CHAPTER IV

THE SAMKHYA DUALISM

(a) A Brief Introduction to Samkhya Dualism:

We have studied, in some detail, the dualistic philosophy of Descartes. It will, however, in the fitness of things, now, to discuss a similar indigenous system, known as Samkhya, in order to find out, in a subsequent chapter, as to how far these two philosophies agree with, or differ from, each other.

The Samkhya system is pretty old, the references of which are found in the Hindu scriptures of India, but Kapila muni, is credited with having given it a form which after various modifications through the ages, is still recognised as one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy.

Here, it may be pointed out, that dualistic philosophies may be of several types, out of which the three mentioned below are the most important.

The first type is a dualism in which there are two different kinds of realities, but they are subsumed under one Supreme Reality. Such a dualistic philosophy we find in
Rāmānujačārya, in which souls and prakṛti, the two different types of realities, are subsumed under God or Brahman. The second type of dualism believes in two independent realities of different nature. This type of dualism is said to be found in the philosophies of some great Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. Then, there is a third type of dualistic philosophy which regards the number of ultimate reality to be indefinite but they are only of two different natures.

This third type of dualism is found in Descartes, the Father of Modern Western Philosophy, and in Sāmkhya, an Indian system of philosophy, which has grown from the dualistic notions found in the Upanisads.

According to Descartes, as we have seen, mind and matter are the two independent realities, but he believes in the existence of different individual minds. In the same way, in the Sāmkhya system, there are two different types of realities puruṣa and prakṛti, but puruṣas are innumerable.

Being essentially a dualistic doctrine, Sāmkhya recognises the existence of two types of prime elements in the universe - one, material, known as prakṛti or matter, and the other spiritual, known as puruṣa or consciousness.

The Sāmkhya conception of dualism can be traced in the philosophic notions found in the Upaniṣads. The seer of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad clearly indicates that, for the
creation of praśā (offsprings), dual principles of opposite characters are absolutely necessary. The following passage indicates the dualistic idea:

"He did not feel delight, as every body, when alone, does not feel delight. He was desirous of a mate. He became of the size of a man and wife, embracing each other. He divided this very body into two. From that, husband and wife came into existence. Therefore this body is one half of himself, just as a split seed is of the whole, so said Yajñavalkya. Hence this void is completed by the wife. He united with her. From that, men were born." Dualism has been admitted in this passage, but the two principles, designated as husband and wife, have sprung from one supreme soul, Ātman.

In Praśna Upaniṣad, too, there is the principle of dualism between the two entities of procreation, viz., Rayi and Prāṇa, both created by Prajāpati. This, too, gives us the idea of duality as we find in Sāṅkhya, but it differs fundamentally in detail, as has been pointed out by Radhakrishnan.

"When Sāṅkhya claims to be a system based on the Upaniṣads, there is some justification for it, though the main tendency of the Upaniṣads is radically opposed to its

1. Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.3.
dualism."

Anima Sen Gupta lays stress on the same point when she says that dualism is not ultimate, because the supreme Being who is ultimate, is one and not two.

We have seen how the Samkhya conception of duality has been traced in the Upanishads. Let us now ascertain whether the Upanishads provide us any clues to the conceptions of purusa and prakrti, as envisaged in Samkhya. In Maitrayani Upanisad, Purusa is described as mere enjoyer and not creator of the world. In another passage of the same Upanisad, we find the soul described as the enjoyer and nature as that which is enjoyed.

As we have already pointed out that Samkhya dualism indicates a multiplicity in the conscious principle of its philosophy, there is a passage in Svetasvatara Upanishad which stresses the same point. Says the seer in this Upanishad,

"There is an unborn single she-goat, of red, white and black colours, who creates many offsprings, resembling herself. An unborn male lies beside her, out of attachment

1. Radhakrishnan - Indian Philosophy Vol II P. 250.
2. Maitrayani 2-7 also in Katha 1.3.4.
for her, while another male also, unborn, leaves her after having enjoyed her."

In this passage, besides the Sāṃkhya idea of plurality of puruṣas we find the phrase, 'also unborn', which indicates the nature of purusa in Sāṃkhya.

In the Kathopanisad, an effort is made for the first time to differentiate the self from the physical body. It is evident from the verses, where the self is described as unborn, eternal, everlasting, immortal, never to be slain, though body may be slain. In the same Upanisad, we find the passage, "The atman is bodiless within the bodies, is unchanging among the changing things."

We find in the Maitrāyaṇī Upanisad the idea of the empirical self, whose body is the combination of the subtle and gross elements. "Being subjected by egoism, this self thinks, 'it is I', 'this is mine', and thus binds his self by his own self, just as a bird does it-self bind by the net!"

The dualism in Sāṃkhya is as between puruṣa and prakṛti. We have studied the conception of puruṣa as found

1. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad IV - 5.
2. Kathopanisad 1. 11. 13.
in the Upanisads, and have come to the conclusion that in some respects the Śāmkhya purusa resembles that of the Upanisads.

It is now for us to study whether the notion of prakṛti, as we find in Śāmkhya can be traced in the Upanisads. In Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad prakṛti is described as pradhāna. It depends on God. We find the description of prakṛti as food in some Upanisads. In Maitrayanī Upaniṣad it is said that prakṛti is food, and inner self is the eater. This food which is not different from prakṛti, evolves into different categories, beginning with mahat and ending with material objects. A verse of Taittiriya Upaniṣad also conveys a similar idea, "From food all creatures are truly born; having been born, they are nourished by food. Food is called 'annam' because all living beings, both consume it and are consumed by it." In the same Upaniṣad, prakṛti is described as indeterminate and unmanifest. The whole world has originated from that. We also find its reference as that which is enjoyed while soul is described as enjoyer. Both these principles are inspired by God.

1. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad VI. 16.
4. Ibid II - 7.
5. Śvetāsvatara Up. 1 - 12.
A synthetic study of various Upanisads tells us that here purusas do not have independent existence. They are part and parcel of the same All-Pervading Reality. On the other hand, Saṃkhya, though taking its conception of purusas from Upanisadic texts, goes a step further to give purusas an independent absolute existence.

So we conclude that the Upanisadic conception of prakṛti also is different from that of Saṃkhya. In Upanisads, prakṛti is not given an independent status whereas in Saṃkhya, it is definitely an independent entity, evolving the cosmos. Saṃkhya may have been inspired through the ages by the ideas of Upanisads but the fact remains that the dualistic conception of Saṃkhya is unique.

Dualism in Saṃkhya is a device to explain the cosmic evolution as a process of nature. The idea of dualism may have been borrowed from the scriptures but it has been so changed by the Saṃkhya protagonists that it has become the basis of one of the most renowned philosophies of the world. Instead of depending on God for the creation of the world and its preservation Saṃkhya seeks to explain this problem by the operation of the forces of nature for the sake of purusa.

It may not always be possible to trace the working of a philosopher's mind, but it is open to the student to be inquisitive to know as to how a particular type of philosophy
has had its origin. In this context, it may be asked why Śāmkhya has propounded a dualistic theory, when the Hindu scriptures, in general, recognise one supreme God who has created the world.

The Śāmkhya philosophers have had respect for the Vedas and Upaniṣads. It was quite natural for Kapila, if he was a real figure and originator of the system, that he should have believed in God and His power of creation. This does not seem to have been possible, as Śāmkhya philosophers had risen in revolt against rites and rituals which were observed by people to propitiate God.

