CHAPTER VII

CROCE AND THE REPRESENTATIVE AESTHETICIANS OF THE WEST

Croce and Kant, Croce and Hegel and Croce and Collingwood on the aesthetic platform.
Chapter VII

Croce and the Representative Aestheticians of the West:

Three stages are there in the developing process of the western philosophy, viz, Ancient, Medieval, and Modern. But in the Bertrand Russell's treatment the first stage-the Ancient-involves: (a) The Early Greek philosophy or the 'Pre-Socratic', i.e. from Thallese to Protagoras, (b) Greek philosophy, i.e. from Socrates to Aristotle and (c) The Ancient after Aristotle i.e. from Hellenistic to Plotinus. The second stage, as Medieval, was of Fathers and Schoolmen. The third stage is modern having two parts: (a) from the beginning of Renaissance to Hume and (b) The Romantic Movement-beginning from Rousseau to present day: 'Present' in Russell's estimation, I think, is the continuing period, when he brought his 'History of Western Philosophy' to picture in 1945. The period of Romantics is considerable because some of the great thinkers of the world like Kant, Hegel, Croce, Collingwood and others came out to prominence for their great achievements in the field of lore and learning. Bertrand Russell describes the Romantic Movement as "From the later part of the eighteenth century to the present day, art and literature and philosophy, and even politics, have been influenced, positively or negatively, by a way of feeling which was characteristic of what, in a large sense, may be called the romantic movement. Even those who were repelled by this way of feeling were compelled to take account of it, and in many cases were more affected by it than they knew." As such, "Feeling" has been the dominating element in this period in all fields of knowledge and in all aspects of human life.

This chapter is basically related to the aesthetic views of Croce and Kant, Croce and Hegel, and Croce and Collingwood intended to have chiefly a comparative account of these thinkers in allusion to the onward journey in respect of the thesis concentrated particularly on the form of beauty and art weened and exposed by these thinkers.

Croce and Kant-Concept of Beauty and Art:

Kant, Fichte and Hegel are treated to be the pioneers of idealism in the history of Modern philosophy. They all belong to the Romantic Movement beginning from Rousseau whose influences on his successors, particularly on Kant, has been great one, although Kant Fichte and Hegel were the university professors and whose contributions to the kingdom of lore and learning are worthwhile, but Kant's status is different from others as he was a great humanist thinker who touched the excelsior of learnings more enough than others of his contemporaries or successors in the various fields of knowledge. Kant did not considered only idealism in all its ornamentation but also he weened on aesthetics and politics to his best to explore certain views and surprising possibilities of human mind. Since his views on philosophy are manifold, therefore, in the following passages I aim at ascertaining
and clarifying his philosophy in close affinity to his theory of knowledge and the theory of aesthetics.

Life Sketch of Kant:

Immanuel Kant, the most prominent figure, was born in 1724 at Königsberg in East Prussia (Germany) who remained bachelor throughout his life and had concentrated fully himself to the cause of knowledge based on the noble interpretations and quite new and praiseworthy guidelines. He adopted an analytical method of study to tackle and solve the problems of philosophy. Kant was the son of Saddler and to his own account, the grand son of an emigrant from Scotland. He was educated at the school of Collegiums Fridericianum. He joined university of Königsberg where he had encountered a first class teacher in the philosopher in Martin Kunutzen. In the beginning, he was more interested in Theology than in any other subject but afterwards became attracted by the work of Isaac Newton. He bade good bye to the university in 1746 due to financial difficulties but having been a tutor of the children of some wealthy families in the near by districts, he returned to university, and after getting a degree he was appointed as a lecturer. In 1770 he occasioned to have a chair in Logic and metaphysics: Douglas Burnham cheering Kant writes, “Kant’s working life spanned the second half of the eighteenth century, a formative period in the history of Europe. In so many ways politically, scientifically, economically, intellectually even in some ways culturally—this period marks the emergence of the distinctive characteristics of the modern world that we now take for granted.” He died in 1804.

Academic Career:

In Germany the reaction against Hume’s skepticism took a new turn. Kant, Fichte and Hegel developed a new and impressive philosophy intending to safeguard knowledge and virtue from the “subversive doctrines of the late 18th century. In Kant, and still more in Fichte, the subjectivist tendency that begins with Descartes was carried to new extremes; in this respect there was no reaction against Hume.” But reaction began with Hegel while Kant took the notice of Hume’s agnosticism and expressed indebtedness to him by saying; “Hume has awakened me from my dogmatic slumber” In Bertrand Russell’s opinion, the awakening was only temporary, and he soon invented soporific which enabled him to sleep again. He was a man of principles and regarded the man as an end in himself. His love of freedom is clear as he says “there can be nothing more dreadful than that the action of a man should be subject to the will of another.”

Isaac Newton’s works and keen interest in science washed out Kant’s dogmatic mind. But he was more interested in science than philosophy. In physical Geography he had deep knowledge and also keen interest. So in his early writings the ‘Theory of earthquakes’, ‘A Treatise on wind’ and the short essay on ‘The question whether the west wind in Europe is moist because it has crossed the Atlantic Ocean.’ are the attractive and compendious works of Kant. Nevertheless,
the “General natural History and Theory of the Heavens” (1755) is the most important of his scientific works. In 1766, he published a curious work entitled as “Dream of a Ghost-Seer, illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysics” and wrote a treatise on sublime and the beautiful in which he enunciated, “Night is sublime, day is beautiful, the sea is sublime, the land is beautiful, man is sublime, woman is beautiful and so on.”

In philosophy, the most important work of Kant is “The Critique of Pure Reason” which obtained two editions-1st in 1781 and 2nd in 1787. “The Critique of Practical Reason” and “The Critique of Judgement” (1790) are also of great importance in which ethical and aesthetic problems have been dealt with properly and plausibly. The Critique of Judgement, translated by James Creed Meredith, published in 1952, is noteworthy for studies of Kant’s aesthetic views mentioned in his original book. These three of his books are often called ‘The First, Second, Third Critiques’ but as clumped up together are also called “The Three Critique”. The term critique in German is translated as “Analysis” in English.

Kant’s Idealism-Discourse on Knowledge

Kant’s idealism is also called ‘Phenomenal Idealism’ because limiting the powers of pure reason, Kant thought that the ‘thing-in-itself’ cannot be known through it (intellect), but what can we know? is limited to mere phenomena. Hence, noumenon for Kant is unknown. That is why he is charged of agnosticism.

However, in developing his idealism Kant is critical to Rationalism on the one hand and to Empiricism on the other. But he attempts to reconcile both on the form and possibility of knowledge. His theory of knowledge is epitheted as a golden mean knowledge a priori; knowledge beyond the experience, which is not possible without experience as its helping element and the knowledge a posteriori, which is like jejune without knowledge a priori; yet experience and ideas inborn together offer the basis to all knowledge. Knowledge is obtainable always in the form of judgements but all kinds of judgements cannot be counted for as genuine as knowledge. There are two kinds of judgements, according to Kant- (1) Analytical and (2) Synthetical. The former does not furnish any new thing to the predicate of the subject except an analysis of the concepts; the latter adds something new to the predicate and thus becomes a form of genuine knowledge. The Analytical form of judgement, moreover, lacks ‘universality’ and ‘necessity’, the two essential characteristics of a genuine knowledge.

Knowledge as formulated by experience together with the concepts apriori in the form of judgement is known as the synthetic apriori. All sorts of true knowledge must have its seat in the synthetic a priori judgements, as Kant considers.

Consequently, in the synthetic a priori judgement, the concepts as a priori are also there, but sensibility is always a posteriori, and a synthesis of the perceptions of the objects (sensations) and conceptions (Ideas) a priori makes the knowledge as ‘synthetic a priori’ possible. But how? was a riddle before Kant in solution of which he introduced certain conditions of knowledge comprising sensibility (Perceptions),
conceptions (Understanding), Time and space (forms of intuition), and self consciousness (Synthetic unity of Apperception).

Conditions of Knowledge

(1) Sensibility or Sensations

The role of senses is to furnish impressions of the objects of the outside world to our understanding. The sensations are treated to be the raw material having no form. Reason is active so far as the sensibility is concerned. But it is not enough; the understanding begins to work on the sensation supplied by the senses and hence the form of knowledge comes to light by co-operation of perceptions on the one hand and the conceptions on the other. Kant explains the notion by saying, "Percepts without concepts are blind, concepts without Percepts are Empty."

(2) Conceptions:

Having received the formless raw material furnished by senses our understanding comes at work, and act according to its own ways. The ways in which our understanding thinks out the material of knowledge, which remains scattered till the process of formulation is completed by understanding; and eventually by the activity of self-consciousness, the so called synthetic unity of Apperception by Kant, through which it comes to arrange, combine and synthesize them, are known by Kant as categories of understanding.

(3) Forms of Intuition

The two forms of intuition, called space and time, arrange the raw material. These two forms are imposed upon the sensation by the mind. These are the native powers of our sensibility and do not depend on the experience. For Kant, they are the a priori forms of our perception as he explains in detail in his 'Transcendental Aesthetics'. Percepts are a posteriori or to say, sensations obtained by reason through senses, or experiences as a posteriori remain disconnected and scattered and so can not become knowledge unless they are united and interconnected. Such sensations come to action by employing the faculty of intuition to the service of knowledge in which its two forms-space and time- impose their impressions on the senses and thereafter hand over such material impressed on to another faculty of mind or mental apparatus, known as understanding. The ways through which this mental apparatus exercises its powers to connect and to associate the sensations or perceptions is called categories, which are twelve in number comprising of the same quantity of judgements related to the objects of the outer world, i.e. to phenomena only, not
to Noumena or the things-in-themselves because they are not in space and time, nor are they substances describable by other general principles or categories. Sensations as formless get form by the categories of understanding, and the concepts apriori together with percepts a posteriori when united by synthetic unity of Apperception come to as knowledge of the objects.

Kant classifies the categories in four sets of three, which re derived by Kant from his syllogism: every set of three comprises of the equal number of judgements. Kant thought that the main function of categories is passing judgements so as to make the knowledge possible or to have the form of knowledge. The description of the categories and related judgements is following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORIES</th>
<th>JUDGEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1-Quantity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quantity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totality</td>
<td>Singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2-Quality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negation</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation</td>
<td>Infinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3-Relation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Relation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Substance-and-Accident (According to Bertrand Russell) But in others it is 'Inherence' and 'subsistence'</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Cause and effect (According to Bertrand Russell) But in others it is causality and dependence.</td>
<td>Hypothetical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Reciprocity (B. Russell) But in others it is community.</td>
<td>Disjunctive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4-Modality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility also (Impossibility)</td>
<td>Problematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence also (Non-Existence)</td>
<td>Assertive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessity also (Contingency)</td>
<td>Apodictic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except the forms of judgement all the four sets of three have been taken out from Bertrand Russell's work.
Unity of Self-Consciousness—Transcendental Unity of Apperception

The categories of understanding presuppose the unity of self-consciousness. Thus unity of self-consciousness has been given the cumbersome name of transcendental unity of apperception, a synthesizing power of the self-consciousness expressed in and through the categories.

Reason, Understanding and Sensation

According to Kant, the understanding is a faculty. The word, the soul and good are the ideas of reason. Reason tries to go beyond the experience and understanding, and tries to know the super sensible. For such super sensibility there are no objects in perception. External impressions are reduced to the idea of soul but both are reduced to an unconditioned totality by being subsumed under the idea of God. And hence, Kant treats the world, soul and God to be a priori ideas of the reason. However, pure reason cannot know the things-in-themselves but the practical reason can give us a clear picture and a clue of reality, which is possible in ethics and religion. However, the ideas of Reason are the useful guides in these affairs.

Antinomies

Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ has a large part of its volume to deal with antinomies, which through four antinomies are the fallacies that arise from applying space and time as being forms of intuition and the categories of understanding to those things, which are not experienced. In this reference, he tries to move the mutually contradictory propositions through four antinomies everyone of them consist of thesis and antithesis-of which great influence we can see, on Hegel’s dialectic. My business is not here to go in details of Kant’s antinomies. But in Critique of Practical Reason Kant has tried to prove the existence of God by advancing Moral argument on the one hand and the existence of self and

---

FN The author of “Kant” in reproducing “Critique of Judgement” in his Remark III has put up three antinomies to pure reason which are thought to be necessary elements to determine the taste of judgement in Kant which the author undertakes to comment in reference to the ‘object of sense’ and ‘the things- in- themselves’ accordingly, the antinomies have three cognitive faculties as their grounds each of which must have its apriori principle. As such, these are understanding, judgement and reason in which each is superior in cognitive faculty. Consequently, in author’s word, “There are then: (1) for the cognitive faculty an antimony of reason in respect of the theoretical employment of the understanding extended to the unconditioned, (2) for the feeling of pleasure and pain an antimony of reason in respect of the aesthetical employment of the judgement (3) for the faculty of desire an antimony in respect of the practical employment of the self legislative….” [Philosophies of Art and Beauty in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger Edt. By D. Hofstadter, Richard Kuhams P, 338] This is his personal remark which, I think, he advanced, against any objection expected to be raised on Kant’s contradictions committed in his idealism on the one hand and in his aesthetic theory in which the main issue is ‘taste’ “which is intrinsically related with beauty in subjective judgement and beauty as objective judgement.” [Encyclopedia of Philosophy P 319]
necessity of freedom of the will on the other to make ethics meaningful. These are the three cogent postulates on which Kant founded his ethics.

The thinkers have evaluated Kant’s Idealism critically time and again but Russell’s criticism on Kant’s notion of space and time is important. Russell has raised so many objections in this respect, which are not intended to be mentioned here. However, he raises these objections in his book on PP 740 to 745, in which his notable remark on “thing-in-itself” is as “The “thing-in-itself” was an awkward element in Kant’s philosophy and was abandoned by his immediate successors, who accordingly feel into something very like solipsism Kant’s inconsistencies were such as to make it inevitable that philosophers who were influenced by him should develop rapidly either in the empirical or in the absolutist direction, it was, in fact, in the latter direction that German philosophy moved until after the death of Hegel.”

