CHAPTER VIII

CRITICAL EVALUATION

Critical examination of the aesthetic theories of Croce, Dr. Freud, Kant, Hegel, Collingwood and alluded others.
A healthy and candourous criticism begins with self-criticism in the spirit of edification for achieving placidity, for maintaining equilibrium, and for creating neutral position to criticism of others. As such a criticism based on logical and moral norms must have two necessary poles of ‘construction’ and ‘destruction’, or of ‘merits’ and ‘demerits’. Such an impartial criticism is intended here which I hope to extend from chapter I to chapter VII. No criticism as I think can be regarded in precision because of individual differences and distinctive nature of idiosyncrasies, as some one victimizes a theory or theorist, the other one patronizes the same theory or theorist; hardly one can be indifferent. But the scholars, particularly those who are preparing a thesis, have the responsibility to go deep in analyzing any theory or thesis before holding a critical study because interpretations of the theories and thoughts may have wide scope and unending discussions, which require lot of time and energy for clearer understanding. Friedrich Schiller’s view is worthy to quote. He writes, “The task of scholar, then, is far from being a purely ‘academic’ activity. it is directly, and reciprocally, related to the personal and public challenge. For each new interpretation inspires for a new kind of testing works back upon interpretation. New interpretation and new testing are important for the purpose of evaluation.”

In this context, I intend to have a critical probe into the matter discussed so far, but chapter wise critical evaluation seems to me just, excellent and plausible.

I started my journey with the two self-composed lines intending to ascertain that ‘expression’, ‘beauty’ and ‘pleasure’ are one. The objection may be raised why I have not preferred prose to begin with. Why have I chosen verse? In answer I once again dare to say in justification that prose exists but poetry is crown sitting on the throne of painting, music, sculpture and architecture in the kingdom of fine art. There is, however, a hierarchy in all these forms of art. Poetry tops the galaxy. The objection is removed, as I believe but requires a bit more justification. Poetry touches the core of heart more than any other form of art. Hegel weens on the spiritual nature of poetry because the proper subject matter of poetry is spiritual than the objects of nature, such as sun, moon, stars, mountains, landscapes etc. He admits an element of vision and illustration in poetry but despite of this fact poetry remains akin to exposing the emotions on the set of spiritual structure. “Thus poetry, according to Hegel, has been and is still the most universal and wide spread teacher of human race.” I do not agree with Hegel who proclaims poetry to be providing knowledge in its original and substantive form because imagination is the core of poetry that can never provide an authentic knowledge, only expression of emotions in language and style makes poetry excellent.

A question may be put up as to why have I cast light on certain theories of art and beauty referring thesis of Croce, Collingwood, Freud, Kant and Hegel etc? While the views of these thinkers have already been discussed mainly in the separate
chapters of the thesis. For removing this objection I like to say that all is intended for
having an acquaintance with the theories of such great thinkers on the one hand and
on the other to have an aesthetic vision of the problems, their solutions contained in
the subject matter of the aesthetics. To apprise to readers interested in the aesthetics
and the related problems it was in excellent to cast light on such points.

Objection may be raised on the length of the Introduction, which might be
shortened, but not on the cost of meaning. On this objection I humbly lay down that
words and pages should not be counted for ease and economy of time, but for clearer
exposition and better comprehension the Introduction must be exhaustive. Paradigmatically I can say that the introduction in F.Schiller: ”On the Aesthetic
Education of Man” covers as may as from XI to CXCVI pages. This is all in reply to
one of my teachers who had raised the objection on the length of my Introduction, no
matter if it covers more and more pages but the matter is not superfluous. In support
to this view Hegel’s Introduction based on 82 pages is a nice example. He divided
his ‘Aesthetics’-Lectures on fine art translated by T.M.Knox Volume I Clarendon
press Oxford in which lectures apart from Introduction have two parts, each having a
separate Introduction apart from preliminary Introduction. But Part II\textsuperscript{nd} has three
sections each of which contains further Introduction (Contents XV to XXI) Vol II
Beginning pages Sections I, II, III also provide separate Introduction (contends PP VII to XI).

The Rehla of Ibn Battuta, translated and commented by Mahdi Husain,
Oriental Institute of Baroda, 1976 extends its introduction from XI to IXXVIII i.e. 67
pages in full size format for which no objection could be raised so far. The viewpoint
is clear that in introduction the matter must be obviously comprehensive and
expeditiously impressive for better understanding.

Problems of Beauty

Owing to self-criticism, the definition of beauty given by me may have
certain shortcomings because the definition in terms of the experience of pleasure
and attraction, which are said to be necessarily implied and expressed by the object
of beauty, does not specify the clear status of beauty itself. Whether beauty is the
same as the pleasure and attraction or these two are essential characteristics of
beauty, is not clear from the definition. Ambiguity in explanation is no doubt there
but the actual situation is different. I do not say that beauty apart from pleasure and
attraction does not exist. I rather say that pleasure and attraction are implicative of
beauty through which beauty is experienced or is brought to our knowledge. But
side-by-side it is also true that philosophically concept of beauty is a general idea of
which things having the characteristics of pleasure and attraction are meant to
concretize or particularize such an idea on the surface of human mind. Better to say
that the abstraction is brought to concrete form by pleasure and attraction in
actualization of the idea of beauty.

Beauty is not an elfin beyond grasp, it is a fact which we experience in our
daily lives and are pleased and happy to have such an experience as expression in the
mind which is brought to light or found embodied in the artistic creation by an artist.
I do not agree with the view that the object of beauty is only expressive of pleasure having attraction as its quality and does not arouse emotions in the perceiving mind, as Collingwood raises the point. In my opinion an object of beauty whether it is simply an idea or an object or any phenomena if it claims beauty, must have the characteristics of pleasure and attraction in expression, arousing and expressing, thus, the emotion.

Dereck Martravers quotes the interpretation of aesthetic pleasure as “I would propose the following characterization of aesthetic pleasure: pleasure in an object is aesthetic when it derives from apprehension and reflection on the objects’ individual character and content, both for itself and in relation to the structural base on which it rests. That is to say, to appreciate something aesthetically is to attend to its forms, qualities and meanings for their own sakes and to their inter-relations, but also to attend to the way in which all such things emerged from particular set of low-level perceptual features that define the object on a non aesthetic plane.” Although, Derek Martravers could only expressed his opinion that aesthetic pleasure is different from other pleasures but could not comment more as required. In my opinion aesthetic pleasure is different from other pleasures, for as it comes from the object by apprehension and reflection. The possibility of such a pleasure depends on objects’ own character and contents, which are expressive of pleasure and attraction both for the experiencing subject, but the low level perceptual features through which the aesthetic pleasure if attempted to be defined, the status of the objects emerging or appearing on a non-aesthetic platform from things is not clear rather it makes the problem complicated. I say in plane language that the aesthetic pleasure is the pleasure obtained from a beautiful object, which is characterized as pleasant as well as attractive in it.

But Leo Tolstoy in his article ‘What is Art?’ writes that there is no objective definition of beauty. Accordingly, the distinct definition whether metaphysical or experimental, amount only to one and the same subjective definition, “Which (strange as it seems to say so) is that art which makes beauty manifests, and beauty is that which pleases (without exciting desire).” Tolstoy’s argument that beauty pleases is correct and supports my definition given, but it is incorrect to say that pleasantness of the object is a passive character in exciting desires. In my opinion beauty having been a pleasant phenomenon ought to excite desire because beauty is also perged on attraction. David Hume in his article has also advocated the same view as was adopted by Leo Tolstoy.

Next question may be raised; whether beauty and the object of beauty are one or different; and whether beauty exists in mind or in object? My answer to these questions comes forward as: The idea of beauty necessarily has its existence in the mind but corresponding to it the objects in nature must exit as beautiful. Explicitly, the distinction between idea of beauty and the object of beauty is there and it is legitimate to ascertain beauty by means of both subject and object, as no consensus in isolation (beauty as mere subjective or beauty mere objective) is possible because views differ. Berkley’s subjective idealism and Hegel’s objective seem to have truth, if both are synthesized.

