CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

(a) A Common-sense View of Reality:

It can very well be seen that the philosophical view of reality has been constantly changing throughout the ages, but our common-sense view of reality has been more or less the same even in different times and countries. Almost in every age, ordinary people believed that the objects around them are real. They have independent existence and are not illusory in any sense. Even today, when scientific discoveries and philosophical speculations have completely transformed the long-established notions about the reality of the worldly objects, our common-sense view of reality has not undergone any radical change. In this connection, Prof. C. E. M. Joad has rightly observed that "the attitude of the ordinary man in the street to the universe is that of an uncompromising realist. He conceives of himself as existing in a world of objects which exist together with him, yet independently of him, and he regards his consciousness as a sort of search-light which illuminates this world of objects, and enables him to ascertain their number and nature." This statement of Prof. Joad clearly tells us that for a common man there is no other reality than this world of objects. Prof. Maxmuller also seems to hold the same view when he says that

"Thus to the great majority of mankind what we call the phenomenal world is thoroughly real, they know nothing more real..........") Here it will not be out of place to maintain that the seer of Brhadaranyaka Upanisad has also the commonsense view of reality when he says that "Real is that which is seen or perceived."

Thus all these statements of different thinkers of different times prove the fact that the reality from the common-sense point of view is that which is perceived through our senses and exists without our mind. A common man does not bother much about what transcends our universe and is not within the reach of our senses. His attitude towards transempirical reality is neutral. Whether there is any transcendent reality or not, he is not concerned with it. This is a universal fact and can be maintained without any hesitation.

(b) Philosophical Views about the Ultimate Reality:

But this common-sense view of reality falls to the ground when we give even a little thought to it. It can very easily be seen that what we see or perceive is not always reality. We see a snake in a rope and silver in a conch-shell. But both these appearances are not real. They are illusions, pure and simple. No doubt, sometimes, these

2. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 5, 14, 4.
illusions work, even then they cannot be said to be real. Moreover, some other phenomena, which are the subject-matter of our experience, can hardly be said to be real. Generally, we do not believe that dreams and hallucinations are real, though they form a part of our experience. Hence we can very well maintain that whatever seems or appears to be there, is not always there. Though to be real, it ought to be there, yet what is there is not always real.

Materialists however, of all ages, have held that the ultimate reality is of material nature. Even the human consciousness, in their view, is a by-product of matter. Everything comes from matter, and to matter it returns. Nothing is real which is not material. Naturalism, which is a wider class of materialism, holds that nature, which is the aggregate of all existing things, is the ultimate reality. Their views about reality may not prove consistent on the criterion of reason, but still there is some reason behind these views. Perception, which is generally thought to be a valid source of knowledge, tells us that the external objects are not merely fictitious.

There are, however, thinkers who give a different view, nay, a different criterion of reality. Bradley, a neo-Hegelian, is a thorough-going idealist. Reality for him is
that which does not contradict itself. For him, that which flows, that which does not stay, that which changes colour, cannot be real. He is definitely against the materialist view, because what is material is changeable. It contradicts itself, because it changes. Moreover, reality for Bradley is of spiritual nature. It is one -absolute. The whole world is a manifestation of that absolute.

Here we are reminded of a great Indian Idealist, Śaṅkara, who, like Bradley, holds that the criterion of ultimate reality is Abādhatva or non-contradiction. Śaṅkara also holds that reality is one, absolute, and of spiritual nature. It is that about which our understanding does not vary. It is 'ekarūpa', 'ekarasa', and undifferentiated. Not only Śaṅkara but also other so many idealists of east and west, hold that reality is eternal, unchangeable and absolute.

It hardly seems necessary to multiply these views here. Suffice it to say, that such views about ultimate reality are the products of reason, yet Hegel will say of 'hard-thinking!'

Thus, these are the problems which set the philosophers of various times to think and decide- what is real? What is the nature of reality? How many realities are there -

1. Bradley - Appearance and Reality Page. 120.
2. Ibid, P. 120.
whether one, two, or many? These questions have been the subject - matter of discussions throughout the History of Philosophy - from ancient times down to our own days. Influenced by the culture and thought of their own times and places, different philosophers have answered these questions differently. Their answers differ, but their purpose has been the same - to know the truth, to discover what is real.

Their answers have come to us in the form of certain "isms", like Pluralism, Dualism, Monism and Neutralism etc. Though these 'isms' may not constitute the whole truth, yet they are, undoubtedly, efforts of noble minds full of curiosity to know. Therefore let us propound a few of these efforts here. They may, perhaps, give us a background to study the Dualistic philosophies of Descartes and Śāmkhya which are the main topics of discussion in the present thesis.

(i) PLURALISM:

The whole history of philosophy, as we have seen, is a conflict of ideas about the nature and number of ultimate reality. Both in early Greek and Indian philosophies, we find that attempts were made to ascertain those fundamental elements of which this universe is composed. The early Greek philosophers, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, have propounded only one element of which this whole cosmos is made.
There were, however, some thinkers, who were dissatisfied with such explanations, and they propounded not one but many elements which constitute the world. These thinkers are known as pluralists, and their philosophies as pluralism. Pluralism may, therefore, be defined as that metaphysical doctrine which maintains that all existence is ultimately reducible to a multiplicity of distinct and independent beings or elements. Pluralism is of various kinds, but two types of it, viz. materialistic and spiritual are worth mentioning.

