CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN

GEOPOLITICS OF PAKISTAN:

As we have noted while discussing the parameters of public opinion in Pakistan in the second chapter, Pakistan, conceptually, was created on the basic premise of Muslims being as a nation. So, her territorial structure was unique in that it consisted of two great blocks of territory separated by nearly a 1000 miles.¹ This resulted into heightening of her sense of insecurity. Of the old state it had included Baluchistan and the NWFP, with Bahawalpur, Khairpure from Punjab state. However, "the inheritance of the North-West Frontier", said O.H.K.Spate, "is not an unmixed gain. Before 1947 the NWFP was a Congress Province, albeit with a difference the alliance between frontier Muslims and the predominantly Hindu congress was unnatural in itself. Following the partition this got disappeared and as its substitute emerged the agitation for self-determination for Pathanistan, as the people on either side of the administrative boundary and of the Afghan frontier are essentially the same".² The Afghan solicitude for Pathan interests has made important bearing on Pakistan's policies both internal and external. Also owing to the geographical factors, the divergence of interests emerged between
erstwhile East and West Pakistan resulting into the break-away of the former to form the new nation of Bangladesh in 1971. All this may be attributed to the geographical drawbacks of Pakistan since its inception.

While most Pakistanis held that the very existence of geographic drawbacks made Pakistan a greater achievement and even a proof of the validity and strength of Muslim Nationalism in India which has triumphed over handicaps and opposition alike. They did not admit that the separation or dissimilarity of its two part made Pakistan illogical or impractical. This agreement suffered a setback in 1971. And so far as the strength of Muslims nationalism inside Pakistan is concerned, the presence of strong religious sects within its Muslims population continues problem for Pakistan. For example, the Qdianis who claim to be a reformist Muslim sect are considered by other Pakistani Muslims as a heretical group. Similar friction to a lesser extent exists between the fundamentalists led by the Mullahs and the radical and liberal people influenced by Western education who tend to be more rationalist in their thinking. At the same time, political and even cultural localisms are quite pronounced in Pakistan despite the overwhelming Muslim population. In order to obviate this identity crisis, successive Pakistani governments have laid much emphasis upon the concept of "Millat" peculiar to, and inherent within, the religio-political discipline of Islam. Pakistani intellectuals also trace Pakistan's affinities and orientation-historical as
well as political to the Near East and, to some extent, of Central Asia... "continual influxes of peoples from the Near East and Central Asia have left their stamp on the ethnic composition on languages, and above all, on the religious and social structure of Pakistan. In history and literature, in customs, manners and even in prejudices the influence of Arabia and Iran on the peoples of this unit is apparent. Pakistan and Near East also exhibit many similarities in their physical, economic and political aspects of their geography. Arid or semi-arid plains, dependence on the rivers, limited resources, growing economic needs and serious strategic weakness are some of the features common to both areas". Thus, every effort has been attempted to exclude anything from history, tradition, cultural heritage and geography etc. of the undivided India. On the contrary, Pakistan often conceived of themselves as struggling for survival against Hindu domination, and of their state as striving for recognition, with no asset other than its sovereignty, in a world where India's status was already ascribed. With such a psychological background the foreign policies of the successive Pakistani governments have been pursued to seek external support to redress the permanent geo-political inequality of (Pakistan) vis-a-vis India and to obtain a favourable settlement on Kashmir. Nonetheless, Pakistan continues to face other boundary problems.

The problem of Pakistan's boundaries was essentially a projection of the larger political problem of India. The
boundaries of Pakistan are a combination of three different kinds (1) those that were drawn as a result of the partition of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam; (2) those that were previously provincial boundaries but are now international, and (3) those that already had an internal status, i.e. the boundary with Afghanistan. In the situational context, as Pakistan lies in the middle of the rimland extending from Finland in the North-West of the Heartland power to Manchuria in the North-East, Pakistan occupies geographical and geostrategic position. Lying at the junction of the Soviet, Chinese and Indian sphere of influence, she has always attracted the Western- especially the US interest in the region. Even before the birth of Pakistan, the then US secretary of state George Marshall on July 17, 1947 in a memorandum to the President Truman said, "Pakistan will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world". Similarly, the former US national security advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski described Pakistan as the "arc of instability". Today the area or crisis is a group of states on the shores of the Indian ocean, which can be drawn on a map from Chittagong in Bangladesh, through Islamabad, all the way to Aden-Persian Gulf, Iran all the way down to South Africa. The best strategic explanation of American perception vis-a-vis Pakistan is given by Prof. Stephen Cohen, "Pakistan belongs to that class of states whose very survival is uncertain, whose legitimacy is doubted and whose security related
resources are inadequate. Yet these states will not go away nor can they be ignored. Pakistan (like Taiwan, South Korea, Isreal and South Africa) has the capacity to fight, to go nuclear, to influence the global strategic balance (if only by collapsing). 9

The Pakistani political leadership has since beginning explored this strategic position of Pakistan and sought external solution of its strategic weakness vis-a-vis India in the South Asian region. Simultaneously, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained strained since 1947, sometimes even reaching the brink of war over the validity of the Durand Line as the international border. So, on the issues of Kashmir and Pakhtunistan - a corollary of the Durand Line - the Pakistani leadership felt for strong ties with the Western world and Pakistan became the active member of US sponsored cold war alliances in the region.

Internally speaking, Pakistan consists of various nationalities - Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Pushtuns and also Kashmiris and other who migrated to Pakistan. Amongst these, Punjabis comprise 56 per cent of the population of Pakistan and along with Muhajirans have a considerable sway over civil administration as well as the military, economy and dominate political structure. The feelings of resentment are found among local Sindhis as the Muhajirans and Punjabis enjoy a favourable treatment. While Pushtuns in the NWFP have deep cultural and tribal ties with the Pushtuns of Afghanistan and enjoy highest representation in the state structure-army.
civil services and even in new rising capitalist class. After the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan 1978, they face refugees problem from Afghanistan. And Baluchistan, by any yardstick, is Pakistan's most impoverished province, where the Baluchi leadership not only struggled against accession to Pakistan but also even now there exists craving for independent Baluchistan. Thus ethnic tensions are quite prominent in Pakistan.

These internal factors—historic, ethnic, geographical and strategic, have had repercussions on the political system of Pakistan. She has passed through a series of political crises. Under Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan moved towards the pluralist democracy, which came to an abrupt end after his death. And since then, with a few exceptions, military force and authoritarian theocracy have been the main instruments of governing in Pakistan. Islam has been the forceful instrument in mobilising people's support as well as in inculcating a favourable climate of public opinion. Consequently, the nature of the Pakistani state has been that of a highly centralised state. Political parties have been intermittent and unstable phenomenon which the political system has neither been able to work well with nor operate for long periods without...the episodic and intermittent conjunctions of social and interest groups that appear in countries like Pakistan and which do have enormous political effects are important phenomena. So, events in the smaller provinces like Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP have had a
fundamental repercussions on the society of Pakistan as well as outside the frontiers of Pakistan. The case of Afghanistan is the point of concern here.

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN - ETHNIC FACTORS

Pakistan shares 1510 miles border with Afghanistan. Which is the result of the Durand Line Agreement of 1893. It zigzags south-westerly from the Chinese border at 2000 ft. altitude through mountains and desert to a rock of 5400 ft. high on the Iranian border on the way it divides Pushtun tribes - the fabled Afridis and Waziris, Yuzutzais and Mohmands and others who snipped at the British Indian army for decades - as well as Baluchi and Brahu people. These Powindahs or Kuchis ignored the line until 1960's, when an estimated 200000 were still crossing annually with their flocks and with small trade goods that supplied remote Afghan villages.

The Durand Line Agreement thus aggravated the problems relating to the Indo-Afghan border and projected them into the 20th century because of its arbitrary division of the Pushtun tribes between Afghanistan and what was then British India. The ruling dynasties of Afghanistan have been of Pushtun stock and therefore bitterly resented and resisted what they considered to be an amputation. After the birth of Pakistan, this issue known as Pakhtunistan issue became central between Pakistan and Afghanistan. While opposing Pakistan's membership of the United Nations in September
1947, Hosayan Aziz, the representative of Afghanistan, stated in the UN General Assembly, "we cannot recognise the North-West Frontier province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of North West Frontier have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence, to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become part of Pakistan".

Pakistan, on the other hand, has regarded this Durand Line, despite its geographic and ethnic absurdity, as an internationally recognised frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan for three reasons: first the treaty of 1893 was not imposed upon Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman but signed after a cordial discussion between Abdur Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand and all the succeeding rulers of Afghanistan considered it binding upon Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan being the successor state assumed obligations and rights under the various treaties concluded between British India and Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan considered Pakistan to be a new state carved out of British India. Finally, the Pathans have never been a nation and it is not necessary that the people speaking a common language should be in one state.

Afghanistan’s concept of Pakhtunistan meant and included a separate state of all the Pushtu-speaking people on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. It is an area of some 190,000 square miles, located between Afghanistan and Pakistan with a population of ten million. It extends from Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the South. The
Pakhtunistan is composed of numerous Pathan and Baluchi tribes at the same time, for the population of Baluchistan consists of several Pathan tribes in addition to the Baluchi tribal people. 17

Such an issue as Pakhtunistan was of serious concern to Pakistan. The importance of this dispute to the security of Pakistan increased considerably in view of the internal politics of the NWFP, where the provincial preparation congress ministry had voted against the partition of the Indian sub-continent and the creation of Pakistan. 18 However, on account of Pakistan’s involvement in a war with India over Kashmir and of her inspiration for taking the leadership of all Muslims countries, Pakistani’s initial response to the Afghanistan’s attitude to Pakhtunistan was very cautious. So negotiations were held in December 1947 with Afghanistan. Afghanistan demanded the establishment of Pakhtunistan to allow Afghanistan free access to the sea, and to guarantee mutual neutrality in case of attack on either party. 19 However, Pakistan could not agree and following the British close Border Policy withdrew its army from South and North Waziristan. This caused resentment in the frontier areas which led to the suppression of all those who might help the Afghan cause. The Fakir of the Ipi, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, and Abdus Samad Khan Ackakzai were dealt with severely. Ever Pakistan resorted to air attacks in these areas. This caused strain in Pakistan-Afghanistan relation and in June 1949 Afghanistan’s National Assembly repudiated the treaties with
Great Britain regarding the tribal territories and disowned the Durand Line.

Pakistan's strained relations with Afghanistan coupled with the Soviet Union's improved relations with Afghanistan increased the importance of the region. The Shah of Iran tried in the early 1950's to bring both the countries to the negotiating table. But Pakistan's entry into the US sponsored cold war alliances, its action for integrating all the four provinces of then West Pakistan and the imposition of an economic blockade on Afghanistan and stopping of the transit trade through the Khyber Pass and Karachi twice brought the two countries on the brink of war. Meanwhile in 1955 N.A.Bulganin and N.S.Khrushchev declared the Soviet support for Afghanistan. Later on a meeting of the South - East Asia Treaty Organisation SEATO held in Karachi on 6th March 1956 provided full support to the Pakistani stand on Pakhtunistan and the Durand Line. This created a further point for the identity of interest between the West and Pakistan on the one hand and between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union on the other.

For the first time, elected governments were installed in the four provinces of Pakistan during the Prime ministership of Z.A. Butto. Ataulah khan Mengal of the National Awami party (NAP) became the chief minister of Baluchistan while Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo became the Governor of the province. In the NWFP, Jamat-al-ulma-i-islami (Hazarvi)
and the NAP formed a coalition government under Mufti Mohammad. Soon just after two months before the Constitution of 1973, both the governments were dismissed on the pretext of NAP’s stated intention of carving out autonomous Pathan and Baluchi areas within Pakistan. The action created wide protest movements in Baluchistan and the government launched campaigns against Baluchis with the help of the army and the air-force. The campaign lasted till the overthrow of Bhutto by Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq in July 1977. Thousands of Baluchis were killed and many more forced to take refuge in the mountains and its neighbouring Afghanistan. In the NWFP the NAP was banned in 1975 on the charge of treason and most of its top leaders were put on trial before specially established tribunals. Thus, Pakhtunistan issue had wide-ranging ramifications for Pakistan’s domestic politics.

The events took a dramatic change after the so-called Saur Revolution in Afghanistan on 27th April 1978. The Pakistanis began to fear the supposed new regime’s support to the nationalist movements in Baluchistan and the Frontier. Realizing the grave repercussion of Pakistan, the right-wing Pakistan National Alliance PNA called for close surveillance of secular anti-national elements in Pakistan. Some newspapers highlighted the need to solve the country’s economic and political problems so as to avoid a revolution, and General Zia-Ul-Haq held talks with political leaders for providing wide support to his regime. But the leftists and the Baluch and Pakhtun Nationalist in Pakistan welcomed the
Saur Revolution in Afghanistan, and urged, as we shall see below, the Pakistani military regime to refrain from giving any aid or assistance to the Afghan rebels.

The military regime of General Zia-Ul-Haq did not enjoy people's support at this time. Zia attempted to gain legitimacy by promising to enforce Islamic laws and thus depended up on the Jamat-i-Islami and other Right-minded parties for political support. Simultaneously, he tried to resolve the problems in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan through several measures, viz., lifting the ban on the NAP and dissolving the Hyderabad tribunal, an amnesty in Baluchistan, extending invitation to the Baluchi leaders who had taken refuge in Afghanistan to return. General Zia also made a visit to Afghanistan in September 1978, with a view to securing Afghanistan's observance of the Agreement reached by President Daud and Prime Minister Bhutto in March 1977 and cease to provide refuge to Baluch and Pakhtun rebels in exchange for transit trade facilities in Karachi. But Taraki-Zia talks failed as Afghanistan insisted that the Baluch and Pakhtun problems should be resolved in the light of historic facts of this region. And the military regime of Pakistan failed to resolve the Baluch and Pakhtun problems.

