing it in concrete terms as very difficult. This attitude generating social distance in all such cases was conceived of in terms of a continuum which represented the attitude of nearness or sympathetic understanding or integration or similarities on the one end of the scale and the attitude of antipathy, farness, disintegration and dissimilarities on the other end. But doubts might be raised if any such continuum really existed. It might also be said that this phenomenon varied from society to society and no universal standards of measurement could be applied and in all social situations.

(II) Psychological Approaches: Some authors who found fault with socio-psychological approaches laid great emphasis upon adopting a purely psychological approach to this phenomenon. Such approaches visualized such feelings as emanating from personality structures, mental attitudes of individuals towards other individuals and groups. Bullough (1912), Nimkoff (1924), Poole (1927), Dodge (1933), Gurnee and Baker (1938), Fairchild (1944), Young (1946), Sherif (1948), Just (1954), Banton (1959), Pearlin and Rosenberg (1962), Williams, Jr (1964), Laumann (1965) etc. were prominent among those who laid greater emphasis upon the psychological element in considering this phenomenon.
(i) Personality system aspect

Bullough (1912-13; 87-118), the pioneer of the psychological approach to such social relationships termed specifically as social distance drew attention to the spontaneous activity 'creating' a distance between objects. He spoke of a personality system aspect of distance, but which was not social. His "distance" lay between our own self and such objects as are sources or vehicles of such affections. "Of course, it was not the subject's social act which created the distance, the subject merely registered greater distance because his sight was blurred by mist.

It was noteworthy here that Bullough's concept of psychological distance partook of the same mystical union of objectivity (that which made one able to see things in a new light) and a subject play on one's affection which characterized Simmel's distance. Thus, his distance had a negative aspect, the cutting out of the practical side (as in a fog), and a positive aspect -- the elaboration of experience on the new basis created by the inhibitory action of distance.

Nimkoff (1924; 1933; 1935; 1936; 1947) also dealt with the phenomenon of social distance in somewhat psychological sense, while dealing with the nature of the changes which took place in the interactions of children and parents. These changes were analyzed by him in terms of processes that involved an increase of activities on the basis of free interplay, and of processes leading to less and less activities in common. In his study of
the parental reactions of 1200 children and of 300 life histories and parent-child research interviews. Nimkoff reported that the main social distance making areas were parent-child detachment, parental detachment, parental dominance, and a mutual thwarting and opposing of interests. Decreasing distance factors were found in the acceptance of the parent and the child, and a tolerance of differences in values.

(ii) **Degrees of intimacy of thought and action conceptualized as social distance**

Poole Jr. (1927) conceptualized social distance as degrees of intimacy of thought and action which existed between individuals and groups in association. Intimacy of thought was not mere likemindedness or knowledge of another's thoughts. It was a situation of conscious sharing and confiding, where one took another into his life and thought and action. However, knowledge on the part of each that likemindedness existed would tend to draw them together, unless they were held apart by barriers erected by group norms. Individuals were drawn together by other factors than likemindedness, as mutual regard or admiration; each desired a more intimate association with the other, a more common life of thought or action or both. Again, despite the presence of factors which tended to reduce distances between individuals, we found individuals held apart because of group norms which demanded a separation, as norms of distance between

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8. Du Vall (1937) made an interesting inquiry into the nature of child-parent distance, following up the work of Nimkoff and obtained a rank correlation of .76 ± .15 in one phase of his study.
the saxes, castes, classes and races. In general, Poole believed that distances were dissolved by the sense of identify, the feeling that each was with, rather than against, the other. The highest cooperation demanded the least distances; the most intense antagonism the greatest distances. Thus conflict was often expressed by distance, and mutual aid by its absence.

Quite apparently Poole's conceptualization laid greater emphasis on "intimate association" rather than on "sympathetic understanding". This underlay the importance of social contacts, social interactions and their frequencies and the resulting feelings of nearness or farness as a result thereof.