Greek Pluralism is generally materialistic. By materialistic pluralism we mean a theory according to which ultimate constituents of the world are many but they are all of material nature. The first known Pluralist in Greek tradition seems to be Empedocles, who declared that the universe is made up of four elements, Earth, Water, Air and Fire which by their varied combinations, produced the objects which we see in the world. Creation is not possible without change or motion, so he attributed all motion to the two opposite principles, 'Love' and 'Hate'. Love mixes the various elements as "a baker cementing barley
meal with water" and hate allows the elements of natural affinity to separate themselves to form objects of different kinds.

The four elements were not considered enough to explain the whole of creation. So, Anaxagoras thought that there are infinite number of elements but they are all of material nature. For Anaxagoras, then, matter is a name given to an indefinite number of elements of different kinds. The number of elements is the same as the number of qualities in the world. This conception is called 'qualitative atomism.' This alone cannot explain the creation of the world, for which change or motion is necessary. He identifies the moving principle of the universe with mind (nous) which alone is self-moved, and causes motion in everything else. Although it is different from the elements, it still retains the appearance of material agency. It is the thinnest of all things.

1. Rogers - A Students' History of Philosophy, P. 32.

2. Ibid. P. 36.
Materialistic in outlook, but of great significance in modern scientific research, is the theory of the atomic creation of the world, as enunciated by Leucippus and his pupil, Democritus. Atoms are infinitesimally small. They are eternal and are of different shapes. They move at a tremendously rapid velocity and form vortices in space, as their motion is circulatory, due to their being of different sizes and weights. Those of similar size and shape group together and form objects. They sort out "as the shaking of a sieve sorts out millet, wheat and barley." It is interesting to note that his atomism can even explain the theory of elements propounded by Empedocles.

The atomists reduced the qualitative differences into quantitative ones, thus enabling Mathematics and Physics to work out scientific notions in a concrete form. Even mind or soul was treated as atomic matter, though composed of the fire-atoms which were supposed to be the smallest and smoothest of all. When these atoms joined together in animal body they endowed it with consciousness.

The spiritualistic type of Pluralism was represented by the German philosopher, Leibniz (1646-1716). Like Spinoza,

1. Rogers - A Student's History of Philosophy, P. 38.
he believed that substance is the starting point in metaphysical speculation, but his substance was an independent power of action, a centre of force or energy, which he called a 'monad'. Like atoms, the monads are single units, but they differ from them in that no two monads are alike. Atoms are divisible but monads are not, the former are the material constituents of bodies but the latter are not, being centres of energy. Each monad is a microcosm, a multiplicity in unity, a mirror of all reality. Among themselves, the monads differ in that some represent all reality more clearly and perfectly than the others. They form an hierarchy: the supreme monad or monad of all monads, is God; man's soul is the 'Queen' monad, whereas sleeping monads form inorganic matter. Each forms a system with others according to a moral law which Leibniz has termed as 'Pre-established Harmony'. So, we may, in the end, remark that his philosophy ultimately recognises the need of some form of system or unity.

Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), another philosopher of the modern age, propounded the pluralistic theory of 'reals'. Nothing in the world has one quality and nothing is so simple as to be one single thing. Each thing can be analysed into smaller units or constituents, each possessing its own quality. So, we may assume that there are many 'reals' because there are so many things having so many qualities. 'Reals' are simple, unchangeable entities which cannot be further analysed, and which are the constituent parts of an object.
In the 18th century, there was a revival of the Atomic Theory according to the modern conception of matter. The name of Dalton is associated with it. Since then chemical analysis of the atom is still going on along the path he pointed out. It has been proved that each atom is not simple in structure, as was supposed by earlier scientists. Recent researches in Physics have revealed that each atom is within itself a complex universe of electrical energy. It is now said to be composed of a nucleus or positive electricity and one or more electrons or negative electricity, revolving about the nucleus at a very rapid rate of motion.

We have discussed the main pluralist thinkers of the west. Let us now peep through the lattice - windows of the East to find out some luminaries who, like their Greek counterparts, were of pluralistic convictions. Pārāśāvanāth, a materialistic thinker of 8th century B.C., maintained that 'all living beings, all things, the whole world, consists of nothing but these five elements.' The Cārvāka ārṣaṅkha also gives a pluralistic view of materialism. It recognises the four elements which constitute the different objects of the world.

1. Bertrand Russell in his 'Outline of Philosophy' chapter one, remarks, "Now Physics says that a table or chair is "really" an incredibly vast system of electrons and protons in rapid motion, with empty space in between."
Not only the heterodox thinkers, but also the philosophers holding orthodox views, have propounded the pluralistic theory. Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣikā school of Indian philosophy was an Atomist. According to him two atoms coalesce together to form a 'dyad', three 'dyads' form a 'triad'. Thus the 'dyads', by multiple combinations, create the world of multitudinous objects. During creation they possess a vibratory motion (parīspanda).

Some thinkers maintain that Indians borrowed their atomic theory from the Greeks. Berridale Keith says that the Atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikā owes its inspiration to Greek thought and arose possibly at a period when India was in contact with the western world, where the doctrine was widespread. But there is no evidence to show that the Indian thinkers borrowed it from the Greeks. Rather, there are vital differences between the two. The atoms of Vaiśeṣikā are at rest and are moved only in the process of creation by an abstract force called 'Aḍṛṣṭa', whereas the atoms of Democritus are whirling about in space. Further, the atoms of Democritus have only quantitative differences, but in Kaṇāda the atoms possess their own qualities or Viśeṣas. Democritus believed that the soul also is atomic but the Vaiśeṣikas treat it as co-eternal with atoms. In

1. Berridale Keith.
Greek atomism, there is no moral order, but in Vaiśeṣika there is a moral law or dharma (adṛṣṭa), central to the atomic structure.

