RESULTANT IMPACT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ON INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

BACKGROUND:

The Indo-Pakistan relations have been acrimonious ever since 1947-four wars in three decades. This may be ascribed to their basic differences in approach and method emerging from the partition, in the political set-up, ideologies, economic systems and the foreign policies. However, from geopolitical point of view, the partition represented the political division of a single geographical, ecological, economic and defence unit, with all the resultant incongruities, anomalies and irrationalities. The Himalayas and the Karakorum mountains constitute a common line of defence for both India and Pakistan. This fact imposes an overwhelming geopolitical compulsion on both the states not to deploy their armed forces against each other and thus weaken the external security of the entire subcontinent. 1 The factor of geographical contiguity along with the wishes of the people concerned was emphasised by the Indian leaders when partition was agreed. But the Muslim League leaders concurred with the British view that when paramountcy lapsed, the princes of the states would become free to accede to either of the two dominions or to remain independent. 2 As a result there exists mutual antagonism between the two countries till today, without seeming no end in the near future.
This antagonism may not be explained merely in terms of the military threat posed by one to the other as widely expressed in the domestic public opinions of both India and Pakistan. "The relations between India and Pakistan since the partition of 1947 have been characterised by extreme tension much of the time, tension almost all of time, economic blockade on one occasion, periodic threats of war and continuous ideological and political warfare which have produced, to put it mildly, a shambles in the relationship between these two countries". From an analytical approach the causes of the recurrent crisis between them "fall into two main categories: First, there are specific quarrels, such as Kashmir, border incidents etc. Secondly, there are the different outlooks of the two countries, which shape the mental image that each formed of the other and serve greatly to complicate their relations". Behind the geo-political and economic quarrels lie the more dangerous tensions based on prejudices, myths and age old hatreds.

The feeling of distrust and suspicion between the two countries has probably been nowhere more prominent than in the conduct of their foreign policies. This is more so with Pakistan. India's post-1947 non-aligned policy was not framed with the physical security of the country chiefly in mind. The policy was very active, judging each issue on the basis of its merit. As such, it was the main source of India's power in international political relations and also vis-a-vis USA and USSR. But this policy was powerless against such
states as Pakistan and China where direct military and economic policies were adopted.  

While Pakistan, which had no image in international affairs as the foundations of her status were only laid after independence, formulated its policy vis-a-vis India in the wake of a psychological background of Two-Nation theory and geopolitical insecurity or to put it differently, the main aim of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to obtain a shield against a possible attack from India and to maintain her sovereignty and territorial integrity repeatedly threatened by India. And in this pursuit, Pakistan has sought external military and economic aid and co-operation. Thus, the partition of the sub-continent and the continued hostility between the two countries since then have exercised considerable influence both on the internal situations in the two countries and on the external policies pursued by them. Each country functions as a domestic compulsion for the other.

From the viewpoint of public opinion, India-Pakistan relations have always played the significant role in the policies of both parts of the subcontinent but apart from this very special category of their respective foreign relations, the impact of foreign policy on the domestic politics of India and Pakistan in the initial era of their independence, has only been marginal. During that phase, the public debates, particularly on the goals and implementation of foreign policy had been restricted to a very select elite.
Till 1953, there was little in content that could be described as any striking departure from the historical drift in the foreign policies of these two countries that could have sparked off a major public debate. However, the first radical change of course of Pakistan's politics in April 1953, altered the entire perspective. To begin with, the justification by Pakistan leadership of the new foreign policy in terms of its impact upon the Indo-Pakistan balance of power in Pakistan's favour, and the opposition of Indian leadership to Pakistan policy precisely because of the same reason, telescoped the public focus of the foreign policy of these two countries within that very special category of foreign relations that has always played an important role in the politics of the subcontinent. This has had the effect on the one hand, of vastly increasing the importance of the Indo-Pak balance of power as a factor in the politics of the sub-continent and on the other hand of broadening considerably the base of public debate on foreign policy in both the countries. The same process was further accentuated by the new western policy, which was summed up by the erstwhile US Secretary of State thus: "Those not with us are against us".  

The Pakistani leadership has given prior to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to the domestic public opinion in Pakistan: that India is out to contain even to absorb Pakistan; that Kashmir is necessary for the existence and security of Pakistan, that the armed conflicts of 1965 and
1971 were begun by India and that the Muslims in India are victim of neglect and discrimination. Other sections of public opinion have also expressed their fears about India's ultimate aim of destroying Pakistan due to India's unwillingness to respect Pakistan as a sovereign state and to accept the reality of her existence. In a word, India has been and still continues to be the most dominating aspect of external relations in the domestic public opinion of Pakistan. Since her inception Pakistan's policy has been directed to securing an adequate protection against India. Simultaneously, there exists other section of the public opinion which views that real or deliberately generated hostility between the two countries is used by the rulers as a means to manipulate the mass opinion to keep them popular and in power. An eminent Pakistani policy-maker exclaimed: "Whenever we seem to be on the verge of a breakthrough in our relations, something happens and up slide back to square one".8

Foreign policy making in India, like Pakistan, has been elitist in its formulation and implementation. India has maintained that her policy towards Pakistan has not been different from its policy towards all other nations: A policy of mutual friendship and accommodation.9 As longer the balance of power vis-a-vis Pakistan remained in India's favour, the aims and goals of the foreign policy remained largely an academic question, notwithstanding the Prime Minister Nehru's efforts to elevate the vision of non-
alignment to the global perspectives. Still the Hindu communalist parties were almost exclusively pre-occupied with relations with Pakistan and were not much interested in other aspects of India's foreign relations. It was the US arms aid to Pakistan in 1953 which created the spirals in the public opinion in India. Nehru himself took up the initiative to build a nation-wide popular upsurge against US arms aid to Pakistan. In fact, the Prime Minister's directive to his party units, to the lowest level, to mobilise public opinion without any condemnation against Pakistan or against the United States either as a country or as a government, but that the policy should be condemned as dangerous to world peace and injurious to India, was designed to take the wind out of the sails of the criticism of the communalists on the one hand, and communists on the other, and to bypass the elite and seek endorsement for his policy of non-alignment from the mass base to which he had wide access. The Prime Minister referred to this issue in almost all his public speeches during the period. The communist party, the Praja Socialist Party and the Hindu Mahasabha all welcomed it. However, as result of the Hungarian crisis, in which India, depending upon the Soviet support, delayed the sharp reaction, the Government policy got much criticism from all quarters.