Discussing the concept of beauty I have produced certain theories but I have to see what merits and demerits they contain.
Pythagorean tradition is based on quality of the pleasure, in which appearance of beauty and beauty proper have been distinctively treated. But what can be the distinctive features of the appearance of beauty and that of reality of beauty is a vexing question? However, in reply we can say that the Pythagorean theory has been divided in two parts—Relativity and Disinterested Pleasure—neither of the case clearly considers beauty in terms of pleasure. Although the element of Super Natural expression has been accepted yet such Pythagorean theory could not satisfy the craving for what we call beauty in itself. This theory relatively or absolutely explains beauty in appearance, not beauty in reality.

Physicalist’s worldview theory may not have exception from the theory of relativity of appearance. All these are limited to sensous beauty only.

Modern theory of beauty belongs to expressionists who claim beauty in expression, apart from which no beauty is admissible to them. Croce is pioneer and Collingwood is follower. But I say that expression brings beauty to light only, hardly can it be treated as beauty proper. Even in artistic beauty the expression makes the creation beautiful instead of being beauty itself. Only divine expression in nature is beautiful despite of the fact that symmetry or coherence is meaningless in such a beautiful expression. Theorists mostly in science favour symmetry for determining beauty. But a disordered form of forests, a zigzag scene of rivers and unsymmetrical order of mountains have no concern with order, straightness and symmetry in expressing nature as beautiful.

Lastly, I myself tried to present a synthetic view on beauty in which I attempted to compromise and synthesize Berkeley’s idealism and Hegel’s objective idealism together with divine manifestation. Objection may be raised on this effort, but there was no way out to determine beauty except a synthesis of subjective idea, objective particular and divine expression forming a whole, calls beauty. Beauty and beautiful are co-relative terms difference is also there. Beautiful signifies the positive quality of a thing but ugly negative quality. If an object is pleasant, it is attractive and together with pleasantness and attractiveness, it is beautiful.

The concept of sublime in the meaning ‘grand’ has been dealt with vividly and cogently. I have not taken it in the sense of awe. It is against the aesthetic mean because aesthetically sublime is meant for the feeling of awe and over rage of a thing, like devastating storm, which lastly culminates into pleasure. Aristotle, that is why, treats tragedy as ultimately pleasant. The pleasantness in tragedy comes to work as a result of sublime. However, Sublime as feeling of awe gets conversion into pleasure, which has a positive meaning and sense instead of negative. Albeit, thinkers have considered the term ‘Sublime’ in its negative character and overlooked its positive side, which reveals nobility and divinity.

**Expression**

Various meanings, various views, different usages and different kinds of exposition have been mentioned in this chapter with a view to find out an articulate meaning or usage. But some other meanings and its kinds have also not been denied; the range of possibility increases as much as we proceed to know more and more
meanings and kinds. However, no objection on this point seems to be raised but the main issue in this respect, as I believe, may certainly be related to the definition of the term ‘Expression’? I earnestly hold the onus for the lecuna involved in it, if any.

In definition it has been said that the expression is a process or activity in which the implicit is made explicit, i.e. the hidden or implied phenomena come out as expression. The definition tells us nothing new, no complete and cogent information it provides. The definition, according to the rules of Definition’, must be precise and complete. This definition is no doubt brief but not upto the mark, not complete. These objections may well be raised, I agree. But the term expression is such that cannot be easily understood in all its forces, powers forms and applicability. No alternative except to define it by stipulation was possible, which I attempted to my best of knowledge.

‘Expression’, moreover, is a simple term and very difficult to define because of its various meanings and usages. Yet I dared to have a possibly excellent definition, which is no more than a definition based on Stipulative technique.

Qualitatively, the definition obviously speaks to us that expression is an activity, not something static, without which nothing comes out in the form of expression. Process means simple, gentle and soft activity as against complex, coercive and hard one; it provides opportunity to all implied phenomena to come out freely. It may be an emotion, a feeling, a present or past experience, an idea or so many ideas and so on. In all artistic expressions we see the expression of emotion. The artist poses her expressions of emotions in her art-products, such as poems, pictures, tones and stone works etc making them beautiful.

The definition articulates the meaning of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ in the process of expression as the two poles of one reality, i.e. that which is inward is brought to light as outward. James W. Manns dealing with a pause for reflection nevertheless directs attention towards numerous objections raised against expressionism over the years which are categorized by him as one encompassing considerations pertinent to the “inner-outer” distinction and the other about emotions. In critical analysis every work of art possibly has aesthetic enrichment or enjoyment. The author writes, “What can we possibly know of the inner, spiritual state of a pre-Columbian sculptor, and ancient Greek potter, a medieval staned-glass master, a court composer under the reign of Henry IV? We may atleast know the name of the last of these, and two facts about his life, but that is precious little to go on was the pre-columbium sculptor expressing personal sentiments in stone or producing craving under mortal threat from a peevish tyrant”. Answering to the question James W. Manns after citing certain examples tries to make the notion of the inner or spiritual states clear by saying that there are certain approaches to inner-outer states but “on any of the approaches that we have considered to this point, the inner-outer relationship is critical: for Ried, once character makes itself apparent through external behavioural signs; for Tolstoy, one’s emotional life is captured and transmitted through one artistic medium or another; for Collingwood indistinct feelings work their way to clarity through a process of exteriorization but if it should proof to be the case that there is nothing beyond observable behaviour- the signs or the artistic forms thew either the explanation theory should be abandoned, or it should receive some radical revision in which any illusion to any thing inner is written out.” However, in every
such critical position the expression is always of something inner; something is the indistinct feeling, which is brought to externalization through the process. The emotional character of art is a form of communication, which comprises of inner-outer relationship. It is such an emotional level, which proceeds from heart to heart. Meaning there by the implicit comes out to the artist mind as an explicit phenomenon to which the artist produces or externalizes in her artwork. Romantic influences on artist’s capacity to express his or her own moods, feelings and responses\(^8\) do confirm the spirit of implicit-explicit or inner-outer relationship in the given definition of expression.

**Expressionism**

Demand for tranquility in English poetry arose from Chaucer’s time. No doubt, Chaucer worked too much in this direction but hardly could he succeed in throwing out the dominating Greek paragons and great many other long-standing influences exerted on English poetry. However, the flame of freedom blown up by him obtained its full swing of operation during the period of Romanticism. Renaissance, Elizabathen era and Classicism were the intermediary stages which raised the slogan of freedom for expression exhibited in its passing out March.

In painting and also in other forms of fine art the romantic movement had a great deal of influence, as a result of which the form and structure of art was found considerably changed. Subjective approach to art was opted and highlighted; objective was discarded by the artists who were working under the title of ‘Expressionism’, especially in painting. Consequently, new definition of aesthetics as a subject, new meaning of the term aesthetic, new techniques and styles and new approaches to problems of aesthetics came out as a corollary of the success and influences of romanticism in the field of fine art and also in the literary hemisphere.

Expressionism as a school of painting and also as an aesthetic theory in Croce and Collingwood emerged and evolved against objectivity of the impressionism. Subjectivity was given a great deal of vibration in producing practical art in general and else in the theorizing the form and structure of modern art in particular. It happened in between the last two decades of 19th century and the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century. It was of course the influence of romanticism, which has still been carrying on its operations even after that to present sprouting century.

Dadaism (nonsense in German) was first to start revolt against the art-proper. The aim of Dadaists was to make deried art and artist of the 19\(^{th}\) and the 20\(^{th}\) centuries. Surrealism and Impressionism had adopted an objective approach to art. Expressionists opposed them. Expressionism in painting too had the aim to ridicule the artists by deforming, disfiguring and distorting the structure and form of painting. They intentionally began to distort the portraits of men, women and animals etc in their paintings.

Expressionist’s approach to art was subjective. They were disappointed by the war and post war devastations. They attempted to let society know the value and importance of man, which was derogated and dishonoured by the war seekers and
the privilege class people of the society. They tried to express their resentment against such tendencies of the statesmen and the opportunists as well.

To this extent expressionist's set of thinking, purpose or mission and work of art is praise worthy; the aim and intention as such is approbative as they wanted to divert the attention of the world towards the poor and sobbing condition of human being; they fought for the cause of humanity, for letting people know that “man is the major of all”, and should not be treated as a means.