Kapila clearly saw that to abjure the evils which had crept into religion, he should have to ignore God, and to explain the world in some other way. What other way was open to him is now a pertinent question to be asked and answered.

Kapila could easily turn to matter and acknowledge it as the sole substance out of which all objects, including living things may have been formed. This simple formula does not seem to have appealed to Kapila. He may, perhaps, have experienced some difficulty in explaining how life could originate from matter. He came to the conclusion that he should posit two substances, one conscious and the other unconscious which, between themselves, would explain the universe.
Dualism, thus, came to the mind of Kapila as the sheet-anchor of his new philosophy. He seems to have argued that matter alone could not produce anything unaided by some force or energy. Consciousness is a sign of life and it cannot be ignored in any system of philosophy which is of a dynamic nature. The 'monads' of Leibniz, and 'elan-vital' of Bergson, are principles, which fully recognise the importance of dynamic energy in the evolutionary process. In sāṃkhya, the conscious principle is purusa. Its influence on prakṛti is the potent force which disturbs the equilibrium of the guṇas and helps prakṛti to manifest itself in the form of evolutes.

It is indeed a novel idea to bid good-bye to the Creator, and then to explain the world with the help of two antagonistic principles. No supernatural force, mystery or miracle is needed to control human affairs. The spiritual force that guides the working of nature is neither the God of religion nor any other agency endowed with the power of creation.

It may thus be conceded that Kapila was rationalistic in his arguments. If God does not create the world, then who does? He found out a formula to explain this. Rather, we should say that, by propounding a dualistic philosophy, he created a cleavage between religion and metaphysics. To say that God has created the world, did not seem to him sound metaphysics.
We may have to admit that Śāmkhya is a realistic system of philosophy. What underlies this realism is its theory of causality called satkāryavāda. The theory, therefore, lies at the root of Śāmkhya Dualism. The entire evolutionary process is based on this principle. We should, therefore, try to understand its nature as well as its importance in Śāmkhya system of philosophy.

(b) Śāmkhya - Satkāryavāda:

Thinkers of various times and countries have thought about the nature and origin of cosmos. For some of them whatsoever exists here is a new creation. It is not linked with anything existing prior to it as potentiality to actuality. Every event or happening is a new arrival, having new qualities and functions. This view is known as 'āsatkāryavāda' or 'ārambhavāda'. In Indian philosophy Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers are the main advocates of this theory. But there are thinkers who believe that in every effect or happening, we have actualisation of pre-existing potentialities. This is satkāryavāda. The Śāmkhya thinkers are main propounders of this theory.

In other systems, causation may play an important part, but in Śāmkhya it is the main arch of the entire fabric of Śāmkhya philosophy. It is its vital part. Dr. Radhakrishnan
also holds the same view. He says, that causality is the
corner-stone of Samkhya metaphysics and the different
categories are deduced by the application of the law of
causation.

This theory has found favour in scriptures also.
In Chandogya Upanisad it is said that "from unreal real cannot
be produced." Bhagavadgita also confirms the same view when
it says, "Oh Arjuna, a non-existent thing has no basis or reality.
Also, an existent thing cannot be diminished in effect." This
has also been stated in other systems of philosophy. We find
in Yoga Bhāṣya that "a non-entity can never come into existence
and an entity can never be annihilated. The same idea is also
expressed in Brahma Sūtra, "That which is posterior in time,
i.e. the effect, is declared in the scriptures to have its
being in the cause, prior to its actual being".

Vacaspāti Misra gives the example of a tortoise to
illustrate the theory of satkāravāda. Just as a tortoise
puts out its limbs and draws them in, but does not create or

1. Radhakrishnan - History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western
   P. 245.
2. Chandogya Upanisad VI 2.2.
4. Y.B. IV 12.
5. B.S. II. 1. 16 Radhakrishnan’s Translation.
destroy them, so that cause is unfolded into the effect and the effect is dissolved into the cause. Just as the tortoise is not different from its contracting and expanding limbs, so the effect, such as the jar, is not different from clay.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa has given some arguments in Śāmkhya Kārikā to prove that the effect pre-exists in the cause.

In the first place, asat or non-being cannot be the cause. If the effect is non-existent in the cause, none can bring it into existence out of the cause. "The sky-flower cannot be produced." "Which is non-existent like man's horns cannot be brought into existence." "The present contains nothing more than the past and what is found in the effect was already in the cause." Vacaspati clarifies the point by giving another example. "Blue cannot be changed into yellow even by a thousand artists." Secondly, a particular effect is produced out of a particular material cause. "A jar of clay can be produced out of clay only and a cloth can be produced out of

2. Radhakrishnan - Indian Philosophy Vol II P. 256.
5. S.T.K. 9 P. 70.
the threads only." Thirdly, if the effect, unrelated to the cause, could be produced, then every effect would arise from every cause. Such a position would undermine the very foundation of all empirical knowledge. Fourthly, cause and effect must be conceived as adequate (both quantitatively and qualitatively) to each other. "The causal energy (śakti) to produce a particular effect resides in a potent cause only." Fifthly, the nature of the effect must be conceived as determined by the nature of the cause. The effect is of the same nature as the cause.

All the above arguments are based on two fundamental principles of causation, viz. that whatever is non-existent cannot be brought into existence and, secondly, whatever is existent cannot be made totally non-existent. These arguments are, in fact, the logical corollaries of the fundamental proposition that the cause and the effect are identical in substance.

Vācaspati Misra goes a step further when he says that the effect not only pre-exists in the cause but is also identical with it in essence. He has given some arguments

2. J.N. Sinha - History of Indian Philosophy P. 6.
to prove this. It is necessary that the effect should be a property of the cause and should inhere in it. For example, cloth is the same material as threads, and so inhere in them. A horse is different from a cow and so it cannot inhere in it. Moreover, causal relation cannot exist between two objects which are different in essence or matter. There is causal relation between the material cause and the effect constituted by it. There can be no causal relation between a jar and cloth but this relation subsists between cloth and its threads. Further, it may be said that there cannot be conjunction or separation in cause and effect. If two things are different from each other, they can be conjoined with each other e.g. a pool and a tree, or they can exist separately from each other e.g. the Himalayas and the Vindhyas. It is obvious that there is no such relation between cloth and the threads. So they are not different from each other in essence. Lastly, there is quantitative equality between cause and effect. The threads and cloth are equal to each other in weight. So, this proves, beyond the shadow of doubt, the identity of cause and effect.

This is, however, not the whole truth. The relation between the material cause and effect is that of identity in difference. This is borne out from the text of Śāṅkhya Karikā no. 8, which says that the effects of prakṛti are like prakṛti in some respects and unlike it in others. In Karikā no. 10,

effect, the svabya is unlike prakṛti in some respects but in Kārīkā no. 11, the same three guṇas are found both in cause and effect. The two kārikās, read together, stabilize the actual position, viz., the relation between the material cause and its effect is that of identity in difference.

The Sāṃkhya recognises two kinds of causes, viz. material cause (upādana kārana) and efficient cause (nimitta 1 kārana). Thus marble is the material cause of the statue, but the sculptor's work and skill and his instruments are the concomitant conditions necessary for the production of the statue. Similarly, milk is the material cause of curd but all the items of the process of curd-making together with the instrumentality of the man who makes it, form the concomitant conditions or the efficient cause for producing the desired effect.