Aesthetic Theory

Douglas Burnham has defined “Critique” in Kant’s sense as “An analysis which attempts to determine the legitimate range of application of a concept.” But modifying his definition he replaced the words “of a concept” from “of some type a mental power.”

Out of Kant’s many books and papers ‘The Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgement’ are the most important, but in Critique of Judgement Kant has done an analysis of the structure of his book as follows:

Preface

Introduction

I-II The division of philosophy and the problem of its unity.

III Judgement as possible ‘solution’ to this problem.

IV-VI Judgement is legislating a priori, and its principle of purposiveness.

VII-VIII Aesthetic and Logical (teleological) purposiveness.

IX Judgment as ‘solution’ to this problem.

Part I: Critique of Aesthetic Judgement.

Division I: Analytic of the aesthetic judgement.

Book I: Analytic of the Beautiful.
Four 'Moments'

1-SS 1-5 Concerning interest.
2-SS 6-9 Concerning Universal delight (or 'satisfaction' or 'liking')
3-SS 10-17 Concerning purposiveness (including discussion of perfection and ideal.)
4-SS 18-22 Concerning necessity and common sense, General comment on 'first division i.e. the first book.

Book II: Analytic of sublime – Deduction of (Pure) Aesthetical judgments. All sections deal with different aspects of aesthetical judgments and with the problem of sublime and beauty.

The second Division comprises of 'Dialectic' of the Aesthetical judgement. But the second part of Kant's book is Critique of Theological Judgement and is less studied and referred than the 1st.

Douglas Burnham points out the following four issues in significance behind the critique of Judgement:

(1) What can I know? is related to Metaphysics.
(2) What ought I to do?: is related to Morality.
(3) What may I hope?: is related to Religion.
(4) What is man?: is related to anthropology.

But according to Kant 'without knowledge one can never become a philosopher, but knowledge alone will never make the philosopher, unless it is added with a purposeful joining of all cognitions and skills into unity, and an insight into agreement with the highest ends of human reason.' The reference to knowledge profoundly indicates Kant's main interest in the sphere of metaphysics to which I have already made clear. But his aesthetic is based on his analytical philosophy (also called transcendental philosophy). It is expedient to have a compendious narration of Kant's analysis of mind or of the faculty of min, with a view to obtain the answers of the questions noted above, and also in reference to the significance of Kant's aesthetical theory in which the judgement of taste, beauty and art, sublime and beauty shall be the main subjects of my study. As such in Kant's view what kinds of thinking are there or what can the man do? are the questions to answer, and for the questions noted above, and also in reference to the significance of Kant's aesthetical theory in which the judgement of taste, beauty and art, sublime and beauty shall be the main subjects of my study. and also for a distinction between the mental faculty and the cognitive faculty it is necessary to note Kant's faculties of the mind, which can properly be arranged in the higher and the lower classes and have again certain specific legislative powers. Douglas Burnham's mapping of such phenomena noted below suffices to understand the faculties of mind, which are really speaking the powers of grasping reality and unreality, but things- in- themselves remain beyond the access of these powers. Since mind's one power is pure reason and the other is
practical reason, therefore, only practically reason can grasp super sensibility; pure reason remains fettered by sensibility.

**The Faculties of Mind:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher</th>
<th>Lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical cognition of nature legislative faculty: understanding, with laws of nature.</td>
<td>Subjective associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic feeling for nature and art. Legislative faculty: judgement, with principle of purposiveness.</td>
<td>Corporeal feeling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure desire in the exercise of freedom legislative faculty: reason with principle of morality and of the highest purpose of God.</td>
<td>Corporeal desire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-legislative faculty: sensibility especially productive imagination.</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kant identified three ‘faculties of the mind’, each with a higher and ‘lower form’ keeping in view of the higher and lower faculties of mind and the faculties of cognition the power is subjective having association, corporeal feeling and corporeal desire; but in all, the pure desire which is our free will as higher faculty, is determined by the moral law. It has a purpose to its action, and its final purpose is that of man’s good, it is called ‘Sum mum Bonum’, i.e. the highest good. Now the cognitive faculties are the distinctive sources or principles, viz, concepts, ideas and sensible images which enable the achievement of the faculties of the mind concepts, ideas etc together are called representations or presentation by Kant. First of all there is understanding, secondly, there is judgement, thirdly, there is reason, and fourthly, there is sensibility which are associated with each other incorporating time and space as the two forms of intuition as a priori through which knowledge of the appearances of the things is made possible, and also through which the synthetic a priori judgement comes to actualization. But the super sensible God can only be known through the practical reason because pure reason cannot go to super sensibility from the sensibility of nature. Space and time are only effects of things on our origins of sense and do not exist in the things. Moreover, intuition is not a sixth sense rather a source of our a priori presentations of the form of space and time, which describe the basic structure of sensibility or appearance of thing. 18 This is all preliminary but important discussion about Kant’s very difficult critical philosophy for the purpose of our clearer understanding. It can be put up mainly under the following heads:

1- The Judgement of taste
2- Beauty
Judgement of taste:

Kant emphatically weighs on the importance and the powers of the taste in aesthetic judgement. In his Critique of Judgement of which Critique of the Aesthetical judgement forms a part and of which first division and first book is ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’; divided into four moments Kant attempted in precision to cast sufficient light on the nature of the judgement of taste which he treats to be aesthetical and subjective yet in onward discussions he proclaims the need of its universality.

Hence, Kant’s chief purpose seems to have the concept of taste highlighted because he thinks it a most essential part of his aesthetics. Taste is actually in experience, intrinsically related to the person experiencing and the object or sensibility being experienced. Kant undertakes the judgement of taste qualitatively and quantitatively both. Qualitatively, it is different from logical and scientific judgements of cognition. The judgement of taste is aesthetic judgement, which rests agreeably on the feelings of pleasure and pain of the subject, but not is a judgement of cognition. The Judgement of taste is aesthetic judgement because in all representations or perceptions, which are concepts, ideas and the sensible images, or to say activities involving all these and which enable the achievement of the faculties of mind, are lumped up together by Kant and named, as representations—all these are the phenomena to be judged aesthetically. “Here the representation is altogether referred to the subject and to its feeling of life under the name of pleasure or pain: This establishes a quite separate faculty of distinction and of judgement, adding nothing in cognition, but only comparing the given representation of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state. The given representations in a judgement can be empirical (consequently, aesthetical); but the judgement, which is formed by means of them, is logical, provided they are referred in the judgement to the object. Conversely, if the given representations are rational and are referred as judgement simply to the subject (to its feeling), the judgement is so far always aesthetical.”

Since Judgement is always co-ordaining faculty to other cognitive faculties, therefore, of course explores what a priori principles might be inculcated in our ability to judge. Such principles stand transcendental condition for the judging ability. Hence, such ability will differ from individual in his judgement of taste. Kant, however, produces reflective nature of aesthetic judgement and tells us four forms of all judgements, which are determinate, undeterminate, theological, and aesthetic, the last two are distinctive by being reflective. So also aesthetic judgements are about things, we call them beautiful, and also such things are included in art as beauty or sublime in nature. Consequently, Judgement is a mental act and judgment of taste is a aesthetical judgement, reflective in essence and subjective in formation. And it is given on the object of nature as well as on art. Pleasure, satisfaction, interest and or
disinterested interest determine the nature of the taste of judgement; it is always about sublime. Satisfaction is always pleasant. In this type of judgement pleasantness of an object is no doubt countable for the taste, not merely the object that pleases and counted for beautiful but also its existence, which is not admitted by Kant because he thought that there is difference between good, pleasant, and ugly. He once again distinguishes between an immediate good and a mediate good in which, the immediately good is countable, not the mediate, but in the case of pleasant the question of immediacy does not arise because pleasant is unconditionally beautiful and is not a faculty of desire; only good is the object of will i.e. it is a faculty of desire determined by reason. Moreover, the judgement of taste is contemplative and is not primarily related to the existence of object.

“Aesthetic judgements are about things, we call beautiful, some other aesthetic category ‘sublime’ such things include art.” This description obviously shows that the judgement of taste has been advanced to know and determine what is beautiful and what is sublime and how the sublimity of the nature and creatures is related to the beautiful of nature and of creatures in Kant’s aesthetics. For as Kant in his “Sublime and Beauty” has written down, “Night is sublime, day is beautiful, sea is sublime, the land is beautiful, man is sublime and the woman is beautiful”. Hence, the aesthetic judgement is connected not only to beautiful objects but also to the objects creating a sense or feeling of awe in the subject, or the overwhelmingness of an object.

**A Priori Principles for Judgement**

Exploring the nature and form of judgement of taste Kant introduced the idea of disinterested satisfaction which is related to subjective universal communicability of the mode representation in the judgement of taste. Moreover, the judgement of taste in Kant is synthetic in form, and subjective in spirit because it goes beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, adding to that intuition feeling of pleasure and pain.

Kant’s approach to beauty is subjective as well as subjective universality or agreement of every one in respect of satisfaction. Interest and pleasure, according to him, are such phenomena which make the universality of the aesthetic judgement possible. This is all in reference to the object that makes the judgement of taste possible and expedient to carry with it an aesthetic quantity of the universality, i.e. it is a fact of validity for everyone.

Since the aesthetic judgements are reflective, and every such reflective judgement must have a priori principles, therefore, Kant in section V of his Introduction argues that the feeling of pleasure and pain is communicable through natural and artistic beauty in judgement of taste. Such judgements are not only communicable but even claim to be universal. Suppose I say, “The landscape is beautiful,” it does not mean that I can authentically identify the landscape according to a concept that makes it beautiful. Nevertheless, expectation that others will agree with me is also there, and if somebody
disagrees then that point stands wrong. "The judgement demands-but does not necessarily expect-assent. Again, would this be possible without a transcendental principle behind the ability to judge? Aesthetic judgements, despite being radically subjective…. Nevertheless claim as a matter of course 'universal assent"27 However, the aesthetic judgement must rely upon a universal principle and seek universal assent for its results and so judgement legislates for the higher faculty of feeling in which beautiful gives a feeling of pleasure. Kant is claiming that there can be an a priori principle—a principle that is prior to any such individual or corporeal concern—even for feeling.28

The Judgement of taste prima-facie requires analysis into

(1) Judgement
(2) Taste

Judgement

For Kant judgement is a secret power hidden in its sources—"A hidden art giving rise to tangles knoth in riddles. Yet, disconcealed power underlies the systems of theoretical, practically and aesthetic judgements analysed in the three Critiques."29 Caygill’s remark is trustworthy which he passes on the concept of judgement in Kant’s aesthetic in reference to the a priori nature of the form of the judgement as considered and exposed by Kant which is as, “If one were able to apprehend what sort of a secret power it is that makes judging possible, then one would be able to unite the knot. My current view is that this power or ability (to judge) can be none other than the capacity of inner sense to make its own representations into objects of its thoughts. This capacity cannot be derived from any other, it is fundamental in the proper sense, and can, I hold, only belongs of a rational being. The entire higher faculty of knowledge rests on this power.”30 In the Mary A. Mc. Closkey’s words, it is “one of the main tasks of aesthetics is to provide a rationale for judging that one thing is aesthetically better than another. The scope of such judgements may be thought of more generally, in the way that Kant thinks of it, as extending across the whole extent of our experience of things, and so including natural objects humble artefacts and works of fine art”.31 However, references yield the articulate meaning of judgement in aesthetic and also in other fields of life. Judgement, hence, is ability; a concealed power of mind and inner sense, which provides rational or standard to know what an object of knowledge is in its totality.

Judgement by connotation is ability or a faculty of judging things, i.e. what are the principles, which are transcendental conditions for that ability. In summary Douglas Burnham writes, “A judgement is a mental act which in some way decides whether a thing is this or that. But there seem to be different types of judgement.”32 The different types of judgement I have already noted down under the heading "Judgement of Taste". Now it is clear that the meaning of judgement is limited to such power of mind, which acts to decide the things beautiful and sublime, or not beautiful and not sublime. Nevertheless, the logical, ethical and aesthetic judgements are the judgements of value, but according to Kant aesthetic is distinct from others, no matter if it has close affinity with good or morality. Kant himself asserts that the aesthetic judgements are about thing, we call beautiful or some other
aesthetic category as sublime. Moral Judgements, on the other hand, are about the concept, concept as mere a concept has nothing to do with the aesthetic judgement because in the words of Douglas Burnham, “My judgement about duty does not follow or produce a concept, but takes place by way of feeling-the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful.”34 For this very reason aesthetic judgement is related to feeling of pleasure, which makes the cognition of beautiful possible, I think and interpret so.

**Taste**

Kant in the ‘Analytic of the beautiful’ throws sufficient light on the nature of taste and the nature of the judgement of taste; he devoted four moments in this regard. Now, the question is what is a taste? Literally it is taste or a thing that we ‘relish’. It is also ‘judgement’, ‘style’, ‘manner’, ‘choice’, ‘flavour’ and also ‘liking’.35 If we undertake the term taste literally then this word will connote the subject’s particular sense which has ability to judge a thing to be relished tasteful or as sweet, pleasant, agreeable and in contrary distasteful, not sweet, unpleasant, unagreeable. But Kant explored the meaning of taste as a faculty of judging of the beautiful. He does not consider it literally and that is why he argues in the four moments of his Critique of Beautiful for the judgement of taste.

