CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in the preceding pages to sketch the varied conceptual framework of public opinion, its relevant parameters, the story of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, its impact on the domestic public opinion in both the countries and the overall resultant impact on India - Pakistan relations. It has been thus a very complex subject permitting few generalizations or firm conclusions. Nonetheless, it is not without significance. The major findings and lessons which have been learnt from this experience are summed up as follows.

First and foremost the research project highlights the tremendously increasing significance of public opinion in the affairs of a country. In all political systems, the opinions of groups as well as of individuals, of elites as well as of masses - play a vital role. Even the governments of nations that deny political freedom attempt in various ways to assess public opinion in order to maintain stability and support for their policies. It is in this respect the nature of public opinion, the process that forms it and its consequences for the political decision making have been analysed generally as well as specifically in the context of India and Pakistan. Theoretically it has been established that public opinion as the main determinant of the domestic environment has a vital consideration in the formulation and persuasion of a country's foreign policy. Even methodologically speaking,
public opinion data could balance traditional, political and historical approaches.

As far as the conceptual framework of public opinion is concerned, its importance was recognised even by the political philosophers in the earliest times. However, they referred to it as mass opinion and its significance. The explicit formulation of the term could take place only during eighteenth and nineteenth century. The modern meaning was given by Rousseau who claimed that even a despositism rests on public opinion. To him public opinion represented as the fourth law, residing in the hearts of citizens, thus forming the real constitution of the state, that which is protected from corruption and decay by the 'censor' - an office created for strengthening public opinion as the guardian of public morality. Nevertheless, he could not establish relationship between public opinion and statecraft, which was done by Neker, who called it an invisible power, varying according to the form and type of government but ever preventing the abuse of power. The French Revolution of 1789 and the American Independence led to the widespread discussions of the term. If Hegel entrusted the great men to find truth in public opinion, Jeremy Bentham referred to it as the moral sanction - a guide to legislative and to David Hume it formed the basis of government as people tend to head it as well as to conform to the environment. Thus systematic analysis of the concept had begun and by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the nature of public opinion, stages in
its formation, government and opinion, definite stages in its development etc. were discussed. But the specific aspects, like the relations between law and public opinion, the role of organised groups in the opinion forming process, propaganda activities, surveying analysis, quantitative methods and statistical studies, communication agencies, the psychology of opinion formation were analysed in the subsequent period. After the World War II several new dimensions have been added: the potentiality of the mass media for the external as well as internal support of government policy and action; opinion polls; survey designs; sampling procedure; intervening, etc., to the study of public opinion.

For the purpose of conceptual clarity, a number of definitions of the term public opinion have been examined. Its connotation vary from limited rational and/or democratic aspect to the all-inclusive - the entire gamut of widely held views - rational as well as irrational, informed as well as misinformed, individual judgement as well as group discussion, notions, beliefs, fancies, prejudices, aspirations, feelings etc., varying from time to time characterized by diversity or some sort of stereotypes as seen by Walter Lippmann which enhance the public opinion process. However, the present study has regarded opinion as social-psychological, having bases in environment leading to an awareness of the public eye to have impact on policy which can be gleaned from a relatively small number of books.
articles, speeches, editorials, legislative deliberations and news analyses. In the final analysis, one of the most interesting types of information which the present study has found is the occurrence of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which had geo-political factors as its base. So, the concern has been with the impact that event had on attitudes and opinions in Pakistan and India about other events, people, ideas and policy. In this process, there have been events within events**, after the single event of the Soviet intervention had given birth to a series of lesser events absorbing the minds of men here. Nevertheless, the study has confined its public to those who had an opinion - written, expressed and published on the issue just to catch the climate of domestic public opinion overlooking the substantive difference between mass opinion and elite opinion.

One thesis that has been sought to be established by the study is that geo-political factors are crucial in public opinion process in both India and Pakistan. Owing to geographical factors, Afghanistan has been an important factor for both of them. And it is also for geographic reasons that whatever happened in Pakistan is of direct concern to India and whatever reaction of India is of direct consequence to Pakistan. In other words, as a result of the territorial aspects of peoples' political thinking and

** The diplomatic flurry between India and Pakistan, Pakistan's acquisition of arms and its opposition from India etc. are such cases.
activities, having a close link with historical, economic, cultural and other traits of India and Pakistan, it takes a major development in one country for the other to think seriously about it. The parameters were different in both the countries to see the single event of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. All parameters - mass media, press, political leadership exhibited diversity in responding to this event - owing partly to geographical environment and complexity of socio-political life bequeathed by history and culture of the Indian subcontinent and partly to the government's realization of national interest in both the countries, norms and ideological predilection of the newspaper industry there and, interaction of inner political process with external international environment.

