Thus metaphilosophy as defined by Lazerowitz may well be said to be a characteristic part or variant of the metaphilosophy in the wider sense; and Lazerowitz as we have said, has no particular objection to this description of his own metaphilosophy; even thought he prefers to confine the application of the name "metaphilosophy" to his restricted area of enquiry.

We have no serious objection to Lazerowitz's characteristic use of the name 'metaphilosophy'. But we sense one danger in it. The enquiry instituted by Lazerowitz and named 'metaphilosophy' is designed to explain one notorious and apparently disturbing peculiarity of philosophical utterances. But philosophical utterances may have more peculiarities which are equally notorious and have an equal claim to an explanation. Cannot the body of sentences containing such explanation, one may ask, make a claim to the name 'metaphilosophy'? Is it not amount to following a double standard to deny the name to it?

Anyway, the question arises: Is metaphilosophy in general and, for that matter, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy which is a characteristic variant of it, a part of
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we know of philosophers who are inclined to liken philosophy too closely to science, and for that matter, metaphilosophy to metascience. For such philosophers, metaphilosophy will not normally count as a part of philosophy at all, just as metascience does not count as a part of science.

But the position which tends to go far as to expel metaphilosophy from the domain of philosophy, need not, we think, be taken too seriously. Philosophy may indeed resemble science, even very closely. Yet it would seem to go too far to suppose that the same resemblance holds also between metascience and metaphilosophy, and to argue, on that basis, that since metascience is not science, metaphilosophy, likewise, is not philosophy. For the relation that holds between metaphilosophy and philosophy differs in certain fundamental ways from that which holds between metascience and science. Metascience is not in actuality claimed to be a science, and for that, there is good reason. The reason is primarily that metascientific problems, e.g., 'What is science?' 'What is the method of science?' etc. do not respond to the same method of approach as questions of science, e.g., 'How does mercury react to heat?
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'What are the effects of carbon monoxide on the human organism?', etc. Our ways of finding answers to the latter are observation, experiment and the like, but these do not apply to the former.

The picture, on the other hand, is totally different when we look at the relation that holds between metaphilosophy and philosophy. Our methods of dealing with problems is the same in both cases. Take for example the philosophical questions, 'What is the nature of ultimate reality?', 'Do Universals exist?' and compare them with the metaphilosophical questions, e.g., 'What is philosophy?', 'What is the method of philosophy?' The way philosophers deal with the latter is not different from the way they deal with the former, and philosophers are not aware of any alternative way which might prove more suitable for metaphilosophical problems.

Interestingly however, one thing may be noted at this point. To his students, Lazerowitz is never known to be one among those philosophers who are prone to liken philosophy to science or even place science and philosophy in the same category.

... philosophy is not a demonstrative
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science and ... we cannot expect from it what we expect from a demonstrative science.

... the [philosophical] theories, unlike those of the natural sciences and mathematics, are not open to proof or disproof.

Also,

... a moment's reflection will tend to throw doubt on the comfortable idea that philosophy is a kind of science.

Yet, at certain places he sounds like someone subscribing to the position that metaphilosophy is not philosophy, at least not necessarily. He says:

... It seems plainly possible to make statements about philosophy (metaphilosophical statements) which are not themselves philosophical statements.

But on what is this grounded? The only ground, as far as we can see, is obtained introspectively in human style. It is, in Lazerowitz's own words,

... to speak for myself, I sometimes
mention philosophical problems without finding philosophical thoughts accompanying them.

An introspective or inductive ground has a characteristic weakness of its own, which we need not elaborate. No philosophical proposition, by its very nature, is amenable to factual or inductive corroboration. But this is not our main objection against Lazerowitz on this particular point. What we would especially like to call attention to, is a feeling we have that Lazerowitz in an unguarded moment lost sight of the distinction that exists between mentioning philosophy and talking about philosophy (producing a metaphilosophical statement). The former is not a philosophical activity. And no one perhaps will say that it is. But, talking about philosophy is doing philosophy. It is producing, fundamentally, the same kind of sentences in which philosophy consists. As a matter of fact, this is one recognised singularity which distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines, in that when we talk about science or art we do not necessarily produce science or art,

So we have good reason to look upon metaphilosophy as philosophy. But the question arises: In what precise way is it so? Is it a part of philosophy in the sense
in which such branches of philosophy as, *metaphysics*, *epistemology*, *ethics*, etc. are? We seem to have genuine difficulties in thinking of metaphilosophy that way. Metaphilosophy, even though a part of philosophy, cannot be assigned the same kind of status or position as *metaphysics*, *epistemology* etc. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between them. The difference in fact goes so far as to make them philosophies of a different kind.