The material cause enters into the constitution of the effect. The efficient or instrumental cause exerts an extraneous influence to produce the effect, it co-operates with the causal power inherent in the material cause and liberates it. It creates a stimulus which removes the barriers containing the energy, which resides in the cause

1. Kārikās 10 and 11.

2. Aristotle recognises four kinds of causes of which the first two are the same as those of Sāṃkhya.
and diverts it to form a different collocation which we call the effect of the cause. Patañjali explains the same principle when he suggests that prakṛti is self-propelled (svatōh pariṇāmini). Motion is inherent in it. Impulse does not come into it from without. The obstructing barrier should be removed for the process of effectuation to take place. The same idea has been explained by Vyāsa by means of an example. The farmer, to irrigate his field, simply removes the barrier from a reservoir of water, so that it flows with all its chemicals into the field. Mr. Pulin Behari Chakravarti goes a step further to show that the principle illustrated by Vyāsa explains the entire cosmic evolution. He says, "The efficient cause, in the shape of virtue and vice, does not move prakṛti into action, it simply removes the barrier and, when this is done, the energy of prakṛti is automatically liberated."

The difference between one object and another lies in the different allocation or grouping of the same constituents in objects which are causally related. The formation of a collocation has an inherent barrier against any change and

1. Y.S. IV. 3
2. Y.B. IV. 3
keeps it in the proper shape pertaining to it. When the barrier is removed, a corresponding change takes place, leading to the regrouping of the same constituents, and producing a resultant object not differing in essence from its cause. The three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas, remain without exception, both in cause and effect, though in either of them in different proportions.

Yet in the process of unfoldment or regrouping in different collocations there are rigid conditions. Anything cannot change into any other thing at any place or at any time. Vyāsa has pointed out that these limitations are those of place (deśa), time (kāla) and form (ākāra). For example, tea is grown on sloping hills, wheat ripens when summer sets in and fire will produce red embers. By removing the conditions barricading production and creating the conditions favouring it, the effect comes into existence.

In Sāńkhya, satkāryavāda is a continuous process. As cause, it is avyakta (latent) or concealed, as effect, it is vyakta (patent) or manifest. This process is dynamic and persistent and is known as vyaktāvyakta. It is called an objective process, because most of the evolutes issuing from prakṛti are objects. As an objective process, it implies

1. Dr. Radhakrishnan — I.P. Vol II, Page 258.
the categories of time and space. It has therefore, a time­ space character. In the objective world, we have to deal with things which are gross and which are formed by the collocation of the constituents of the five elements, viz. earth (ksit), water (ap), fire (tejas), air (mārut) and ether (vyoman).

The problem of causality is a field of great controversy among the different schools of thought. Vācaspati Misra has maintained four views as to the relation between cause and effect. The first is the Mādhyamika Buddhist view which holds that an entity is produced by a non-entity, that an existent effect springs from void which does not exist. The second view, as we have seen, is that of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika, which maintains that a non-entity is produced by an entity. A thing, in its own identity, does not exist, but another thing is created in its place. This is what we call ārāmbhavāda. The third view is that of Vedānta which holds that a non-entity is produced by an entity. Brahman is the ultimate reality, but the whole world is an unreal appearance. The fourth view, with which we are mainly concerned here, is the view held by Sāmkhya which is based on the assumption that an entity is produced by another entity, both being real. The effect resides in the cause, in a latent or potential form.

This view is called sākkāryavāda.

In fact, both Vedānta and Śaṅkhya agree on the cause being real but they fundamentally differ as to the effect. The Vedānta view is that the effect is unreal and illusory, whereas the Śaṅkhya maintains the effect to be as real as the cause. We call the view of Vedānta as Vivartavāda while that of Śaṅkhya as pariṇāmavāda. It appears from this discussion that Śaṅkhya maintains the objectivity of causation, regarding causal relations as relations between objects themselves. This view confirms our faith in the objective reality of the world. As we are wedded to the realistic view of life, we cannot brush aside the world which is real and matter-of-fact.

The Śaṅkhya view of causation leads us to the conclusion that in the process of transformation from cause into effect there is no loss of substance. Sākkāryavāda is in essence the well-known scientific principle known as Conservation of Energy. In other words, this principle is the basis of the theory of causation. Anima Sen Gupta has rightly said, "Conservation and transformation of matter and energy from one form to another seems to be the basis of the Śaṅkhya theory of causation." Śaṅkhya has clearly stated that energy remains the same while the world is constantly

1. Anima Sen Gupta - The Evolution of the Śaṅkhya School of Thought, P. 42.
evolving. Cause and effect are only less or more evolved forms of the same energy. It means that the effect pre-exists in the cause in a latent potential state. The effect is merely the manifestation, development, regrouping of the constituent parts of the cause in a new form. The writer of Yukti Dīpikā also points out the same fact, "It is the manifestation of the implicit." It is never a new creation. "The grouping or collocation alone changes and this brings on the manifestation of the latent process of the gunas, but without the creation of anything new."

In other words, the relation between cause and effect in Śāmkhya may be summarised by the remark that the effect is the cause explicitly patent as the cause is the effect implicitly latent. Creation is nothing but the process of transforming the implicit into the explicit form. Ahamkāra remains in an implicit state in the mahat and the mahat in prakṛti. When the barriers are removed, the equilibrium of the gunas is disturbed and the process of evolution takes place.

Now, it becomes clear to us that the theory of satkāryavāda is the basic principle of Śāmkhya. Without it

1. Yukti Dīpikā, P. 31/11.
the evolutionary process is meaningless, all its categories will cease to have their existence, with purusa staring at prakrti, unbound and indifferent to pleasure or pain, and prakrti remaining a barren entity, an abstract point without magnitude, an hypothesis leading to no results.

For all systems of philosophy which deal with material objects, it seems that the category of causality is one of the main categories of scientific investigation. The causal relation between two entities implies functional dependence of one on the other. Things in this world do not exist alone and quite apart from one another. The seed grows into sapling which, in turn, develops into a tree, the tree ultimately falls to the ground by the action of wind and weather or by the strokes of the woodcutter's hatchet. But the matter or substance of the wood in the tree does not vanish. It changes its form. The law of causation based on change, seems to operate everywhere. The principle of satkāryavāda provides to the theory of causality a scientific basis.

The principle is rich in its consequences. It presupposes categories without which it cannot function. The Sāmkhya system, as we have seen, is based on two principles or categories named prakṛti and puruṣa. We have now to study the significance and reality of these two basic conceptions.
(C) The Śamkhya Conception of Reality, Prakṛti and Purusa:

By reality we mean the being of things as opposed to non-being. It connotes whatever is absolutely essential in a thing and excludes whatever is accidental and unnecessary. It is contrasted with appearance, which is the aggregate of diverse external properties which are ever changing. Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "By reality we mean something that exists of itself and in its own right and not merely as a modification of something else."

The problem of reality has been constantly discussed by saints and seers from the very beginning of Indian thought. The idea of sat or truth has not only been the basis of religion but also the fundamental principle of Indian metaphysics. Truth is the essence of the Absolute. It conveys to us the idea of reality on which we can base our convictions. The quest for truth by the human mind can be traced to the oldest scriptures of India.

In Rg-Veda, we do not find any clear-cut definition of reality, but on the basis of a summary view, we can conclude that there is a constant development of thought in this direction. The earlier portions of Rg-Veda Śamhitā indicate the fact that

every existing object is real for the vedic seer. Here, a common-sense view of reality is propounded. The belief in different gods and goddesses is also evident at this stage; and their belief in many gods is termed polytheism.