Notwithstanding all this, they could not opt an excellent and plausible way to express their heart-feelings as other means and methods were also available. I think it is not a proper method to paint and produce figures and portraits by distorting them. How awareness of the elements of the power in our minds can be generated. It is not significant. Expressionists might have painted things in sobriety, and also in peace making scenes, which might look harmonious and healthy but they did not make any such attempt that can be treated right. However, they must have had to sketch out the ducts and figures on such pleasant guidelines.

In this regard I have the privilege to put up a distorted portrait is a man, obtained from the expressionist's paintings. Black and white strokes are clear, the formation of nose, of ears, of cheeks and of mouth etc. appear unnatural. It is very difficult to understand what all these strokes speak to us. The expression of portrait is not attaining luminosity because the symbolic expression or meaning of the face of the portrait is also vague. The painting in prima-facie looks haphazard. There may be some hidden meaning in the portrait, no doubt. But what truly speaking it represents, is abstruse. To ridicule and decline art in desperation by such an unhealthy manner is not proper; it is in my opinion, nothing more than an expression of expressionist's dividence. It is an outbreak of their feelings merging in dismal. To make this point of criticism precisely clear is to refer an opinion contained in the A compact dictionary of English literature, in which it is stated that it is very difficult to follow the expression implied in the paintings of Expressionists.

Finally, subjective as well as objective approaches to art and to other matters in isolation from each other are one sided; both are on two opposing poles. Subjectivity is doubtlessly superior to objectivity but the practical utility and importance of objectivity in the field of art can on no ground be ruled out.

**Croce**

Croce had the privilege to study Kant, Hegel and other putative thinkers of the west. His academic career is excellent because he was a man of higher possibilities who succeeded to utilize all means and measures, whatever he could have availed, to critically study his predecessors' theories on the one hand and to produce his own out look on the nature of art and aesthetics on the other hand.

Croce's theory of expression is intuitive but not reflective, although he does not dislocate the importance of reflection from aesthetic field. Basing his intuitive expression on his spiritual idealism he certainly availed the privilege to owe must of Hegel's idealism, differing a little or so on certain points of issue. Critics particularly of his native lay greater emphasis on Croce's synthetic view in art,
which is taken from Vico’s historical hypothesis, Sanctis’s literary criticism and Sapventa’s Hegelian thought out of which Croce developed his own expressionism, possibly cogent, adequate and excellent theory of art. He was perhaps the first to pay proper attention to the term expression for determining its aesthetic meaning and artistic value more clear, more articulate and more plausible than anyone in the history of aesthetic. That is why he is regarded as the most influential figure of the 20th century.9

Expression for him is wide term with limited aesthetic meaning. Croce’s expression is intuitive; if the expression is successful, it is art proper and if not, it is either a pseudo art or not art. Collingwood follows him. But there are so many shortcomings in the form of paradoxes in his theory. I will fix the force of criticism to paradoxical aspect of Croce’s aesthetics.

In Croce’s thesis, intuition and expression have been taken to be synonymous. But it is wrong because these are the two terms having two different meanings. To say that all works of art are intuitions and that all intuitions are works of art as indicated by Croce is not correct because a case of intuitive process and a matter of physical process differ in spirit and structure both. Intuition in the mind and in art as an its externalized form can hardly stand reconciled. In the Dictionary of Art Vol 8 this view has been expressed, as “This may be hard to reconcile with the way in which the artists solve their artistic problems as the work on or with physical material. Since these are no degrees of success in intuitions, it raises the question of what criticism is to do.”10 In Estetica Croce maintained this point by reacting the artist’s original act of intuition. But the question remains as to how it is possible to react himself or herself in the artist’s original act of intuition? In reply, after sometimes Croce brought about the distinguishing situation of the artistic intuition in Art, which appears convincing. Thus, he called the artistic intuition first as lyrical and thereafter as cosmic.12 Even then he could not satisfy the critics on the form and nature of Intuition. The categorical mistake that Croce commits in exposition of expression as intuition is bound up with the one sided view adopted to explain total artistic phenomena. Expression is not the only criterion to determine the structure of art.

**Paradoxes:**

In the Chapter I entitled as ‘Intuition and Expression’ on page I of his work “Aesthetics as a Science of Expression and General Linguistic” Croce treats “intuitive knowledge as the simple, genuine and self sufficient; it is obtained through the imagination: it is, in fact, productive...of images.”13 But in his Breviario di Estetica on P20 Croce distinguishes image from imagination and intuition from image or fancy by proclaiming precisely that images presuppose with in the spirit the production and the possession of the single images themselves. Hither to “Fancy is a producer, whereas imagination is a parasite, fit for incidental occasions but incapable of begetting organization and life.”14 It can simply and obviously be interpreted that fancy is the root cause of imagination’s nourishment, i.e. imagination as imagination
obtains its virtue and value by means of fancy. Fantasy or image in Croce's view is the cause of intuition or expression, or in his words, "it is, in fact, productive...of images". Likewise, the status of imaginations has equally been assigned to images excellently as Croce writes “knowledge has two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; knowledge obtained through the intellect.”

There appears an obvious paradox between Croce's two different statements i.e. once he says that intuition is productive of images but changing his view further he says that intuition are products of images. Hence, what reconciliation can logically be possible here? Nothing except to plead that Croce is either fond of changing his views or he is accustomed to do so from the beginning of holding pen and paper to write. Moreover, he takes imagination as playing important role in obtaining the nature of art; he seems to overlook its value and importance by saying that art is based on expression and not on any other phenomenon. Croce actually keeps in his mind the role of expression as expression in the field of art. He does not like to provide a position of dignity either to imagination or impressions. Although, he admits the distinction between real and unreal, the intuition and between the real imagination and pure imagination.

But it is once more unpleasing statement to say, "To show how the content of history comes to be distinguished from that of art in the narrow sense, we must recall what has already been observed as to the ideal character of the intuition or first perception, in which all is real and therefore nothing is real". Moreover, Croce's contradictory proclamations are also not plausible. What can be the meaning of the version that art is intuition; but intuition is not always art? Again, artistic intuition is a distinct species from intuition in general be something more.

When all intuitions or expression Croce keeps at par making no distinction even of degree. He just enunciates rhetorically, “There is not one physiology of small animals and one of large animals; nor is there a special chemical theory of stones as distinct from mountains. In the same way, there is not a science of lesser intuition as distinct from a science of greater intuition, nor one of ordinary intuition as distinct from artistic intuition. There is but one Aesthetic, the science of intuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the aesthetic or artistic fact.” There are the two contradictory statements between which no reconciliation seems possible.

Croce's notion of intuition is creative and simple which requires no assistance because it is a self sufficient activity and knowledge, Croce exposes this fact on P 2 of his work, Aesthetic. As science of expression and general linguistic. But on the same page he says that intuition is blind; intellect lends her eyes. Contradicting it he says further “She does not need to borrow the eyes of others for she has excellent eyes of her own”.

Now what is actual position of these statements is difficult to apprehend.

Croce keeps impressions; sensations, feelings, impulses, emotions, or whatever else one may term what still falls short of the spirit and is not assimilated by man. But the very nature of art is the expression of emotions and feelings etc.; it is an admitted fact by the prominent aestheticians of the world. But Croce keeps them out and if it is argued by questioning that 'Expression of what in art? Then I think Croce will be bound to favour the answer that it is expression of emotion and nothing more.
If the form and the content are not different, and are one and the same in artistic expression, what can be the articulate meaning of “Art is expression of impression, not expression of expression.” Moreover, on page 53 of Aesthetic, As Science of Expression and general Linguistic Croce writes, “Finally, sincerity imposed as a duty upon the artist (a law of ethics is also said to be a law of aesthetics) rests upon another double meaning. For by sincerity may be meant, in the first place, the moral duty not to deceive one’s neighbour; and in that case it is foreign to the artist. For indeed he deceives no one, since he gives form to what is already in his soul. He would only deceive if he were to betray his duty as an artist by failing to execute his task in its essential nature. If lies and deceit are in his soul then the form which he gives to these things cannot be deceit or lies, precisely because it is aesthetic.” In this respect, it is easy to say that Croce indirectly allows the distinction between form and content at least in degree on the one hand and on the other he excellently paves the way for interpreting his theory of expression as art, as expression of emotions too.