There exists a varied type of public opinion in India vis-à-vis Pakistan. Many Indians regarded the creation of Pakistan as a tragic mistake which might still be corrected. Others view Pakistan as inimical to the Indian
secular democracy and constantly attempting to subvert the loyalty of Indian Muslims. Many others view Pakistan's strategy to capture Kashmir, avenging Bangladesh by establishing Khalistan through promotion of regional and secessionist movement among vulnerable groups in India. Besides, the existence of religious minority groups in the two countries has added highly emotional factor in Indo-Pakistan relations. For instance, it is widely believed in India that Pakistan is an intolerant, theocratic state, where the Hindu minorities may best live on sufferance as helots or worse, face genocide. Similarly, it is widely held in Pakistan that Muslim minorities are systematically and continuously suppressed and oppressed in India; that they are in perpetual fear of being butchered by the Hindu extremist groups, and that they have lost all possibility of security and dignity. 13

However, there is a sizeable public opinion among the people of the two countries to live in peace and cooperation, to have far greater interaction on people to people level on both sides-to begin with the non-controversial areas of sports, culture, academics, banking system, tourism and similar other areas as well as a non-governmental forum where intellectuals of goodwill of the two countries from various walks of life could meet regularly. The salient voice of domestic public opinion in both the countries took vociferous spiral when the governments in both the countries came out with on-war pact talks -from
first mooted in November 1949 from Nehru to the 1959 Ayub’s Joint Defence Scheme, again its repeated offer by Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1965, by Mrs. Gandhi in 1968 and by Morarji Desai in 1979 to General Zia’s proposal in 1981. However, nothing concrete could take place as one rejected other’s proposal. For instance, Nehru rejected Ayub’s scheme by asking "against whom"? while Z.A. Bhutto reacted sharply by saying that "history shows that the initiative for proposals for no war pact has generally emanated from perspective aggressor states. states with an aggressive intent such as Nazi Germany. The Ribbontrop-Molotov pact is a classic example of a no war-pact. If India were to embark on aggression against Pakistan and we were to defend ourselves, India would turn round and tell the world in its characteristic historic fashion that it was Pakistan that had committed aggression, for peace-loving India offered a no-war pact, and having done that how could India commit aggression? The purpose of India in making the present offer of a no-war pact is a deceptive one. It is to advance India’s interest. Pakistan cannot be an accessory to further self-aggrandisement by India." 14

Thus, the people’s sentiments for peace and co-operation between the two countries have been overshadowed by the politico-military vested interests in both the countries.

AFGHANISTAN AS FACTOR IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS BEFORE SOVIET INTERVENTION:

Afghanistan has been an important factor in India-Pakistan relations from the viewpoint of two main issues-the
Kashmir problem and Pakhtoonistan issue. "Afghanistan indeed holds, observed OHK Spate, a watching brief in frontier politics, is most important for Pakistan but rulers of Afghanistan may not be able to resist the temptation to fish in troubled waters and Karachi watches relations between Delhi and Kabul with considerable uneasiness. Both India and Pakistan will probably wish to continue the British policy of keeping Afghanistan and Russia as buffers. Further north the Kashmir problem is not without wider implications. In some sense Kashmir is a part of the North-West Frontier, on its marches in the Pamir-Karakoram, the empires meet".15 The Karakorum Highway through Chinese province of Sinkiang and the Wakhan corridor having an added significant strategic value has adversely affected India-Pakistan relations. It is for this reason that Pakistan's hostile frontier with Afghanistan has been held as favourable to India's security.

Immediately after 1947 there emerged tension between India and Pakistan over the uprisings in the tribal areas of the NWFP of Pakistan for which Nehru had to give clarification thus: "May I say in this connection that because of the great tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan over various matters, we are continuously being charged with having secret intrigues with Afghanistan and bringing pressure upon her to adopt a policy in regard to Pakistan which she might not otherwise have done? That, of course, I regret to say, is one of the numerous things without foundation which emanate from Pakistan".16 Similarly Ashok
Chanda, the then deputy Minister for External Affairs had to repudiate Pakistan's allegation regarding worsening of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in 1955: 'India has not interfered in any way in the internal affairs of Afghanistan or in its relations and controversies with Pakistan and any statement to the contrary is wholly false.'

India's support to Afghanistan on Pakistan issue was made subject to much criticism in Pakistan along with the Kashmir issue.

The Afghan rulers have always tried to win Indian sympathy for furthering their interest and causes, to create apprehension among Pakistanis vis-à-vis India. Even Hafizullah Amin, who used to say that area from the Amu to the Indus belonged to Afghans, told the then Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee: "Let us have a secret pact; you take one part of Pakistan and we take the other part".

**PAKISTAN'S REACTION TOWARDS INDIA'S STAND ON THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN:**

India took a regional view of the Afghan crisis taking into account Pakistan's acquisition of arms from the US. The caretaker government under the leadership of Chaudhary Charan Singh expressed on December 30, 1979 its concern at the US decision to supply arms to Pakistan which could hurt the normalization process as well as delay the restoration of normalcy in Afghanistan. On January 2, 1980 Charan Singh expressed India's total opposition to this decision and suggested that "the US should relapse into its old misguided
policy of rearming Pakistan in response to a temporary phase of developments. The supply of arms to Pakistan would have the least relevance to the largest interest of the subcontinent at a time when, after decades of suspicion and animosity interpersed with two armed conflicts between India and Pakistan, bilateral relations had been improving steadily."^20

To Mrs. Indira Gandhi it would be necessary to obtain the withdrawal of the bulk of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a specific time frame. But this would not be possible if the insurgency was internalised and if Pakistan were converted into a base for Sino-US military operations against the soviets in Afghanistan. Mrs. Gandhi's policy, in the opinion of Bhabani Sengupta implied that while India could live with a Marxist Afghanistan passing into the orbit of the Soviet bloc, it could hardly live with a Pakistan rearmed by the US and China, even less with a Pakistan destabilised and perhaps dismembered by the intermeshing impact of great power confrontation and internal conflict. Mrs. Gandhi's way to establish the situation and enforce a certain element of caution in the actions of Pakistan was to unequivocally reaffirm the strategic linkage between India and the Soviet Union in the event of a major conflict building up in South Asia."^21

The press also saw Pakistan's acquisition of arms as threat to India. Mr Kuldip Nayar reported Pakistan's desire
to have arms without being asked for any assurance that they would not be used against India. "A bullet is a bullet which will be shot in battle against any country, it was stated. Washington also made it known that the USA and China intended to co-ordinate military and other assistance to Pakistan. Military attaches of some of the foreign missions in Islamabad told me that the Karakoram highway had been closed to civilian traffic so as not to hamper the flow of Chinese arms. This also annoyed New Delhi which conveyed its concern to Peking through diplomatic channels. China’s reaction was to take note of India’s concern and of course do nothing more". 22 Indian attitude towards Pakistan’s rearmament by US also stemmed from the fact that the arms given to Pakistan in the past had never been used for the purpose for which they were given.

At a seminar on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis on January 3, 1980, Rakshat Puri of Hindustan Times pointed out the implication of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for Pakistan." Supposing, just supposing that the new relatively flexible Afghan President, Babrak Karmal is able, in due course, as the Islamic fundamentalist wave begins to wave, to divert the attention of the Baluchi and Pathan Tribal elements, who are not political animals exactly as we might know the breed in India and elsewhere, but thrive on the right kind of slogans, to renewed demands for some kind of Pakhtoonistan, even as reports keep coming in of disaffection in Iranian as well as Pakistani Baluchistan." 23
Thus, press in India took an alarming view of American arms to Pakistan. Immediately after the Soviet intervention, the daily Hindustan Times editorially argued; if Soviet intervention is to be condemned so must also be the American. What is more any strengthening of the Pakistan army as a part of the power game will only revive the tensions on the subcontinent. Another daily Hindu which condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan strongly, also showed concern over the US plan to bolster Pakistan's military strength by way of raising of at least five new divisions over the next two years to double the deployment along the Afghan border without reducing its present strength on the Indian front. Similarly, all other newspapers showed such concern as usual.

