Chapter IV

Globalization and International Terrorism

Al-Qaeda “a Global Terrorist Group”
We may not live yet in a single world society but every aspect of social reality is simultaneously undergoing globalization, witness the emergence of a world economy, a cosmopolitan culture, and the rise of international social movements. And this global inter-connectedness runs much deeper than the interdependence of states discussed in the 1950s when academics identified for the first time the rise of transnational organizations such as multinational corporations.

Globalization also involves an increasing cultural awareness of global interconnectedness. It fosters the consciousness of the world as a single frame of reference. Global theorists like Roland Robertson have emphasized the ways in which the language of globalization captures the increasingly widespread conscious awareness of the interdependence of local ecologies, economies and societies.

Since the mid-1990s With regard of Globalization era, many scholars, government analysts and politicians point out that ‘terrorism’ has changed into an inherently new form with new characteristics. They have articulated the concept of ‘new terrorism’ or ‘Global terrorism’, which involves more advanced and different actors, motivations, aims, tactics and actions, compared to the ‘old’ concept of terrorism used in the mid twentieth century. After the Sept. 11th terrorist attacks against the US, the very discourse of international relations and global politics has been transformed. Prior to Sept. 11th, the dominant issues were geo-economics in nature. Globalization and humanitarian issues occupied the agendas of international summits and international organizations. But now geopolitics and security concerns have once again become the
central issue and the “old language and institutions” of the cold war are shaping our thinking about global politics. The world was rapidly moving to realizing the idea of a global village as commonalities in terms of economic aspirations and technological progress were emphasized by politicians and opinion makers, over differences such as religion, culture and ethnicity. Globalization of the world was the ultimate celebration of the political, economic and social homogenization of the global populations.

Globalization as a process was facilitated by the liberalization of trans-border transactions by the dilution sovereignty. Globalization is essentially a measure of the ease with which, labor, ideas, capital, technology and profits can move across borders with minimal governmental interference. This measure of liberalization is also a surrogate measure for security.

The great sense of insecurity that terrorism now inspires in the world wide economy and the government, the two most important forces behind globalization, has resulted in a reassertion of sovereignty by the US and other nations. The fear that liberal standards are facilitating terrorism is causing the US and other European Union members to control trans-border transactions. The efforts to prevent terrorists from moving their resources is leading to greater scrutiny of banks and setting up of new measures that will slow down the flow of capital. The fear that porous borders allow terrorists to enter target countries is leading to new rules about border patrol, VISA regulations, and monitoring of foreign travelers. New security measures at airports have already raised the costs of travel and are affecting the profitability of the airline industry.
It is ironic that global terrorism, the phenomenon of terrorists operating in and against several nations simultaneously, was facilitated by globalization and now it has become one of the biggest challenge to globalization. Global terrorism depends on the success of globalization. In fact one may very conceive of global terrorism as a facet of the global culture resulting from globalization.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss about the globalization effects on international terrorism by considering Al-Qaeda as a case study.

The topic of global terrorism is both complex and emotive. It is complex because it combines so many different aspects of human experience, including subjects such as politics, psychology, philosophy, military strategy, and history, to name a few. Terrorism is also emotive both because experiences of terrorist acts arouse tremendous feelings, and because those who see terrorists as justified often have strong feelings concerning the rightness of the use of violence.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in human experience. Violence has been used throughout human history by those who chose to oppose states, kings, and princes. This sort of violence can be differentiated from what is termed as terrorism. Violence in opposition to a government is often targeted against soldiers and those who govern. Terrorism, however, is characterized by the use of violence against civilians, with the expressed desire of causing terror or panic in the population. Terrorism is not unique to the 20th and 21st centuries.
Figure 3: Terrorist Incidents 2012

Terrorism existed in 18th century revolutionary France during the reign of terror, as well as among the Zealots of Palestine in opposition to Roman rule some 2000 years ago. Today, terrorist activity can be found in Israel, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and the United States, to name a few. Of particular concern, here are the September 11 suicide attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the attempted attack that resulted in the plane crash in Pennsylvania.

As a consequence of those attacks, the U.S. government initiated a war against terrorism and its sponsors, targeting Osama bin Laden, a Saudi-born anti-Western, Islamic militant who were residing in Afghanistan before being killed, and his al Qaeda organization.