Let us illustrate this point.

No two things, say A and B, can be assigned to the same class, say, C, if their logical relations to C are different. This follows from the fact that every two members of a particular class stand in the same logical relation to the class as a whole. (For otherwise* the class-name could not have been applicable to both in the same sense.)

Now, one could have indeed maintained that metaphilosophy is philosophy of a kind with *metaphysics* or *epistemology*, if it were the case that the metaphilosophical problems and the problems of metaphysics* *epistemology*, etc** could be said to stand in the same relation to the class of philosophical
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is not philosophy at all. Nor is it correct to think that it is philosophy along with metaphysics, epistemology, etc. But how, then, rate we, place metaphilosophy or Lazerowitz's characteristic version of it in the map of philosophy? The most appropriate way, according to us, is to conceive it, as a philosophical activity of the second order, as distinguished, from metaphysics, epistemology, and the like, which may well be called philosophical activity of the first order. Co in being a kind of metaphilosophy, Lazerowitz's metaethics may be called a species of second order philosophy.

In introducing such notions as first order, second order to characterise philosophy, we would appear to be introducing a hierarchy in philosophy which may never end. For, someone who investigates the nature of metaphilosophy will produce a third order philosophy and the process will go on endlessly.

This notion of an endless hierarchy appears repellant to some. But what is there to be frightened of? It follows naturally and inevitably from the nature of man as incurably self-conscious. Besides, it also accords with the nature of knowledge as endless.
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Lazerowitz however, as far as we know, has not said anything which can be understood as an acceptance of our characterisation of metaphilosophy. But that is because, of the unfortunate fact that the philosopher, so remarkably conscious of the first order philosophy, has not carried forward his self-consciousness a step further to reflect on his own metaphilosophisings, that is to say, to be sufficiently inquisitive about what it is that he is doing or how to characterise it. Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy covers a lot; contrarily, his philosophy of metaphilosophy covers little.

II

In his own preferred sense, metaphilosophy, as we have repeatedly said, is to be conceived as a characteristic preoccupation with the object of finding an explanation of the allegedly irresolvable disagreements among philosophical theories; and in practice also, that is, in the course of working out his unique and sophisticated metaphilosophy, Lazerowitz never loses sight of this stated objective. His metaphilosophy is above all an elaborate and persistent attempt to provide an account of why philosophers disagree endlessly with one another. From this, one thing is obvious. This is that, for Lazerowitz, the
thesis to the effect that philosophers disagree, will have to be true. The position is in fact the most basic presupposition of Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy; on its acceptability depends the identity and relevance of the metaphilosophy as he conceives it and as he has practised it. So it is essential that we should examine the position, before we make a claim to have understood Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy.

As we know, from Descartes onwards it has been quite common with philosophers, with an introspective bent of mind, (having in their minds the agreed results obtained in science and mathematics) to speak of the irresolvable disagreement in philosophy and to treat it as a malaise which afflicts philosophy. In this way, the position that philosophers disagree or that disagreement is built into philosophy, has come to assume the standing of an axiom so that few have ever thought of the need of subjecting it to scrutiny.

The position can be critically approached in a number of ways. E.g., one, assuming that philosophy is always fraught with disagreements, may well ask (as Watkins does), whether these disagreements are necessarily a malaise. We may also ask whether the disagreements
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attributing to philosophy are peculiar to philosophy and strictly confined to it. But our approach to the position will be different. We are going to question it at a more basic level. That is, we are going to investigate whether there is any sense at all in which philosophical utterances may be said to be in disagreement with one another. Do philosophers really disagree?

Lazerowitz has not investigated this problem in detail. However, he does not deny the importance of the investigation. In a letter, he writes as follows:

... one point you make is too important, however, to delay. This is whether philosophers can be said to disagree. I have remarked on this but in much too cursory a manner. If I may quote one passage: 'With Moore philosophy gains sobriety and the appearance of rigour but loses most of its dramatic appeal; and it is taste and nothing else which dictates which we choose in philosophy, the extra-vaganza of metaphysics or the sobriety of common sense with the semblance of science. We may well say with Hume: *tis not solely in poetry and music that we must
fellow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. But you are right; of course, I do not state this sufficiently clearly nor do I elaborate it nearly enough. In philosophy there are preferences for opposing semantic innovations...

He says something to the same effect also in his 'Cassandra in Philosophy'

It would seem that the validity of a philosophical argument is determined by preference.