With the leftist regime in Afghanistan many peoples rose in revolt against the Government headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki, and started crossing over to Pakistan as refugees. The right-wing parties and peoples in Pakistan started
supplying national and moral support to them. Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, became the centre of the activities of the rebel groups from Afghanistan. Their number began to multiply after the take over by Hafizullah Amin, reaching at alarming proportion after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 27th December 1979. These refugees has caused numerous problems for the Pakistani people-social, economic, cultural, ethnic, political and environmental etc.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 stunned the domestic public opinion in Pakistan. The articulation and mobilization of varied public opinion began to take place on the main considerations of (1) geopolitical and geostrategic factors affecting Pakistan's security and interest. (2) the ever swelling number of the Afghan refugees including the Afghan rebels in the territory of Pakistan, and the financial, economic, socio-cultural, ecological and political costs of maintaining the Afghan refugees. Let us analyse these factors in details:

1) **Geostrategic and Geopolitical Considerations:**

Pakistan was late in reaction about by 48 hours. General Zia-Ul-haq and the official press called the Soviet intervention an occupation of Afghanistan and an act of blatant, open and naked aggression. The Government of Pakistan rushed with a statement issued on December 29, 1979, regarding the situation in Afghanistan: "Pakistan has a
consistent history of defending the inalienable right of the people of every country, big or small, to order their internal affairs in accordance with their own wishes free from dictation or interference by any external power."

"The Government of Pakistan, therefore, views this development with the gravest concern. Its concern is all the more profound since the country which has been subjected to military intervention is an Islamic country, which is its immediate neighbour and is a member of the Islamic conference as well as of the Non-Aligned Movement."

Gen. Zia wanted the United States and the Muslim world to take increasing interest in south-West Asia, where, he pointed out, Pakistan occupying a strategic location, "But if you visualise the map of the region and if you extend the hammer and sickle over Afghanistan and then see from their onwards, which are the areas that are likely to come under influence. Where is Iran, where is the Gulf and where is the Strait of Hormuz and where is Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim world, and if the recent events in Afghanistan, because of the Soviet intervention have changed the environment, then Pakistan deserves attention."

**Press:**

General Zia-Ul-Haq's opinion of this geographical thrust of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was shared by some sections of the press in Pakistan. Pakistan Times
saw the Soviet intervention "as a frontal drive against the rising crescendo of Muslim rebellion and the spreading fire of Islam" and argued that Pakistan "must accept American help for the Soviet invasion had brought Muslims and Christians together to fight a common enemy". Similarly, an Islamic daily, Wafaqq asked Pakistan "not only to accept help from the United States and China but also to join with these countries to serve the Soviet Union with an ultimatum demanding immediate withdrawn at from Afghanistan". On 2nd January 1980, Pakistan Times came out with a geographical view of the Soviet move into Afghanistan which betrayed the deep sense of insecurity that gnawed at the military regime of Pakistan. According to this view, Afghanistan was eliminated as the buffer by the Soviet Union, which actually denied the viability of the successor countries in the subcontinent. On January 3rd, 1980, Z.A. Suleri, the chief editor of Pakistan Times observed in an editorial page, "the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has created an unprecedented critical situation for this country and it stands in due need of all the reinforcement it can get to defend its integrity and independence. What is more, the whole future of the southern region is hinged on the maintenance of Pakistan's sovereign existence: the danger to the country is so real and imminent that we cannot indulge in the luxury of waiting for elaborate discussion. Let us not probe into the past of American behaviour. All that we should concentrate on is to get the most and of its present willingness to give arms". The same voice was echoed by daily Jasarat through an
editorial page article by Alib Usmani. "Is it indeed the time when Pakistan has to plunge head-long into the battle-field? The red storm has already gathered along our north-western horizon and poses a grave threat to the integrity and independence of our countries. Thanks to the Afghan traitors". The Soviet Union today, is at the very doorstep of Baluchistan. Therefore, the daily called upon the USA, Iran and Arab countries to resolve their mutual differences fast and unitedly fight the increasing Soviet threat.32

Dissenting opinions also emerged immediately in the press. Muslim cautioned the government against getting involved with US activism in the region, reminding of what America had done, and was doing to Iran.33 Similarly another Urdu daily Sadaqat urged Pakistan not to get "entangled in a confrontation with the Soviet Union as Pakistan's interest lies in trying, as far as possible, to ensure that its relations with the Soviet Union are not spoilt. If the USA is indeed sincere about countering the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan it should change its policy towards Iran".34 The English daily Muslim, later commenting on the US arms aid offer to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan said "this time, it is Pakistan which should put an embargo on American arms for...if Pakistan goes into the lap of the other super-power, that would be tantamount to attempting to right one wrong by committing other". The editorial saw two grave consequences of the Soviet action in Afghanistan: "one, it will make non-sense of the concept of
non-alignment. Perhaps this concept has now outlived its utility so far as the neo-imperial ambitions of our great neighbour are concerned. Two, what one super-power can do in Afghanistan the other can do in Iran. The government could do well to take all important leaders of public opinion into confidence so that a broad national consensus emerges on the grave situation across our north-western borders".35

Viewpoint, Pakistan's only noteworthy leftist weekly, found the Soviet intervention regrettable, "the induction of foreign troops in any country provides cause for serious concern. Even Soviet troops have entered Afghanistan at the behest of Government in Kabul and only in order to assist it to resist other foreign interference, the development can only be regretted. However, the strident objections voiced by the doyen of the western powers, with American troops spread all over the globe and US military bases established on all continents, hardly bring it any credibility...rational world opinion will hope that the situation in Afghanistan will be mended in the coming weeks, and that the Soviet troops in the country will soon be withdrawn". It also pleaded that Pakistan should concentrate on the vital task of seeking complete normalisation of relations with Afghanistan in view of national interests, for common history, peoples cultural affinities, ties of religion and language and geopolitical situation.36 The Pakistan Economist, maintaining sobriety asked Pakistanis to do some hard thinking on whether it is a practicable proposition to build
the armed forces in which they have to remain counterpoised against two military threats—India on the east and Russia on the west. "Siding with the United States will mean a day to day and perilous living for Pakistan".37

Business Recorder stated that "with the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, the world's attention has focussed on the political future of the region and more particularly on the security and integrity of Pakistan. The Western Powers have really been shaken and are frantically busy in a re-appraisal of their foreign policies". The editorial called for evolving a well calculated stance to face the newly emerging situation: "Any step that is taken has got to be solely in the interest of Pakistan which will also be in the interest of the subcontinent, we should be ready to accept material aid without conditions from the United States of America but not at the cost of improvement in our relations with the USSR. All that we should do is to evolve a national consensus on the measures that have to be taken to cope with the situation. And, let us never forget that the strength of a nation and its defence rests on the strength of the economy. Then, whatever steps we take, we must keep in close contact with the Muslim nations around the world, as the future of Muslim countries is also irrevocably linked together.38

Pakistan Times editorially stressed to face the situation arising out of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
in all its horrific dimension: "all depends on the acuteness of the American sense of alarm, if the sense is really as deep as the underlying tone of declarations suggest, then the White House may make a truly worthy and weighty efforts to reinsure peace in the region of which Pakistan is in the frontline". In the final analysis it is up to us. It is simply a matter of life and death for us. And the only way to survival is national unity".39

Commenting on the actual objectives of the major powers - Soviet Union, China, the US and its numerous European allies and some Muslim countries, the article by M.B. Naqvi analysed the disproportion between the Russian response and the actual magnitude of the challenge it (Soviet Union) faced through a possible downfall of a friendly regime in Kabul: "It is obvious the size of their presence has... two possible objectives: either these moves are related to the clutch of problems issuing from the near total uncertainty about Iran, Persian Gulf's future and the safety of the oil lanes through the latter or the Soviet Union can be seen as being in the first phase of reaching the warm waters of Arabian sea while controlling and/or occupying western areas of Pakistan and thus in some way to control or deal with the rest of South Asia would constitute the next phase. The Pakistan - China friendship is an important component in the whole situation. Then, the US is playing the China card in response to the Russian moves in Afghanistan. But Pakistan-China cooperation continues to be viewed with suspicion in
India. So, Pakistan has to seek to arrive at some understanding with India on this issue and to serve as some kind of bridge between China and India in view of its need to keep its Indian flank secure. The article suggested a theorem: "if the Russians have occupied Afghanistan so as to influence the course of events in Iran, the Persian Gulf and in South Asia, we too can, with Chinese help, retaliate elsewhere: controlling or occupying the Indo-Chinese peninsula and converting South Asia or parts thereof into a bulwark."  

Nawi Waqt, the urdu daily editorially expressed an air of ambiguity about the policy of the USA and its allies vis-à-vis the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and called upon them to declare that "any attack on Iran or Pakistan will be tantamount to an attack on her. The reported heavy deployment of Soviet troops on the Iranian border or their movement along the Yugoslavia border should not be viewed with relief by the Pakistanis." While the daily Jang urged India to appreciate that a durable peace in the subcontinent is a joint responsibility of India and Pakistan. While Muslim, pleaded to acquire a better understanding of the Soviet Union and to live in harmony with it, warned against accepting US aid "if it comes weighted with the caveat that Pakistan should view regime's portents through Western eyes."  

The Weekly Viewpoint editorial analysed many facets of the Afghan crisis: "one, the meaning and implication of the
events in Afghanistan - the Saur Revolution of April 1978, followed by sudden coups accompanied by the physical elimination of the previous leaders, the induction of Soviet troops in the country and the consequent rebellion problem. "Whatever the circumstance, the editorial deplored the use or stationing of foreign troops, can only be regarded as an unhappy development: two, it is the matter of direct and serious concern to Pakistan because of the cold war at its very doorstep and the need of receiving military assistance, for which Pakistan has to move cautiously in the matter of accepting Western succour and avoid being made a pawn in any great game in view of Pakistan having paid a heavy price for entering into military pacts and special treaty relations with the Western powers, which annoyed a large part of the Third world and the Soviet Union, and finally for this Pakistan Government should remain in close touch with the Government of USSR. Contacts should be renewed with the Afghan Government whose misgivings need to be dispelled and avoid a narrow and sectarian approach to embrace all sections of opinion". The daily Amn urged the Pakistan government not to accept the US arms in the light of history, "when Pakistan was really in crisis that tore it apart, the USA did nothing to sustain its integrity but today, when Russia has intervened in Afghanistan and the US interest is in jeopardy, it is vociferous in support of the Pakistan's integrity, it will be the most stupid idea to image a war between a small country like Pakistan and a Superpower like
Soviet Union. Pakistan is facing several domestic problems and our people are interested in solving these and having cordial relations with our neighbours on the basis of mutual respect. We don’t want to get involved in others’ conflict nor can we allow the superpower to use us in furtherance of their expansionist design they should learn a lesson from Ayatullah Khomeni who flatly rejected Soviet arms against the USA. The daily Jasarat examined the political and geographical consideration of neighbouring countries. China, India, Iran, Afghanistan and Soviet Union. "If a defence system or agreement increase our military potential but at the same time makes the whole region suspect our bona fides it has, of necessity, to be considered with almost care. Out of the five neighbours our relations were cordial with only two (China and Iran). The relations with other three varied from deep enmity to grave suspicion. The present need for friendship has also been created due to the Soviet action in Afghanistan. We are therefore, aware of their possible reaction. So, (before the US help we must seek) the approval and understanding of our neighbours."

The First Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers:

Gen. Zia’s first diplomatic triumph in mobilising the public opinion was the extra-ordinary session of the Islamic Foreign Minister Conference (IFMC) on 27-29 January, 1980 in Islamabad. It was virtually a rallying point of anti-Soviet forces in Islamic world. Addressing the Foreign Ministers General Zia exhorted the Islamic world to join hands not only
to make the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, but also to consider ways and means for the collective defence of the Islamic Umma rather than the defence of individual countries. To him, Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan was entirely contrary to the establishment and fundamental norms of international relations. It is the first instance since World War II when a superpower has made a sovereign and independent Muslim country the target of its attack. We view this development with the utmost apprehension, because unless this trend to subjugate small countries through the use of force is arrested in time, world peace and the independent existence of small countries will be endangered. In plain words, if this precedent is allowed to perpetuate itself then what has happened in Afghanistan today could happen in another country tomorrow.48

The conference strongly condemned the Soviet military aggression against the Afghan people and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops who should refrain from acts of oppression and tyranny against the Afghan people and Muslim countries should not recognise the Karmal Government.49 The stridently anti-Soviet resolution of the conference denied the Kabul regime even a hearing and a seat and hear leaders of the Afghan insurgents. It also asked member states to suspend diplomatic relations with Afghanistan till complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from that country and to extend economic aid to the
countries neighbouring Afghanistan. It supported the US call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.\textsuperscript{50}

The actual, concrete results of this resolution were very limited and virtually were not known. "How far the Islamic countries." said Kuldeep Nayar, "are willing to back up their words of support to Pakistan with money and armament. Islamabad is expecting a bounty and has employed all its resources and energy to make a success." However, he was able to mobilise a favourable public opinion, which made his stand harden. He could now anchor his policy on Islamic rhetoric: "It is for the Muslim countries to get together to defend the sovereignty of a Muslim country, not only of Pakistan but of the entire Islamic world."\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Press Comments:}

When the conference of IFMC was being held, Pakistan Times came out with an editorial to stress the need for Muslim solidarity to counter the situation created by the Russian occupation of Afghanistan for Pakistan occupying a crucial geo-political position in the "arc of crisis" and holding the key to the entire Muslim Middle East. "The whole seriousness of the Soviet threat lies in the fact that were it to make a thrust into Pakistan to reach the warm waters of the Indian ocean, it would be in a position to dominate the surrounding oil producing area and not only rule the lines of the people there but also hold the West to ransom." Describing Pakistan as a sentinel of Muslim World's
collective interest, the daily said that the creation of Pakistan not only pushed the British of the shoulders of the Muslim Middle East but also prevented India from getting on them as the inheritor of the imperial mantle. While earlier it had pointed out three options generally talked about in Pakistan after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. "First aid from the United States, second, understanding and United Front with India and third, coexistence with the Soviet Union. In fact, a fourth opinion emerged in the shape of then "current extraordinary meeting of the Islamic conference, this is the most natural and practical option. After all, this vast sensitive area belongs to the Muslims. The countries of this area are so geopolitically bound up with each other that if one were to fall, others would be profoundly affected by its repercussions. Whether or not profoundly affected by its repercussions. Whether or not the Dullesion Dynamo theory held good in the Far East it is certainly true of the Muslim world. The far-reaching and disastrous consequences of the occupation of Afghanistan are apparent. Pakistan is automatically threatened and with it the entire Middle East becomes a danger zone. were the conference to harken President Zia-Ul-Haq's call, the present state of helplessness can be easily transformed into one of power." The daily Nawai Waqt also expressed the opinion that if Russia succeeds in reaching the warm waters all Arab countries of the Middle East might face the same danger that are being faced by Pakistan and Iran today.
"Every participant state of the Islamic conference should, therefore, realise that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses a threat to Muslim state. If Russia can defend itself in Cuba and the USA do the same in Korea, why should not the Muslim world defend itself in the Muslim states that border the rival powers". It also urged the IIFMC to take some effective steps to make India realize the gravity of the situation arising out of the developments in Afghanistan. 54

