CHAPTER 5

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

This chapter will attempt to present Morris Lazerowitz's views on the nature of philosophy.

The previous chapter showed clearly Wittgenstein's great penetration into the hidden workings of philosophy. The following section will aim at highlighting the similarities and dissimilarities in Wittgenstein's and Morris Lazerowitz's positions.

It is to be noted that from the beginning of our exposition there has had one aim, viz., to bring out Lazerowitz's main thesis regarding the explanation of the mystifying irresolvability of philosophical disagreements. This explanation has some of its roots in Wittgenstein's remark that "philosophical propositions are of course not empirical." Here we have a metaphilosophical claim about the nature of philosophical utterances. Our understanding of the endless disagreements in philosophy is improved once we take note of the difference between a scientific and a philosophical statement. A scientific disagreement in principle comes to an end when all the facts necessary for its resolution are arrived at, whereas a philosophical dispute continues to exist in the presence of all facts necessary to settle the question.
were the philosophical disputes empirical, i.e., about the facts of the case.

In addition, Wittgenstein held the meta philosophical view that they are not about facts even though they are a priori. His point, that a priori propositions are not about the world, has been already discussed and an attempt made to support it. Nevertheless, it might be useful to connect this thesis with the claim that the statement "Every occurrence has a cause" is a synthetic but logically necessary claim, which gives information about the structure of the world. Kant disagreed with Leibniz over whether an analytic proposition, the predicate term of which is a conjunctive component of the subject term, could yield information about things. According to Kant, the predicate of such an analytic proposition as *"Every effect has a cause" adds nothing to the subject. This proposition which is equivalent to "Every caused event has a cause", is of the forms a, b is a. Kant's reason is that the predicate of this statement says nothing new about the subject in which it is already contained. By contrast* a synthetic proposition the predicate of which says something new about the subject term* does so even when the connection between the subject and the predicate term is logically necessary. Kant maintained that the
statement "Every occurrence has a cause" is logically necessary, but conveys information about the world because it is a synthetic a priori proposition. A former criticism of the statement that a proposition can be both necessary and about things remains goods this is that a proposition, the truth-value of which is not determined by what the world is like gives no information about what it is like. This holds not only against the idea that analytic propositions yield information about things (as Leibniz held) but also against the Kantian claim. What prevents a statement from being about things is that it is logically necessary.

Recently the philosophical claim has been made that there can be a proposition that is both a priori true and also contingent. This is reminiscent of the von Wright's view that $\phi \rightarrow p$. The same criticism applies to the contingent a, priori as to the synthetic a priori being contingent, its actual truth-value is not its only theoretically possible truth-value, while being a priori, its possible truth-value coincides with its actual truth-value.

On this point* Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz are in agreement that a philosophical proposition is not empirical and also is not about things. The difference
THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

between the two philosophers lies in the fact that Wittgenstein never offered any explanation of the irresolvability of philosophical disputes, nor did he seem to be concerned about it.

To see what Wittgenstein was interested in, it is important to notice his two main aims: (1) To determine the nature of philosophical statements. (This as we know is a metaphilosophical investigation). (2) To find the sources of philosophical puzzlement. As regards (1), we see that this became the central aim of Lazerowitz. The second aim of Wittgenstein sheds light on the nature of the "theories" which traditional philosophers advanced. According to him, these "theories" which do not arise because they rest on matters of fact about which we do not know enough. Unlike scientific problems, philosophical problems are not solved by the discovery of new facts. It only compounds the problem to treat it as if it is a scientific problem. A little reflection should make philosophers aware that in philosophy, "experiments are not made, because they would be utterly useless."

If experimentation was useful, philosophy, the oldest of the intellectual disciplines, would have laboratories by now. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that some philosophers continue to hold, as did W.V. Quine, that
philosophy "...is continuous with science. It is a wing of science..." Wittgenstein's aim of seeking the sources of the puzzlement leads him to say that the problems appear... to concern questions of fact of which we do yet not know enough." And also, "philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of raetaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness."