Unfortunately, the lines quoted do not make things as clear for us as we would have desired. If we have not grossly misunderstood him, in saying this Lazerowitz appears to understand disagreement in terms of our differences in respect of taste, sentiment and preferences. But in so doing, if one may say so, Lazerowitz is perhaps making a 'holiday use' of the word 'disagreement' to explain the point. Suppose that I prefer coffee to tea, while my friend prefers tea to coffee, or that I admire Gandhi, while my friend does not. Such are not exactly the occasions where I and my friend may be said to disagree with each other; we are said just to differ in
tastes, sentiments and preferences. However, I and my friend may rightly be said to disagree when I assert that drinking coffee is injurious to health", while my friend asserts the opposite, i.e., drinking coffee is not injurious to health. 'Agreement', 'disagreement', and their equivalents, are in fact cognitive words and as such they are explainable only with reference to truth-value, and not with reference to taste, sentiments, etc.,. A situation which can rightly be called one of disagreement arises only when the same proposition is at the same time called true by one and false by another.

So the question whether philosophical utterances can correctly be said to be incompatible with each other hinges ultimately on whether they can rightly be said to have a truth-value, in other words, whether it would make sense to call them true or false. Lazrowitz's position on this point is quite clear. He says,

... a philosophical theory is not the kind of theory which has a truth-value

and elsewhere
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... metaphysical theories have no truth-values and the controversies about them are not debates over whether they are true or false.

Thus Lazerowitz denies truth-values to philosophical utterances! philosophical utterances according to him can neither be said to be true nor said to be false. But the position, as we can see, tends to spell disaster for Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy itself. Unfortunately, Lazerowitz however, does not appear to be fully aware of this.

First: We have argued that statements over which philosophers can be meaningfully said to agree or disagree, must be such that they can meaningfully be said to be true or to be false. The notions of agreement and disagreement are understandable only in terms of truth or falsity. This means that statements which cannot meaningfully be said to be true or false cannot, for that reason, also be meaningfully said to be compatible or incompatible. Now, if there is nothing basically wrong with this position, then it would follow that in denying truth-values to philosophical propositions, Lazerowitz has unconsciously committed himself to the position that there can never be any disagreement about them. And in that case, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy, essentially an attempt at explaining
philosophical disagreements, will have no job to do; it will lose all of its supposed relevance. Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy in this sense turns out to be self-annihilating.

Second: Take the utterances of which Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy itself is comprised. What exactly may be the logical value characterising them? Can they make a claim to being true? Taken as philosophical utterances, as we would be inclined to do, in his view they certainly cannot, because philosophical utterances, according to Lazerowitz, are not such as can be said to be true.

But Lazerowitz may escape this consequence by denying philosophical status to his metaphilosophical utterances. And this is perhaps what he is inclined to do. For he seems to look upon his metaphilosophical theory virtually as an empirical hypothesis. Consider the kind of expressions he uses in talking about his theory. "The hypothesis I am going to formulate...", "Regardless of whether..." the hypothesis I'm going to put forward," and so on. And the hypothesis, according to him, is empirical in the sense that it is backed by factual claims about "the unconscious". "It is now possible,"
writes Lazerowitz, "to establish them or disestablish them [conjectures about the unconscious significance of philosophical utterances] for there does exist a science of the unconscious. The unconscious no longer is an unknowable, a Ding-an-Sich".

However, taken as an empirical hypothesis, it gives rise to the question: what tests has Lazerowitz conducted or proposed to ascertain its truth or falsity? The answer to this is far from encouraging. Thus as Daya points out:

*** one is amazed to find that there is hardly any evidence of empirical methodology being used throughout the whole book. There are no data, either statistical or clinical on which the theory is supposed to be based ***

the hypothesis belongs to the well known field of psycho-analytic theories and, whatever may be the limitations of the verificational methodology in that field, there certainly is a methodology to test the various hypothesis put forward in that field. It is inconceivable that Lazerowitz does not know the fact, yet it is equally strange that a serious thinker should formulate
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an empirical hypothesis and not try to test it.

Lazerowitz is not altogether silent about the question of the justification of his hypothesis, that is, his metaphilosophical theory. Asking himself

*** what right do I have to think that it is correct.***

he says,

*** in a answer to this question, perhaps the best thing I can say is that the position has 'clicked' for me, that I see that it is correct, if not in every detail, then at least in subst ace.

and continuing,

The hypothesis I am going to formulate meets the intellectual need of facing and explaining this fact, and to put the matter subjectively has clicked intellectually for me.