Mr. Tariq Niazi in the weekly Zindgi came out with an analytical approach of the intense diplomatic activity in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. To his mind, "Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are the target of superpowers in this region. After the military occupation of Afghanistan, Russia has deployed her troops around these two countries on the plea that they pose a threat to Afghanistan's territorial integrity. In the circumstances, the Muslim world is confronted with the task of safeguarding Pakistan and Iran besides repelling the armed aggression in Afghanistan. If the Muslim world comes to the aid of Pakistan and commits its resources for the purpose, Pakistan can be consolidated economically and made impregnable militarily, thereby paving the way for a federation of Pakistan and Iran". 55

**Brzezinski's Visit and the Press in Pakistan:**

The US President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski paid visit to Pakistan on February 2-3.
1980. Zia and Brzezinski shared geo-strategic perception of the Soviet move into Afghanistan in which Afghanistan had gone as a buffer and the region had been transformed into an offensive wage. There could not be agreement on two important points, the size of the US aid to Pakistan and the structure of US-Pakistan security relationship. General Zia had earlier rejected as peanuts the US offer of $400 million in military and economic assistance. Brzezinski told reporters that the $400 million was only a beginning of the American response to the threat posed by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Also Gen. Zia asked for a formal military treaty between Pakistan and the United States, while Brzezinski held that the United States is committed to safeguarding Pakistan in terms of the 1959 agreement against the Soviet danger from the North. Later on, Pakistan’s then Foreign Minister, Mr. Agha Shahi told that the proposed military cooperation agreement between Pakistan and the US would not apply to any hit and run operation along the Pakistan - Afghan border. "We do not think it necessary to invoke the 1959 agreement with the US in the event of violation of Pakistan’s territory on the protest of hot pursuit".58

Commenting on the outcome of the visit by Brzezinski, the daily Dawn editorially pointed out that the visit intended Carter’s commitment to Pakistan. "that the United State’s policy of safeguarding its energy supplies in the region has led to a convergence of Pakistani and American interests is generally acknowledged in view of the changed
circumstances, the two countries would obviously seek to maintain their independent approach in the region, it is extremely important for Pakistan to act within the framework of the Islamic conference. This was quite manifest in the resolutions adopted by the IFMC (which denounced the attempts by certain Western Powers to exploit the situation in Afghanistan for reintroducing imperialistic intervention in the Islamic world). In that context Pakistan's desire not to become a cockpit of super-power rivalry is very logical. Hence, Islamabad's efforts to strengthen its security should be viewed in the national and regional context only and not as part of the global strategic rivalry of the super-powers.

Another daily, Maghribi Pakistan also referred to the US pro-Israel policy and backed the reported Soviet proposal to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan if a matching withdrawal was made by Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and the Palestinians were allowed to return to their homeland. "The Western press propaganda against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its emphasis on the Soviet threat to Asia seems to have eclipsed the terror struck by Western imperialism, particularly by USA and Israel, in the Arab world. But now when the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has posed a threat to the Western vested interests, it has suddenly become a champion of Islam and human rights". The daily Muslim expressed through an editorial the cautious hope for better US-Pak ties. "There
are indications now that greater attention may be paid to Pakistan's genuine aid requirements after the Brzeznski visit hacking through the weed-ridden paths is bound to take time but the important thing was that the American response which had been absent for quite sometime had begun. After the Islamabad round of talks, Pakistan can cautiously hope that this process will be short".61

An editorial article by M.B.Naqvi in Muslim examined the options before Pakistan. "Among the options being suggested that Pakistan should accept a NATO umbrella had been rejected by Agha Shahi. He put forth other option to keep out the Americans as the bulwark of Pakistan's security and, instead relying on Chinese friendship and aid. (Chinese) cannot fight for others as was shown in 1965, in 1971 and now in Kampuchea". Pakistan is left with no option but to seek US aid because if anyone can roll back the Soviet Union military it is the US and its NATO allies. They have enough means".62 In an another article in the daily Nawai Waqt Mr. Irshad Ahmad Haqqani expressed his opinion that in the ultimate analysis, "whatever option is exercised by Pakistan the whole thing will turn on how the domestic political affairs are handled at the national level". He did not agree that Pakistan must necessarily hitch on to the US bandwagon, and proceeded to set out the manifold ramifications of the situation as it had developed to make the point that a greater degree of national self-confidence could help Pakistan pursue its objectives more effectively.63 But Mr.
Z.A. Suleri in Pakistan Times expressed that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan could not be explained merely in terms of a desire to acquire control of the country. "There is something more than meets the eye. It may be the lure of the warm waters of the Indian One is therefore compelled to look for other factors, factors which are perhaps internally operative. And among those the most perceptible one is the challenge of Islam which arose from the revolutionary Iran and reinforced by the unbending Afghans. The gravity of the crisis is deepened by the fact that the West, which is an equally affected party, has no clarity of vision. Afghanistan is pre-eminently an Islamic country. and the Islamic Conference is a pivotal base to take off from. It is possessed of both actual and potential power and once it begins to operate, it can give a good account of itself".64 A special article in the daily Muslim pleaded for a re-appraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy in her historical perspective to steer her clear of the Super-power rivalry in the region and work out a new basis of peaceful relations with its neighbours. It concluded that the plea to diffuse the situation rather than aggravate it through confrontation may turn this region into a battle-ground 65. Similarly an another special article warned that "If the countries concerned fail to take the initiative for a settlement of the Afghan problem now, the two super powers may eventually arrive at a bilateral settlement in the context of their global interests to be imposed on the smaller nations whether
they like it or not. The only chance of resolving the issue lies in holding a regional conference comprising the Soviet Union, China, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. This can happen if the parties concerned are realistic and flexible". The weekly stressed that the fundamental differences between Kabul and Islamabad could be dealt with through direct negotiations. "Since no other options can produce any results, the Islamic Conference should be persuaded to agree that Pakistan and other Muslim countries directly concerned, should negotiate with the Afghan Government".

Meanwhile President Zia paid a visit to China for the purpose of getting Chinese support to Pakistan on the Afghan problems. Commenting on Zia's talks with the Chinese leaders at Beijing, the daily Dawn editorially stressed the significance of the identity of interests between the two countries in the then regional situation and said that Sino-Pak friendship clearly serves as a factor for stability, at a time when the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has upset the strategic and political balance in the region. While Nawai Waqt editorially expressed concern over the direction in which the country's foreign policy was moving and called upon the Government to dispel the impression that "it is getting interested more in non-alignment than in Islam. In fact it (NAM) had become a tool in Russian hands, and its negative character has been clearly shown up by the recent Afghan events. Afghanistan too was a member of the
NAM, but the Russian aggression against it to include it in the Communist block has all but been ignored by the non-aligned leadership, whose silence over the issue only shows that its purpose is nothing but to promote the Russian cause. 69

**When Zia Rejected the US Peanuts offer:**

Zia-Brezhinski talks did not make headway in the interest of Pakistan. At that time the US public opinion was against providing much more to Pakistan. The New York Times visualized that Pakistan's foreign policy initiatives "boiled down to waiting anxiously for Saudi Arabia to say how much it can offer". 70 Earlier Washington Post observed that "aid commitments from European nations to Pakistan were either modest or none at all. Pakistani officials were disappointed by a seeming decline of interest on the part of donor nations. Saudi Arabia was negotiating with Pakistan to provide up to $750 million to help in a military build up". 71 Later on the Washington Post reported that Pakistan was asking for about $1.5 billion a year in economic aid from a variety of sources including the US. So, the US offer of $400 million economic and military aid seem too little to Pakistan. The reason was as the Times reported that Gen. Zia's military regime was "unpopular with the reports of dissent and dissatisfaction in many sectors. There is latent but perceptible secessionist feeling in Baluchistan". 72

The ruling section in Pakistan was divided over Pakistan's military linkage with the US. Claiming US-
Pakistani interests converging, one section wanted a relationship with the US as the North Vietnamese have with the Soviet Union. But other section saw US -Pakistani interest conflicting and laid more emphasis upon Pakistan's necessity of initiating a dialogue with the Soviet Union as well as upon the rallying force of Islam. Zia-Ul-Haq was himself bitterly disappointed over the US offer and Agha Shahi announced the rejection of the American aid package thus:

Acceptance of the US offer would have detracted from, rather than enhanced our security. Also, we could not ignore the fact that the US sensitivity to Indian reactions appeared to be determining the size and nature of the aid package. The Soviet Union too has made its relationship with Pakistan conditional on the nature of Pakistan's relations with its two neighbours, India and Afghanistan. We shall remain persistent in our search for a relationship of trust and confidence with that great power and we do not view the future with pessimism.

Now, Pakistan was prepared to participate in any process, bilateral or international, for a guarantee by the super-powers of the independence, neutrality and non-aligned status of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces. Any guarantee on Pakistan's part would necessitate reciprocal Afghan recognition of the international frontier and a commitment to non-interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. But a Soviet drive into kunar province of Afghanistan at the Pakistan border led to a negative public opinion abroad. The Washington Post clearly stated if Zia made Pakistan the American surrogate in the South-West Asia, he would expose the smouldering protest.
movement of the Baluchis to Soviet encouragement. The real Soviet threat to Pakistan was not of direct invasion but of meddling in its ethnic discontents. 76

However, Gen. Zia started bargaining with the United States by declaring to get insurance from the Soviet Union against Soviet meddling. "All doors for a dialogue with Moscow must remain open. In internal affairs there is never the last word, our options must remain open and we will do what is good for Pakistan". 77 Also, a report from Islamabad had earlier offered three alternatives to satisfy the Soviet Union and Afghanistan: (1) Pakistan was not feeding insurgency; (2) if Moscow and Kabul did not believe the Pakistani denials, any international body could verify the fact or Afghanistan could seal its border with Pakistan; (3) an international peace force drawn from the Muslim countries or non-aligned countries or raised by the U.N. could be stationed in Afghanistan to see no foreign power interfered in its internal affairs. 78

The change in the Pakistani stand was an outcome of the public opinion in Pakistan. Some sections of the press as we have seen were already making such suggestions. A strong and expanding pro-Soviet constituency, viz. the Baluchistan mainly, in the country as well as Pakistanis living in England expressed their opinion in this direction vociferously. The cadres of Pakistan people's party came out openly in favour of Pakistan's direct negotiations with the
Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Among Pakistanis living in England, a strong minority was propagating the view that friendship with Moscow was essential for Pakistan's social progress and for the restoration of representative government in Pakistan. However, General Zia-Ul-Haq resisted direct talks with Afghanistan until the Soviet troops were withdrawn from there. In May, 1980 without closing any of his options, he leaned primarily on his Islamic option to get maximum advantage from the Afghan crisis.

The Second Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers:

On May 17, 1980, Zia-Ul-Haq inaugurated the Second conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in Islamabad at the initiative of Pakistan and said that "the conference must consider the problem in all its aspects and give thought to the constitution of a permanent committee with the sole object of keeping constant watch on the developments in Afghanistan and exploring ways and means to implement the decisions which have been taken in the first conference to the foremost problems facing the Muslim world: occupation of the Qibla-e-Ahwaal by the alien; the usurpation of Arab lands by Israel; the denial of the just rights of Palestinians; foreign threats to Iran and ever increasing massive presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan with no improvement in the situation since the first meet". Aga Shahi also stated that "the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan had been massively reinforced".
The deliberations of the conference brought the serious differences obtaining among Islamic states on the assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. The PLO delegates warned the ministers not to make too much of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It would only weaken the Arab's ability to fight for a national home for Palestinians." While the Foreign Minister of Iran accused both superpowers of harbouring parallel aggressive designs against the Persian Gulf and Arabia." Five delegates - the PLO, Algeria, South Yemen, Iraq and Syria especially fought doggedly for a mellower attitude to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and wanted Afghanistan to be readmitted to the IFMC and to hear its view on the issue. However, they failed to readmit Afghanistan to the IFMC but succeeded in keeping the Afghan rebels out.82 Even Gen. Zia had to put himself to say that the two superpowers had the same tendency to interfere constantly in other nations' affairs. "No, foreign power can be allowed to impose its own ideology on our peoples against their wishes. It is for this reason that we vehemently oppose the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. We also oppose the presence of US Naval forces which have been deployed in a threatening posture in the vicinity of Iran".83

The resolution the IFMC adopted a balanced approach. It called for a political solution of which the first step being withdrawal of Soviet troops. It also accepted, in principle, the concept of negotiations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran in this respect. It set up a three-member
committee, with Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Iran and the Moroccan Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference to hold informal talks with Babrak Karmal. Agha Shahi took the mellower stance by declaring that "members of the committee would go to several capitals including Moscow and could have contact with the Karmal government".84

The conference decided to appoint a panel to explore ways and means of implementing the resolution passed by the extraordinary session of the IFMC in January, 1980. It bestowed on Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq the honour of drafting a "collective security plan" for the Islamic countries. It also appointed him as the spokesman of the Islamic conference at the 1980 session at the UN General Assembly.85