Al Qaeda is an organization based in Afghanistan that has a history of War against Soviet Union and also terrorist involvement. Al Qaeda was an ally to the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Using the military, law enforcement, diplomacy (including coalition formation), the treasury department, and other instruments of state, the U.S. government undertook a campaign against bin Laden and his al Qaeda group.

The trends in international terrorism point toward an escalation through the remainder of this decade and into the 1990’s. Increases will be reflected in both the number and the lethality of attacks, mostly because of the availability and use of sophisticated technology by terrorist groups. The exporting of terrorism has been a major factor in Europe the last few years and is probably a foreboding of what the US can anticipate. The trend toward the use of high technology and a confluence of other factors indicate an increased probability of eventual nuclear terrorism. In combating terrorism, the world
community will realize success only through a well-coordinated global program. Such a program will require a universally acceptable definition; one which clearly distinguishes between terrorism and illegal forms of warfare. A close study of profiles on terrorist leaders such as the infamous Carlos, Osama bin laden or Ayman al Dhawahiri, provides a clear distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters.

**Globalization and Terrorism**

For a long time, however, globalization was not discussed much, if at all, by the security community. Strategic concerns seemed remote from a world, which had been conditioned to believe that the market was the source of contemporary history. The success with which the West achieved its material goals in the 1990s removed the impetus to enquire too deeply into the obverse side of globalization: the discontents to which it gives rise and even more the strategies of the discontented. Just because war and its avoidance was the great topic of the twentieth century, many political economists argued, was no reason to expect that it would be of great interest in the twenty-first.

The globalization of terror has also changed in character as the world moves away from the state sponsored phenomenon of the 1980s. The statistics tell their own story. Between 1968-89, the incident rate of terrorism was 1,673 per year. Between 1990-6, there was an increase of 162% on the Cold War years (4,389 a year). The percentage increase would now be closer to 200% given the escalating number of conflicts since 1996. More alarming is that the new terrorism is primarily conducted against citizens not
governments. Fifty thousand people died in terror attacks between 1990-96 (according to the Rand Corporation) and the main reason people are targeted is that terrorists no longer distinguish between limited and restricted uses of violence\(^2\).

Secondly, globalization is encouraging religious fundamentalism. Thirty years ago there was not a single religious cult or religious terrorist movement in the world. As recently as 1980 only two of the world’s 64 known terrorist groups were animated by religious belief. Since then Shia Moslem groups have accounted for a quarter of all terrorist related deaths.

Thirdly, it is also producing new network centered terrorist organizations. Thus, Al-Qaeda is largely a franchising agency, which functions through religious internationalism and state-less networks rather than through the Cold War mechanism of sponsoring states.

The majority of terrorist movements in the Middle East are not transnational despite links with similar movements in neighboring countries. However, some like Al-Qaeda are truly global in their reach. The assassins responsible for the death of the Afghan warlord, Ahmed Shah Masood prior to the September 11 attack were Algerians with Belgian passports that had visas to enter Pakistan issued in London. The death of

Masood shows how radical Islam does not reject the means of globalization, only its message\textsuperscript{3}.

Paradoxically, while denouncing globalization it relies on it to reconstruct a Moslem community beyond national boundaries. Its use of English, the internet and satellite phones is an authentic product of a modern globalized world, even if they serve a movement that is fundamentally in conflict with it and this is particularly true of radical Islam.

Radical Islam indeed thrives on globalization: on Saudi and Persian Gulf state funding for mosque building programmes and the rapid spread of information and communications technology. Both empower the \textit{ummah} (the world wide Moslem community). But for radical Islam (as opposed to the mainstream Moslem world) the message is different; they wish to construct, not a Kantian cosmopolitan order, but a world order (\textit{al nizam alislami}) based on fundamentalist values and the duty of \textit{jihad} (religious war)\textsuperscript{4}.

As Anatol Lieven\textsuperscript{5} contends, the danger to world order comes not from ruling elites that are integrated into world society but those numerous social and economic groups who for whatever reasons (culture, history, geography) are unable to take part in the global success and produce new political pathologies that are profoundly anti-global. ‘This is the dark side of the global village – the ability of that village’s alienated minorities to hit

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{5} Peter Paul Anatol Lieven is a British author, journalist, and policy analyst. He is presently a Senior Researcher at the New America Foundation, where he focuses on US global strategy.
out at their perceived oppressors over huge distances’. Some of these groups have proud cultural traditions, which make it difficult for them to accept second-class status. Others have strong fighting traditions that give them a distinctive edge in certain kinds of warfare. In addition, religion gives them an *expressive* instrument such as suicide bombing.

