Chapter 5

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It is true: Man is the microcosm:

I am my world. (NB p. 84)

It deserves attention of what makes Wittgenstein paraphrase the above propositions. It is worth considering what makes it true to him that ‘man is the microcosm’. At the first place, mankind, as he has seen, is a small-scale model of the universe. It means that man is the presenter of the universe. The universe can be displayed in such a position only when man is put in the centre and as an integral part. It is only because man is in the position and with capacity that can have the knowledge of the universe with its various purposes and conditions. Therefore, the world to be good or bad is purely determined by the condition(s) prepared by man. If man, by himself is in fine towards the world, the world will be good and congruous for a living. And when animals, plants and other living creatures are having naturally inbuilt capacity for ecological balance, they do not require to think about the need for checking environment disruption. Whereas man, having both the capacity to disrupt and organize or re-organize to neaten or put everything in form, requires thinking on the causes and factors of ecological balance and imbalances. We can also admit that the world has all the essential resources at least for basic sustenance of man’s livelihood. At the same time it is the responsibility of man and it is the natural demand to take care of this world and everything in it. Man has this
capacity: a capacity to have dominion to everything (every living creature). The capacity that we are talking about is the capacity to study, know and understand the world. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s views can be put before us as he holds that man is in the highest position among all other creatures in terms of capability of ‘knowing’. Through the power of knowing alone we come to know the world. The world by itself is senseless. According to Wittgenstein, the ‘I’ is with senses; it can therefore be either good or evil, not the world which is senseless (NB p. 80). In this connection, we may cite what Swami Vivekananda says, ‘this “I” is the outcome of the Infinite behind, trying to manifest itself on the outside world’.¹ From this we get the idea that there would have been no meaning and life in the outside world unless the “I” is manifested. Vivekananda further confirms it in saying that, in encountering discriminations, when ‘man finds there are not two but one’ he finds that he is himself this universe. “It is I who am this universe as it now exists, a continuous mass of change”.² The epistemic input regarding the “I” and the “world/universe” of Vivekananda and Wittgenstein are quite similar. From this we can come to drop ourselves into a standpoint that the “I” or the human person is the concierge of the world with all its organic and inorganic things. We can also come about into the real nature of the ‘I’ from what Wittgenstein has conceived in his Notebook that the “I” is not an object, but a subject (NB p. 80). The ‘I’ as a subject is not just a thinking subject but a willing subject too. Should it be just a thinking subject it will end as mere illusion. Let us consider the questions posed by Wittgenstein: “We only say of a

² Ibid. p. 226
human being and what is like one that it thinks,” (PI §360). “Does man think, then, because he has found that thinking pays?--Because he thinks it advantageous to think?” (PI §467). Thinking must have paid. We often say, ‘Think twice before you act.’ It must be advantageous too. The lives of two persons: The one, who thinks, considers and ponders before he takes any decision for action and the other who never thinks about his doings – lot of difference between the two. Besides thinking, the ‘I’ can hope, desire, expect to which he lives on. In this regard Wittgenstein declares: “I am my world” – this is a *compos mentis* declaration. The ‘I’ as a thinking and willing subject can welcome in the world all its happenings. Nothing will make him understand his world unless he himself is the agent with a capability of knowing or getting it. This standpoint goes along with the existentialists’ concept like that of Sartre. But with Wittgenstein, ‘knowing interests us only within the game’.\(^3\) It means that our knowing should be with good reasons and it must also be within the spheres of human language. In the language of Wittgenstein, if we are to be aware of about anything intuitively, our knowledge must be within our language-game. Indeed, it is the hope working in man to generate his thinking capacity that he wishes to live on somehow. Yet man cannot deny himself that he is an epistemic agent. For a true human being it takes sound thinking, not against the system of the human world.

We are born capable of learning. Animals do not have the capability of learning at least in the sense that learning that p presupposes believing or accepting that it is true

\(^3\) Wittgenstein, L., *Cause & Effect: Intuitive Awareness* in PO p. 393
that p. They do not believe that p nor do they disbelieve that p. Accordingly, in the sense that Belief Condition, Justification Condition are necessary conditions of knowledge, animals cannot know that p since neither they can believe that p nor can they be justified in believing that p. Believing, thinking, accepting, meaning, understanding, justifying, doubting, hoping, wishing and willing etc. are making sense only in relation to human form of life. In this sense, animals do not mean anything, nor do they understand what we say. They do not use language; hence, do not mean or understand any language. They seem to be learning and knowing when their actions are interpreted from human perspectives, but they are only behaving in accordance to their naturally physical set up and have no knowledge about anything in the real sense of the term knowing. It is because knowledge involves belief. The animals do not believe or doubt anything. Wittgenstein says, “Understanding is effected by explanation; but also by training, instruction, exemplification, with all tactfulness” (Z §186, Italics added). In general, by explanation we mean making apparent or intelligible, making known in detail (by words) about anything and even by citing examples. To perform this act of explaining, words and their utterance are indispensable criteria for understanding. Only man uses words as language. Through and by the uses of words man grasps the meaning. And it is acceptable that ‘human beings are born with a capability of learning and using language’ (Italic added). This means that only human beings can do the work of explanation and understanding by their natural form. Even Kant has shared about the understanding of

man. He says, ‘But the most important object in the world to which he can apply them is
man, because man is his own final end – so an understanding of man in terms of his
species, as an earthly being endowed with reason, especially deserves to be called
knowledge of the world, even though man is only one of the creatures in the world.’ He
gives all the credit of knowing the world to man. It is because man is the only creature
that can reason out. Man has the capacity of understanding and making understand too.