Elaborating the distinction between theoretical and practical it is said that will is the activity of the spirit differing from the theoretical contemplation of things, and is productive of actions, not of knowledge. Henceforth, it is argued that man understands things with the theoretical form but changes them with the practical form, “with the one he appropriates the universe, with the other he creates it.” Further, it is argued that the theoretical form is the basis of the practical knowing without will is conceivable but not the will without knowing. Again, “Blind will is not will; true will has eyes.” Now the question comes to mind, what is the nature of will that brings man to action and what is the nature of knowing that is necessary for will to create activity in man? Croce reply does not exceed to differentiate theoretical from the practical activity. In our practical lives on certain reasons an ordinary man comes to action without knowing the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ or the consequences of his action taken against anyone. In an acute emotion man does first and thinks afterwards. Without will how can he try to understand the world. Actually, it is will that produces motivation in man to know and then to act. Croce ignores this psychological fact. If will depends on knowing then why not knowing on will? Does intuitive activity (knowing) lends eyes to will to make it true? If so then it is true to say that knowing and willing, the two process-theoretical and practical- respectively are simultaneous or are interdependent.

In justification to my contention I quote here Croce’s version. He says, “A good or useful action is an action willed. It will always be impossible to distil a single drop of usefulness or goodness from the objective study of things. We do not desire things because we know them to be good and useful, because we desire them.” Further he says, “Practical action is preceded by knowledge, but not by practical knowledge, or rather, knowledge of the practical: to obtain this, we must first have practical action. The third moment, therefore, of practical judgements, or judgements of value is altogether imaginary. It does not come between the two moments or degrees of theory and practice.” It means Croce negates the importance of the judgements of the value by assuming them to be purely imaginary.

Imaginations are treated to be the core of art: no form of art, particularly poetry, is possible without imagination. But Croce seemingly keeps all forms of
imagination out of the aesthetic field. It is not logical: However, indirectly he makes a few references of its importance in art. He writes, “What we admire in genuine works of art is the perfect imaginative form that a state of mind assumes there; and this called the life, unity, compactness, and fullness of the work of art.” 29 Actually, imagination is also a form of expression, provided expression is real and so also imagination may have the efficiency to satisfy the criteria of expression. Further, real expression is artistic and is beautiful; the real imagination expressed in art makes the art proper and real. At this point the romantic motto “art for art’s sake” gets its transition to “art is life’s sake.” But for Croce every work of art is independent and is an expression in itself. That which is expressed is beautiful and that which expresses is beauty.

There is one more very-very critical state of Croce’s thesis on art and beauty in which he does not recognize the distinction between content and form. I believe that sufficient light has been thrown out, yet I once again like to refute his notion of content and form. Paradigmatically, although curd comes out of milk, i.e. milk constitutes the content and the curd its form but neither milk can be called curd nor curd the milk. There is relationship of content and form but unless the form comes out from the content this relationship cannot be logically proved as the relationship between content and form, unless abstract is brought to the surface of form, no art is possible. Every art requires inner feelings and the material as content to convert into art as form.

Even then Croce was a great philosopher aesthetician of artistic genius, of higher possibilities, of most influential in pen and ink, and of distinguishing nature and of merits as well.

Sigmund Freud:

Freud was an expert neurologist, (‘Neurology’ is a branch of physiology) who focused his attention on the researches of a peculiar type. As such, he invested a great deal of time and energy in searching and sifting the real causes and their removal involved in mental disorders. His method was remarkably analytic which he used to study and detect the causes of mental disorders, especially hysteria. He had, therefore, established a new school of research and study in the field of psychology, called as ‘Psycho-analysis.’ In utilizing this newly invented method Freud began to analyse the mental states of the patients with a view to know the causes of hysteria. No doubt he was an honest person in his researches because he happened to analyse himself and also to his daughter Dr. Anna Freud to obtain and furnish the proofs of his conclusions. To what extent his self-analysis and that of his daughter has been impartial, is difficult to pass any judgement. But there are thinkers who are not convinced particularly with the impartiality of Dr. Freud in holding analysis of Dr. Anna Freud. I have nothing to say on this point of issue except this that the doubt may be genuine.

In studying and discovering the causes of hysteria the credit is not related to mere Freud. Charcot, Bruer, Janet and others were also carrying out the researches in this course of study and practice; Freud happened to have a great deal of recourse from them by paying due respect and honour to their findings. Certain methods to
cure hysteria were also practiced by Freud in which the preliminary was hypnotism, which was also not the monopoly of Freud because Charcot and others too had it in their practices. Some other methods of treatment, particularly case history and free association are likely his inventions.

Another magnificent personality in the field of psychology was Wilhelm Fliess, a friend associate of Freud, who worked on nasal disorders and connected causes to women’s menstruation; he was also interested in studying sexuality. Dr. Freud joined hands with him to discover the mystery of sex. (Frank J. Sullowav: Freud, Biologist of the mind P 138) Bisexuality was the main issue on which Fliess tried to convince Freud (Ibid P 183). Regarding the ‘Interpretation of Dreams’ Freud again attempted to get accord to Fliess by writing down a letter to him on March 10, 1898 in which he proclaimed to stick on the claim that, “It seems to me as if the wish-fulfillment theory gives only the psychological and not the biological, or rather metaphysical [developmental] explanation…. Biologically dream life seems to me to proceed directly from the residue of the prehistoric stage of life (one to three years), which is the source of the unconscious and alone contains the aetiology of all the psychoneuroses the stage which is normally obscured by an amnesia similar to hysteria. ...a recent wish leads to a dream only if it can be associated with material from that period. If the recent wish is a derivative of a prehistoric wish or can get itself adopted by such a wish I do not know yet to what extent I shall be able to stick to this extreme theory, or let it loose in the dream.” (Origins PP 246-47 referred by Frank J. Sullowav Freud, Biologist of the Mind on P 341) Due to differences of opinion on certain points Freud withdrew himself from Fliess, which was surprising for Fliess.

Freud’s theory of dream involves earlier and later, the two stages. What he thought and theorized earlier had got radically changed in later stage: Frank J. Sullowav considers it a meager aspect of Freud’s theory. He writes, “Another little appreciated aspect of Freud’s thinking about dreams is that he held two distinct theories between 1895 and 1900. Or I might say that his theory of dreams passed through two major stages with the later reformation encompassing the earlier”. (Ibid P 327) Developing process and amelioration intended in earlier thought and theory is approbative, but it is least appreciative as thought by Sullowav because Kant and Hegel and others too had the same spirit of change in their earlier thoughts and theories. If a better philosophy or scientific conclusion comes out through the change then it must be appreciated.

In founding his theory of dream on the tenets of wish-fulfillment Freud was not alone rather according to Sullowav the self analytic study of dream in 1865-97 was an out come of his scientific relationship with W. Fliess, “from the influence of contemporary sexualologist, and, most of all, from his own increasingly biogenetic conception of human psycho sexual development between 1896 and 1899” (Ibid P 329)

Alfred Marry (1861) and Hervey de Saint Devys (1867) jointly carried out researches on dream introducing experimental method and related dreams to past experiences of life as afterwards Freud worked out and had likely claimed that his wish-fulfillment theory was genuine and most satisfactory. Alfred Marry and Harvey’s influences on Freud are obvious as, according to Sullowav, Freud was
aware of all such researches (Ibid P 325). Id, the most popular but also disputed concept produced by Freud is not his own discovery but rather Fliess also helped him in stemming it through his scientific relationship with Freud (Ibid P 329) “Wilhelm Fliess, like Sigmund Freud, says Sullowav, assumed the unconscious mind to be the repository of those biologically innate and repressed sexual impulses that have proved incompatible with the normal adult psycho sexual organization” (W. Fliess P 186) Sullowav has written these lines under ‘Fliess Mathematical Biology of the Id’. It is because unconscious is dynamically named as Id.

The great achievement of Dr. Freud can be adequately be related to his analysis of mind in which he honestly denied to have invented ‘unconsciousness’. He rather proclaimed that it was invented and used in physiological researches by others before him. But he gave a new shape and colour to unconsciousness and related the causes of neurosis to it. The wish-fulfillment theory of dream is a corollary of Freud’s explanation of unconsciousness which is dynamically called as Id. In formation of Id it was Fliess who associated the origin and development of this concept to family members of every person; Freud developed it to the maximum but differently.