This is one of the paradoxes of globalization. It engenders terrorism: the wish to protect traditional cultures; it creates a sense of powerless for those left on a planet where there is no viable alternative to the orthodoxies of the World Bank. It focuses even more attention on America and ‘Americanization’ seeping out of the satellites and cable networks like toxic waste. It creates, when it works, strong opposition to violence between states and even between communities, and so to a lower incidence of *instrumental* violence for political ends. But it also engenders the need for *expressive violence* (ritualistic, symbolic and communicative). The expressive violence of the World Trade Center attack had meaning for the victim (anxiety and humiliation) and for the perpetrator (status, prestige and reputation in the Islamic world). And the choice of target, the World Trade Center, a global icon, shows how globalization gives expressive violence greater symbolic force than ever.

Writing in the 1950s the German philosopher, Karl Jaspers⁷ concluded that World War 2 had produced a single history for the world. Until then, history had been ‘a dispersed field of unconnected ventures… now it is the totality which has become the problem and

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7 Karl Theodor Jaspers was a German psychiatrist and philosopher who had a strong influence on modern theology, psychiatry and philosophy.
the task’. Jaspers was writing in the shadow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The threat of nuclear war posed a true existential crisis for it involved the globe for the first time.

Fifty years later Jaspers’ fears of global catastrophe – on one level – seem unfounded. One of the great successes of the Cold War era (and perhaps even of the Cold War itself) was the absence of weapons proliferation. The Superpowers managed not only to avoid using nuclear weapons against each other; they also succeeded in persuading the majority of countries to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a long list of international agreements intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. After fifty years the most striking feature of the nuclear age is that there are so few nuclear states, far fewer, in fact, than predicted by virtually every expert and policy-maker at the time of the 31 nations that started down the nuclear path, 22 changed course and renounced the bomb. More importantly, the rate of proliferation has actually declined. After peaking in the 1960s, the number of new nations joining the nuclear club each decade has fallen steadily and several of the nations that built or inherited nuclear weapons – South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan – have chosen to renounce them. Indeed, in the ten years since the end of the Cold War there have been no new nuclear states. India and Pakistan acquired their nuclear weapons capabilities in the 1970s and 1980s. Iraq and North Korea were near-misses but in the earlier decades the rate of near-misses was even higher. Indeed despite all the talk about the dangers of the post-Cold War era the past ten years have been marked more by renunciation than proliferation.

Simply put, the absence of widespread proliferation by states may be one of the great successes of globalization.
However, in recent years the WMD issue has acquired much greater global significance because of the very success of non-proliferation. For the more obvious US predominance, the more nuclear weapons may be used for asymmetric purposes. The former Indian Army Chief of Staff General Sundarji is reported to have said that the principle lesson of the Persian Gulf War is that if a state intends to take on the United States it should first acquire nuclear weapons. And there is now a global trade in nuclear material for states or non-state actors that wish to do precisely that. This development justifies Daniel Bell’s prediction in 1980 that proliferation would become one of the most likely sources of ‘future world disorder’.

In addition, it is the threat from terrorist movements that is perhaps, the most alarming. Unfortunately, the nuclear dimension is the least of it. During the 1990s concerns arose that terrorists might use chemical, biological or radiological agents. In the 1980s terrorist groups could have developed such weapons but chose not to do so, apparently calculating that their use would make public support for their cause less likely. But far from steering away from such agents, the new terrorists might find these weapons attractive precisely because they can kill tens of thousands. This was the goal, fortunately unrealized, of Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Indeed, there’s evidence that some new terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda,

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9 Aum Shinrikyo (currently known as Aleph) is a Japanese cult listed as a terrorist organization by several countries. The group was founded by Shoko Asahara in 1984. The group gained international notoriety in 1995, when it carried out the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. ( Encyclopedia Wikipedia) URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aum_Shinrikyo.
have tried to acquire biological and chemical agents. Moreover, in the 1990s information about them became widely available on the internet.

In the wake of the September 11 World Trade Center attack the World Health Organization (WHO) felt it ‘prudent’, not ‘alarmist’, to bring forward the release of its report that had been due later in the year on preparing for biological or chemical attacks.

