CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan constitutes very significant incident which has profoundly influenced the course of events and thoughts throughout the globe at the varying intensity. More specifically owing to geopolitical imperatives and geo-strategic compulsions, it has the greatest impact on India and Pakistan region. On 27 December 1979, the Soviet troops entered into Afghanistan followed by the removal of President Hafizullah Amin from power, his execution soon thereafter, the installation of Babrak Karmal as the President of a new regime, the flight of a large number of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran mainly and various other subsequent events on both national as well as international plane. In other words, the Soviet military intervention led to the formulation of the Carter Doctrine, the vigorous operational strategy of the Rapid Deployment Force, greatly increased U.S. and Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. campaign to establish an anti-Soviet strategic consensus, the massive rearmament of Pakistan by the U.S., the internationalisation of the Afghan insurgency and reactions in India. The purpose of the intervention, according to the Soviet Union, was to save the new Marxist regime from being toppled by providing it "assistance and support in the struggle against external aggression as the imperialist interference in Afghanistan had
assumed the scope and form that jeopardized the very existence of the Republic, the Central Committee of the PDPA and the Government of DRA.¹ To justify the extensive intervention, the Soviet Union invoked Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good neighbourliness and cooperation of 1978 which made obligatory on the Soviet Union on request to take appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. Further, the request of the Afghan Government for military assistance was in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognizes the inherent right of states of individual or collective self-defence.

The asserted norm of anticipatory self-defense is said to be governed by standards of necessity and proportionality that are widely accepted in the international community². The critical actors in this incident - the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan in particular and the US, China and the UN in general presumably held certain views, measures and expectations concerning the Afghan situation both prior and posterior to the Soviet military intervention. The study seeks to explore how those views, measures and expectations including the concepts of necessity and proportionality were influenced and affected by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, presumed on the treaty of 1978 and on right of self-defence, and the international reaction to those actions and claims.

To study this problem, the factual contexts-historical,
contemporary, geopolitical, geostrategic etc. of the intervention are presented first followed by an analysis of the conflicting interpretations and claims of the actors in the incident. Then the outcome of the intervention is described and evaluated in terms of the interactions and appraisal by the relevant actors of the Soviet actions.

**GEOPOLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN**

Afghanistan occupies a very important position in the strategy and politics of the central and south Asian region. It is located in the south western part of central Asia. Lying on the northern subtropical zone, it extends from 29°21' N to 38° 30' N latitude and from 60° 31' N to 75° East longitude. Covering an area of 647497 sq.km. the country is divided into three regions by the great mountain ranges of the Hindukush: (i) a region of plains and foothills with gentle slopes towards Amu Darya to the north; (ii) a region of high plateau and sandy desert to the south; and (iii) a region of lofty mountains and deep and narrow valleys between the two regions. Closet to the sea, lay its most intractable terrain, farthest from the marine contact and communication were its major commercial and agricultural regions, e.g. the Kabul valley and northern Afghanistan. The general topographical features of Afghanistan played a dominant role in dissociating the underdeveloped southern half of the country from the developed northern Afghanistan, thereby reinforcing the political separation of the highland from the coast. Given such situation and with the constant increase
of regionalism among the Afghans, the Afghan rulers were not able to consolidate their power.

The geographical perspective has remained as one of the constant variable influencing the power and ability of Afghanistan to survive as an independent state in the Soviet dominated heartland. The geography has made it the great crossroad between north and south, east and west. At different periods of history the region known as Afghanistan has been incorporated in a larger empire, with its centre in Iran or India, or Central Asia. Large parts of the land were ruled by Greeks, Mongols, Turks, Uzbeks and other Empire-builders, who settled in distinct regions. Modern Afghanistan was given a definite shape by Ahmed Shah Abdali in 1747 by uniting its various autonomous principalities into an organized state after the disintegration of Persian, Mughal and Uzbek empires. Since then its interior location has affected its development as nation-state.

Afghanistan has the strategic location. It is bound by the Soviet Union in the north; by Iran in the west; by Pakistan in the south and east; and, by the People’s Republic of China in the extreme northeast i.e. Wakhan region. This central location of Afghanistan has been in the nature of a serious practical disadvantage. For instance, in its internal and external communication networks matter Afghanistan was compelled to accept the subordinate role in the decision making process affecting the transit trade and
economy. To avoid the overdependence of the transit agreements and closer trade relations with the Soviet Union improved Afghanistan's bargaining position, politically as well as economically. By developing an alternate source of petroleum products and manufactured goods, and alternate land and air routes to Europe, Afghanistan was able to bring pressure on the west, and so on Pakistan to keep open the routes to Karachi.

The location of Afghanistan also attracted outside powers. It had faced pressures from Russia and British India. As a matter of fact modern Afghanistan was the result of border settlements with Russia in 1873, 1887 and 1895, with Iran in 1905 and with British India in 1893. To Lord Curzon it was "indeed a purely accidental geographical unit, which has been carved out of the heart of Central Asia by the sword of Conquerors or the genius of individual statesmen". The frontiers of Afghanistan were demarcated from Russia in the north by a line running from Zulfiqar at the north-west corner, joining the Oxus river in the district of Kham-i-Ab and Skirting Lake Victoria to the junction with Sinkiang on the inaccessible range of Sarikol. Then, from the east, the boundary ran along the north-west frontier province and reached Baluchistan at the Gomal Pass and, from Koh-i-Malik-Siab in the south of Zulfiqar Pass it ran parallel with the Iranian frontiers. The great game of nineteenth-century geopolitics in Afghanistan was played by both powers - the British and the
Russia. The main object of the British policy was to keep Afghanistan out of the Russian influence and within that of British India, keeping chiefly in mind the considerations of Indian defence. The various facets of policy were; 'forward policy', policy of non-interference in the internal affairs a neutral zone' or buffer state between the British and Russian possessions. However, the British seldom wanted to annex Afghanistan to British India. In 1870s, the Russians wanted Britain to concede Afghanistan as a buffer state between the two powers. The British refused. In the agreement of 1873, Afghanistan was not recognized as a buffer state of influence. Even in the convention of 1907, which came into force without the consent of the ruler of Afghanistan, and which generated Afghan fears that the two imperial powers might divide the country between themselves. Afghanistan was not given the status of a buffer state. It retained its independence within the British sphere of influence: Britain promised not to interfere in its internal affairs or to tamper with its territorial integrity. Russia was given the right to have only local contacts with Afghans across the border. For substantial business with Afghanistan, the Tsars had to use the good offices of Britain. The Russian Consul - General in Calcutta, Nabokov may be quoted from the reports he sent to the Foreign Ministry of the Imperial Government.8

Once we have accepted the British in principle as solicitors with the Amir till our political interests in Middle Asia do not clash with those of the British, the stronger is the authority of the Government of
India in Kabul the easier it would be for us to achieve the safety of our interests and fulfillment of our demands.

The British policy was also determined by the gradual advance of Russia south-wards and partly also by the turbulent character of the people of Afghanistan. In this pursuit they invaded Afghanistan twice as preemptive measures but both expeditions failed miserably. After the third Afghan war of 1919, Afghanistan could succeed in coming out of the British sphere of influence. The Soviet support came in at this point.

The object of Russia as widely believed in the western world was to have an access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The Russian power, it seems, was mainly directed towards the Persian Gulf while the pressure on Afghanistan was to keep the British occupied and concede Russia a warm water outlet. For the British, however, it was much easier to have naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf, both to relieve Afghanistan from Persian pressure and prevent Russia from gaining such an outlet. The demonstrations took place in 1838, 1857 and 1903. And when Britain was involved in the Boer's War, Russian worships attempted to establish a naval base at Bandar Abbas. The British Government moved to resist the Russian naval presence. In November, 1893 Lord Curzon visited with a formidable array of worships to assert British Supremacy.9

The Russian interest in its south can be traced to the British success in developing a valuable trade with India.
Peter the Great of Russia in 1717 was inspired to seek an overland route to the sub-continent. By the 1830s the Czarist empire had taken over the degenerate remains of some Central Asian Muslim emirates that before the age of discovery had prosperously dominated trade between Europe and China. The Russian expansionism in Afghanistan can be inferred from an extract of Tzar's foreign minister, Prince Alexander Gorachkone.

The interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbour whose turbulence and nomadic instincts render them difficult to live with. The state must abandon the incessant struggle and deliver its frontier over the disorder, which renders property, security and civilization impossible, or it must plunge into the depths of savage countries, where the difficulties and sacrifices to which it is exposed increase with each step in advance. The greatest difficulty is in knowing where to stop.

After the 1815 settlement of Vienna, Russia turned her attention from European affairs to Central Asia and expeditions were taken into various provinces to explore commercial and military prospects. By 1863, the distance between the Russian empire and British India was reduced from 4000 to 1000 miles. In 1864, the Russians reached the borders of Kokand, Bokhara and Khiva; in 1865 Tashkent was occupied, in 1867 the new province of Russian Turkestan was constituted and Bokhara had to accept the position of a subsidiary ally of the Tsar, in 1866 Samarkand was annexed, and Khiva and Kokand were occupied respectively in 1873 and 1875 and thus Russia secured very strategically important
point in Central Asia which gave her easy access to both Kashmir and Kabul through the open valley of Gilgit and Chitral. The Russian expansion into Turkoman territory was prevented by the lack of transport facilities. To compensate for this, in 1881 the Russians had built an extension of the railway from the eastern shores of the Caspian to Qizil Arvat. From then onwards, Russia could station a sizeable force in the most remote area of her trans-Caspian territory. The submission of the inhabitants of the Tajend Oasis brought Russia a territory which was within 30 miles striking distance of Sarakhas and within a radius of 232 miles of Hearat. "If England does not use Surrukhs (SIC) for defence, Russia will use it for offence". In 1884 Merv was occupied and 1885 saw Russian attack on and occupation of the Afghan town of Panjdeh, which brought British India and Russia to the brink of War.

Russia's interest in that strategically important area of Turkestan, bordering Afghanistan, becomes clear if we examine the development of the Russian railway system. A rail link was extended to Merv (1886) and from there to Samarkand (1888); and a further extension linked Merv with Kushk (1898) and Samarkand with Tashkent. The railway network was of strategic importance in view of any Russo-British military engagement in India, the Kushk post being only 70 miles from Herat. From Krasnovodsk on the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, to Orenburg (Chkalov) on the extreme south-east of Russia proper, a single line extended 2300 miles. Orenburg is the point of junction between the railway systems of Russia proper and the Trans-Siberian railway, so that the new line to Tashkent not only brought European Russia close to Central Asia but also formed a link with Far East. Krasnovodsk had steamer communication with Moscow, and was also connected by rail with Batumi (Batum) on the Black Sea. Thus, it was only two days' journey for the longer

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In the latter half of the century, the Eastern question had an important bearing on the Afghan issue. Britain's support for the Ottoman empire had led Russia to put pressure on Afghanistan to gain concession from the British in Europe. General Skobelev had this in mind when he said 'the stronger Russia in Central Asia, the weaker England in India, and the more conciliatory she will be in Europe'. This is further proved from Moscow Gazette extract of July, 1878.

The time has arrived for Russia to establish her influence over the whole of Central Asia, and this is all the more easy as the ruler of Afghanistan is not on good terms with England - our foe in Central Asia. The concentration of our influence on the frontiers of the territories of the Empress of India would be a natural answer to the English seizure of Cyprus. In Asia, there are two political powers confronting each other, and they must inevitably come into collision. England wishes to be Russia's nearest neighbour in the Asia Minor, and it is only natural, therefore, that Russia, in her turn, should desire to approach somewhat nearer to the English frontiers in India.

Afghanistan thus became very important in geo-strategic considerations of both Russia and England. It virtually became a zone where the territorial interests of Britain and Russia clashed. Russia sought to expand beyond the Oxus, while the British fortified themselves along the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. The changes however in European balance of power and the increase of German influence over the government at Constantinople, tended to close the Anglo-

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Russian garrison in the Caucasus, and was conveniently connected with Russia proper. If Russia moved further South, her logical step would have been a dash upon Herat.
Russian rivalry in Europe. The stability of political conditions in Afghanistan after 1880, and the resistance by Abdur Rahman and Habibullah Khan, to play the role of a mere pawn in the game of power policies paved the way for the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. The constant Russian advance towards south in the Central Asia and her conquest of Bukhara had opened the road to Afghanistan. Negotiations between London and St. Petersburg culminated in January 1873 in a gentleman’s agreement that accepted Afghanistan's boundary from Lake Victoria (Ozero Zorkul in Russia) 13,400 feet up in the Pamirs down the river system that begins with the lake's snow-fed waters and eventually takes the name of Amu Darya, the Oxus of antiquity, until the river turns northwestward toward the Aral Sea. With colonial carelessness, neither British nor Russians cared that this boundary divided Uzbek and Tadzik peoples in what had been one ethnic, economic, cultural and historic region. Nor did they clarify the precise river boundary, leaving islands in dispute until a 1946 Afghan - Soviet frontier agreement. This agreement was not a formal treaty but it forestalled a head on collision between Britain and Russia. Nevertheless, the situation remained tense because a few months later Russia took Khiva and two came to the brink of war in 1876-78, when Russia made a drive for the Turkish Straits and sent a strong military mission to Kabul. But at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Russia was kept off from the Straits and it withdrew its mission from Kabul.
When in 1885 war again threatened over the Panjdeh Oasis, Britain backed Amir Abdur Rahman 1881-1901. Nevertheless, there took direct negotiations between Russia and Britain for setting up a joint boundary commission. The Britian contended that Russia should withdraw from Pul-i-Khatar and Panjdeh and on the same basis Afghanistan was asked to withdraw from Sari Yaza. Rejecting the proposal, Russia demanded the Afghan withdrawal from Panjdeh as both Pul-i-Khatun and Panjdeh remained outside the Afghan influence. With this impasse the strategic situation changed. Russians reached 170 miles nearer to Herat and the British reached up to Quetta leading to further counter-proposals by each. However in July 1887 Russo-Afghan border was established in the north-west, where the Oxus river turns sharply into Russian territory. Beginning the process of elimination from the Hari Rud to the Oxus, the boundary was settled from Zulfiqar on the Hari Rud to the Khusk river and thence to the Murghab. By June 1886, the Afghan north-western boundary from Zulfikar on the Hari Rud to Dukchi, 40 miles of the Oxus was delimited.

The Turkomans' established limits of pasture constitute the significant aspect of this boundary. The Turkomans of Panjdeh and Merve have their pasture limits on the west of Kara Kum desert, while those living on the banks of the Oxus had on the east. Between these two lay a barren country. This compelled Russia to seek a compromise between the political and geographical boundaries. This frontier.
however. remained advantageous, for the earlier conditions against the reopening of the canals below Chizil Duktar remained in force, but the Afghan immigrants at Karatapa were allowed the exclusive use of the Maghor river. Further by restoring rights to the Sarikhs, the district of Khamiab was retained by Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the problem of Pamir continued. In 1891, Russia claimed the whole of Roshan and Shignan and suggested that the northern boundary of Afghanistan ran straight from Lake Victoria to the junction of kokcha with the Oxus, thereby increasing their claim to Badakhshan north of Faizabad. As reaction British claimed in accordance with the 1873 agreement that it was accepted that both Badakhshan and Wakhan belonged to Afghanistan. At this juncture China after consolidating its western and southern frontier in Turkestan gradually expanded in Pamirs. This called for British, Russia, China and Afghanistan to cooperate in the settlement of boundary issue which became more complicated when Sino-Afghan dispute at Somatash surfaced.

In 1893 Afghanistan lost Alichur Pamirs to Russia. The Amir of Afghanistan was restrained from vacating eastern portion of Wakhan and had negotiations with the British whose interest in the tribal areas south of the Hindukush was mainly strategic. Notwithstanding Chinese advance into the Pamirs, the British identified the Karakoram ranges as the natural boundary between Hunza and the Chinese territory of Sinkiang because to the north of Hunza it stretched towards
the junction of the Muztagh and the Hindukush was divided by a narrow wedge of Afghan territory separating from the Russian Pamirs. In a word, the whole question of Afghanistan's north-eastern frontier began to focus on and around the exchange of Trans-Oxus Roshan and Shignan for Oxus Darwaz. This led to the Durand mission to Kabul. Amir gave up all the districts held by him to the north of the upper Oxus on condition that he received in turn all districts not then held by him to the South of Oxus. So in 1895, the Anglo-Russian agreement over Pamir was concluded with the recognition of further assessment and concern with the Taghdumbash Pamir in the Chinese frontier. The Russo-Afghan frontier was demarcated up to the Poraloschverkorski, a point on the Taghdumbash, where it was accepted to have reached the Muztagh range of Sarikola which was taken up as actual Chinese frontier. The settlement laid down that the spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia to the east of Lake Victoria should follow the crest of the mountain ranges running somewhat to the south of the latitude of the lake as far as the Bedersky and Ortabel passes. From there the line should run along the same range where it remained to the south of the latitude of the said lake and on reaching that latitude of the said lake it should descend a spur of the range towards Kizil Robat on the Aksu river, if that locality was found not to be north of the latitude of the Lake Victoria, and thenceforth it should be prolonged in an easterly direction so as to meet the Chinese frontier. The result was border 1481 miles long between modern Afghanistan
and the Soviet Union. This length depended upon settlement of a Chinese-Soviet border dispute in the Pamirs. In 1963 Afghanistan and China defined a forty-seven mile border at a watershed more than 16,000 feet high, but its juncture points with the Soviet Union and Pakistan were in doubt.