**Definition of Taste**

Judgement of taste is a faculty of judging of the beautiful and also carries with it an aesthetic quality of universality, i.e. of validity for every one, which cannot be found in a judgement about the pleasant. “It is only judgements about the good which...have logical and merely aesthetical universality, for they are valid of the object as cognitive of it, and thus valid for everyone”.36 Meredith in his F.N write the definition of taste....is the faculty of judgement of the beautiful. But the analysis of judgements of taste must show what is required in order to call an object beautiful.37

**Beauty and Beautiful**

In my view Kant’s judgement of taste is more complicated than any other problem as in the description the judgement of taste is entirely analytical, not easy to follow, for he creates confusions in the elaboration of his thoughts. Also he coincides to and more ideas in such a complicated manner which make understanding abstruse, and an integrated view of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement stands too far because, “He fails to give explicit directions to the reader about the bearings of his discussions of his central topics on one another.”38 In division and sub division of his Critique of Judgement, Kant’s analysis of the Analytic comprises of the four Moments in which the First Moment is the principal and basis of the other three. Discussing the form and nature of the judgement of taste Kant very excellently makes a tactful transition from judgement or from various judgements to beautiful, and from beautiful to two kinds of beauty-
(1) The natural beauty which, in my opinion, is the only original, and
(2) The artificial beauty, also called artistic by Kant himself, it includes the
beauty of the art works.

The exposition of beautiful and beauty (in two of its forms) runs simultaneously with
the description and elaboration of the judgement of taste.

Logically beautiful and beauty are distinguishable in my view. ‘Beautiful’
always indicates an object judged beautiful as, “This Tulip is beautiful” or
considering sublime as overwhelmingness an object or awe-creating object we
propose and judge. “This stormy seascape is sublime” (Both are Kant’s examples). But ‘Beauty’ is always a concept whether the object is present or not. If the object is
there, the aesthetic judgement will determine whether that is beautiful or not.
Eventually, ‘beautiful’ is grammatically an adjective of an object of beauty. Beauty
is noun and mere a thought or idea inculcated in our minds not needing the physical
presence of an object before us, the knowledge of which depends on the synthetic a
priori judgement, employing Kant’s theory of knowledge. In other words, the term
‘Beauty’ is general, the term ‘Beautiful’ is particular when we say, “Rose is
beautiful”, we find ‘Rose’, subject and beautiful the predicate in which Rose without
judgment will exist, but beautiful without Rose does not. It means ‘beautiful’ is
dependent on the object of beauty. Nevertheless, one can argue that whenever we
conceive of beauty we always have an impression or imagination of a particular
object of beauty, without which cognition of beauty is impossible. This argument
confuses beauty with the object while beauty and object are the two different
phenomena, and hence without admitting beauty as different from object we can not
qualify a thing by using the term beauty: Kant’s view in reference to beauty of art is
remarkable. He says, “A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a
beautiful representation of a thing.” To make this point more clear, plausible and
certain is to quote Kant’s own another view. He says, “If we wish to discern whether
anything is beautiful or not, we do not refer the representation of it to the object by
means of understanding with a view to cognition, but means of the imagination
(acting perhaps) in conjunction with understanding we refer the representation to the
subject and its feeling of pleasure.” Hence, Kant’s notion of beauty ultimately
relies upon the notion of pleasure or displeasure. Until now the discussion I held on
the distinction between beauty and beautiful is according to my own understanding
and interpretation, but what is the view of Kant, is contained in his ‘Analytic of the
Beautiful,’ a brief account of which runs as follows:

**Definition of Beauty, According to Kant**

‘Pleasure’ rather; ‘disinterested pleasure’ is the keynote of Kant’s
definition of beauty or beautiful. In the preliminaries of the Analytic he exposes the
kind of aesthetic judgment with the expression, as ‘This is a beautiful’, ‘This Tulip is
beautiful’, expresses nothing more than a disinterested pleasure which according to
Kant are entitled to demand of any and also everyone. It is due to the fact that the
object judged as beautiful is perceived as to have sort of discernible form-the ‘Form
of Finality’ as called by Kant, in reference and in continuation to which the
definition Kant puts up in the four ‘Moments’ each with its definition.

In the first moment, Kant’s definition of beauty moves from taste, “Taste
is the faculty of existing an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight
or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such delight is called beautiful.”

In the second moment, “The beautiful is that which apart from a concept
pleases universally.”

In the third Moment, the definition is, “Beauty is the form of Finality in an
object, so far as perceived in it apart from the representation of an end.”

Definition of Fourth, Moment is that which apart from a concept is
cognized as object of a necessary delight.

In the definition of the First Moment it is taste which decides an object or
a mode of its representation whether that one is beautiful or not, but it is apart from
interest and any means of pleasure. Interest rather disinterested interest of any is
necessary element involved in this definition. The thing, which is pleasant for me, is
expected to be pleasant for everyone, but it is not necessary in expectation for every
one and also not necessary in all matters; however, Kant seems adamant on this point
and insists on the universality of the taste without hesitation in determining the
aesthetic judgements, which are subjective yet he expects them as universal. Hence,
it is in the definition of the second moment in which concept is treated apart and the
sense of pleasantness of the object universal. In the Third moment Beauty has been
ascertained in the ‘Form of Finality’ in an object imbibing the representation of an
end and also ingenuously assimilating good to show that beauty is a symbol of
morality. Because Kant thinks of pleasure in the form of Finality as disinterested
pleasure and that we can only take disinterested pleasure in the Form of Finality
taking pleasure in anything else, will be by definition pleasure in ‘the agreeable’ or
‘good’ both of which are interested.

In the Fourth Moment, the concept of Beauty is admitted but cognition of
object a beautiful rests upon the necessary element of delight.

On the basis of these definitions it can aptly be concluded that:

Beauty and beautiful or beautiful and beauty are not discernable rather both kinds
denote-

(a) Taste
(b) Object in the outer world,
(c) Concept in the mind,
(d) Interest-treated as disinterested satisfaction.
(e) Pleasure and pleasantness of an object

Meaning and Judgement of taste I have already made clear. Here ‘Pleasure’ and the
object of delight are required to deal with.

FN. All the four definitions Meredith translated from Kant’s German work ‘Gesammeltic Schrifton,
Vol 5, Section 5, P 211, lines 2-4, 59 P 219 line 25, 57, P 236 lines 9-11 and 522, P 240 lines 18-19
satated by Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant Aesthetic P 163.
Pleasure and the Object of Pleasure:

Pleasure in Kant’s early writings is a passive effect on the mind of its stimulation by the object. It is mechanical explanation, not plausible in aesthetic sense and judgment. But pleasure, which we get in beautiful, is an expression of our intelligible nature of the free spontaneous activity of the mind, and yet is caused basically by reflexion upon objects where mind with all its powers of judgment remains free from any such effects, which may be incompatible with freedom. “Here is something between the sharp alternations of actions from respect for the moral law and heteronomous actions by accidental pleasure.”46 What is something is a matter of enquiry; it is really the pleasantness of an object, which counts for beauty.

Pleasure in Kant’s view is something indispensable aspect of judgement, which estimates the aesthetic value of that thing. Actually pleasure is not a sense of feeling in the perceiving mind of an object in determination of sensibility rather pleasure is obtained actively by the perceiving mind. Kant modifying this preliminary view proceeds in observation by saying “The sublime moves, the beautiful charms.”47 That which is charming in it, is judged as beautiful, not the affecting mind as passively or as qualitatively. There are three kinds of pleasure or the kinds of charm:

1. The agreeable pleasure. (Or pleasure in the matter of sensation)
2. The pleasure in the ‘good’.
3. The pleasure in the beautiful.

These are actually the ‘sensation’, the ‘concept’ and the ‘perceptual’ forms respectively.

Kant removes the misconception involved in these three types of pleasures, and determines the pleasure entirely subjective rather than objective sensation. He writes, “The green colour of the meadow belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness to subjective sensation, by which no object is represented i.e. to feeling through which the object is regarded as an object.”48

In further classification Kant proclaims rhetorically, “The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good thus denote three different relations of representations to the feeling of Pleasure and displeasure, as a feeling in respect of which we distinguish different objects or modes of representation.”49 Again, in the same context the classification of pleasures into three basic kinds really forms the background of Kant’s efforts to produce an excellent definition of beautiful; it is interesting. Lastly, pleasure in finality is disinterested and it can be taken in the form of finality, if and only if a plausible definition of beautiful in the form and text as agreeable pleasure or disinterested pleasure in Kant’s view is taken for granted. Kant’s intention is candid in defining beautiful in this way. He wants to have a very sound ground for universality of his aesthetic theory, which is basically subjective.
Kinds of beauty in Fine Art:

Kant draws a distinction between the beauty of nature or natural beauty and the beauty of art or artificial beauty. As such, Kant deals with only two kinds, no third exists for him.

In Croce, beauty is intuition or spiritual expression; he does not recognize physical beauty in true sense of the concept although he regards art and artefacts as expressing beauty. He declines pleasantness of object for beauty itself. (It is his contradictory statement)

According to Kant, the successful works of art viz. poetry, painting, sculpture, music and architecture etc. and the beautiful objects of nature are all compatibly equal in value and form, and are the best examples of beautiful objects. Both are to be judged universally and necessarily pleasing by virtue of their perceptual form. But in section 43 onward Kant differentiates between the beautiful works of art and the beautiful natural objects. He obviously ascertains the superiority of art, rather fine arts to the beautiful natural objects. Kant sometimes appreciates and argues for the superiority of the beauty of natural objects over the appreciation of the beauty of art works, but Mc. Closkey’s interpretation is reverse. In the words of Mc. Closkey “He (Kant) finds the two main points of difference to the that, first, worth while works of fine art are intended to be as they are, and second they are expressive of what he calls ‘aesthetic ideas’, ideas which are the distinctive contribution of men of genius.

Kant equally pays regard to the beauty in art and beauty in nature but paradoxically maintains the superiority of the fine art, for as he thinks that mere theoretical knowledge is not enough. For natural beauty, no skill is required but for artificial or artistic beauty skill is a must. However, Kant is interested in showing a keen relationship between these two kinds of beauty. Pondering the distinction between the two Kant emphatically relies the fine arts on genius of the artists because art needs skill in full-fledged form and also implies an end. Kant in this regard writes, “Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be turn beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance.” Henceforth, Kant clears the point by saying, “A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing.” Here in art there is a representative picture of an object while in natural beauty the thing remains physically present; physically pleasant and physically observable.

Kinds of Art:

Regarding the kinds of beauty it correct to say that, “It is imperative at the outset accurately to determine the difference of beauty of nature, which it only requires taste to estimate and beauty of art which requires genius for its point in estimating such an object.” Albeit, taste and genius are considerable. A work of fine art is tasteful if it expresses aesthetic ideas which it transforms into aesthetic merit. Genius in the work of art gives the form conforming the artist’s aim in
producing such an artefact. Moreover, originality in the work makes the work grand and countable as in the example of fine art. This discussion now results in fine art and its products, as it is necessary to have in all:

1. Talent
2. Concept of productivity.
3. Portrayal or expression of aesthetic ideas.
4. Subjective Finality in the free harmonizing of the imagination.\(^{57}\)

For Kant “beauty” is a name for the ‘something subjective’ (Pleasure, in my opinion) about art or certain natural thing.\(^{58}\)

There are also mechanical and free arts and are aesthetically distinguishable in form and in matter both. Free arts are the agreeable arts and differ from the fine arts because in agreeable arts pleasure in sensation while in the case of fine arts, pleasure is in a representation, which stands obviously final and is one of reflection. However, pleasure is the common ground of both kinds of art-Mechanical and Free arts.

**Sublime and Beauty:**

Sublime and beautiful prima-facie are incompatible with each other, yet Kant believes and ponders the sublimity, not being a necessary constituent of fine art, may enter into it (fine-art) with the condition that what is sublime is made to be, in addition, beautiful. But how, remains a vexing problem for Kant. Unfortunately, Kant gives us a clear exposition of the problem. However, in second part of his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, the problem concerning to sublime and fine art has broadly been discussed. His discussion on sublime indeed breaks the main current of the development of his analysis and judgement converging on beauty in fine art.\(^{59}\)

**Meaning of Sublime**

Lexicographical meanings of sublime are generally “grand”, “noble”, “exalted”, “majestic” etc. all in positive sense. But in aesthetics from the time of Aristotle sublime is such a term which has been used for any thing which makes us feel or experience ‘awe’, or the overwhelmingness of an object. It may be a violent storm, a piece of architecture e.g. Egyptian Pyramids, howling of winds and out rage of tides etc, all creating the feeling of awe in us. Also sublime means ‘lift up’, ‘elevate’ and also in the sense of chemical processing involving vaporization or liquidizing and the condensing forms. Moreover, sublime is also used as to transmute into something higher, nobler or more excellent, to raise up or aloft, to cause to ascend or to raise an elevated sphere or exalted state, to make morally or spiritually sublime etc.\(^{60}\)

With certain minute differences sublime is also used in the sense of refining, elevating or to cause in condense form, or to exalt or elevate especially in
dignity or honour, to render finer (as in purity or excellence) to convert something inferior into something higher of worth, exalted in thought, expression or minor, outstanding spiritual and intellectual or moral worth. Also it is "tending to inspire awe because of elevated quality (as of beauty, nobility or grandeur etc.)."61

**Definition:**

Douglas Burnham excellently defines the term 'sublime' as "the feeling of, or associated with, the overwhelmingness of an object."62 It is obvious by the definition that we always feel awe when we come across an object in its overwhelmingness. Storms, tides, churning of dark clouds, roaring forties of Chili, thundering, lightening etc frighten us and we experience awe, and thus desire safety from them; such desires and efforts in this concern come to as pleasant in the end when we are safe.