(iii) Social distance visualized also as mental nearness

In the psychological sense, some authors preferred to view this phenomenon of social relationships seen as social distance in terms of "mental nearness" or "mental farness", "social acceptance" or "social avoidance" than in terms of "social nearness" or "social farness". Thus Dodge (1933: 233-244) and Gurnee and Baker (1938: 265-269) thought that Bogardus' conceptualization of this phenomenon was psychologically vague and might well represent a consequence rather than a necessary component of an attitude of social distance. Social distance in terms of mental nearness appeared to them as more intelligible psychologically and more congruous with the idea of social distance. According to this conception, that relationship had the least social distance which produced the strongest feeling of mental nearness, and so on.
(iv) **Social distance as reserve or constraint**

Accordingly, Fairchild (1944: 281) also defined social distance as reserve or constraint in social interaction between individuals belonging to groups rated as inferior and superior in status. The differences giving rise to social distance may be those of race and nationality, of class, of institutional role as between officer and soldier or teacher and student. Social distance so defined, according to him, need not preclude a certain kind of intimacy, circumscriber by rules governing the relation of the superior and the inferior. Fairchild emphasized that social distance must be distinguished from the emotional tone of the relationship; it need not imply aversion. Nevertheless, especially in race and nationality relations, social distance was often accompanied by fear and hostility. Similarly, the social relationships between higher castes and scheduled castes and between persons of scheduled castes social distance was most often accompanied by attitudes of social avoidance or social status differential.

(v) **Social ambivalence as social distance**

The degree of farness and nearness might also be seen in terms of ambivalence at the time of grading one's own group and its values with reference to those of another, (Young, 1946). It was measured by the degree of acceptance and intimacy of contact, on the one hand, and by the degree of antipathy, on the other. There was an element of ambivalence implied in social distance which might permit the expression of love and hate in
the most extreme forms. Social distance symbolized aversion and avoidance on the one hand, and friendliness and close contact, on the other. It signified not merely spatial isolation but, more importantly, isolation or ideas and attitudes.

Sherif (1948: 268-278) on the other hand referred to such feelings of social distance as a dimension of interaction between members of different groups, ranging from intimacy to complete separation (no contact). It was defined by norms governing the situations in which interaction with members of the outgroup was permissible. Pearlman and Rosenberg (1962: 56-65), adding the psychological dimension, referred to both status and personal distance.

(vi) **Social distance as social intolerance**

Just (1954) felt that Poole’s formulation of such a social distance could also be placed on a continuum, but, contrary to him, he visualized this as a continuum of social tolerance and social intolerance. According to him, when an individual possessed an attitude of great social nearness he was tolerant and had a great deal of sympathetic understanding for a particular group or groups. When his attitude was of great social farness, he was intolerant, prejudiced and characterized by a very small degree of sympathetic understanding.

(vii) **Social discrimination as Social Distance**

Banton (1959) thought that the observance of social discrimination in selecting or avoiding a mate of a particular
group or refusing to invite or to attend dinner by another group was a form of social distance. Where racial distinctions were more rigid, patterns of social distance also reflected political and psychological influences to a marked extent and it was more difficult to isolate the purely sociological factors.

(viii) **Feelings willingness or unwillingness also termed as social distance**

Williams, Jr. (1964) conceived of the phenomenon of social relationships expressed as feelings of willingness or unwillingness, to accept others within given degrees of intimacy or association as a dimension of social distance. Thus specific aspects of such feelings were characterized as: (i) feelings of group indifference, (ii) dislike of the outgroup, (iii) feelings of inappropriateness, (iv) fear of anticipated reactions of the ingroup, (v) aversion to and fear of anticipated responses of the outgroup, and (vi) unfamiliar social situations. Williams, Jr. (1964: 29) observed that an individual of a social group learnt norms of appropriate behaviour toward his own group and toward outgroups from the primary groups in which he had membership. Such social feelings reflected the individual's conformity to the expectations and demands of his ingroup rather than his attitudes toward members of the outgroup. All other things being the same, both his acceptance of the norms and his actual conformity with them would be the more likely, the more he had a positive desire to associate with and be approved by the members of his group. His conformity, by the same token, would be a way of avoiding negative sanctions, including disap-
proval. Thus, an individual might abide by a definition of social distance without being actively hostile toward the excluded group.