The main drawback of the Russo-Afghan boundary has been its anthropographic character. So, instead of assimilating the political and ethnic features of the region, it has provided a sharp political contrast between them and divided the existing ethnic distribution. For example Turkoman, who inhabit the Oxus river region are found on both the banks of the river. Consequently any disturbance had a direct bearing on both sides of the boundaries. IN 1880s when Amir Abdur Rahman Khan led a military expedition in the northern province, many Turkomans migrated to the other side of the Oxus and aggravated the Russo-Afghan relations. Similarly in 1921 many Turkoman groups escaped to Afghanistan after crossing the Oxus resulting into the propaganda war against Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Thus friction and dispute are inherent in this boundary.

Post 1917 period saw the breakdown of Russian administration and civil war ranged throughout 1919 and 1920. The Red Army was attacked on seventeen different fronts. England, America, France, Japan, Italy, Serbia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the Baltic states, Poland, and a host of counter-revolutionary Russian generals were
opposing the Soviets and fighting extended from eastern Siberia to the Baltic and the Crimea. This also gave opportunity for Afghan irredentism in Central Asian territories north of the Amu Darya river. In the year immediately after 1917 Afghan Cavalry forces were active all over Central Asia, trying to retrieve and actually to expand historic Afghan policy in the region - as Iranians were also tempted to do in their own terra irredenta north of the Caspian sea, lost to Russia in the early nineteenth century. However, Soviet Russia survived and triumphed. While Amanullah succeeded his father in Afghanistan, declared Jihad against British and won freedom for his country. This ensured close link between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

The newly born Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic RSFSR was the first country to recognize the independence of Afghanistan on 27 March 1919. The Soviet Government also informed Amir Amanullah to have annulled all the Tzaust treaties and agreement infringing upon sovereignty of Afghanistan and particularly the Anglo-Russian convention of 31 August 1907. Amanullah in turn wrote on 7 April 1919 to V.I. Lenin, proposing diplomatic relations. In his letter to Mukhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Chairman of the RSFSR Central Executive committee (later the Supreme Soviet) he said:24

"Afghanistan, by its very spirit and nature, has since its emergence as an independent country been the champion of freedom and equality. However, for certain reasons it has up till now been unable to establish relations with other countries and peoples."
Since you, your excellency, my great and gracious friend, President of the Great Russian state, along with your comrades, who are friends of humanity have undertaken the honourable and task of concern for the peace and good of people and have declared the principle of freedom and equality of the countries and nations of the whole world. I am happy to sent to you this friendly message for the first time from independent and free Afghanistan on behalf of the Afghan people striving for progress."

Lenin’s reply on 27 May was later taken as recognition of Afghan independence and autonomy with the Bolsheviks as the first to accept that status. In turn, Afghanistan became the first state of officially recognize the Republic of Soviets. Lenin’s reply again exhibited the revolutionary rhetoric and urged Afghanistan to take the great historic task of uniting around itself all enslaved Muslim peoples and leading them on the road of freedom and independence. However, due to the events in the former Czarist Central Asian empire north of the Amu Darya made Afghanistan’s situation complicated.

During the time of the Bolshevik Revolution Central Asia was full of turmoil. The Muslims there had revolted twice during 1919. The Russian reply was full of overwhelming firepower and uncontrolled retaliation. These events and further ones in Tashkent in 1918 inspired largest

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* This statement is not supported by Western historians of the Soviet Union. Any legal capacity of Afghanistan to recognise any state or government was questionable. On May 27, 1919, Amanullah sued for peace and won later full freedom for Afghanistan to such direct foreign ties.
and most persistent resistance movement to the Soviet Union known as Basmachi resistance. According to a Soviet Encyclopaedia itself, it was almost a mass movement of the peasant population led by the local national intelligentsia and religious and temporal leader as well as partisan commanders. Basmachi bands numbering 20,000 men reached a peak of power between 1920 and 1922. Despite some help from Amanullah and British, the Basmachis were ultimately defeated. But many Tajiks and Uzbeks as well as Turkoman also fled across the Amu Darya to join their kin in northern Afghanistan in 1930s.

The Basmachi situation troubled Soviet-Afghanistan relations. However Amanullah's government installed treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union on 13 September 1920 and signed in Moscow on 28 February 1921. Each contracting party recognized the independence of the other. Lenin, in a letter to Amanullah, observed that the treaty gave 'formal consolidation to the friendship and mutual sympathy between Afghanistan and Russia which have grown and strengthened in the past two years. Both countries prize their independence and freedom for themselves and for all nations of the east. There are no issues between Afghanistan and Russia likely to lead to differences, or even a shadow on Russo-Afghan friendship.' Later on, Afghanistan also concluded treaty with Turkey, Iran, France and Italy leading to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty in which Great Britain renounced control of Afghanistan's external relations.
The Soviet diplomacy at this stage sought to achieve a favourable position in Afghanistan vis-a-vis Great Britain and other western countries by the popular Marxist style. Said Lenin in a friendly reply to Amanullah on 27 May 1919: "Russian Soviet Government and the High Afghan state have common interests in the East. Both states cherish their independence and want independence and freedom for themselves and for all the peoples of the east. Friendship between them is not only because of this, but more because of the fact that there are no problems between Afghanistan and Russia which can cause disagreements or even cast a shadow on Russo-Afghan friendship. The old imperial Russia has disappeared forever, and the high Afghan state now has for its northern neighbour the new Soviet Russia that has extended a hand of friendship to all the peoples of the east and to the Afghan people in the first place. Convinced that the bonds of friendship between Russia and Afghanistan will continue to strengthen, I take the liberty of expressing to you my sympathy and confidence that no one either by force or cunning will undermine the independence of the high Afghan state\(^3\)\(^2\). To this may also be added Georgi Vasilyevich Chicherin\(^3\)\(^3\) instructions to the Soviet Plenipotentiary Yakov Surits in Afghanistan on June 3, 1921.

Our policy in the east is not aggressive, it is a policy of peace and friendship. Throughout your work you must systematically stress this basic point - you must study the needs and requirements of Afghanistan and elucidate to us the wishes of its Government - you are instructed to pay particularly close attention to Amir's programme of reform. At Afghanistan's present stage of development, an enlightened absolutism of the
type that we had in our country in the eighteenth century is of great progressive significance. We (should) render all the assistance we can to the reformist undertakings of the progressive minded Amir. You must avoid altogether the fatal mistake of trying to impose Communism on that country. We say to the Afghan Government: you have one political system and we have another: but we are linked up by our community of aspirations for complete sovereignty and independence. We do not interfere in your internal affairs, we do not intrude upon the activity of your people. We do not for a moment contemplate imposing on your people a programme that is alien to them at the present stage of development.