By implication what Wittgenstein declares is that philosophical statements are not empirical, and not about things. Further, one of his stated aims of investigating the nature and source of philosophical theories is to make the theories disappear. For he says:

... the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.*

Here the difference between Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz
has to be noted. Lazerowitz's intention would be to understand what makes it possible for a philosophical problem to disappear. Wittgenstein's main intention is to say that philosophers are misled by language into putting forward what looks like a scientific position. Sometimes Wittgenstein talks as though language misleads the philosopher into false positions, and sometimes that it misleads a philosopher into supposing that he is advancing a truth-valued claim, i.e., a statement that is either true or false. To be misled into supposing that a form of words expresses a theory is the kind of claim made over and over again by philosophers who attempt to refute an opponent's view. To charge a philosopher with not expressing a theory at all is a much more radical attack. Both accounts of how philosophers are misled find illustration in Wittgenstein's writings. But Lazerowitz, who holds that philosophical claims have no truth-value cannot be said to picture philosophers as being misled into a false view.

Here it is interesting to note that both philosophers attach importance to investigating the language philosophers use, though their goals are different. For Lazerowitz we can say this: to understand a philosophical problem is to understand what is in the nature of the problem that makes it possible to disappear. What is the
semantic magic which could bring this about? No philosopher can tell what it would be like for a philosophical dispute to be permanently resolved, since the enigma of the continuance of a philosophical dispute is that it goes on in the presence of all facts necessary to resolve it if it is about the facts of the case. Both Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz devote themselves to questions about the nature of philosophical propositions which scarcely are to be found among philosophers, classical or contemporary. Wittgenstein was aware of this and even raised the question as to what he does should be called "philosophy". He says:

The use of expression* constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart •••[showing this] may be extremely useful. It is, in most cases [however r*] impossible to show an exact point where an analogy begins to mislead us ••• It$ e.g., we call our investigations "philosophy" this title, on the one hand, seems appropriate, on the other hand it certainly has misled people.

Wittgenstein remarks that "one might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject that used to be called 'philosophy'." For convenience Lazerowitz
THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

has given the name "metaphilosophy" to this "heir" of philosophy. It should be pointed out, however, that only part of what Wittgenstein does can be classified as an "heir". What Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz have in common is their attention to language, Wittgenstein in order to make a philosophical "theory" disappear, Lazerowitz to explain the continuing debate over their assumed truth or falsity.

II

Let us consider the raetaphilosophical thesis common to Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz:

1. Philosophical propositions are not empirical. We have already discussed this metaphilosophical view in the preceding section, and with it the claim that philosophical propositions have no factual content. We have seen that some philosophers hold that philosophical propositions could have factual content in virtue of being synthetic a priori. This is the second metaphilosophical view which needs to be considered.

2. Philosophical propositions are a priori. Wittgenstein asserted that "it is the essence of philosophy not to depend on experience and this is what is meant by
saying that philosophy is a priori. The "cannot" and "must" occurring in philosophical statements is, he says, the "cannot" and "must" of logic. Here Lazerowitz disagrees, and gives as a reason for holding that a philosophical proposition is not as Wittgenstein claimed—a priori: he denies that the "cannot" and "must" of philosophical statement is the logical "cannot" and "must", even though these statements purport to be a priori.

A point of special interest here is that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical view that philosophical statements are a priori rests on a philosophical view about all necessary propositions; namely, conventionalism: necessary propositions are verbal. John Wisdom has said that necessary statements are "purely verbal", that, "they are purely about the use of the expressions they connect". The conventionalist view is that if philosophical statements are a priori, it follows that they are verbal. Lazerowitz and Wittgenstein differ on this point. If philosophical statements are a priori, Lazerowitz's fundamental question would not be answered. For presumably a claim about the application of words as dictated in the language would be fairly readily tested. A consequence of this philosophical view would be that philosophers make mistakes, when they put forward a philosophical proposition. To see why
Lazerowitz does not adopt this position, we shall consider briefly his account of logical necessity.

III

According to Lazerowitz, if the conventionalist takes necessary proposition to be verbal, he is committed to the consequence that there are no necessary propositions. The implication of conventionalism is that necessary propositions are empirical since it equates a necessary proposition with an empirical proposition about the use of words in a language. This means that "necessary" would not have any use in the language to characterize propositions. This in turn would make "empirical propositions" lose its function of distinguishing among propositions. So "all propositions are empirical" will contract into the empty tautology that all propositions are propositions. That is, "empirical" would be absorbed into the word "proposition", so that "empirical proposition" would mean the same as "proposition".