But the Vedic seers were not satisfied with this naive view of reality. They seem to have visualised the concept of one fundamental reality which is the root cause of this whole cosmos. This concept of Vedic seers can be found in the verses like: 'Akam sat viprah bahudha vadanti' and 'tishthati dashāngulam.' The concept of purusa of the Purusa Sūkta of Rg-Veda Samhita gives us an idea of an all-pervading, eternal, unchanging being.

In the Upanisads, we find the conception of Brahman gradually taking shape. Brahman in them is a supreme reality. The following quotations from different Upanisads will convey this idea clearly.

In Brhadāranyaka Upanisad, it is said that only 'truth is Brahman.' 'He who knows this fact conquers the worlds'. The ultimate reality in Upanisads is Brahman. In Taittiriya Upanisad, it is said that Brahman is truth, knowledge and eternity. Elsewhere in the same Upanisad occurs the passage,

1. The learned seers call that one by many names.
2. That transcends the universe by ten angulas' (Angula is a measurement).
3. Brhadāranyaka Upanisad V. 4-1.
4. Taittiriya Upanisad II 1 Satyam Jñānamanantam Brahman.'
"That from whence these beings are born, that by which when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death; try to know that. That is Brahman." The Upanisadic idea of reality becomes clear when we read the following words of Dr. Radhakrishnan.

"The ultimate reality sleeps in the stone, breathes in the plants, feels in the animals and awakes self-consciousness in man." So, we have seen that reality in Upanisads is one, beyond human grasp, eternal, and unchanging being.

The Upanisadic concept of reality has been fully endorsed in Mahābhārata. There it is said that "Real is that which is eternal and pure." In Bhagavadgītā, we find the idea that the real cannot be changed into real, nor real can be changed into unreal." This seems to be a distant echo, across centuries, from Chandogya Upanisad. In Yoga-Vāṣistha, Reality is said to be eternal in the beginning as well as in the end.

1. Taittiriya Upanisad, III - 1. "Satyaṁ Jayanāmaṁ Brahman"
3. Mahābhārata Santi Parva 162.
4. Bhagavadgītā II, 16.
5. Chandogya Upanisad VI, II. 12 (In the beginning there was only sat (real) and from that sat all things have originated because from unreal, real cannot be produced).
6. Yoga - Vāṣistha.
In the Purāṇas, reality has been mentioned as an unchangeable entity. In Viṣṇu Purāṇa it is stated about it that even in remote time it does not obtain a different or changed name.

Not only do these orthodox schools of philosophy give us the concept of reality, but also the heterodox systems of thought, like Jainism and Buddhism, have also defined reality in their own ways. The conception of reality in Jain philosophy is based on its notion of substance or dravya and mode or parayaya. It does not believe that being is permanent. All things are in a state of flux. Change is the law of nature. Things come into existence through the process of change. The substance does not change because the universe which is made of substance, is essentially unchanging. Old things change into new ones, the latter retaining some of the qualities of the former, as the base or substratum of either of them is the same substance. The relation between the old and new is thus that of a unity in difference or bhedābheda. The qualities change but not the substance. Dr. Radhakrishnan has rightly said, "Substance is one, the inherent essence of all things, manifests itself through diverse forms; has the three characteristics of creation, destruction and staying, and may be described by opposites."

1. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2 - 1300.
2. Radhakrishnan - Indian Philosophy Vol I P. 313.
Six qualities of substance are mentioned. They are inseparable from it. If the substance exists as separate from its qualities it may be changed into other substances. Also, if the qualities can exist without a substance, then substance will not be needed and qualities by themselves shall not be able to form objects.

Thus, we can say that, according to Jainas, the substance is real; it gives rise to everything through parayāyas or modifications but itself persists through the process of change. Though the Jainas do not propound a concept of transcendental reality like that of Upaniṣads, yet they seem to say that reality is not destructible. We may, however, look at it from different standpoints.

We have already seen how different orthodox schools have propounded the concept of one ultimate, unchanging, reality. Contrary to this view, Buddhism holds that there is nothing permanent or unchangeable in the universe. Everything changes. Nothing stays for two moments. We cannot take our bath in the same river twice. Even the human soul is a stream of our feelings, emotions, ideas etc. Thus, for Buddhists, there is nothing that does not change. Consequently, they do not

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1. Radhakrishnan - Indian Philosophy Vol I P. 313. These qualities are (1) Existence, (2) Enjoyability (3) Substantiveness (4) Knowability (5) Specific character or identities or essence (6) the quality of possessing some kind of form.
recognise any permanent reality. Reality for them is change. This doctrine of change or momentariness has been propounded on the basis of the well-known theory of arthakriyākāritva which means that 'Existence is a capacity to produce effects'. According to this theory, Buddhists hold that nothing can produce two identical effects at two different moments. It means that nothing stays for two moments.

Now on the basis of these various views about the nature of reality of the pre-Sāṃkhya thinkers of India we may very well proceed to take up the notion of reality as it is found in Sāṃkhya philosophy. It is evident that Sāṃkhya thinkers neither agree fully with theistic systems of Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā nor do they see eye to eye with the notion of reality as found in heterodox systems of philosophy in India. It is a fact that neither in Sāṃkhya-pravacana Śūtra nor in Sāṃkhya-kārikā reality has been defined in so many words but we will try to gather something in this direction on the basis of their main metaphysical assumptions. We will see in the pages to come that in Sāṃkhya philosophy two ultimate substances have been recognized. These substances are puruṣa and prakṛti and they give us some idea of the nature of reality in Sāṃkhya philosophy.

Puruṣa is a conscious substance, while prakṛti is unconscious. Prakṛti is the source from which all things have evolved. Puruṣa is the mere enjoyer of what prakṛti offers to
it in the shape of evolutes. Sāmkhya does not believe in God or any supernatural force. Reality in Sāmkhya is the ever-creating, dynamic principle of evolution which, by the joint action of prakṛti and purusa, evolves the universe. When these categories forming the notion of a single reality, disunite, dissolution takes place and all objects recede into the 'avyakta' or 'prakṛti'. The existence of prakṛti cannot be proved, but it has to be inferred. It is one, but it becomes complex, due to its being constituted of the three guṇas. Unlike prakṛti, purusa is simple and not complex. It is not active, knows no change of place or form. It is a mere witness or looker-on. Yet, in the scheme of evolution, both the categories, namely those of purusa and prakṛti, play a joint part, if they disunite, the whole universe disappears, or its different parts fall apart. Harides Bhattacharya has very well remarked. "Spirit without nature is inactive and nature without spirit is blind. Matter is merely the medium for spirit to manifest itself."

For Sāmkhya, both matter and spirit are necessary for the comprehensive conception of reality. Aurobindo Ghosha has rightly pointed out that Sāmkhya is not materialistic, though it may be said with justification "that the materialistic theory of evolution starts from the Sāmkhya position. The

materialists ignore the silent cause of Śāṅkhya, the puruṣa or observant and reflective soul." The materialists have a wrong notion about the world, they conceive it as a sort of automatic machine, without the mind or spirit as its mover.

In Śāṅkhya, therefore, the conception of reality is based on the dualism of prakṛti and puruṣa which, by their joint action, explain the universe.