The main objection on Freud’s theory rests on the concept of sex. Freud had tried to explain the total life phenomena from early childhood to puberty, and in my opinion even after that, through the means of sex. It is not illogical to accept his theory of sexuality in toto; it can partially be true on assuming that the instinct of sex plays a greater role in personality development and also the chief causes of neurosis are found related to sexual urge, but other causes may also be there which were to be brought to light. Moreover, instinctual aspect of our personality is not the whole of personality. There is however another higher than instinct is stateliness to which Freud consciously ignored. Too much emphasis on sex cannot be logical. Apart from Fliess, Henry Maudsley (1872) viewed that sexual feeling is the primary basis of all social life. He argued that ethics, religious sentiments and aesthetics have their roots in sexual feeling. But unlike Freud Henery honoured moral tendency along with sexual instinct. (Freud Biologist of the Mind P 283 by Sullowav) Craft Ebbing also regarded human life as a combination of sex and morality. In his own words, “life is a never ceasing duel between the animal instinct and morality.” (Ibid P 283) These thinkers suppressed Freud’s bare theory of sexuality by introducing the noble element in man’s life.

In dream analysis only the ordinary dreams which we experience may have their genesis in unconscious level of mind but what about those dreams which occur true, not illusory? No answer from Freud’s behalf. The concept of sublimation for Freud is just to get a higher stage in instinctive behaviour. It is appreciable yet his notion of art as thought by him is not plausible because he proclaims the art a neurosis and the artists suffer from mental disorder; the suppression are transformed into science, religion and art. It is the meaning of sublimation in Freud. It is to have a better status than mere instinctual. But to say that the man becomes religious or scientist or artist because of repression is to dishonour the pious spirit of all those persons who prefer to be scientist, religious and artist.

Expression is there in art of the artist’s desires, which are altogether sexual for Freud. But the artist’s own imagination and his mental set cannot be said
to be caused by such sexual desires, as pious desires are also there on the surface of
the artist’s mind. Sexual Expression on developing stages of personality is partially
true. He left to consider and explain the concepts of beauty, love and the women’s
role in socio-moral life of man.

As a founder of psychoanalysis, his scientific researchers in the field of
psychology can never be forgotten. In his contribution to scientific knowledge by
means of his outstanding works are admirable. Frank J. Sullowav’s opinion in this
connection is good one “Nor was the scientific gain represented by Freud’s new
psycho analytic paradigm limited, solely to normal psychology. His discoveries
offered contemporary psychopathologists a valuable methodological window into the
minds of their patients. Together with the technique of free association, his various
doctrines became united into a powerful method of psychotherapy, eventually
leading to many further refinements in the understanding of mental pathology....”

With the achievement of his far-reaching paradigm of human behaviour
normal and abnormal Freud soon began to attract adherents. (Freud, Biologist of the
Mind Frank J. Sullowav P, 360)

Sullowav perhaps either consciously avoided to note that Adler and Jung,
the Freud’s dedicated students, departed from their teacher and established new
schools of psychoanalysis on account of difference in views between them their
teacher Dr. Freud but in my opinion differences have no much importance in the
field of research and study.

**Croce and Kant**

As a great thinker of the world fame Kant’s life has been dedicated to the
cause of knowledge. He was the only a metaphysician of the higher rank who never
enjoyed a family life because he remained a bachelor. However, as an aesthetician
philosopher of the age he attempted to his best to conciliate the extreme views of
Rationalists with Empiricists in his own critical philosophy. Yet he could not
safeguard his thought from the eyes of the critics, though he himself adopted a
critical view and reflective thinking in his philosophy. He was too strict to his
principles based on pure reason and never liked to be broken by any one, despite of
the critical situations even on moral grounds. No doubt, pure reason was the strong
hold of his philosophy but he could not keep away himself from the acceptance of
the importance of the practical reason to which he gave a nice momentous in the
exploration of the philosophy in formation of the concepts and in implication of
Freedom and Good in practical life. Unfortunately, views differ on this point.
According to Douglas Burnham, the practical world of reason-Freedom and Good-
again belongs to outside the natural world. But, clearly, practical philosophy must in
some sense also refer to the natural world, that is to say, where our moral or immoral
actions take place and have their effect. Freedom, and the moral law, would be
powerless unless they could change real, sensible-things (at the very least, our
bodies) Kant although transcends his thought from the sensible world but fails to
do so and presupposes a sensible world for his concept of understanding and reason
alongside the moral good and freedom.

Regarding understanding and reason Kant developed his philosophy of
categories postulating on the reflective apriori judgement. He produces four sets of
three categories of understanding, and one apriori form of intuition, which again has
its expression in two of its forms-Time and space. Bertrand Russell puts up a four-
point criticism on Kant's critical philosophy of mind and on its powers, a repetition
of which will be superfluous because it has already been stated in compendium in the
previous chapter. Another criticism is based on Kant's famous passage entitled 'The
Transcendental Deduction' which is Kant's one of the key arguments. I would like to
quote the original criticism put forward by Douglas Burnham without further
comment. He writes, "Kant had already identified a list of abstract concepts called
categories, which he believed were the basic forms of the faculty of understanding.
But he had not yet fully proved that these concepts were apriori, rather than merely
abstracted form and after our ordinary experience. And even if they were apriori, he
could not be sure that they also formed the transcendental conditions of the
understanding: they could by concepts that though a priori, just loiter in the mind not
doing very much for us." 31

Out of two versions of the transcendental deduction in 1787 Kant
described and ushered the notion of the 'Transcendental unity of Apperception'. It is
such a principle, which governs the possibility of all kinds of experiences to be
united ultimately in one experience. But it is a way to argue in favour of Kant's
notion of the categories which remain discrete in understanding needing basically
some one synthesizing principle such that may stand as a sovereign medicine for all
such diseases which may demolish knowledge. However, in Bertrand Russell's
opinion it is also full of certain flaws, which can on no account be thrown out from
Kant's critical philosophy. Defending Kant I can say that on reflective ground there
was no way out except to introduce such a strange principle to prove the utility of a
synthetic a priori judgement.

In his article entitled as "Kant on the Categories: The two Deductions."
R.C. Pradhan pointed out the least acceptability of Kant's notion of the synthetic a
priori truths by the contemporary thinkers "because the notion of science has very
much changed considerably after Kant." 32

J.M. Bernstein in "The fate of Art" has narrated a long but healthy story of
comparison between Kant and other aestheticians. Derrida's interpretation and also
that of Hiedeggar's, which they produce in Kant's critique of Judgement, is worthy
to note. Kant's sublime and also Derrida's has been interpreted as a double
repression of judgement. Many questions, answers, interpretations and re
interpretations exemplifying Van Gogh, Levinas under the heading "Intrupting
Metaphysics" have been stated by the author and in most cases Kant's view has been
defended. 33

Apart from Kant's metaphysical view the aesthetic view of Kant is too
attractive. Critics have held discussions on Kant's aesthetics in their own whim and
enthusiasm. It is difficult to summarize the views of all critics except a few. Side by
side my own criticism will be most likely in favour of Kant's aesthetical views
because I know well that such a great thinker who has attempted to consider the
basic principles with capillary to explore the fundamental form and figure of beauty
and art in his Critique of Judgement, can not cross the limitations of intellect and
may stand weak on certain points, it is unfortunate that such a great idealist failed to
cross the locus of sensuousness because neither Kant admires nor imbibes nor
considers the spiritual form of beauty genuinely and necessarily in his aesthetic judgement.