The treaty with the Soviet Union helped Afghanistan under Amanullah to establish Afghanistan independence. The Soviet Government agreed to return to Afghanistan territory in Panjdeh district and to pay Afghanistan a yearly subsidy of 1000000 gold or silver rubles. In addition, the Soviet Union helped Amanullah in the task of modernizing the society and economy of Afghanistan. In this task the Soviet Union outbid the western countries with aid and quickly built up its advisory personnel to 120, the largest group of foreigners in Afghanistan. Soon the Afghan air force was to all intents and purposes a Russian service and was indeed to be regarded as a Russian advanced base. But the Soviet pre-eminence in presence and influence in Afghanistan did not last long. After long tour of Europe, including Moscow, Egypt, Turkey, Persia and India, Amanullah returned home in July 1928. Inspired by this tour, Amanullah sought to modernize Afghanistan in the way that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk did in Turkey. This led to a wider rebellion and throne was occupied by an Afghan Tajik named Habibullah but known as Bacha-i-Saqa. His chaotic rule ended on 13 October, 1929 and
Mohammad Nadir Khan took the throne in 1933. He was murdered and succeeded by his son Mohammad Zahir Shah whose reign lasted for about 30 years. During Nadir Khan's regime, Soviet-Afghan relations improved notwithstanding many strains. Nadir Khan followed a policy of non-intervention in Soviet Central Asia, and refused to allow Afghanistan to be used to promote anti-Soviet, Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic activities.

Under the regime of Zahir Shah, Afghanistan relations with Soviet Union improved considerably through the mutual Soviet - Afghan Assistance Pact of 1931, new trade agreement of 1936, large volume of Russian exports to Afghanistan and other various deals. The Soviet objectives during this period also broadened to include providing incentives for Afghanistan not to join a Northern Tier alliance, encouraging economic and trade dependence on the USSR, and using Afghanistan to support Soviet regional objectives and to serve as a model of good neighbour relations. The factors that permitted the broadening of these objectives were the withdrawal of Great Britain from India, U.S. refusal to fulfill Britain’s balancing role in the region, the advent of modernization oriented leaders in Afghanistan, and the general opening of Soviet attitudes toward the Third world which accompanied post-war decolonization and death of Stalin. During the period, Afghanistan first tried to keep balanced relations with the Soviet Union and the United States which actually lasted from 1946 to 1963. The next
decade exhibited the Afghan till towards the Soviet Union in view of sharp deterioration in its relation with Pakistan on Pakhtunistan issue. Thereafter, Afghanistan tried to normalize its relationship with all its neighbours including Pakistan and Iran.

The monarchy was overthrown and the Republic of Afghanistan proclaimed by Daoud on 17 July, 1973 with himself its founder President and Prime Minister. His declared objective was to stop King Zahir Shah’s apparent moves to improve relations with the United States and lower Afghanistan’s commitment to Pushtunistan. However, he signed pact with Shah of Iran amounting to the reducing of Soviet influence in the Northern tier and an understanding with Pakistan to run down virtually the Pushtunistan movement. These political contradictions led his fall and the Saur revolution of 1978. The culmination of further events finally led the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

AFGHAN ETHNICITY AND POPULATION

The geographical remoteness of Afghanistan has considerably influenced the character of the people. The physical environment has to large extent determined all the major aspects of the Afghan society. Owing to its location, Afghanistan has seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed the world. Each horde, as it passed, will have left its mark on the inhabitants of the country, one way of life constantly
In addition, the Hindukush and its westward extension served to divide the westward migrating Central Asian tribes into two streams diverting one westward to Herat and Iran and the other southward to the Indian subcontinent through the seasonally open passes of the Hindukush. It served as much to unite as to divide Central Asia from the Indian subcontinent. Yet the story of Hindukush - neither of peripheral remoteness nor of the disconnected comings and goings of people and ideas merely - the wild mountains that are the backbone of Afghanistan not only divided central and southern Asia, the Oxus and the Indus but also always interconnected the two parts of Asia into a system of inter-relations.36

Afghanistan is a traditional multi-ethnic state having preponderance of the Pashtun tribes. The entire population is diverse both ethnically and culturally. The Pashtuns constitute less than half of the population. They are a leading and dominant nationality or tribe in the country. Their dominance is resented by other people. The Pashtuns are kinsmen of the Pathans of the north-west frontier province of Pakistan. as the Baloch and Braui are kinsmen of Pakistani Baluchistan. Similarly, to the north, the Tadzhik, Uzbeks, Turkmen etc. the second largest nationality of Afghanistan have their kinsmen in the Soviet Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan. To the west the Afghan-Iran border divides six nationalities - Baloch, Brahui, Turkmen, Fariswan, Aimaq and Siaibash. The Hazaras - the purely and
completely Afghan tribe are concentrated in this central mountains. Thus, Afghans are a gaggle of ethnic nationalities. Their cultural diversity is accentuated by the fact that the various nationalities speak different languages and dialects, have different physical features and practice different customs. Afghanistan thus is exposed to several cross national ethnic pressures - a political geographic factor that came sharply into focus since Saur Revolution of 1978, both for external and internal reasons. To this may also be added extreme backwardness in regard to education, economy, transport and communication etc. Further there is little sense of national identity as Afghans, little feeling of Afghan patriotism and little loyalty to the state. In addition primary loyalties exist which make local chieftains and landlords run things pretty as they please in the province. Many other ethnic groups are divided by boundaries from their co-ethnics in the adjoining states - the groups living to the north of the Hindukush range, which divides the country from east to west are Turkmens, Uzbeks and Kergiz, all speaking Turkic language and dialectics. In addition, Persian speaking Tajiks and other ethnics have also inhabited this region: in the west are Persians and Turkmen speakers which are also found in Iran as well and their language is referred to as Tajik, Farsi and Dari, in the south and the east of Afghanistan live the Pashtuns together with Brauis and Baluchs having their co-ethnics in Pakistan, which have influenced Pak-Afghan relations. All this has 'time and time again, exerted their influence to retain
control of the state or perpetuate instability in one form or the other.\textsuperscript{37} Simultaneously the nature and the process of Afghanistan's boundaries have exerted considerable influence on the State's activities and on the response reaction of its tribal inhabitants, leading Afghanistan at the crossroads with its inhabitants as well as with its neighbour irrespective of the differences in the ideological approach.

Historically, external involvements have taken place to manipulate ethnic diversity against the Central Government to gain economic and political advantages - the Soviet involvement with Kurdish and Azeri ethnic groups in the 1940s or the American involvement through surrogate in the Kurdish autonomy moves in Iraq during sixties and recently in the wake of liberalism of Kuwait by the US led UN forces in February 1991. The Soviet influence in Afghanistan can be seen from Kabul's declaration and action during the first twenty months (April 1978 to December, 1979) revise then existing pattern on the basis of the Soviet Model\textsuperscript{38} as distinct from the most Middle Eastern countries, where "the pattern has been to ignore or suppress Muslim ethnic minorities. Constitutionally the smaller non-Muslim ethnic minorities who have had no avenues open to them for perpetuating their languages, literatures, or cultures. Unlike religious minorities, they do not have right for ethnic political representation".\textsuperscript{39}

Like the Soviet Union, there has been the lack of clear demographic information in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{40}. In order to adopt
a new nationality policy. First Census was conducted in 1979 stating categorically an ethnic question on the mother tongue of the individual. However, there are some discrepancies in the Soviet and the Afghan engineering of the Census. For example, Soviet Uzbeks and and Turkmens often have an exaggerated estimate of their population across Soviet borders. It is fed by the continual stress in Soviet media aimed at ethnic groups on the suppression of co-ethnics living in Muslim countries, and the contrasting autonomy of these ethnic groups in the Soviet Unions. This factor becomes more significant in the Central Asian People's reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The bid to implement the nationality policy—teaching children in their own mother tongue became critical for non-Pashtu and Persian speaking groups. The Afghan government also recognized Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, and Nuristani language, in addition to Pashtu and Persian. Uzbek has been recognized due to demographic factors—"more than one million Uzbeks indigenous to Afghanistan living in the area from Maimana in the West to Faizabad in the east" and they constitute as the third largest linguistic group in the country after Pashtu and Persian speakers. Among them are Muhajirin who fled Soviet Central Asia following the collectivisation of the 20s and 30s. Ethno-linguistic facility for Turkmens, numbering 1,25,000 is explained on regional factor on the line of the Soviet Union, denying the practical necessity of Turki a common Turki dialect of Central Asia, often called

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category in its library form. The choice of Baluchis and Nuristanis was based on their potential regional importance, (1,00,000 Baluchis and an equal number of Nuristanis) and Brahuis (2,00,000) were not given the nationality status because Baluchis overlap into Iran and Pakistan laying historical claims to coastal region on the Arabian sea. While Nuristanis were posing problem for the Afghanistan Government for fighting Kabul. They are strategically important as long Afghanistan they inhabit the areas through which China and Pakistan communicate. Along with Nuristanis, Hazars the major Shi‘te Muslim group having their cultural pattern territory and distinct dialect of Persian called Hazaragi, have been ignored by the Afghanistan Government as they have either kept aloof or anti-Soviet and they inhabit central spine of the country.