Thus, we conclude that Śāṅkhya conception of reality is somewhat different from that of the scriptures. Śāṅkhya has no doubt taken the names of 'prakṛti' and 'puruṣa' from the Upanisads, but, as we shall see, has given different interpretations to these principles. In Śāṅkhya, the two principles, viz. puruṣa and prakṛti are ultimate. They, together, give us the idea of reality in Śāṅkhya. It means reality for Śāṅkhya is all-pervading, eternal and imperishable. These two substances have nothing to do with God.

After discussing the nature of reality in Śāṅkhya philosophy, in brief, it is now in the fitness of things to discuss the two substances which have been given the place of ultimate reality in this system. We will like to discuss their nature separately to understand them fully. To bring out the relation which exists between these two substances, will also be our problem here.

(D) The Śāṅkhya account of Prakṛti, Purusa and their relation:

(i) Prakṛti— The word, prakṛti, is derived from the sanskrit word 'Kṛti' by adding the prefix 'pra' to it. 'Kṛti' means creation and 'pra' means before. Thus the word prakṛti literally means that which exists before all creation. But with the development of thought this word has acquired various names and has been interpreted differently. Now, let us see what prakṛti means mainly in Śāṅkhya philosophy.

Prakṛti is the abstract, unlimited source of the operation of satkāryavāda, that is to say, of the process of unfoldment of the cause into effect. "The conception of prakṛti is arrived at by inference" On the basis of the principle of causality, every effect must have a cause and that cause another, until to avoid the endless regress, we reach an uncaused first cause. While every effect is caused, prakṛti has no cause, but is the cause of all effects. So, the ultimate prakṛti has no origin, nor is it the result of any transformation. It is called pradhāna since all effects are founded on it. It is not apprehended by the senses.

1. S.K. 8
5. Max Muller - Indian Philosophy Vol III P. 31.
The concept of prakṛti can be traced to the scriptures. The recognition of the first objective principle as an indeterminate, homogeneous entity is present in Taittirīya Upaniṣad, which has described it as 'asat'. In Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad it is called aja (unborn). In the same Upaniṣad, elsewhere, it is called pradhāna. It is described as perishable and controlled by God. The term 'māyā' is also used for prakṛti in some Upaniṣads. "Know, then, that prakṛti is māyā and that the Great God is the lord of Māyā. The whole universe is filled with objects which are parts of His being."

We can find references of prakṛti as avyakta in Mahābhārata also. It is spoken of as the root cause of the universe. It is considered as the mother of twenty-three categories. Bhagavadgītā, which is virtually a part of Mahābhārata, gives a somewhat similar description of prakṛti to what we find in the Upaniṣads. God creates the world by entering his own prakṛti through his own Māyā. In the seventh chapter we find that there are two types of prakṛtis: the lower

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3. Ibid I 10.
4. Ibid IV 10 (Swami Nikhilanand's translation)
7. Bhagavadgītā VII. 4-5.
and the higher. Every-thing in the world is constituted out of these two kinds of prakṛti. He creates the world with the help of prakṛti. Both purusa and prakṛti, the two important principles of Śāmkhya philosophy, are also described as eternal. "Know that both jīvatman and prakṛti are beginningless. The modifications like desire and aversion and all the objects composed of three gunas originate from prakṛti." He who knows purusa and prakṛti essentially, does not take birth again.

The above-mentioned references indicate the fact that the conception of prakṛti which is found in the scriptures is different from that of Śāmkhya. In the scriptures, prakṛti has not been given an independent place. It is subordinated to Īśvara and is considered His creative power. In Śāmkhya, however, prakṛti has got an independent existence. So we can say that though Śāmkhya has taken the conception of prakṛti from the scriptures, it does not infer its origin from the Creator. Śāmkhya interprets the scriptures in its own way and treats prakṛti as an independent uncaused category.

According to Vijnāhabhisṣu, a commentator on Śāmkhya, prakṛti is unlimited, all-pervasive and infinite, because it is uncaused first cause of this vast universe. It

1. Bhagavadgītā IX 8.
2. Ibid XIII 19.
3. Ibid XIII 23.
acts independently, without taking help of God or any supernatural being.

The most important characteristic of prakṛti is that it is productive or prasavadharmī. It is one, unconditioned, indeterminate, devoid of parts, independent and unmanifest. It is common to many individuals at one time. Its existence can be proved by its effects. It has been indicated in Karikā 14 that the effects have the characteristic of being of three gunas, so they presuppose a cause of the same nature. Prakṛti is avyakta. It is the unconscious matrix of all modifications, physical and psychical. The Śāṅkhya sutras have stressed the point that prakṛti is the material cause and have said that the scriptures also maintain this view.

In Karikā 10, the difference between prakṛti and its evolutes is described. The evolutes are many, while prakṛti is one. They subsist in their causes while prakṛti does not subsist in any other cause. They are determinate, while prakṛti is indeterminate. They are composed of parts, while prakṛti is partless.

They are differentiated and heterogeneous, while prakṛti is undifferentiated and homogeneous. They are subordinate

to prakṛti while prakṛti is self-subsistent and independent. Prakṛti is imperceptible owing to its subtlety. Subtlety means a general attribute which prevents the right cognition of it by perception. We cannot disprove its existence on the basis that it cannot be experienced because its existence is proved by its effects.

In Śāmkhya philosophy, the two states of prakṛti are described as unmanifest and manifest. The state of equilibrium is called dissolution while the state of disturbance is called evolution. The state of equipoise is absolutely indeterminate, undifferentiated and homogeneous, and it exists only as a possible source of energy of the whole world. The disturbance of the equilibrium of the gunas starts the evolutionary process. In other words, creation and dissolution are the two functions taken by nature to serve the purposes of the spiritual principle.

4. S.P.S. I 137.
5. S.P.S. VI. 42
Interpreting the conception of prakṛti, Srinivas, a vedāntist, says, "The universe was existent, indeed, prior to creation, though not known to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest but is clearly known as the universe at the time of creation when its name and form become manifest.

Though prakṛti is unconscious it acts for the sake of puruṣa. Saṁkhya believes in the unconscious teleology of nature. The prakṛti of Saṁkhya seems to be different from matter, pure and simple. Rather, it should be considered as the ultimate state of causal matter. It is the primus or producer of the entire physical, biological, and psychical order of being.

Holding the same view, Dr. Radhakrishnan says,

"The prakṛti of the Saṁkhya is not a material substance, nor is it a conscious entity since puruṣa is carefully distinguished from it. It gives rise not only to the five elements of the material universe, but also to the psychical..."

We may thus come to the conclusion that prakṛti is the ultimate cause of the universe. But why do we say so? Does prakṛti actually exist? To this the Saṁkhya thinkers

1. B.S. II. I. 19.
reply that it can be inferred. Śāmkhya Kāriśā gives five arguments for inferring the existence of prakṛti. They run as follows:

Specific objects are finite in their nature and must have a cause. Whatever is finite is limited and cannot be the cause of the universe. Besides, all individual things possess certain characteristics which signify that they have a common source from which they all come out. Moreover, all things are in a constant state of change, and show an active energy of evolution which must have been derived from a primary source. It is also argued that the existing world is an effect and, therefore, there must be a primary cause. Lastly, there is a real unity in the whole universe which proves a common origin of all the objects of the universe.