(ix) Ego-centricism reflected as an attitude of social distance

In the psychological sense, Laumann (1965: 26-36) referred to feelings of ambivalent or antipathetic "social distance", instead of feelings of "objective social distance", which he defined as the attitude of ego toward a person with a particular status attribute that broadly defined the character of the interaction that ego would undertake with the object with whom he is inacting. The character of the interaction might vary along a dimension of socially defined intimacy.

(III) Sociological Approaches to Social Distance: Apart from the partly sociological and partly psychological or purely psychological approaches, a good number of scholars laid great emphasis on adopting a purely sociological approach to the study of social distance, following the lead given by classical sociologists. Prominent among such scholars were: Hypes (1928), Sherif (1946), Sorokin (1930; 1947), Preher and Calvey (1947).

9. cf. Banton (1960: 113) commented on British attitude: "When people say that others of their acquaintance would dislike working with a coloured man, or having one as a neighbour, or visitor, they are saying that this would be contrary to the group's norms of conduct, not that each one of these people, individually, is unfavourably disposed... The maintenance of social distance is customary; it is not necessarily accentuated by prejudice."

In the same view, we may say that a member of a given scheduled caste refuse to eat food at the house of another scheduled caste or even take tak at his shop or seat near him in a train compartment, it would give an indication that persons of both the scheduled caste group maintained a certain degree of social distance in their social relationships.

(i) Social distance as a division of attributes

Hypes (1928: 234-237) thought that the term "social distance" had a technical value in as much as it signified a distribution or division of attitudes upon matters of social concern; also by implication, it suggested a methodology of measuring the range of distribution or the width of diversion of these attitudes. In practice, however, individuals or groups disagreeing, recorded the magnitude of their disagreement by the extremists to which they would extend themselves in acts of conflict; such acts might vary all the way from very mild disapproval to the bitterest of warfare or other more subtle forms of conflict. When the conflict was outwardly visible, the observer might infer rather accurately something of the "distance" that intervened between the attitudes of the contestants; but when conflict was more or less camouflaged by the amenities of life, attitudinal distances became more difficult to measure.

(ii) Social distance in terms of socio-cultural space

A little later the renowned sociologist Sorokin (1930) elaborated the problems of social solidarity and antagonism and highlighted the phenomenon as social distance. He characterized the immediate and most decisive factors of either solidarity or antagonism of the interacting parties as (a) the character of
their law and ethical convictions; (b) the social distance (condordance or discordance) of the law and moral convictions of each party with those of the others; (c) the degree to which these norms were consistently and adequately practised by the overt actions and vehicles of the parties. Intense solidarities and antagonisms were possible only when there was a common fund of important values. Where there was no such fund of values the relationship of the parties assumed a neutral indifferent character, neither intensely solidary nor intensely antagonistic, which modern sociologists termed as 'social distance'. Our solidarity readily decreased with social distance between ourselves and others.

In fact, Sorokin (1947: 362) explicated the phenomenon of "social distance" in terms of "socio-cultural space". It was a peculiar manifold composed of three main "planes" and of a certain number of "dimension". It had a plane of meanings, values, and norms; a plane of vehicles; and a plane of human agents. Its dimensions were made up of the main cultural systems with their subsystems and subgroups. Sociologically, two or more socio-cultural phenomena were near to one another if they occupied the same or an adjacent position in the vector system of the socio-cultural space; and they were distant from one another if their position in the vector system was different. Thus, two individuals belonging to the same constellation of unibonded and multibonded groups and to the same strata of these groups were very near to one another in the superorganic space; the more different the groups and strata they belonged to, the more
distant they were to one another.

(iii) **Degree of Social separation as a dimension of Social Distance**

Theodorson and Theodorson (1969) looked to this continuum in terms of the degree of social separation. They observed that most discussions of social distance were often concerned with relationships between statuses and the groups with different social ranks, but social distance might also be the result of vigorous mutual repudiation when the structure of a society was based on a hierarchy of statuses. Social distance was a part of the role structure of a society. It might be regarded as desirable and legitimate within a tradition and stable system of social stratification. Thus, the greater the social distance between two groups of different statuses or cultures, the less sympathy, understanding, intimacy, and interaction there was between them. It was noteworthy that these authors had included cultures also into consideration while thinking of social distance.