The main issue in Kant's aesthetic theory is related to the judgement of taste. Kant's emphasis on taste is subjective. It is a subjective criterion to determine what is beauty and what is art. Being subjective in form and feature it is expected to be universal. But how, is the most vexing question? Kant making a transition from pure reason to practical reason as appears in his Critique of Judgement tries to show the element of disinterestedness of the satisfaction, as related to subjective universality of the judgement of taste, is no more than the feeling of satisfaction grounded on the judgement "this is beautiful". According to Allision's interpretation it is such disinterestedness that requires for it a universal agreement for others. It is because in the judgement so stated, i.e. in 'this is beautiful', there appears a tacit consent of others, if it is taken in the form of disinterestedness. But I think that it is a hypothesis without confirmation. That is why H. Ginsborge regarding the Allision's claim that the feeling of satisfaction rests on the judgement that "this is beautiful" is disinterested and requires for it a universal consensus. He had tried to maintain the concept of free beauty.\[FN\] No feeling is disinterested in totality. (Article: Kant's Theory of Judgement and Judgement of Taste by Hannah Ginsborge PP 151, 152 Published in "Inquiry' An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy- Editor Wayne Martin Vol. 46 No.2 June 2003) The Judgement of taste demands agreement for Kant but it is not adequate for Hiedeggar; the difficulty can be observed when we try to discover the neutralized disinterested subject to the task. Here we press the claims of genius, work, and sublimity against the claims of taste “it became increasingly obvious that it was the object of judgement that was making demands upon the judging subject. Albeit, according to Mary A. Mc. Closkey Kant's theory emphasizing ‘disinterested’ as necessary for experiencing an aesthetic attitude theory is offensive. (Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetics P 42) (The Fate of Art Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derida and Adorno by J. M. Bernstein, Polity Press P 118). Certainly judgement of taste as criteria, if taken for granted, will lead us to mere subjectivity and this subjective judgement is very difficult to be generalized in its pure form and genuine spirit. Still it demands agreement, which is not possible on ordinary surface. For its generality, I am sure, some extra ordinary ground will be needed, and otherwise tastes differ from person to person and culture to culture. Moreover, the variety of tastes is also there from barbarious to educated persons. No consensus, however, on taste is possible, says David Hume, (David Hume's article “Of The Standard of Taste" published in Oxford readers Aesthetics: Edited by Susan L. Feagin and Patrick Maynard P 350)

Kant has given us four moments of taste but the possibility of other forms cannot be overlooked. The question may also be raised on this point. But in defence I think better to say that all other forms of taste can more or less be assimilated in the four such forms, given by Kant. But difficulty remains, the problem is not solved because in other forms of judgements certain judgements are those, which are basically a posteriori and can not claim to be at par with the judgement of taste denoted by Kant in four forms and considered them a priori. However, according to Eva Schafer the judgement of taste as apriori differs from the judgements of

\[FN\] Free beauty is absolute, beauty without qualifications of disinterestedness and satisfactions etc.
experience. "Kant seems to be saying, says he, "just that judgement of taste are apriori judgements. Many readers simply take it for granted that this is a central feature of Kant’s aesthetics". (Eva Schafer: Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics P.18 The Scholar Press Ltd. Yarks 1979) If the judgement of taste is actually apriori, no problem remains to accept it as a general principle for determining beauty as in definition of the moments of judgement of taste. Mary A. McCloskey adequately determines the nature of beauty in Kant’s aesthetics.

Kant on beauty is a hedonist. It is surprising that such a great rationalist postulated his philosophy of art and beauty around the locus of sensibility. He is not alone but others, like Hegel are also in the same category. In support to Kant I as a research scholar, candidly say that Kant moved his pen and used lot of ink to make his view on beauty as reflective as possible as the object of delight apart from a concept. He writes that the definition of taste in the first moment is, in his words, "the faculty estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful." But according to his interpretation, further, "The definition of the second moment is, The beautiful is that which apart from a concept, pleases universally."

The definition of the third moment is, Beauty is the form of Finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from the representation of an end. And the definition of the fourth moment is, the beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized an object of a necessary delight. (Mary A. McCloskey: Kant’s Analytic CH4- The Analytic of the Beautiful-Preliminaries P P 24,25)

In all forms of taste the definition of beauty remains localized to the characteristics of object as delight, pleasantness and the mode of representation. But in every case beautiful should have universality as its necessary factor. It is in my opinion hardly possible, if not impossible because tastes differ in quality and quantity both and no general consensus is possible.

Kant considers beauty as a concept and also as an object of delight. Hence, distinguishing beauty of nature and that of art Kant in Section 48 of his Critique considers a beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing. But in no case his philosophy of beauty supersedes the sensuousness of beauty.

The distinction between subject and the object continues in determining beauty employing the four forms of the judgement of taste because the subject always concerns with the beauty of something. But according to Eva Schafer the perceiving mind, i.e. for example I myself am concerned not with existence of that something but I am concerned only with the manner in which it impresses me (Eva Schafer: Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics The scholar Press Ltd. Yarks 1999 P 62). Here Schafer’s view is basically related to showing that the beauty in thing has the quality of impressing to the perceiver. It means beauty in Kant must have two qualities of pleasure and attraction or impressiveness for its own sake.

The notion of sublimity comprises of displeasure or pain and is not used by Kant in its positivity, i.e. in the sense of grandness as divine is. However, his use of sublime is not different from others in aesthetics that have taken it in the sense of ‘outrage’ or ‘overwhelmingness of an object.’ Kant merely replaced the commonly used words in the sense and meaning from excessiveness of an object, which is an
opposing tendency or antagonistic phenomenon to beautiful. It means that beautiful and sublime in Kant’s reflective judgement are the two such factors that may be designated as the two species. Israel Knox quotes the view of Burk on Kant’s concept of beautiful and sublime, as, “They are, indeed ideas of a very different nature, one being founded on pain, the other on pleasure; and, however they may vary afterwards from the direct nature of their causes, yet these causes keep up an internal distinction between them, a distinction never to be forgotten by any whose business it is to affect the passions...For sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, beautiful once comparatively small; beauty shall be smooth and polished; the great, the rugged and negligent: beauty should it insensibility; the great, in many cases, loves the right line; and when it deviates, it often makes a strong deviation: beauty should not be obscure; the great ought to be dark and gloomy: beauty should be light and delicate; the great ought to be solid, and even massive.”

The Beautiful is what pleases in the mere judgment (and therefore not by the medium of sensation in accordance with a concept of understanding). It follows at once from this that it must please apart from all interest....The sublime is what pleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of sense. Both, as explanations of aesthetical universally valid judging, are referred to subjective grounds; in the one case to grounds of sensibility, in favour of the contemplative understanding; in the other case in opposition of sensibility, but on behalf of the purposes of practical reason. (Israel Knox: The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer PP. 54,55- New Jersy Humanities Press Sussex Harvest. First published in 1936 copyright 1938 by Humanistic Press Inc)

A clear distinction between sublime and beautiful has been depicted by Burke who think of beautiful as pleasant, delicate and small but its opposing, sublime is painful, hard and great. I do not agree to the reflective quality of sublime as great because it is divine, the great whose expression is nature which involves all such qualities which are good and bad, beautiful and ugly and so on. Sublimity as great is not compatible, instead beautiful as great as reflectively judged as great as acceptable to me. There is however, no accord on the concept of sublimity a exposed by Kant, Gilles, Deleuza commenting on Kant’s notion of sublime cogently writes that dissension rather than accord, a contradiction is experienced. It is because, he argues, imagination. Thus loses its freedom and feeling of sublime seems to be pain instead of pleasure. But, however, Gilles admitting Kant’s theory on sublime concludes that at bottom the makes pleasure possible, not proving as to how the pain turns to pleasure. (Kant’s Critical Philosophy. The Doctrine of Faculties by Gilles Deleuza P 51 Translated by A. Tomlinson and Habberjam The Athlone Press, London 1989)

The two forms of sublime in Kant as mathematical and dynamic are praiseworthy but it is difficult to accept Kant’s proposal of its being pleasurable. Summarizing Kant’s claim that sublime experience turns to pleasure Douglas Burnham writes, “The key puzzles of the sublime experience are, first how any judgement could be formed on the basis of counter-purposiveness; and second, how an overwhelming experience, which should be experienced as frightening of otherwise displeasurable, can instead be experienced as a pleasure. (Douglas Burnham: An Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement P 91)
Lastly, the concept of fine art in Kant is also full of contradictions. As a philosopher aesthetician Kant distinguishes a product of fine art from the product of nature. Kant says that a beauty of nature is a beautiful thing while beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing (Sec 48 Critique of Judgement) is it not an imitation of nature in art? Certainly, it is representation, if belongs to the thing of nature as it is, logically it is immolation. But the artist employing her genius, if varies the form and feature of the thing of nature for expressing or communicating her emotional inner or spiritual world then naturally imaginations will dominate the artistic creation. Salim Kemal’s in this respect plausibly writes, “For Kant asserts that ‘a product of fine art, must be recognized to be art and not nature.’ Thus judging them an object is a work of fine art must involve knowing that it is the result of human making and that, in turn, requires is to see it as intentional ‘under a definite concept-the description which determines rules for its production. Consequently, again we cannot judge that a work is fine art because the latter requires us to see the object as both beautiful and work of art. (Salim Kemal’s Kant and Fine Art An Essay on Kant and the Philosophy of Fine Art and Culture P 36 Clarendon Press Oxford.)