But "clicking" as Daya rightly points out:

... is not a sufficient condition for the establishment of any empirical hypothesis, and he would be
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a strange scientist indeed who is quite satisfied with a hypothesis just because it has "clicked" for him.25

In fairness to Lazerowitz, it should be mentioned that his remarking that "the position has clicked for me"26 and that "the hypothesis ••• has 'clicked' intellectually for me," are not the only thing he has said in defense of his metaphysical hypothesis. He also tries to derive credibility for his hypothesis from an explanatory efficacy it is supposed by him to possess. He thinks that it explains "the chronic condition of philosophical differences of opinion."28 As quoted above, he says that it "meets the intellectual need of facing and explaining this fact..."29

Explanatory efficacy is indeed one thing which contributes to the credibility of a hypothesis. This is a recognized fact. In his criticism, Daya, however, overlooks this aspect of the defense set up by Lazerowitz in support of his roet^-philosophy. Thus his criticism has not been fair. To be fair, we have to examine the explanatory relevance or efficacy Lazerowitz claims for his metaphilosophy.
Any claim to such effect as that a particular hypothesis or a theory explains a fact makes sense only when the fact it claims to explain is really there to call for explanation. Talking of explaining a particular fact when no such fact is there, makes no sense. The fact which Lazerowitz's raeta-philosophy makes a claim to explain is, as he explicitly states, the endless disagreement in philosophy. But do philosophers really disagree? Is it really a fact that there is anything in philosophy which may count as disagreement in the true sense of the term? We have argued previously that in consciously denying truth-values to philosophical propositions, Lazerowitz has in fact been unconsciously led to deny that there is in fact disagreement. Disagreement presupposes truth-values. And there is no disagreement without them.

III

The problem that will occupy us now is whether, without leaving Lazerowitz's own framework, we can restore truth-values in some way to philosophical propositions, so that the alleged disagreements among philosophical propositions may turn out not to be a syth
and the invaluable philosophising he does in the name of metaphilosophy is not in consequence irrelevant. To put the matter in another way, can we find any ground for saying that philosophical propositions can sensibly be said to be true or false, so that we may also have a ground for maintaining that philosophers may sensibly be said to disagree and that, therefore, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy has a genuine fact to explain.

The crucial point for us here to be clear about, we think, is this. What is it that makes Lazerowitz commit himself to the position that philosophical propositions do not have truth-values? The answer is not hard to find. It lies mainly in the third layer of his 'three-layer' analysis of a philosophical theory as expounded in the previous chapter. The position which constitutes the third layer links up philosophic utterances with the non-cognitive functioning of our minds, mostly of wishes (and sometimes also with emotions). It is held by Lazerowitz consistently. To state the position in his own language.

... his [the philosopher's] utterances give expression to unconscious fantasies ... [and] an unconscious fantasy like a dream functions as the substitutional gratification of wishes.
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... joined to these is a third and less accessible layer, a complex of unconscious fantasies. A philosophical theory consists... lastly, of an unconscious fantasy or cluster of fantasies of importance to our emotional welfare.32

The great importance of the utterance to the philosopher makes it safe to compare it with a dream... like a dream it is fundamentally a wish fulfilment.33

The lines quoted above make it plain that in Lazerowitz's mind philosophical utterances or theories, like dreams, are closely linked up with wishes. This, in turn, makes him feel that the body of utterances that constitute philosophy is a part of our conative discourse as distinguished from the discourse which is cognitive. Once committed to the view that philosophical utterances are a cross-section of conative utterances* Lazerowitz seems to find it mandatory to hold that they are not amenable to any appraisal in terms of truth or falsity; for truth and falsity belong strictly to cognitive discourse.

However* the passage from the 'third layer' i.e.* that philosophical utterances have their roots in our
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unconscious wishes, to the position that they do not admit a truth-value is not, perhaps as straightforward as it would appear to be at first glance. There is, we feel, some degree of clumsiness about it. Admitted that philosophical utterances are rooted in our unconscious wishes, it does not follow that they are unconditionally conative and, therefore, necessarily devoid of truth-value. Utterances may be linked to wishes in two senses.

First: we may speak of utterances as linked with wishes in the sense that they are straightforward expressions of some wishes in our mind. Examples of such utterances are: 'Had I the wings of the dove!'; 'If I were a multimillionaire!', and the like. Such utterances constitute conative discourse par excellence. They are essentially immune from characterization in terms of truth-value; no one in fact calls them either true or false.

But, that an utterance is linked with a wish may also mean that it is in some sense caused by the latter. And this, as we understand it, is the sense which Lazerowitz has in mind when he speaks of philosophical utterances as wish fulfilment. That is to say, in calling a philosophical utterance an "unconscious fantasy" or
"wish fulfilment", or in comparing them with dreams, all that he has in mind is the idea that philosophical utterances have in some sense, their cause in our unconscious wishes. But for an utterance to be conative in this sense is very different from its being conative in the sense of being a direct expression of wishes. The latter excludes its having a truth-value but the former does not. Being caused by wishes is not incompatible with a statement being true or false. One may well call it true (if it is so), or false (if it is so).

