INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER 1


2  "Deontic Logic and Theory of Conditions", Critica 2, (1968), p.3.

3  E.g., F.H. Bradley, Ellis Mc Taggart.


7  4.461.


9  The convention here is to underline, to indicate a proposition and to use quote to indicate a word or sentence.

CHAPTER 2


3 Ibid.


7 Italics mine.


9 Hume's word was "copy".

10 In this respect Hume may be said to have thought with the learned but to have spoken with the vulgar.


15 Given by Lazerowitz.


CHAPTER 3

1 According to Moritz Schlick "stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stating the rule according to which the sentence is to be used, and this is the same as stating the way in which it can be verified (or falsified)", "Meaning and Verification", The Philosophical Review, Vol.45, (1936), p.341.

2 Ibid., p.342.

3 Philosophy of Science, Vol.33, 1936, p.422.


6 Ibid., p.5.

7 4.000


CHAPTER 4

1. *Appearance and Reality*, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1920), seventh impression, p.43.

2. p.11.


4. Ibid., p.133.

5. 6.54.

6. p.263.


9. Ibid., p.97.

10. It should be noted here that Wittgenstein uses "metaphysical" in the Blue Book, when he could just as well have used "philosophical". The statements cited as "metaphysical" do not refer to anything beyond the bounds of sense.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that when the Greeks e.g., Democritus, spoke of an atom as being uncuttable, what that meant was that it was physically uncuttable, not that it was logically uncuttable (decomposable) into smaller parts.


25 Gilbert Ryle.


27 Preface.

28 p.49.

29 Ibid., p.51.


33 Ibid., p.16.

34 Ibid., p.21.
The allusion is to "language games", as he sometimes called them.


*Ibid., p.49.*

*Ibid., p.43.*

*Ibid., p.103.*

*Ibid., p.48.*


*Ibid., p.51.*

Ibid., p.28.

Ibid., P.52.


Argument from Morris Lazerowitz.


Ibid.,

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, (edited by

59
p.46.

60

61

62

63

64
Ibid., p.59.
CHAPTER 5

1 And was held even so recently by H.W.B. Joseph, (An Introduction to Logic, p.13), who said "a=a" is a law of things as well as a law of thought.


9 Ibid.


Norman Malcolm in his paper, "Are Necessary Propositions Verbal?" mentions that Ayer is committed to the view that necessary propositions are not really necessary. *Mind*, Vol. XLIX, N.S., No. 194.

John Austin argues (in a discussion) that since \(2+2=4\) is true, it must be about something.

The form of speech in which no reference to words is made.


Hardy writes: "I have myself always thought of a mathematician or in the first instance an observer, a man who gazes at a distant range of mountains and sits down his observations", *Mathematical Proof*, *Mind*, Vol. XXVIII (1929), p. 181.

According to which a necessary proposition about the numbers 2 & 4 is about scratches on paper.


Here "a priori sentence" is used for "sentence which expresses an a priori proposition".
The Yellow Book (Unpublished)


p.45


Ibid. p.51.

Interestingly enough, Ayer maintained that it was impossible to know with certainty that a physical thing exists on the grounds that such knowledge would require an infinite number of sense observations having been made.
In discussion.


Ibid., Part I, Sec. 33.

pp.209-10.


CHAPTER 6


2. Tape recorded by me.

3. Vide his letter to Mr. M. Chakravarty.


7. Portion within parenthesis ours.


11. Ibid., see pp. 17-20, (For elaboration).

Vide his letter of March 21, 1934 to Mr. M. Chakravarty.


Ibid., p.58. (Italics mine).

Ibid., (Italics mine).

Ibid., p.69.


23 Ibid.,

24 Ibid., p. 58.


27 Ibid.,

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy,

P. 226.


44 Vide, The Structure of Metaphysics, p.78, where Lazerowitz says: "the philosophy theory ... is composed of three interrelated, interacting strata: the illusion of a theory about the world, at the conscious level; a non-verbal sentence which embodies an alteration of language, at the preconscious level, and a belief (one or more) which satisfies a wish and counters a fear in the substratum of our mind. (Italics ours).


51 Philosophy and Illusion, (George and Allen, London, 1963), p.82.


53 Asking "what about those questions for which it is logically impossible to find an answer?" Schlick says, "it would not be a genuine question at all but a mere row of words." And elsewhere, "... a question which is unanswerable in principle can be no question at all; it is nothing but a nonsensical series of words", "Meaning and Verification", *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Feigl and Sellars, New York, pp.147-56.


55 Ibid., p.12.


-. Kalidas, Presuppositions of Science and Other Essays, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharathi, India, 1970.


Metaphilosophical and Model Philosophical Questions, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Vishva-Bharati, India, 1972.


Freud, Sigmund, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*,


Hardy, G.H., "Mathematical Proof", *Mini*, x\xvIII, 1929.


- "Strong and Weak Verification", Mind* 1939.
- "The Null Class of Premises"* Mind, 1938.
- "Philosophical Semantics"* Old and New Questions in Physics, Cosmology, Philosophy of Science and the Biological Sciences, Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1983.


Malcolm, Norman, "Are Necessary Propositions Really Verbal?", Mind, XLIX.


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