By the above-mentioned arguments, Īśvarakṛṣṇa proves the existence of prakṛti as the ultimate cause of all entities. The prakṛti is one and indivisible, but it is the gunas which give rise to the production of innumerable objects of the universe by functioning through infinite number of permutations and combinations.

1. S.K. 15.
2. S.P.S. I - 130.
Illustrating the unity of prakṛti, an excellent example has been given by Vacaspati. As a downpour from clouds on different kinds of soils mixes with a variety of ingredients and produces a variety of tastes in juices of different fruits, such as apple, mango, orange, lemon and others, so one and the same prakṛti, by the instrumentality of different assortments and combinations of guṇas, brings forth different effects. Thus the whole fabric of the evolutionary process lies in the unevolved prakṛti which functions in and through the guṇas.

In the history of Śāṅkhyā system, we come across quite a new interpretation of Śāṅkhyā concept of prakṛti. Paurika, a Śāṅkhyā teacher, seems to be the propounder of this doctrine. In his opinion, there are a number of prakṛtis, probably as many as there are puruṣas.

This doctrine of the plurality of prakṛti seems to be unsound. We may say that it is misinterpretation of the conception of the original Śāṅkhyā because it is arbitrary to categorise the prakṛtis. Who is to decide one category to be more divine than the other? Moreover, as the prakṛtis are beyond the range of perception, their plurality

1. The same point has been illustrated with different names of fruits in S.T.K. 16 P. 114.
cannot be determined. Again, it is unnecessary to postulate a number of prakrtis when only one is quite capable/generate the whole universe. Further, it may be said that plurality of prakrti will lead to the conclusion that they are finite. Being finite, they are liable to be exhausted, thereby arresting the cause of metempsychosis. Lastly, it will have to be admitted on this assumption that the prakrti of a yogin is also limited and finite. Therefore, the claim that the yogin can create any number of physical bodies will be a myth.

A Sāṃkhya teacher, Vārṣaṇya, adds that the notion of distinction among several entities arises when there exists any difference of form or of genus. No such distinction exists between one prakrti and another, so their multiplicity is out of question.

Therefore, we conclude that prakrti is one, but it is subtle and imperceptible. Vyāsa describes prakrti as "that which never is nor is not, that which exists and does not exist, that in which there is no non-existence, the unmanifested, without any specific mark, the central background of all!"

The nature and function of prakrti are determined

by its three gunas. They are the three constituents of prakṛti. They are just like the three strands of a string. They are in the essence of prakṛti and not the qualities of it. They, in fact, constitute prakṛti.

They cannot be perceived by the senses because they are superfine, subtle and super-sensible. They are infratomic quanta of reals which lie beyond the human ken. They are forces rather than substances. Their innumerable permutations and combinations give rise to different collocations or groupings of the constituents of prakṛti and its products. All effects are due to particular collocations of the gunas. When they are in a state of equilibrium, there is no evolution (āvirbhāva) but when this equilibrium is disturbed by the preponderance of a particular guna, the evolutionary process is released and the products and by-products of prakṛti appear as objects.

In Śāmkhya, the gunas are classified as sattva, rajas and tamas, indicating joy, sorrow and delusion, respectively. Sattva has the function of manifestation (prakāśa) rajas has the function of activity (pravṛttī) and tamas has the

2. S.P.B. VI 39.
3. Yukti Dīpikā P. 57/12
4. S.P.S. I 127, also in S.K. 12.
function of restraint (niyama).

"Briefly speaking, in any entity, whether physical or psychical, whatever is serene and tranquil is due to sattva. All excitement, motion, force or energy is due to rajas and all that is massive, inert or dull is due to tamas."

Vijñānabhikṣu says that these guṇas are not the qualities of the Vaiśeṣika system, but they are substances. They are substances rather than attributes, because they possess the qualities of lightness, activity and inertia and are capable of "conjunction and disjunction". "They are the qualities of objects and not of puruṣas. They are objective, ultimate and irreducible elements of experience."

The guṇas are not three in number. But they are infinite and classified in three groups. When we talk about sattva we do not mean one substance only but a number of subtle substances, possessing the common characteristics of luminosity and self-shiningness.

1. S.K. 12.
5. Anima Sen Gupta -The Evolution of the Sāṃkhya School of Thought P. 17.
These gunas, though always functioning antagonistically are always in co-operation with one another. Each guna is capable of suppressing the other two and dominating over them. They act like the oil, wick and fire in a lamp. In every act there are all the three gunas but one guna predominates. They represent both sameness and diversity in nature. They show that the world of experience is always changing. They are ever in a state of flux.

Prakṛti is, no doubt, a changing and evolving principle, but there is also the conscious principle, which Śāṅkhya calls puruṣa, on account of which the evolutionary process sets in and continues. We shall now study the notion of puruṣa in Śāṅkhya and try to find out what relation it bears to prakṛti. The

(ii) Purusai:

The explanation of the world can hardly be satisfactory with only one unconscious principle. Śāṅkhya thinkers, probably, recognised this fact and propounded an equally ultimate conscious substance known as Puruṣa. The word 'Puruṣa' is commonly used to denote man and woman is excluded from its denotation. But the case with Śāṅkhya philosophers is otherwise. Puruṣa for them is an ultimate conscious substance which

2. Y.B. II. 15.
moves prakrti, as we will see, to give rise to this universe. Now, let us discuss the notion of purusa in brief and, before coming to the nature of purusa according to Samkhya, it is proper to go to those sources from which Samkhya concept of purusa seems to have been derived.

Upanisads are the treasure house in which we find the basic conceptions of almost all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, either in their full-fledged forms or in the embryo. The idea of purusa in Samkhya does not seem to be the original conception of the propounders of this school of thought. It may be remembered in this connection that a deep study of the scriptures and of the Vedic lore was considered a necessary training for every founder of a religious sect or a system of philosophy in India. It may, therefore, be presumed that Kapila in his own day and his followers in the later stages of the development of Samkhya, may have been influenced by Upanisadic thoughts.

The conception of purusa in Samkhya appears to have been derived from the Upanisads where we find the word 'self' used in different senses. In Chandogya Upanisad, there is a dialogue between Prajapati, the teacher and Indra, the pupil, on this subject. The idea of 'self' there has developed in four stages, namely, the bodily self, the empirical self, the

1. Chandogya Upanisad VIII 7-11.
transcendental self and the absolute self. The Saṃkhya idea of purusa seems to approximate to the third type of consciousness, i.e. the transcendental 'self', but the 'manyness' of the purusas in Saṃkhya characterises them as belonging to a category all by itself.

In some Upanisads the term 'purusa' is used in the sense of empirical self. Purusa is called 'enjoyer'. In Katha Upanisad soul is compared with the lord of chariot, the body itself is the chariot, buddhi is the charioteer, and mind is the bridle which keeps the chariot under control.

The notion of purusa resembling that of Saṃkhya may be found in the books of the epic age also. In the Mahābhārata, this twenty-fifth principle i.e. purusa, is called ksetrajña, but it is also called the spark of the Supreme Self getting entangled in the meshes woven by prakṛti. Herein it differs from Saṃkhya conception. The Saṃkhya does not recognise the twenty-sixth principle, viz. God, of whom the individual soul may be called a spark. In another passage of the Mahābhārata we find a similar notion of purusa.

"The perceiving self is in fact different from the mind-body complex with which it gets identified through ignorance. Though radically distinct these two principles are related together like fish and fig leaf."