Public opinion in Pakistan reacted sharply. The trend upto February, 1980 was analysed by Ashrad Haqqari—a Pakistani analyst, saw the fundamental objectives of India(1) to prevent the arming of Pakistan (2) to be recognised by all the major powers as the dominant power in the region; (3) to insulate the region from the great power rivalries so that India's own predominance remained uneroded, (4) to keep the Soviet Union far away from its borders as possible. 2.A. Suleri immediately after the Soviet intervention examined Pakistan's Afghan policy by taking into account India's reaction to the acquisition of arms by Pakistan and regretted: "Unfortunately, Pakistan is confronted with imponderables. India for one has not got out
of its old shell of prejudices and reservations about Pakistan. The short-sighted manner in which it has reacted to the American offer obviously shows that it has not developed a wider horizon of regional and collective outlook. It has expressed alarm when it has no ground for it. Actually, there can be no comparison between the armed strength of the two countries. India is not only many times larger in size and manpower—especially after the separation of East Pakistan—but it possesses a vast range of indigenous defence industries and even the capacity to produce tanks and aeroplanes. What fear can it have possibly from Pakistan? Moreover, Pakistan has concentrated on policies which aim at preserving peace and achieving self-consolidation yet facts don’t seem to weigh with the Indian leadership and it continues to stick to a narrow mentality which it should have outlived. There is, however, nothing that we can do about it except to take cognizance of this hurdle in our way".27

The daily Maghribi Pakistan commented that "Mrs. Indira Gandhi appears to be keen on a weak defence for Pakistan for it was precisely this weakness that she exploited in 1971 to take away East Pakistan. There cannot, however, be any concrete change in Indo-Pak relations unless the Government and people of India accept the existence of Pakistan by giving in for a just settlement of the Kashmir issue. Mrs Gandhi’s out-dated stand that Pakistan should not be rearmed is, therefore, incomprehensive for any body can see that the present situation requires a strong and stable Pakistan with
is compatible with the interest of India's own security as well.

The Press in Pakistan attacked Indian leadership by taking instances from Indian press and leaders. The Urdu daily Nawai Waqt expressed that "Mrs. Gandhi had been giving indications of her pro-Russian stance even driving the election campaign by adopting a vague policy on Russian action in Afghanistan. In the circumstances when India's sober and knowledgeable circles are emphasising the need for a realistic foreign policy in tune with the world opinion, Mrs. Gandhi's policy is rather strange. India's responsible Press is also advising the Government to discard the traditional attitude of enmity with Pakistan at any price. Even the defence and foreign policy experts, who have normally wielded influence, are not only emphasising the need for better relations with Pakistan, but seek a review of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in the context of India's self interest... Mrs. Gandhi should give serious thought to the fact that Vietnam's seizure of Kampuchea and now Russia's domination of Afghanistan flow directly from the treaties of friendship. As for Kashmir, the problem has to be solved one day by the two countries. The circumstances have developed that point to a new approach in India's own interests and Mr. Vajpayee has indicated this strategy should be".

The daily Jang saw Indira Gandhi's calculated move for her support to the aggressive soviet intervention in Afghanistan in line of Soviet support to India during the
1971 Indo-Pak conflicts. Maintaining that Mrs. Gandhi and the Soviet Union have set different standards for themselves and other smaller and weaker countries of the region, the daily commented, Mrs. Gandhi's stand is "definitely an aggressive posture but a majority of the Indian people, specially its 150 million Muslims, can never approve of this. Mrs. Gandhi should consider the situation more realistically because the interest of the entire region, in fact that of the entire world, lies in pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. This is the only hope for peace in the region and fully compatible with India's own interests". Another daily Sadaqat called Indira Gandhi's suggestion of the Afghan themselves "to solve their problem hypocritical maintained that she may raise the bogey of Sino-US cooperation to get all the modern weaponry from the Soviet Union and might try that USA does not give any aid to Pakistan even by using the good offices of Israel. One cannot, therefore, ignore the possibility of Mrs. Gandhi's crossing all limits in her enmity to pakistan and make a common cause with the Soviet Union, who too does not like a strong Pakistan". While the daily Muslim came out that in the context of three wars between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan's traditional adversary "has been India and India alone. Afghanistan continues to rub Pakistan up the wrong way. The question is, will the US be willing to supply such arms to Pakistan as will be adequate to meet an Afghan-Russian challenge! As for the US coming physically to the aid of
Pakistan in the event of aggression against this country, the key question once again is: from which direction? Suppose, such an attack comes once again from India, will the US commitment to Pakistan stand?" 

Mrs. Gandhi's Letter to Zia: Mrs. Indira Gandhi summoned the Indian ambassador to Pakistan to New Delhi for the assessment of the situation in Pakistan and gave him a letter aimed at efforts under way to understand each-other's point of view, anxieties and concerns in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, the press comment on it in Pakistan turned very adverse: commenting on her stand on the then developments in Afghanistan and the US arms offer to Pakistan, the daily Muslim editorially accused her of adopting "a posture which ran counter to the thinking of nature politicians and the responsible press of her country subscribing to the Kremlin's rape of that strife-ridden country and said that her pronouncement is bound to ring an alarm bell in Pakistan. She apparently continues to nurse the fond dream of 'Akhand Bharat'- a concept she has inherited from her forbears. Islamabad is fully alive to the dangers lurking in the north and looming large on its eastern border and the situation is determined to remain prepared to repel aggression from any quarter."  

The daily Pakistan Times saw Mrs. Gandhi's amendment in somewhat her original pronouncement after meeting Lord Carrington. "The Indian Prime Minister may not wish to be entirely alienated from the non-aligned opinion and the opinion in some of the
influential quarters of her own country and may, therefore, try an apparently softer line of negotiations with Pakistan, but the real purpose would be to cause delay. With the lapse of time, it may be expected, the hear of the shock will cool down and meanwhile pro-India and pro-Israel lobbies can be set afoot to do mischief”. An editorial article by M.B.Naqvi called the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a threat to both Pakistan and India. Calling India virtually a joker in the pack, Mr. Naqvi regretted that “Indian response continues to object to any improvement of Pakistan’s defence capability at all. Even in the new situation created by Afghanistan’s latest changes, it started off by opposing any infusion of new arms into Pakistan, though later on its objections have been somewhat muted. However, Mr. Naqvi conceded that some amount of accommodation and understanding from and with India is needed if “we are to cope with the new realities that have come to exist across our western and north-western borders”. He also suggested a modicum of Sino-Indian reconciliation because Pakistan-American cooperation does not really arouse any serious misgivings but Pakistan-China cooperation continues to be viewed with suspicion in India. Given the central importance of two factors, viz, impossibility of a military solution that may conceivably result from Afghanistan’s insurgency and the need to keep Pakistan’s Indian flank secure, the article provided for diplomatic, apolitical and non-aligned forms; and some understanding with India and some kind of a bridge between China and India.
The daily Jang viewed that the apprehensions and concern expressed by Indian Prime Minister about foreign arms' aid to Pakistan are absolutely baseless, for "Pakistan has never used such aid against her neighbour. Pakistan is already in touch with India and will do its best to remove any such apprehensions. The security of the countries of the subcontinent is a common problem and calls for mutual understanding and confidence between India and Pakistan".35

Another daily Jasarat pointed out that no defence system or agreement can be useless unless it takes into count consideration the political and geographical realities. The piling up of arms, military equipments and economic resources alone do not guarantee the security of a country, which is provided mainly, by its practical understanding and goodwill in its region. Considering the Indian protest towards US aid to Pakistan, the daily suggested an understanding of India first hand: "When we are prepared to take into account Soviet reaction to our defence planning, why not take into account the Indian reaction too? Instead of others offering assurances to India about our intentions we should ourselves ascertain the Indian point of view and explain ours to them".36