However, regarding capacity of understanding, Wittgenstein says, ‘What
interests me is not having immediate insight into a truth, but the phenomenon of
immediate insight. Not indeed as a special mental phenomenon, but as one of human
action’ (RFM 32). For Wittgenstein, understanding is ‘a human action’. Insight or
understanding does not just refer to mental but the whole phenomenon of understanding
has been taken as human action. Indeed we could be right concerning mental
preparedness. It takes language to expect or to anticipate; or before carrying in any task,
mental preparedness is essential so as to go about things smoothly. And we do not apply
this to animals. We know that they do not use language and do not also talk.
Nevertheless, it is good to keep in mind that to make someone understand about what
you are explaining him needs tactfulness and some special skill although you might
speak the same language. The admittance of requirements of tactfulness and special skill
has arisen from the view held by Wittgenstein in saying that ‘Knowledge is not
translated into words when it is expressed. The words are not a translation of something

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5 Kant, Emmanuel, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Mary J.
Gregor, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 3
else that was there before they were’ (Z 191). Words (familiar ones) can help one to understand (better) what somebody is trying to convey or express. We may say words are means/ways/modes of expression of speech. We can also put it like this: words are essential ingredients of speech. In speech knowledge can only pass through. In a similar fashion to what Wittgenstein has said, we can claim that knowledge is not transferred into words or knowledge is not converted into words. At this stage it is expedient to keep in mind the genesis of words that words are of human. And words are essential for the framework of knowledge. In other words knowledge is structured in ‘words’ and proved through ‘words’. Again, human words can be categorized into two viz. spoken and written words. But this does not mean that the same word which is spoken when it is put into writing has different meaning. It’s only that since words are of human – in terms of effectiveness – written words may not be as effective as spoken ones depending on how a particular human community concern normally apply those in communication. For instance, in my Darlong Community (or tribe), the practice of giving verbal invitation on any occasion to relatives, near and dear ones, is valued more appropriate than the practice of written invitation (card) so much so that the latter is considered offensive. The close relatives, if not verbally invited, start grumbling and continue saying, ‘What do they think of us? Aren’t we their relatives?’ Verbal (spoken) invitation is much valued or taken in high esteem by the relatives than written invitation card, however beautiful the card may be. If a couple go out of their house for giving invitation to their relatives or to any of their dear ones it is considered that that couple really gives importance to their program as well as intimacy is well maintained with their relatives.
For which they spared their times just for that purpose. Those relatives to whom cards are given may not even remain present in the occasion by hardening their hearts. For that reason, if a busy couple are unable to give time for this task – either of them, the husband or wife, will make at least a telephonic arrangement to inform the reasons why they are unable to step in their relatives’ house for the invitation. In that they would send apology saying that they are really sorry that they are unable to make it convenient to physically go and step in their house to give invitation. They would then request to kindly accept the invitation card which they sent by post or by messenger. If you fail to send words of apology, you can expect bad verbal reactions or physical reactions.

Let us look the other way round. Irrespective of tribe or caste, man in general, at times of lack of confidence and courage or due to shyness or timidity, may choose or prefer writing to speech in order to convey a message. Like, a gutless young lover boy sends words of his love to a girl whom he admires in writing or just words through his friend. Or he would better send SMS. It could also be like this: when someone finding fault in others and has the desire to correct or chide, but lacks the courage to speak up face to face may call him over telephone or send him in writing what he is intending to. In the present day, written words seem to be stronger/powerful than spoken words in terms of proof or support of any claim that someone is making or as evidence. Written documents will speak louder than verbal expression. When one can show a written proof for what he claimed instead of just verbal explanation, there is a good chance that almost everyone will believe to be true, that is as per the present day context. The above instances are to show that in contrast, man has more capacity than any other animals in
terms of language – in creating, in using etc. So language is an instrument for expressing (or revealing) our desires, fears, feelings, etc. It also works as an instrument for concealing man’s real nature.

Due to lack of human-form of language animals cannot praise, raise complaints, agitate, or grumble etc. When they are happy about anything, they may stay close nudging each other; again, when they are not happy about each other they may start a fight. Not only that they fail to present their happiness or unhappiness in ways other than the ways they are physiologically conditioned; in accordance to Wittgenstein even they do not know that they are happy, hence, they are not happy although we ascribe happiness to certain kinds of behaviour resembling to human behaviour. About the concept of ‘happiness’ Wittgenstein says: “How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world? Through the life of knowledge. The good conscience is the happiness that the life of knowledge preserves. The life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of the world,” (NB p. 81). Knowledge is a determinant of happiness. The Buddhists hold that ignorance is the root cause of suffering. In a like manner, Wittgenstein also holds that through the life of knowledge one can ward off the misery of this world. Moreover, not only the case that knowledge can help man removes his misery but gives confidence. Let us consider the following lines of Wittgenstein: The feeling of confidence. How is this manifested in behavior? (PI § 579). An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria (PI § 580). At first we need to know that confidence is prompted by knowledge which is an inner process. The question raised by Wittgenstein can be answered like this – a person’s confidence can be
known from his action, way of talking or communication. That all come from knowledge and understanding. For this reason a man is expected to be confident or unsure, because he has the capacity of understanding and expectation and expectation to be confident is out of question from any other living creatures which does not use language. Round about this Wittgenstein also talks about good conscience, or simply conscience. It is the epistemic power that keeps the function of conscience (the power of moral envisioning) in man. Any person who lacks this cannot be happy or sad. For this reason animals are kept out of the rightful or wrongful domain. To a being which lacks conscience, a question of choice does not arise. At best, ‘one can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not?’ (PI II i). Let us consider what kind of answer could be put forth following the illustration Wittgenstein has made an observation after posing the above questions. “A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after to-morrow?--And what can he not do here?--How do I do it?--How am I supposed to answer this? Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life.” (If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write) (PI II i). Wittgenstein sets his recommendation by saying that, ‘the word “hope” refers to a phenomenon of human life. ‘A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face’ (PI §583). Not only the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated (human) form of life, but ‘a belief, a wish, a fear, a fondness; each can be called a state of a man; we can count on this state in our behaviour towards this man, we can infer his reactions
from his state’ (RPP-I § 832). That act of inference too is possible because of all those states are in man.

Let us take one more pensive question put forward by Wittgenstein: ‘why can a dog feel fear but not remorse? Would it be right to say “Because he can’t talk”?’ (Z 518). Talking may not be the right and sole criterion for finding out if a creature feels remorse or not. But talking can do much. Possibly feeling remorse comes through reflection of the past.\(^6\) In order to reflect or introspect or even to hope, one needs words to do that. In addition to that the feeling of remorse which has an ethical aspect cannot occur without the employment of words. Without a moral sentiment with just a capacity to reflect on the past will not lead to a feeling of remorse or angst. A dog, e.g. or any other animal lacks this sentiment. For an entity that has no feeling of remorse cannot also be sorrowful. It will, therefore, not be wise to demand moral responsibility from the animals. In the same way we do not find any sign of regret in them for there is nothing wrong in the world of their activities. Moreover, due to lack of moral sentiment animals cannot be compassionate; they cannot also cultivate the nature of forgiveness. They cannot express “I forgive” in speech. Unless it is expressed through language (may be of body language) it may not be understood by the one who is forgiven. Moreover an understanding of one’s right to punish is presupposed for the act of forgiving; and animals lack that understanding.