Pakistan Times, explaining the rationale of President Zia-Ul-Haq's proposal for a standing body of the IFMC argued that "the possibility cannot be ruled out that the West will not hesitate to strike a bargain with the Soviets. Those left to pay the price will be the Afghans themselves, then their strategic neighbours, and the Muslim world in general, who should be aware of the contingency of being presented with a critical fait accompli".86 The daily Muslim noted the prospects of a political settlement of the Afghan crisis: "the principal parties concerned are beginning to realise that bitter and bloody conflict must be resolved across the table. It is time all of us forgot cliches we inherited from the second World War". The daily asked the IFMC to opt for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis calculated to rid
the region of both the superpowers to ensure against the possibility of a US-Soviet condominium emerging to dominate the Arab oil states. 87

Initial press comments on the 11th session of the IFMC expression, in a low key, Pakistan's disappointment over the dissent voiced by Libya, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen and PLO on the approach to Afghanistan. 88 Z.A. Suleri, the chief editor of Pakistan Times through an editorial article expressed that "an Islamic Bloc had emerged. it gives Muslim world an equation that weighs both in the counsels of the UN and the NAM". He also noted that the appointment of the three members committee on Afghanistan might give an impression that the "attitude has somewhat relaxed on the issue" and conceded that the Soviet Union is not quite without a foothold in the Muslim world itself." The greater attention was given to Afghanistan because it threatened the security of the entire Islamic region". 89 The daily Maghribi Pakistan commended the decision of the IFMC to seek a solution in Afghanistan, through negotiations and observed "the IFMC has proceeded with caution and restraint to adopt a balanced approach to the issue". 90 The Muslim opined that the IFMC decision to appoint a 3-member committee on Afghanistan "provides all the parties involved in the crisis an opportunity to defuse the tension and find a solution acceptable to all, but the Soviet Union, too, has so far failed to heed the voice of world opinion". 91 While an editorial on the Economic content of the IFMC asked the
Islamic financial institutions to give priority to the adoption of effective means for solving the problems of less fortunate regions, including land-locked Muslim countries.92

The Weekly Viewpoint noted editorially the urge of the PLO spokesman at the IFMC to clearly differentiate between friends and enemies and observed that "with regard to Afghanistan, a new, more pragmatic approach was advocated by the Arab Steadfastness Front, represented by Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO. Afghanistan should be invited for talks, so that the path of peaceful negotiations could be explored. (the 3-members committee) will function mainly as a watch dog body, serving as a political platform. What is more, it has been authorized to give a call for an international conference, possibly under UN auspices, to mobilise world public opinion in support of the IFMC stand" the weekly also warned that continued stalemate might lead to even greater and more explosive confrontation between Afghanistan and its nearest neighbours.93

Evaluating the outcome of the IFMC Mr. Wahid Basheer through an editorial article in Al Falah observed that "apparently, one cannot ignore the fact that the IFMC has not put any pre-condition for holding talks with the Kabul regime. Nor is there any talk of preserving the Islamic characters of Afghanistan. All that the IFMC has said is that the people of Afghanistan should get a chance to elect a government of their choice, though it sounds rather strange;
because when Zahir Shah and Daoud were in power, no one ever talked either of the Islamic character of Afghanistan or the need for a representative government. We do not expect that the 3-members committee will be able to solve the crisis in the immediate future. However, it can pave the way for talks which lead to a solution.94 But Imroze expressed hope that the proposed committee "will spare no effort to resolve the Afghan crisis. But the success would depend on the attitude of the Soviet Union and the Karmal regime".95 The Dawn also expressed the opinion that the IFMC sought "to establish clearly the non-aligned orientation of this organization as a whole. But success would depend on how the committee shall proceed".96

Two right-wing weeklies Badbaan and Chatan reacted adversely against the role of Libya, South Yemen and the PLO etc., on the Afghanistan issue at the IFMC and reduced them as the gang of four. The weekly Badbaan observed that "PLO's current policies have already tarnished its image and if it persists with them, it might face dissension from within. It also ridiculed Col. Gaddafi who swears by the Islamic Revolution but preferred silent on Afghanistan issue. His foreign minister even asked for the recognition of Karmal regime".97 The weekly Chatan went to the extent of wishing that "this conference had not been held at all because the stand taken by these countries shows that instead of sorting out the differences and uniting as one Millat they seem eager to break away from the Millat. Some of our Muslim
countries bask in the glow of political patronage of Russia but they should not forget that whatever happened in Afghanistan was also in a way the outcome of the Soviet patronage and aid. What Russia has done in Afghanistan she can do elsewhere also".98 Pointing out the threat to Pakistan's security following the Soviet action in Afghanistan, Muslim, editorially called up Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq "to have a frank and open dialogue with all shades of opinion that may lead to the formation of a government of national concord, the only way is to stand up and galvanise the nation into an indomitable body of men who think and act in unison".99 While viewing a speech of Soviet President Brezhnev as both an offer and a threat to Pakistan, weekly Akhbar-e-Jahan columnist Mr. Habibur Rehman called upon Pakistan Government to adopt a balanced approach towards the Afghan issue and not to spurn Moscow's offer for its negotiative settlement, but any unbalanced approach could be disastrous. 100

When Zia Carter meets the daily Dawn editorially called Zia-Carter meet of far reaching implications for the peoples of the region. "Given the crisis in Afghanistan and the Gulf region, it is in the interest of international peace and stability that Pakistan's defence and security be strengthened while giving the due respect to its non-aligned and Islamic state".101 While the daily Muslim lauded Zia for not taking any interest in 1959 agreement in the light of past experience, "we are on the most cordial terms with the
People's Republic of China and ardently wish to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. The recent Agha Shahi-Andrei Gromyko meeting in New York, which was followed by warm embraces by the two Foreign Powers promises a better understanding between Islamabad and Moscow in the coming years. In any case, Pakistan will not open a threat of war on its soil for one superpower to settle its score with the others". 102 Meanwhile, the daily Pakistan Times commented on the success of foreign policy of Zia to the distinct aspects of his foreign policy by following which "Pakistan has pulled out of unequal relationships and developed consolidated its contacts with the Muslim world". 103

Reported Afghan Air Attacks on Pakistani Territory and Soviet Annexation on of the Wakhan Salient:

Commenting on the Afghan air attack on Pakistan territory, the dailies Wafaq and Imroze appreciated Pakistan's patient approach to the repeated violation of her space by Afghan helicopters but said that the patience, too had its limits. While Wafaq called upon the Pakistani Government to take effective steps to check further violations of its territory. 104 Imroze also urged Afghanistan and the Soviet Union not to push the things to a point of no return. 105 The daily Nawai Waqt, however, described these raids as deliberate provocations designed to test Pakistan's nerves and stressed the need for continued restraint by Pakistan. 106
Similarly, the daily Pakistan Times reported quoting APP and PTI that "the Soviet Union has been quietly busy for the last six months in annexing the Wakhan salient of Afghanistan and called it another step forward to further Soviet expansionist designs, aimed at getting a strategic edge over China and Pakistan as it would do away with the only common border between China and Afghanistan and also result in Russian borders physically resting on Pakistan’s northern borders". The daily pointed out that the annexation would thus make Pakistan feel more vulnerable give Russia a free hand to consolidate their position in Afghanistan for their permanent stay there.107

The implications of the reported move to annex Afghanistan’s Wakhan corridor were analysed by all sections of the Pakistani press. They all pointed out its strategic significance in the historical context and saw a threat to Pakistan. The daily Jang asked all particularly big powers, to take a serious view of the Soviet move since it had serious regional and international implications. Other dailies, Dawn, Morning News, Wafaq, Nawai Waqt, Hurriyet and Maghribi Pakistan carried similar editorials pointing out the seriousness of the Soviet move.108 Describing the above reported Soviet move as a manifestation of its long term aggressive designs, the daily Jasarat editorially called upon China and Pakistan to jointly declare their refusal to accept Wakhan as their boundary with the Soviet Union and raise the issue at the UN Security Council to compel the Kabul regime
to disclose the true state of affairs. While Mr. Habur Rehman, columnist of the weekly Ahbare Jahan pointed out that the Iran-Iraq war "is likely to push the Afghanistan issue further to the background and called up the Pakistani Government to adopt a realistic approach towards the Afghan situation, recognise the Kabul regime and settle its differences with it not only to put an end to the blood-shed in Afghanistan but also to ensure its own security". He further elaborated: "Moscow's position is that its forces entered Afghanistan under a treaty with that country and that its own security needs a friendly government in Afghanistan. The plea is not devoid of any justification, for doesn't the USA too offer similar arguments when it steps up its military bases thousands of miles away from its borders. The Muslim countries have, therefore, only spoiled the situation by sharply criticising the Russian presence in Afghanistan while closing their eyes to the similar US activities".

The situation created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led to the assessment of Pakistan's foreign policy by the press and other intellectuals of Pakistan. Stressing the need for a searching evaluation of Pakistan's foreign policy, vis-a-vis its strategic environment not too distant, the weekly Mag article by Syed Sikander Mehdi called for a realistic policy that "properly reflects national aspirations and emotions". Calling Pakistan's entry into cold war in 1953-54 against the wishes of the people he, on the basis of geo-political proximity between Pakistan and the
Soviet Union, opined that Pakistan could have a dialogue with Afghanistan. Soviet Union and India to diffuse the Afghan crisis. The chief editor of Pakistan Times, Mr. Z.A.Suleri also criticised Pakistan's foreign policy planners for having been doctrinaire rather than realistic and practical, and questioned the wisdom of construing non-alignment as complete isolation from the USA and the USSR and entering illusions about the platform of Islamic conference. He called for "shaking ourselves free of any hang-over of theory or bias in alignment or otherwise. There is no room for misconception or ambivalence, despair with India and conciliation with the Soviet Union, the Pakistan Government should grasp even as President Sadat did. In the present given situation, there is a natural community of interests between Pakistan and America. Unfortunately, Islamic conference is as helpless in the face of real-politic as the non-alignment movement".

The Soviet Leader Artamar Alkhanov's visit to Pakistan and the Press:

Commenting on the friendly sentiments expressed by Zia and Soviet team leader Artmar Alkhanov, the daily Nawai Waqt editorially described the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Soviet policy of making India the dominant power in the region as the main stumbling blocks to the further development of Pak-Soviet friendship. On the suggestion of solving the Afghanistan problem on the Finland model, the daily stated, "the Finlandisation of Afghanistan should not imply disarming of either Pakistan or Iran. Pakistan cannot
afford any weakening of its armed forces".113

The weekly viewpoint and daily Mashriqi Pakistan on the other hand lauded Pakistan's firm adherence to non-alignment and the former urged it not to give undue importance to transitory factors but to initiate appropriate action without delay to overcome the current situation.114 The Afghan problem was further analysed by other papers also stressing that "it is in the interest of everyone to bail the Russians out of Afghanistan without loss of face, the weekly Pakistan Economist wondered how that could be done When the Russians are determined to sustain an unpopular and rootless communist regime there. There cannot be a solution of the problem if it suits only the Soviet Union". The weekly opined that "nobody in South Asia wants the Russians. The entire subcontinent has now gone non-aligned and there is no future for the Soviet Union in maligning Pakistan or keeping on the tender hooks".115 Meanwhile, an editorial in Muslim stressed that Pakistan did well to keep all options open throughout the deepening Afghanistan crisis but cautioned against being over optimistic about the final outcome of the latest initiatives in view of the complexities involved.116 In a discussion organised by monthly Defence Journal the Pakistan defence experts showed an increasing awareness of the geographical and strategic implications, protests and possibilities of the present Afghan situation not only for their country but also in the regional context. The monthly circulated a questionnaire to leading defence specialists to
elicited their opinions on the various aspects of the Afghan situation and its affects on Pakistan. Brig.(Retd.) Abdul Rehman Siddiqui, its editor observed that, "while Babrak Karmal and his Soviet supporters are finding the situation facing them infinitely worse then their worst case scenario, it hardly be denied that the continuing Russian occupation of Afghanistan is beginning to acquire the status of a fait accompli through the brute force of reality that remains physically unchallenged". 117

Discussing the strategic implications of the reported likelihood of the US arms aid to Pakistan, weekly Mag article by M.B.Naqvi warned that, "in the process, Pakistan would earned bitter enemity with both the Kremlin and its men in Kabul, that far exceeds any short-term benefits and may expect from American friendship and goodwill". 118 While the daily Nawai Waqt urged Pakistan to reflect calmly before it rushes in to accept the preferred US aid. 119 Another daily Amn said, "we cannot afford to annoy anyone just for the sake of the US". 120

Proposed Visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firyubin:

Urging the Pakistan government to include the Afghan issue in its free and frank talks with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin, during his proposed visit to Pakistan, the daily Jang editorially called upon it to assure him that Pakistan would neither interfere nor become
instrumental in any interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. For Soviet leaders and mass media have been accusing Pakistan of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by providing training and arms to the Afghan Mujahideen. The daily also pointed out that a similar assurance from Iran could ease the way for a possible solution of the Afghan issue.121

Mr. A.T. Chaudhri, the chief editor of Muslim analysed in detail the Afghan developments.122 on which "hinges the future of regional peace and global equilibrium. In moving towards a negotiated settlement, Pakistan has pivotal role to play - either separately or in concert with Iran". And in this he made realistic observations i.e. "Afghanistan has been for decades - a nation within the Russian sphere of influence; not a strict puppet, but a client of Washington. Afghanistan is historically and geographically within the Russian orbit. To pretend otherwise would be hypocrisy and sophistry. Starting from this standpoint, Pakistan should not over-stress the nature of the regime in occupied Afghanistan and should renew its previous offer to discuss the issue (with Afghanistan)". It also pointed out the political compromise in Afghanistan in the mutual interests of the super-powers as well as regional powers who have been directly affected by the conflagration in the eastern roundabout of the world. It also expressed the opinion that the Soviet action disturbed the old power equilibrium in Asia, sullied Russia's image in the Third World and also
hurt its carefully built ties with America and Western Europe. It also had adverse repercussions on China, India and ASEAN countries. "Then the Gulf states, with few exceptions, have begun to unite against the Soviet threat. to the crescent of crisis. The fact is that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has cast a long shadow on world power structures and global alignments. The NAM has been divided. The Muslim world has been alarmed. The Atlantic community has felt obliged to readjust its sights and take new look at the East-West balance of forces. Particularly significant is the sharpness of the American response to the expansionist creed of Kremlin. It gave a credible formula for Soviet withdrawal, sealing of borders between Afghanistan and its neighbours, international guarantees for regional security and the reversion of Afghanistan to the status of a non-aligned buffer and called for Pakistan being flexible about Kabul's plea for bilateral talks and appreciating that a Soviet pull out is not possible unless Afghanistan has a government acceptable to Moscow." It also suggested that Pakistan's new deal with the USA should not come in the way of forging closer ties with the USSR.