Maintaining that the entire region became threatened by the situation created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the daily Hurriyet carried out that even "Mrs. Gandhi has conceded that Russian occupation of Afghanistan has increased the danger to India. At this juncture when peace of not only this region but of the whole world is threatened Pakistan and India as neighbouring
countries should arrive at a settlement through peaceful negotiations. Arms aid offered to Pakistan should not cause concern to Indian leaders. If they view the matter with an open mind, they will find that what is being offered is not sufficient for Pakistan's defence needs. As it is, India is buying arms on a large scale from different countries. We feel that instead of raising concern over arms aid to Pakistan, India should cooperate with Pakistan in ensuring peace in the region.\textsuperscript{37}

Meanwhile, Dawn editorially took note of the fact that Mrs. Gandhi's response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan of late became "a shadeless ambivalent that it was immediately after the Indian elections a fortnight back. Earlier Mrs. Gandhi's emphasis was on what she called the American responsibility in destabilising the region and thus inviting Soviet intervention. But now she has been more categorical in expressing her disapproval of the presence of soviet troops in Afghanistan. She has also admitted, through discreetly, that the present situation has increased tensions in the region and poses a danger to India. So it seems quite obvious from Mrs. Gandhi's statements as well as Indian press reports that like Islamabad, New Delhi also perceives grave implications inherent in the Afghan crisis for the sub-Himalayan region. Given the geographical compulsions facing both India and Pakistan and some of the common points in their basic perception of the Soviet intervention, it seems but logical that the two countries
should seek to reach some understanding on points of common concern. It is encouraging to learn from reports that high level contacts have been established between New Delhi and Islamabad aimed at analysing the developments and trying to understand each other's anxieties and concerns. Dismissing the reported Indian offer of no war pact in the absence of the short-term urgency, the editorial also ruled out any long term developments especially in the context of the Kashmir dispute. Nevertheless it desired for the need for the two countries to seek to identify the issues of common interest and concern to them and explore broad areas of agreement between them continuing the normalisation process initiated under the Simla Accord, both should seek to open channels of communication between them. Expressing that Pakistan being militarily and politically in India's interest, the editorial accused Indian government and press reacting negatively to Pakistan's move to strengthen its security.

Another daily Baluchistan Times also complained India's unsympathetic and unfruitful attitude against Pakistan's acquisition of defence equipment for her security. Simultaneously it took happy note that India is also willing to stabilise the situation in the sub-continent: calling that happy growth and strengthening of relations between Pakistan and India "is a pre-requisite for development and progress and prosperity of the people of the both countries and for the promotion of peace and harmony in this region which has been troubled as a result of sad happenings in
Afghanistan the editorial wished that "the situation in the region demands that both these countries should remove all sorts of misunderstandings and apprehensions, if prevailing, and take proper steps towards that direction." Maintaining that it was the power-vacuum in the Sub-continent following British withdrawal in 1947 that had tempted the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan, the chief editor of Pakistan Times, Z.A. Suleri opined that "the only bulwark against the northern thrust could have been built up by a close bond of relations between Pakistan and India. Had the two successor states stood together, Moscow would not have so easily trespassed the traditionally demarcated neutral zone. But the iron logic of history was lost on Delhi and even as it raised a hue and cry against the increasing use of the Indian Ocean by the American and the Soviet nuclear fleets as a down-right threat to the peace of the region, it calmly dismissed the brutal invasion of a non-aligned Afghanistan as a routine fulfillment of the friendship treaty. Mrs. Gandhi’s entire emphasis is on the threat, the contemplated arms aid to Pakistan poses to India. The bitter truth is that some grain of incurable anti-Islamic prejudice induces India’s jaundiced perspective. Every now and then, in times of trouble, its irreconcilability to Pakistan gushes forth to surface." The daily Muslim called for the better relations with India in view of the indivisibility of the sub-continent’s defence as of the foreign policy options to cope with the then unsettling crisis. Maintaining that "the
problem of security has been the bane of relations between the India and Pakistan, he asked the foremost question; defence against whom? We must if we wish South Asia to face the lurking dangers together and suggested that instead of being concerned with, Beijing-Washington, Islamabad axis, India should acknowledge the gravity of the situation and to concede the legitimacy of Pakistan's quest for additional security. It stressed that lighting South Asian thinking from its old grooves requires a major wrenching effort. Bridging different standpoints will be impossible without adjustments on either side.  

THE FIRST SESSION OF IFMC AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS:

The Pakistani leadership kept on examining various options. Gen. Zia had mentioned from time to time to maintain good friendly relations with India and to seek India's cooperation in solving the Afghan crisis. However, with the extra-ordinary session of Islamic Foreign Ministers meet, his attitude on India-Pakistan relations underwent a change. Kuldip Nayar remarked: "the Pakistani leader's attitude on Indo-Pak relations had hardened since I met him last about a year ago. He did not favour no war pact with India nor did he wish to join with India to sculpt a regional approach to the Afghanistan crisis." It is for the Muslim countries to get together to defend the sovereignty of a Muslim country not only for Pakistan but of the entire Islamic world."
Some circles in the Pakistan press wanted Indian attitude to be discussed in the conference. The daily Nawai Waqt urged the conference to take serious notice of the Indian attitude, because "she is the one country that has left no stone unturned to eliminate the largest Muslim nation of Pakistan. She has already succeeded in dismembering it with Soviet help. Even today, when almost every state is criticising the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the rulers of India are justifying the Soviet aggression. India herself might some day become a threat to the region with Soviet support. So, the conference must take a serious view of the Indian attitude and effective steps to make India realize the gravity of the situation."43

An editorial page article by Aziz Beg in Muslim also called upon India to realize Pakistan's position. "There is no tragedy starker than the common belief that the Soviet military take-over of Afghanistan has generated new complications in relations between India and Pakistan. But Mrs. Indira Gandhi's statement, in the Lok Sabha, read between the line, is not as disappointing as it might appear at first. A common meeting ground is covered by (i) polarisation of views between India and Pakistan on the non-involvement in the rivalry between the Superpowers in the Indian Ocean area (ii) opposition to foreign presence or intervention in any country and thus seek withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (iii) Soviet action as a threat to peace in the region and the world". Expressing
wonder at Mrs. Gandhi's deep concern about efforts by the U.S., China and other countries to arm Pakistan, he called upon India to realize that Pakistan is a king of kingpin in the defence mechanism embracing the Indian sub-continent and given the tenuous difference between balance of power and balance of terror Mrs. Gandhi should come out a little more boldly in support of what she believes in both politic and just."