After discussing the pluralistic viewpoint, both of eastern and western thinkers, we come to the conclusion that philosophy does not deal merely with the dry-as-dust facts of science but also with the working of the human mind. Materialistic Pluralism has failed to give a satisfactory account of cosmological evolution. It does not say how many independent realities unify to create this cosmos.

Spiritualist/Pluralism also has its drawbacks. The theory of Leibniz that his window-less monads exist and function according to Pre-established Harmony is no philosophical explanation. The comparison of monads with clocks keeping time without being out of order or needing the services of a watch-maker, sounds like a fairy tale.

Nor has Indian Pluralism fared better. In the Vaiśeṣika system, there are only seven categories. The number seems to be arbitrary. There cannot be qualitative differences among atoms, as is held in this system. If they differ in quality, their must be difference in form and weight. If their qualities change, the atoms cannot be eternal. If the qualities are eternal, why do they change when they leave the souls at the time of death? So, we find that pluralism may have appealed
to the primitive mind, but it has failed as a satisfactory explanation of the various problems connected with metaphysics. We now turn to examine another system of philosophy which claims to explain the cosmological evolution by positing two opposite substances. This system we call dualism.

(2) **DUALISM:**

We have seen, in brief, the main features of pluralistic viewpoint towards the cosmos and in the end we have maintained that, as metaphysics, it completely fails to give a systematic account of the world. This takes us towards a second system which admits two independent realities, as constituent factors of the universe. We call this system 'Dualism' and its followers 'Dualists'. Dualism is a philosophical term applied to any system of thought which rests on two co-existent principles, which are heterogeneous and irreducible.

Dualism is related to a tendency of the human mind to think of one's experiences and feelings in terms of opposite meanings. We contrast pleasure with pain, joy with sorrow, weak with strong and sweet with bitter.

The Chinese philosophers contrast good with evil. All good forces are enshrined in 'Yang' and bad elements are united in 'Yin'. 'Yang' and 'Yin' are further contrasted as masculine and feminine. Similarly, in Persia, the contrast
is between the 'Ahuras' and the 'Devas', forces of good and evil respectively. Later on, they are incorporated into 'Ahur Mazda' and 'Ahirman'. These symbolic forces of good and evil take the shape of a cosmic struggle. Earth is created by the joint action of both, and man is expected to side with the benevolent principle in the cosmic strife.

The germ of dualism is found in Greek philosophy also. There are discussions between material and immaterial, reality and appearance, boundless and limited. There are also cosmological questions whether things are one or many.

Anaxagoras made a distinction between mind and physical objects. Plato, though he claims to be an idealist, seems to propound two realities, ideas and objects. He has drawn a distinction between the two kinds of realities, the Idea (Archetype) and the phenomena (copies or Ectypes). The ideas are of the highest order, immaterial, real and eternal. Their copies which form the basis of our daily experience are imperfect, transient and illusory. Thus "Plato's dualism puts the ideal over against the material, the universal over against the particular, the perfect over against the imperfect, the absolute over against the relative."

1. Ernest Hocking - Types of Philosophy P. 220.
In Mediaeval philosophy, St. Augustine has maintained in his system the complete dualism, which regards the soul as immaterial substance, and man as the union of two substances, body and soul. He has also drawn a distinction between soul and inner experience. Among the mystics, Hugo of St. Victor is conscious that the soul is the lowest in the immaterial world and the human body highest in the material world, the two are yet so opposite in constitution that their union remains an incomprehensible enigma. It is in this that God has shown that there is nothing impossible.

Descartes, whose views we will discuss in chapters to come, is a well-known dualist of modern times. According to him, the world falls into two completely separated realms, that of bodies and that of minds. In the background of this dualism there stands, in the thought of Descartes, the conception of God as perfect substance. Bodies and minds are finite substances, created by God. God alone is infinite being. Descartes' greatest merit is his 'clear and distinct' characterization of the difference between mind and body. Mind is regarded as a thinking substance and matter as an extended one. There is nothing common between the two. We shall see later on how this differentiation between the two, created a gulf which was hard for him to bridge.

1. Hugo of St. Victor
Not only the western thinkers but also the Indian rishis visualised that the cosmos can be explained by assuming two substances. We find traces of the idea of dualism in Upanishads.

Kapila, the founder of the Śāmkhya system of philosophy, is the greatest protagonist of dualism. According to him, Puruṣa and Prakṛti are the two substances which together explain the evolution of the universe.

The dualism of Śāmkhya had a distant echo across centuries in the philosophy of Madhava. In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan. "Madhava stands out for unqualified dualism and insists on five great distinctions of God and the individual, God and matter, the individual soul and matter, one soul and another, and one part of matter and another."

After discussing the main features of dualism we can conclude that it has failed to explain the origin and development of this universe. If two independent realities are admitted, the question automatically arises about their relation. How they influence each other, as we shall see hereafter, is itself a big question which has not been

1. Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad: 1.4.3. 
Praśna Upaniṣad 1 - 4.

2. Radhakrishnan - Indian Philosophy Vol. II P. 738.
satisfactorily answered by any dualistic philosophy what-soever. That is why rationalist thinkers of both east and west go to propound some sort of monism.

(3) **MONISM**

Monism is a metaphysical theory which advocates that ultimate reality is one. This reality may be either material in nature or spiritual or neutral. According to the nature of reality monism can very well be classified under three types, Materialism, Idealism and Neutralism.