(iv) **Relative Accessibility as a dimension of social distance**

Eysenck, Wurzburg and Berne (1972) have considered the feelings of relative accessibility of a person or group of the degree of desired contact with a second person or group as an important dimension of social distance. It depended not only on the spatial distance between two individuals, but also on the similarity of their social attitudes, their interests and preferences, occupations, aims, etc. The greater the social distance was the more the likelihood of contact between indivi-
duals or hostile attitudes would interpose themselves between them, and vice versa.

Thus, from the purely sociological viewpoint social distance was seen as an element in the social structure itself, as a division of social attributes, in terms of socio-cultural space, and as social separation. The tendency among scholars of sociological approaches was to decry the psychological undercurrents in the phenomenon of social distance. But the question was whether it was possible to separate the psychological from the social and to identify the purely social structural aspect of social distance.

(IV) Social Relationships typified as Social Distance: Its Dimensions (Classical to Modern): Both classical and modern scholars conceptualized social distance as having several aspects and dimensions. Mention may be made of the following dimensions:

(a) Personal Distance: Simmel (1908) referred to 'personal' relationships in his writings and suggested that the intimate revelation which a person made to a stranger, a situation of empathetic understanding, might occur precisely because the stranger was distant on other dimensions of social distance. It clearly implied a sort of personal distance, which could be expressed as the degree of understanding or unspoken communication that took place between two persons or two statuses. Poole Jr. (1927) also visualized of personal distance, as having a subject form, the individuals's conception of its relation to another
individual. He thought that persons seeking to satisfy their wishes struck up various degrees of intimacy with one another; these degrees of intimacy were personal distances in so far as they were free from the dictates of social norms and contained merely the element of individual welfare and satisfaction, such personal distances, in fact, revealed the conflict nature of relations. Those with us, were brought near; those against us, were kept away.

It may be observed that personal distance was an important dimension of social distance in so far as there could be no social distance where there was no personal distance. As the group existed only in the individuals who composed it, so social distance existed only in the degree of personal distance which it required.

Laumann (1965: 28) referred to personal distance as the subjective social distance, which he explained as the attitude of ego toward a person with a particular status attribute that broadly defined the character of interaction that ego would undertake with the attitude object.

(b) Horizontal Distance: Bogardus (1960: 10), and Gould and Kolb (1964) referred to the degree of sympathetic understanding that functioned between persons of the same or similar status as the horizontal dimension of social distance. Fairchild (1944) also spoke of this dimension of social distance but referred it to obstacles in free interaction. According to him, it could be identified with antagonistic attitudes and
often accompanied some suspicion or hostility. It did not, however, involve attitudes of superiority and inferiority.

(c) **Vertical Distance** :- Park and Burgess (1921: 441), Hiller (1933), Gould and Kolb (1964) and Bogardus (1960: 10) also spoke of the vertical dimension of social distance characterized by attitudes and feelings of superordination and subordination, or superiority and inferiority, which developed due to differences, in rank, prestige, power, authority, renown, etc.

(d) **Passive Distance** :- Bogardus (1960: 10) also referred to passive farness and passive nearness as important dimensions of social distance. Passive farness was exhibited in the attitude of avoidance and illustrated by the inability of members of different social classes to communicate with one another fully even though they tried to do so. Passive nearness existed in a vertical sense between persons who felt they were social class equals.

(e) **Normative Distance** :- Park (1924) spoke of normative dimension of distance, referring it to the manner and degree of interaction which ought to hold between two or more persons or statuses.

(f) **Interactive Distance** :- The degree of actual interaction was referred to by Park (1924) as the interactive dimension of social distance, which was not required to match the normative prescriptions.
(g) **Cultural or Valuational Distance** :- It referred to the degree of value homophyly that existed between two persons or statuses (Parks 1924).

(h) **Racial Distance** :- When we took into consideration the distance between two ethnic groups, it referred to racial distance (Bogardus, 1960).

(i) **Age Distance** :- When we referred to distance between the "older generation" and the "younger generation" which arose due to the degree of responsibility, we had the age dimension of distance (Bogardus, 1960). Parent-child distance was related to age dimension of distance (Nimkoff, 1924).