The difference between Lazerowitz and Wittgenstein becomes clear from examination of the following three sentences:

(a) "A rhinoceros is an animal".
(b) "The word 'animal' correctly applies to whatever the word 'rhinoceros' correctly applies to".

(c) "A rhinoceros is a comical beast".

We shall see how these differ from each other by asking in each case what it is about. (C) is obviously about what the subject-term refers to (a kind of creature). (b) *s subject-term clearly refers to a word. As for (a) we are presented with a problem. If it is about the use of the word, it would be open to the objection already made against conventionalism: a necessary proposition is not necessary. Wittgenstein's conventionalism would require him to say that (a) is replaceable by (b) - that (a) and (b) are translatable into each other.

As for sentence (a), if its subject-term refers to an animal the implication is "essentialism", according, to which some properties are essential to its subject, without which it could not exist, as against so-called accidental properties, without which it could exist. It is to be noticed that an accidental property is not, in the ordinary way of speaking, accidental (happening by chance). To say that being an animal is an essential property of a rhinoceros is a mystifying way of stating the entailment claim: being a rhinoceros entails being
an animal. The essentialist philosopher reformulates the entailment claim as a claim about the manner in which a thing possesses a certain attribute.

On Wittgenstein's account of necessary propositions as "rules of grammar" an entailment statement is about the linguistic connection between the application of expressions in the language. To this account the former objections remain, i.e., objections against conventionalism. It would seem that the only conclusion regarding the questions as what (a) is about, is that it is not about anything, inasmuch as it is not about either things or words. However, it is not, as it would perhaps be natural to infer, without sense.

The question we now face is: "What is sentence (a) about?" can properly be asked. The analogies between sentences (a), (b) and (c) easily lead one to suppose that the same question can be asked about each. But the conclusion that (s) is not about anything and the same time is not nonsensical, suggests that "what is (a) about?" is not like "what is (b) about?" and "what is (c) about?", both of which have straightforward non-philosophical answers. Philosophers have found it natural, regarding (a), to use the same interrogative form of speech used regarding
(b) and (c)* and to answer with a controversial philosophical "theory". Conventionalists argue that it is about words, Platonists that it is about abstract entities. Here we have a good illustration of how a philosophical theory can arise through what Wittgenstein described as an obsession with language, here with the phrase "is about".

What is needed here is an account of the nature of necessary propositions which does not commit one to a philosophical view. This is what Lazerowitz attempts to do. He will not expect an answer to "what is the sentence (a) about?". However, he will try to elucidate the nature of an a priori proposition by showing its connection with words used in its expression. It is natural to say, as did C.I. Lewis, that a necessary proposition is "true by definition", i.e., by definition of the words occurring in the sentence expressing it. That is, it is natural to justify a claim that a proposition is necessary, not by turning to things, but by turning to language. The proposition, a cat is an animal, is true in virtue of the conventional use of the words "cat" and "animal". How is Lazerowitz to give an account of necessity without being caught in the toils of conventionalism? In an early account
Lazerowitz said that it is for a sentence to express a logically necessary proposition will now be clear if it will express a logically necessary proposition if it converts (not translates) into a sentence which expresses a true proposition about usage. A logically necessary proposition is the meaning of a sentence in the ontological idiom, where converts into a sentence about the use of expressions. What Lazerowitz means by "convert" is unexplained. Apparently he uses it as synonymous with "translate" - which brings him back to the conventionalist view, with all its shortcomings. Lazerowitz was aware of this. In his book, The Language of Philosophy, he gives an account of necessary propositions, which avoids conventionalism. This means not equating the necessary propositions with a proposition about the use of words. To cite an extended quote from Lazerowitz should be useful here:

The idea that an indicative sentence might have a literal meaning but nevertheless, have no subject matter, and make no statement about anything* apparently produces discomfort in the minds of philosophers. Like an oyster which tries to remove an irritant by manufacturing a pearl, a philosopher tries to make up for what language
MORRIS LAZEROMITZ: ON THIS NATURE OF
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