(1) **MONISTIC MATERIALISM**

The human mind has been trying to find out what actually is the original ground of things which outlasts all temporal changes. Physical scientists tell us that it is matter, and philosophers designate this belief as materialism. This view visualises a general metaphysical theory that matter is the ultimate reality and that human beings and other living creatures have no immaterial soul. What we call consciousness is only an aspect of matter. According to this theory, mental events are only complex physical events. The working of the mind is determined only by physical processes. Materialism also implies that the world is eternal, not created by God, and is infinite in time and space. God has been divested of all responsibility of creation and destruction, so, He is a figment of imagination and has no existence.
The materialist treats both soul and body as different forms of matter. It is, however, important to notice that he does not deny the existence of mind or consciousness. What he denies is that mind and consciousness are characteristics of soul; rather, soul.

The first materialist theories made their appearance with the rise of philosophy as a result of the progress of scientific knowledge in astronomy, mathematics and physics in Greece, China, and India. The general feature of ancient materialism is the recognition of the world existing outside man's consciousness.

It was the merit of ancient materialism to create an hypothesis on the atomic structure of matter. The theory of atoms was propounded by Leucippus, and his pupil, Democritus, of the 5th century B.C. They believed that the ultimate constituents of the universe are indivisible, indestructible and eternal particles of matter, called atoms, which are moving about in empty space. All objects, animate and inanimate, are formed by the combination of these atoms and, by their disintegration, they decay or change their forms. Sensations are explained as the changes caused in the atoms of the soul by the atoms entering the human body through the sense organs. After death, not only the atoms of the body but also those of the soul fall off disjointed and disintegrated.
Progress in science in the 17th century gave an impetus to materialistic ideas. Science essentially deals with material objects, so it is naturally inclined towards naturalism. In the 17th century, thinkers like Hobbes, gave materialistic arguments in favour of science.

Materialism became the creed of 18th century atheists also such as Baron of d' Holbach in Germany, who says that everything is explained by matter and motion. Thought is the function of the brain and matter alone is immortal. There is no soul and no God.

In the 19th century there was a sudden upsurge in favour of materialism. New discoveries in physical sciences were mostly responsible for this change in outlook. In order to follow its rise, it is necessary to consider the discussions which began with the publication of Darwin's 'Origin of Species'. Darwin's work had shown that the evolution of life is a continuing process from the unicellular amoeba in which it first manifested itself to the final shape it took in the form of human being.
Materialism basically changed the viewpoint of psychological study. Human beings are now treated more or less as automata. Our actions seem to have no concern with the mind; they are to be interpreted by reflexes and physico-chemical actions in the body. "In the brain there are facts but no meanings. What is a meaning for the mind is a connection for the brain. The five o'clock whistle is connected with the muscular activities of quitting work."

The German, physiologist, Karl Vogt (1817-96), became notorious for his statement that thought is related to the brain, much as bile is related to the liver, and urine to the kidneys.

The official philosophy of the communist world is found in the writings of Karl Marx, Engels and Lenin, who were uncompromising materialists. Karl Marx used to say that "matter is not a product of mind but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter." Engels held that matter without motion is just as unthinkable as motion without matter. The human mind is governed by material laws.

1. Hocking - Types of Philosophy, P. 100.
2. Karl Marx;
3. Engels.
Indian materialists also held similar views about matter. Bṛhaspati is supposed to be the founder of Indian materialism. He and his followers denied God, soul and a life beyond the grave. Between the 8th and 9th centuries B.C. many varieties of materialist views existed in India. Lokāyata was born out of these views. Lokāyata is also called Āgarvāka darshana. Its main thesis is that what we perceive by the senses is real. We do not perceive akāśa. So it does not exist. Āgarvāka, therefore, recognises only four elements and not five as are traditionally believed. Consciousness cannot be perceived, so consciousness is not distinct from matter. God does not exist, because we cannot see Him. The four elements exist not on account of some external agency, but on account of their inherent nature or svabhāva of the world.

Materialism is not to be condemned as an unmixed evil. It has had its own use in man's life. It is said to have created self-confidence instead of reliance on supernatural powers, a determined will to act and not to depend on destiny. It has also given impetus to the study of science which has made wonderful progress, having been influenced by it. Materialism, as a type of speculative thinking, has been severely criticised.
It is the contention of materialists that everything can be explained by matter and that mind is also matter. We should not forget that the idea of matter is mental, because thought is a mental process. So, when the idea of matter is the product of the mind, we cannot say that mind is the product of matter. Matter is the object of consciousness, so consciousness should come first and not matter. Materialism cannot explain the origin of life from matter. Life comes only from life and not from lifeless matter. The materialists have asserted their theory in this respect but have not been able to prove it. Self-consciousness cannot be explained by materialism because it is a quality of mind. In matter we do not find this quality. It has utterly failed to explain freedom and creativity of mind, and the purposes and adjustments of life. If consciousness is a quality of body, then it must be observed by senses. But it cannot be seen.

So, materialism has failed to give a satisfactory account of cosmic evolution or matter's relation to man's life in the universe. We have lost faith in the principle of matter and turn to some other type of monism which may solve our problems in this regard. Monistic idealism seems to be that metaphysical principles to which we now turn.
(ii) IDEALISM:

We have seen how materialism has failed to explain the reality about the existence of the objects in the phenomenal world. There are thinkers who believe that reality is one, but it is not material. It is immaterial in nature. It is mind or spirit. The system which believes in the supremacy of mind over matter is called 'Idealism'.