To illustrate the point, let us take what you dreamt last night. You dreamt that you had become the Prime Minister of India, that you had gone to the United States on the invitation of President Reagan, that you held a very crowded press conference which had been telecast all over the world, and that for your performance you were being showered with praises coming from all corners of the earth. Take the sentences the dream is comprised of: (a) 'You have become the Prime Minister of India' (b) 'You went to the United States on the invitation of President Reagan'. (c) 'You held a press conference'. (d) 'Your performance in the press conference was very good.' (e) 'Praises are being showered on you'.

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As you are not actually the Prime Minister of India, the sentences are all expressions of your unconscious wishes. But that does not stand in the way of their being called false, as they are in fact false.

As a matter of fact, along with every statement that is undeniably truth-valued, may well go some wish in our mind. E.g., when I say to somebody 'I am thirsty' I may well be supposed to be expressing my wishes in order that my hearer will listen to me and that he will give me a glass of water. My statement, though motivated by my wishes, is to be called true if it is really true.

Lazerowitz makes no distinction between an utterance which directly expresses a wish and one which is caused by a wish. He seems to have modelled the latter after the former. And that possibly is one thing which has debarred him from granting truth-values to philosophical utterances and thereby, eventually, made him unwittingly liquidate the very logical basis of the alleged fact of their disagreement, i.e., the very thing which his etaphilosophy centers around.

Thus the psychological information about philosophical utterances contained in Lazerowitz's 'third layer'
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may well be accepted as true, without it being logically obligatory to say that philosophical utterances have no truth-values. Philosophical utterances may in fact be true or false. So where is no need to deny the factual feature of disagreements of philosophical utterances and for that reason, to deny the relevance of Lazerowitz’s metaphilosophy. But are they true or false in the sense in which utterances in science or those in mathematics are said to be true or false? This, however, is a very different issue: which we need not discuss here.

But one may ask what about the acceptability of the third layer itself?

For one thing, the position is emotionally disturbing to philosophers. Hospers in his paper, “Philosophy and Psychoanalysis” refers to the “violence of the reaction” to the position when it was presented by Lazerowitz at a conference in New York University. And the reaction is, in a way, emotionally not unjustified.

The position that philosophical utterances are the fulfilment of unconscious wishes, is apparently an attempt at using psychoanalysis’ arsenal to debunk philosophy, and this is unlikely to please philosophers. The/ see in
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it, not only an attempt at undermining the glory of their professional achievements, but also an act of betrayal, that is, a colleague of theirs crossing his professional boundaries and leaguing himself with the psychoanalysts.

It is not that Lazerowitz does not anticipate such a reaction. Referring to this position, he writes in his *The Structure of Metaphysics*:

... Freud describes three great 'outrages upon its naive self-love' which cultured mankind has had to endure in the last few hundred years. And if the present hypothesis is correct in its general outline, a special group of intellectuals, who have prided themselves on being impersonal seekers after truth, are exposed as the dupes of games they unconsciously play with language.

Theoretically also, the hypothesis of a third layer is perhaps more vulnerable than that of the other two layers in Lazerowitz's three-tier analysis. And that is one reason why critics generally have chosen this as a convenient target of their attack.

The source of our own unhappiness with it, however, as we have already elaborated, is that it tends eventually
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to liquidate the very reality of philosophical disagreement which Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy has to presuppose for the justification of its relevance.

There is another objection which also should not go unmentioned. While fraught with dangerous consequences it dilutes Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy, which is philosophy, with psychoanalysis which is not philosophy.

It may however, be mentioned here that in Lazerowitz's own eyes, this layer, is far less important than the other two layers.

Yet Mr. Lazerowitz maintains that this is not the main point he is interested in making. He has even indicated that he would be willing to drop this part of his theory if it raises too many additional problems. 3

To me also, in discussions, Lazerowitz adds something substantially to the same effect.

Despite all this, the position embodied in the third layer is not altogether without sympathisers. It continues to derive support of some kind from the writings of such philosophers as J. O. Wisdom, Alice Mabrose, John Hospers, Margaret Chatterjee, and others.
Let us now turn to the consideration of the first and second layers of Lazerowitz's three-layer analysis of philosophical utterances. In Lazerowitz's writings the third layer appears connected with the first two layers. That is true. But the connection is not necessary. This means that the first two layers can stand on their own without the third, in other words, the first two layers are not adversely affected if the third layer is dropped. On the contrary, they gain in respect of philosophical purity, if it is so done, for, the third layer, as we have pointed out, is a suggested excursion into an area outside philosophy, that is to say, into the science of psychoanalysis.