denies him by manufacturing a subject
of discourse for it. The result is a
thicket of theories. Philosophers of
the \textit{a priori} rid themselves of a \textit{linguistic discomfort but in} doing so pro-
duce a typical philosophical \textit{symptom},
an \textit{irreducible} number of views. Anyone
who prefers fact to \textit{semantically} indu-
ced fantasy will experience little
trouble reconciling himself to the
idea that a sentence whose meaning
is an \textit{a priori} proposition has no
subject about which it makes a \textit{state-
ment}. He will have little trouble
seeing that, although it says nothing
about \textit{words}, in knowing what it says
we know only facts of \textit{usage}. This
\textit{fact} about sentences \textit{for \textit{a priori}}
propositions \textit{is, perhaps, shown}
most simply and clearly by writing
out the following \textit{equivalences}:

\begin{enumerate}
\item the fact that the \textit{sentence} \textit{'It
is impossible} to grow a tulip
which \textit{is not} a flower\textsuperscript{9} \textit{express-
ses} an \textit{a priori} proposition
\textit{is} equivalent to
\end{enumerate}

the fact that the \textit{sentence}
\textit{''grows a tulip which is not}
a \textit{flower} \textit{is a phrase that has}
no descriptive function* \textit{expresses}
THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

a true verbal proposition.

(2) the fact that the sentence 'A tulip is a flower' expresses a logically necessary proposition is equivalent to

the fact that the sentence "flower" applies by reason of usage in the language to whatever "tulip" applies to 'expresses a true verbal proposition.

To hold that (1) and (2) are equivalent is not to imply that the proposition expressed by 'The phrase, "grows a tulip which is not a flower" has no use' is the same as the proposition expressed by 'It is impossible to grow a tulip which is not a flower'. Neither is it to imply that the proposition expressed by 'Usage dictates the application of the term "flower" to whatever "tulip" applies to' is the same as the proposition expressed by 'A tulip is necessarily a flower', or by 'Being a tulip entails being a flower'. The fact about usage expressed by the first sentence of each of the two pairs of sentences is what we know in understanding the second sentences, and we know nothing in addition to these facts in knowing the propositions
expressed by the second sentences. The facts which we know are never
theless not the subject-matter of the sentences and cannot be identified
with the propositions they express. Mathematics, which may be truly de-
scribed as the systematic science of the a priori, has been a source of
wonder and mystification to many people. G.H. Hardy represented the
Mathematician as gazing into an intricate system of objects less
gross than those encountered in sense-experience, and recording
what he sees. The view we have arrived at here about the nature
of the a priori de-Platonizes mathematics, without reinstating Hilbert's
form of conventionalism. To make an observation on part of what a math-
ematician's work consists in, it is
the explication of rules of usage
presented in a form of speech in
which no terms are mentioned, i.e.,
in the ontological idiom. 18

It is to be noted from this excerpt that at no
place is an equivalence between a necessary proposition
and a proposition about words asserted. It thus does
not advance or support a conventionalist view, neither
does it suggest a Platonist view. What then is the conventionalist doing when he maintains his view in the face of facts to which attention has been explicitly directed by Norman Malcolm and others? According to Lazerowitz he is manufacturing a subject of discourse for necessary propositions: they are about words. A game is being played* to use Wittgenstein's words* with the term "verbal". "A necessary proposition is verbal" stretches the word "verbal" to cover what is indirectly and obliquely referred to by an a priori sentence. The sentence "A rhinoceros is an animal" makes no mention of words* yet what we know in knowing that it expresses a necessary proposition is a fact of usage. The conventionalist who supposes himself to be announcing a theory about the nature of necessity* is stressing this similarity between a priori sentences and sentences about word usage. These are alike in respect of the information they convey* the one explicitly, the other obliquely. Wittgenstein notes that our language sometimes stresses a difference* or a similarity* and sometimes hushes it up. A notation can stress or it can minimize.

According to Lazerowitz, "necessary propositions are verbal"* while purporting to announce a feature of a priori propositions* is in fact introducing a stretched
use of the word "verbal". If the conventionalist was making a mistake about the nature of a priori propositions, the mistaken claim that the word "verbal" applies to them, then he can be disabused of his error. Thereupon debate over his claim would come to an end, through citing such simple facts as that "verbal" applies only when the use of words is mentioned. Lazerowitz maintains that, in general, a philosopher who advances a "theory" is not making a mistake. Instead he is introducing a re-edited piece of terminology. He does this in a form of speech in which words are not mentioned i.e., in the ontological idiom. This explains why "a debate ... can go on, without prospect of future resolution". It is because no fact is in question.