Ever from the beginning, India-Pakistan relations have been characterised with antagonism - the inevitable result of the divergent political systems, ideology adopted by the two states, their economic systems and their foreign policy. For India the major concern has been with regional and international interests, for Pakistan it has been obsession with India that has dominated Pakistan's foreign policy. Even after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan's major preoccupation was and would remain India. This was amply made clear by Francis Fukuyama, the US Officer-in Charge of Planning at the Joint Staff Headquarters. Thus, nature and parameters of public opinion in both the countries are multi-layered depending on the
views and attitudes of the people in all groups. Nonetheless, there has been and still continues the wholesale public hysteria in India every time Pakistan has a major military exercise, attacks a post on the Indian side, arms a few more extremists and terrorists, buys a few hundred million dollars worth of arms, or successfully smuggles another component for its uranium enrichment centrifuge.

India, eight times larger in terms of population and five times bigger in terms of economic strength, is much more militarily capable of putting the screws on Pakistan. Pakistan being the weaker and the smaller state, the alarm and hysteria there is much greater. The impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was bound to take place in this contextual framework.

The event of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had a logic of its own. It was more defensive and lesser offensive response of the Soviet Union in the geopolitical and geostrategic situation, which was couched in legal justification by the Soviet leadership. As Afghanistan occupies a very important position in the strategy and politics of the Central and South Asian region, it becomes crucially significant to the Soviet Union from strategic point of view. The great game of the nineteenth century between Russia and Britain was played over the strategic land of Afghanistan in which Russia tried to put pressure on Afghanistan to gain concession from the British in Europe. This is borne out by General Skobeloff's statement: "The
stronger Russia in Central Asia, the weaker England in India and the more conciliatory she will be in Europe". This resembles with the situation when the Soviet Union made military intervention in Afghanistan but with a change. The change was instead of the imperial Britain, it was the democratic USA; instead of imperial Czarist Russia, it was the Communist Russia. The ideology was thus changed from imperial rule to the liberation of the poor people in democratic or socialist manner but always in accordance with the national interest of the superpowers. At the time of intervention the global balance of power was in favour of the United States - doctrinal changes in the strategic thinking of the US and NATO, deployment of RDF with a thrust against the southern borders of USSR, new strategic relationship between the USA and China, total exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Camp David Agreement and significant developments in the Third World in Southern Africa, Horn of Africa, Iran and in Afghanistan itself.

More specifically Afghanistan became the focus of the new cold war and the Soviet Union could not tolerate the rule of Muslim fanatics there along with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey close to the Muslims in Soviet Central Asia and Caucasus. The Soviet Union is the country full of multi-national and ethnic diversities. There were in 1979 about more than forty-five million Muslims in the USSR who combine new as well as old, clinging tenaciously to those items which do not
interfere with material progress. The demographic vitality of the Central Asian people, their large size families and their rapid growth rate had already created fear among Russians. The neighbouring Afghanistan also has many ethnic groups - Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Turks divided by Soviet-Afghan boundary from their co-ethnics in the Soviet Union. Owing to these factors the Soviet leadership looked any change in the Afghan PDPA regime with fear and apprehension. The old memories of the Basmachi fight, which had Afghan Uzbeks and Turks as their folk heroes were there in the mind of the Soviets who developed good relations with Afghanistan over a period of time since then.

In addition to the Soviet military and economic aid under the Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1921, 1931 and 1978, the role of Soviet ethnic advisors, officers, engineers, doctors, film-makers, etc. shows the extent to which Soviet-Afghan relations reached. The Soviets role was greater than their counterpart Americans, who saw Pakistan with favour vis-a-vis Afghanistan over various matters of much Pashtoonistan has been very prominent. Even the so-called Saur Revolution of 1978 began to bring change in the socio-economic system and political structure, having ideological similarity with the Soviet system. The steps were taken for giving representation to non-Pushtun Afghans in the government participation, education, newspapers and culture. However, changes took place so suddenly and abruptly that
Taraki was replaced by Amin, who on account of his own policies and action got replaced and executed when the Soviet troops reached Kabul. At this point the Soviets felt concern with the apprehended Chinese activities on the Afghan borders in collusion with Pakistan and the USA. Thus, geopolitical/strategic considerations and ideological compulsions made the story of the Soviet intervention. And Soviets justified it on the basis of an invitation from the Afghan government to undo outside intervention: duly in accordance with the treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Cooperation, in keeping with the international law - Article 51 of the UN Charter. But the key questions that remain unanswered are: who or which legitimate government sent invitation at a time when PDPA was faction-ridden and no meeting of Revolutionary Council; No provision of stationing Soviet troops in Afghanistan; no armed attack had taken place on Afghanistan from outside or if any threat of such an aggression existed, it was not immediately reported by Afghanistan to the Security Council.