According to Kant sublime and beautiful both are experiences and are the objects of judgement. In both the judgement is reflective, not sensible because, in the words of Mary A. Mc. Closkey, "The value of that which in contrast with the value of that which is sublime, according to Kant's analysis in contrast with the value of that which is beautiful, is not a distinctive kind of value. It derives from the values of the intellect and morality. This is one of the reasons, which make it seem that Kant's discussion of the sublime is something of a diversion from the central thesis of his book."63

There are two kinds of ideas-

1. The ideas of Reason
2. The Aesthetic ideas.

Former are concepts, no intuition can be adequately ascribed, the latter are intuitions, and no concept is adequate, as the aesthetic ideas as presentation cannot be brought to ideas of reason.64

**Two questions to answer:**

Since the notion of sublime and the concept of beautiful both are treated all equally in judgement despite of their different meanings. Therefore, the questions arise-why sublime is an aesthetic judgments and how it differs from beautiful? Kant is not clear on these questions. Albeit, he depicts a comparative sketch as follows:
Resemblances:

(1) Sublime and Beautiful both are pleasing on their own account apart from any interest. Example—Storms frighten us and we want to have a safe place; when it is found we feel pleasure.
(2) Both are reflective judgements because just like feeling of pleasantness we reflectively come to feel awe because of the overwhelmingness of an object.
(3) Both please universally but it is doubtful in my opinion because the feeling of awe and the feeling of pleasure being subjective have no common ground to be admitted universally. Yet Kant argues in favour of universality. For example— a knight feels pleasure to achieve some adventure while a poltroon feels danger and discards such adventures. However in Kant's thought beauty and sublimity both are counted for universality.

Differences:-

Some differences have also been pointed out by Kant—

*Form and Formless*: Beauty is dealt with, as the form of an object, sublime instead is possibly something formless.

Example—

(a) An object in sublimity may either be too huge or too small but in both cases it is overwhelmingness of the object, which is experienced as awe. In this respect Kant's own example is, the Pyramids of Egypt for too large, (but Bacteria of Cholera, is my own example for too small). Moreover, beautiful cannot be reduced to charm, yet it is compatible with charm or ornamentation (paradoxical statement, I think). Sublime on the other hand, has no relation with charming or ornamentation.
(b) Sublime is partly more serious than beautiful as it involves negative feeling, i.e. pain, the beautiful instead involves a positive feeling, i.e. pleasure.
(c) Beautiful in nature and also in fine art consists in recognition of the pre-adaptation i.e. purposiveness, of natural objects, for our ability to judge, the pleasure, thus arises from the judgment.

In sublime there is all adaptation of the object as for example the outrage against our sensible judgement, which resists management in beautiful.

Two varities of Sublime:

Kant tells us two varities of sublime—

(1) The Mathematical and
(2) The Dynamical.

To be discussed in continuation to the kinds of stages.
Two Stages of Sublime

Stage I-Objective

Sublime is mere an experience of awe aroused by the outrage of an object.

Stage II-Subjective

Subjectivity, Kant in S-28 of his ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’ puts up certain questions and eventually answers by claiming that representation of sublime is mostly misspoken object. “What is sublime is the ‘supernatural’ mind that contemplates. In each case the mind is led to discover within itself something that transcends even the apparently ‘sublime’ object in nature.”66 Kant proposes that the sublime experience has two stages, the first involves counter purposiveness and displeasure because of the feeling of awe inspired by the overwhelmingness of an object, second involves overcoming that feeling of awe in some way and is therefore, pleasant.

Types of Sublime:

There are two kinds of Sublime distinguishable as:

(1) The Mathematical Sublime and
(2) The Dynamic Sublime

The former is characterized by the overwhelmingness of the experience of an object, such as spatial or temporal enormity, or having to do with magnitude, second is characterized as the overwhelmingness of the experience caused by the hugeness of its power or having to do with power. Mathematical Sublime fundamentally includes measurement and remains too great for our imagination. The Dynamic on the other hand is a power beyond ability of man’s embodied will to offer any resistance. In both cases the result is displeasure, which is encountered by pleasure in the second stage of sublime because it is not in object of awe rather in the supernatural mind that contemplates and finds way-out from displeasure and transforms it to pleasantness. Mathematical sublime is form of the idea of the totality of all nature but dynamical sublime is related to freedom and hence, “True freedom is nothing but a transcendence of or autonomy from natural law so that there can be rational conformity of moral law.”67 However, Kant is happy to say that beauty is, as it were, in or of, beautiful objects where as Sublimity is something in our minds. He, thus, makes a transition from sublimity of objects to sublimity of man.

To sum up the discussion is to lay down the characteristics of sublime, different stages and varieties of it:

(1) Sublimity is a feeling of awe.
(2) It is displeasing and painful in the beginning but its end is pleasant.
(3) It is both objective and subjective. Objective in its first stage which is incomplete according to Kant, and subjective which is basically related to ideas of Reason and the Ethical principles.

(4) There are two kinds of Sublimity- (A) Mathematical Sublimity and (B) Dynamical Sublimity- the distinction between them is-

(a) Mathematical sublime concerns to hugeness of an object; an immeasurable imagination cannot grasp it, but Reason or thought is only means to have its experience.

(b) Dynamical sublime involves power or might so much that we are frightened; it is not an overcoming power by natural or supernatural forces.

Judgement concerning to Mathematical sublime may be pleasant, but in Dynamical the judgments are not pleasant.

**Strength of Kant’s Philosophy of Art and That of Croce**

Croce availed the opportunity to have studied Kant’s works on metaphysics and aesthetics. He is admirer of Kant yet so also a vehement critic. Croce points out certain inconsistencies in Kant’s aesthetic and thinks of his aesthetics as lacking truth and unity. Although, there is an identity on art between Kant and Baumgarten. Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason praises Baumgarten as an excellent analyst. Even then the strength of Kant’s philosophy does not come down; his influences are great. Hegel, Fichte and Schelling are on the front to have absorbed the influences of Kant’s idealism as well as his aesthetic theory.

In comparison, Kant is such a philosopher who in one glance can be judged to be an agnostic in metaphysics and hedonist in his aesthetics, which are not in admission to Croce. Croce criticizes and repudiates all such theories, which are related to hedonism along with Kant who is also one of them who describes beauty in the form of pleasure.

Metaphysically, Kant and Croce both are idealists with the difference that reality in Croce is spirit, which expresses itself into four Moments, the aesthetic moment is governing one, which has not been conjoined with the logic. Kant apart from taking reality as unknown, undertakes the concept of God, soul and freedom as the necessity of morality which he explains in his Critique of Practical Reason. Croce believes in reality and morality but not even the least in God’s existence.

In aesthetics Kant’s stress is on the judgement of taste, the main issue in his thought over beauty and art. Croce’s aesthetic judgement is related to his intuitive expression. Intuition seems to be something internal as a sixth sense, which has judging ability; whatever is intuitively in expression is beautiful; it is mental; or spiritual but it is not physical. Kant’s conception of beauty is not transcendental; it is empirical, sensous and physical.

Croce does not recognize degrees in beauty. To him every expression, which is successful in art or so also in art products, is beautiful, but if it is hindered or it is unsuccessful then it is ugly, although ugly is recognized as complimentary to beauty. Kant on the other hand does not differentiate between beauty and ugly on the
criterion of expression rather it is the judgement of taste, which is countable in determining what is beautiful and what is not. Kant as such has discussed the Criterian of judgment in the four moments of his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement.

Croce and Kant distinguish between natural beauty and artistic beauty, they give superiority to artistic beauty. But for Kant, art and its products are all equally beautiful are equally important in aesthetics, Croce does not recognize such an explanation of beauty apart from mental expression. For Croce, art is no doubt important, provided it expresses that which is aimed at by the artist. Croce’s expression in theory and practice is not related to feeling and emotion, which is a necessary element in art but Kant and others basically accept them.

Aesthetic judgement in Kant is subjective yet he wants to show it universal and it is employing the rules of ethics produced in his ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. That, which is not possible logically, thinks Kant possible practically. But it is paradoxical. Also there are certain paradoxes in Croce. Even then both the thinkers are esteemingly very important and praiseworthy.

**Croce and Hegel on the Concept of Beauty and Art**

**Hegel’s Life Sketch:**

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in 1770 and died in 1831 due to cholera at the age of 61. He was too much indebted to one of his friends Goethe, born in 1749 and died in 1832. Goethe was Hegel's senior by 11 years and out lived him by one year. Hegel had been visiting oftenly to him in Weimer and had the benefit of consultant in the built up of his philosophy, who mostly advised him to be more clear about his thought. Hegel was a German Idealist Philosopher whose birth place was Stuttgart. In 1788 he happened to enter the theological seminary at the university of Tubingen and was graduated from the same university. Among his fellow students there are Schelling and the poet Friedrich Holderline. Schelling had become the professor of Philosophy in Jena succeeding Fichte. But Hegel’s fate remained hankering for a suitable job. After graduation in 1793 Hegel became a resident tutor in an Aristocratic family of Berlin. But he couldn’t perhaps get a suitable job until 1800. Consequently, in 1796 he again undertook tutorship in Frankfort due to his ill fate, I consider.

Fortunately, in 1800 Negel was accepted merely as a teacher at Jena on the basis of his dissertation “De Orbitis Planetarum” (1801). He collaborated with Schelling in editing “Kritisches Journal der Philosophie”. He published his first book “Differenz des Fichteschen und Schelling’s Schew systems der philosophie” (1801). In 1802 he published “Glanben und Wissen”. In 18303 it was “Ober die. Wissershaftlichen Behangulgsarten Naturrechts” that came out from the press. But in
1807 Hegel wrote and published his major book entitled as "Phenomenologic des Geists" (i.e. Phenomology of Mind, Wurzburg and Banberg) at Jena. It is the most interesting but most obscure Hegel's work. He got appointment as a Head Master of a school at Nuremberg in 1808, and a professor at the University of Berlin where he worked from 1816 to 1818 and became famous and highly influential because of his profound knowledge, deep thinking, outstanding career and religious books, such as "Life of Jesus", "The Positivity of Christianity religion" and "The Spirit of Christianity" in which Hegel vehemently attacks Judaism. In Aesthetic Hegel wrote 'Introduction to Aesthetic' of which English translation was done by Professor Knox covering 1237 pages in all which is too long for an ordinary reader but Hegel himself shortened and reproduced his 'Introduction' which covers 90 pages and is too short in the opinion of Charles Karelis. Many other books he wrote, but after his death some of his friends complied and published an Edition of his works in Berlin during 1832 and 1840 which covers 18 Volumes.

Hegel was a rationalist, pantheist in his Idealism. He weened reality as an absolutist. According to him 'absolute' is not more than the world in its organic unity; the Absolute as a prime idea is self-conscious reality but it is not the creator of the world. Hegel disliked to be called a pantheist in the crude sense of pantheism of Indian philosophy in which Maya is taken to be the world in an illusory phase of reality, as standing on opposition to the pure Absolute. He developed his own philosophy on the strict postulates of Mentalism or Absolutism. His aesthetic theory, which he designated and ascribed as sensuous, is also based on his idealism in its entirety. Hence, before discussing and ascertaining the structure of Hegel's aesthetics and its comparison with Croce's expressionism, it is plausibly nice to have an eye­bird view on Hegel's main theme of his idealism, which may thus, be summarized as follows-

**Reality:**

'Giest' a German word translated as 'Mind' but not spirit, is the only reality. Hegel constantly reiterated his views as pure Absolutist throughout. 'Giest' is Idea of Mind and is self-conscious sole reality. "Freedom" is its essential characteristic and all that which lacks the absolute freedom is not reality. Freedom is highest destiny of spirit, and art's contribution to man's liberation. The relation of this liberation to the contribution of practical, scientific, political, religious and philosophical activity is important. Idea is art; it is such an expression for the absolute as unity of thought, being of finite and of infinite, ..., for the unity expression abstract and merely quiescent identity. Free will is contained in the unity of subject, object duality because Idea is self contradictory. In his

---

**F.N.** 'Spirit' as translated in English from German 'Giest' has been refuted on the ground that the term 'Spirit' has a religious flavour (Encyclopedia of Philosophy P 436) hence it stands illegible for its inclusion in the sense of idea or mind. But it is not correct in my opinion because reality is either spiritual or material or both, exposition of which we find in the metaphysics of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Descartes and Croce etc.
Encyclopedia Hegel summarizes "Understanding" Free-will-The idea of unity of duality but idea is self-contradictory the "Understanding"[i.e. is roughly, the perspective of common sense] mery demonstrate that the idea is self-contradictory: because the subjective is subjective only and it is always confronted by the objective.... The reverse of all these however is the doctrine of logic. Logic shows that the subjective, which is subjective only, the finite, which is finite only and the infinite, is infinite only and so on, have no truth but contradict themselves, and pass over into their opposites, i.e. subject into object, finite into infinite, infinite into the synthesis of finite and infinite or subject and object both. It is Hegel's dialectic Idea is infinite, it is self-conscious and hence the only real. Consciousness is the necessity of freedom; it is active throughout and involves a process of dialectic in its evolution. Thought and object together constitute knowledge but summarizing the new conclusion of common sense theory Hegel says, "In its relation to the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this, as a thing-in-itself, remains a sheer beyond of thoughts." Kant holds the view that only knowledge of appearance is possible but Hegel criticizes Kant's this view because in Kant's theory there is reconciliation between the appearance and the knowledge of thing-in-itself. However, Hegel's Reality is not logically independent of appearances in general but in some way identical to them: Thinking subject and the thought are not alien of each other-subject and object in duality persist together. Artefacts may always be considered mental whether observed or not because they are an objectification of the mind of their makers. Natural objects too are always mental because all of nature is an objectification of the infinite mind of God.