In the Encyclopaedia Britannica we find idealism described "as the name of a group of distinct but allied philosophical theories, all of which agree in denying that mind has originated from or may be reduced to matter and in affirming that mind is a more fundamental feature of the universe than matter is."

Idealism may be of different types, but here we are concerned primarily, with monistic idealism. This type of monism originated from Plato's Idea of the Good, which formed the highest pinnacle of his hierarchy of ideas.

An important exponent of monistic idealism is the German philosopher, Fichte, who conducted his metaphysical research in the footsteps of Kant, but who, as an original thinker, recognised the principle of 'ego', which he considered to be the sole reality. Fichte's ego essentially takes the

1. Encyclopaedia Britannica - From the article on 'Idealism'.

place of Kant's 'thing-in-itself'. His ego does not mean the individual but the universal self-consciousness. He identifies it with self-activity and also with moral principle. From ego he deduces all thought and all being, all principles of morality and self-activity. His ego is the image of the Absolute.

After Fichte comes Schelling. He starts with the conception that reality consists of action, life and will. Energy is at the root of both the unconscious nature and self-conscious mind. This energy is identified with the 'absolute will' or 'ego', with the 'world spirit' which is immanent in all creation, mental and material.

"In Schelling's philosophy we find a combination of metaphysical thought with Natural Science. He postulates a common root for nature and intelligence alike in which the differences of the two merge themselves in abstract identity! He calls it Absolute will or Ego.

Mind and matter are not two parallel entities as in Spinoza but are the different stages in the evolution of the Absolute mind. His idealism is of the "Objective type.'

1. Rogers - A Students' History of Philosophy P. 405.
In order to have a clear idea of Hegel's idealism, it is necessary to start with his conception of the 'Absolute'. His Absolute is a dynamic force, a spiritual process which reconciles all differences arising from sense and intelligence. It includes both mind and nature. Being self-active and self-developing, it explains the entire evolutionary process of the world along with the development of mind. Thinking requires an object of thought; so there is an intimate relation between the two. Reality is thus an interrelated unity. "Hegel's central thought is that only the whole is real, the partial fact is an abstraction, which needs to be brought into connection with the whole in order to gain validity."

His philosophy is a type of idealism which is logical or conceptual rather than ethical or scientific. German Idealism created a metaphysical wave in the still and tranquil waters of western thought. British philosophers seem to have been affected by it, and its influence was felt in America and Italy also.

British Idealism is represented by its two important exponents, Green and Bradley. Green starts with an analysis of human knowledge which involves two principles, one Natural- and the other, Super-Natural or spiritual.

1. Rogers - A Student's History of Philosophy, P. 409.
The perception of an object does not conceive of mere sensations which may be disjointed, but requires the supernatural principle which Green calls consciousness, to unify the elements of perception. Without consciousness there would be no synthesis.

Consciousness is eternal, infinite and ultimate. It is beyond space and time. It is a spiritual force which never changes. If consciousness itself changed there would be nothing left to grasp the changes relating to the successive moments of change in worldly objects.

According to Green, mind or consciousness makes nature not in the sense that it creates it but in the sense that it constructs it out of given stuff. Both matter and form of our knowledge are the two products of mind or spirit. The spiritual principle in nature and the spiritual principle in man are one and the same thing. The same principle manifests itself in nature and synthesises the sensations in us. His spiritual principle is absolute. Thus Green's idealism is absolute idealism.

Bradley identifies reality with the Absolute. There are contradictions in the phenomenal world, but reality does not contradict itself. It is one and not many, for multiplicity of reality will lead to conflicts and contradictions. The Absolute of Bradley includes all diversities of concrete
existence, so it is a concrete universal. The Absolute is made up of the very stuff which forms our experience. So, experience is the same as reality. The Absolute cannot be identified with the God of religion. The conception of God is finite. He is supposed to possess certain attributes. He exists apart from man and is above all humanity. As an object of worship, he is treated as something different from worshipper. So he cannot be called an all-embracing and all-inclusive reality, but only one aspect of reality. The Absolute represents the whole of reality.

It is gratifying to note that Bradley's philosophy has much resemblance with that of Advaita Vedanta. Bradley's Idealism is the Absolute type of Idealism.

Monistic Idealism found its way to America and Italy also. The chief exponent of monistic idealism in America was Josiah Royce. He was greatly influenced by the English Neo-Hegelianism and also directly by the German thought. According to him, experience contains no facts which cannot be interpreted in terms of ideas. All the reality is ideal. The world presents no enigmas. It is intelligent and rational and has a system. Even the darkest mysteries about it are known to the supreme self, which is super-consciousness. It includes the consciousness of the finite individuals. His 'Absolute consciousness' is the God of religion.
The human will being dynamic and purposive conceives of the Absolute as the creator of the universe. Thus the philosophy of Royce provides a rational justification for the popular beliefs about God.

The Chief representative of Italian monistic idealism was Croce. On the continent the most widely influential reinterpretation of idealism was that of this Italian philosopher. He shifted his emphasis from Logic, which formed an integral part of Kantian philosophy, to 'cultural' values, such as art and history. His idealism may be called Aesthetic Idealism.

Monistic Idealism, as a metaphysical theory, has had its protagonists in Eastern countries also. In China, Leo Tze's philosophy was based on intuitions. Judaism produced idealistic philosophers. The Indian mind also recognised the importance of spirit over matter. The entire world is supported by Brahman, Prajna or Atman.