\(^6\) Wittgenstein clearly says that with a capacity of reflecting on the past can one repent. But he safeguards himself in saying that that does not mean as a matter of empirical fact only such a one is capable of the feeling of remorse. (Z 519)
Linguistic activity is the power of man – by which he can teach, admonish, correct, reproof, etc. Linguistic activity is the essence of man. But when language is in misuse, life becomes helter-skelter. The element of language present in man makes him more unique from rest of animals. Language is a tool that he can fight with, challenge, warn, convince, win, appease, express, etc. So keeping all these in mind, we may claim that proper use of language can be therapeutic for misunderstanding and conflict among human beings. It is true, as the scripture says, that ‘a gentle answer turns away wrath, but a harsh word stirs up anger. On the contrary, a bad mouth (word) can be a disease to life. Perverse lips can be harmful to others.’ (Proverbs 15:1, 2) Quarrelling words are of no value, they can only ruin our lives. But a good talk or discussion can change things, makes totally different situation, turning condemn to commendable. Sharing of ideas and opinions can result in good strategy for the human society. This could be one of the reasons why in the college, university and at national or international level seminars, workshops; symposiums and the like are organized. The ultimate purpose of holding such programs is how to take human life to a new height. Seminars, workshops are platforms where different ideas, views, opinions are compiled together to form new and stronger findings to keep up life to an ideal position. In short, the universe is in all human expressions. Human language determines the kind of world we live in. As C. Goswami has maintained, the structure of the world is mirrored in (human) language.\footnote{Chinmoy Goswami in his “What is it to be Human?” in K.C. Pandey’s (ed) \\textit{Ludwig Wittgenstein: Ethics and Religion}, Rawat Publications, 2008, p. 148} Language, therefore, (can be said) is active as the \textit{monad} of Leibnitz. It is living within the human world. Each one’s language reflects his/her world. In this way language helps
us to review our lives, if we want to. It is like if we want to live (like normal human beings) we need to play language-game. Whoever plays the language-game neat lives a rich, purposeful and meaningful life. Language is the summary of life. Individual man dies, but human language will continue to be there with man, so long as human beings will exist to live in this world. And one can stop another’s life but not language.

It is alright to say that the business of language is to assert facts. But it does not mean that language should always be factual. For example, in order to calm down the situation of untoward incidence it is sometimes necessary to either exaggerate or deflate the actual happenings by way of expression of words. To mention here, passing a message should be done tactfully in the right context or to meet the situation which is quite necessary, keeping in mind that it bears positive results. Our aim should be how we are to bring and maintain human atmosphere – then it will tell us whether to amplify or douse the fire. Flattery or toadyism will not do much good to build up human life. If language of every man is taken care of every human being will really be human. Human language, after all, has its own versatility. Drury left a remark on William James as ‘such a human person’. And in support to Drury’s remark, Wittgenstein writes in his remark column for James: ‘That is what makes him a good philosopher; he is a real human being.’ Wittgenstein’s level as a human being was drafted by Drury as ‘not

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8 The full line is: “The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts.” - by B. Russell in the introduction of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. But I intentionally omit the word ‘deny’ because I find that even if language denies facts, facts are neither changed nor mitigated. Fact is fact. Denial of fact does not turn it to nothing. What we do is, but assert fact(s).

just an important name in the history of philosophy, but as a personality – kind, generous, quick tempered, and with his own eccentricities. In deed to an extent it is possible to tell what kind of person is a man by the language he uses, from the pitch of his tone etc. Man is accorded with a dignity, unique in nature, moulding his destiny in exercise of his choice, i.e. if he wishes to. I once came across a driver who stopped his car right in the middle of a road. His car had broken down. Being ignorant about that I asked “Why did you stop the car in the middle of the road”? He immediately shouted at me, “You need not teach me traffic rules; my car has broken down. What do you want?” and many more. From his fuming voice I could make out that he’s a short-tempered man, proud type and lacks self-discipline. He’s a driver by profession but that does not qualify what it needs to make one a real human being. Man should be more than a philosopher, an engineer, a doctor, a teacher or religious leader. To maintain the real human world, one’s being a philosopher or any professional career or any profession, for that matter, should not erase the prerequisite character of human being. Wittgenstein insists that the more one claims to be a philosopher he/she should be careful about his way of understanding, i.e. it should be in the human form. He says, ‘The philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of many sicknesses of the understanding before he can arrive at the notions of the sound human understanding’ (RFM 53). Man needs to question himself that whether his understanding is within the web of human society. Our thinking level on morality and also our level of moral sentiment define the real nature of our being real human.

\[10\] ibid. p. 11
What about the smile on human face? Smile has different dispositions or implications. We smile at a person whom we like; we smile back at a known person’s smile at a distance just to express that we are aware of his/her presence. A smile is also used for teasing, or a smile may also flash on the face when gloat at somebody. A smile on a face can also mean in favour of. Thus smiles can be categorized as positive smiles and negative smiles. How you smile on what occasion will tell the person to whom you are smiling at whether he should be happy about it or not. Let me repeat: *a smiling mouth smiles only on human face.* The different dispositions of smile can be read and understood only by human beings. If we train our pet animals, they may also get to learn when we are happy and not happy with them or even among ourselves. Monkeys chatter, other animals make different kinds of facial expressions, but no animals smile like human being. Simultaneous facial expressions together with utterance can be read through; even when without hearing another’s voice in utterance we can make out what he is expressing or saying from his facial expressions. This physiognomic episteme is also collected through first employment of language. The smiles, the grimace, the winking of an eye etc. have all human significance. For example, human smile may have different implications depending on how you use and on what context one may have used. A smile on a face can be sign of approval, acceptance. The same kind of smile can also be a sign of non-acceptance, disagreement or a mockery. Man can also use a smile to hide an inner sorrow or pain or even one’s own ignorance. It can be a missionary smile too. Smile on human face can also be read as one is in good term. When someone went wild (or angry), we tend to say, “Please smile!” in order to confirm
he is no more angry and that he has forgotten all the reasons what makes him angry. Yet a smile can also be reflexive. All these capacities of man which have been highlighted here supports our thesis that man is an embodied epistemic agent. In this line we should keep in mind that meaning involved in gesture, talking, writing, or any kind of expressions as forms of language can be made known – the purposes or their significance. If only he puts effort to know about anything, man as a man can understand and know about different phenomena in this world. He can try to interpret them until he finds possible solutions.