The spirit and the course of its development is the substantial object of philosophy and of history; the nature of spirit is contained in its opposite, namely matter. "The essence of nature is gravity; the essence of Spirit is Freedom. Matter is outside itself, whereas spirit has its center in itself. "Spirit is self contained existence". Further "But what is spirit? It is the one immutable homogeneous infinite-pure identity-which in its second phase separates itself from itself makes their second aspect its own polar opposites, namely as existence for and in self as contrasted with the universal." Hegel 'considers concrete and Abstract in a unique way and distinguishes between them as an abstract and a concrete universal. Citing the example, 'the man is a rational animal'. This definition of man is abstract but Hegel claims that his logical categories are not abstract but concrete universals. That is to say such logical categories include all specific differences, which are in themselves. Moreover, the Absolute of Spinzoa and Schelling is an abstract universal because it is mere identity. Hegel goes on comparing 'Spinzoas' Absolute with the lion's den in Aesop's fabe (....) and why he says Schelling's Absolute is like "the midnight in which all cows are black." Because Hegel's own Absolute, on the other hand, is wholly concrete; it is all reality comprehended with in a whole, not something apart from other things."
Hegel's Dialectic:

Hegel's method is dialectic for which he became so popular. Under his dialectical method his system in Encyclopedia has been divided as: (1) Logic, (2) Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Mind. In logic he expounded the categories of thought, in Philosophy of nature the Idea is considered as “otherness” or externality (Anderssein). Nature really speaking is an antithesis to logic; the Absolute stands as a pure thought and the nature is such a phenomenon in the developing process in which the Absolute Spirit finds its manifestation in itself, or to say plausibly, externalization in itself in the form of outer world. It is because the universal conception underlies nature. In Hegel's philosophy of nature the space, time and motion and other such conceptions are lowest and most abstract which go on in nature for concretization. Thought and object together constitute knowledge but summarizing new conclusion of common sense theory in this respect Hegel says, “In its relation to the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object, this, as a thing-in-itself remains a sheer beyond of thought.” and under Philosophy of Mind; the mind is considered as existing for “itself” as conscious of itself and as the institution it gives rise to them Developing his theory Hegel explains his dialectic as follows:

The process in dialectic proceeds from positive pole to negative, synthesizing the third as:

Being → not being → becoming.

Thesis → Antithesis → Synthesis

Idea or Absolute has developing nature and involves oppositions but ultimately reconciles in itself, i.e. beginning is absolute and through opposing tendency the end is also the Absolute. Thought and nature as opposites are united in mind and society, in the artistic and religious product of mind, and ultimately in the ceaseless activity of Ideal self-consciousness. Hegel uses the term “Aufgehben” which stands for to conceal, ‘to preserve, and literally, to lift up’, which shows that the evolution in Absolute is in ascending order and is related to his dialectic i.e. it is reconciling and over coming process in a larger unity, in English “Aufgehben” is some times rendered as “Sublated.”

As regards the Crocian concept of Spirit the Hegel’s concept of Idea or Mind seems to me very much in close contiguity in meaning and in essence with Croce’s concept of Spirit because both have taken reality as non-material, although the opposite of Spirit or Mind is nature which is necessity for Idea or spirit in both thinkers.

FN: In Bertrand Russell's opinion Hegel has developed his dialectic under the influence of Kant's antinomies. He writes, “This part of the critique greatly influenced Hegel whose dialectic proceeds wholly by antinomies (History of western Philosophy by B. Russell P 735)
Historicity:

Hegel preceded Croce because the time interval between the two from death of Hegel and Croce's birth exceeds about 34 years. So Croce must have availed the privilege to study Hegel whose influences we see on Croce's Idealism and also on his theory of aesthetics; no matter Croce was an Italian and Hegel was a German. The Geographical conditions are also not too much different. Germany is situated in the north of Italy in between 47° and 55° latitude, and the climate is also similar to Greece; it is healthy, nice and suitable for philosophical researches and scientific careers and courses.

Hence, Croce also developed a new theory on dialectic, which is dyadic as against Hegel's Triadic (Chapter IV). Hegel and Croce both have grave concern with historicity in their philosophical layouts. Applauding the form of history, Hegel says that it is impossible to be a Platonist in the 19th century because he had a great deal of esteem for Plato. In this respect Hegel's Lecture of Philosophy of History is admittably important.

Religious Status:

Hegel by birth was a Christian but Croce was a Jew. However, Croce became a critic of religion while Hegel's Philosophy defended Christianity. In his book 'Phenomenology of mind' (Hegel's outstanding work) he had the opportunity to deal with master and slave as struggling for power and recognition in the world; the unhappy consciousness as the dialectical transition from mind to nature, reason as objectivity, the dialectic of morality that embodies the mind in rules and in institutions and lastly, which is entirely an exposition of Christianity in all its orthodoxical character in which Croce in his time never had faith but was seen inclined towards religious thinking during the ending years of his age.

Aesthetic theory-Croce and Hegel on Beauty and Art

Hegel preceded Croce by 35 years as a full-fledged philosopher and aesthetcian from the year of Croce's birth having the seniority of 61 years, the 2/3 of which he rendered to the cause of his philosophy and relished the days of his life and age as a putative scholar of his flourishing period, the romantic. My pattern to fathom the ocean of art and beauty existing between Croce and Hegel will be as before. But it is nice to have Hegel's aesthetics for study and exposition first and side-by-side, keeping in view the expediency of the matter; I will refer Croce to show similarity or dissimilarity between the views of the two.

Hegel's doctrine of aesthetics can be briefly stated and explained as: -(1) Hegel adopts historical method. He is critic of the contemporary artitic trends. He was facing the decay of Christian faith in romantic era. Since Hegel flourished during romantic period, therefore, he could not over shadow himself from the existing trends of thought despite of the fact that he was in favour of Grecco-Roman
antiquity in art and philosophy. Brian K. Elter’s view is “that inspite of differences Hegel’s theory may have the presentation and aesthetic subjectivity in the roots of today’s historicism. The definition of art especially in terms of its vocation is “to unveil the truth in the form of sensuous artistic configuration.”

Hegel’s Aesthetic like Croce depends on his idealism. In Philosophy, the Absolute or Idea for understanding, the structure of nature and the world as a whole are important. Philosopher’s job is to identify the existence in its own right and to describe the dependent relation of everything to the absolute thing. Actually Absolute is not only idea but also God. It is an influence of Christianity on Hegel’s Idealism that he makes a transition from philosophy to religion. Idea is unity of spirit and nature, the Idea, says Hegel “..... which alone is true and actual.”

Hegel lays greater emphasis on historicity. Dilthey presents Hegel’s fundamental Definition of Historicity in

(1) “The construction of the Historical world in the Human science.” Quoted by Herbert Marcuse, Translated by Seyla Benhabid in “Hegel’s Ontology and The Theory of Historicity”, The MIT Press Cambridge 1987 on PP 320, 321 as follows: Historical life for Hegel is the most important because “Historical being is the being of life”. It is human life, a part of life. It is spiritual being.
(2) Historicity is the essence of human beings.
(3) Historicity is a process characterized by the ‘overcoming’, which goes beyond the subjectivity and objectivity. Historical life is therefore unique and is grand, transcending all limitation in my opinion. Whether it is a correct view or not, is a matter of discourse to be dealt with in criticism. Croce, I believe, carried in historicity the philosophy on the same Hegelian pattern.

**Meaning of Aesthetics:**

Hegel rejects aesthetics as science of sensation and of feeling. He thinks of Aesthetics by definition as “Philosophy of art and more definitely as Philosophy of Fine Art.” But Croce’s aesthetics in form and structure is a science of expression and general linguistic. Hegel considers beautiful as dominating over art but for Croce it is art that dominates beautiful.

**Beauty:**

Defining beauty I have already emphasized its essential characteristics, which are (1) Pleasantness and (2) Attractiveness. Theorists pertaining to beauty mostly describe beauty in terms of ‘Pleasure’ that actually indicates the sensuousness as the inherit characteristic of beauty. Hegel is also not an exception in this matter. He also weens the sensuousness as the most essential character of beauty, though he is an idealist. Croce differentiates between beauty, beautiful and art, and artistic beauty. But artistic beauty for him is the supereme one. Beauty in itself is different from beautiful because beauty is that which has its roots in freedom and in
excellence. Freedom means excellence, which reveals beauty and in sensuous terms freedom stands as beautiful art. Because "The look of independent and total life and freedom lies at the root of the essence of beauty." Consequently, beauty in true sense is essential to art but it is always sensuous. Moreover, sensuous pleasure is beauty. In this respect 'Stephen Houlgate in his Presidential address on Hegel and the art of painting writes that by means of sensuously intuited materials and phenomena, such as stone, wood, sound and coloured pigment. When the artist into the presentation of human freedom vitality works such natural materials and phenomena, what results is beauty. Beauty thus is not something ethereal or otherworldly; it is actual stone, wood, colored pigment or sound worked in such a way that we can see our own life, freedom and spirit expressed in it. As Hegel puts it in his 1820-21 lectures, "the connection between the beautiful and ourselves is that we catch sight of our own essence in the beautiful."

In Encyclopedia of Philosophy the Hegel's account of beauty has been determined as Schiller's modification of views because Schiller holds the view that beauty is mediation between sensible and reason. This opinion seems to me correct because Hegel himself ascertains beauty as in his words, "Beauty is the rational rendered sensible". The sensible appearance, in my interpretation, is the form in which the rational content is made manifest. And hence the sensible embodiment of the rational, according to Hegel, can be held in three principal ways of- (1) Symbolic art (Material), (2) Classical Art (Idea Making) and (3) Romantic Art. T.M Knox, the English translator of Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics, opines the same in the foot note as "Hegel has in his mind not only Kant but also Schiller's Aesthetic letters which had a considerable influence on the development of his view of art...." The concept of beauty ultimately is entirely sensous in Hegel and it is to my wonder that such a great idealist whose absolute in my view is spiritual, had crossed the floor of his idealism and took shelter in sheer sensuousness on the problem of beauty and beautiful.

**Kinds of Beauty in Hegel:**

Hegel's differentiation in beauty can be considered from two-view points- (1) Artistic viewpoint, (2) Natural viewpoint. Hence, there comes to his account two kinds of beauty, which are as artistic and natural but imposes limitation on aesthetics, thinking it (aesthetics) to be the beauty of art and excluding beauty of nature. The beauty of art is higher than nature. It is (beauty) "born of the spirit and born again, and higher the spirit and its production stands above nature and its phenomena the higher too is the beauty of art above that nature." Hence, only spirit is true, not the nature and that which is originated by it and also shares in it, i.e. in the spirit, is beautiful. So beauty of nature is merely a reflexion of the beauty sharing the spirit. In Hegel's view the beauty of nature is an imperfect mode of beauty. In Croce's opinion, Hegel does not deny the importance of natural beauty but he proceeds to bring about the consequences at length with beautiful in nature. Side-by-side he views Hegel's beauty vague and so inconsistent to apprehend in its real form. Hegel does not recognize the utility of Natural objects in the realm of beauty because
he says that the things useful as productions in medicines or other things simply make material medica which is mere description of the mineral, chemical plants and animals but not a criteria of beauty in itself rather it may be criteria to judge natural beauty in assumption. These preliminary remarks on beauty in nature and in art, on the relation of the two, and the exclusion of the former from the scope of our proper subject, should dispose of the idea that the limitation is due merely to caprice and arbitrariness.\textsuperscript{94} Hegel's doctrine of natural beauty implies beauty and ugliness simultaneously and hence the artistic beauty in Hegel's aesthetics has got a supereme position which he grasps as an idea in entirety for natural which has three stages of its traverse, viz, beauty in general, natural beauty, the defects of which show the necessity for art and the idea itself, "the first existence of idea is nature and its first beauty is natural beauty."\textsuperscript{95} Stage third is not so important. In this way in Croce's assessment Hegel's emphasis is on natural beauty that is the first manifestation of the idea or Absolute which reaches a real existence in organic facts, in the living creatures and in physical facts united in systems.

**Art and Art Products**

According to Hegel art is a creation of man, not a creation of God. All artistic creations are directly related to the artist's own genius, that is why Hegel regards artistic beauty higher than natural beauty. But "Artefacts may always be considered mental whether observed or not because they are an objectification of the minds of their makers. Natural objects too are always mental because all of the nature is an objectification of the infinite mind of God."\textsuperscript{96} Albeit, Hegel does not concede to Artistic products as the products of God and also he banishes out the role of imitation from the field of good art,\textsuperscript{97} but Plato's condemnation of art has been strictly refuted by Hegel and he undertook this matter seriously because for Hegel apprehensiveness of Absolute is possible only through art.\textsuperscript{98}

Art is purposive; it is for the apprehension of the man; it is a concrete concept in which the philosophical concept of beauty is a reconciliation with in itself i.e. reconciliation between universality and particularity. The presentation of free spirit in sensuous form is art, and also beauty, also idea. Hegel weens emphatically on transcendence and traditions and also lays greater emphasis on the form of art as sensous representation of truth, beauty and good which stand identical. But the task of art may best be judged by art itself. Although Hegel's view on art directly or indirectly leads us to expressionism. But Maker's opinion goes against all forms of expressionism in modern aesthetics.\textsuperscript{99} Moreover, on the same page Hegel's transcendentalism has also been refuted by him instead, subjectivity in Hegel prevails throughout and a systematic ordering in art as pointed out by Maker, is of much importance for apprehension of Hegel's doctrine on the fine art. Accordingly, architecture seems to be least developed; it is in classical ideal treated as pre-Greek culture. But in second order there is painting, in third order music and lastly poetry is placed as fourth. Poetry is the art of speech.\textsuperscript{100} But music is direct expression of the soul, which visualizes the life phenomena or is rather a cogent
enough a philosophical expression. However, “every work of art belongs to its own time, its own people, its own environment, and depends on particular historical and other ideas and purposes...”, the influences of which can never be refuted. It is true but Maker’s antagonistic trend of thought for expression is not correct, may it be compatible in respect of German Expressionism. Regarding fine art in Hegel’s consideration it is “meant to arouse feeling, in particular the feeling that suits us, pleasant feeling.” In this sense Hegel raises many questions and lastly takes the matter as abstraction related to subjectivity.

Hegel tries to remove the objections against his theory because he thinks that the fine art deserves the scientific discussion of worthiness. He treats art as science, as religion, as philosophy and as politics in reality but the unworthiness of art is in appearance and in refutation because appearance is necessity of essence. Hence, the aim of art is to mediate between reason and sense and between inclination and duty. (It is ethical view, I think) Further for Hegel freedom of production and configuration are enjoyed in beauty of art. These two elements are the essential characteristics of an artistic production. The source of art works is free activity of fancy. Thought is a feasible phenomenon for criticism of fancies and their products. Croce, however, lays greater emphasis on the fancies in realm of art and on its products.