However, Kant was a great philosopher whose views difficult to enclose in a limited space.

**Croce and Hegel**

Kant was great in knowledge, so also Hegel. Both were German. Kant preceded Hegel or Hegel succeeded Kant. The privilege that Hegel had to study and understand Kant; much of Kant’s I think, Hegel owed and put up reshaped in his philosophy. Bertrand Russell’s remark that Kant’s antinomies have received the form of dialectic in Hegel is trustworthy. (B. Russell: History of western Philosophy P 735) To study and owe to proceed a head to having either a synthetic or analytic view for a new and developed thought is not bad. Not only Hegel but others also are in the same class of thinkers where the policy of ‘give and take’ has been in vogue from generation to generation. Hegel was also a critic of Kant’s philosophy. In Bertrand Russell’s opinion “Hegel (1770—1831) was the culmination of the movement in German philosophy that started from Kant, although he often criticized Kant, his system could ever have arisen if Kant’s had not existed. His influence, though now diminishing, has been very great, not only or chiefly in Germany.” (Ibid P 757.) Bertrand Russell thinks of Hegel’s philosophy as very difficult to understand. He writes, “.... he is, I should say, the hardest to understand of all the great philosophers.” (Ibid P 757)

Such a thinker about whose thought the 20th century great thinker like Bertrand Russell holds the view that Hegel is difficult to understand, is actually most difficult to have a critical evaluation of his philosophy in general and the philosophy of art in particular. However, I would like to follow the footprints of a few critics of Hegel and if possible like to put up my own criticism. (1) Hegel was a critic of contemporary artistic trends, rooted in his historicist view of history. He rejected romantic irony. Post modernity of art for Hegel is the
product of the progress of enlightenment to which David Roberts describes as, “For Hegel heralded the end of art.” (David Roberts: Art and Enlightenment P 157) Hegel’s terminal dialectic has been opposed by David Roberts because Hegel’s and also that of Adorno’s and Burger’s account of the enlightenment of art have in common the manifestation and exhaustion of latency. (Ibid P 161) David Roberts’s criticism is basically on Hegel’s approach to art, the approach that he had under the influence of running tendencies of 18th century’s romantic movement or the enlightenment in the field of art and literature and since Hegel opposed romantic irony, therefore, the character of art and literature was brought to change in such a way that the serious matters were undertaken more lightly what they have been previously.

(2) Hegel stresses on transcendence and tradition all equally. The understanding of human history by him is working out of God’s self-revelation. But the individual human spirit, he regards as the locus of divine spirit. Absolute in Hegel is reality-involving contradictions. Truth Good and beauty are identical. The problem of subjectivity exists as it is in him as in Kant. And following the footprints of Kant he too distinguishes between beauty in nature and beauty in art. He regards artistic beauty superior to nature and discards imitation in art. Religion and Philosophy for him are the two higher means of knowing truth. Concrete human freedom and again subjectivity are the main themes of his philosophy.

(3) Apart from all this Hegel maintains the task of aesthetics as to supply a universal standard by which the work of art may best be judged. The same I have seen in Kant’s four forms of the judgement of taste in which the most striking and determining factor was pleasure. Hegel’s position is also not different. He, no doubt, tried to articulate the meaning of art in terms of ‘vocation’ “to unveil the truth in the forms sensuous artistic configuration.” (Werke: 13:82, A1.55) but he could not give up the idea of sensuousness in art. Although element of divinity he imbibed but the sensuous form and character of beauty he could not set aside. I do not agree with the picture depicted by Israel Knox who writes, Hegel’s Aesthetics in the context of his Metaphysics. P 79 It was art-the beauty of art as consciously produced by the mind of man—that absorbed Hegel’s interest. Both by temperament and by dialectical exigencies of his philosophy, Hegel was disposed to fathom in consciously created beauty a higher manifestation of the Absolute, of Spirit. He excludes, therefore, the beauty of nature from his aesthetic, “…we are justified in maintaining categorically that the beauty of art stands higher than Nature. For the beauty of art is a beauty of begotten, a new birth of mind; and to the extent that spirit and its creations stand higher than nature and its phenomena, to that extent the beauty of art is more exalted than the beauty of nature. (The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer by Israel Knox, New Jersey: Humanities Press Sussex Harvest. First published in 1936 copyright 1938 by Humanistic Press Inc P 79)

Braink Etter clearly mentions that form of Art in Hegel is sensuous representation of truth. (P 41 Hegel and Aesthetics Edited by William Maker.) Hence, as modernist contempt for all beauty or sensuous pleasure, B. K. Etter raises
the question as why the modern world esteems the ugly and revolting as the only
genuinely creative art is a question even more worth being asked.” (Ibid P 31)

Hegel’s view on painting and poetry is also not above the senses. He
promotes the use of colours and the creation of tones etc to merely sensous level
only, not giving them any spiritual. (Ibid P 75) Jere Surber writes, “The vocal note
which receives further articulation to express specific ideas-speech and its system,
language-gives to sensations, intuitions, conceptions, a second and higher existence
than they naturally possess-invests them with the right of existence in the ideational
realm. (Hegel and Aesthetics Edited by William Maker P 56)

But Hegel’s thinking makes the artistic production as the unity of spiritual
and the sensous aspects and thus supersedes an ordinary thinking. It is praiseworthy
but the main spirit of his art and the concept of beautiful remain more or less on the
surface of sensibility. However, Hegel is liberal in the assessment of art and he
regards all such productions, which are expressive of free spirit.

Eventually we just to quote Jere Seiber’s decision taken finally in regard
to Hegel, which I believe is sufficient to end the critical evaluation of Hegel’s, view
on aesthetics. He writes, “To give Hegel the final, as well as the first, word, “For this
reason the work of art, in which thought divests itself of itself, belongs to the realm
of comprehending thought and mind by subjecting it to scientific contemplation,
thereby simply satisfies its most essential nature.” (Ibid P 57)

Collingwood and Croce

Wordsworth in his Preface to ‘Lyrical Ballads’ proclaimed, “All good
poetry is the spontaneous over flow of powerful feelings.” Poetic spontaneity and the
musical expressive character we truly have from Romantic Movement. It is in
reminiscence for plausibility, not a repetition of what has been stated in the detailed
structure of Romantic Movement lays greater stress on the emotions and the process
of artistic creation. As such all art evolves expression of emotions, is a thought
which has its most developed form has been from the romantic period of 18th and
19th centuries.

Croce and Collingwood were the two prominent figures that concentrated
their minds on aesthetic meaning and artistic value of the term ‘Expression’. None
before them had paid due attention to this most valuable term. Tolstoy in “What is
Art” tried to express the meaning of art by saying that it is the contagion of feeling
and so declared that the true artist is one who expresses and also evokes the emotion.
(Anne Sheppard: Aesthetics P 20) But it is wondrous that such a great expressionist
like Collingwood ruled out any possibility of artistic beauty in the process which
apart from expressing emotion either merely arouses emotion or together with
expression and excitement, stands as a genuine artistic phenomenon in the mind and
work of the artist.