The Government of India sent Ram Sathe Foreign Secretary to Pakistan in pursuit of the normalisation process between the two countries following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The discussion on bilateral issues was marked by a restoration of both countries' commitment to the Simla agreement. Sathe told that India shared Pakistan's anxiety about superpower military involvement in the region, and realised that Pakistan needed to augment its defence, Pakistan had nothing to fear from India in the context of events in Afghanistan. However Pakistan's understanding of the nature of the crisis was wrong. What was building up in South Asia was a great power confrontation which would undermine stability and development in the entire region. Pakistan and India must act together to diffuse it. There should be no big flow of arms and weaponry to the region from the arsenals of the major powers, nor should any country do anything, which might add to tension and confrontation. While Zia told that the military help Pakistan was seeking from the US "must not cause India and concern: on the
contrary India should be pleased that Pakistan was taking on the Soviet giant, thereby making solid contribution to the security and stability of the region". He also opted an Indian initiative to secure the independence of Afghanistan. "As a big country and as the most important regional power in the area, India should assert its position and influence with the Soviet Union to get the Russian troops withdrawn from Afghanistan". He also favoured the raising of a peace-keeping mission consisting of India, Pakistan and Iran for this purpose. To him, however, the Afghan issue was not a regional issue but a global one. Calling the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to be as much a threat to Pakistan as it was to India, he perceived Indira Gandhi to be pro-Soviet. The elite opinion in India saw the visit to be fruitful and PTI found the climate in Islamabad for talks with India not as bleak or disappointing as it used to be in the past. The daily Times of India also opined that there were positive elements in Pakistan which India could exploit, including a considerable body of public opinion, articulated more in living rooms or across coffee tables than in the columns of the press, that Pakistan could be defended only on a subcontinental basis, that is, on the basis of cooperation between Pakistan and India.46

However, Mr. Sathe's visit's principal thrust was to prevent large scale arming of Pakistan by the US and thus both countries were diametrically opposed in viewing the Afghan crisis. Their only meeting ground was a concern for
peace and security in the entire region which could be seriously threatened in case the crisis was not defused soon.\textsuperscript{47} To Indians the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not the cause but a consequence of big power rivalry in the area, while for Pakistan, her own security was threatened and they needed assistance of other countries like the US. Gen. Zia asked that the Soviets must pull out from Afghanistan and did not put any concrete proposal to India embodying his concept of a regional peace-keeping force as well as to the demand that the Pakistani territory not be used by other powers to arm or incite Afghan Mujahideen.

Public opinion in Pakistan viewed Mr. Sathe's Visit as the positive development. The daily Jasarat described Sathe's visit as a positive step in the development of Indo-Pak relations and wished that "India continues to maintain this approach." The daily appreciated the Janata Government's efforts to undo the congress legacy of hostility towards Pakistan and work for normalisation of Indo-Pak ties. "Mrs. Gandhi's victory in the recent Indian elections, however, once again generated an atmosphere of uncertainty but both internal and external reaction to her policies has compelled her to tread somewhat cautiously, to create an atmosphere in which they can resolve their basic differences and move towards the development of friendly relations".\textsuperscript{48}

**GRUMYKO'S VISIT TO INDIA:**

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Soviet
Foreign Minister, Gromyko warned Pakistan by saying that "Pakistan would get nothing if it went along the path followed by the US and China. Pakistan's interests would imply good and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries. The US was determined to convert Pakistan into a hotbed of tension and a springboard for further escalation of aggression against Afghanistan."47 "Pakistan and its leaders must weigh which political path for it will be better—the path of peace and good neighbourly relations or the path of tension and hostility with neighbouring countries. The leadership of Pakistan has spoilt its relations with a number of states at the same times, we do not think this is a wise policy.50 However, difference persisted between India and the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and the Afghan question was not included in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of Gromyko's visit.

Pakistan reacted to it. Agha Shahi the Foreign Minister of Pakistan described Gromyko's pronouncements in India to be entirely negative and expressed that Gromyko had attempted to sidetrack the real issue which was Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the universal appeal for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. He felt disappointed that the talks between Gromyko and Mrs. Gandhi did not bring out a Soviet commitment to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.51 President Zia-Ul-Haq expressed worry on Gromyko's strong and bitter attacks on Pakistan, signalling a harder Soviet stance and feared that Indira Gandhi might
decide that discretion was the better part of non-alignment and move closer to the Soviet Union despite her much publicised differences with the Soviets on the issue of troops withdrawal. He also expressed that there was no meeting ground between his and India’s regional strategic thinking. "The Indian view is that any attempt to confront soviet presence in Afghanistan with a matching military build up in Pakistan will only intensify the prevailing tension in the region. The best way of inducing Soviet Union to pull out would be for the regional states to get together and exert their collective influence to impress upon Moscow that the continued presence of its forces would be politically counter-productive, whatever the initial exercise for intervention. This would benefit India and be harmful for Pakistan".

The press and other bodies in Pakistan also viewed the outcome of Indo-Soviet talks and the joint statements issued on the conclusion of Mr. Gromyko’s visit to New Delhi with scepticism. Z.A.Suleri of Pakistan Times called the disagreement between the India and the Soviet Union as "a facade for a unison of minds, for the real theme of the talks was no other than the arms aid to Pakistan. And on that both agreed in denouncing it, if the Indian Prime Minister were truly interested in defusing tension in the area she could have easily and convincingly explained the position to the Soviet Foreign Minister. On the contrary, she gave Mr. Gromyko ample opportunity to thunder against
Pakistan. To say the least this was an unfriendly act. One's soil is rarely allowed to foreigners for slandering a third country. Mr. Suleri went to the extent of accusing India of adding "a little fuel of its own to the fire set by its treaty partner. Moscow looks upon Delhi as an ally. It is an axis". Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed in Pakistan Times opined that "the object of the present Soviet diplomatic drive is to rehabilitate its image by mobilising opinion in the countries which have been the major recipients of its favour. Having a prior and special claim on India for upholding the Soviet action in Afghanistan the Soviet Union would be most willing to oblige India which can act as an effective counterpoise to China and allow it to annex the territories of Pakistan in realising its dream of Akhand Bharat". An editorial in the daily Muslim opined that it "is difficult to appreciate the self-contradictory speech of the Indian Foreign Minister. It however concedes that there are indications that Mrs. Gandhi is not altogether happy with what her Soviet friends have done in Afghanistan. Also that India has not openly supported the Russian intervention can, at best, be regarded as a token concession forward opinion, rather than as a disagreement in principle with its Soviet partners". The daily Zamana, however, observed editorially that the Soviet Union had failed to win Indian approval for her action in Afghanistan. "If the Indian leaders had approved the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, they would have found it difficult to explain their position to international opinion and the Soviet Union. India, after all, is a member of this
region and is found to be affected by the Soviet intervention. It could, therefore, altogether ignore the interests of the region.57

Abuzar Ghaffari in the daily Nawai Waqt analysed the following choices before India in the wake of the Russian intervention in Afghanistan. "(1) India and Pakistan to live as close friends; (2) India should consolidate her relations with the Soviet Union in a bid to destroy Pakistan; and (3) an attitude of duplicity to dissuade the Western nations from coming to the aid of Pakistan while providing the Russians with an opportunity to consolidate their position in Afghanistan". He argued that "if Pakistan and India come together as friends, the Russians will have to move out of Afghanistan and the superpowers will no longer able to do as they please in the region from Singapore to Aden". Mr. Ghaffari blamed India's hostility towards Pakistan for the spectre of insecurity haunting the subcontinent. "Tibet and Afghanistan constitute the strategic frontline of the subcontinent. India is responsible for their collapse and it is time that her leaders wake up to a realisation of the implications".58 Another daily Sadaqat viewed that Mrs Gandhi "is least bothered about the security and integrity of Afghanistan. She only wants to support the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for her own interests. We should not ignore Mrs. Gandhi's warning".59
SARDAR SWARAN SINGH'S VISIT TO ISLAMABAD:

On being asked by Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq to receive a special envoy of Mrs Gandhi, Sardar Swaran Singh was sent to Islamabad on April 10, 1980. On the eve of his departure from New Delhi, the Indian press saw a far greater degree of closeness in the Indian and Pakistani approaches to the situation created by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, Mr. Singh said that he went only "to discuss with Pakistan's leaders anything which would cease the crisis and confrontation in the region. As India had the friendliest feelings for Pakistan, it wanted a break with the past. Both neighbours should narrow down their differences in view of the crisis created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan". He also viewed that the atmosphere of tension and misunderstanding prevailing in the region must be diffused through developing cooperation between various countries of the region. Agha Shahi, the Pakistan Foreign Minister also wished that "Pakistan looked forward to a good neighbourly and tension-free relationship with India".