A fortnightly Taqazay criticised strongly the Pakistani approach: "The biggest tragedy our country is that a class of people which claims its role monopoly over Islam, scares our people and Government of the Soviet Union on the plea that it is an enemy of God and the Prophet because of its communist ideology. Nobody has, however, taken the trouble
of asking them how they viewed the USA as devoted lover of Islam although history shows that the USA has done more harm to Islam than any other country. We would like to sincerely suggest to our Government that it is not yet too late for it to establish contacts with the Soviet Union and the Babrak Karmal Government. Pakistan should recognise, and improve its relations with the Babrak Karmal government if the latter agrees to give up the Pashtoonistan issue and take back the Afghan refugees along with a Soviet pledge to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Heavens would not fall if Pakistan were to initiate talks with the Karmal Government for this purpose”. The fortnightly also urged the Government not to keep clinging to the USA but to develop relations based on equality with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan also. The daily Jang also appreciated the visit of the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and continued negotiations between Pakistan and the USSR but pointed out that the Afghan people should be free to elect the government of their liking and establish a system according to their faith and ideology.

An editorial article by Brig. A.R. Siddiqui in Dawn disputed the traditional motive behind the cataclysmic Soviet move against Afghanistan to the historical Russian craving for the warm waters of the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan and Pakistan, Baluchistan for geographical reasons. "The Soviets are already sitting at Aden and Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea not too far away from the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf itself. Also, from the Soviet
Azerbaijan, the northern bank of the Gulf is just about double the distance from Kandahar to the southern bank of the Gulf which is about 600 kilometres. The Azerbaijan-Persian Gulf nexus has the added advantage of running along the oil-rich routes, unlike the Kandahar-Gulf link mostly through arid, inhospitable terrain. The author also rejected the philosophical view, based on Prince Gorchakov's formulations about civilising the savage tribes of Central Asia, of extension and carrying of the white man's burden as far east of the Urals as possible. The article characterised the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as defensive for claustrophobia sense of encirclement through a series of multilateral military alliances like NATO; hostile coalition of Japan and China; a pro-American tilt Soviet saw in the emergence of Mr. Hafizullah Amins as strongman of Afghanistan; and her fear that the United States would walk in to pose a serious threat to Russia's southern flank from the Afghanistan launching-pad. Visualizing the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan since 1975, the article observed that "sheer military optimism, conjuring up the allusion of an early victory, simply prevailed upon civilian hesitancy and feeble-mindedness, leading to the Soviet demarche, with the Western failure to take timely action. Comparing the Afghan crisis with Vietnam and Kampuchea and pointing out strategically obvious similarities the article said, "the crisis over Afghanistan has, without doubt, added a major irritant to an already highly
inflammable global situation and would continue to fuel unless the resolution of the problem". The article saw serious military threat to Pakistan, on along its long and rugged frontier with Afghanistan under Soviet military control. Numerous border and air space violations in NWFP and Baluchistan have already taken place and, to all outward appearances, may go on and on." The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, apart from the massive wreckage of the war, has also thrown open the flood-gates of sweeping geopolitical changes and re-structuring in the region doing away demarcation frontier lines- the line of Uxus between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, annexation and garrison of the Wakhan corridor. The article raised two questions here (a) whether the southward advance of the Soviet Union automatically turns Pakistan into a better state between India and the Soviet Union and (b) whether Pakistan can be classified as a frontline state. Nonetheless, it concluded that "it would not be either right or fair to call Pakistan a buffer state which it should and shall never be. calling Pakistan a frontline state vis-a-vis the Soviet Union by the sheer incidence of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan should also rather be avoided as far as possible".125

A Pakistan Times editorial article by Lt. Gen. I. A. Akram pointed out that the Russians and their satellite Afgha forces are certainly not in sufficient strength to indulge in adventure against the neighbour of Afghanistan.
We could manage to defend our Western border even if the Russians build up their strength two-fold or three-fold so that they have forces available for powerful rallies across Afghanistan's border. 126

Pointing out that Pakistan and Afghanistan have shared a common history for centuries and arguing that the Durand Line and the Pakhtoonistan are divisive concepts, a letter to the editor of Pakistan Times from Mohammad Masihuzzaman, Karachi said, "we should be the first to decry the Durand Line and demand that this line erected by the British to divide brothers should go. If a referendum were taken, people on both sides of the Durand Line would vote for union". 127

New Soviet Leadership in Moscow After the Death of Brezhnev:

Cautioning against over optimism over reports that the new Soviet leadership in the post-Brezhnev period would be keener on an Afghan settlement than the earlier one, weekly Mag columnist Nasir Hyder pointed out that even if Mr. Andropov was opposed to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the first instance, "he cannot leave Afghanistan to God or chaos. A Soviet pullout from Afghanistan is, therefore, possible only if they can leave behind a dependable and first worthy political structure". 128

Similarly, Mujataba Rizvi observed in Defence Journal that the potential for further destabilisation of Pakistan and Iran seems a continuation of the great game of the 19th
An editorial in Muslim expressed the opinion that "Pakistan is not flattered to be termed a frontline state by Washington and is not going to commit the folly of confronting by Soviets. Mr. Reagan would be well advised to abandon any hopes he may nurse of making Pakistan a cat's paw to play Washington's game." Thus by 1983 the public opinion in Pakistan put pressure on Zia-Ul-Haq's Government to cooperate with the Soviet Union in reaching a settlement over Afghanistan. In the light of realpolitik there were also other strong inducements for Pakistan: a major prize for the final resolution of the Pakhtunistan issue, large scale Soviet economic and military aid as well as bargain with the US for larger US economic and military aid.

In February 1984 Andropov died the reform impulse slackened in the following months. The Pakistan's domestic public opinion pointed out some re-examination of the foreign policy of Pakistan. Criticising Pakistan's foreign policy on the Afghanistan issue in view of the heavy political, economic and social costs involved and the security problems caused by it besides past irredentist and confrontationist Afghan attitude towards the subcontinent a Muslim editorial article by Sajjad Hyder called for a policy of neutrality as the only assurance to Pakistan's Afghan predicament. The article examined various explanations why the USSR invaded Afghanistan. "Some postulate defensive motives, others expansionist aims. The basic Soviet aims was to prop
up and to save the new marxist-socialist regime from being
toppled and being replaced for the first time in
Afghanistan’s history by an anti-Soviet regime. Other
advantages, a political flanking move into Iran has the US
used the hostage crisis to intervene physically, closer
access to the Indian Ocean and more important to the Gulf oil
field and oil lane choke points. In the light of our
situation we should have two aims to avoid coming under the
influence of one superpower while avoiding becoming the
menacing outpost of the other superpower”.

Similarly an editorial article by M.B. Naqvi in Dawn in
the light of reported hundreds of violations of Pakistan
airspace and border areas by Soviet planes and artillery
since 1983 and 1984, urged closer thinking on the Afghan
issue by asking Pakistan government to know its priority
because the Americans “betray no desire to fight any of the
Afghans’ battles themselves. It is a cold war issue between
the superpowers and they may do a deal over it any time any
why should Pakistan spite two powerful neighbours—USSR and
India by giving into US wishes”. Similar regret was made
by an editorial article in Muslim by Hassan Habib that
Pakistan’s foreign policy was “mainly directed towards
serving US interests and called for direct talks with
Afghanistan as the prolonged indirect talks as a result of US
policy perception hardly serve regional interest in the
Area.”
The weekly Mag editorial article also maintained that Afghanistan issue had receded into the background because of the resumption of US-Soviet talks on arms limitation at Geneva. It also called for "a new approach to the problem.. even direct talks must not be ruled out. We must realize that we are being used by the Americans and accused of pilfering US assistance for the Afghan refugees". Thus, a sizeable section of public opinion in Pakistan on the geographical and geo-strategic grounds, went into favour of holding talks with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to resolve the Afghan crisis. This led, in a large way, to the signing of the Geneva accords, 1988.

Leaders and Intellectuals:

Uwing to domestic pressure inside Pakistan, General Zia-Ul-Haq and his colleagues in Governments gained considerably by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Their objective was to use it to legitimize their rule by calling for national unity to face Soviet threat, to invite the maximum possible military aid from the West, to secure massive economic aid from the Arabs in the name of Islamic Ummah. The growing pressure of the domestic public opinion was in favour of a settlement of the Afghanistan crisis and the return of the Afghan refugees, in view of the various costs of their maintenance. So, General Zia-Ul-Haq, his foreign ministers-Agha Shahi and Sahibzada Yakub Khan and other officials continued to throughout maintain their stand for an independent, Islamic, non-aligned Afghanistan. Soviet
withdrawal, respect for the right of Afghan people to choose their own government and creation of right, conducive conditions for the return of refugees. On numerous occasions they pointed out the changing geo-political structure of the region and the danger to the defence and security of Pakistan and in this pursuit he continued to hold talks with other countries keeping in tact the principled stand. For instance, when, after five years on 12 June 1985, the National Assembly in a 30-minute debate on Afghanistan, demanded retaliation against the Afghan Government and direct negotiations with it, the then Foreign Minister, Yakub Khan, declared that Government would spare no sacrifice for the defence of the mother-land against provocations and inhuman violation of its territory. He also asked the members "to appreciate that we must always keep the objective of a negotiated political settlement in our minds... to remain firm in our resolve not to accept unprincipled compromises under pressure of military threats and violations, and not to allow ourselves to be provoked into retaliatory measures which could harm the prospects of a peaceful solution".

The conservative section of the Pakistanis supported Zia's stand on Afghanistan. Ziq-Ul-Haq himself allowed the Jamaat-i-Islamia financed by contributions from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to preach through rebels in Afghanistan that Muslims belonged to one Ummat and what hurt one segment hurt the rest. The Jamaat had contacts in Afghanistan with the three traditional Muslim organisations: Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen.
Hizbe Islami, and Jamaat-i-Islamia to help them to check the advance of communists in the region. Rao Farman Ali ruled out that Soviet intervention was due merely to the internal situation in Afghanistan or to reach the warm water parts of the Indian ocean and pointed out "the economic and ideological reasons. In the economic context, oil was the most important single factor. As, according to experts, the oil resources would begin to diminish by 1995. Russia had launched the offensive 15 years in advance. Ideologically, the Iranian Revolution was beginning to effect the other states in the region and this ideological onslaught was touching the Muslim areas under Russian occupation where 50 to 100 millions of Muslims lived. The ideological base in Afghanistan, whose fountain-head was in Moscow, had been rejected and it was to thwart this ideological advance to the Muslim areas that this extreme step had been taken.

Afghanistan, was a springboard for Russia to reach the oil rich ran and the Gulf States and Pakistan, which safeguarded the sea routes leading to the Western countries. 139

Mian Tufail Mohammad, Amir of the Jamaat-i-Islamia emphasised on the strict Islamic character of the Afghanistan crisis on all occasions. He sharply criticised the Muslim countries for their indifference to the Afghan crisis and said that "even now if they begin to look upon the freedom struggle of the Afghans as their own, which in fact it is, not only the problem of Al-Quds but all problems of the Muslims will find an early solution". 140 Later on, he
reported the propaganda against his party that it involved the Afghan people in the internal politics of the country. Referring to certain forces, who were proposing to extend hands of friendship towards the Soviet Union, he asked if they had forgotten the treatment which the Russians had meted out to its friends like Zahir Shah, Daoud, Taraki and Poland and many others.141

Wazi Hussain Ahmed, the General Secretary of the Jamaat-i-Islami called the US role in Afghanistan as hypocritical, trying to bring the secular and nationalist leaders to the foe. USA was afraid of Islamic leadership, which was struggling against Russian interference142. The Central Shoora of JUI (Fazalur Rehman Group) condemned the Russian occupation of Afghanistan and said that the Pakistan Government had not played due role in this regard143. Prof. Khurshid Ahmad of Institute of policy studies, Islamabad called the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a turning point in the history of West Asia, making Afghanistan and the countries of the region major subjects, rather than being objects, of international politics. "The region has once again emerged on the chess board of the big game and may eventually become a major theater of war in the future". The central issue to him was "the right of a super power to create geopolitical facts, to invade and implant government of its choice and make the people of that country and the whole world accept these concocted and counterfeit facts as fait accompli". After examining both defensive and offensive
theories explaining the Soviet move in Afghanistan he opined that the "only valid frame work for an analysis of the Afghan problem is provided by the ideological-cum-geopolitical policies of Russia and by the Islamic frame work of the resistance: "Criticising the Pakistani Government for the absence of an actual systematic foreign policy and viewing Pakistan and Iran in a very sensitive position in this context, he urged both these countries along with the entire Muslim World to develop a long periodic perspective on the issue and evolve a policy in keeping with our ideals and aspirations. an active foreign policy supported by well throughout Defence and Economic policies for the region so as to influence the course of events in the direction we want them to take". Tahir Amin of the same institute examined the entire gamut of the Afghan problem. Calling it a very deep process involving both domestic and foreign dimensions which ultimately paved the way for the 1978 coup d'etat in Afghanistan and later the Soviet military intervention in 1979. he came out with its political, economic and strategic implications for Pakistan - politically immense pressure from the Soviet Union strategically a direct Soviet military threat. often resulting in its space violation by the Russian planes and helicopters and economically, the burden of refugees from Afghanistan. He criticised Pakistan's foreign policy for adhocism and compromises seriously lacking initiative, strength and effectiveness due to the chaotic political situation at home. "The military regime is
intensifying political deprivation, delaying the grave problems of socio-economic justice and further alienating the regional elements. Above all Islam is being used by the regime as a legitimizing tool for its stability". Realising grave dangers to Pakistan's security he examined foreign policy options available to Pakistan - "accommodation with the Soviet Union and India; alignment with the USA; non-alignment and external help; and non-alignment self reliance and external help with special relationship with Iran and Muslim world- in the light of cost-benefit ratio analysis and came out in favour of the fourth option. "Pakistan while keeping its non-aligned status in-tact, builds special relationship with Iran and Muslim countries; clearly articulates its interests in Afghanistan and mobilises all resources to solve Afghanistan issue according to the right of self determination of our Muslim brothers: funds out solution for its domestic problems and adopts effective strategies in order to build a self-reliant defence capability".144