It is for this reason that the story espoused reactions all over the world. And for the US and Pakistan it was something that had to be kept living by seriously opposing it for their own reasons.

The sounds of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan reached Pakistan immediately, for her relations with Afghanistan remained strained since 1947, sometimes even reaching the brink of war over Pashtoonistan - the validity
of the Durand Line as the international border. Pakistan shares 1510 miles border with Afghanistan which divide Pushtun tribes as well as Baluchi and Brahwi people. The Pushtuns and Baluchis in Pakistan have always opposed Pakistani authorities in Islamabad and demanded their provincial autonomy. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan; his son Wali Khan; Ataullah Mengal, Sardar of the Mengal tribe in Baluchistan. Ghaus Bux Bizenjo; Khan Bux Marri, Sardar of the Mari Tribe who had praised and supported the 1978 Afghan Revolution bitterly criticised Pakistan for pursuing the wrong policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, by giving support and encouragement to the Afghan rebels, whose continuous inflow was upsetting the existing delicate balance between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns. They also feared their interference in Pakistani politics in NWFP and thus their exploitation by certain vested interests their own political and economic gains. Even Begum Nusrat Bhutto and her daughter Benazir Bhutto also expressed their opinion that what was happening in Afghanistan was an internal affair, Pakistan had no right to interfere as the Soviets had also no intentions against Pakistan. Gen. Zia had blown up the Afghan situation to attract attention of USA instead of finding out other means to resolve the crisis. The opinions of other opposition leaders also turned against the policies pursued by Zia regime vis-a-vis developments in Afghanistan.
The Government of Pakistan called the Soviet intervention an occupation of Afghanistan and act of blatant, open, and naked aggression. Zia also made the United States and the Muslim world to take increasing interest in South West Asia. Till he got the required US $3.2 billion economic and military aid, he kept the other options open, e.g., keeping door open for discussions with the Soviet Union, taking cognizance and giving response to Indian regional efforts to diffuse the Afghan crisis. But these options were elusive. General Zia also asked media-men to keep the Afghan issue alive. This was aimed at creating favourable climate of public opinion both within and outside Pakistan. He also showed more concern about the swelling number of the Afghan refugees, created relief funds for them and opened camps for this purpose. In his efforts he was supported fully by Jamat-i-Islamia and other right-minded groups and leaders. He called upon the political leaders to cooperate him in this respect, as it would not be too difficult for Pakistan’s 84 million people to absorb only three million people, if it comes to the worst. Nonetheless, the sole emphasis was on the unconditional, total and immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; Afghanistan’s status as an Islamic and norm-aligned; creation of a conducive atmosphere so that Afghan refugees could return to their homeland; and, the freedom for the people of Afghanistan to have the Government of their own choice without outside interference, to influence the viewpoint of people.
The press in Pakistan was divided over the Afghan issue and its implications for Pakistan. Some sections shared Zia-Ul-Haq's opinion of geo-political thrust of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan Times saw it throughout as a frontal drive against the rising crescendo of Muslim rebellion. It viewed that Afghanistan as buffer was gone, accused India's lack of realism for the precarious situation and thus found unprecedented critical situation for Pakistan threatening its security and economy. So, it suggested Pakistan to accept American help. Another daily Wafaq asked Pakistan to accept US and Chinese help to bring forth pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Urdu daily Nawai Waqt, observing ambiguity of the US and its allies called upon them to consider any attack on Iran or Pakistan as an attack on them. Dissenting opinions also came in. The daily Muslim cautioned the "Government against getting involved with the US activism in the region in the light of historic facts, non-alignment and what one super power can do in Afghanistan, other can do in Iran". The daily also pointed out the economic problems for local people of Peshawar as well as city's law and order situation. It also analysed in detail the heavy political, economic and social costs involved in the Afghan crisis, which virtually meant Pakistan's failure to define its foreign policy goals. Similar opinion was also expressed by other sections of the press.