However, Mr. Singh's visit failed to bring any concrete results except Zia's renewed proposal for mutual force reduction conceding that India's defence commitment was larger than Pakistan's but Pakistan's requirements increased due to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Singh said that the differences on Afghanistan had narrowed as a result of his visit.
The Pakistani press saw doubts in India's efforts. On the eve of Mr. Singh's visit, the daily Nawai Waqt observed that "India has decided to sponsor this visit deviating from the normal practice according to which somebody of Pakistan should have returned the recent visit of the Foreign Secretary Mr. Ram Sathe. In view of her special relations with the Soviet Union, India has not cared to join the cry of anguish, emanating from all over the world. Instead, India is actively engaged in explaining away the Russian constraints and imperatives. Under the garb of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries India desires to convene a conference of the countries of this region with a view to secure the guarantees sought by the USSR so that the Russians can get the time required to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan. This would also help establish Indian dominance and hegemony in the affairs of this region".  

Maintaining that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan poses a common danger to both Pakistan and India, Z.A. Suleri, the chief editor of Pakistan Times observed that "India's readiness to make common cause with Pakistan depends on its capacity for emotional readjustment to Pakistan. For the issue between the two countries is primarily psychological rather than political. So, diplomatic manoeuvre cannot make up for the awesome geographical and military vacuum that is emerging and short or deep psychological metamorphosis on the part of the Indian people. Whatever half-hearted steps are taken will prove ineffective". Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed, the columnist of Pakistan Times also opined that the major
concern of the Indian policy "to emphasise the regional aspect of the Afghan crisis to the derogation of its global character is to weaken Pakistan to a point where Indian ascendancy in the region is acknowledged by all the states on its periphery." 64

Commenting on Sardar Swaran Singh’s visit to Pakistan on bilateral and regional issues, the press in Pakistan emphasised the need to resolve the Kashmir issue. The daily Dawn urged for common identification of issues despite differences by the two country. However, it argued that "the importance of Kashmir cannot be overemphasised since the need to reassume a section of opinion in Pakistan in respect of India’s intentions in the region is a real one." 65 The daily Jang argued editorially that "in the absence of a solution of the Kashmir issue, the area of suspicion and doubt will widen further without in any way promoting the interests in India and Pakistan! Sardar Swaran Singh’s statements show that the Indian leaders now realize the importance of Pakistan's defence and stability. But this feeling should not remain transient. India has to show in a concrete manner that she is sincere in her profession." 66 The dailies Waqaf and Imroze described the visit as satisfying and welcomed development and expressed the hope that "although a hundred percent understanding between India and Pakistan on all outstanding issues is practically impossible to obtain. The current attempts at reconciliation will certainly produce positive development." On the other hand, dailies, Maghribi
Pakistan and Sadaqat remained as a sceptic of Indian intentions as ever before and pleaded editorially "not to take New Delhi's profession on their face value until the Kashmir issue is finally resolved."67 The daily Maghribi Pakistan also rejected Mr. Singh's view that "relations between Pakistan and India can be improved through exchange of journalist, artists, poets and writers" and said that "since their differences are essentially political in nature, they can therefore be removed only through a political process, which requires a sincere dialogue between the leaders of the two countries".68

SUBRAMANIAM SWAMI'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN:

Meanwhile, Dr. Subramanium Swami, the then opposition member of the Lok Sabha visited Pakistan and called both India and Pakistan to give top priority to settling political problems including Kashmir through negotiations on the basis of the Simla Agreement. He viewed that the 'Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan had posed a joint threat to the subcontinent and required a collective response from the countries of this region. As such it was essential for India and Pakistan to take full advantage of this historical opportunity to mend their forces and put behind the bitter heritage of the past'. Dr. Swami did not exclude People's Republic of China from taking a legitimate interest in the security of this region. Favouring a joint India-Pakistan-Chinese approach, he suggested that Indo-China relations should also be normalised.69
The daily Jasarat reacted sharply to the statement of Dr. Swami that with a generational change in India and Pakistan, the younger generation in India was not tied down to the bitter memories of the past. It argued that "the choice of Sardar Swaran singh for discussion with Pakistan instead of a new person directly controverts this thesis." 70

Taking into consideration the varied type of public opinion in Pakistan, the daily Muslim pleaded for a "reappraisal of the country's foreign policy in its historic perspective to steer Pakistan clear of the superpower rivalry and work out a new basis of peaceful relations with its neighbours, for confrontation might turn this region into a battle-ground". It also warned that if the countries concerned fail to take the initiative for a settlement of the Afghan problem, the two superpowers might eventually arrive at bilateral settlements in the context of their global interests. In this respect it discussed Indian diplomatic efforts and observed that only chance of resolving the issue lies in holding a regional conference comprising the Soviet Union, China, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India and called the visit of Sardar Swaran singh full of historic significance, "if it results in an understanding on Afghanistan between India and Pakistan, if the two countries act in unison the chances of the proposed conference arriving at a settlement would be more than 50 per cent. The success of this conference may create an atmosphere conducive to amicable settlement of bilateral disputes between China and
However this conference could never take place.

Sardar Swaran Singh's visit provided a gainful outcome in the form of a reasonably friendly meeting between Indira Gandhi and Zia-ul-Haq at Salisbury. Mrs Gandhi desired to come closer to Pakistan "our neighbour should be strong and stable internally". She also told that "India is anxious for a lasting solution of Afghanistan. India does not approve the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan but with rivalry between Moscow and Washington, the Soviet Union was bound to react if the American presence comes closer to them". She assured Zia that "she would create a favourable climate of public opinion in India to make Indo-Pakistan detente more meaningful, to play a positive role in defusing the Afghan crisis which has created new threats to Indian security due to the rivalry of big powers, which must be kept out of the Afghan situation". Zia agreed with Mrs. Gandhi's view that big power rivalry should be kept out of the Afghan situation. He also offered to have a UN supervisory group stationed in Pakistan, drawn from countries like India, to ensure that Afghan rebels were not armed, trained and sent across the border to carry on guerrilla war. however, he maintained that like "India, we also need military hardware".