Presently, ‘Expression of Emotion and else Arousing Emotion’ shall be
locus of my criticism. Both Croce and Collingwood determined intuition or
imagination to be the source of aesthetic expression or in other words intuition in
Croce and imagination in Collingwood, being equal in meaning, are the two sources of our aesthetic experience or knowledge. It is a particular activity, which is in its preliminary stage is psychical expression; the developed stage is conceptual that is logical or general. Collingwood in his work entitled The Principle of Art in Chapter II distinguishes art-proper from pseudo art or else from craft in which a list of six such pseudo arts has been produced clearly. This distinction narrows down the extension of art; only a few forms of art can be called art proper. If purpose of art is mere apprehension or else mere expression then what is the position of those artists who create things of art for the purpose of livelihood. It is said that Ghalib once desired to depart with his ‘Deewan’ for a few coins to manage his livelihood, fortunately his dedicated wife obstructed and had not allowed him to do so. But, suppose Ghalib would have disposed of his precious Deewan in the market and if we have been reading it, whether his Deewan would have not been regarded as a genuine art or art proper? Certainly his Deewan despite of its disposal would have the equal artistic value as before its sale. To cite an other example: if I compose a poem to express my emotions to a friend departing on the occasion of her marriage—the lines of which are as follows:

JEEVAN MEIN AAJ TERE ALA MAKAM AYA
NOUSHA KE SATH MILKER TERA BHI NAAM AYA
RANGEE HINA MEIN KOYI RANGI PAYAM AYA
KHUSHIYON KA JAAM LEKAR MERA SALAM AYA
HOTON PE CHETNA KE SOUGAT HAI DUA KI
KAGHAZ PE KHINCH LAAYEE TASWEER ATMAA KI
NAYE RISHTON KO LEKAR AAJ BARATE GOHAR AYEE
JILA JEEWAN KO DENE AAJ TANWEER-E-SAHAR AYEE
GUL-E-NOUKHEZ KO LENE SHAMEEM-E-HAMSFAR AYEE
ANDHERA DOOR KARNE ROSHNI SHAMS-O-QAMAR AYEE
UROOS-E-NAU KO AZMAT AI RAFEQUE-E-DIL MUBARAK HO
ADHURI ZINDAGI KA BAS YEH SHEERIEN HAL MUBARAK HO

ILM KI CHADAR AMAL KA PAIRHAN MAT BHULNA
DAGAR CHALNA SHARAFAT KI KABHI MAT BHULNA
MOHABBAT SE NILON KO JEEYEA MAT BHULNA
VATAN SE BE VATAN HOKAR VATAN MAT BHULNA

TABASSUM AUR AANSU LE KE MERI SADHNA AYEE
AAJ TUJH KO ALVADA KAHEHNE TERI YEH CHETNA AYEE--.
Then is it not a poem of good taste or a form of art? Can it be banished from Collingwood’s watertight compartment of the art-proper? The purpose of composition is clear and there is no reason to dismiss from the court of the art proper, or not to pay honour to it by implementing the judgement of taste.

According to Collingwood there are three such stages that are involved in artistic expression, viz., (1) Psychical Expression in which artist is not fully conscious of the raw data of sensation and perception. But this stage we simply externalize our bodily reactions which are the symptoms of psychical expression, and we are not in the state of controlling such emotional expressions at this first psychical stage. Shephard criticising Collingwood’s psychical expression writes, “Already at this stage a difficulty in the theory becomes apparent: it is never clearly explain how one can feel an emotion without being conscious of it. What is clear is that once this preliminary stage is posited a distinction can be made between the symptoms of an emotion, its psychical expression and its imaginative expression. (Anne Shephard: Aesthetics P 23)

The second stage is of imaginative expression. It is so called expression. Croce names it intuition. Art does not make its appearance. At this stage the artist is seen placed in the position to communicate her expressions to others, i.e. to audience and perceivers. But in the third stage of our mental activity the concepts are formulated because the understanding of bare meaning of imaginative expression receives the emotional charge and communicate such charges to the hearer or perceiver who exercise their own imaginations in the same manner as they do when they respond to a work of art. Collingwood distinguishes communications of emotions by means of imaginative expression from the direct arousal of the emotion. It is because in the words of Anne Shephard “My happy singing and dancing or my happy poem will not make my audience happy but will enable them to grasp my happiness.” (Ibid P 23) But to Collingwood’s mind arousing emotion and thereby creating a situation or a set up in the minds of the audience is not art proper. This thinking is not seemingly correct because Collingwood’s such a notion involves certain fallacies; hence, it will not be unjust to quote T.S. Eliot’s account of expression, which he treats as the most sacred task of an artist. He writes, “The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an object co-relative, in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.” (Anne Shephard: Aesthetics P 19)

‘Objective Correlation’ is most striking in Eliot’s thought. And unlike Collingwood he pays greater regard to art even if it arouses the emotion. Adequately, the expression of emotion or the process of excitement or both in the audience is a form of good art, nor a pseudo nor a bad art. But Collingwood is not prepared to entertain excitement of emotion as a good form of expression in his theory, which is astonishing. I will continue my argument against Collingwood’s proposal in which he set aside the role of arousing emotion in art-proper.

No doubt expression is one of the sources of aesthetic value on the one hand and on the other it is such a source through which an artist can exhibit her or
his emotion. Abstract painting is paradigmatic in this context. In abstract painting the abstractions are brought to surface i.e. the artist expresses her emotion by means of painting to be known and apprehended by the perceiver because the formless matter or sensa now gets form as produced in the painting by means of variety of colours, variety of strokes and other required materials that make artistic expression as representational, as articulately meaningful as possible. Such a painting may have both characters, i.e. expressing the emotion and also arousing the emotion simultaneously. Plausibly expression is one aspect of art, other aspects are also there. But Croce and Collingwood exaggerate the importance of expression. “They do too little justice to the intellectual elements in art and to the fact that art can arouse some sorts of emotion directly. Art may not be all craft but craft plays a considerable part in it.” In continuation, “A successful work of art may arouse some emotions, express others, and exhibit technical mastery, all at the same time.” (Anne Shephard: Aesthetics P 28) It is now adequately made clear that a work of art proper may arouse emotion directly in audience.

Moreover, Kandisky in significance to arousing emotion remarkably held that “the purpose of painting is to give expression of the artist’s inner feelings and to arouse corresponding “spiritual vibrations” within the viewer.” (Hegel and Aesthetics Edited by William Maker P 72) Hegel in his introduction under heading as, ‘The Work of Art, as being for Apprehension by Man’s, Senses is drawn from the sensuous sphere’, plausibly stated that, “This reflection has given rise to the consideration that fine art is most to arouse feeling in particular, the feeling that suits us, pleasant feeling. (Ibid P 32)

Continuing the criticism Collingwood rules out the acceptance of those arts which art created for some practical purposes. Hymns and patriotic songs, romances and detective stories and all such skills as smithy, carpentry and so on have been condemned by him on the ground that they are crafts. For Collingwood, in true expression the artist does not know what he is expressing unless his expression is complete, he does not have the idea of end of his creative activity in advance. It is also not logical because artists must know the end of his or her artistic expression in advance, otherwise a blind array may mislead the aim and objectives of creativity and its processing.

I myself had pointed out certain paradoxical corollaries in Croce’s theory of expression and also attempted to remove them by my own interpretations. But Anne Shephard points out certain more paradoxes in Croce and Collingwood on the ground that if the activity of the artist is largely based on what goes on in the mind of the artist then the real work of art will be in artist’s mind and the physical object will simply be an externalization. But how is it possible, is a question unanswered by both Croce and Collingwood? Suppose for example, if the artistic expression belongs to mind only then its externalization will mean nothing real except an unreal projection of what is in the mind and hence, the work of art could never have the access to an audience to influence them. Anne Shephard views the theories of Croce and Collingwood as, “But if we cannot know the artist’s expression except through the work, it is misleading to maintain that what was in the artist’s mind is more real or more valuable than the object he has produced.” (Anne Shephard: Aesthetics P 27)
Finally, despite of so many weakness, contradictions and limitations the theories of Croce and Collingwood should not be dismissed as a n extravagant fantasy. “It is worth considering a little more closely just what the theory was trying to do like Tolstoy, Croce and Collingwood wished to give due weight to the differences between art and conceptual thought, to the fact that creating a work of art is not a purely intellectual activity, nor is aesthetic appreciation the same as intellectual understanding.” (Anne Shephard: Aesthetics P 27)

References over leaf
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