The organization thought it important to warn governments of the potential danger. As a spokesman for the WTO was quoted as saying with regard to a terrorist small pox attack, ‘the unthinkable is no longer unthinkable’. The risks we run are greater than ever.

Economic Elements of Globalization and New Terrorism

Globalization of economy has had great impact on south countries and causes to increase the distance of these countries with north countries and their people become frustrated and know the new international system and developed countries as the cause of their backwardness and do violent measures and terrorist attacks against these so-called corrupt system. The most important economic impacts of globalization, which helps this process, are:

A: Increasing of Gap between Rich and Poor

Globalization process has increased the gap between rich and poor in developed and developing countries; as the average percentage of these countries’ GDP simply shows this gap. While countries like United States, Japan and Canada have suitable percapita
of GDP. Many of the countries not only do not have desirable growth, but this growth is negative\textsuperscript{10}.

Seceding south countries from globalization process of economy means renouncing foreign capital and technology, not regarding international standards and rules and renouncing privileges and priorities, which are in this system. In this situation, not only technological distance of south with world would increase, but with decreasing investment and production for limited internal market instead of widespread global market, the economic conditions of these countries in region and world would weaken. Naturally, with weakness of economic conditions and increasing technological distance of south and world should wait for weakening of political and security conditions in these countries. Because a weak economy cannot provide security system for itself and due to being in margin and loss of foreign economic interests, will weaken the situation of south countries in politics arena. Also decreasing the quality of produced commodities in these countries is another element in backwardness and increasing the gap of these countries and north countries. Relative limitations of these countries’ economy due to tariff and non-tariff supports, loss of motivation for promoting quality of internal productions regarding loss of internal competition, not transferring new technology, loss of need to regarding international standards and rules will cause production of commodities with low quality.

**B: Increasing Dependency of South to North**

Weak competition situation of south countries and increasing their dependency to one special production due to globalization intensifies. Distancing from globalization process

of economy due to different reasons (including depriving from foreign capital and
technology, depriving from tariff discounts and privileges, relative high cost of
exchanges and decreasing competition status will cause to increase dependency of
countries to unstable incomes.

C: Increasing Poverty and Marginalizing of Poor People

Decreasing potential growth of GDP and increasing poverty and unemployment is in
long-term. Decreasing foreign investment and relative deprivation in reaching to global
markets have caused to decrease growth of capital reserve in these countries which this
problem decreases potential economic growth and increases unemployment and
poverty. Although global capitalism system have had successes in producing wealth
and different commodities, according to statistics accomplishments of these great
improvements have been divided in the world unequally. Therefore, those countries of
the world can be divided into two categories, including winners and losers: But we
should not forget that a similar division is observed in developed countries. A Disturbing
classification, which divides the citizens of developed countries into two classes of
winners and losers. According to the World Bank in 2005, 6.76 percent of total global
consumption have been allocated to the twenty percent of riches (top two deciles) of the
world. While share of twenty percent poor people (bottom two deciles) is only 1/5
percent of total global consumption. In addition, annual production or income of
41poorest and owing countries of the world (567 million people) is lower that wealth is
less than wealth of seven capitalist of the world. Seventy six percent of global revenues
belong to some rich countries (with approximately 1 billion people). While low-income
countries, with 6/1 billion people, only have 3/3 percent of global income.
Statistics show that between distance of rich and poor countries has increased in the last two hundred years. Earnings ratio of rich and poor countries, which was 3 to 1 in 1820 to 1, in 1992, reached 72 to 1\textsuperscript{11}.

On the other hand, according to UNICEF, every day 22000 children under 5 years die because of poverty. This figure is about 8 million people every year. Statistics show that between 2000 and 2009 more than 88 million children have lost their lives due to poverty. Based on these statistics, one billion of the world’s children live in poverty. According to official statistics of the United Nations, about 1.1 billion people in developing countries do not have access to safe drinking water\textsuperscript{12}. For example, according to World Bank statistics, 88 percent of people in Tanzania, 64 percent in Nigeria, 42 percent in India, 20 percent in Bolivia, 16 percent in China and 21 percent of the world’s people live in absolute poverty and earn less than a dollar a day. Clearly, these statistics indicate hunger, malnutrition, disease and various problems of the people of countries.