Qazi Hussain Ahmed, General-Secretary of the Tehrik Islami said that the Jehad movement launched by the Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan would absolutely change the situation, taking the Pakistani borders to the Amu Dariya River from the Durand Line. At the same time, he regretted that certain elements were propagating against Jehad-e-Afghanistan falsely branding it as a war between two Superpowers and advising against involvement in conflict with
a big power. They, however, forgot that a similar element was propagating against launching the struggle of independence against British imperialism".145

However, an important section of the domestic public opinion in Pakistan was against Zia's policies and conservative section's opinion. To Begum Nusrat Bhutto, what was happening in Afghanistan was an internal affair; Pakistan had no right to interfere. The Soviets had no intentions against Pakistan. Gen. Zia had blown up the Afghan situation to attract attention. If the Soviets came to Pakistan in hot pursuit, it will be fault of the government here".146 Later she stated if her party came to power, it would recognise the Babrak Karmal Government and pursue a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.147

The two dailies Nawai Waqt and Imroze criticised Mrs. Bhutto's stand on Afghanistan policies, accused her of subordinating supreme national interests to her own and unscrupulously angling for personal power even at the cost of national honour.148 However, she later stated that "the present Pakistan Government had no right to call the Karmal Government an undemocratic one since it was being run in the name of Islam and Afghanistan and not its people".149 Further "those who questioned Mr. Karmal's representative character should not do so, for they too were living in glass houses".
Benazir Bhutto shared her mother's perceptions of the Afghan situation and of the Soviet move. She stated that "Pakistan should have tried other means to resolve the crisis, and should not have rushed to the United States accusing the Soviet Union which is a superpower and the fifth largest Muslim nation in the world. We don't want to become pawns in anybody's hands. Our country must think for itself. The question is: how do you make these Soviet troops go back? You don't do it by closing all doors. You don't get results through detente". However, a change took place in her opinion in December 1987. She said "her party stands firmly for a political settlement of the Afghan problem, incorporating the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of the Afghan refugees. Two-front conflict, which is the nightmare built into Pakistan's geopolitical situation, is now a reality". In this context, she referred to "the violation of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan and the cease-fire line in Kashmir". After being sworn in as Pakistan Prime Minister she ruled out any change in the Afghan policy and stated that Afghanistan had an important influence in the region since the Soviet Union took action in that country and declared that her government would respect all international commitments as well as agreement so far on this issue "my government would like to see the continuity of the process of settlement. The PPP Government wanted the Afghan policy to be continued. One year later she called for what she termed the vestiges of Soviet rule to be removed from Afghanistan to allow. "The symbols of the Soviet rule

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continue in Kabul. The refusal of these symbols to go is leading to further agony of Afghanistan. Pakistan wants a non-aligned state to emerge in Afghanistan and a political settlement which would entail the removal of the vestiges of the Soviet rule.\textsuperscript{153}

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a great protagonist of the demand for Pashtoonistan, was in self-exile in Afghanistan when the Russian forces marched into Afghanistan. Then, he supported Soviet intervention which, he said, took place because Amin had reached an understanding with the USA and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{154} But later he felt extremely disappointed thereby the disintegration of the Afghan nation; which had to see that the Russian-motivated revolution was taking valuable lies of Pathans unjustifiably.\textsuperscript{155} He also expressed his grave concern over the developments in Afghanistan and blamed the Soviet Union for the plight of Afghan people. Claiming that Afghanistan had then been virtually subjugated by the Soviet Union, which posed great danger to Pakistan's integrity, he opined that "the Soviet Union considered Pakistan a great hurdle in its way as according to the Soviet thinking, the present fight in Afghanistan had become complicated because of the existence of Pakistan. The people of the NWFP, Punjab, Baluchistan and Sind, should therefore, close their ranks to cope with the Soviet danger": To him, Afghanistan had turned into a battle field for the two superpowers and the US-Soviet confrontation might envelope Pakistan if the situation further escalates.\textsuperscript{156}
Ataullah Mengal, Sardar of the Mengal tribe in Baluchistan stated "no matter how much one may disapprove of one country's interference in the affairs of another country, it would not be fair or objective to hold Soviet Russia alone responsible in the case of Afghanistan".  

Lamenting the fate of Afghan President Babrak Karmal he said that "power would lie with some one else if the Russians came. We know there is a difference between getting freedom and changing masters. But would Americans be better". He denounced the American role in Pakistan and urged the US to withhold further military and economic aid to the Zia regime till democracy: "the continued state of near civil war in which the Baluch, the Pashtuns, and the Sindhis will sooner or later see their opportunity to overturn the present power-structure. Much will depend on development in Afghanistan, since continuing border tensions would enable Zia to frighten some of the people into supporting the status quo and would help to keep the flow of Western aid coming".

Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, the president of the PNF strongly supported the progressive 1978 Afghan revolution with a vocal opposition to Pakistani support of the anti-communist Afghan rebels and urged "all concerned to take note of the delicate nature of the geo-political situation in our region. You are playing with fire". In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, he feared that Baluchistan could become the focus of a superpower collision that could greatly damage the Baluchi cause. "Now that Afghanistan can no longer play the
role of a neutral buffer, perhaps Pakistan, which is very much affiliated with the Western powers, should change its course and should play that role. If it fails to do so, there may well be a series of upheavals and conflicts leading to the break-up of Pakistan, and the superpowers will have to create a new buffer zone to preserve peace in the Persian Gulf area.¹⁵⁹

Mr. Bizenjo described Mr. Karmal as a revolutionary leader who enjoyed the mandate of the people and stated that Pakistan had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, nor could it demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan only if Mr. Karmal demanded their pull out and the Soviet refused to accept the demand.¹⁶⁰ He also stated that "the US would not, for reasons of its global strategy vis-a-vis Afghanistan and the Gulf region, allow a democratic government to manage Pakistan's affairs. For God's sake, for the love of Pakistani nation, settle the Afghan issue amicably through a direct dialogue. The only way out of the international dilemma facing Pakistan vis-a-vis Afghanistan. USSR, India was for it to pursue in letter and spirit a non-aligned policy designed to keep Superpower involvement away from the region."¹⁶¹

He strongly criticised later in 1987 the Zia regime for pursuing a wrong foreign policy and said that "if present state of affairs continued in Afghanistan it might lead to a Third World War". He held USA responsible for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as it had not spared a single
chance to interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan after the coming into power of Noor Mohammad Taraki. Afghanistan had an old treaty friendship with the Soviet Union and after the intervention by USA from Pakistan soil, Afghanistan was constrained to seek help from the USSR.162

Khair Bux Marri, the Sardar of the Marri tribe alleged the communist Revolution in Afghanistan and the new regime expressions of interest in the Baluchi course. His opinion became ambivalent after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. "What can we, what can the Afghans, what can any small nation do. You need help, but when you accept it, they feel they have their investment and they take over. whether it is the Russians or the Americans can you take help from any stronger side and retain your own image of yourself".

Akbar Y. Musti Khan, one of the leading Baluch businessman come out with his views. "most Baluch regard the descriptions of Soviet atrocities that appear in the Western press as greatly exaggerated. They are reluctant to believe that the Russians, whom they don't know first hand, could be worse that the Punjabis whom they do know too well. We talk to them of freedom, but they say, what freedom do we have to loose! We never had freedom like the Afghans."163

Nawab Akbar Bugti, the former Governor of Baluchistan said that "the Karmal Government of Afghanistan is a representative Government enjoying the support of a majority
of the Afghan people. The Russian troops, therefore, had not committed any aggression against Afghanistan since they had gone there at the invitation of the Karmal Government. Later he stated that "Karmal will not need the help of the Soviet forces after sometimes because his Government is getting stronger with each passing day". Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the former Sindh Chief Minister and chairman of the PPP opined that he was not in favour of the recognition of the present Afghanistan Government because that would encourage foreign intervention and aggression. "We should, however, keep open the option of negotiations because one could not ignore geopolitical facts. The Afghans must be given an opportunity to decide the form of government". Farooq Leghou, the secretary general of the PPP expressed, "We did not find an opportunity to discuss these issues in the party meeting because of the ban in political activities. However our party was against interference of any superpower, Eastern or Western in the region".

Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, chief of the National Democratic Party (NDP) also said that his party did not approve of foreign intervention in any country, including Afghanistan. "We want that the people of Afghanistan be allowed to decide their own future without foreign intervention and that Afghan refugees now in Pakistan should return to their homeland". He also accused the Zia Government of "perpetuating its rule by raising the slogan of Islam; but there is a limit to it. The present Government has no right to deliberate on the
Afghanistan issue since it was against the people's wishes". He also applauded Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan's statement that the present Government had brought the country on the brink of war, since the war had reached Pakistan's borders. 168

Khan Abdul Wali Khan, son of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, Pakistan's opposition leader and president of the NUF, saw as early as in April 1979 that Zia was "playing with fire by organising raids into Afghanistan. The Russians are not going to sit idle: they will hit back one day". He was proved right. 169 He continued to criticise the Government's policy on the Afghan issue. He even paid a visit to Afghanistan in 1982 and met with Afghanistan's President Babrak Karmal, his cabinet colleagues and the ambassadors of India and the Soviet Union, which was criticised by daily Jasrat and other newspapers /mass media in Pakistan. To his opinion, Pakistan had unnecessarily been involved in the conflict for the sake of the Americans, who had no sympathy for Pakistan but were following their own global strategy. Pakistan had no enmity towards any of its neighbours. 170

Maulana Siraj Ahmed Dinpuri, opined that "if the Soviet Union was an aggressor, why Pakistan should not break off diplomatic ties with it, how strange that Pakistan demanded a government of people's liking and backing in Afghanistan, while this principle was not being practised at home". He also demanded direct talks with Kabul. 171 Narees Siddiqi, the former leader of the Tehrik Istiqlal and Secretary
General of the National council for civil liberties called the Afghan issue as "the main hurdle in the way of restoration of democracy in the country and was being made more complicated by those in power to perpetuate their rule. He also suggested direct negotiations with Afghanistan. Dr. Hubark Hussain, the former FPP Minister suggested massive development of tribal areas on both sides of Durand Line and said that "by affording the fruits of progress and prosperity to one of the most backward peoples of the world, real stability in the region will come, which will also entail a lasting solution of the Afghan issue".

Ghulam Ahmed Bilour, the Secretary-General of the NDP urged the Government to hold direct talks with the Karmal regime to resolve the Pak-Afghanistan crisis. He called air violation of Pakistani territory by the Afghan air forces "a sheer bad luck that we are playing in the hands of superpowers." Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, President of the JUP (Jamaat Uleme Pakistan) also called for a direct dialogue with the Karmal regime on the Afghanistan problem and emphasised for political solutions. Kunwar Kutubddin, chief organiser of the Muslim League (Pagar) said that his party was in favour of direct talks with Karmal administration. Air Marshall (retd.) Asghar Khan, the President of the Tehrik-Istiqlaal accused the United States of being the biggest impediment in finding a solution to the Afghan problem" as it does not want it to be settled. And Pakistan had unnecessarily involved itself in the super-
powers" conflict. It is in its interest to pull out from the present position through direct talks with the Kabul regime. A peaceful settlement through direct contact would help remove the exciting burdens and dangers." He also accused Pakistan for pushing Afghanistan into the Soviet lap through a gradual process since the early fifties. 177

Khurshid Mohammad Wasoori, Information secretary of the Tehrik Istiqlal also suggested that Pakistan, on its part, should restrict to the humanitarian task of giving food and accommodation to Afghan refugees. Referring to alleged anti-USSR propaganda in the Pakistani press he started that there was total Government control on the press. Therefore, whatever appeared in the Press reflected the Governments views and media's harshness was because of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Once troops are withdrawn, this harshness would disappear. 178

Sardar Shaukat Ali, the central secretary general of the Awami National Party (ANP) bitterly criticised the Government policy on the Afghanistan issue and said "nobody had a right to poke his nose in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. He also came out with a statement that it has become a common feature in Pakistan that the person who has different points of view is branded as a traitor and anti-national. 179 Altar Hussain, MQM leader also lashed out at the government's policy on Afghanistan at the behest of one superpower. He observed that the government was playing with the security of the country just to please USA and urged
Pakistan to recognise the Afghanistan government and negotiate with it. The government should take a lesson from the Gorbachev-Reagan negotiations. The Punjab branch of the PNP called for the recognition of the Afghan government and holding direct talks with it for the resolution of the Afghan problem including honourable return of Afghan refugees to their homeland. The executive committee of the Party also demanded Pakistan’s entry into bilateral agreements based on peaceful coexistence with Iran, Afghanistan and India to give a clear shape to Pakistan non-aligned position and its being a part of the third world.

The central working committee of the PNP resolved that Pakistan should initiate direct negotiations with the Kabul regime to solve all mutual problems on the basis of positive non-alignment and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

Similarly, PNP Central Steering Committee at Karachi on August 6, 1983 criticised Pakistan’s policy vis-a-vis the Afghan issue: sometimes they (the Government) turn Pakistan into a frontline state and at others they say it is not so. Meanwhile the Afghan issue simmers, the committee noted that Pakistan never had a dispute with Afghanistan: it was Afghanistan which had a dispute with Pakistan. The committee also demanded that the draft agreement concluded between Afghanistan and Pakistan in August 1976, which reportedly solved the century old problem of the Durand Line, be published immediately.
The movement for the Restoration of Democracy MRD set up in February 1981 also criticised Gen Zia's Government on the Afghanistan issue and demanded free, fair and impartial elections under the 1973 constitution with the objective of transferring power to the elected representatives. The MRD included (1) the PPP (2) the NPD (3) the PDP (4) Tehreek -i-Istaqlal (5) Pakistan Muslim League (Khairuddin Qasim Group) (6) the QMA (7)the PMKP (the Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party) (8) the JUI (9) the PNP (10) the Awami Tehrik (11) the NAP. 