The position upheld in the first layer is, in substance, that philosophical theories, even though they do not convey any information about reality, produce the illusion of doing so. Lazerowitz has put the matter in various ways. To quote just two examples:

- a philosophical theory creates the intellectual illusion that a theory about the world, either true or false, is being pronounced...
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A metaphysical [philosophical] theory may be described as a two-layer structure. Uppermost is the illusion of a theory about the nature or real existence of a phenomenon, the illusion, that is to say that a metaphysical [philosophical] sentence states a view of some sort about reality.43

In talking about the three layers, Lazerowitz as we know, has, among other things, the Freudian picture of the mind as divided into conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious regions. He links up the first layer with the conscious region. On the other hand, the second layer is attributed to the pre-conscious functioning of our mind. It is intended to provide an account of the mechanism of the illusion of reality produced by a philosophical theory, in other words, of how the illusion is created. The illusion is attributed by Lazerowitz to a certain alleged peculiarity of philosophical language. The peculiarity consists in its being innovative or contrived. Lazerowitz describes it in such words as follows:

(At the pre-conscious level) a piece of altered terminology is introduced.

* * *

whereas what he [the philosopher] is doing is introducing a linguistic innovation.
A philosophical theory consists, for one thing, of a statement of an unheralded, concealed alteration of terminology...

... a philosophical theory is an illusion which is created by presenting in the ontological mode of speech, a gerrymandered piece of terminology.

... a revised piece of language which is artfully concealed by the non-verbal idiom in which it is expressed.

We have stated the contents of the first two layers, We may now turn to examine them. To start with the first layer, which says that philosophy produces the illusion of conveying information about the world or reality. This implies that, according to Lazerowitz, philosophy is not justified in presenting claims about reality or the world, in other words, the investigation of reality or the world is not its job inasmuch as the relevance of its methods for securing knowledge of the world is in Question. But must philosophy be viewed as debarred from conducting an investigation of reality and conveying to us the reports of the investigation? Obviously, that depends upon the idea of reality one has in his mind. Needless to say, in
using the words 'reality', 'world', etc., Lazerowitz means the world or the reality which is investigated and talked about in science, so that in asking whether a philosopher should, or have a right to, undertake an investigation of this world or reality, amounts to asking whether philosophers should, or have a right to, be concerned with the nature of the scientific world of reality. And on this point we would agree with Lazerowitz. Preoccupation with the problems of the reality which concern science cannot be the job of the philosopher. For the characteristic methods for handling these problems are not the characteristic methods of philosophy. Philosophers qua philosophers are not supposed to know the use of it or to practise it. The method which is appropriate for dealing with the reality of science is irrelevant in philosophy. No philosophical theory, as has been repeatedly pointed out by Lazerowitz himself, has ever been proved or disproved by a method by which a scientific proposition is proved or disproved.

"... the [philosophical] theories", he says, "unlike those of natural science and maths, are not open to proof or disproof."
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**Philosophy is not a demonstrative science**... we cannot expect from it what we expect from a demonstrative science.*'*

At this juncture, it may however be asked: How then, does it happen that philosophy and science do in fact have in common many sentences which apparently do not differ in their literal meaning. To mention a few examples: 'Time is infinite', 'Space is endlessly divisible', 'An organism is a material complex'.

The answer which appeals to us is this. The sentences, even though they have the same literal meaning, function very differently in the two contexts, namely those of science and philosophy. While occurring in the body of sentences that constitute science they purport to refer to and describe parts of reality with which science is concerned, on the other hand, when used in philosophy they refer, if we may say so, to themselves, in other words, the kind of reality or world which is constituted by scientific sentences.*

To state the matter in another way, in science they perform the role of referring to (or describing) a world which they are not themselves parts of, at least
not in the sense in which the objects of science are parts of the world, while in philosophy they perform the role of naming themselves, of referring to a world or reality of which they are themselves constituents.

In saying all this, it is plain that we are introducing an order of reality different from that with which science is concerned, that is, a reality which is constituted of various categories of semantic (logical) entities, e.g., propositions, concepts, etc., which are couched in the sentences of science and in all other such sentences which may be said to describe primary experiences of any kind (religious, moral, artistic and so on). This hypothesis of two-order reality has no doubt many difficulties, or it gives rise to many disturbing questions. A few examples: Do the alleged constituents of the second-order world have a being in any sense whatever or are they just myths? How is the second-order reality related to the first-order reality of science? Can it be assimilated, in any sense, fully or partly, in the latter? Is there any identity in respect of structure or in any other aspect between the two orders of reality? Can we read in the nature of one the nature of the other? And so on. Dealing with such
difficulties is an enormous job by itself, which we cannot afford to undertake hers without getting too far afield.