**D: Increasing Technological Gap**

Another consequence of globalizations the increasing technological gap with the world. Staying away from the globalization process due to not accepting global rules on rights of intellectual property and not attracting foreign investment, will lead to slow speed of country’s technological developments in comparison with its development speed in the world. Relatively closed economy for domestic producers, does not leave sufficient


incentive for technological improvement. As a result, the technological gap will be even deeper.

**E: Lack of Standards and New Commercial Measures**

Another issue is losing business opportunities. The era of globalization era of speed in performing affairs and using the fleeting opportunities. Lack of presence in the global market and depriving of rules, standards, and new methods of information, marketing and e-commerce mean that Fleeting commercial opportunities, even if in the goods and services of interest we have a competitive advantage, will be lost.

**F: Introversion of South Countries’ Economy**

The last point is the issue of introversion of these countries’ economy. These factors will cause South countries’ economy to go further towards introversion. Therefore, they will deprive of the presence in associations and international economic agreements, which have own economic and commercial consequences for us to be removed and instead of active presence in these communities and trying to push the indecision toward developing countries, only are open to the consequences of these decisions. On the other hand, the negative effects of globalization have been increasing poverty in South countries\(^\text{13}\). International terrorism has a mutual relationship with poverty. On the one hand, poverty, terrorism can increase poverty. Integration of the world economy means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the developed world will have devastating consequences for the welfare of millions of people in the developing world. The World Bank estimates that the September 11 attacks of 2001 alone have increased the number of people who are living in poverty (about 10million people); this figure will be

\(^{13}\) UN Millennium Project (2005), "Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals", New York: UN PRESS. pp. 8-9.
much higher in an unclear terrorist incident. In addition, poverty affects international terrorism. Countries with high rate of poor population are more exposed to growth of terrorist groups. International terrorist groups victimize the weak countries with their own actions (with taking refuge in those countries). Their recruitment in these countries is due to growing discontent arising from poverty. International terrorist groups, which usually have considerable financial resources, can be a reliable point for poor people and they gain financial rewards by recruiting and having activity in those groups. On the other hand, individuals who live in poor societies and in extreme poverty, because of dissatisfaction with the status quo are more ready to attract to such groups. Therefore, although it cannot be said that poverty is the only cause of international terrorism, it can be stated that increase the risk of international terrorism, make activity of terrorist groups easier and challenge dealing with international terrorism. Poverty in the sense indirectly leads to violent behaviors and terrorism\textsuperscript{14}.

**Cultural Elements of Globalization and New Terrorism**

Some aspects of the globalization of culture have caused cultural effects of some of North countries (considering technological development in these countries) can have higher degree of permeability in these countries. This issue causes feelings of cultural invasion, alienation and identity crisis of in individuals and groups. To compensate for this problem, use the measures, which it’s toughest form includes new terrorism. The most important elements of cultural globalization are:

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A: Reinforcing Feelings of Westernization and Cultural Imperialism

In general, the globalization of culture has ideological and technological dimensions. In other words, technological aspects of globalization have caused development of its ideological aspects. Cultural aspects of globalization mainly consists of a set of does and don’ts associated with human life. In other words, whereas globalization at least from cultural perspective learns some cultural values and aspirations to the communities, and makes clear their positions toward current events and questions, and become a guide for their action, has ideological dimension. It seems that ideological dimension of globalization a comparison to its technological process, has more technological contrast with the beliefs and culture of the South countries. Because westernization of politics, culture and economy has results such as some values and teachings which are largely at odds with the beliefs and values of these communities. This contrast especially in the approach that interprets globalization as synonymous with Westernization is clear. However, even an optimistic interpretation of globalization, which sees it as a natural process, has cultural and value conflicts between “globalization” and the cultures of these countries. This conflict is due to the nature of modern life and modern society, which is developed in the globalization process. Thinkers such as Edward Said believe that West with relying on its power tries to impose cultural imperialism, which includes Western culture and values, on other parts of the world. Based on the theory of cultural imperialism, globalization is not anything but exporting commodities, values and preferences of western lifestyle. What dominated in the world arena of culture, and identity are imaginations, productions and identities of

Western modernism, which are provided by Western cultural industries. These industries are dominant on global networks and leave little possibility for an equal relationship and cultural exchanges between the West and the rest of the world. Spread Values of capitalism, such as consumption patterns, dress patterns, sexual relationships, human rights and secularism are features of cultural imperialism. Capitalism, which is instinctively a hegemonic system, tries to make individuals to consumers of capital accumulation with the help of ideology or culture of consumption\textsuperscript{16}.