Likewise, even sound(s) which are made by human being can have meaning without being a word. Like, a feign cough – it can be used for eve-teasing, for giving warning, to show one’s presence, to declare one’s awareness etc. There can be man-made (invented) sounds which are not considered as words but still be used as communication tools. Man can create any new sound/movement/action but in the course of time they get their meaning according to their use – keeping in mind the motive and intention behind. Any normal man can recognize the sound made by his fellow beings sooner or later. On the other hand, other living beings can hardly change their normal way of making noise – the lion roars, the bird chirps, dogs bark, snakes hiss etc. Of course, the sounds they make may have their impacts based on physiological conditioning or natural instincts. But they do not possess the capacity to create new sound(s), and help their partner learn them. As it is mentioned earlier, some exceptional birds or animals do have the capacity to imitate sounds or actions but still they cannot mean anything through those sounds or actions. A parrot can imitate human sounds but
it cannot use these sounds to communicate something to the other parrots. Likewise the
mynah as we shall see later on of what happens in imitation.

A dog may recognize his master very well. But he cannot expect or hope that his
master will be fine when he is out. Moreover we do not find any reason in a dog to be
hopeful about his master’s safety and security although he may guard his master (and his
home) and barks at unknown face(s) or creatures. A dog cannot be hopeful because hope
involves the phenomenon of calculation which in turn needs record making. And again
for making a record either in writing or in the mind we need words for that. This is
where the animal’s (e.g. dog) inability to hope lies. For, hope, belief etc. as Wittgenstein
has held, were embedded in human life…which constitutes human life (RPP-II 16). And
hoping, believing etc. are embedded in human nature. When we hope something to
happen, we are with an expectation i.e. counting on time. Since animals have not
mastered the use of a language they cannot be hopeful. Animals or birds may migrate
and may have stronger sense on natural calamities but for not having words they cannot
count on number of time or days. A dog used to come to my residence. I used to give
him food. When the giving of food was repeated for several days, the dog also kept
coming every day. I stopped giving food on daily basis; instead I gave him on alternate
two days. The dog came daily for food for several days even though he did not get food
daily. But when I start giving him on alternate two days the dog could not be found
present for food on alternate two days. I called and waited he did not turned up. The dog
could not read and count on time or day; could not understand that he had been given
food on alternate two days. The dog’s thinking capacity does not include how to count
time/day – e.g. I was regularly giving him on every alternate two days – it did not come to his mind saying that, ‘this man is giving me food on two days interval’. It is noteworthy that hoping involves thinking too. That task is the difficult part for the animals to perform. If the same act of giving (food) was done to a normal man on regular basis, that man would reason out that his food is made available on an interval of two days. The dog was unable to gather the knowledge that his food was made available on two days interval. Without the capacity of reading and counting on time or days the real acquisition of knowledge cannot happen. So we can come to draw an epistemic remark, as Wittgenstein has concluded, that hope has no application to beings that do not write or talk (PI ii-i). For the animal (dog in particular) could not write or talk by itself. Moreover, animals do not prove a proof (RFM 25, pt-v p. 282) since they have no ‘words’ for doing this task. To prove means to test or establish the accuracy or validity of a claim. This task requires language too. A person who always suffers toothache complains about his eyesight as becoming weaker, and when his eyesight becomes weaker and weaker he complains about headache. How is the relation? Talking can also be related to hoping and proving. An idiot’s (taking as unable to read and write) person’s evidence may not be as strong as (or as clear as) an evidence provided by an intelligent person (able to read and write). Wittgenstein’s ‘mastering a language’ can also mean educating oneself, in the present context. An educated person or say any person who can write well can be more convincing than the one who can hardly write a single correct sentence. A person who speaks well and influentially will convince more than a person who can hardly speak out what is in his mind. Proficiency in language can fetch a man
good remarks and reputation, especially proficiency in using soft, impressive, attractive language. This type of person can control himself to hide even his anger or sadness by way of his language. It is quite difficult to tell when he is angry or unhappy.

To mention some more why man should be placed in the centre of the universe, Wittgenstein tries to prove in PI that only human beings can hope. Hope in man upholds the universe he lives in. The capacity of hoping is further taken as one of the remarkable human abilities. Man does not only hope, but he can give himself as a cause to hope also. This means that man has the capacity to create a cause for a hope. His basis in holding this view is that man can master in a language – in its use and creating too as and when necessary. In simple term, man can acknowledge. Whereas, a clever monkey or a sniffer dog, however strong its senses may be it still lacks the capability of acknowledging. The sniffer-dog may point to a murderer or criminal or a bomb, but it does not know the purpose or reason behind for pursuing or seizing the crime involved there. The capability of acknowledgement and feeling of confidence have something to do with talking or at least with behaviour (bodily gesture). In terms of making a record, say historical records, man has the capacity to verbalize or to transfer their thoughts into writings or symbols In this regard, Wittgenstein poses a question like this: ‘how did human beings ever come to make the verbal utterances which we call reports or past wishes or past intentions?’ (PI § 657). Moreover, “The language-game of reporting can be given such a turn that a report is not meant to inform us about its subject matter but about the person making the report” (LW-I 416). It is interesting to note here that the phenomenon of reporting can contain the meaning of the report content, meaning of how
it is reported, the person’s (reporter’s) nature and intention behind the report. In taking care of our languages we take care of many activities and conditions besides the very act of speaking or writing. As we can see within the Wittgensteinian analysis of language-games, the role of bodily gestures, physical activities and trainings are quite significantly associated with language-learning and language-use. Possibly, since man has the capacity to create or form word for an act or gesture and having also the capacity to utter or make sound of that created word, he can as well make a record. In the language of Wittgenstein: ‘man possesses the ability to construct language’ (TLP 4.002). Any act, gesture or activity can be described with word or language; if word is not already available to describe particular act or an idea, man has a capacity to create (or construct) new word and learn the meaning thereof and use it further. Animals or birds are lacking this capacity. Birds, like parrot, mynah bird or cuckoo by imitation may utter human words exactly as we do but without meaning something through those words. For example, if “Good Morning” is uttered frequently to the mynah bird or parrot, it will also learn to utter the same. But it utters “Good morning” anytime: morning, noon, evening, and even at night. The parrot does not know the meaning, so it does not wish ‘Good Morning’ even if it may utter that in the morning. Whatever the birds utter is only gibberish. Birds or animals have no words and also do not have the capacity to create or learn words with meaning. For this reason they have no names by themselves and they cannot name too. ‘A dog might learn to run to N at the call “N”, and to M at the call “M”, -- but would that mean he knows what these people are called?’ (OC 540) Animals come when their names are called. Just like human beings (CV p. 67e). But they act so
without understanding that they have been named and called by their names; they act in accordance to the way they are conditioned physically. For example, our neighbour has two dogs, named Tom and Jamy. When Tom is called, Jamy also runs to the owner, and when Jamy is called Tom also runs to the owner. None of them would think that one who has been called and not the other should run to the master. Another family also has a pet dog named Micky. Micky’s master is quite confident that his dog really knows its name. But, when I called his dog by “Lippy”, the dog started waging its tail and came towards me. Or an untrained dog may run to the one who makes a ‘chhk...chhk…chhk...’ sound even if he is a stranger. On the other hand, if a stranger who knows the name of particular dog calls that dog by its name, it may not run to him. Instead it may start barking. Thus we find that a dog does not really know names or words, it’s more about the sound, tune, and their associated conditionings.