Anyway, for those who believe that there is sense in talking about the second-order reality, Lazerowitz's position that philosophy is debarred from talking about reality would not hold good unconditionally. It would not be binding on them to accept it. They may well hold a position to the effect, that, even though philosophy is not supposed to be concerned with the first-order reality of science, it cannot be altogether divested of its right to talk about reality as such: it may justly claim, as it actually does, that it is concerned with the second order reality, i.e., sentences and words as looked upon as vehicles of propositions, concepts and such like. The idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis, as critique of language and so on, is very familiar to us all.

But this does not provide any conclusive answer to the problem which takes Lazerowitz to the second layer of his hypothesis. By minor amendments in its formulation, Lazerowitz may well asks how then does it come
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about that philosophical theories, which purport to talk about the second-order reality produce the illusion of providing information about the first-order reality? So the second layer which makes a claim to provide an answer to this question continues to be relevant and important.

Even a cursory look at the language in which the hypothesis embodied in the second layer is formulated by Lazerowitz will make one feel that Lazerowitz has in fact two different answers to this problem, even though he does not appear anywhere to make the difference fully explicit. By one answer he attributes the proneness of philosophical theories to produce the illusion of talking about the first-order reality to what he calls 'linguistic innovations', 'unheralded concealed alteration of terminology', etc. The other answer proceeds to explain the illusion by what he calls the 'ontological mode of speech'. The two are different concepts, which means that Lazerowitz has two different accounts of the illusion producing proneness of philosophical theories. But in that there is little in the matter is, whether the accounts do in fact do their job?
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We do not understand how linguistic innovation or alteration of terminology can be linked up with the 'illusion' as the source of it. In talking about linguistic innovation, Lazerowitz means using a word to mean something which is different from what it means in its ordinary use, in other words, an innovative language, according to him, is a language in which words of ordinary language have lost their ordinary use.

Now if this is what 'linguistic innovation' means, then we would share with J. Wisdom's doubt on two points. First, how it becomes peculiar to philosophy; and second, how it becomes a cause of an illusion at all.

In the sense explained, in using any technical word whatever, one may well be said to make a linguistic innovation, so making a linguistic innovation cannot count as anything which only philosophers do. Mathematicians and scientists in using their technical words are also engaged in making linguistic innovations. 'Point', 'straight line' and such other words, as they occur in geometry, lose their ordinary uses. And the same is true of the numerous technical terms (e.g..}
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"force", 'energy', etc.) used in the various natural sciences. But because of the strictly defined use of technical terms, mathematics and science are not looked down upon as a source of an illusion. As a matter of fact, these technical terms, by ensuring precision and exactitude, ensure the advancement of mathematics and science. What then, may be the basis for saying that philosophy alone, in having recourse to linguistic innovations, i.e., sometimes, but not always, to the use of technical terms, reduces itself to a source of illusion? we do not find anything in Lazerowitz which may count as an answer to this. To quote J. L. Judd in this connection:

One could justly claim that advances in natural sciences is impossible without linguistic innovation. Indeed those who have not gone carefully into nutters of science can scarcely be aware of the enormous extent of linguistic innovation involved.

As a matter of fact, the role of linguistic innovation in philosophy, in our opinion, is the exact opposite of what Lazerowitz says about it. Philosophy, like mathematics and science, is indeed in need of mixing linguistic innovation; there is nothing wrong in it. On the
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contrary, we feel that if the linguistic innovation made by philosophers would have satisfied the requirement of it, philosophy would have perhaps been freed, at least partly, of its illusion producing proneness. This point will be made clearer later.

Philosophy is supposed to talk about what we have called second-order reality. However, the way it talks, that is, its use of language, produces the illusion that it talks about what we have identified as first-order reality. All this is true. But the cause of this peculiar malady does not lie in what Lazerowitz calls the 'linguistic innovations' made by philosophers, in other words, in any technical expressions they use. The cause lies elsewhere. And Lazerowitz has very correctly identified it also. It is what he calls the ontological (material) mode of speech used by philosophers in common with the scientists. The mode of speech very naturally meets the requirement of science because of the kind of reality it deals with. It is perfectly appropriate for scientific discourse. But philosophy, in so far as it is concerned with a different order of reality, cannot have recourse to them. It is not so to speak, in tune with the precise requirement of philosophy. Yet, philosophers have to fall back on it because there is no alternative mode of
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of speech available to them. And this is how the illusion Lazerowitz talks about arises. The illusion is in fact one thing which philosophers, with their present linguistic resources, cannot overcome.