When Berkeley said that chairs and tables are mind-dependent, he was using his argument that variability in our perceptions implies the subjectivity of their object to extend the use of "mind dependent". Of course Berkeley, like other philosophers, does not present his view as either implying anything about the actual use of terminology or as suggesting a reform of terminology. Philosophy would lose its appeal if to use Hume's expressions, it were taken "to turn upon words". Rival philosophers suppose themselves to be disputing
over nonverbal facts. This brings us to our exposition of Lazerowitz's account of philosophical theories.

IV

What follows in this section would be an exposition of Morris Lazerowitz's metaphilosophical view on the nature of philosophy. Keeping in mind that no explanation on the nature of philosophy will be satisfactory unless it is also an explanation of the continuing irresolvability of philosophical disputes, we proceed to examine his exposition of a philosophical theory.

According to him, a philosophical theory may be viewed as a structure consisting of three related interacting parts, one of which is visible and the other two hidden from our awareness. This distinction between the three layers connects up with one of Freud's topographical maps of the structure of the mind. The one which is relevant to the purpose at hand describes the mind as consisting of three components, the conscious, the pre-conscious, and lastly, the unconscious, which is the repository of repressed ideas.

To quote Lazerowitz:

Z propose to illustrate the hypothesis
that a philosophical view is a three-layer structure composed of the illusion of science (the illusion that a factual claim about the existence or nature of phenomenon is being made), an unconscious group of ideas, and an altered piece of language which creates the first and gives expression to the second...

The illusion is created by the form of speech in which language is used to describe things. It is the form of speech in which the scientist and the mathematician present their findings. Parenthetically, this may be one of the reasons which led Quine to say philosophy is continuous with science. Lazerowitz's view is that this is an illusion. In his opinion, Wittgenstein is correct, when he said that the philosophy "of a given subject is an idleness in the subject." The philosopher, according to him,

... uses language to bring about simultaneously a double dramatic effect, the convincing semblance of deep science and the expression of a cluster of inner fantasies.

One thing that creates the semblance of science is, as
Wittgenstein pointed out, the fact that often the words of the metaphysician "can also be used to state a fact of experience." Philosophical theories are frequently paradoxical, apparently flouting both commonsense and science, but their similarity at least in appearance, to scientific claim is undeniable. One has merely to turn one's attention to any branch of philosophy to find illustration of claims which have the appearance of being advanced and supported as though they were statements about the nature and existence of things. It is worthwhile reminding ourselves of this feature of philosophical theories by citing a few examples. The following is an example from the Blue Book.

"...We have been told by popular scientists that the floor on which we stand is not solid, as it appears to common sense, as it has been discovered that the wood consists of particles filling space so thinly that it can almost be called empty. This is liable to perplex us* for in a way of course we know that the floor is solid, or that, if it isn't solid, this may be due to the wood being rotten but not to its being composed of electrons. To say* on this latter ground* that the floor
is not solid is to misuse language. For even if the particles were as big as grains of sand, and as close together as they are in a sandheap, the floor would not be solid if it were composed of them in the sense in which a sand heap is composed of grains. Our perplexity was based on a misunderstanding; the picture of the thinly filled space had been wrongly applied. For this picture of the structure of matter was meant to explain the very phenomenon of solidity.

Wittgenstein somewhere characterizes a philosopher as making the mistake of substituting the explanation of a phenomena for the phenomena. In the above quotation he claims the mistake rests on a misuse of language. Lazerowitz would not say that philosophers make mistakes. According to him, language has been re-edited so es to delete the word 'solid' but doing this in a way that creates the impression that a disconcerting fact about things is being announced. In the present example, this is done by exorcising one of a pair of antithetical terms, not mistakenly, but for the effect it produces. The term "solid" is deprived of its application
to states of things. But since the word "solid" is retained, even though artificially, the fact that the terra "solid" no longer has application tends to be hidden from our awareness. The gain from bringing back an exorcised word into usage is that its antithetical partner regains its usage. However, something is lost in the process: a philosophical theory! Bringing terms back "from their metaphysical to their everyday use" reinstates the actual use of the artificially retained word but does this at a cost. The philosophical problem is made to disappear. It will be recalled that one of Wittgenstein's basic aims was to make "philosophical problems completely disappear."28