(2) THE AFGHAN REFUGEES AND COSTS OF THEIR MAINTENANCE:

The most serious dimension of the Soviet action was the colossal problem of the Afghan refugees, which constitute about one fifth of the total Afghan population. Size alone creates logistical problems of providing shelter, food, water and other material needs on a very large scale. It also puts serious strain on the public and municipal facilities and undue pressure on the natural environment. The large number of refugees also provoked overt unrest among the native population who feel that the quality of their own lifestyle is threatened. Of more concern to Pakistan and of more serious to its stability is what would happen if the refugees do not return to Afghanistan. 

On one important point, the situation of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan differs from most refugees contexts, at least as far as the Pushto - speaking refugees are concerned.
These refugees, the Pashtuns come from South and East Afghanistan from provinces adjoining the borders of Pakistan: ethnically they belong to the same people, living in the border regions of North-West Pakistan, and basically they share the same culture. Nevertheless, a picture of conflicts and tension is emerging which may, overtime, cause changes in the culture and identity of the Pashtun, both in their own eyes and in relation to the Pakistani Pashtun. The further in-fact of refugees changed the ethnic complexion of the area in which they are heavily concentrated. Louis Dupree viewed the result of the refugee movement out of Afghanistan loaded with political implications. Among the Pashtun refugees are many who had been compelled to move from the southern to the northern province of Afghanistan in the 19th century reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan; since the Soviet military intervention, large numbers of northern based Pashtuns have taken their families to the security of refugees camps in Pakistan and then returned to their zone of origin to fight with their distant cousins. This was a process of re-emigration. Several of these Pashtun refugees, told Dupree that after the first Russo-Afghan war ended, they would remain in their traditional homelands and not return to the north.

The Afghan refugees problem has virtually complicated the already existing Pakistani domestic pictures of ethnicity and exacerbated these divisions Pakistan has historically been dominated by Punjabis. other major ethnic
groups have long resented this domination and separatist movements have taken place in all of the non-Punjabi provinces, especially among the Sindhis, the Baluchis and the Pashtuns. In the long term the massive influx of refugees could intensify Pathan national feelings and in seeking greater political autonomy in the Pakistani context it could create a de facto Pashtunistan. This fear is accentuated as more and more sophisticated arms are acquired by the rebels from external sources. However, it is to be noted that it is secrecy that is maintained by the Pakistan Government about the arms sent for the resistance fighters. Arms sent by Western countries by Arab countries or by China are exclusively handled by the Pakistan military authorities and they do not disclose to the groups or to their leaders either the amounts that they have received or the quantities that they have passed on to this or that group, causing rivalry and antagonism among different rebel groups.

Besides political, social and cultural costs, the Afghan refugees problem has been a threat to Pakistan’s economy. The refugees have been mainly engaged in the following occupations:

1. Kitchen-gardening in fruits, vegetables and spices;
2. Officially employed by the Government of Pakistan to work in areas of reforestation, water drainage, etc;
3. Farming land released from local Pakistani peasants;
4. Daily labour especially in the labour intensive market places in the large urban centers;
trade and smuggling, especially drugs and arms;
trucking and shipping;
live-stocks;
merchants and craftsmen;
miscellaneous small-scale trades.

In sum, the Afghanistan refugees have penetrated the entire Pakistani economy. Though they are not permitted to purchase immovable property, the wealthy Afghans have been able to evade the operative rules and regulations through utilizing loopholes within existing rules or employing illegal means. This has given rise to social tensions and frictions leading to periodic clashes between the locals and refugees notwithstanding the fact that "the numbers of voluntary Agencies (VOLAGS) assisting the Afghan refugees in Pakistan increased appreciably up to about 35 VOLAGS in Pakistan along with specialised agencies with the UNO including the UNHCR. These agencies have catered to primary health care, health, education, education through mass media, income generation, and income-generating projects. "The limited economic resources of Pakistan could not allow Pakistan Government to sustain the economic burden for a long time without foreign economic assistance. The Soviet armed forces on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border with the responsibility of defending the Afghan border impelled guerrilla attacks from the Pakistan since."

The refugees problem has for the aforesaid reasons generated the most heated foreign policy debate inside
Pakistan. The domestic public opinion has been in favour of return of refugees to Afghanistan which has ever been emphasised by the Government of Pakistan. Highly controversial issue has been the cost of supporting them and their presence inside Afghanistan. The press reacted mildly, while the leaders of banned/opposition political parties reacted sharply to the military government. National opinion survey undertaken by the Islamabad-based Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) indicated overwhelming popular backing for government support of the Afghan refugees. In early polls (1980, 1982, 1983, 1984) three out of four Pakistanis supported Government’s policy but in 1986, public support declined by 67 percent.

The following are the various shades of Pakistan’s domestic public opinion on this issue:

The Government and Its Spokesmen:

The Government of Pakistan showed more concern about the swelling number of the Afghan refugees. Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq stated, "the Soviet Union might be right in her claim of having intervened in Afghanistan on the request of the Kabul government but the flight of 43,000 refugees into Pakistan showed the reaction of the Afghan people. He thought it politically expedient to support the cause of the Afghan rebels through the help from the US, China, Saudi Arabia and other countries. However, the resistance groups routinely denied that they were receiving guerrilla training and
wepons from foreign sources. President Zia also repeatedly asserted that Pakistan was not permitting the training equipping of guerrillas on its territory and would not allow them to use it as a sanctuary for attacking across the Durand Line. Nonetheless, he announced on January 13, the institution of relief fund for the Afghan refugees and opened camps in Pakistan for them allowing the Jamaat-i-Islamia, to preach among them.

President Zia was in an awkward position. He and other Pakistani generals saw an advantage in the Soviet Union's not being able to consolidate its grip on Afghanistan and thus pose a greater threat to move on into their country, for that reason, a strong resistance benefitted Pakistan. But helping make it strong risked provoking the Soviet Union and Pakistani leadership was apprehensive of it in the light of its historical experience in 1971. So, General Zia and his colleagues continued to voice concern. While inaugurating the 11th session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in May 1980 stated "it is necessary to ponder over the question as to why these hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to leave the security and comfort of their own hearths and home and to face the rigorous of living under the open skies." The Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan had been. declared Agha Shahi, "massively reinforced and more and more refugees were seeking refuge in Pakistan". General Zia also severely chastised Russia for depriving the traditionally free people of Afghanistan of their
independence and declared that "Pakistan was providing them with shelter in humanitarian spirit, and in conformity with the tradition of Islamic brotherhood. It is the task of awesome magnitude in view of Pakistan's limited resources". He also expressed his gratitude to aid giving countries and praised the insurgency by brave men and women while Agha Shahi called Pakistan having "a direct and vital stake in a peaceful political solution of the conflict in Afghanistan which has burdened us with the responsibility for 1.2 million refugees." "

Gen Zia also called upon the political leaders to cooperate with him in this respect. In an interview to the newly published world Islamic Times he expressed that along with the solution of other problems, the Afghanistan tangle would also be resolved. Later he told New York Times that the 3 million refugees now in Pakistan, would eventually be able return country but "it would not be too difficult for Pakistan's 84 million people to absorb 3 million people, if it comes to the worst and the refugees had to stay in the country." So also Sahibzada Yakub Khan also denied that the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan posed internal political problems. The refugees were guests in Pakistan and Pakistan's principal concern was that they should be enabled to return voluntarily in safety and security. Mr. Mohammad Khan Junejo the then Pakistan's Prime Minister also sought public support about keeping the Afghan refugees in their camps. Questioned about keeping the Afghan refugees in
the thickly populated residential areas, he observed that the landlords ought to realize the implications of renting out their houses to the Afghan refugees. They should also not go for petty financial benefits and should give their houses to patriotic Pakistanis. He also said that the government and the people of Pakistan had allowed Afghan refugees to live in Pakistan like brothers. They were, therefore, under obligation to assist the authorities in controlling subversion in the country.

The weekly Viewpoint expressed its view that "international opinion will necessarily be guided by the manner in which the Afghan government can deal with the rebellion which, if Western Press reports are to be believed, has reached the stage of a civil war. The attempted transformation of a pastoral, tribal society into a modern state based on egalitarianism could not possibly take place without some opposition, and it seems that the speed with which the change was introduced fostered greater resistance than was expected, while rifts within the regime led to confusion and ineptness in dealing with the situation."

Pakistan Times reported in a letter from Frontier by Murtaza Malik a big change brought about by the big influx of Afghan refugees in Peshawar - the capital city of the NWFP, which prompted the suggestion that Peshawar ceased to exist for the Peshawarites. "This capital city, has in fact, undergone a tremendous change in its shape, size and character over the period, Afridis. Shinwaris, Mohammans
and Waziris now almost dominate the city having gone into business. A competitive and flourishing business. From transport operation to carpet selling while hiring spacious bungalows against high rents, seems to be a popular hobby which has further upset the legitimate house hunter. Pointing out the shortage of houses, high rents and big increase in vehicle traffic, the letter passed sarcastic remarks:

Attique, my poor friend who was elbowed out by an Afghan refugee when he had almost struck a deal for hiring a house is now scared of the reported indiscipline among his guests. But probably he missed Defence Minister Ali Ahmed Talpur's statements he made in Peshawar saying the Government is vigilant enough to see that the Afghans don't take undue advantage of the shelter. So let there be no more sleepless nights. Good luck Attique. 204

The weekly Viewpoint also cautioned that apart from the possible risk of the conflict in Afghanistan over the borders, Pakistan has had to cope with the problem of a large number of Afghan refugees, who whatever the reasons for their exodus, seem to be settling down in this country. 205 In June, a partial Soviet pull out took place in Afghanistan. Dailies, Jang and Jasarat viewed it as a ruse calculated to lull the world opinion and called for all help to the Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle for securing the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. 206

Stressing that Pakistan had done well to keep all options open throughout the deepening Afghan crisis Muslim editorially called upon Pakistan to pursue quiet diplomacy:
"our object should be to continue a situation in which the
1.5 million refugees could go back peacefully and honourably
to Afghanistan". Later on article by Mariana Babar, giving
graphic details of the life of Afghan refugees in Pakistan,
referred to the various incidents of clashes between the
refugees and the people of Baluchistan and the NWFP over
water-holes, grazing rights, illegal seizure of residential
plots and agricultural lands and wondered if that region
would ultimately become another Assam. "Unless concrete steps
are taken to rehabilitate them, think of the coming years.
Slowly one sees the emergence of the Pakistani Afghanistan.
Based on personal observations and interviews with the women
refugees the article gave a general idea of their life as
well as their determination to fight the Soviets in their
country."

Commenting on the NWFP Governor's statements against
elements trying to create a law and order problem in the
region as well as fanning public feelings against the Afghan
refugees and his appeal to the people to cooperate with
Government's policies and give every help and succour to the
Afghans who were their guests and were behaving with
exemplary discipline and character, the weekly Viewpoint
suggested the Federal and the Provincial Governments in the
NWFP and Baluchistan to alleviate the pressures created by
the presence of the Afghan refugees there. Apart from the
burden of providing food and accommodation for them, the
weekly pointed out other problems for the local population
especially with regard to the use of forests, private or government, grazing and water rights, and in some places the depressing effect of their presence on the local labour market. It also urged the authorities "to regulate the activities of the Afghan refugees to maintain their refugee status in a manner that their presence does not impinge on the lives of the local people and because some Afghan refugees find the pastures here a little greener and may be reluctant to return to their homes at the first opportunity".209

The daily Muslim editorial also suggested that "the generosity shown to the seemingly helpless guests is not allowed to be misused by its beneficiaries. A closer surveillance should have been exercised on their activities here to preclude the possibility of their operating to the detriment of our own nationals. It is an irony that endless kindness is being lavished on a people who have nothing except the bond of religion with us."210 Later, it quoted a survey conducted in Peshawar that the local people were acutely apprehensive about the rising number of Afghan refugees and their impact on the local economy: "the decreasing rates of casual labour: an increased number of Afghan trucks and rickshaws: changes in the trade and sale of Barra goods and: the practice of selling relief goods in the open market are making the traders, small time businessmen, transporters and the casual labourers feel insecure. They
bought land and ran shops in the town. So, the prevalent feeling was that the refugees will not go back". 211

A letter to the editor of Muslim by Peshawar's Mohammad Iqbal Siddiqui complained that the Afghan refugees had not only created economic problems for the local people of Peshawar but also posed a threat to the city's law and order situation. It also called for their removal from the heart of the city to its outskirts and said that their mutual hostilities should come to an end before "they outstretch our Islamic brotherhood, human sympathy and hospitalities". 212

A Muslim article by Sajjad Hyder analysed in detail the heavy political, economic and social costs involved in the Afghan crisis. He called Pakistan's failure to define its foreign policy goals "that till this day, not one solitary Mujahideen leader in Afghanistan or in Pakistan has ever publicly stated the wrongness of the past Afghan foreign policy. Also no attempt was made in Pakistan to quantity in broad terms the financial, economic, ecological and social costs of this Afghan invasion into Pakistan. His attempt is as follows:

(1) "Taking Pakistan's Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88) as a reference mark in 1983 terms, he quantified the direct fixed cost to exchequer of maintaining 3 million refugees at US$ 300 million a year exclusive of declining international donations. Loss of import duty for exempting all relief vehicles and goods came to about US$ 50 million annually. In addition, the refuge
burden on social services and general developmental infrastructure: scarce resources such as cement have to be diverted for refugee relief and rehabilitation from development projects and potential exports;";

(2) "Labour-displacement by refugees competing for employment at lower wages; lost labour opportunity costs in a variety of occupations and small traders, particularly in the field of transportation: their short-term profits without adding to Pakistan's long term commercial infrastructure;

(3) "The ecological costs from refugee deforestation and over-grazing: every refugee family utilising some five point 3 cubic metres to four tons of firewood a year; the additional degradation of our forestry resources, especially in the NWFP leading to soil erosion, flash flooding and eventually affecting agricultural land and weather cycle;

(4) "Demographic changes with the refugees outnumbering the local inhabitants in a number of areas; the importation of the refugees from NWFP and Baluchistan to Punjab leading to political dissent, apart from social tension and its costs upon local inhabitants;

(5) "The revolution in Iran and the Afghanistan crisis led to a vast increase in opium production in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A combination of these two factors turned Pakistan into world's primary heroin production centre;"
entire social fabric erosion due to heroine addiction in Pakistan":

(6) "Political implications of these refugees: fundamentalist parties relying on armed refugees in election:

(7) "Indirect economic costs: equal to the direct financial costs bringing the annual total to Rs. 8 billion a year: the ecological in terms of firewood, deforestation, erosion, floodings, soil malnutrition and other downstream productivity losses; the direct annual fiscal costs of these refugees came to 26 percent of the total developmental outlays, which would suffice for 85% of the cost as the projected Kalabagh dam on whose energy generation our economy will depend in large part: it would be enough to pay for two one thousand Megawatt nuclear power plants at Chasma: costs in human terms - every Afghan refugee that is allowed to stay indefinitely in Pakistan, one additional Pakistani child or adult will die from malnutrition/lack of health facilities, one additional Pakistani adult will be without adequate education, and one Pakistani adult will be without a job”.