The positive result of this meeting was that public opinion in both the countries called for an Indo-Pak summit to get down to the serious business of settlement to enable both of them overcome their differences and start relation
through cultural and journalist exchanges, trade and business i.e. from negative security oriented to positive development oriented. The common people blame the power drunk politicians and the far-off armament manufactures, greedy for their gains: "it is the politicians who need a change of heart. The people of both side are ready for friendship and cooperation".73

Un May 17, 1980 Zia inaugurating the 11th session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference made a causal reference to the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. He said that, "yet another vital issue in the long standing and unresolved problem of the state of Jammu and Kashmir whose people have yet to exercise their right of self-determination. A settlement of this issue will greatly contribute to the betterment of Indo-Pakistan relations, which is indispensable for the peace and stability of this region. we are committed to the resolution of this issue in the spirit of the Simla Agreement and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN".74 A written appeal on Kashmir dispute addressed to the participants of the IFMC by the Azad J & K President Brig. Mohammed Hyat Khan was distributed, dealing with various stages of Kashmir issue and urged "the Muslim Foreign Ministers to exercise their influence to bend the circumstances conducive to the just solution of this issue".75
The Indian public opinion got confused and infuriated by this development, showing this ambiguous attitude in Pakistan towards India: Zia seemed to be trying to be soft and tough at the same time.76 This reaction in India led to the exclusion of the Kashmir problem from the final draft of IFCG to which Pakistani press felt disappointment. Z.A. Suleri, the chief editor of Pakistan Times deplored that "Kashmir did not figure in the 102 item agenda".77 The daily Nawai Waqt also viewed that the "session concluded without taking up Kashmir, the most important issue for the host country".78 Thus, bilateral India-Pakistan relations refused to take off and Indians blamed Pakistan for stalling. Zia was not ready to give the kind positive push which alone could help clear the air between the two countries.79

AGHA SHAHI'S VISIT TO INDIA

In July, 1980 Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Agha Shahi visited India to discuss the progress of the Islamic panel as well as of India-Pakistan bilateral relations. He asked for serious modification of Indian strategic thinking with regard to Pakistan as a pre-condition for better political and even economic relations. Other points he emphasised included: the meeting of the field commanders of the two countries for mutual force-reduction; South Asia to be turned into a nuclear free zone; Pakistan's nuclear development programme aiming at nothing more than India's; and Pakistan's desire to have adherence to non-alignment and to live in peace and friendship with India.80
The Indian opinion took this visit as full of dismay. The Indian press called it an utter failure. Indian Express reported that it was Indira Gandhi who faulted her foreign minister for mishandling it. An editorial article in the daily Amrit Bazar Patrika observed that the "blunt truth is that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has not brought India and Pakistan together in search of common security and shared stability. India (with a substantial $1.6 billions new arms deal from the Soviet Union) has not been able to offer Pakistan a regional security and stability which strategy would diminish India's own special relationship with the Soviet Union. Nor has Pakistan shown the slightest inclination to move away from its own special relationship with China, the United States and the Islamic world to forge new strategic linkages with India. In short, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has not released fluids of friendship in South Asia. If anything it has sharpened the traditional strategic divisions of the regions or at least reinforced them."

While Pakistani press accused India of having created further obfuscation during Mr. Shahi's visit. The daily Pakistan Times editorially described Indira Gandhi's justification of India's arms purchases and her talk of threat and danger to India as so much sophistry and criticised her stand on the Soviet action in Afghanistan. "This is no way to promote the cause of regional peace and detente the interests of the subcontinent cannot be divided
into compartments". While another daily Dawn pointed out that the "talks have provided definite indications that despite the divergence of opinion over Afghanistan, the process of normalization has not been affected and short of a miracle, this is perhaps the best that could be hoped for".

Meanwhile Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in India. Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq expressed regret that, "80 million Muslims in India are still a victim of neglect and discrimination" and claimed to oversee their welfare in pursuit of Islam. Even the Indian ambassador's meeting with Benazir Bhutto led the Pakistan media to attack India for interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs. The Indian Government lodged a diplomatic protest and press blamed Pakistan for unnecessary steps which reversed the process of normalization between India and Pakistan. The daily Hindu observed that "once again the Indo-Pakistan syndrome is producing multiple symptoms of a much deeper malaise that is threatening to put the clock back to the pre-partition days. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, President Zia-ul-Haq made some reassuring noises about the need for better understanding between the two neighbouring countries in the larger interests of peace and stability in the subcontinent. But he is back at the old game of India-baiting and has started to talk darkly of Indian will towards Pakistan".

This trend continued to persist in the time to come. Maintaining that Pakistanis must continue to strive for the self-determination right for various peoples like
Palestinians, the Kashmiris and the Afghans, Zia touched the vital matter of Kashmir in the UN General Assembly "not the least being the Kashmir dispute whose resolution alone could pave the way for peace and stability of South Asia". Zia in this context also mentioned substantial progress made over the years in the promotion of communication, travel and trade between the two countries. India immediately reacted. Indian Foreign Minister, Narsimha Rao vigorously criticised Zia for raising the Kashmir issue at the UN General Assembly and called it contrary to the spirit of the Simla agreement. Similar voice was also raised by the Indian press. As usual, the Pakistani press criticised Narsimha Rao for his statement and described his reference to Kashmir "as an integral part of India" ill-spirited and called upon New Delhi to appreciate that "the Kashmir today is much more than it was at any time before, not merely in terms of Indo-Pakistani harmony but as a question crucial to India's security and nationalism in the context of Soviet power in Afghanistan". The press also analysed India's military expansion and called it domestically harmful in the long run for socio-economic reasons of Pakistan. However, some opinions also pleaded Pakistan to strengthen its ties with the USSR, India and Afghanistan in view of Reagan's efforts to plunge the Middle East into war. Even some circles in the Pakistani press went to the extent of explaining India's preparing for war with Pakistan on the basis of report in Guardian, which was ridiculed by other sections.
We have seen in the preceding chapter the expectations and reaction of Indian public opinion on the visit of the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev to India in December 1980. The Pakistani press saw it as further attempt for Indo-Soviet collusion for making Pakistan give up its principled approach towards Afghanistan and called up the people and the Government to prepare for all eventualities. The press found, after his visit, Indian and Soviet views on Afghanistan incompatible but saw Indo-Soviet cooperation in numerous fields including economic and defence as counterproductive. The daily Pakistan Times called upon Indian leadership "to seriously ponder the long term implications of its massive arms build up policy, that is not only raising misgivings among its small neighbours about its intentions of the area; but is also causing the diversion of the area's scarce economic resources to non-productive use". The press described the Indo-Soviet joint communique issued at the conclusion of President Brezhnev's visit as non-communicable but noted that "the mere fact that India has not rubber-stamped the Soviet Union's Afghan policy is no small merely both for South Asia and for the non-aligned nations as a whole". The daily Jasaarat even called upon the Soviet Union to leave it to the regional countries to look after themselves and throw the USA out of the region. The daily Elaan lauded the Indian protest to the Soviet position on Afghanistan, as "so effective that the Soviet President..."
and his spokesmen did not even dare say all that was expected of them against Pakistan. We are gratified at this demonstration of Indian people's love and goodwill for their Pakistani and Afghan brothers. We thank them from the bottom of our hearts." \(^9^9\)

Zia-Ul-Haq however viewed Indo-Pak relations better than some time ago in this changed scenario and held that "it is for India and Pakistan both to see the implications of such a move. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to the security of the region as such. Today it is Afghanistan, Iran is next door. It is also a threat to India and a threat to Pakistan. The borders will then not be at the Oxus river or at Landikotal. They will be at Wagah. So, it is a threat to India as well". \(^1^0^0\) In June 1981 the then foreign minister of India, Narsimha Rao paid visit to Pakistan for the purpose of normalizing Indo-Pak relations. Both countries ruled out the use of force or the threat of use of force between them and reiterated their commitment to the Simla Agreement to expand mutual cooperation in different fields. They also discussed the subject of arms acquisition by India and Pakistan. \(^1^0^1\) Immediately the announcement of US $3.2 billion military and economic aid to Pakistan and the US permission to Pakistan to buy F-16 aircraft virtually shattered the confidence building move between India and Pakistan. While Agha Shahi related Pakistan's purchase programme exclusively to the defence needs of the country in view of the developments in Afghanistan, \(^1^0^2\) the Government of
India taking serious note of this development expressed its concern that it could introduce immediately a new level of weapon sophistication into the region which could affect the existing balance.  