We only give names to our pets. Naming has the power to captivate. After all every human word is a name in one way or the other. So word or name has power. For example, now a-days things are named by the name of other things. Like, ‘ghari’ which literally means a watch, but is now a name given to soap; ‘masterblaster’ is a nickname given to Indian cricketer Sachin Tendulkar but now it is given as a name to handwash liquid soap, only to cite a few examples. What works behind all these – to attract customers, and they are spread on the TV screen as advertisement. On top of that, celebrities or famous personalities are paid for doing the advertisement on the screen to attract more buyers. One can raise a question: how is man or what makes a man famous? Could it be the epistemic thing vested in him? Moreover the idea behind this type of
naming could be to make it easier to remember the product. A man who takes ‘Colgate’ as synonym of ‘toothpaste’ went to a shop and asked for ‘Colgate’. But the shopkeeper said that only Pepsodent was available at that time. The buyer said, “That’s the one I am looking for”. This shows that he was not looking for colgate-toothpaste, but a pepsodent-toothpaste because he mistakenly takes ‘colgate’ word as ‘toothpaste’ and he doesn’t know ‘toothpaste’. After things are named and became popular or famous they attract people. In knowing that name has power we are now careful about giving names. You name a thing means you create word and can call it. A thing named by you is under your subjugation at least for that moment. You, as a giver of name(s), are greater than or more powerful than the thing(s) you named. Let us see this illustration: A hen may inform danger to her chicks the moment she sees snake or kite or eagle or any of their enemy. But she cannot call one particular chick of her for something in special. Whenever she clucks all the chicks run to her. It is because each chick has not been named by the mother hen. Or the hen has no special ability to cluck in different way to call her chicks individually. These show that, animals or birds do not linguistically interact among themselves. Linguistic interaction covers up a wide range of communication. By the use of word you can win, convince, hurt, impress etc. And depending on how you use a word the power may be more or less effective or intensive. Linguistic interaction is human in nature. It is the most important element of epistemic agency.

One more point we may underline here: in naming or the name itself has a lot to do with our emotions. We human beings are more emotional than animals. Why?
make or add more meaning to our relationship we use different kinds of affectionate words like ‘baby’, ‘honey’, ‘darling’ etc. We use these words to make sure that we are really very close to and have a deep and intense feeling of love and respect for the listener; and perhaps also to win the heart and mind of dear ones. We also use them to tell or express that we truly care the one we are addressing to. In every human community we have these types of words; we can either call emotional words or wise words for the time being. Both the speaker and the listener feel that they are deeply touched by these emotional words. To make a crying child stop we use, ‘baby’, ‘darling’; watch out that the child either stops or increases crying. We sweet-talk our children, dear ones so as to make them obey and believe what we are saying. We use them also to pacify anger, resentment, hatred and the like. Where there are feelings of anger, hatred, resentment, love, happiness, guilt, like, fondness, intimacy, etc. the question of ethics arises.

Since animals cannot talk, they are not in the capacity to understand the meaning of ethical sense also. We can also simply say that they do not have ethical sentiment. It is because, talking (language) is like a channel through which we pass (or give) moral teachings. Morally sound language, sometimes acts as terminal by which we can go a long way in life. Birds or animals train their young ones mainly on how to feed themselves, take their prey and escape from their enemies. They do not teach or learn how to respect. And they do not know the sacred of life. In another sense the animals are also not aware about their rights and they are unable to claim such. It is because they do not think in the way men do. Men do know about the rights of animals and they try to
preserve every bird, animal and living creature because man knows their significance and purpose on earth. Even if animals may think or, rather, have brains, they do not doubt. Doubting means there is a desire to know the truth or facts. Whenever and wherever we have doubt we look for the ‘how’ and ‘why’ answers. So, man as an embodied epistemic agent can only make that search. During such a search new ideas may come up which men think suitable for the present life time. Every new idea has a force or impact-power as it is laid up in language. It is such that man, only in man, with the capacity to use language, can there be an epistemic horizon.

Man can be laborious or lazy, diligent or lethargic, careful or careless, active or inactive, patient or impatient…and the list goes on. We first do the work of comparison of all those words (that can be suitable for human beings), and then employ those words to describe particular individuals. After that only we decide to take/give advice, instructions or guidance. We human being hope for a better tomorrow. But a being which has no capacity to hope can neither be patient nor impatient; it can neither be tolerant nor intolerant. So, unlike men, whatever the animals get are by their own natural inborn capacity and not because they are patient or hopeful. If only trained by men they come to carry out different activities. In case of human beings, we need to study, examine, observe, and demonstrate before putting in practice into our lives. Due to this, in the real human life, new systems, policies and methods are introduced everyday as means to earn livelihood. Moreover, as population is growing, in order to absorb the right and able person in a job-field, men are tested to the standard of epistemic agent.
In considering man as an embodied epistemic agent it is found that man is a law-governed subject, as C. Goswami has put it. To live as a member of the society, one must admit that certain rules must be followed and every member should also feel the binding of norms. Law comes in naturally as an exercise of conscience and knowledge together. In the light of this Wittgenstein says, “Fate is the antithesis of natural law. A natural law is something you try to fathom and make use of, but not fate” (CV p. 61e). An epistemic agent not only tries to fathom or understand, or think through about law but tries to abide by and lives to it. Fate is not a thing that we can rely on. But in keeping law, man can live a sound and blameless life. Man, therefore, is subject to accusation. If any wrong is committed against the society he lives in he will be put to trial and judgment because he is the one who knows that there is law, not the animals. Where there is law, there is a provision for punishment to an act of crime. Whereas the animals do not belong to this province, and do not know what law is, imposition and the use of law to animals are insignificant. In exercise of freedom of will, every man is expected to act in conformity to social system because he has the capacity to contemplate before doing an act. On the contrary, an animal may not do such a thing if you frequently frighten it. A fear gripped animals may not come to you for food. Man would not do such action which is against the law not just for fear of punishment but more than that he would not do because he knows what is healthy for the society.