To turn now to a further example of a philosophical theory which creates the illusion of conveying a fact about the world. As in the preceding example, the illusion is generated by a hidden re-editing of terminology, formulated in the fact stating form of speech. This is the nature of Zeno's claim that space does not exist. His argument was that the existence of space involved the existence of an infinite number of spaces, which he declared to be impossible.29 Since Georg Cantor, however, the idea of the completed or extended infinite
cannot be rejected in this easy way. For Zeno's thesis, Lazerowitz has given the following additional argument:

If space exists, it exists as a whole and every space must be a part of the whole of space. Let $S^*$ be the whole of space. Then there must be a space, $S'$, which contains it, as every space is enclosed in a greater space. But $S'-S$ will itself be a space, which cannot be part of the whole of space, and thus contradicts the hypothesis that every space must be part of the whole of space.

without going into the matter, the idea of space underlying this argument is that it is a cosmic container, as C.D. Broad puts it, a box without sides. Behind this idea is a re-edited piece of language, the point of which can be brought out quickly by noting that a box is something from which one can exit, whereas there is no exit from space. To put it in Wittgenstein's way, "space" is a substantive for which we tend to look for a corresponding substance. Parenthetically, to say that time is a river, is to do a similar thing, viz., to treat "time" as a name denoting a fluid substance. In certain respects the use of the word "space" resembles the use of the word "box". In order to heighten the similarity, the philosopher
re-edits the word "space" into the name of a container. Just as the imagery brought out by the words "time is a cosmic river" is that of something which flows so the imagery generated by the word "space" is that of a vast container.

Consider now another example of a philosophical theory which appears to make a factual claim. This is H.A. Prichard's view that it is impossible to perceive things. He says:

No one doubts that in certain cases we have or are under an illusion [of seeing a body] and all I have been doing is to contend that all so-called seeing involves an illusion just as much as that so-called seeing which everyone admits to involve an illusion.

Prichard is saying that there is no intrinsic difference between cases of what is ordinarily called seeing a body, and cases where we are under the illusion of seeing a body. Given that there is no difference between the two, if one is not a case of seeing a body, neither is the other.

According to Norman Malcolm:
When Prichard's view is drawn out in the only direction it can go, it turns out to be the claim that it is an a priori truth that we cannot see bodies. He is holding that the very notion of seeing a body is absurd.

Prichard does not say what it would be like to see a thing, as against seeing an appearance of a thing. He therefore rules himself out from being able to distinguish between them by any means whatever. His theory provides no test for determining whether we are seeing a thing or not. In doing this, he severs the connection between what appears to be a claim about the inaccessibility of things and tests for determining whether and what they are. As George Paul has pointed out, in the ordinary course of things we know how to test for the difference between a fruit in a basket and a wax imitation.

It becomes clear that Prichard's view does not make an empirical claim about the inaccessibility of things to perception. He apparently imagines himself to be making an empirical claim, and does not realize that his claim, if a priori, cannot be about things. Prichard's view sees as to be a dressed up version of Locke's substratum theory, that a thing can present appearances but cannot itself be
one amongst them. Substratum is something that is beyond the bounds of sense, so that not even God can perceive what intrinsically is not open to perception.

As is known, Locke held that a thing consists of a substratum in which experienceable attributes inhere and Prichard appears to adopt a variation of this philosophical view. A thing presents appearances to our senses but the thing itself is never presented to the senses, the idea presumably being that if the thing were presented to the sense it would be one of its appearances, and a thing is more than just an appearance. To suppose that it is one of the appearances it presents, is to imply that it is not a thing; it is no more than an appearance. If one refuses to accept the Berkeleyan idea that a thing is a system of mind-dependent ideas, then the notion of something distinct from the ideas would itself not be subject to perception. What Prichard has done is to heighten a distinction between a subject and the experienceable predicates (or appearances) of a thing. He does this by a semantic manoeuvre in which "is perceived" no longer applies to "subject" of appearances. It applies only to the appearances.
THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

explanation of why controversies between philosophers of opposing views are interminable. Like aesthetic disputes they can go on endlessly without resolution. The disputes, according to him, are conducted in the presence of all facts necessary to resolve them, because these opposing views are expressions of semantic preferences, i.e., preferences of one terminology over another. And to argue for the preference is not to argue for or against the truth of a statement. As Hume says 'tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy.'