**B: Ignoring Indigenous Cultures and Cultural Assimilation**

However, globalization before everything indicates spreading cultural values, political management and Western economic model and this issue faces other societies with the political and identity challenges. The most important effect of cultural globalization is facing local identities (linguistic, ethnic and cultural identities) with the new identities of the world. Global culture by using mass media has become as one of the main tools in order to increase public awareness and, consequently, to undermine local and national cultures. In South countries, mass media such as the internet and satellite easily violate traditional taboos and sacred cultures. Transitional populations of South see social changes and question of identity and ethnic, religious and linguistic personality and also formation of distinct social, economic, and ideological groupings are the most important causes of tension and challenge in these countries. With the development of South countries’ societies, traditional bases become unstable.

Exacerbation of this issue by the globalization of culture, has caused self-identity crisis among these societies. The person who without having secure identity support sees

\[16\] Golmohammadi, Ahmad(2000), Globalization of culture and Identity, Tehran, Ney publication, p. 103.
increasingly weakening of government against transnational currents, suffered from a cognitive insecurity and sees ideological-psychological supports in collapsing. The more this idea is strengthened and the ground for serious resistances and also violent and terrorist actions is provided\textsuperscript{17}.

Also Neil Marnist (one of the theorists of globalization) emphasize on this point that growth of terrorist actions and emergence of revisionist movements south societies more than any other factor reflect the west’s thoughts and ideas in these societies\textsuperscript{18}.

**Technological Elements of Globalization and New Terrorism**

The main aspects of globalization in the field of technology can be summarized into two distinct field regarding issue of new terrorism:

**A: Advances in Information and Communication Technology**

With amazing and increasing improvement of the mass media in the world and the possibility of obtaining the latest written and audio-visual news and reports from the furthest parts of the world and optimum use of media, these communication means have been important basis of relentless process of globalization. The new communication technologies in the world, have realized the idea of a global village and the people already live in a world where every aspect they are under the sharp watch of each other. The reality of globalization means that the progress of science and the industrial revolution, particularly in the area of communications allow for emergence of


the forces, institutions and networks that have global nature and dimensions. As a result, it causes many problems in the global scope and it is not possible to solve them, but with global and comprehensive politics they can be solved; in other words, global problems need global policies, strategies and plans, and that means emerging opportunities and favorable conditions for realization and implementation of the globalization process.

B: Access to Free Flow of Information and Communication

From an ontological perspective, the globalization has relations with information field, which leads to building society and in that a continuous flow of information accelerates rapid dissemination of opinions. In line with this thinking, the globalization framework has formed based on increasing number of relationships and mutual communication that goes beyond government. Communications will have acceptable outcomes in making decisions and national and local activities for individuals and societies. These developments have caused an international virtual community takes perfectly transparent aspect that no problem remains hidden from the eyes of individuals and groups and can be available quickly for all of the people and naturally can be used by them and provide abuse conditions and creates security consequences for the governments. Globalization dimensions are affected by an effective process, which undoubtedly have widespread political, security, military and even cultural consequences and make control of these affairs too difficult for governments.


International terrorism, including al-Qaeda benefit from the fruits of globalization and new technologies for planning, coordinating and performing lethal attacks. These terrorists who are not limited geographically in a territory and are not politically or financially dependent to a particular country, rely on advanced communication capabilities, including the Internet to move forward their agenda. In 1998, less than half of the organizations, which designated by U.S. State Department as a foreign terrorist organizations, have had internet sites. Almost all of these terrorist groups become present on the Internet by 1999. Today, all active terrorist groups have provided at least one internet presence for themselves. By controlling internet between 1998 and 2007, it was made clear that there are more than 5,000 terrorist sites, chat rooms and circles. Terrorism and internet are related to each other. First, internet is an arena for groups and individuals to publish their messages of hate and violence, and in addition to the psychological war, have relationship with each other and their supporters. Second, individuals and groups have tried to carry out attacks on computer networks. These attacks have been known to terrorism and cyber warfare. But at this point, the terrorists have used the internet more to attack it. Communication via computer is ideal for terrorists; this method is decentralized and is not controllable or limitable, it cannot be censored and makes available free access for anyone who wants it. Internet for terrorist groups, which are woven together to form a system, is an ideal and critical device for establishing network connections among groups and beyond them. Many other facilities such as email, chat rooms, electronic groups, internet circles, virtual bulletin boards are among these facilities. Many of internet sites are for psychological war against the enemy and its military. They show horrific images of hostages and captives who are
executed (sometimes by beheading), and the troops were killed on the battlefield by snipers or shoulder missiles, or their vehicles which have been detonated by roadside bombs or suicide attacks. Graphic and text messages try to weaken the enemy’s morale and scare him or create feeling of guilt, doubt and internal division and at the same time send threatening messages to various governments and their citizens. Their message is that we do not care who we kill you and no one is immune. They gain their power from the reaction to fear.  