Should we then have to say that philosophy is inseparable from the illusion it produces? Is there no way out of this predicament? The only way that suggests itself strongly to us is what has been mis-identified by Lazerowitz as a source of illusion. This is the creation of linguistic innovations in a form of speech which conceals what is being done with terminology. If philosophers could have contrived a mode of language perfectly appropriate and sufficiently comprehensive to meet the requirements of talking about the characteristic reality they are concerned with, then they could have avoided the material or ontological mode of speech, and with that, also could have freed itself of its proneness to create the illusionary impression that they are talking about the first-order reality.

Lazerowitz's ret3philosophy, as an attempted account of disagreements in philosophy, has to presume that philosophers do in fact disagree with one another. As we have
stated previously, without this presumption his metaphilosophy loses its relevance. We have further claimed that by purging philosophical utterances of their truth-values which they are usually supposed to possess and thereby making them in a way parts of our conative discourse, Lazerowitz made a move towards destroying the very basis of his metaethics. However, by taking necessary precautions against his suicidal move, we have reinstated the fact of disagreement in philosophy, although we have found it difficult to accept his explanation of it. What then, we may be asked, is the explanation of this notorious disagreement? It behoves us to give an answer, however brief, on this point. The explanation, we suppose, need not be confined to sin 1 reason. It may possibly be found in many sources. Let us conclude by pointing out a few such sources.

One probable source, we think, may be a certain basic peculiarity of the questions which occupy philosophers. The peculiarity consists in the fact that, as distinguished from scientific and mathematical questions which are answerable by our recognised means, philosophical questions are logically unanswerable, in the sense that it is in principle impossible for one to know the
answers they have. This idea about the nature of philosophical questions has been held by many, most notably, by Kant and the logical positivists. Kant's belief that philosophy (metaphysics) is impossible, was in fact, based on this particular construction of the nature of philosophical questions. On the other hand, the logical positivists, Moritz Schlick in particular, having equated the notion of being logically unanswerable with that of meaninglessness, came to the conclusion that philosophical questions are meaningless. Whether this equation and the consequent conclusion are correct is a matter to Judge separately, what we first want to point out is that being logically unanswerable has been believed by some to be a characteristic feature of philosophical question which, in turn, may provide a possible explanation of why philosophers constantly disagree with one another.

The second peculiarity of philosophy is closely linked up with the first peculiarity that its questions are logically unanswerable. Philosophy, unlike science and mathematics, is not result-oriented. It does not aspire to yield a definite result, so that a multiplicity of results following from philosophical enquiries is inevitably its possibility lies in the
very nature of philosophy, which means that disagreement in respect of results is the essence of philosophy. It is only too natural. There is nothing disturbing or worrisome about it. It becomes disturbing only when we overlook its uniqueness, model it after the analogy of science and mathematics and expect it to go the way science and mathematics go.

Another possible source of the disagreement may perhaps be said to lie in a basic peculiarity which distinguishes philosophy from sciences and mathematics. Science and mathematics, as we know, start with a set of beliefs the truth of which is assumed, independently of any proof. The truth of science and mathematics are contingent on the truth of the assumed body of beliefs. But philosophy is different from science in this respect. Within the framework it functions, there is no room for any assumed belief which might provide a starting point for it. The truth of philosophical propositions is in this sense supposed to be unconditional. If science and mathematics were to work within the characteristic framework of philosophy, then perhaps scientists and mathematicians also would have disagreed with one another more or less in the same way as philosophers do.
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This particular peculiarity which makes the functioning of philosophy vis-à-vis that of mathematics and science is not unknown to Lazerowitz. He recognises it when he says:

one difference between philosophy and natural science is evident... Science conducts its investigation and makes its speculation on a foundation of presuppositions which philosophy undertakes to examine. Thus, science assumes the validity of inductive procedures, which presuppose the uniformity of nature and the existence of a world independent of our perception, whereas philosophy looks into the foundations of induction and the warrants for the belief in an external world. The scientist accepts the commonsense belief that the future will be like the past, whereas philosophers like some are concerned with its justification. And the scientist accepts the everyday belief that there is a common objective world, while philosophers, for example, Descartes, investigate its rational justification.

Likewise, he says further:
An important difference between mathematics and philosophy is of course apparent: In mathematics we proceed from explicitly formulated postulates and precise definitions to conclusions rigorously circumscribed by the rules of deduction.