Secondly, his met@-theory explains why there is no common-sense answer to a philosophical question because the problem does not concern a fact of the world. It is neither an empirical problem about what the facts are, nor a problem about "the essential features" of things (therefore not the problem of finding an a priori truth about things). Nor will a common-sense answer show that a philosopher has made the mistake of misusing the language. Lazerowitz's view is that such a mistake would eventually be rectified and the problem would be settled. But this is not the case as the disputes remain unresolved indefinitely.
MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

It will be useful here to look at various attempts to give a common sense answer to a philosophical question. Samuel Johnson's well known attempt to refute Berkeley's view that physical objects are sets of ideas coees to mind. Johnson's kicking a stone is not a refutation of the theory since Berkeley claims not to have denied the existence of stones and the like. His theory concerns their nature, not their existence. He says that he calls "real things" simply "those ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature". He grants that

"it sounds very harsh to say that we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas ... the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things, ... I cannot for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things, rather than ideas."
These words show that Berkeley is almost aware that his "view" is a revision of accepted terminology. He is not using the term "idea" mistakenly. Instead he is stretching the term so as to apply to atones, chairs, tables and the like.

In our own day perhaps the best example of an attempt to give a common sense answer to a philosophical question is the work of the common sense analyst, G.E. Moore. In his Philosophical studies, and in his famous "Defence of Common Sense", Moore tried to answer Bradley's claim that time is unreal and that the external world of physical objects does not exist. By "translating into the concrete" i.e., by drawing out its consequences, Moore tried to refute Bradley's claims. He said:

... if you try to translate the proposition [that time is unreal] into the concrete* and to ask what it implies, there is, I think* very little doubt as to the sort of thing it implies. The moment you try to do this* and think what it really comes to, you at once begin thinking of a number of different kinds of propositions* all of which plainly must be untrue* if time is unreal.
If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing ever happens before or after anything else; nothing is ever simultaneous with anything else; it is never true that anything is past; never true that anything will happen in the future; never true that anything is happening now.

Moore then puts an argument in Bradley's south by which he supposed that Bradley might defend himself, and charges him with committing a fallacy, which Moore admits may be thought "too gross for it to be possible that Mr Bradley should have been guilty of it."

Lazerowitz maintains that Bradley did not commit a fallacy in the course of supporting his view, or that he is mistaken about usage. He agrees with Wittgenstein who said:

A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who doesn't see what everybody sees; nor on the other hand is his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street. That is, his disagreement...
THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

is not founded on a more subtle knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look round for the source of his puzzle. And we find that there is puzzlement and mental discomfort ... when a notation dissatisfies ... Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary language.

If a philosophical view arises because of dissatisfaction with language, and by use of the fact-stating idiom conceals the revision of language which would be satisfactory, it is clear that citing facts accepted by common sense will not impinge on the view. The facts are irrelevant: a nonverbal empirical fact can upset only a nonverbal factual claim, not a terminological claim* because a nonverbal fact does not contain its name as part of its nature.

The linguistic concomitant of Bradley's view that time is unreal is that temporal words such as "past", "present"**, "before" and "after" are by implication...
self-contradictory. Bradley's arguments are to the effect that the concepts "time", "physical objects", etc. are self-contradictory. If Bradley's views are taken to express a priori claims then (as has already been shown) empirical facts will neither support nor go against the truth-value claimed for them. For a priori propositions are not about things. Nor will nonverbal empirical fact upset or support a language innovation.

Lazerowitz has given an interpretation of Moore's translations into the concrete and of his other so-called attempts to defend common sense say by citing "truisms" which imply the existence of a world of things. It therefore is something of a mystery that Moore thought it necessary to "prove" the existence of an external world. Moore certainly considered himself to be showing Bradley's views to be false. By citing such common place facts as that he was born at a certain time in the past and that there is a human body which is his body he expected to refute Bradley's claims to truth. Bradley expresses himself in the ontological node of speech. He speaks of space, time, material body being self-contradictory rather than the terms "space", "time", and "physical objects"
THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

are self-contradictory expressions. To say that space is self-contradictory is a nonverbal way of saying that the word "space" is a self-contradictory term. Moore's translations into the concrete taken at face-value are incapable of the work Moore intended for them. They do not show that space-terminology is not self-contradictory, since on Bradley's claim any "space" translation into the concrete would itself be self-contradictory. How, now, are we to understand Moore's claims and his truisms and his translations into the concrete? This no longer presents a difficulty. His truisms give expressions to the wish to retain ordinary terminology, which has worked and continues to do the work assigned to it. Moore has to be understood as denying that space-terminology is self-contradictory, and his denial is to be interpreted as opposing the philosophical suppression of ordinary space nomenclature.