Form and Content:

This problem is not new, but differences on what is content and what is form, prevail throughout from beginning of the enquiry into beauty and art to present. Since, there is no oracle for art, therefore, content and form in philosophy of fine arts, according to Hegel, have bearing of his idealism. Accordingly, content is divine (God) and form is expression. But in content the human spirit has also been included. It is because the expression of the infinite man on the one hand and that of finite man go together as content and also can be called the idea, the expression of which in the sensous way is the form of art. Hegel contends, “It has already been stated that the content of art is the Idea, and the form of its display the configuration of the sensous or plastic image. It is further the function of art to mediate these two aspects under the reconciled mode of free totality.” Consequently, in Hegel’s view the concept of art is a concrete concept and the philosophical concept of beauty is reconciliation with itself, i.e. between universality and particularity, in which former is the ideal content and later is its actualization, may be called in Crocian spirit as expression.

Role of Freedom in Art:

For Hegel freedom alone is fine art, provided it full-fills its task when specifically placed in the form of religion and philosophy. It is art, only when it brings our minds the expressing divine. He writes, “In works of art the nations have deposited their richest inner intuitions and ideas, and art is often the key, and in
many nations the sole key to understanding their philosophy an religion. Art shares the vocation with religion and philosophy, but in a special way, namely by displaying even the highest (reality) sensuously, bringing it there by nearer to the senses, to feeling, and to nature’s mode of appearance. It means the sole function of art, according to Hegel, is related to expression of divinity.

Sensuous nature of beauty:

Hegel’s beauty is sensuous although he tries to give it spiritual touch. According to him the higher position of art lies in sensuousness. But, “art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance and deception of this bad, transitory, born of the spirit. Thus, far from being mere pure appearance, a higher reality and truer existence is to be ascribed to the phenomena of art in comparison with [those of] ordinary reality.” Culminates into sensuousness yet he absolute. “Hegel says in the lectures that the apprehension of the absolute, through art ‘is an immediate and therefore sensuous knowing [Wissen], a knowing in the form and shape of the sensuous itself, in which the absolute is presented to contemplation and feeling; where as religious apprehension of the absolute is in the form of do vorstellende Bewisstsein or simply due vorstellung-translated by Professor Knox in broad accord with other commentator’s interpretations of this concept in Hegel as ‘pictorial thinking’” But beauty in the form of physical satisfaction is desired not only for its own sake but for the sake of inner harmony. Because beauty and excellence reveal freedom and so freedom and excellence manifest beauty in true sense, which is possible only by means of art.

Romantic Art:

Hegel is critic of romantic art and is very much approbative of historicity, particularly of Greek art and sculpture. He takes romantic art as having no living spirit and “….the romantic form of art cancels the undivided unity of classical art because it has one a content which goes beyond and above the classical form of art and its mode of expression.” Lastly, Hegel deals with three common ideas of art, such as

(1) The work of art is no natural product; it is brought about by human activity.
(2) It is essentially made for man’s apprehension, and in particular is drawn more or less from the sensuous field for apprehension by the senses.
(3) It has an end and aim in itself. Although artist is an spiritual activating agent and a work of art is entirely specially gifted spirit, but divine product rather is product of talent and genius. Moreover, the work of art is for apprehension by employing the faculties of subjective tastes and experiences, which are related to the sensuous sphere. “The connoisseur has taken the place of the man of taste or the judge of artistic taste. The positive side of
connoisseurship in so far as it concerns a thorough acquaintance with the whole sweep of the individual character of a work of art."

The purpose of art is to awake and vivify our slumbering feelings, inclinations and passions of every kind in filling the art, in forcing the human being to the extent that man may have complete acquaintance with all that which is pleasant or unpleasant in our lives. This account of Hegel's Aesthetic now inspires me to have a brief comparative account between him and Croce.

Theories of art and the art products represent the mental sets of the artists and the cultural figures of the artists of age and era. Every artist must have the evergreen advantages from one's predecessor artists so as to improve what is lacking or what is more suitable needed to be added in the theory and practice. Aestheticians particularly are found accustomed to have deep study of their preceeding philosopher aestheticians. Hegel and Croce both have had the reaping crops to their study, sown and nourished by their fore going aestheticians. Hegel was too much influenced by Kant, Schiller and Goethe; Croce had the influences of Hegel, Vico, Sanctis and some other putative thinkers of his period. Hegel developed his philosophy of fine arts on the main tenets of his absolute idealism in which he thought that absolute expressed in human mind is beauty. Croce too had the idea of spirit as reality expressed in four moments in which the first moment is intuitive or aesthetic or beautiful because expression as mental or spiritual is the one only real, having its expression in nature, and also through spirit may be counted for expression as beauty in real analogous way to that of Hegel. Jack Kaminsky adequately states in reference to Hegel's Idea, "Because Hegel's philosophy of fine art is based not only on his observation of art works and technique but also on his theory of reality, it is necessary to understand Hegel's metaphysics in order to attain a clear comprehension of his aesthetic theory." Consequently, "thus the work of art too in which thought expresses itself belongs to the sphere of conceptual thinking, and the spirit..." supports the interpretation of Hegel's aesthetics running to expression. For this very reason Croce's idealism compared with Croce on the ideals of spirituality which are differently interpreted by different thinkers in my interpretation is as above because I think that having been an idealist both Hegel and Croce come down to beauty as explaining it in the form of expression. Croce does not seem to bid good-bye his spiritual idealism when observing and explaining beauty and the structure of art. It is purely intuitive expression in which no tinge of sensibility he accepts apparently.

But in the case of Hegel's beauty it is just to say that he observes beauty in sensuous form and tries to explain it on the feasible grounds of his idealism. He does not mention anywhere the role of intuition but what he mentions is limited to reason and sensation.

Artistic beauty is higher than natural beauty in Hegel's view, but Croce does not centralize his inquiry on this distinction. However, he weens art as intuitive expression to his best in explaining the form and content of art. And if Hegel's argument that "Art...develops an insight into the idea develops" is assumed as intuition then to some extent the element of intuition as expression in developing art may rightly be taken for granted.
Croce does not make distinction between forms and contents while Hegel’s aesthetic view is that the idea and the spirit make the contents and their expression, as sensuousness is the form of beauty and art.

Freedom and configuration are the characteristics of beauty and also of art. Hegel emphasizes freedom more than Croce and determines, “Fine art is not in the true sense of the form until it is also thus free, and its highest function is only then satisfied when it has established itself in a sphere which it shares with religion and philosophy, becoming there by merely one mode and form through which the Divine, the profoundest interests of mankind, and spiritual truths of widest range, are brought home to consciousness and expressed.”

Paradoxical statements create confusion in both these philosophers, e.g. in Hegel, “The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit and born again.”

In Croce’s statement, “when all is real nothing is real.” It creates confusion as much as that in Hegel’s aforesaid statement. Subjectivity has got important place in both thinkers. However, the concept of beauty and of art in Hegel and Croce being different in form and meaning has, to some extent, the considerable account of relational touch and flavour in expression, although Hegel’s view is completely sensuous while that of Croce’s purely spiritual.

Symbolism as a necessary and marvelous role-playing element in Hegel and Croce has all equally been recognized and emphasized, but Croce ignores the most important role of emotions and feelings in art while Hegel restores them all.

Lastly, Hegel depicts a besieging line of church and moral norms around his aesthetics; Croce shatters such a cage and gets his aesthetic pigeon of expression absolutely free and unfettered. So Croce becomes a most influential expressionist of the 20th century. (A Compact Dictionary Of English Literature P 208)

Croce and Collingwood-On Art and Beauty

Collingwood, R (obin), G (eorge)- born in 1889 and passed away in 1943, was a putative philosopher, historian and archeologist whose birth place was Coniston, Cumbria but in Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 1 by Paul Edward P 140 it was Coruston Lancashire where he was born and his father’s name was W.G. Collingwood, a friend and Biographer of Jhon Ruskin. He was educated first at home then imbued him with a Ruskinian devotion to Craftsmanship and art. In Greek and Latin R.G. Collingwood got his under graduate work, which was remarkable. In 1912 he was selected to a fellowship at Pembroke College, in 1934 to Professorship in Waynflete (Oxford University) and in 1941 due to his sickness he got his retirement from the Oxford University.

He was a gifted disciple of British archeologist F.J.Haverfield. Collingwood was an authority on the archeology of Roman-Britain antiquity. His work is mostly related to the history of philosophy. He pursued a course in
aesthetics, which drew upon the work of Vico, Croce and others. His most important contribution of philosophical aesthetics is “Principles of Art” which he published in 1938 as a radical reworking of themes from his previously published ‘outlines of Philosophy of Art’, 1925. A lengthy discourse on the nature of art in the form of emotional expression as beauty Collingwood attempted to defend the thesis derived from Benedetto Croce. He thought after Croce that art is expression in an imaginative activity whereby we become conscious of our emotions.

About 10 published books and one still unpublished he contributed to the kingdom of knowledge. Apart from his two popular books on aesthetics, his well known works are: (1) Philosophy of History (2) Philosophy of Mind (3) Philosophy of Language (4) Philosophy of Religion, Ethics and Politics. His works have roughly been put up into three periods- (1) From 1912 to 1927 is related to his acceptance of Idealism, (2) From 1927 to 1937 concerns to his mature philosophy of the special sciences conceived as resting on an idealist foundation, and (3) From 1937 to 1943 concerns to his system of Idealism. He discussed ethical and political problems separately from the philosophy.

Idealism:

Like Kant, Hegel, Croce and others in aesthetics Collingwood was also an idealist and had taken idealism as the tenet of his aesthetic views. As he put up three doctrines:

1. That creation of the human mind must be studied historically, not psychologically,
2. That historical knowledge is attainable, and
3. That there is no distinction between history and philosophy.

No distinction or identity between history and philosophy concerns to the meaning of these two terms taken by Collingwood himself. This view he afterwards gave up and because a critic of Croce for his philosophy which Croce absorbed into history.

As a true follower of Croce in expressionism, and also a critic of Croce’s idealism, Collingwood comes to the description of idealism on the same patterns, which Croce adopted. It astonishes that once Collingwood criticizes Croce for his idealism and thereafter adopts the same pattern to explain his own views.

Mind and Spirit

Croce takes spirit as the sole reality having four of its activities through which it is known by the subjective mind. Collingwood undertakes mind to explain the whole metaphysical world. But the primary level experience in his idealism is
feeling and sensations together with their positive or negative emotional charge. Mind, therefore, is an activity that spirit holds; it is the active position in Croce. Mind is not an entity rather a ground of the different types of mental activities, which yields various forms of experiences. So also in Croce knowledge involves theoretical and practical activities. For Collingwood knowledge is an essential unity of mind by charting the relations between its form of experience, which are art, religion, science, history, and philosophy. Other forms of experience may also develop but principally ground of all forms of experience is aesthetic activity; it infuses all other activities of mind in the realm of knowledge. This view appears to have been borrowed from Croce’s idealism wherein the aesthetic activity has been treated to be the basis of all the remainings.

Collingwood seems to have sole concern with showing the relationship between art and mental activity. He was not interested too much in working out the features of the works of art. To this extent the author in A Companion to Aesthetics is correct but I do not agree with his view in which he thought that Collingwood was not interested in finding out the criteria of works of art. It is because in his ‘Principles of Art’ Collingwood has devoted full-fledged 2 Chapters to determine its nature and form entitling it to be ‘Art-Proper’: (1) As Expressions, (2) As Imagination. Moreover, on P 151 summarizing the discussion held on ‘Art Proper’: As Imagination, Collingwood writes, “Thus a work of art proper is total activity which the person enjoying it apprehends, or is conscious of, by the use of his imagination.” The criteria of art-proper, thus he determined by employing expression and imagination, though both are subjective. This is all based on his idealism, which is no more distinct from that of Croce.

In aesthetics R.G. Collingwood contributed two outstanding books- (1) Outlines of A Philosophy, published in 1925. (2) ‘The Principles of Art’ published in 1938. In these books he has dealt with art and beauty articulately but sometimes using rhetorical language. He is said to be a true follower of Benedetto Croce because Collingwood is also a twentieth century expressionist along with Croce who was one out of others to focus his attention on the concept of expression more excellently than any one. Collingwood following Crocian exposition of expression, attempted to intensify the meaning of expression and signify its value and wide scope in the field of art.

He begins his journey in the field of Aesthetics by outlining the Philosophy of art. He undertakes the general conception of which he found in the work of Coleridge and Croce. Other conceptions like the Sublime, the Comic, (the forms of beauty in general) and other such conceptions, which are implied in the meaning of art. But all these, according to Collingwood, are not reducible to any one form of art. Eloquently he writes, “To reduce these to so many cases of art, and to leave it at that, is to fall a victim to the skeleton-key habit, to convert the philosophy of art into night in which all cows are black.” It is because the different concepts have their different values and cannot be conjured up in any single conception. So he starts his discussion in philosophy of art employing the same spirit. Significantly, the most important bearings of Collingwood’s thought on the philosophy of art are to be taken out from his two afore mentioned books for the purpose of study and work, but by breaking the previously adopted chain of study in the case of Kant and Hegel,
where I had availed the opportunity to discuss the views of Kant and Hegel first and then a comparative narration with Croce’s notion of intuitive expression. Presently, I will like to carry on the comparison for its own sake.

**Philosophy of Art:**

The starting point in art is the awareness of beauty. Art is an activity, different from other activities; it is an activity in which the most important element of imagination prevails throughout. In reference to imagination art has been treated theoretically and practically both with the essence of emotion, but theoretical and practical are such specific activities without which no art is possible.

1. Theoretically, art is an imagination in which there is apprehension of beauty.
2. Practically, art is a pursuit of beauty in which the attempt of art is to achieve beauty. But in both cases beauty is neither more nor less than imagination.