The weekly leftist Viewpoint saw the events in Afghanistan full of grave dangers but asked Pakistan to move
cautiously in accepting the western aid. The weekly suggested the Government to remain in close touch with the USSR and Afghanistan as well as to make high level contacts with India. The daily Jasarat examining political and geographical considerations of neighbouring countries - China, India, Iran, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union felt need to have friendly relations with them in the best interest of Pakistan. The Dawn also viewed the security of Pakistan in the national and regional context only and not as part of the global strategic rivalry of the super-powers.

The right-minded section spoke of Islamic solidarity. Business Recorder viewed that "whatever steps we take, we must keep in close contact with the Muslim nations around the world. as the future of Muslim countries is also irrevocably linked together". Even Pakistan Times, Nawai-Waqt and Zindagi, realizing a crucial geographical position of Pakistan in the arc of crisis holding key to the Muslim Middle East stressed the need for Muslim solidarity to counter the situation created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Maghribi Pakistan referred to the US Pro-Israel Policy and along with Badbaan and Chatan opined the entire Islamic world to sort out the differences and unite as one Millat.

Thus, the domestic public opinion in Pakistan over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan varied in three ways: 1) Accommodation with the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and India:
2) Special relationship with the U.S.A., non-alignment and other external help; and 3) Islamic solidarity with the entire Muslim world. Nonetheless, all sections of opinion were against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the entire debate was placed on how best can Pakistan's interests be served by taking advantage of the favourable public opinion and its utilization to gain political and economic strength in order to bring pressures on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The question of refugees remained and still remains burning and the dominant Pakistani public opinion, as this dissertation has found, has not viewed it with favour as varied type of the local crises have erupted inside Pakistan since their exodus from Afghanistan.

The South Asian region is the strategic divide between India and Pakistan, as both occupy key geographic position in the region. So, the happenings in Afghanistan were of profound concern to Indians. Kautilya had already told that the neighbour on your border is your enemy and the neighbour of your neighbour is your friend. Relations with remote states follow the pattern - the enemies of your enemies are your friends while the enemies of your friends are your enemies. India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and USA followed the same pattern. So, India sympathised with Afghanistan over the Pashtunistan issue whenever its relations with Pakistan worsened. But the Afghan Revolution of 1978 was viewed differently. The leftist leaders and
intellectuals hailed it as new dawn ushering in broad transformation in the socio-economic system and political structure of Afghanistan, along with a change in the politics of the region. They accused Pakistan and the US for fanning resistance to the new regime by arming the Afghan rebels in the territory of Pakistan. While Janata Government asked Afghan rulers to acquire credibility among the Afghan people rather blaming Pakistan for it troubles. The press in India characterised the new regime in Afghanistan as left-oriented frankly discussed in opposition inside the country the refugee problem and other issues connected with it. Only two dailies Patriot and National Herald called the regime revolutionary full of promises and prospects.

The domestic public opinion in India was also divided the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The care-taker Government of Choudhry Charan Singh made it clear that it supported the sovereign right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference and hoped that no country would take steps that might aggravate the situation. Simultaneously, the Government of India expressed its concern at the US decision to supply arms to Pakistan - the old misguided policy of arming Pakistan in response to a temporary phase of developments in Afghanistan. It was, however, Mrs.Gandhi who expressed her opposition to foreign military intervention anywhere but considered the Soviet intervention in response the other foreign intervention in the internal affairs of that country.
for a long time prior to the Soviet intervention as well as to the growing U.S. presence in the Indian ocean areas and the U.S. - Chinese collaboration against the Soviet Union. She almost endorsed the Soviet stand. However, on the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in February, 1980 and the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, she pressed without success for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan within specific period of time with the Soviet adherence to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The same thing was done by her foreign Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao. The Government of India and its officials continued throughout with this policy. Taking the regional view of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan it took diplomatic measures with the regional and concerned countries to diffuse the Afghan crisis and damn the confrontation, e.g. missions to Pakistan, to Afghanistan, to the US were made immediately after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. But Pakistan's adamant emphasis on the Islamic framework for the solution of the crisis in the beginning and on the US economic and military aid later left no chance for its successful operation.

Other opposition parties had opinion different from Congress I. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) described the intervention regrettable including the US-Chinese and Pakistani. despite both CPI and CPI(M) supported the Soviet intervention. Other leaders and intellectuals of the leftist orientation supported the Soviet move. Janata Party, a
section of intellectuals, including bureaucrats took antipathic view, condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, criticised Government of India's policy which actual meant against public opinion in India and an alienation of the neighbouring countries including Pakistan and China. Some sections of the press and intellectuals took global - geopolitical approach to the Soviet action and viewed it as part of a larger Russian foreign policy geo-strategic design.