To quote Lazerowitz:

A philosopher who holds a view like "Time is unreal* and resists its translation into "There are no temporal facts" is not failing to see an obvious implication. His resisting the translation means that his words do not have that translation.
And they do not have that translation because he has in the way usual in philosophy, changed language. In the light of this supposition, Moore's translation, which takes the philosopher's words in their everyday sense is to be construed not as correcting a mistaken idea about the use of the word 'time', but as countering an academic decision to cast out 'time' with a vote for the status quo. This explanation of what has happened must be conceded to have the merit of making intelligible to us a philosopher's being able to remain obdurate when faced with a translation into the concrete, and indeed it explains how he could even come to hold his view.

"Thinking with the learned" comes no more than what Wittgenstein calls a language game—a holiday use of terminology.

Wittgenstein said that philosophers are dissatisfied with everyday language, and this may be the reason for their re-editing language. This is not done for any practical purposes—the philosopher is not *language...
Despite his philosophizing, he continues to "speak with the vulgar." All this is done in the spirit of a semantic game. This is why a person who might express some scepticism, say about, Zeno's paradoxes against motion can be made to join the philosopher and enter into the game with him. When philosophical reasons are given, the supporting arguments can be looked upon as part of the game.

This brings us back to Lazerowitz's exposition of the third layer of a philosophical theory. It is to be noted here that the first two layers can stand alone without bringing in the third layer. In Lazerowitz's opinion it is the contents of the third layer which hold the philosopher in fascinated bondage to his subject. It might be called the nightmare part of the mind which can be brought to consciousness only by a special technique devised by Freud. According to Freud, there is a third component of the mind the unconscious, which consists of unacceptable ideas, kept under repression. According to his findings, these ideas occur in a highly disguised form as in dreams and in pathological states. Wittgenstein observed that "our ordinary language holds our mind rigid in one position." We may permit ourselves
the conjecture that quite unwittingly he was referring to unconscious ideas as the cause of our rigidity. Lazerowitz brings into his account of the nature of philosophy, 'the unconscious', only to give what he calls the complete picture of how a philosophical theory works. He has been criticized for describing the philosopher as "dreaming with words". The reason for his choice of language is to highlight the ideas that the philosopher's use of language gives hidden, dream-like expression to impermissible ideas. The philosopher uses language in such a way as to create a conscious illusion - at one level of the mind, he re-edits terminology at another level of the mind, and he uses his re-edited language to give hidden expression to ideas in ourselves which we cannot consciously tolerate. We might say that like Cedipus Rex, who blinded himself in punishment for unacceptable wishes, the philosopher blinds himself to what he is doing in order to be able to give expression to ideas that are inadmissible.

To return for a moment to the view of Parmenides and Heraclitus, we can only guess at the unconscious material with which they link up. The Parmenidean view that motion is impossible, or that nothing can move,
might, at the unconscious level, represent a death with: the dead do not move. On the other hand, Heraclitus who maintains that everything flows, i.e., that nothing remains the same, may be understood to be expressing at the unconscious level of his mind the idea that everything is alive. Freud somewhere identified motion and change with life. As is known Leibniz in his Monadology, developed the view that there is no such a thing as (dead) matter. Nothing can die, as a monad is incapable of decomposition.
made a stable part of philosophy by Plato and, ouch, by a number of modern philosophers, especially, Hume and others. However, thanks to acutely self-conscious twentieth century philosophers, now forms, as everybody knows, a large and significant field of philosophy.

Lazerowitz has no particular objection against using the word 'metaphilosophy' to describe this field of philosophical enquiry. But in his own actual and philosophical practice, the word 'metaphilosophy' means a narrower sense. It is intended to designate a limited field of philosophical investigation. In The Language of Philosophy, he describes it as a field of

... investigation of philosophical utterances with the special aim of reaching a satisfactory understanding of what in their nature, permits the intractable disagreements which invariably attach to them.

During discussions with me also, he maintains the position when he says, "Metaphilosophy is just the investigation of the philosophical problems with the a la describing what there is about them that makes them