Prior to the Soviet intervention, four areas were selected -- government participation, education, newspaper, and culture to implement the nationality policy. The representation was given in the cabinet and officers to the ethnic minorities despite Pashtun dominance. An Uzbek poet, Abdul Hakim Sharai Jauzjani was given place in the cabinet and was replaced in the late 1979 by the Turkmen Mohammad Khan Jalaler. Jauzjani vigorously promoted Turkmen and Uzbek interests, organised committees to study the unification of Uzbek and Turkmen orthography and language and promoted Turkic language cultures and composed verses with political orientation. 44 Pashtun domination has been opposed. For
instance. Setam-e Milli organization having leftist (both pro-Soviet and Maoist) orientation included Turkic and Persian speaking minorities and created channel for Ethnic minority expression. This has resulted in the inclusion of token ethnic minorities in the Government as well as spread of insurgency, chiefly in Badakhshan in the Panjshir valley and in the Hazarajat notwithstanding their being logistically ill-placed and low level of attraction towards these minorities by insurgent leaders.

However, the areas in which Afghanistan regime implemented its national policy initially were education, language and culture. Before 1978 no publication in the ethnic minority language of Afghanistan was allowed except biography of Turkic literary figures such as Sultan Hussean Bagquara and Mir Ali Shir Navai partial recognition of the cultural heritage of Turkic people having the religio-mystic nature in Persian available only at some places like Mazari Sharif and Balkh. The result was that most Turkic Afghans who were literate at all could not read or write own language and became dependent upon Soviet Turkic advises. In such pursuits, the school system was envisioned first graders were permitted choice of attending classes in any of five languages - Pashtun, Persian, Uzbek, Turkmen and Baluch. Each year a new language was proposed to be taught in the selected languages and this enable a student to complete his first 10 years of study in his own language. However, the plan is fraught with many difficulties like complications.
created by the lack of text books, teacher and specialist and unavailability of all choices at on place due to geography.

To promote the selected languages as well as to spread its revolutionary message far and wide, weekly newspapers in Uzbek, Turkmen and Baluch were started after 1978 in Kabul.

The material published included chiefly government declarations, speeches and decrees with little cultural material. 'For instance,' the Uzbek weekly Yulduz issued its first number on July 6, 1978. In its first issue, the four page weekly devoted much space to quotations from Turkic poets of Central Asia including Navai Zahruddin Babur, Ahmed Yassavi and the contemporary Uzbek poet Jauzani. Subsequent issues have included materials taken from the Soviet Uzbek newspaper Uzbekistan Mazaniyati and from Aynin, the Soviet Uzbek publication aimed at non-Soviet Uzbeks. The Turkmen language weekly is called Gurash (struggle) and the Baluch Soub (struggle), and both publications in the summer of 1978.

All these papers are printed in a form of the Arabic alphabet formulas in Afghanistan, the one used for Persian. To date, the Soviets have not introduced a modification in this alphabet to allow for the writing of short vowels as they did among Soviet Muslims during the 1920s. In addition, the role of Soviet ethnic advisors, officers, engineers, doctors, film makers and other specialist can not be ruled out in the policy formulates of government, science and technology, military, society and culture. Most important has been the supply of military aid leading the Afghans into tying their
economy, through barter agreements for non-military goods with that of the Soviet Union. Please refer Map - 1.

THE SOVIET ETHNIC PROBLEM

A country's internal as well as internal political behaviour is the geographical expression of the interaction between internal dynamics and external compulsions. The Soviet Union is the country of multinational diversities amidst which the Central Asian ethnicity was to have a direct bearing on its policy on Afghanistan, largely on account of ethnic factors. There are about more than forty five million Muslims inside the USSR - one of the largest Muslim populations in the world in size, second only to the countries like Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Indonesia etc. This population, however, is of quite exceptional ethnic, cultural and regional diversity: Turkic problem, such as, the Tatars, Azerbaidzhans, Uzbeks and Uighurs; Iranians such as Tadzhiks, Ussetians, Kurds and Baluchis; Caucasians, such as the Avars, Lezghis and Tabasaran; and several other small groups, such as the Arabas, the Armenian Khemshils, the Chinese Dungans, the Central Asian Gypsies, the Mongol Sart Kalmuks and the Finno-Grian, Mordvinians and Udmeerles. Their linguistic heritage is so varied as to include some 15 Turkic, 10 Iranian and, 30 Caucasian languages- not to mention Chinese, Mongol and an obscure form of Arabic. So far as concerned their social and cultural origins, the Tadzhiks represent an ancient urban tradition: the Kazakhs are still
AFGHANISTAN - PRINCIPAL TRIBES AND ETHNIC GROUPS
nomadic: the Pamirs even now lead an isolated existence in remote mountains valleys. 48

After the Bolshevik Revolution 1917, efforts were made for political self-determination in the Central Asia. But due to partial success there began drive towards collectivization after 1928. Mass Russian colonization took place and continued for the next decade. Ethnographic information 49 shows contrast in the degree of detail and coverage offered for different ethnic groups and periods. Nonetheless, among Central Asian groups we found a combination of new and old and people "clinging tenaciously to those items which do not interfere with material progress" 50 or can be modified to serve it. Syntheses between traditional and Soviet forms can be seen in clothing, diet etc., and the Central Asian Soviet elites provide Soviet basis - a combination of Soviet with local term for leader because they function as intermediaries and continue to focus upon their traditional culture. Thus, ethnicity in the USSR is not just a cultural or historical given, or a political identity to be manipulated from above but has concrete meaning for its people influencing their every day's life.

The territorial demographic rooting as we shall see below, is the primary determinant of ethnic relation in society and political participation in the power dynamic of the Soviet State because of the interaction taking place within the individual union republics and between the indigenous population and the local Russian population. most
of which has migrated to the border lands in the relatively recent past.\textsuperscript{51} However, cultural and historical conditions have set limits for Central Asian participation— a traditional way of looking to other Turkic peoples, primarily Tatars for cultural leadership: a Muslim cultural heritage inclining Central Asian intellectuals toward humanistic careers rather than scientific and technical ones; restricting the participation of women in public and social life and also an instinctive racism of the Europeans settled in the Central Asia and finally the low levels of education and training among Central Asian nationalities.

The Soviet leadership owing to above factors has been making changes in the policy adopted towards the Central Asia. During the first seven years of the new regime, old administrative divisions of the area— corresponding to historical and geographical formation and not to ethnic factor viz the Republic of Kazakhstan being renamed from erstwhile the General government of the steps: The Autonomous Republic of Turkistan and the merger of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva to become the Peoples Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm. It was only in 1924 that the area was divided by Stalin along national lines:

(1) the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, created on 27 October 1924 (with written language distinct from Chagatay since 1923;)

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(2) the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, created on 27 October 1924 (with a written language close to Chagatay since 18th Century but modern literary Turkmen created in 1924 only)

(3) the Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic first created as an Autonomous Region on 14 October 1924, and Autonomous Republic on 15 March 1925 and a Federal Republic on 15 October, 1929 (with old literary language since 9th century)

(4) the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic created first under the name of Qara Kirghiz Autonomous Region on 14 October 1924. Autonomous Republic on 1 Feb. 1926 and Federal Republic since 5 December 1936 (with written language created in 1920);

(5) Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, created first under the name of Kirghiz Autonomous Republic on 26 August 1920, and became Kazakh Autonomous Republic in April 1925, and Federal Republic since December 5, 1936 (with written language since mid-19th century)


Thus, several nations and nationalities each with its own territory and written language were created. Exceptions were Uyghurs with literary language, Neo-Uyghur close to the
old Chagatay and Dungans using Chinese translated into Crillic script. However, the problem remains in tact. In its national perspectives the problem revolves around four main issues: one, the demographic vitality of the Central Asian people, young age pyramid large and united families clarify of diverse character their demography. The Kirghis, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen comprise only a small proportion of the urban population in their republic. The Russians comprise the most numerous group living in these cities with little migration from the countryside due to the lack of knowledge of Russian language and an alien cultural environment. So, only a small proportion of the factors and constructive works in the region were native to it in the sixties with the demographic explosion in the rural areas, great political upheaval for socio-economic reason set in 70s and considerable migration from the rural areas of Central Asians took place along with the feeling of discontent with communist ideologies and state system.