In congruent to epistemic agency, Goswami further says, ‘If I were a disembodied soul, there would neither have been any language nor a world.’\textsuperscript{12} He is right in saying that an ethereal soul does not need language, nor does it require this world, because this world and language have no part to play to hold such ethereal, intangible soul. The spirit or the mind – the thinking capacity is made discernible in man. Man can now discern the system of the world to which his life rests on – to live a meaningful life or not. And man alone can be held responsible for the world to be worth for living or not. The law of the world is made but for the man and by the man. Regarding law, Wittgenstein says, ‘A law is given for human beings, and a jurisprudent may well be capable of drawing consequences for any case that ordinarily comes his way; thus law evidently has its use, make sense’ (RPP-II 392). Moreover man is the only being that requires law; for drawing conclusion to the consequences of man’s actions – he needs law. It can be said that law is a determinator of all (human) actions to reduce to morality. As we have mentioned earlier that animals have no moral sentiment, so law can be imposed only on human beings – for man is the one ‘who has the capability to disrupt the world.’ At the same time man has the power to dominate all other things – living and non-living.

Excluding man, all animals, birds, or any living species by their natural instinct maintain ecological balance. They take part by their nature in the ecological order and this allows them to subsist and reproduce. Whereas, man has the capacity to see whether

\textsuperscript{12} ibid. pp. 147, 148
nature is ruined or nature is fitting for human survival. He can at first check in whether it will be fit to make a home for himself or not. Again he can either be the exploiter or preserver of nature. Like other living beings man naturally does not do good or harm to nature. For this reason, Wittgenstein contends that ‘law is given to human being’ to put himself under control. There is scope to see where law is rightly followed and where it has been violated. Law is there to strengthen the social solidarity and not to divide. Whoever violates law is the one who disrupts the social network. In human society no one who goes against the social norms will flourish in life time. Only law abiding man can develop in different spheres. Let us consider this question put forward by Wittgenstein: “Who knows the laws according to which society develops?” (CV p. 60e). Man and his society develop only by abiding law (or within the system) and not by breaching of law. Social norms are boundary lines for the social beings. It must not be crossed over.

It needs also to be mentioned that man has the capacity to mould and shape the world (society) to make it fit for his survival, when the human mind is at work. And he can also adjust himself to suit the world condition. In both ways, there is plasticity. I mean to say that man has the capacity to change the unconditionally given world into such a condition just suitable for his habitation. Whereas the animals or other living beings have to passively biologically adjust themselves for maintaining their lives because they lack the capacity to shape or mould their kingdom so that they can fit it in. It is not just that man can shape or mould the world; he can as well store information about the changing world. This helps him able to cope with the world. Without such
special or extra capacity man would not have survived this long. Man has kept the world alive with all his epistemic power. It is almost like an obligation for man from the point of possessor of epistemic power to nurture the world and see everything is fine. As mentioned earlier, the new ideas, findings and knowledge through research works, seminar or workshops about this world, or man or about any happenings are shared and spread. The news about these findings and new developments is spread by men through various means and thereby get themselves learn to get in tune with the changing world. In this way the epistemic power works in man to fight back diseases, anti-social groups etc. after clear remedy is found. In the present world context, there are various high level forms of media through which we can see and come to know what is happening in every corner of the world. While the animal world remains almost the same since the creation, man’s world undergoes many changes. The animals’ way of getting food also remains unchanged. The animals must go or come to a place where their foods are available. They cannot place an order and wait for their food. Unless the food is brought by mother-animal, they receive not their food; else they have to search by themselves. Moreover, it is not possible for them to check from their own shelter where food is available in abundance. Yet, it is true that they do not cultivate, weave, plant or work for their livelihood. They live but not like the epistemic agents.

Another exceptional capacity of man could be connected to what Wittgenstein points out through “the connection between illness and dirt – ‘to cleanse of an illness.’ It affords a simple, childlike theory of illness, that it is dirt which can be washed off” (RFGB in PO p. 153). A little about the concepts of ‘dirt’ and ‘clean’ has been already
been discussed in Chapter 3, following Lagerspetz’s illustration. Here we can stress it more in connection with an epistemic power of agency in man. Lagerspetz has described the concept of ‘dirty’ and ‘clean’ in a way to tell that nothing is dirty or clean by itself. The concept of ‘dirty’ and ‘clean’ is contextual – depending on the time of use, place and its relativity. From the standpoint of Wittgenstein we want to point out the capacity of man regarding how man can cleanse (or wash) off dirt in order to prevent himself from illness. It is amazing how men gain the knowledge about dirt and clean and their connection with illness or health. We human beings wash our hands (or spoons, for those using spoons) before taking food; we wash our dishes, clothes, and also take bath. These actions of cleanliness are done to wash off dirt which may incur illness in us. We try, as far as possible, to keep ourselves clean, neat and tidy at all times – not just for enjoyment, not even for the sake of mere looking good. For example, in summer we take bath with cold water and in winter with hot water – both not just to enjoy the coldness or hotness of water; but to keep ourselves clean. Unlike human beings, the animals dip (or dive) themselves in water – for example, a buffalo simply enjoys muddy water. Even some birds dive and dip in water to enjoy during hot weather but not with the intention of keeping themselves clean in order to remain healthy. They do not have the capacity to think how and why they become ill; they do not diagnose their illness. With a firm conviction we can tell that animals will not succeed in reading the cause (or the significance of a context or time) of any happening, because only epistemic agents can do that. Wittgenstein in this regard observes that surroundings (context) give human
Otherwise, if the surroundings or context does not tell what I speak or do or where I am now, my speaking or doing will be of no significance. The animals are deficient of this ability to consider the surroundings. Exceptionally trained pet animals may be able to act like human beings in the right surroundings. That means where human involvement is absent there is no contextual behavior for the animals. Moreover, their little contextual behaviour would be without thoughts, without any plan or purpose; and without an understanding of the significance of the context itself. A parrot might be so trained that it might utter “Good Morning” before friends only in the morning, Yet it does not wish good morning in so far as it does not know that it is wishing that.