"Atman is known in every act of cognition. It is the basic light of all empirical knowledge. The Atman, though neither speakable nor thinkable nor provable has yet to be known as an eternal principle. It is the eternal, unchanging ground of all."

"In the language of the Upanisads, that which is below and above, which is in front or on the back, which is to the south or the north, may be represented either in terms of the individual self or in terms of the universal Atman."

This Upanisadic idealism has been variously propounded and interpreted by different Indian thinkers who came after Upanisadic age. The Yoga-Vāśistha also propounds monistic idealism similar to that of Upanisads.

Vāśistha has first analysed the phenomenon of experience. "The first revelation of experience is the multiplicity of individuals and things. Our reflective consciousness reduces this plurality to a duality of the subject and the object." He further says that "the subject cannot be aware of the object unless they are related. There cannot exist any relation between two heterogeneous things." Vāśistha goes a step further when he says that there is a unity in the subject, object and their relation, which, in its own nature, is beyond the three, yet which exists in them. Bradley seems to think like Vāśistha when he says that "A relation between A and B implies really a substantial foundation within them."

---

1. Haridas Bhattacharya in the 'Cultural Heritage of India' under 'Nature of the Soul.'
2. B.L. Ātreya - The Philosophy of the Yoga-Vāśistha, P. 149.
3. Ibid, P. 150, III, 121, 37
Vāsīṣṭha seems to be very scientific in his idealistic conceptions. He takes up the categories of time and space and proves that they are mental events. The extension of space is nothing real in itself apart from a mind. A long distance of miles may be represented by an artist on a small piece of canvas. The reality of time consists in imagination. "The whole life-time of Manu is only a moment for Brahmā and the life of Brahmā is said to be a day for Vīṣṇu, the life-time of Vīṣṇu, again is said to be a day for Śiva." The relativity of time and space are accepted as facts by modern scientists, such as Einstein. The relation that exists between the object and the subject is that of identity. "The mind and the objects are never different." As the surging waves are related to the sea from which they arise, as the spreading beams of the moon are related to the moon, as the mirage-river is related to the sun, so are the objects related to the subject from which they arise.

The germs of monistic idealism we also find in Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to it, the whole world is ideal (Vijñāna - maya). There is no such thing as an objective world. Says Aśvaghosa "Independent of that which perceives i.e. the Ego, there is no surrounding world of objects."

1. B. L. Ātreya - The Philosophy of the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha P. 161 III, 60, 26, III, 60, 26.
2. Ibid. P. 166 2. B. Ibid.
The monistic idealism of the Upanishads culminated in Advaita Vedanta of Śaṅkara, the great idealistic monist of India, has proved that this cosmos which consists of various kinds of objects has Brahman or Ātman as its ultimate cause. Brahman is both material and efficient cause of the world, but is not itself material at all.

Śaṅkara inspired new Vedántins like Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan to propound monistic idealism of their own kinds.

By far the most important figure is that of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, the sage of Pondicherry. According to him, "the basic reality is beyond all conflicting relative characters, subjective and objective, that it is an attribute-less indeterminate, Absolute - a nīrguna and nirviṣeṣa Brahman, as Śaṅkara has conceived it." We may know it only by direct intuition, not by any description.

In this context, we can not ignore Radhakrishnan. Though the germs of his philosophy we find in Upaniṣads and in many idealistic systems, his originality lies in considering the present-day problems.

The central idea of his philosophy is spirit. We can not define it. We only feel it. Self, God and Absolute

are all names of this spirit. Matter, life, mind and self form a hierarchy of the manifestations of the spirit in the world. He gave a high place to intuition.

There are, however, other Indian idealists who could not be mentioned here for want of space.

From the various types of monistic idealism discussed above, it appears that none of them can be easily understood and appreciated by a lay man. It requires philosophical knowledge to have just the idea of what idealism means. Idealists hold views that are contrary to common-sense. They not only talk about transcendental matters but also snatch away the reality from the objects which lie before them.

The monistic idealists cannot satisfactorily explain the objective world. They believe that ultimate reality is one and spiritual in nature. The question arises how this manifold world, which is of different nature, came down from that one reality? The world is material while the reality is immaterial. The magnificent building of idealism seems to crumble down. This is the crux of all monistic idealism.

Thus we find that theories based on matter and mind have failed in explaining the reality of the objects in the universe. Let us now examine the theory which goes by the
name of monistic neutralism, and which has discarded both mind and matter as unsatisfactory conceptions for the explanation of cosmic evolution.

(iii) MONISTIC NEUTRALISM:

In the preceding pages we have seen that there has been a long-standing controversy between two types of monistic philosophies, viz., 'Materialism' and 'Idealism', one advocating the supremacy of matter over mind, the other claiming mind as the only entity which can explain the cosmic evolution and the nature of things in the universe. As a result of this controversy, first matter and then mind have gradually lost their importance. Revolutionary changes have taken place both in Physics and Psychology. The atoms, as we have seen, have been reduced to electrons revolving about the 'nucleus' at a very rapid rate of motion. Mental phenomena are being treated as reflex actions or the results of physico-chemical changes in the living body.

Philosophy, too, could not remain unaffected by these changing trends, and lost faith both in matter and mind. Some thinkers evolved the theory of 'monistic neutralism', the basic principle of which is that there is no fundamental difference in nature between mental events and physical events, and that the stuff of which the world is composed are 'neutral particulars'.
Bertrand Russell who has given this theory a 'final' shape, tells us that the principle of 'neutralism' can be traced as far back as 6th century B.C. The Milesian philosopher, Anaximander, had an argument to prove that the primal substance could not be water or any other known element. "If one of these were primal, it would conquer the others. Aristotle reports him as saying that these known elements are in opposition to one another. Air is cold, water is moist, and fire is hot. And, therefore, if any one of them were infinite the rest would cease to be by this time. The primal substance, therefore, must be neutral in the cosmic strife."