It is being an imaginative activity, has its close relationship with theoretical, practical and emotional spheres. But the emotional element in all forms of art is universal, which determines the universal nature of art. Imagination and emotion go together to make art as adequate and plausible.

**Emotion:**

Collingwood is not in favour of any such emotion, which is not aesthetic. However, distinction between psychic emotion and intellectual emotion is clear in his ‘Principles of Art. According to him art proper as identified with expression has no distinguishing features of emotion. Consequently, if art means the expression of emotion, the artist must be absolutely candid to her or his art; hence the artist must be free in her speech, activity, form, feature, style, decision, selection and so on, for as art in no case is fettered, no besieging line can be depicted and no compulsion on her part can be admissible for doing this and not doing that, or she is thought to be bound to express this, not that; all such conditions will damage the pious spirit of the art proper, not in the sense that these inartistic conditions are actually hideous and harmful to the real spirit of art, or being inartistic damages the sincerity and sanctity, which distinguishes a good art from a bad art rather in the sense that it represents a further process of a non-artistic kind, carried out when the work of expression proper is complete. Moreover, emotion as a specific aesthetic emotion is also not admissible to Collingwood, any distinction on the basis of specification is inartistic. It is just like a day-dreaming that seeks free expression of emotions in man’s mind, so also in the artist who expresses the emotions freely through her or his art.

Accordingly, art is most theoretical as well as most practical activity. It is an expressive of itself and different from historical expression. In the philosophy of history there is reflection on facts and the judgements too rely on the facts. But in aesthetics it is intuitive imagination, which is counted for beauty. To enjoy beauty hence, is an imaginative act, not reflective.
Collingwood is interested in philosophy of art. He defines art, as "The philosophy of art is the attempt to discover what art is." Further he contends that it is "but a reflection upon our activities among which art has its place." Accordingly, our activities related to imaginary world involving emotions may expediently be assumed as the matrix of art or its products, in my interpretation.

**Meaning of Art:**

Collingwood mentions the use of the term in three senses in which the first is the ground of other two:

1. Art is used as the creation of objects, called the works of art; to be beautiful is the aim.
2. It means creation of objects as artificial as opposed to natural one.
3. It means the artistic frame of mind in which there is an awareness of beauty.

Beginning from awareness of beauty the activity as such finds its culmination, presupposition and the end in itself. Awareness of beauty is the initial impulse in an artist, which activates her, to work for achieving the goal concerning beauty.

**Experience and the Primitiveness of Art:**

To produce a work of art is to have personal experience of that. But contradicting this notion Collingwood treats art as the most primitive theoretical, practical activity; it is such which is away from any artistic experience. Children and savages too produce originally good art but in their own ways, such as composing poems, displaying folk dances and reciting folk songs which are the activities as an integral part of life, not of dead but are revived in all of primitive art where in the expression of imagination prevails. Since, thinking presupposes imagining, therefore all the activities in theoretical aspect take the form of thought presupposing art, "and art is the basis of science, history, 'common sense' and so forth." The activity in art is more primitive than religion, philosophy and science as the children and also the savages show a high degree of artistic power. The idea of art in mind is apriori present in child's mind; it is not a higher activity as supposed by aestheticians, but it is a primitive form of which imagination is the core and the life of art. Collingwood developing his thesis also proclaims that the primaryness in art has tendency to go up. "Generally he (Collingwood) identifies art with movement from unreflective to reflective thought."

Experience, as I think, cannot be challenged in any art. At the primitive stage the children and the savages what ever they imagine and produce remains primitive for want of artistic experience. Such art is produced not in a sophisticated manner as in the art of experienced hand; it is confirmed by Collingwood's own
statement in which he says, "In trying to arrive at an understanding of an activity one must begin with a mass of experience, relative to that activity, and this experience cannot be acquired by philosophical thinking or by observation of the activity in other people, but only by a long civilized pursuit of the activity itself." Moreover, art is representation as expression of emotion, as expression of experience. Collingwood determines the technique implied in poetry as 'a poet has certain experiences which demand expression, demands for its realization the exercise of certain powers or forms of skill, and these constitute the poet technique.' It again confirms the need of experience in artistic expression. The primitiveness of art as devoid of experience, Collingwood signifies under generic nature; it is common with all other activities, e.g. in the knowledge of religion, science, art proper and in all other fields-all they claim their activities in their respective fields, more or less. Art as activity in generic character is a jumble of theoretical, practical emotional elements, in its specific character experience is required for being a good work of art.

**General and Specific Nature of Art:**

Collingwood begins his journey in the vast ocean of art from an excellent description of the nature of art divided into generic nature and specific nature of art.

**1) Generic Nature:**

When art is to mean an activity to apprehend beauty, it has certain things in common with other activities, also certain those activities which are merely peculiar to it. Formerly, the generic nature of art is describable by means of genus and differentia of logic. Philosophy as genus of which art as a species, may be taken for granted. But art as art is such an activity which is at once theoretical, practical, and emotional. It is, finally, also primitive. Emotionally art is a "life of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, inter twined, as these opposite feelings always are in such a way that each is conditioned by the felt or implied presence of the other." But the artist's pleasure is especially aesthetic pleasure, it is different from scientists or others brought about by means of that particular activity.

**2) Specific Nature of Art:**

The specific nature of art is emotionally the enjoyment of beauty. According, to Collingwood, every activity imbibes in it both pleasure and pain. Activity accompanying pleasure is beautiful, but ugly due to the element of pain, remains present in that activity. Failure and success in the same way are relative terms and therefore, pleasure and pain are the two poles of an experience, which is the emotional sense of our own activity. If we overcome to unsuccess or to difficulty, it is pleasant; unsuccess brings pain and uneasiness. Actually, Collingwood makes
beauty possibly significant by specific nature of art. I would like to consider beauty under two heads.

(1) Beauty and kinds of Beauty, also ugliness.
(2) The forms of Beauty.

**Beauty, Kinds of Beauty and Ugliness:**

There are two kinds of beauty, according to Collingwood-

(a) **Natural Beauty:**

It is beauty of nature, it is original, untouched, undecorated, may also be called, in my opinion, beauty in Divine creation.

(b) **Artificial Beauty or Beauty of Art:**

It is imaginative, ornamental and created by the artist in a work of art. This distinction is on the basis of the awareness of beauty.

As far as the question of beauty in itself is concerned Collingwood is basically interested in signifying the role of art in the form of expression; emotions expressed in art are called beautiful, provided the expression is successful. Croce adopts the same view in describing what beauty is, which is too, not more, nor less, than a successful expression. It is in the mind of the artist or the creator, who contemplates first, thereafter the audience. Contemplation accompanies the awareness, belonging to intuition. Nature is beautiful means the objects in nature e.g. a landscape; a mountain, a lake, a woman and so on are naturally beautiful. Croce referring feelings defines nature as merely passive, inert, mechanical, material, which he excludes from the spiritual activity. Moreover, he thinks that the feeling involving pleasure and pain is to be interjectionally disproved in the negation of the character of activity of feeling. Hence, neither nature nor feeling except a successful expression is countable for beauty. Artistic beauty is different from natural beauty, it is artificially brought to being by the artist, e.g. through painting, music, poetry and sculpture: Things produced are beautiful and are artificial, imaginary and ornamented. However, Collingwood as emotionally enjoyment of beauty treats artistic beauty in its specific nature. But there is an equally indescribable and unmistakable difference between the aesthetic pleasure of natural beauty and the pleasure of the beauty of Art. In natural beauty it is always real but in artificial beauty it is always imaginary and imagination distinctively plays important role in it. Collingwood signifying the character of natural beauty writes, “Natural beauty is thus beauty in its immediately, a beauty special quality in its freedom from effort from the attempt to realize something unrealized.” The emotional element is found present in all such activity, which is artistic; it is Universal in Collingwood’s account, as he does not recognize art in the form of contemplation, which is altogether private. In his own words, “Art is not contemplation, it is action. If art were contemplation, it could be pursued by an artist who constitutes himself a mere
spectator of the world around him and depicts or describes what he sees. But, as the expression of emotion and addressed to a public, it requires of the artist that he should participate in the public’s emotions, and therefore, in the activities with which these emotions are bound up.” However, Collingwood mentions the general view of the people in which beauty is meant as pleasing object, or beauty is that which pleases in certain way or simply pleases. In this connection Collingwood, I understand, admits the hedonistic theory indirectly by uttering, “...and it is clear that hedonism, while no doubt just as unsatisfactory in the philosophy of art as in logic or ethics, is a great deal more plausible here than elsewhere.” Further beauty is not a quality of objects apprehended by perception, or a concept grasped by thought; “it is an emotional colouring which transfers the entire experience of imagined object.”

Beauty is an imaginative coherence, which is different from the coherence of an object of thought. The coherence of the object of the imagination is intuitively felt as an incandescence so to speak, of a whole. Finally, beauty, according to Collingwood, is present to the mind simply in the form of emotion; this emotion is bipolar: the one pole is pleasure, the other is pain, and hence pleasure and pain go together in our experience throughout and also in the awareness of beauty and ugly; it is intuitive in character.

Since, pleasure and pain, success and unsuccess are correlative terms, beauty and ugly are also co-relative. In description of the nature of beauty and ugliness, Collingwood means by beauty as ‘unity in diversity’ a harmony in various parts. But lack of unity, lack of coherence means ugliness. The unity in beauty is related to pure imagination; the ugly lacks it by both qualitatively and quantitatively.

**Thinking and Imaging:**

Further, a successful Imagination is beautiful which is opposed to thinking. In imagination there is internal coherence contained in itself but in thought the coherence is external and self-transcending. The first form is beauty the second is mere reflection and nothing more. Collingwood exemplifying the distinction says that the two plays, for example, written on one matter, may both be true because of imagination as beauty but two biographies on one matter cannot be true. He gives this description while discussing the monadism of art on page 23 of his first book ‘Outlines of Philosophy of Art.’

Discussing co-relationship between beauty and ugly Collingwood writes, “Nothing is ugly except in a qualified and relative sense; a picture or a view which is described as ugly is never wholly and simply ugly, but is always a mixture of ugliness and beauty and it is the presence of the beauty that alone makes the ugliness possible (St. Augustine reversing the order says, “ugly brings beauty in prominence.”). Nor can such an object be dissected into beautiful parts and ugly parts.” Accordingly, “All ugliness is beauty spoilt, beauty uglified.” Moreover, where ugly is, beauty is destroyed, it ceases to be, and starts fair with a chance of new beauty. Hence forth, ugliness is a low degree of beauty but this is all related to the imagination and expression, no matter if it is material beauty. Collingwood has definitely carried on Croce’s view in describing the nature and co-relationship
between ugly and beauty. Croce treats beauty as unity in itself and ugly as multiplicity in the same account. Beauty has no degrees, ugly possesses high and low degrees. But if ugly were complete or beauty were complete then both cease to be ugly or beauty: at this juncture the disvalue would become non-value, activity will give place to passivity, with which it is not at war, save when activity is really present to opposite. Further, ugly and beautiful are co-relative and no one is possible without other. (Theory of relativity brought to work.)

Croce is vehement critic of hedonism and does not place feeling of pleasure and pain in exposition of his intuitive expression, nor does he like to imbibe, however, such emotion in artistic creation. Moreover, the characterization of beauty in two forms as natural and artificial is definitely an on coming of Kant’s and Hegel’s in Collingwood, but not in Croce. This is the reason to my assessment that Collingwood attempted candidly to distinguish art proper from the not-art. Art-proper is that which is bound up with merely expression of emotion while that which is not art is simply a craft, which is meant for serving some purpose. Therefore, Collingwood provides a list of crafts, which are confused for art, as he ponders.

The list is as follows:
(1) Magic (It is pseudo science)
(2) Propaganda
(3) Amusement
(4) Puzzle
(5) Instruction
(6) Exhortation

Forms of Beauty:

There are three such forms in which element of aesthetic satisfaction makes them all beautiful. But two first are incomplete forms of beauty. These are-
(1) Sublime.
(2) Comic
(3) Beautiful.

The aim of art is to obtain beauty but sublimity having been a form of beauty also becomes the object to achieve in all its powers and qualifications as a form of beauty but incomplete. Beauty is higher than any other of its forms, i.e. sublimity and comic. It is different from both sublime and comic in form and structure. The distinction in all the three is due to aesthetic significance. However, beauty if taken as a logical genus then sublime and comic stand as it species, but it is also true that beauty is a whole and its part, if any, implies a lower degree of beauty. In this form beauty is incomplete, but where beauty is in its full significance dominating other two, it is complete. Consequently, sublime is the foremost and elementary form of beauty. Moreover, sublime as an overwhelming power, and also in cases where no such power persists in our imagination yet, finally, it is also a beauty because “Sublimity is the mere revelation of beauty as beauty in the inrush aesthetic experience.” The
experience of sublimity is untenable and that what is experienced as sublime, is also experienced as beautiful. This description is psychological in nature. Sublime is supposed to have two primary and secondary stages: in its primary stage it is feeling of awe but in second it is feeling of pleasure. There is, however, a co-relationship between subject and object in sublimity, on the basis of which comic is also supposed to have tendency of turning itself to beauty and tragedy. Tragedy as Aristotle, thinks takes a nice turn to comic or to pleasantness, but in the end. As such both sublime and comic are complementary to beauty itself. It is due to our satisfaction about which Collingwood exemplifying laughter writes, “The theory of laughter belongs to the philosophy of art; the satisfaction which we find in it is an aesthetic satisfaction and to this extent the comic is a form of the beautiful.”

Referring subjectivity and objectivity Collingwood ascribes beauty to the experience of our union with the object, every hindrance is now broken and the perceiver feels that the object of beauty is neither objective nor subjective rather it is an experience in the beholder himself. But aesthetic experience is always imaginative, not reflective, as Collingwood says “To enjoy beauty is an imaginative act; not a reflective, and the object of imagination cannot possibly become an object to philosophical thought.”