(j) **Educational Distance** :- Bogardus (1960) referred it to teacher-pupil distance, pupil-pupil distance, teacher-principal distance, teacher-teacher distance, teacher-parent distance. It was not limited, of course to school situations, but included educational relations in industry, recreation, community affairs, Church, etc.

(k) **Class Distance** :- Bogardus (1960) referred to this dimension of social distance with reference to rank and status. It was an expression of a defence mechanism whereby a group of people, having acquired a position of importance, wealth, power, or a combination of these, desired to protect these privileges from encroachments by outsiders, and so they set up distance barriers.
(1) **National Distance** :- Bogardus (1960) characterized this dimension of social distance by differences in national loyalties and ideologies, competition for markets and for land areas, mutual struggle for dominance of one nation over another, difference in economic ideologies, etc.

(m) **Residential Distance** :- Westie (1952) referred to this dimension of social distance in terms of the degree of residential proximity of any two groups.

(n) **Position Distance** :- This dimension of social distance, according to Westie (1952) referred to the extent to which one group would be willing to have another occupy positions of prestige and power in the community.

(o) **Inter-personal Physical Distance** :- It referred to the degree to which a given social group was averse to physical association with another or with physical objects with which it had been in contact (Westie, 1952).

(p) **Inter-personal Social Distance** :- It referred to the degree of proximity permitted in interpersonal interactions (Westie, 1952).

It may be observed here that Kadushin (1962: 517-531) examined the concept of social distance in terms of three conditions for stable interaction—internalized norms, congruent expectations, and optimum cathexis, which were much like the found dimensions of social distance of Park, in that they formed a package over the long run.
The above dimensions of social distance clearly bore the fact that classical and modern scholars applied the concept of social dimensions in several personal and social situations of interactions.

(V) Evaluation: A consideration of the historical development of the concept of social distance revealed that it was conceptualized in either purely psychological or purely sociological or socio-psychological terms. Also, social distance was conceptualized along several diverse dimensions so as to be applicable to a variety of social situations. But, the fact remained that despite the apparent diversity of "distances" the majority were either explicitly or implicitly consonant with one of the following more classical or representational definitions: the "grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy that characterized personal and social relations". (Park; 1924), "the degree of sympathetic understanding that existed between two persons or between a person and a group..." (Bogardus; 1933), "the feeling of mental nearness", (Gurnee and Baker; 1938), "the degree of intimacy of thought and action..." the actual degree of intimacy which prevailed", (Poole, Jr. 1927b), and "...that indicated by a person to exist between himself and another by means of endorsement of certain statements", (Triandis and Triandis, 1962).

But taking a package view of all the classical and modern approaches to the phenomenon of social relationships of social distance we find that it was best expressed in terms of the
degrees of acceptance and rejection by one group of another or by the ingroup of the outgroup, in a situation of group to group interaction, depending on criteria of group identification, values and norms. The degrees of acceptance and rejection clearly implied the degrees of sympathetic understanding, or social nearness or farness, or friendliness or hostility, or solidarity or antagonism, etc.

Again, social distance should be considered as a unitary concept and not a multi-dimensional one. When we spoke of social distance we actually referred to inter-group relationships as such and not individual to group or group to individual relationships. All individuals belonged to group or associations. Therefore, when individuals interacted with other individuals or groups they actually so interacted with reference to the group to which they belonged. Thus, while taking into account the extent of social distance, we have either to coalesce the various dimensions or at least the important ones, particularly those which characterized the distances between groups.

Thus, while dealing with the Indian society, since we know that inter-caste relations characterized it more importantly, any consideration of social distance would broadly limit itself to intra-and to inter-caste distances only. Problems only arose in highly pluralistic societies in which different dimensions of inter-group differences characterized the social relations of the people. In such cases, the need would be to cross-validate the different dimensions of inter-group relationships and to arrive
at a composite picture of social distance. By doing so, such areas could be easily delineated as reflected distances between groups. Differences in age, education, occupation, status, ideology, political orientation, religion, etc. did not constitute different dimensions of social distance but determined the extent, course and degree of social distance existing between any two groups. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to confuse social relationships characterizing social distance with its determining factors or criteria on which such distance was based.

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