On the basis of the 1979 census results, the rise in the number of Muslims during the first inter-censusal period of 1959-70 was more than 2.4 times the national growth rate of 1.34 per cent per year, and it climbed to 2.74 times the national growth rate of 0.90 per cent per year during 1970-79. In large part, this was due to the drop in the number of Russians from 1.04 to 0.62 per cent per year in the two periods respectively. Especially the reproduction rates of Central Asians in 1978-79 were 2.15 - 2.91 per cent as.
opposed to 0.93 - 1.00 per cent in the Slavic republics, RSFSR, Ukrain and Belorussia, and this trend is responsible for demographic explosion, the successful survival of private initiative and the progress achieved on the road to modernization and development. And the standard of living in Muslim territory of the USSR is lower than the rest of the country. Their income is lower and they are disproportionately rural in their residence but they were better off than the population of such countries as Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

For the statistical information of Central Asian Sea, the Appendix 1 and 2.

In addition to demographic factors which concern the Soviet policy makers in the Central Asia, there is the question of the identity and allegiance of the people in Central Asia. Alexandr̂a Bennengson gives classification of the three allegiance:

1) sub-national or tribal the oldest of the three directed towards the extended family, the tribe or territory;

2) national directed toward the Union Republics as they were created out of the 1924 delimitation in the territories of old Turkistan and of the former Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara:

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## APPENDIX - I

### ETHNIC TRIBES OF AFGHANISTAN, THEIR CORRESPONDING NUMBER AND GROWTH RATE TO SOVIET CENTRAL AND OTHER NATIONALITIES/ETHNIC GROUPS (1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.N.</th>
<th>Name of Ethnic Tribe</th>
<th>Population (1970)</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Rate of Main Tribal Groupings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Pushhtuns</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>2,135,883</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>9,195,093</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Turkomen</td>
<td>270,000 to 400,000</td>
<td>1,525,284</td>
<td>33.0 Tekke, Ersary, Salor, Chaudor, Beshir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Baluchis</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>12,582</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Hazaras</td>
<td>870,000</td>
<td>Not listed in census after 1926</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Nuristanis</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1,452,222</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Alimaq, Farsiwan, Brahu</td>
<td>1,420,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Karakalpaks</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>236,069</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,298,818</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Pamiris, Galchahs, Mountain Tadzhiks</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>87,314</td>
<td>- Shugnis, Rushanis, Ishkaishis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>129,015,140</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40,753,246</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Byelorussians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,051,755</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX - II

APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE ISLAMIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR

(1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethic Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkic (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, Azerbaidzhanis, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Chuvash, Bashkirs, Karakalpaks, Kumyks, Uighurs, Karachais, Turks, Balkars, Nogais)</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian (Tadzhiks, Ossetians, Kurds, Persians, Tats, Baluchis)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian (Chechens, Kabardians, Ingush, Adygeis, Abkhazians, Cherkess, Abazins and all the Dagestanis except the Nogais)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Including Dungans)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

supra-national, a feeling of being a part of the Islamic community (Dar-ur-Islam) or at least of central Asian Islam as a whole in opposition to the alien world of the rest of the Soviet Union:

To this may be added:

4) allegiance directed towards the Soviet Union as a federal state at national and federal allegiance conflict with each other creating a strong competition between two officially promoted goals. Moreover conflicting allegiances can co-exist not only within the same ethnic groups but also within the same persons. 56

The orientalist Michael Zand sees the feelings of identity or allegiance as the by-product of cultural process and calls the culture of Soviet Central Asia as local sub-types of the general Soviet sub-culture which emerged after the October Revolution. To his mind, local Muslim variants of the sub-culture are its Tadzhikized Uzbekitized images, akin to the Soviet whole despite religious and ethnic difference while Lev Gumilev defined the meaning of ethnus, as a kind of inner drive acquired from early childhood and bound to last as long as the customs are tradition of the ethnus survives. When applied to the Soviet Central Asian Muslims all these can not appear otherwise than Islamic in nature. 57 But distinction is to be made between Islam as a religion and a feeling of Islamic identity to which an agonistic can adhere, a feeling of belong to a group distinguishable from the other. The Soviet leadership was quite aware of the quick
repercussions of ethnic trouble on the southern borders if Afghanistan was allowed to go in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. So they decided to strike.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Soviet Union sent its troops to Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. A. Petrov justified it in view of an attempt of imperialism to take advantage internal reactions in Afghanistan. "The fall of Shah in Iran had created cracks in the notorious strategic arc that Americans have been building for decades close to the southern borders of the Soviet Union since Dulles era. In order to mend these cracks, the US sought to bring in Afghanistan under its control, but our country made no secret that it will not allow Afghanistan being turned into a bridge-head for preparation of imperial aggression against the Soviet Union".58 Further on January 3, 1980 Pravada elaborated that "having lost their bases in Iran, the Pentagon and the US Central Intelligence Agency were counting on stealthy approaching our territory to Afghanistan".59 Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR also said "if the limited contingent had not been sent into Afghanistan, it would have meant passively watching the creation on our southern border of a source of serious danger to the security of the Soviet State".60 After six months of the
intervention, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party claimed that "plans to create a threat to our country from the south have failed. It fully approves the measures taken to repulse the creation of a pro-imperialist bridgehead of military aggression on the southern border of the USSR. Added Brezhnev to it "we had no choice but to send the troops". 61

Let us examine these factors closely:

1. It has been demonstrated in the foregoing pages that Afghanistan over the last decade (1970-80) became the most telling symbol of the new cold war between the USA and the Soviet Union. However, it can not be taken for granted that Afghanistan was the prime cause of the collapse of detente and the revival for Soviet-American confrontation of the 1970. K.Subrahmanyam and his colleagues in the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis formulated the concept of new cold war and dated its beginning to 1978. K.Subrahmanyam quoted Zbigniew Brzezinski from his book, "Power and Principle". 62:

I have been reflecting on when did things genuinely go wrong in the US-Soviet relationship. My view is that it was on the day sometime in 1978 when at the SCC meeting, I advocated that we send in a carrier task force in reaction to the Soviet deployment of the Cubans in Ethiopia. The President backed the others rather than me, we did not react subsequently as the Soviets became more emboldened. We over reacted, particularly in the Cuban-Soviet brigadeiasco of the last fall that derailed SALT, the momentum of SALT was lost and the final nail in the coffin was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Brief, under reaction then
bred over reaction that is why I have used occasionally the phrase SALT lies buried in the sand of the Ogaden.

So the origin of the new cold war could be traced to the doctrinal changes in the strategic thinking of the US and NATO, political resurgence of the new right in the USA, the end of bi-polarisation and support to détente in the USA, the new strategic relationship between the USA and China and significant political developments in the Third World in Southern Africa, Horn of Africa and in Iran along with the developments in Afghanistan, together with its total exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel actively promoted by the US.

The Soviet Union alleged the imperialist aggression in Afghanistan. But the expression imperialist aggression was not made very clear. There is no evidence of the fact that the USA was intent upon harming or creating trouble for the Soviet Union through Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was over apprehensive to the dangers to be created by the replacement of a neutral if not a friendly state on an ethnically and religiously sensitive part of the border by an antagonistic if not hostile state of Afghanistan. Occasional references to religious and ethnic problems were also made in the Central Asian Republics and their hostility towards the Soviets viz. 1978 stark opposition to Russians in Dushanbe. To this may also be added the fear of spread
of *Jihad* by Muiaheedeen across Amu Dariya. The Basmachi fight is well known in this respect, which had Afghan Uzbeks and Turks as their folk heros. "If Afghanistan also came under the rule of Muslim fanatics, and since Pakistan and Turkey were Muslim too, Moscow might be faced with ban hostile Islamic neighbours close to the Muslims in Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus." 64

3) Afghanistan has a short frontier with China which was happy to give aid and encouragement to any anti-Soviet regime in Kabul. The Soviets suspected Peking to send arms to the Afghan rebels after the Saur Revolution. 65. The Soviet fears became established with the Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington in January, 1979 followed by the grant of the most favoured nation treatment by the US to China and the proposed visit of US defence secretary Harold Brown in October, 1979.

4) The Soviet Union might also be attracted towards the Afghanistan's mineral resources - natural gas and other minerals. 66. The Soviet experts made surveys several years earlier in the field of oil, copper, barite, bauxite, beryl, iron ore, fluor spar, coal and chrome etc.