Drawing upon the actual position summed up in Drew Middleton’s New York Times Article of December 1983 entitled "4 years of Afghan Battle: No Vietnam for Moscow", the article viewed the future of Afghan armed resistance with pessimism. "even if the Afghan resistance were better
supplied they face a pessimistic future as the Soviets could contain them and unlike the US in Vietnam, the Soviets are not going to get tired of Afghanistan which is too close to them and too close to the Indian Ocean" Pak-Soviet-Afghan understanding, which would limit their refugee's capability and spur to bring them to the conference table. 213

The daily News editorial also pointed out "that many Afghan refugees had started venturing out of their camps to live like Pakistani nationals and called for effective action to control those Afghan refugees who have got out of the camps and menace various walks of life". 214 While and in-depth analysis of the political situation in the NWFP was undertaken by an editorial page article in Muslim by its editor in chief, Mushahid Hussain. To his mind, there were following consequences:

(1) The refugee question spawned a vast bureaucracy employing nearly 6500 people; Running such a bureaucracy is naturally quite a headache imbibing malpractice and corruption in it;

(2) About Rs. 4,500 million are spent every year on the maintenance of these refugees, of which 50 percent is fully subsidised by the Government of Pakistan and the rest by international donor agencies or countries; the refugees created some sort of socio-economic destabilisation in certain parts of the NWFP; two basic question asked by people (1) will they go back? (2) what will happen if they don't!

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(3) Among the political forces a general sympathy for their plight but also concern at the possible political fallout of their continued presence in the NWFP: irritants over little things like their stay, raised real estate prices, their taking of jobs in certain areas, without any explosive consequences.

(4) Concern also shared by the government on three counts: a law and order issue, either in terms of increasing crime in the region or as a consequence of political infighting among the Mujahideen groups: there may be agents of the Afghan regime or subversives being infiltrated through them; and, their endeavor to sabotage a political settlement reached by Pakistan at Geneva in the Afghanistan question.215

The Muslim reported later several cases of large ammunition and explosions in the Afghan refugees camps and expressed possibility of pro-Soviet elements intent on sabotaging resistance activity. In retaliation, Afghans murdered a couple of Soviet prisoners taken to refugee camps in Pakistan and the incident was given a lot of publicity, creating embarrassment for the Pakistan Government.216

The weekly Pakistan and Gulf Economist later found the new complexion in the NWFP society quite disturbing. None of them had a ready solution to offer but their concern about the Socio economic and political problems arising out of the long and heavy presence of Afghans in the province was identical. The writer Mr. Wahab Siddiqui visited the
province and met with political leaders, government, functionaries, retired civil servants journalists, lawyers, students, shopkeepers and transporters etc. Many of them pointed out the gravity of the refugee problem and were sceptical on the score that an administration which had failed to confine the Afghan's movement to their tented villages would not prove capable of pushing them out of the Pakistani border. Calling the situation tragic, the writer opined that "now with millions of people armed with most sophisticated weapons, the possibility of bloody clashes between the armed Afghans and the local population cannot be ignored." 217

Leaders and Intellectuals:

Begum Nusrat Bhutto criticised General Zia-ul-Haq. To her, Zia exaggerated the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan which was aimed at getting foreign aid. If the PPP were in power, it would not allow the Afghan refugees to wage a war of resistance from Pakistani territory "we would never forget that whenever we had wars with India, the Afghans have never made use of that excuse to attack us from their side. We should not pay them back by allowing these people who call them Mujahiddin, to use our territory to attack their". 218 Later on she pointed out that besides genuine Afghan emigrants and refugees, many Afghans were coming to Pakistan with arms and equipments which could be dangerous for Pakistan as they would support the secessionist movements of Pakistan, Sindhu Desh and Baluchistan. 219
Benazir Bhutto also shared her mother's perceptions of the Afghan refugees but after coming to power in 1988 she maintained the status quo and invited the Peshawar based Afghan resistance leaders to discuss the post-Geneva Accords situation. Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Veteran political leader opined that the Russians were pushing hundreds of thousands of refugees into Pakistan in a bid to create problems there. This could be disastrous for a country like ours. If the Russians were sending even 2 per cent of Karmal agents in the shape of refugees, they could create a very difficult situation. The Government has no means to ascertain as to who is a genuine refugee and who is not. Several Baluch Leaders also expressed the opinion that the continuous inflow of refugees "will upset the existing delicate balance between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns and might make the Baluchi minority in their province".

Many Pakistani Intellectuals also showed almost concern at the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Pervez Iqbal Cheema feared that the Soviets would seriously contemplate active hot pursuits and sanctuary destroying operations. Hafeez Malik stressed that the Soviets could capitalise internal politics with objective of installing sympathetic party or group in power in Islamabad. Mujtaba Rizvi saw potential for further destabilization of Pakistan and Iran through the refugees, while Abdul Rehman Siddiqi stated that the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran are not only their sacred trust but also as responsibility of the world.
Prof. Khurshid Ahmed provided ideological cum geopolitical explanations and Islamic frame work of the Afghan resistance for Pakistan and Iran: "Resistance movement to Russian-cum-Karmal rule in Afghanistan to be launched exclusively by the Afghan people. They should be supported morally, politically and materially, but as far as the armed struggle is concerned, it is and must be the exclusive responsibility of the Afghan people. There should be extensive humanitarian support to the Afghan resistance commensurate with the gravity of situation which is primarily the responsibility of the Muslim world. Tahir Amin analysed the unity, differences and overall strategic considerations of the Mujahideen groups inside Pakistan and suggested greater military help from Pakistan as they "get small help from the Muslim countries".

Khan Wali Khan, leader of the NDP deplored the plight of the Afghan refugees living in a very bad condition. "My daughter who is a doctor tells me that some 80 percent of the women are suffering from tuberculosis". He visualized that "at least 25 percent will go back, if the situation normalises". His concern was on two counts mainly: "their interference in Pakistani politics; as a result of their presence arms are available in abundance in the NWFP". He also accused again and again certain vested interests of trying to exploit the refugee problem for their own political and economic gains. His basis charges was that the government had allowed Jamat-e-Islami to function somewhat freely among the Afghan
refugee camps - a privilege denied to other political parties. He also felt that the Jamat-e-Islami connections with some Mujahideen leaders, in a worse case situation, could serve as a political plus thereby tilting the balance in the Jamat's favour. To substantiate it he mentioned one particular election in a college in Peshwar where armed men of one of the Mujahideen groups were present in support of the Islami Tulaba. He also suggested to Pakistan's distance from the superpower conflict, which in the past had reduced it by half. While talking of Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan he quoted a Pushto proverb "when bulls fight, the frogs get crushed". Similarly Begum Wali Khan in an interview took strong exception to the Jamat's attempts to involve to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan's internal politics and described it as a dangerous course. The NWFP province MRD also strongly condemned that elements trying to involve the Afghan refugee in Pakistani politics for their own political gains 'such a tendency could lead to dangerous consequence and threaten the security of the country. Instead of patronising such elements, the Government should take serious note of the situation'.

The working committee of the Pakistan Muslim League (Pir Pagaro) also resolved that the Afghan refugees had been handed over to the Jamat-i-Islami, while all other political parties had been barred from meeting them. Mohammad Yusuf Khattack, a Muslim Leaguer and a former chief Minister of the NWFP proposed the settlement of a sizeable number of
Afghan refugees in Baluchistan and allotment of government lands to them for involving them in Pakistan’s affairs and making them useful citizens.  

The Baluchistan unit of the PNP demanded that the Afghan refugees should immediately be sent back to their country, while Sahiwal district unit of PNP in a resolution strongly opposed the setting up of Afghan refugee camps at Dera Ghazi Khan and its surrounding region in Punjab for socio-economic, law and order reasons for the problems of Punjab including the possibility of increase in drug trafficking, narcotic peddling, arms smuggling, highway robberies, abduction and decoits etc. The Jiya Sind Students Federation expressed its deep concern over the earmarking for the Afghan refugees of 5 seats each in medical and engineering colleges in the province saying that "it would add to the frustration of Sind people who already have a sense of deprivation and were struggling for the realization of the national and political rights within Pakistan". The students of various educational institutions in Sind observed protest day on December 21, 1983 at the call of the Jiya Sind Students Federation against the permanent settlement of Afghan refugees and Biharis from Bangladesh in the province.

Maulana Akbar Saqi, the leader of the JUP said that "trained saboteurs have entered Pakistan in the guise of Afghan refugees and can pose serious threat to the country". Begum Raqyya Soomro, President of the
women wing of the PPP Sind unit also charged four years later that the Afghan refugees were responsible for the then ethnic violence in Karachi. 237

Mr. Altaf Hussain stated MQM stand on Afghan refugees describing them as the root cause for the spread of arms and ammunition in the country. "By providing protection to four million Afghan counter-revolutionaries, the rulers have turned Pakistan into a big bazar of heroin and arms". According to political observers with its strong support in Sind cities, the MQM could have enormous capacity to mould public opinion against the displaced Afghans living in the country. An ANP-MQM alliance over the Afghan refugee issue was considerable concern for the policy planners. 238 PNP Provincial Chief. Latif Afridi also feared that the NWFP could be another Beirut if the Afghan refugees stay on.

Mian Tufail Mohammad, Amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami refuted the propaganda against his party that "it involved the Afghan people in the internal politics of the country. Neither anybody had prohibited them from serving the Afghans nor were there people enjoying special concessions". 239 The activists of Islami Jamaat-e-Taloba also stated" we support the Afghan Mujahideen. Since this is a Muslim struggle against Russia, we particularly co-operate with Hizbe Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar and the Jameat-e-Islami of Barhanuddin Rabbani. Some of are activists are also volunteers in the Jihad in Afghanistan. However, we are not getting any military training with the Afghan Mujahideen. The Bomb blasts
against the Afghan Mujahideen was the work of local communist agents. In fact, recently, a suspect was caught for planting a bomb and he turned out to be a person by the name of Shams Bonari, who is a known worker of PNP".240

The Governor of the NWFP Fazle Haq felt that "the Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan had been a boon for the country and the Afghan Mujahideen's struggle is buying him time for Pakistan. Therefore, it is something which is directly related to our national security.

Thus, domestic public opinion was divided in Pakistan depending upon the environment: geographical, political, strategic, ethnic and social. It showed both trends pro as well as anti vis-a-vis the policies adopted by Government of Pakistan. Zia tried to formulate, mould and mobilize public opinion to justify his government policy towards the development in Afghanistan. But the spiral of silence process moved on and on, assuming a voice to be reckoned with and Zia's Government had to cooperate with the Soviet Union in reaching a settlement over Afghanistan i.e., Geneva Accords 1988. Genuine fears existed and still exist among Pakistanis at large about making of a second Lebanon inside Pakistan with the armed Afghan groups.
NOTES:


2. Ibid. pp.155-165.


4. Ibid. p.18.


22. Ibid


26. There existed six main groups of the Afghan rebels: (1) Hizbi-Islami led by Gulbadeen Hikmatyar, (2) Jamia-i-Islamia led by Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, 3) Hizbi Islami led by Yousus Khalis. 4) Harakat-i-Islami led by N.M. Mohammad. 5) Milli Islami Mahaz-i-Afghanistan led by Prof. Sibghat Ullah Mujaddadi. Numerous other small groups also existed along regional, ethnic, tribal or religious lines (Azmat Hayat Khan, "Afghan Groups Based in Peshawar", Central Asia, Area Study Centre, Peshawar, Summer 1980, pp. 48-58.


57. Bhabani Sengupta. no. 47, pp. 145-146.
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60. Majhribi Pakistan. February 6, 1980
61. Muslim. February 5, 1980
63. Ibid, p.331.
64. Pakistan Times. February 15, 1980
66. Muslim. April 19, 1980
67. Viewpoint. April 27, 1980
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69. Nawai Wagt. May, 12, 1980
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72. The Hindu. February, 30, 1980
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86. **Pakistan Times**, May 21, 1980
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89. **Pakistan Times**, May 24, 1980
90. **Maghribi Pakistan**, May 24, 1980
91. **The Muslim**, May 24, 1980
94. **Al Falah**, May 22, 1980
95. **Imroze**, May 25, 1980
98. **Chatan**, May 26, 1980
99. **Muslim**, June 3, 1980
100. **Akhbaren Jahan**, September 8, 1980
102. **Ibid**
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107. **Pakistan Times**, November 5, 1980
111. Mag. November 20, 1980
114. Ibid.
115. Pakistan Economist. December 27, 1980
116. Muslim, January 9, 1981
118. Mag. March 25, 1981
120. Amn. March 22, 1981
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127. Ibid. November 14, 1982
128. Mag. November 25, 1982
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133. Dawn, February 6, 1985
134. Muslim. March 7, 1985

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141. *Ibid.* March 5, 1983

142. **Daily News.** October 30, 1982


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145. **Dawn.** January 16, 1984, quoting FPI

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