Just as beauty and ugly are co-relative terms, in the same way sublime, comic and beautiful all the three forms are complementary to what is called beauty and in no case these three can be studied in isolation. Eventually, the feeling of awe, the experience of pain and the tragic formation of a play or event arouse the sense and experience of beauty in the end. There remains nothing unhappy.

**Place of Expression in Collingwood:**

After Croce it was Collingwood who paid due attention to the term expression yet he had also not tried to define the term expression, but considered and accepted it as the foremost topic of discussion in his aesthetics. Expression for Collingwood is basically related to emotion. In art it is expression of emotion that is countable for beauty. But there is a difference between expressing emotion and betraying emotion, both should not be confused. Expressing of emotion is necessary for an art-proper. The characteristic mark of expression proper is “lucidity or intelligibility; a person who expresses something there by becomes conscious of what it is that he is expressing, and enables others to become conscious of it in himself and in them...” Hence, for this very reason Hardy’s tragic novels, Milton’s ‘On his blindness’, ‘The lost hand’ (break, break, break) magnificently express the sorrows of the artists.

But arousing emotion cannot be counted for art-proper because the nature of a good art is to express the emotion in its full-fledged form while any piece of artwork lacking this characteristics, instead arouses or excites any kind of feeling in the audience, will always be a kind of pseudo art, or the so called improper art. Collingwood names it craft as he writes, “this is a point in which art proper, as the expression of emotion, differs sharply and obviously from any craft whose aim it is to arouse emotion.” For an artist it is necessary to be conscious of what he is
expressing and also the audience's should clearly follow his act of expression. Expression, according to Collingwood “it is an activity of which there can be no technique.” But in all respects there should be an exploration of the artist's own expressions. It is actually first individualization and then the description of the emotion comes to generalization. In this reference, Collingwood identifies the artist, reader and the writer by writing, “Thus, if art is the activity of expressing emotions, the reader is an artist as well as the writer. There is no distinction of kind between artist and audience. This does not mean that there is no distinction at all.” I think Collingwood favours the notions of publicity, communicability, individuality and freedom in the field of artistic expression. He ends his book with, “art is the community's medicine for the worst disease of mind, the corruption of consciousness”. By this stament he wants to prove that art is not anyone's private property, it is rather one's and for all. He seems to be more humanist in this regard and is parallel to Croce who is also against any monopolistic formation of art. Collingwood proceeds ahead in this recourse and says, “His business as an artist is to speak out, to make a clean breast. But what he has to utter is not, as the individualistic theory of art would have us think, his own secrets. As spokesman of his community, the secrets he must utter are theirs.”

Kinds of Expression:

Collingwood as far as considers expressionism in three forms:

1. Linguistic Expression.
2. Physical Expression.
3. Imaginative Expression.

Expression of all emotions whether tragic or comic is possible through language. Language in the broad sense is not limited to words only rather becks, gestures, bodily movements and other such things, which are used as symbol, are meant for language. But according to Collingwood language comes to existence with imagination, as a feature of experience at the conscious level. Language as imaginative is what 'it is', and as expressive, 'what it does'. Language by itself is an activity, and as expressing emotion it is imaginative, but it is its functional characteristic. However, language aims at expressing the emotion which may be of any kind, whether it is symbolic or non-symbolic. Clarifying the doctrine of art and beauty in the form of language Collingwood answers to the question “what kind of a thing must art be, if it is to have the two characteristics of being expressive and imaginative? The answer is: “Art must be language.” Consequently, the activity generating artistic experience is the activity of consciousness involving the expression of emotion in real sense. ‘Consciousness’ is remarkable because no activity, no expression, no emotion, no feeling and no experience are artistic unless it is in the consciousness or awareness of the artist. Hence, the artistic activity is not blind, no matter if it is primitive in Collingwood’s opinion. Croce too has the same view and regards the meaning of aesthetic as expression and general linguistic, in which every thing, which has the power of communication, as expression is
language. Linguistic and aesthetic for Croce are identical. However, he includes all such sounds and gestures etc, which are articulated, expedient and expressive in aesthetic as a science of expression and linguistic. In his own words, “Language is sound articulated, circumscribed and organized for the purposes of expression. If, on the other hand, linguistic were a special science in respect to Aesthetic, it would necessarily have for its object a special class of expressions. But the non-existence of classes of expression is a point which we have already demonstrated.” It is beneficial to quote the view of the author in the Dictionary of Art Vol. 8 Edt. By Jane Turner who on Page 571 writes, “Following Croce, Collingwood held that language includes self-conscious bodily gesture-including speech and writing-by which emotion is expressed, such as even a child’s self-conscious expression of rage. For Collingwood art is language in that it is a bodily gesture expressing an emotion and there by bringing it to consciousness. Speech, painting, dance and instrumental music are among the many different forms of language. Since we can experience emotions only through expressing them in language, art is an important means of access to our emotions and hence a source of self-knowledge. Bad result from insincerity and a ‘corrupt consciousness’.

Psychical expression is independent of consciousness and it is an emotional expression, which actually occurs through automatic bodily responses, such as feeling of pains on the sight of some distressed person. Here the experience of pain, in the words of Collingwood, is “not the emotional charge of the tension is the facial muscles; the sensum is here not prior to feeling of pain because the emotional charge on acts of higher thinking makes the feeling of pain or so possible when the expression psychically occurs prior to bodily action.” (Principles of Art) The third phase of expression of emotion is imaginative. Collingwood examined the theories of creation as divine, as some visible and invisible power (controlled and uncontrolled) and physiologically psychological of Grant Allen and putting down the example of spectacle to find out he rejected all such hypothetical grounds of artistic creation. To his mind a work of art is neither divine nor some controlling or uncontrolling super or sensuous power but it is a creation of human mind in whose thought the plan of the work may and may not be prior to what he wants to actualize. But it is creation that it is imagination, which functions to bring art into existence. The artist has imaginary thing in his mind, and when that is brought to light in the form of emotion prior to any such plan then it is artistic creation. “But the musician’s tune is not it is only musical notation. The relation of the tune of the notation is like the relation to the plan to the specifications, and drawings; for these, too, do not embody the plan as the bridge embodies it, they are only a notation from which the abstract or as yet unembodied plan can be reconstructed in the mind of a person who studies them.”

Collingwood in characterization of imagination is vicissiduous as in his work ‘Principles of Art’ on page 136 he writes that the nature of imagination is indifferent to the distinction between the real and the unreal but on Page 288 of the same book he contradicts his previous statement and writes, “art is not indifferent to truth; it is essentially the pursuit of truth.” Also in characterization of imagination he thinks expression of emotion and expression of imagination, the two properties of art-proper are contradictory. He writes, “The view just stated develops the first of
these, but ignores the second. And it develops the first in such a way that the second is, as it were, disfranchised from the start. An imagination which contended itself with constructing possible worlds could never be at the same time an expression of emotion." This contradiction Collingwood admits but makes it plausible by uttering that it is a process of development of his aesthetic thought. He writes, "Further development of this point below, in Chapter XIII I, will involve a certain modification of the statement that what is imagined is as such neither real or unreal. The reader understand, I hope, that everything I say in Book I is avowedly provisional, and that my theory of art is not stated until Book III." Croce’s position in developing his theory is also the same as he also is seen wont of such a vicissitudinous trend of thought which I have already pointed out from place to place while studying and noting down his theory of intuitive expression.

**Feeling and Thinking:**

Feeling is different from thinking, former is individual, later is universal, but feeling and thinking both is at par in making process. Feeling is either pleasant or painful and such experiences are very important in creation of art. However, Collingwood has highlighted feeling in his thesis in which nothing remains the same. Accordingly, the nature of feeling is fluctuating, not static which is expressive of two conditions of man-The pleasant and the doleful-between these two the whole story in aesthetic experience runs smoothly.

Art is knowledge “knowledge of the individual”. It is also a theoretical activity as distinct from a practical. The distinction between the two is the same as Croce makes in his aesthetic theory. For Croce aesthetic activity is theoretical as well as epistemological but ignoring the criteria of expression he considers ethical activity as good as for art. So also Collingwood considers art as an activity to say “its essence is that of an activity by which we become conscious of our own emotions.” Croce banishing emotion from the aesthetic realm also holds the view that the essence of art is aesthetic activity. Collingwood solving the problem pertaining to theoretical and practical, sometimes distinguishes between them in artistic activity, sometimes he makes no distinction, but aesthetic experience to him presents characteristics of both kinds because it is a knowing of oneself and of one’s world which the artist makes for himself in imagination and as well as in expression.

Finally, according to Collingwood the aesthetic activity is an activity if thought in the form of consciousness, which is converted into imagination. It is as experience, which is also sensous, if we consider Collingwood’s views on music, painting and seeing. But in every case “Every imaginative level by an act of consciousness; or every imaginative experience is a sensous experience together with consciousness of the same. Now the aesthetic experience is an imaginative. It contains no elements that are not imaginative, and the only power, which can generate it, is the power of the experiment’s consciousness.
Sensuous experience is necessary for consciousness of the aesthetic experience, which is in Collingwood’s words “‘externalized’ or ‘recorded’ or ‘expressed’ by the painted picture.”

In summarization the following points are ingenuously valuable: -

(1) Collingwood has based his theory on Crocian aesthetics, which is known as a science of intuitive expression.
(2) Paradoxical statements in both thinkers are apparent but considerable in polemic spirit or developing aesthetic thought.
(3) Collingwood distinguishes art proper from craft. Craft is arousing emotion but art-proper is expressing emotion.
(4) Linguistic expression, psychical expression and imaginary expression, all the three go together to create an art proper.
(5) Croce ignores emotion and feeling but Collingwood concentrates the expression on emotion.
(6) For Croce and Collingwood art creation is representation of what an artist consciously feels and sensuously presents to the audience for experience.
(7) Beauty for Collingwood accompanies pleasure, Croce repudiates it.
(8) There are two kinds of beauty-Natural and Artificial-the same is described by Kant and Hegel, Croce differs.
(9) In forms of beauty the sublime, comic and beautiful are Collingwood’s own classification.
(10) Beauty and ugly, beauty and sublimity are correlative-Croce thinks, Collingwood follows.
(11) Finally, art is expression of emotions, nothing more, nothing less than Expression. For Croce it is bare expression or intuitive expression, not of Emotion. But for Collingwood, it is the expression of emotion that goes to Create a masterpiece art.

References Over Leaf
References

1: Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy P 701.
2: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3-4 Edited by Paul Edward P 305
3: Douglas Burnham: Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement P 2.
5: Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy P 730.
7: Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy P 731
8: Ibid PP 731, 732
11: Kant: Critique of Pure Reason.
12: Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy P 734.
14: Ibid P
15: Douglas Burnham: Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement PP 7, 8.
20: Douglas Burnham: Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement PP 26 to 28.
21: Critique of Aesthetical Judgement, Moment First section 4.
23: Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy P 732.
26: Ibid P 309.
27: Douglas Burnham: Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement P 32.
30: Kant: The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic figures referred by Howard Caygill in Art of Judgement.
31: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 148.
34: Oxford Dictionary.
37: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 1
38: Meredith: Aesthetic Judgement P 172.
40: Ibid P 41.
41: Meredith: Aesthetic Judgement P 50.
42: Ibid P 60.
44: Ibid P 85.
45: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 28.
47: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 19.
51: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 2.
52: Ibid P 105.
54: Ibid P 172.
56: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 111.
58: Douglas Burnham: Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement P 43.
59: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 94.
61: Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary P 1151.
63: Mary A. Mc. Closkey: Kant’s Aesthetic P 149.
64: 65:
66: Douglas Burnham: Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement P 98.
70: Ibid P XII
75: Ibid XV.
76: Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy P 763.
78: Ibid PP 36, 37.
79: Charles Karellis, T.M. Knox: Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics P XV
82: Wreke 13: Attitude P 155
William Maker: Hegel and Aesthetics P 33
83: Charles Karelis, T.M. Knox: Hegel’s Introduction to Aesthetics P XIV.
84: Ibid P 2.
85: Ibid P XXXIII.
89: Charles Karelis, T.M. Knox: Hegel’s Introduction to Aesthetics P 4
90: Ibid PP 1, 2
91: Ibid P 2
94: Charles Karelis, T.M. Knox: Hegel’s Introduction to Aesthetics P 3
95: Croce: Aesthetic: as science of Expression and General linguistic P 341.
96: Charles Karelis, T.M. Knox: Hegel’s Introduction to Aesthetics P XVII.
98: Ibid P XXVII.
99: Jerry Surber: Art as a Mode of Thought: Hegel’s Aesthetics and the Organism of Modernism P 41.
100: Charles Karelis, T.M. Knox: Hegel’s Introduction to Aesthetics P 40.
102: Ibid PP 32-33
103: Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhuns: Philosophies of Art and Beauty. Critique of Aesthetical Judgement, Moment First
106: Ibid P XXVIII
107: Ibid P 79.
109: Ibid P 34.
111: Jack Kaminsky: Hegel on Art An Interpretation of Hegel’ Aesthetics P 3.
113: Jack Kaminsky: Hegel on Art An Interpretation of Hegel’ Aesthetics P 42.
120: Edt. By David Cooper: A Companion to Aesthetics 1995 PP 75-76
129: Ibid PP 115
130: Ibid PP 116-117
132: Ibid P 44.
133: Ibid P 8.
137: Ibid PP 15 to 19
138: David Cooper: A Contemporary to Aesthetics PP 76 to 77.
144: Croce: Aesthetic: as science of Expression and General linguistic PP 74, 75, 79
146: Ibid P 55.
148: R.G. Collingwood: Outlines of a Philosophy of Art P 27
149: Ibid P 27.
155: Croce: Aesthetic: as science of Expression and General linguistic P
158: Ibid P 35.
159: Ibid P 37.
160: Ibid P 44.
163: Ibid P 111.
169: Croce: Aesthetic: as science of Expression and General linguistic P 143.
172: Ibid P 159.
175: Ibid P 309.