In Bhagavadgītā, virtually a part of Mahābhārata, we find the reference of purūṣa as inactive. The sloka runs as follows, "He sees aright who looks upon actions as in all respects performed by prakṛti alone and upon the self as never an agent." Elsewhere in the same book it is stated, "When purūṣa is united with prakṛti it becomes enjoyer."

This conception of purūṣa which is found in upanisads, Mahābhārata and Bhagavadgītā is no doubt the very basis of the Śāmkhya concept of self but in propounding the nature of purūṣa the Śāmkhya philosophy has gone a step further. In Upanisads, as we all know, self or soul has no independent existence. It is a part and parcel of the same universal spirit known as Brahman or God. But Śāmkhya, on the other hand, gives purūṣa an independent and absolute existence. This, we may hold, is a departure from Upanisadic point of view.

The purusa in Sāṃkhya philosophy is described as being devoid of all other attributes, except pure consciousness. Consciousness is its essence, and not its quality. It is not bliss. So it differs from the Vedāntic concept of Ātman which is Sat, Chit and Ānand. Purusa is not one, but many. Each body has its separate soul or purusa, which serves as the basic epistemological principle of knowledge in each person.

It is an abstract principle - a subtle substance, being without parts. The purusa is a seer because it perceives the modifications of prakṛti, is enjoyer because it experiences pleasure and pain, is pure and spotless, because it is not the doer of any action, good, bad or indifferent, and so is free from merit or demerit (dharma or adharma), which are the functions of buddhi and not of purusa. No virtue or vice can be attributed to it, as it is free from all desire or aversion. It is immutable and cannot have volitions.

The purusa in Sāṃkhya is described as unfailing light (Sadāprakāśasvarūpa), which does not change, and without which all knowledge would be blind. It is neither cause nor effect.

1. S.P.S. I - 146.
3. S.P.B. VI 54.
4. S.P.B. I 75.
Purusa is eternal and immutable, while prakrti is eternal and mutable. Purusa is not an object, but is a witness (saksin) to which buddhi shows its modes and modifications and keeps it charmed and spell-bound. It is inactive, only the gunas are active, which are the constituents of prakrti.

Purusa is present everywhere; it is all seeing, and also perceives pleasure and pain due to avidya. It is in essence neither an actor nor doer because it is passive and also because it does not possess the gunas, which motivate and initiate action. All action is due to ahamkara and not to purusa. Purusa is without parts, without seeds and without matter. It is eternal, pure, conscious and free. Its bondage is only phenomenal. It is free from pains and sorrows. Purusa is adhisthata because it is guide and supervisor.

It gets liberation only when it has discriminative knowledge that the things coming out of prakrti do not belong to it, when renunciation of all worldly objects, passions and desires frees it from all attachments to prakrti, in one word, when he comes to his own true self. Panchasikha is reported to have said,

1. Y.B. IV. 33.
2. S.P.S. VI. 54.
5. S.P.S. I 142.
"He who knows the twenty-five substances, whatever stage of life he may be in, and whether he wear matted hair, a top knot or be shaven, he is liberated."  

Purusa is not liberated by actions but by knowledge, so purusa in Samkhya is not an agent. We find in Bhagavadgītā the śloka which says,

"This imperishable supreme self neither acts nor suffers, even while staying in the body."  

The arguments put forward for the existence of purusa in Samkhya are as follows-

The aggregate of nature must exist for the sake of something. The body is the aggregate of the five gross elements. It is enjoyed by the purusa even as a bed is enjoyed by the man who sleeps upon it. Moreover, all the objects of nature are composed of three gunas. They presuppose a self who is their seer and devoid of three gunas. Further, it may be said that there must be something to be the presiding power for which the evolution takes place. Non-intelligent products of prakṛti are controlled by the intelligent purusas even as non-intelligent

1. Tattva-Samāsa Sūtra III, Pañcaratnākha's view.
3. S.K. 17 also in S.P.S. I 140 - 144.
5. S.P.S. I 141.
chariots are controlled by the charioteers. In the next place, all knowable objects presuppose the existence of the knower. There can be no not-self without self. Experience is the privileged gift for the immutable purusa, it can never belong to prakrti. Lastly, prakrti evolves to serve the needs and wishes of the purusa. It is pre-supposed that the purusas, when they are fed up with the charms of prakrti, develop discrimination and desire liberation. This implies the existence of purusas with qualities different from those of prakrti.

Anima Sen Gupta has pointed out that the first four arguments given above are definitely of teleological nature. The cosmological process is not going on haphazardly, but with some definite purpose, under the guidance of the eternal consciousness, "which though inactive, co-ordinates, synthesizes and gives meaning to all our worldly experiences." The evolution of prakrti is to serve the purposes of the purusas. The fifth argument, however, is of an ontological nature. It is based on the scriptures which promise release to the purusas on certain conditions, such as having discriminatory knowledge. It is not only within their rights but is also of their nature.

2. Anima Sen Gupta - The Evolution of the Śāṁkhya School of thought P. 27.
to strive for liberation. This essential urge of the purusas, which cannot be falsified, as it is based on the scriptures, denotes the existence of the conscious principle struggling for release.

Sri Udaivir Sastri is of the opinion that the second argument given above proves the existence of a being that controls prakṛti i.e. Parmātman or God. It appears that this scholar is trying to prove that even the classical Sāṁkhya has a theistic touch. We are afraid that the inferences of Sri Udaivir Sastri do not seem to be justified in the context of other arguments given above to prove the existence of purusa.

Sāṁkhya recognises the multiplicity of purusas. This view is also found in the Upaniṣads, but there the purusas are the empirical selves or jīvātmans. A similar view can also be found in Ahirbudhnya Samhitā, a treatise on Sāṁkhya. Purusas are like the collection of selves in a honey-comb. These selves being special manifestations of God are in themselves pure and omniscient but when they are associated with ignorance, they become impure. Being manifestations

2. S.K. 18.
3. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad VI - 12.
of God, they are different, in conception, from the purusas of the classical Śāmkhya.

Śāmkhya gives some arguments to prove the multiplicity of purusas. Birth, death, and experiences of pleasure and pain differ from person to person, as the personal qualities, attainments and character of all persons are not the same. So there are different souls in different bodies. Sense organs of different persons are also different, so there are different purusas. If there were one purusa in different bodies, the activities of one person would automatically and simultaneously lead to the activity of all persons. Sattva, rajas and tamas, by their varied combinations, produce different moral attitudes in different persons, indicating multiplicity of souls. If there had been only one purusa, then all persons would die at once or will have the same pains and pleasures, or with the liberation of one soul, all souls will be liberated, causing pralaya at any moment. The passages of the scriptures which suggest monism are interpreted as referring to the non-difference of essential properties.2

Prof. Radhakrishnan has summed up the relevance of this principle of Śāmkhya. "The Śāmkhya lays stress on the

1. S.P.S. I. 149.
numerical distinctness of the streams of consciousness as well as the individual unity of the separate streams.¹

Thus we have discussed the nature of purusa and prakṛti separately. One of them, as we have seen, is unconscious but acts under the influence of unconscious teleology to bring forth the objects of the world. The other is a conscious substance which plays a most significant role in the evolutionary process. Now the question arises as to how these two different principles are related to each other. And to answer this question is the problem of our next discussion.