Man is naturally moulded to possess epistemic power. Due to epistemic touch, not only we keep ourselves clean but we are under obligation to keep our pets clean, our surroundings clean and to do things that can save us and the world from sufferings. In a sense, the moral agency owes to the epistemic agency. Responsibility cannot be denied in so far as we are no less epistemic than ethical. If we deny our responsibility and hold natural things and animals responsible, we really lack the sense of morality. Wittgenstein stresses about this: “Denying responsibility is not holding people responsible” (CV p. 63e). So if we all deny our own responsibility for long we will at last turn ourselves into beasts (acquiring beastly nature).

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13 Wittgenstein, PI # 853 “What is happening now has significance—in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance.”
After all there is no linguistic interaction among animals. Sound interaction can bear good ideas, makes ways to carry on and adjust our lives. Exchange of ideas may produce new knowledge. New knowledge is further used to uplift standard of living. This flow of thought or knowledge increases in human beings and not in animals. Could it be, therefore, appropriate to say that their way of life depends (more or less) on feelings? That the feeling which we have for our lives is comparable to that of such a being who could choose for himself his viewpoint in the world underlies, I believe, the myth – or the belief – that we had chosen our bodies before birth (RFGB in PO p. 137). To man we use and ascribe such words like, ‘great’, ‘holy’, ‘saint’, ‘revered’, ‘famous’, ‘respectable’, ‘honourable’, ‘Excellency’ ‘dignified’, ‘bold’ etc. to address him as per his level of epistemic power and service rendered from the measure of human meter. The value of holiness and the likes, in life, society, culture and human history is much treasured. These ascriptions of human level of dignities come through constitutive views or consensus from the ground of language. If there be no language, the concepts of respect, obedience, homage, sincerity etc. will not be formed or understood. As these concepts can come only with epistemic power, are constitutive views. Wittgenstein may be right in his observation in this regard. He puts forward a rhetorical question: “Would it be correct to say our concepts reflect our life?” (LW II). This may not be a total truth; in practical life, if we consider, in most of the times, we live on our attitudes. Meaning, the positive or negative concept that one forms in mind, will reflect his life. These reflections or inflections are totally absent in non-humans; and difficult to study their nature or character; showed almost having the same in each species or class, except as
being animal or bird and not more. On the contrary (from the ascriptions that can be
given to man), to animal we use ‘strong’, ‘wild’, ‘fearful’, ‘poisonous’, etc. as per their
physical strength and appearance. ‘We do not condemn the lion for its ferocity and
praise the lamb for its meekness.’ (Quoted by S. Radhakrishnan in his *Bhagavadgita*,
Introductory Essay #7 referred from *Svatantrah karta*: Pamm). On animals the somatic
ascriptions are more than dignity ascriptions. However good and excellent behavior a
trained animal may display before us, we will not address it as ‘Its Excellency’. This
reference can be made only to persons who are dignified. Animals are not categorized on
dignity. In other words, epistemic set up is only meant for creatures having the power of
holding dignity. Earlier we talk about ‘naming’ and this naming has epistemic bond;
animals lacking this has no desire of becoming famous or great, because it has nothing
to do with them as they have no names. Having names engenders the spirit of dignity.
One may ask, “Are *all* people great human beings? (CV p. 53). Wittgenstein’s answer is,
“No” (CV p. 53) and, recognizing that each one of us hope to become a great human
being, he exclaims, “Well then, what hope can you have of being a great human being!”
(CV p. 53). The epistemic power works in man to help himself to keep name in good
position so that men will not take this name for mockery or anything negative. The
epistemic power of naming in man, therefore, helps him to take decision before
performing an act. And the epistemic power comes in with the seriousness of the words.
When speaking in front of people we take care of the phrases (felicity) we use so that we
can touch and convince and make them believe what we say. When a man is not serious
with the words he is using then people will not believe or it won’t have significance.
People will tell that he is that sort of person and what he says have no value. He cannot be the kind of person that people can trust. Taking this ‘trust’ or ‘believing’ from another angle, we borrow or lend commodities or money basing on trustworthy communication. Animals on the other hand do not know how to borrow or lend; they do not possess anything by name. Sharing they do among themselves, especially mother animals to their young ones. Lack of linguistic activities hinders them from acquiring things to their possession or on contract that which they can lend or borrow. If they borrow, will they know when to return; and if they lend, will they be able to ask the debt or remind it? Then how can we expect them to lend or borrow? These actions of borrowing or lending have to be done on exchange of words, that too on faith or trust or by signing undertaking. And at times of exchange of words for carrying the tasks of lending, sparing, or borrowing, both parties must really mean to their meanings or words exchanged. This is to say that meaning of word by itself can have not much effect/impression simply by uttering. It can have better effect or impact depending on how one’s seriousness is or authenticity with the word at the time of uttering. In this regard, Wittgenstein says that we must commit ourselves to the words that we are using, otherwise the word has no significance by itself. So man must learn how to use word and commit himself to its use so that he can make it significant, believable and trustworthy. Man can show either his seriousness or triviality of any subject-matter by the way he uses/utters the word(s). On the other hand, however serious with words one

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may be, if his character (conduct, habit) does not go in tune with what he speaks, the
hearer will not be ready to believe or follow him. In both ways man’s epistemic agency
works. The role of epistemic agent is not just mouth-piece, but more of actions, will,
desire and character too, although language (spoken) can do much.

Before we end this chapter, we would like to mention one more notable
observation that Wittgenstein has made regarding the capacity inherent (or inbuilt) in
man. He observes, “Man can regard all the evil within himself as delusion” (CV p. 67e).
It is true that man can conceal the bright or dark side of his life, under necessity,
according to the situations he confronts; he can pretend that things never happened in his
life. He can also take even the worst thing just as a dream or an illusion. What makes
this possible in man? The answer is obvious. It is nothing but the epistemic power
working in him. The epistemic power comprises of knowledge, wisdom, and
understanding (insight). Those people, who can’t make happen in this form in their lives,
will surely ruin their own lives. For, ‘wisdom is like cold grey ash, covering up the
glowing embers,’ (CV p. 56e). People, who are wise and having the capacity of
understanding the other people’s condition, can always light up the lives of others.
People can feel the warmth of their presence, as they remain themselves cool. To be
optimistic with my philosophical anthropological approach, man’s epistemic power will
cover up the true human nature under all difficult situations. Those people, who do not
apply the inherent capacity mentioned above, disgrace themselves. They do not know
how to respect their fellow beings either. These types of people incur disturbances to
social system, for the epistemic norms are based on social conventions. A being which
has no epistemic capacity neither respects nor disgraces. Its actions are all the same. There is no ground from which we can impose judgment upon this being.