Theories in philosophy are not evolved in a day. They have a history of their own. Russell seems to have had in his mind a rough idea of neutral entities before he formulated his theory. In modern philosophy, even before Russell published his theory, there were some thinkers who recognised the principle of neutralism.

William James (1842-1910) started with the question, "Does consciousness Exist?" He himself gave the answer, "Consciousness is on the point of disappearing
altogether. It is the name of a nonentity and has no right to a place among the first principles. Those who still cling to it, are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy." James called the neutral stuff 'pure experience'. Ernst Mach (1838-1916), a German philosopher, designated his neutral entities as 'sensations'. Russell introduced the term 'sensibilia' and argued that mind and matter were mere logical constructions out of 'sensibilia'. He propounded the theory of monistic neutralism which, in his own words, runs as follows:

"The ultimate constituents of the world do not have the characteristics of either mind or matter as ordinarily understood; they are not solid persistent objects moving through space, nor are they fragments of consciousness." They are 'sensations' or 'neutral particulars'. Russell formulated this theory in three successive stages:

In his first book, the "Problems of Philosophy", published in 1911, he indicated that there are four kinds of

2. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy - From the article on 'Neutralism'
entities in the world, viz, 'knowing minds', 'sense-data', 'universals' and 'physical objects.'

In 1914, appeared his second book, under the title, "Our Knowledge of the External World". In this book he says that the world is not composed of physical objects but of sense-data which are entities, such as patches of colour. The sense-data are different from 'sensations'. Sensations are mental events which make one aware of the sense-data. The sense-data are such qualities of objects as hardness and solidity. Russell, in this book, recognises only the sense-data but not the physical objects. He has also eliminated 'Universals' from his list of entities given in the previous book.

In his third book, "The Analysis of Mind," published in 1921, he deals only with one entity, viz, "neutral particulars". Sense-data and sensations are one. Taken in one context they are mental and in another context they are physical. To clarify his notion about sensations, Russell says,

"Sensations are what is common to the mental and physical worlds, they may be defined as the intersection of mind and matter." The two worlds, mental and physical, interact. There are physical causes which account for mental

events, and mental causes which produce physical effects. Sensations are those which have physical causes and mental effects.

Pure sensations are impossible. They may occur in new-born infants. In adults they are generally associated with past experience. "In order to arrive at what really is sensation, we have to pare away all that is due to habit or expectation." "Sensation is a case in our actual experience."

To illustrate this point, he takes the help of a photographic plate. If we expose a photographic plate to a star on some moon-lit night, we will have its impression on it, as well as impressions of other objects in the intervening space. If they are very small, their impressions may be faint or even invisible. If we change the place of the photographic plate and have impressions of other stars also, we find that the same star belonging to one series of particulars belongs to the other series as well, which has particulars of other stars as well. This shows that the same star belongs to two series of particulars. If we now replace the photographic plate by mind, we shall find that the mind also has impressions just as we have on the photographic plate. The same impressions belong to one series of

2. Ibid, Page 144.
particulars which are physical and to the other series also which are mental. Thus sense-data which belong to the 'physical' series are identified with sensations belonging to the 'mental' series. So sense-data are replaced by sensations which are neutral particulars.

There seems to be no difficulty in assuming that a certain particular belongs to two series, one mental and the other physical. To take an example, a person's name can be hunted up in a Telephone Directory according to the alphabetical arrangement of names or with reference to professions or residences. Similarly, a chair may be located and numbered according to its being a unit in a particular row or in a particular column. Sensations, in a similar way, may be treated as particulars belonging to both mental and physical series.

The theory of monistic neutralism has some good points in it. It enables one to eliminate both mind and matter and to treat them simply as logical constructions. Russell has tried to bridge the gulf between the psychic and the physical worlds and to remove the age-long opposition between materialism and idealism. If we subscribe to this theory, we need not reduce mind to matter nor matter to mind. We can dispense with both. There is one substance, neutral in essence, of which both are made—in one context, it is
called mental, in the other we may call it material. In a completed science, the words 'mind' and 'matter' would both disappear.

This theory is not popular because it cannot be easily understood. It claims to simplify the problem of the relation between mind and matter but it, in itself, is not easy to understand. Further, "if Mr. Russell's attitude is the right one, no sphere is left to philosophy which she may regard as particularly her own. The place and methods of philosophy have been abandoned for physics and Psychology respectively." Russell seems to have favoured the view that we should arrive by scientific methods at isolated specific results and not to have a synthetic human view about the world. Russell's attempt at economy, by applying Occam's razor to his entities, has been detrimental to his theory. Professor Stace rightly points out that,"the neutral entities in Russell's system are just aspects that can be constituents of both mind and matter. Images on the other hand, are purely mental, while aspects that remain unperceived are purely physical. And if that is so, Russell has not avoided either dualism or a fundamental distinction between the mental and the material worlds." We have studied, in brief, pluralism, dualism and

1. Russell.
2. Prof. Joad -Introduction to Modern Philosophy, Page. 35.
many kinds of monism. They have all tried to find out the nature of ultimate reality in the world. Ontology is the branch of metaphysics which deals with the knowledge of reality. We have now to assess the importance of ontology in the study of various types of philosophy.