The press in India created the sound, balanced public opinion in India. The Hindu was the only daily which called the Soviet intervention clearly military aggression on the part of the Soviet Union against the small nation of Afghanistan against the UN Charter. The daily continued to report the details of the Indian initiatives to solve the crisis. The daily Times of India also suspected Afghanistan to become a captive Soviet satellite. However, both offensive as well as defensive versions of the Soviet intervention continued to be projected in the daily. The daily Tribune and other sections also saw the Soviet Union taking control of Afghanistan's Marxist Revolution. Only two dailies, Patriot and National Herald, along with other sections like Link, Mainstream etc. accepted the justification given by the Soviet Union. Thus, from the viewpoint of the domestic public opinion in India, the Soviet action, its objective and India's response thereto differed greatly. The consensus was on the two main factors: Both the
super-powers had vested interest in the region and thus were responsible in someway or other for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; concern with the arms acquisition by Pakistan from USA and Pakistan’s collaboration with China, that could seriously jeopardize the security of India.

The India-Pakistan relations were affected. There had been mutual antagonism between the two countries owing to their basic differences in approach emerging from the partition itself. The problem of Kashmir between India and Pakistan and of Pakhtoonistan between Afghanistan and Pakistan brought Afghanistan even prior to the Soviet intervention in India-Pakistan relations. India’s regional stand vis-a-vis the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and her regional approach for the political solution annoyed Pakistan. The domestic public opinion in Pakistan ever felt the necessity of India-Pakistan cooperation in the strategic situation of South Asia but always accused India for unrealistic policies which virtually meant India’s desire for domination in the region. Some sort of public hysteria took place whenever India expressed concern on Pakistan’s acquisition of arms from the US. The same thing took place in India. This was nothing more than worsening the climate of good-neighbourly relations which was prepared by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as the security of the entire region was threatened and both the countries exchanged diplomatic moves in this respect. If Pakistan feared Indo-USSR collusion for her security, India also feared US-Pak-China axis in the like manner.
The Soviet intervention thus added the intensity to the arms race, both quantitative and qualitative, including the nuclear one between India and Pakistan. This was actually the physical manifestation of mutual distrust of suspicion. Such an arms race acted as the permanent drain on the scarce resources of both the countries and blocking them in non-productive sectors of economy with a negative impact on investment, inflation, employment, balance of payment, industrial production and economic growth. In addition, the said support and encouragement given by Pakistan to anti-Indian extremists and secessionists and the counter allegation by Pakistan vice-versa has also affected and still affects the relations between India and Pakistan.

The Soviet intervention had also positive impact. The various confidence-building measures between them in the wake of the Soviet action in Afghanistan took place. Mrs. Gandhi sent Indian Foreign Secretary, Ram Sathe and her special envoy, Sardar Swaran Singh to Islamabad. Even Zia also agreed to seek India's cooperation in resolving the Afghan crisis and reciprocated by sending Agha Shahi to India. He also put forward non-war pact for India which India reciprocated by the treat of friendship with Pakistan. Nothing concrete could emerge but these steps were significant for themselves as they represented people's choice to live in peace in both the countries.

The story of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had to be finished. Every beginning has an end. The Soviet
Union's new policies both at home and abroad out of "perestroika" and "glasnost" brought about a radical shift in the direction and content of her policy and Geneva Accords were signed on April 14, 1988 between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the principles of Mutual Relations, in particular, on non-interference and non-intervention and on the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees and declaration on international guarantees was made by both USA and USSR. This ended the Soviet intervention without giving final resolution of the Afghan crisis. At the same time, Indo-Pak acrimony persists till today.

As a matter of fact, four decades conflict, mutual distrust and suspicion cannot be removed so easily. The partition of the sub-continent and the continued hostility between them since then have exercised considerable influence both on the internal situations in the two countries as well as on the external policies pursued by them. One country functions as a domestic compulsion for the other. The Kashmir problem is the burning example of this premise. So, there are serious differences in the perceptions of the two countries in regard to strategic environment, bilateralism, non-alignment and disposition of the armed forces. Therefore, their efforts for normalisation must be accompanied by considerable good will, tenacious efforts and people to people understanding between them irrespective of the fact that it may take sufficiently longer time.