5) To many western and other intellectual analysts the possibility of the Soviet Union exerting influence in the Indian Ocean through the territory of Afghanistan was also the factor in intervening Afghanistan.
Historic Russian drive to control warm water ports was cited to substantiate their arguments. However, it was quite remote on the part of the Soviet Union. But the genuine Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean then included: maintenance of trade and other links between Pacific provinces and other parts especially the Black Sea area through Indian Ocean; political interests in the Indian Ocean region; deployment of Chinese nuclear submarines and China's rapidly growing naval and nuclear power etc. So, the Soviet move into Afghanistan could give the Soviet air force a base 200 miles closer to the straits of Hormuz and thus check the growing western, Chinese and Japanese influence in the region.

IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS:

Theoretically, speaking, the official History of Soviet foreign policy upto the Brezhnev era evolved round four basis tasks:

1. To secure, together with the other socialist countries, favourable conditions for the building of socialism and communism;

2. To strengthen the units and solidarity of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood;

3. To support the national liberation movement and to effect all round cooperation with the young, developing countries:

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4. Consistently to uphold the principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the aggressive forces of imperialism and to save mankind from a new world war.

Under this framework, it may be argued that Soviets believed that PDPA would provide Afghanistan with a government with a socialist orientation and that it had with generous Soviet help and assistance - a good chance of success. In the pre-1978 era, the Soviet objectives towards Afghanistan were not to join a northern tier alliance by Afghanistan: to develop trade and links to encourage defence on the USSR; to conduct mutually beneficial trade relations etc. Events however took a turn on 27 April 1978 when Saur Revolution took place establishing the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Roderick Ava has called the political crux of the Afghan revolution, namely, an opened situation of violent struggle where in one set of contender attempts successfully or un成功fully to displace another from state powers". However, the leaders of Afghanistan revolution denied the Marxist nature of the regime. President Taraki declared on 6 May, 1978 "We are non-aligned and independent" and appealed all the countries including the USA for economic aid, and said nothing of new regime's connection with the Soviet Union. But radical socio-economic reforms had Marxist nature. Simultaneously, Leonid Brezhnev was reported to have told President Carter that the Soviets first heard of it over the radio. But, whether not the Soviet Union had
anything to do with the internal turmoil and Saur revolution in Afghanistan, they stood by it the moment it was proclaimed. The Soviet Union was the first to extend diplomatic recognition and both Taraki and Amin appreciated the unbreakable ties of brotherly friendship and neighbourliness of the Soviet Union. After the first few months of the PDPA regime, bitter political and personality clashes began to take place leading to alienation of people and intensification of insurgency in and around Afghanistan. Here, out of ideological factors, the Soviet Union was impelled to intervene in Afghanistan to save the Marxist regime from being toppled. According to Victor Grishin - a politburo member and the Moscow city party boss, "Socialist internationalism obliged us to help the Afghan people defend the April revolutions gains". 70 Leonid Brezhnev, sounding the echo of ideological commitment made it very clear that "failure to have acted would have meant leaving Afghanistan a prey to imperialism, allowing the aggressive forces to repeat in that country what they had succeeded in doing, for instance in Chile where the people's freedom was drowned in blood".71

THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERVENTION

In terms of international law it is the duty of each state not to intervene in the affairs of another state. The duty extends both to internal and external affairs. This is recognized in Arts. 1 and 3 of the Draft Declaration on the Right and Duties of State adopted in 1949 by the UN
International Law Commission, and by the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among states in accordance with the UN Charter, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970. This declaration also treats as intervention an interference with a state's inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems. According the eminent jurist, Starke, 'International Law generally forbids such intervention which in this particular connection means something more than mere interference and much stronger than mediation or diplomatic suggestion. To fall within the forms of the prohibition, it must generally speaking be in opposition to the will of the particular state affected' and almost always as Hyde points out 'serving by design or implication to impair the political independence of that state'. The term intervention has also been used by some writers in the expression subversive intervention to denote propaganda or other activity by one state with the intention of fomenting for its own purposes, revolt of civil strife in another state. International Law prohibits such subversive intervention. However there are following exceptional cases in which a state has at international law a legitimate right of intervention:

a. Collective intervention pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations (by enforcement action under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, or any action
sanctioned by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 3 November, 1950. Otherwise, the UN is prevented by Art. 2, para 7, of the Charter from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state):

b. to protect the rights and interests, and the personal safety of its citizens abroad:

c. Self-defence including collective self-defence by the parties to a mutual security treaty (Art 51 of the UN Charter) if intervention is necessary to meet a danger or an actual armed attack:

d. in the affairs of a protectorate under its domination:

e. if the state subject of the intervention has been guilty of a gross breach of international law in regard to the intervening state, for example, if it has itself unlawfully intervened.

As far as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is concerned, the Soviet Union justified its action in the following manner:

1) According to A. Petrov, "The Afghan government made an insisted request to the Soviet Union for the provision of immediate aid and support in the struggle against outside intervention. The Soviet Union decided to satisfy this request and to send to Afghanistan a limited Soviet military contingent which will be used..."
exclusively to help rebel armed interference from outside. The Soviet contingent will be completely withdrawn from Afghanistan when the factors that made this action necessary are no longer present. 76

2) The Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow brought out 'The Truth About Afghanistan - Documents, Facts and Eyewitness Reports'. 77 The forward of this publication states: 'in order to repulse the outside imperialist aggression the new leadership of Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union to render it prompt moral, political, economic and military assistance such requests had in fact been made to Afghanistan's northern neighbour a number of times both under President Taraki and later'.

The Soviet Union granted that request and sent limited troop contingents to Afghanistan with the sole task of helping the Afghans to fight the aggression. It was anticipated that the Soviet troops would leave Afghan territory when their mission was fulfilled. "In no way is this assistance limited in time, purpose and scale, directed against or does it infringe upon the interests of third countries. It is valid and legitimate, since it has been provided fully in accordance with the letter and spirit of the treaty of friendship. Good-neighbourliness and cooperation, which the two countries signed in December, 1978, and it is in keeping with international law.
specifically Article 51 of the UN Charter which provides for
the inalienable right of states to collective and individual
self-defence against aggression".

"The action taken jointly by Afghanistan and the USSR
is of an exclusively defensive nature and was motivated by
the pressing need resolutely and once and for all to put an
end to armed and any other interference by external forces
hostile to Afghanistan".

Un close examination the Soviet view rests upon the
proposition that the request to intervene came from the new
leadership of Afghanistan. With no indication was given
towards Taraki and later Amin because no military assistance
was given by the Soviet Union on their request. However
Leonid Brezhnev stated that during the life time of President
Taraki and later, the Afghanistan leadership repeatedly asked
the Soviet Union for assistance. "We on our part warned those
concerning that if the aggression was not stopped we would
not abandon the Afghan people in their trail. As in well-
known we keep our words". Babrak Karmal, who assumed
power in Kabul on December 29, 1979, also did not say that he
invited the limited armed contingents of USSR into
Afghanistan. On the contrary he on January 10, 1980 said 'it
was the old government that had invited in Afghanistan a
limited contingent of Soviet troops. This was not done by
Amin, who has been proved to be agent of the CIA. but the
majority of the Revolutionary Council'. But the council
resolved "the fraternal friendly assistance the Soviet Union
has lent to Afghanistan at the request of our government". 79

So, the question of who invited the Soviet troops in Afghanistan as attempted by the Soviet Union was shrouded in obscurity. The sending of invitation is the act of legitimate government. And in Afghanistan in 1979 there was only the revolutionary government of a party PDPA, which was fraction-ridden into Khalq and Parcham, the relations of which were governed by rivalry. But there existed no situation of insurgency or of civil war. There was no evidence of any diplomatic pre-mediation or suggestion between Karmal and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the intervention was unlawful and unjustified on invitational grounds.