(c) ONTOLOGY AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN PHILOSOPHY:

We have discussed different views of philosophers about the nature of reality. Some have held that there are many substances which can be treated as the constituents of the universe, others have reduced the number of entities to only two, while there have been thinkers who believe in the reality of only one substance. Corresponding to these beliefs, the different thinkers are known as pluralists, dualists and monists.

We are now keen to know whether there is any science or branch of philosophy which gives us a systematic knowledge of reality. We find that such a knowledge is given by Ontology, which means the knowledge of Being as such.

Ontology is the science which deals with the principles relating to pure being. It is that part of metaphysics which treats of the nature and essence of things which really exist in contrast with those which are transitory and changing.

Philosophy starts from phenomena or appearance and proceeds towards noumena or knowledge of reality. Philosophy is, therefore, a study of both phenomenology and ontology.
Ontology is the speculative enquiry into all sorts of reality. It is within the province of ontology to study whether reality is one entity with a diversity of manifestations or a multiplicity of entities. It has also to examine the different views on the subject and to indicate how far they are tenable.

In Greek philosophy, it is Parmenides who seems to have originated the notion of ontology, without specifically mentioning it as a distinct branch of metaphysics. After an earnest search of reality, he came to the conclusion that 'Truth consists in the knowledge that Being is and that not Being cannot be conceived to exist. The greatest source of error is to mistake Being for not-Being and vice-versa.'

Parmenides used to say that not-Being cannot be conceived. "It is impossible to think what is not and it is impossible for what cannot be thought, to be."

The idea of ontology in Western Philosophy received its final shape in the works of Wolff (1714-1762). His philosophy lost all connection with the subject matter of all sciences and he built up the notion of ontology largely through abstract analysis of its concepts. He discussed in it, such topics as 'cause and effect', 'being and not-being', 'reality and possibility', 'truth and error', 'quantity and quality.'

1. Parmenides.
2. Burnet - Greek Philosophy P. 67.
Materialistic trends in the 17th century philosophy undermined to a certain extent the conception of ontology. Some philosophers like Hobbes and Locke had little faith in its utility.

Attempts have been made in the 20th century also to construct a new ontology which will lay greater emphasis on materialism. The philosophies of Karl Marx, Engels and Lenin envisaged this new type of philosophy.

In India, philosophy begins with Ontology. The conception of Being can be traced as far back as the Rg-Veda and the Upanisads. All systems of Indian philosophy have their own conception of reality. Some like Vaisēṣika believe in pluralism, Sāmkhya is dualistic, while Vedānta advocates idealism. All are in genuine search of reality.

The entire philosophy that we know of, is divided into different types based on different ideologies and conceptions of reality. A critical study of the basic principles which underlie different notions of reality, is absolutely necessary for a proper study of philosophy. Ontology, therefore, occupies a prominent place in metaphysics - we may call it the First Philosophy.

We have studied some of the most important theories of reality both in Eastern and Western philosophies; 

...
we are in a position to judge their relative merits and
demerits. Our knowledge of Ontology will certainly help us
in understanding correctly the nature and significance of
dualism in the philosophies of Sāmkhya and Descartes, as we
will find in the succeeding chapters.

(d) Our Thesis:

A bird's eye view of the history of Philosophy tells
us that human race has consistently been trying to explain the
universe and to know the truth. Both Oriental and Occidental
thinkers have been making efforts in this direction since times
immemorial. Though their approach towards the problem has
been a bit different yet, surprisingly, very often they have
reached similar conclusions. That is why we find that
Pluralism, Dualism and monism etc. have been propounded with
equal force and conviction, both in the East and West.

Here, some one may point out that the thinkers of
East and West have been borrowing ideas from each other, from
time to time, and consequently they have reached similar
conclusions. But such a view will do injustice to human
mind and its capacities. Human mind and its potentialities
are similar everywhere. Hence, what is possible for a
thinker of a particular country at a particular time may also
be possible for another thinker of another country at a
different time. Max-muller also says, "That we must also
admit the existence of undesigned coincidences to a much larger extent than our predecessors were inclined to do. We must never forget that what has been possible in one country is possible in another also. Hence the independent growth of similar views can never be ruled out in different countries and at different times. We therefore, propose to make a sincere effort at a faithful but critical exposition of the two conspicuous landmarks in the long history of philosophical thoughts, one in the West and the other in the East, and then we will try to unearth and bring out the happy points of similarity, as well as those of difference between them. So the primary purpose of undertaking to write this thesis is to make a comparative, critical and comprehensive study of the two very important and assiduous attempts, made in different times and countries, to understand the essential nature and the ultimate constituents of man and of the world, he lives in. This study, it is believed, will thus serve the purpose of not only advancing the cause of comparative philosophical knowledge of vital importance to the people of both east and west, but also the very much needed purpose of drawing them nearer to each other by bringing home to them the fundamental fact of their essential affinity. Moreover, such studies are badly

1. Cited by Dr. Radhakrishnan in his Indian Philosophy, Vol II, Page 85 - 86.
needed in the days of scientific and cultural advancement when the different nations are coming closer together with one common world culture. The fact that there exists considerable literature on the philosophies of both Descartes and Sāṃkhya cannot be denied, but, at the same time, the need of a comparative study thereof cannot also be over-emphasised. Then we will not only be comparing and contrasting the two dualistic systems of the world, but our humble attempt will also be to show which of these systems is more logical and consistent within itself and which of them explains the world and existence of man more satisfactorily than the other.