The then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi viewed that "acquisition of arms must only be according to needs and legitimacy, but the subcontinent is being willy-nilly pushed into an arms race, increasing financial burden on our people at a time when our limited resources should have been entirely used for the needs of our people and to make up for last time in technological and scientific progress". The Pakistani press reacted very sharply to it. The daily Pakistan Times found Pakistan's difficulties especially on account of Indian propaganda - a play of diversion of attention. The weekly Pakistan Economist also criticised India's powerful and ingenious propaganda machine and regretted that Mrs. Gandhi could not think of another role for herself except that of a bully for Pakistan. A leading Pakistani military thinker Lt. Gen (retd) A.I. Akram outrightly rejected Indian logic and propounded a theory that Pakistan's defence capabilities must correspond to the size of the threat it faced and not to the size of its territory or population. "We are under a bigger threat both from India and the Soviet Union".

However, despite apprehension against arms purchases in both the countries against each other, arms race continued and still continues between the two countries. If Pakistan
acquired US $3.2 billion economic and military aid, F-16 aircrafts and other subsequent aid and weapons. India also purchased $1.6 billion worth of arms from the USSR, other weapons and many other weapons from UK, France and West Germany. In other words, it was the manifestation of mutual distrust and suspicion between the two countries, leading even to nuclear rivalry. This has adversely affected their economic development paving a way for varied kinds of domestic and external crises between them in both the countries.

It is for this reason that there have been endeavours for a constructive dialogue between the two countries - the diplomatic flurry between them after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This has already been discussed in the preceding pages. Specific mention must be made here of Pakistan’s proposal for a draft of guarantees of non-aggression between India and Pakistan on November 11, 1981. The proposal suggested Pakistan’s readiness to enter into immediate consultations with India for the purpose of exchanging mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. Indian Government responded on November 25, 1981. Maintaining its earlier stand on no-war pact, the then Foreign Minister Narsimha Rao expressed that "our attitude will be positive on the basis that Pakistan’s offer constitutes an acceptance for the first time of India’s offer of a no-war pact which has stood intact since 1949 and as further amplification of the
Simla Agreement.109 And so India came out to have a friendship treaty with Pakistan to further progress to be made over some period of time taking into account of national interest, peace and security.110 For Mrs. Gandhi no-war pact was not enough for making the relations between the two countries sound: "apart from no-war pact proposal, there are a number of bilateral problems like visa, trade, and cultural exchanges. Secondly, the offer of no-war pact gave the impression that India is going to wage war and it is Pakistan which has come forth with a magnificent offer."111 While to Pakistan only no-war pact was Sinlquanon for further good relations—the prerequisite ground for the promotion of mutual friendship and cooperation can be effectively prepared through this approach. Indian offer of treaty of peace and Friendship seemed as a loaded missile intended to by-pass the military administration and hit Pakistani public opinion directly. Again mutual distrust came in the way of improving relations between them. However on November 1, 1982, the then Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and the then Pakistan President Zia-Ul-Haq agreed to establish an India-Pakistan Joint Commission, which was done on March 10, 1983 and on June 1-4-1983 the first meeting of the Indo-Pak Joint Commission decided to set up four sub-commissions on (a) economic, health, scientific and technological area; (b) Trade; (c) information, education, social sciences, culture and sports and; (d) travel, tourism and consular matters.
The commission also made suggestion for the exchange of academicians, scientists, journalists and other media-men, sports team and film-personalities between the two countries. Specific proposals were put forward for increasing cooperation in agriculture, health, communication, science and technology, trade, education, information and easier travel facilities for the people. Since then numerous deliberations of the Joint Commission along with the four sub commissions, several rounds of official talks between both the countries have been taking place yet the atmosphere of mutual distrust continues to persist, viz. for India it is Pakistan's hand in her internal matters: Specifically in the context of Punjab and Kashmir problem: and for the Pakistan it is Indian unwillingness to settle Kashmir dispute and its hand in the internal turmoil of Pakistan. It is for this reason mainly the domestic public opinion in both the countries is moulded and manipulated by the political leadership. From the purely geographical point of view, the problem of security would be immeasurably simplified for both India and Pakistan if the armed forces of the two states were not locked up in mutual confrontation within the subcontinent, but regarded as complementary to each other for the defence of the common geographic unit. The reaction of the domestic public opinion in both the countries towards the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan justifies and amplifies it, along with the mounting pressure of the economic development and people's desire for their well-being in peace.
Notes:


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41. **Muslim.** January 25, 1980.
43. **Nawai Waqt.** January 25, 1980.
44. **Muslim.** February 3, 1980.
45. **Hindustan Times.** February 3, 1980.
46. **Times of India.** February 4, 1980.
47. **Hindu.** February 5, 1980.
49. **Times of India.** February 13, 1980.
50. **Indian Express.** February 14, 1980.
51. **Indian Express.** February 18, 1980.
52. **Dawn.** February 19, 1980.
54. **Pakistan Times.** February 15, 1980.
55. **Pakistan Times.** February 16, 1980.
56. **Muslim.** February 14, 1980.
57. **Zamana.** February 17, 1980.
58. **Nawai Waqt.** February 19, 1980.
60. **Hindustan Times.** April 11, 1980.
61. **Indian Express.** April 19, 1980.
62. **Nawai Waqt.** April 7, 1980.
63. **Pakistan Times.** April 11, 1980.
64. **Pakistan Times.** April 16, 1980.
65. **Dawn.** April 15, 1980.
70. Jasarat, April 15. 1980.
71. Muslim. April 15 and 17, 1980.
72. Pakistan Times. April 18, 1980; Muslim, April 19, 1980; 
Hindu, May 10, 1980.
74. Times of India. May 18, 1980.
81. Indian Express, July 18, 1980.
86. Indian Express, August 28, 1980.
89. Hindustan Times, October 5, 1980.
90. Morning News, October 8, 1980; Pakistan Times, October 
9, 1980; Afaq, October 8, 1980; Nawai Wagt, October 9, 
1980; Madrig, October 9, 1980; Maghribi Pakistan, 
October 9, 1980.
91. Pakistan Times. October 15, 1980; Jasarat, October 15, 
1980; Nawai Wagt, October 20, 1980; Chattan, October 
20, 1980; Wafaq, October 23, 1980; Al Faah, October 
23, 1980.
Akhbare Jahan columnist Habibur Rahman for instance gave four geopolitical considerations to review Pakistan's foreign policy: (1) the geographic position of Pakistan; (2) the economic and military strength of the neighbouring countries with whom our relations are strained; (3) the nature of our differences with these neighbours; and, (4) the US attitude towards Pakistan. and came to conclude that 'If we want to bequeath a prosperous Pakistan to the coming generation, we must strengthen our bond of cooperation with New Delhi, Moscow and Kabul.' Akbare Jahan, November 17, 1980. Similarly another daily Amn columnist Juma Khan also called upon Pakistan to disentangle itself from involvement with big powers and instead opt for non-alignment in the real sense of the term. Amn, November 17, 1980.


94. Amn, November 26, 1980.


96. Pakistan Times, December 18, 1980.


100. Times of India, March 18, 1981.


103. Times of India, June 17, 1981.

104. Indian Express, July 11, 1981.


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