As far as the contention of the Soviet Union that "it sent its limited contingent with the sole tasks to help Afghans to put an end to (i) armed, and ii) any other interference by external forces hostile to Afghanistan", is not substantiated by any proof of threat or actual external aggression in/around Afghanistan. As we have discussed before in this chapter, the increasing US presence in the region was there, but it was in the context of super power rivalry having global perception as its basis rather any design specifically meant to harm the Soviet Union through the control of the Afghanistan. Regionally speaking help and assistance was being given to the Afghan rebels by US, China and Pakistan but this could not amount to any threat of
aggression to the might of the Soviet Union through Afghanistan. Secondly and more significantly, there existed great turmoil inside Afghanistan on account of socio-economic drives of radical reforms of Taraki and Amin. And the pressure but not suggestion came from the Soviet Union since the summer of 1979 to rectify the left deviationist mistakes as well as to broaden the base of the government. So Noor Mohammad Taraki, while in Moscow on September 10, 1979 was persuaded by Brezhnev to win the civil war by a new political line of moderation and conciliation. Taraki is also said to have met with several Parcham leaders who were self-exiled in Moscow. So, the regime announced a United front of all progressive public and political forces - a plan welcomed by Moscow.\footnote{Simultaneously, Amin was accused in the end of August 1979 of selfish and personality cult, undemocratic with collusion with foreign enemies etc. While he was upgraded in July 1979 as Defence Minister, became suspicious of Taraki's move in Moscow. So he manoeuvred the PDPA and as a result Taraki was relieved from party and state posts on health ground and finally replaced by Amin. Later on it was transpired that Taraki has been killed by Amin's men in the dark night of 8 October, 1979.\footnote{This is nothing more than personality based fraction, ridden nature of PDPA and the struggle for power pursuant to it. Nonetheless, Amin was at logger heads with the Soviet Union, despite Soviet support and 6.5 million \$ worth of military assistance. It may be noted here that Soviet military advisors like Gen. Alexander A. Erishchev, Chief of the main political administration of the}
Soviet armed forces before such Soviet supply of weapons and General Ivan G. Pavlovski, Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Command Force visited Afghanistan during the period of Amin's leadership. So, Amin began to shift his allegiance towards the US as he had several meetings with the American Charge d' Affairs and took various measures - further reforms, inculcation of Islamic values and symbols, release of political prisoners etc. But it was of no avail, insurgency got intensified in the south of the country and in Paktia province for the suppression of which a major offensive was taken by Amin which caused some 40,000 Afghans leading to Pakistan. Amin made contact with General Zia-ul-Haq in early December, which resulted into Agha Shahi's Pakistan's foreign minister, visit to Afghanistan but nothing could work and Soviets intervened on December 27, 1979.

And now the question whether the Soviet intervention was, as claimed by the Soviet Union, full in accordance with the i) letter, ii) spirit of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of 1978 and iii) Article 51 of the UN Charter. The treaty was signed in 1978. Article 4 of the treaty provided for cooperation in the military field in the interest of "strengthening of defence capacity of the high contracting parties" this article is similar to Article 3 of the Warsaw Pact Treaty of 1955 and after signing this treaty, fair east European states namely, Poland, German Democratic Republic, Romania and Hungary also signed separate treaties with the Soviet Union on stationing of Soviet troops. But Afghanistan did not sign
any such treaty with Russia on stationing the Soviet troops in Afghanistan after intervention which made provision (Art. 11 of the fundamental principles of DRA, paras 1.77, 1.83 and 1.84) to perpetuate indefinitely the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Soviet Union's justification of treaty obligation is not sound enough in the light of all the then existing facts and circumstances.

So far as Article 51 of the UN Charter is concerned, we have already dealt the essential characteristic features. Under these features, it can be safely said that no armed attack had taken place in Afghanistan prior to December 27, 1979. Secondly, no immediate report was made to the Security Council by Afghanistan or the Soviet Union as required by Art 51. Thirdly, as we have seen no invitation from the legitimate government of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union as the two ingredients: i) the existence of the government ii) the fact of invitation by that government could be seen.

The question of Afghanistan came before the Security Council in January 1980 but the council could not take any decision. So, the UN General Assembly discussed this question on 14.1.80, 20.11.1980 and on 18.11.81 respectively and on each occasion expressed its deep concern at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan in contravention of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and it repeatedly called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Thus, the USSR virtually committed armed
interference, as defined by resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the UN General Assembly by use of its armed forces in Afghanistan in contravention of the UN Charter.

THE INTERVENTION AND THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan espoused reaction all over the world. The mass media throughout the globe became very concerned over this issue, which made the Soviet Union to defend before the outraged opinion of many countries by launching a campaign of blaming outsiders for supporting the Afghan resistance to the Kabul regime. Nonetheless, the intervention was condemned by the Western world and many Third world countries. In the United Nations also most of the countries voted against the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan without specifically mentioning the Soviets in Afghanistan.

It was, however, the United States which took a lead in this respect. "We are", reacted the President Carter, "the other super power on earth and it became my responsibility to take action that would prevent the Soviets from this invasion with impunity." Carter telephoned the leaders of UK, France, West Germany, Italy and Pakistan and all agreed with him that Soviet action is a grave threat to peace because of threat of further Soviet expansion into neighbouring countries in South West Asia. On 28 December, 1979 he also sent Brezhnev a message calling the Soviet troop withdrawal and saying that the Afghanistan action, if not corrected, would have very
serious consequences to US-Soviet relations. He found Brezhnev's reply as the inadequate as the person, he claimed, invited him in President Amin, was murdered or after the Soviet pulled their coup. However the Soviet fears before the intervention were also analysed: The Soviets invaded Afghanistan because of a broad fear of the crescent of militant Islamic anti-Soviet states on its southern borders, with the added possibility of Chinese or US influence and not because it seeks to gain access to the Indian Ocean and control over Middle East. While the military correspondent of the New York Time, Drew Middeton viewed: "Soviet forces could further more into Iran or Pakistan and command the entrance and exit to the Persian Gulf and the policy of the US should be to supply Pakistan with modern fighter air crafts, tanks, anti-tank missiles and armed personnel carrier. The Chief political drawback seen by some officials in Washington is that such a steps would frighten India and possibly move that country closer to the Soviet Union, thus, shifting the power balance in Asia evermore towards Russia. And this is what exactly happened, which we shall see in the next chapter. President Carter realized a strategic challenge and declared: "our own nation's security was directly threatened. the Soviet's move into Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again until they reach warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies. The Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in that part of the world in a very
differing interests of the allies on the use of sanctions would have emerged. Perhaps in view of economic recession, few countries were eager to restrict trade with the USSR - the West Germany increased its exports by thirty-one percent in the first nine months of 1980 while boycotting the Moscow Olympics. While Europeans were more eager to continue disarmament talks with the USSR to prevent detente being collapsed. At the same time, Scandinavian countries such as Sweden adopted ambivalent approach to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A Finnish newspaper suggested, for example, that there was a double standard in the mildness of general world reaction to the Soviet action.

The Third World countries also criticized the Soviet action in Afghanistan. A wave of protest on in Islamic countries impelling the extra-ordinary Islamic Meet on 27 to 29 January 1980 in Islamabad to condemn the Soviet action as military aggression against the Afghan people and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops. Harsh attacks on the Soviet Union came in China. Observed a newspaper "from pulling the strings and using surrogates, their (Soviet) method has escalated to armed occupation of a sovereign country and change of its government by violent means. They have extended the use of the theory of limited sovereignty from their community of nations to a non-aligned and Islamic country of the third world". In all other countries there was to more or less extent, opposition to the Soviet action in Afghanistan
despite favourable or equivocal stand among some circles including government in all Third World countries. The most affected countries of South Asia were Pakistan and India.
AFGHANISTAN AFTER SOVIET INTERVENTION: STRATEGIC LOCATION AND REFUGEES' SPILL-OVER TO PAKISTAN AND IRAN (1982)
NOTES


21. Gopal Krishan K. op. cit p.91

22. This length was used in standard Soviet and Afghan references in the early 1980s, e.g. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report, South Asia, Washington, 29 June 1981, p.61 which uses the equivalent 3.994 kms. Alexander, Boundary Study No.26 uses 1281 miles, or 2061 kms, based on imperial map measurements.


33. Ibid.


38. During the International Kushan Conference in Kabul in November 1978 it was proposed to create a progressive national cultural system and in the first step there appeared a condition ensuring evolution of art and literature, education and publication in the mother tongues of tribes and nationalities resident in Afghanistan.


65. See An Article by Vladimir Solov'ov and Elena Klepikova in Los Angeles Times. 29 December, 1980, part 2. p. 5.


78. Quoted in Ibid.
79. Ibid.
81. FBIS, 10 October, 1979.
90. Ibid.
91. Afghanistan (House of Commons) p.13.