Judgment comes from two different angles, viz. certainty and doubt. Only to a being which has the capacity of knowing and understanding can the concepts of ‘believe’, ‘surmise’, ‘doubt’, ‘be convinced’, ‘conjecture’ (cf. OC 21) be ascribed to. Doubt can be a method or a process leading to knowledge through justification. Perhaps, this could be the reasons why Wittgenstein talks so much about ‘doubt’ in his *On Certainty*. He says, ‘the game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’ (OC 115). A question of doubt or certainty rest upon human epistemic authority. Due to this, perhaps, some people are credulous and some adamant on different issues and subjects. When one is so certain about a matter, the other on the same matter is so doubtful. Whenever there is doubting there is thinking, but not vice versa. And suspicion can be the result of doubt. Again out of suspicion a mistake may be committed. Only when we judge in conformity with mankind, (cf. OC 156) we can say that it is mistake or not a mistake. It is because human beings are the ones who doubt and suspect, who know and understand. To the extent that language is a rule-governed activity and the rules of a language-game constitutive by nature, there is no proper language-game without the presupposition of the concepts of ‘know’, ‘doubt’, ‘understand’, ‘believe’, ‘convince’, ‘surmise’, etc. which are closely associated with the concept of rule and rule-following.
Wittgenstein states that doubt\textsuperscript{15} is a follower of belief. This is what he says: “doubt comes after belief” (OC 160). Human being, counting right from birth, starts with the way of believing (in the adult). But as we can see, after doubt comes in and then leaves or diminishes the strength of knowledge increases. Say, you half believe on certain thing to be ‘a’ at one hand, and also ‘b’ at the other. Supposing, the doubt on ‘b’ loses its sense gradually and comes to a zero level, you now take yourself to be very certain about that thing to be ‘a’. Faith or belief with certainty can overpower doubt. A doubter is not a skeptic. He just doubts to get himself into certainty. Can we not say that doubt is a projector which projects human beings as embodied epistemic agents? Now faith is a reducer of doubt or suspicion. Faith works as forceps by which we can get knowledge, truth, and understanding. What one believes may turn to be false. Knowledge is always true. But even if you have a good positive knowledge about a person, if you lose your faith in him, you will be no more ready to take his words. Faith is what that helps a person to assess himself and the other, especially from the religious ground. It is faith in God that holds me, not my knowledge about God; my knowledge about God is very limited. But this limited knowledge does not encumber the growth of faith in me. On that basis through and out of faith one can even sacrifice his own life for the sake of religion. Wittgenstein puts it this way: “…I need certainty--not wisdom, dreams, speculation—and this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what my heart, my soul, needs, not my speculative intellect” (CV p. 32e). Faith, as it were, comes from the

\textsuperscript{15} Wittgenstein talks or mentioned about ‘doubt’ more than 140 times in his \textit{On Certainty} alone. It shows that he wants to stress on the point that doubt is a pathway that leads to knowledge.
heart and soul, not from the mind. It is more of that the human society or societal relations are grounded not just on human knowledge but on faith and mutual trust. As Peter Winch suggests, the notions of social relations, community, and intervention – are essential composition in order to make sense to human life. These concepts also are reliable for reflecting upon facts of our existence.  

“Let us be human”. — (This is a clarion call of Wittgenstein to us as epistemic agents in CV p. 36e). This urge made by Wittgenstein contains in it all sort of knowledge that are valuable for the upkeeping of humanity, preservation of humanistic traits, so on and so forth. Again, the entreaty of Wittgenstein to each of us to ‘be human’ implies that man is a being that can understand each other, have the power and capacity to bear burden of each other, can try to commune, walk towards building a peaceful atmosphere. The demands, or dispositions or qualifications to be fit in ‘being human’ are worth considering. From this clarion call of Wittgenstein we can come to know that although he does not put himself in the class of ‘being religious’, he is afraid that he will be out of the domain of ‘being human’. Within the call, Wittgenstein says that ‘other forms of behavior are also presupposed’ and he continues to make the idea more intelligible, thus saying, “If I ask someone on the street for directions then I prefer a friendly answer to an unfriendly one. I react immediately to someone else’s behavior. I presuppose the inner in so far as I presuppose a human being” (LW II 84e). His whole life of doing philosophy seems to be conforming what it means ‘to be human’. This

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shows that his epistemic energy upholds his movement towards maintaining and upgrading the humanistic nature – i.e. meaning of man in a complete form to be understood from language. Man, as an embodied epistemic agent conceptualizes and reflects upon these facts of collections of knowledge for his existence and even for the existence of world (cf. PI §174). Our discussion has guided us to accept that all our character-traits, behavior, the relations we are holding etc. are nothing but language-games, from the very start. And man into the field of language-games presupposes epistemic power. In this connection, Michael Grant admits that: “We are, so to speak, born into language, into the language-game. It is not incumbent on us to see the language-game as being the result of reflection, or ratiocination.” This means that we are not coming from somewhere and then achieving language; we are born into language and it is growing as we are learning in different stages of our lives.

There is stimulating thing and exquisiteness in the community of man qua an epistemic agent. This one: endorsement of labour is mostly done depending on the epistemic capacity and strength. Teacher, an engineer, doctor, archaeologist, priest, etc. are given or shared the labour on epistemic capacity and commitment. This is one of important distributions men should do to uphold the human community. Why this distribution or division is essential? Unlike animals, men are not solely feeding on natural products; the possession of episteme takes men to consider, reconsider before taking or doing things, in so doing will shape up the being of human. We do not only

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think endorsement of labour on the basis of epistemic capacity, we have been grouping ourselves on the basis of having similar ideas, interests, religion, profession, caste, and politics too. As men, we group ourselves upon taste – people of sports, music, religion, politics, science and technology, teaching, etc.- but come to a common notion called ‘human’ upon understanding. Wittgenstein, in this regard has kept the ‘notion of common sense’ as the agenda of epistemic agency. To get rid of all possible confusion and vying of labour inhumanly (or job, in today’s language), it is done after the measure of epistemic capacity and then the endorsement is complete. Labour/job determination of who and what and which and where can be carried out only with an epistemic import to make it sound and undisputed. So, every man is expected to arrive at the notion of common sense, including a philosopher, because everyone is cumbered with intellectual diseases (in the language of Wittgenstein). It is insisted that these diseases (cf. CV p. 44e) should be cleared up in the first place and then one can lead to a common sense to play a common language-game where understanding and acknowledgement prevail.