(iii) Relation between prakṛti and Purusa:

The relation between prakṛti and purusa explains the entire evolutionary process in Sāmkhya philosophy. This philosophy is based on the principle of dualism between prakṛti and purusa. As already indicated, prakṛti is unconscious but inactive and indifferent (udāsin). It seems really difficult to imagine the relation between the two entities which are diametrically opposed to each other. The gulf between the two is so wide that no connecting link seems to be visible.

Sāmkhya tries to surmount this difficulty by analogies and hypotheses. Here we do not intend to examine these analogies and hypotheses critically. Our purpose, here, is only to see as to how Sāmkhya thinkers establish a relation between these two divergent principles.

According to Sāmkhya philosophy, at the beginning of the evolutionary process, prakṛti is in unmanifested form. The three gunas of prakṛti are in the state of equilibrium. When purusa comes close to prakṛti, the relation between the two then is that of sannidhi (Proximity), there is a stir created in the uncreated cosmos, with the result that the equilibrium of the three gunas or the strands of prakṛti is disturbed. Prakṛti which was in a quiescent state is awakened from its slumber and becomes active. The evolutionary process starts.

At this stage, the relation between purusa and prakṛti is only of proximity. We can explain this relation by the analogy of magnet and iron. Just as the magnet attracts iron, so purusas move prakṛti by their proximity. The purusas of Sāmkhya are, in some respects, like God of Aristotle, which is the unmoved mover of the world.

The relation of purusa and prakṛti in Sāmkhya is not that of direct contact between two entities of opposite
nature. Purusa is reflected in buddhi, the first evolute of prakṛti, on account of the nearness of purusa to it. The reflection theory obviates the difficulty of establishing contact between purusa and buddhi, both of which are of heterogeneous nature. Vyāsa, the author of the Yoga-Bhāṣya, seems to think that contact between purusa and buddhi may be possible, as the relation between them is that of identity-in-difference. The purusa is not entirely similar to buddhi, nor entirely different from it.

Whenever sattva predominates in buddhi, it becomes sattavika, i.e. transparent and bright, and like purusa luminous. It is in this condition that buddhi catches the reflection of purusa. The unconscious buddhi, which is only an evolute of prakṛti and partakes of its nature, is suddenly illumined by the effulgent light shed on it by purusa. The reflection of purusa on buddhi is in the nature of the reflection of the moon on the surface of water in a lake. The moon does not actually get itself united with the clear water but it seems to be so on account of the reflection cast on its surface, and being united with it. Similarly, the purusa is not united with buddhi but it appears to be so, since its reflection has been united with it. Here it may be pointed out that purusa is, in fact, inactive, but it appears active, on account of the

1. Yoga-Bhāṣya II 20 (Sa Buddhern sarūpam nātyantam virūp iti)
activity of buddhi in producing evolutes, just in the same way as the moon seems to tremble on the surface of water, on account of the tremors in the water.

Purusa does not directly enjoy the cognitions of buddhi or its material evolutes but it does so through the medium of its reflection on it. It may be noted that this 'bhoga', on the part of the purusa, is only imaginary and not real. From this contact, the inactive purusa appears as active. Sāmkhya Karika no. 20 also explains this phenomenon in the following words:-

"Thus from this union, the insentient "evolute" appears as if "sentient", and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the attributes, the spirit, which is neutral, appears as if it were active."

Purusa, though conscious, is abstract and is incapable of enjoying the fruits of prakrti. It is only due to ahaṃkāra that the feeling is created in it of appropriating to itself the evolutes of prakṛti. It wrongly supposes that whatever the evolutes of buddhi experience, are its own experiences; it feels pleasure or pain as the case may be. By acquiring the discriminatory knowledge that the entire thought

1. S.K. 20 Jha's translation - from A Source Book in Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore.
stuff which it has considered to be its own, is foreign property; it first becomes isolated from it and then gets liberation.

There is difference of opinion between thinkers about this theory. Vacaspati Misra holds the view that there is no contact between puruṣa and buddhi in space or time. There is only reflection of puruṣa in buddhi. Aniruddha also holds the same view. Buddhi is an evolute of prakṛti and is unconscious. Its modifications, such as pleasure and pain, and its cognitions, are also unconscious. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is conscious and indifferent to pleasure and pain. Such an indifferent puruṣa, when reflected in buddhi, identifies itself with buddhi. He wrongly thinks that the modifications of buddhi are its own. The result is its bondage through non-discrimination caused by avidyā. The change also occurs in buddhi. From this reflection the unconscious buddhi appears as conscious.2

This theory of single reflection of Vacaspati Misra does not satisfactorily explain how change occurs in puruṣa itself. There is only reflection of puruṣa in buddhi. How can puruṣa be said to be the enjoyer of the buddhi states when there is only connection between its image and buddhi and not between buddhi and real puruṣa?

1. S.S.V.I 143 Garbe's translation P. 78.
2. S.T.K. 5 P. 35.
Further, it is also said that purusa must have eyes to see the modifications in buddhi before it appropriates them to itself. It must have other senses also, just as we have, because the field of experience which purusa is likely to have, is so wide and requires the use of all senses on the part of the experiencer. Purusa, however, is a conscious substance, but is not credited with sense organs.

To remove this difficulty, Viṣṇuabhaikṣu tries to evolve the double reflection theory by which he claims to explain satisfactorily the relation between prakṛti and purusa, through buddhi. There is mutual reflection between purusa and buddhi. Viṣṇuabhaikṣu explains this theory by the analogy of crystal and red flower. The redness of the flower does not transfer to crystal but only reflects on it. In the same way there is no transference (uparāga) of the modes of buddhi to the self but there is only their reflection. With this, there appears in purusa the false sense of identity with buddhi on account of its having abhimāṇa. The reflection of the self in buddhi is called the appearance of the self (cidadesa). This theory presumes that there is no modification in purusa on account of its witnessing or perceiving the events in buddhi through reflection. It is its own reflection back in it which

conveys to it what it claims to be its own through ahamkāra. The self cannot have knowledge of objects without this double reflection.1

This theory also explains the phenomenon of bondage. "A special kind of conjunction (samyogavisēsa) between purusa and buddhi is the cause of bondage."2 Radhakrishnan3 has clarified the view when he says, "Bondage is the reflection in purusa of impurities of buddhi."4

Both the theories viz. those of Vacaspati Misra and Viśnabhikṣu try to explain the contact between purusa and prakṛti through reflection. The single reflection theory credits the purusa with the power of perceiving the modifications in buddhi and claiming them as its own. The purusa, though conscious, does not possess any such powers of perception and it is incomprehensible that it could have such experiences. The double reflection theory, on the other hand, absolves purusa of the responsibility of exercising its own powers of observation, which it is not known to possess. Its own reflection with modifications caused by buddhi, is reflected back in it. Being inactive and passive, it is in a position of receiving back the impressions cast on its own reflection by the evolutes of buddhi. This latter theory seems to be more

1. S.F.B. I 87. cited by J.N. Sinha in his 'A History of Indian Philosophy' P. 50.
2. Ibid I. 19.
3. Radhakrishnan-Indian Philosophy Vol II. P. 293.
convincing than that of Vācaspāti Miśra, but this, too, explains an imaginary phenomenon in an imaginary way.

To avoid such explanations of the hard facts of life, Śāmkhya should have been more realistic in propounding its theory of evolution. Contact between two heterogenous entities, through reflection, is a poor device in rationalistic philosophy. It may convince only those students of śāmkhya philosophy who go to read it with only faith and devotion. To a critical mind it may not give even the least satisfaction.