Identity Crisis and New Terrorism

Terrorists with their own perceptions of globalization and its effects believe that globalization means full control over all aspects of global society in terms of political, cultural, economic, social dimensions. Globalization means assimilation of societies in framework of the single domination of West. Globalization is a system that enables powers to impose inhumane dictatorships on deprived people of the world with claiming free relationships and free market. Globalization process means any change in food, clothing, traditions and culture of the world toward Western models that spend all of their power over the South countries in all religious, economic, cultural and value aspects. In the light of globalization, poor countries lose not only their political independence, but are enslaved, as if they are indebted who cannot pay their debts. Therefore, they have no authority to terminate their proposed projects. On top of globalization is United States and most of the pillars of globalization such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNESCO and others have been designed and

led by United States. In these conditions, we will witness destruction of ideological, cultural and identity values of other societies that on way of exploiting potential financial benefits of the West, will lie under the influence of West’s liberal culture. Thus, there is not equal share in the phenomenon of globalization for South and North countries. Because West with centralism approach sought to have cultural domination on the world through cultural integration, homogenization and assimilation, and imposing liberal and secular patterns on South countries. Globalization is an approach based on West’s neoliberalism that reduces the spatial distance and at the same time increases structural distance of societies. On the other hand, according to the interpretation of Giddens globalization has brought new identity and it deals with the generalization of it. Globalization culturally refers to a situation in which local traditions and culture are destroyed and a kind of cultural assimilation is promoted. The local and global conflicts create some kind of identity crisis and frustration. This identity crisis is due to the loss of signs of popular identity that their culture cannot maintain themselves in a global competition against other major cultures that impose their presence on countries regardless of geographical frontiers. In such conditions, ideology plays its meaningful role more and helps these attacked groups and individuals. In this regard, more violent teachings become notable. On the other hand, cultural and religious conflicts due to contact of ideologies with other cultures including western culture, can cause intensifying fundamentalism and lead to terrorist violence.

23 Hooshangi, Hossein(2009), Effect Of modernity on increasing islamic Fundamentalism, Danesh Siasi magazine, year 6, vol. 1, p. 206.
Ideology and Global Terrorism

As it was noted, resorting to the ideology is one of the characteristics of global terrorism. The important question is what is the relationship between ideology and terrorism? Mark Yurgenzmayr believes that religious ideology is emerging and developing throughout the world. He believes that the new world order after the end of the Cold War not only is influenced by economic forces and the collapse of the empires, but it is influenced by the emergence of ethnic and religious identities. In other words, in certain conditions the ideological consciousness around the world can cause conflict. This process is formed in four stages: firstly, individuals and groups feel distortions, problems and crises in their social environment that these problems are in conflict with their intellectual and ideological mindset. For example, issues such as US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan or Kashmir causes some people know these situations sign of world diverge from real path and this issue provide the atmosphere for second phase. In second phase, the common options reach to the dead end. At this stage, people come to this conclusion that there is no effective solution for these problems. At this period, people may enter particular political groups or social movements, but ultimately become disillusioned and know the world a nonsense thing that has imposed only harsh conditions on them. In other words, an order has been created that is in contrast with thoughts of these people and is not changeable. This is the introduction for entering the third stage. Third stage is satanization of enemies and starting global campaign. At this stage, problems become absolute evil and satanic and ideology shows the solution for fighting against evils and Satans. At this stage, disillusioned people know Satan as cause of their humiliation and defeat and with using the religious teachings fight against it. Naturally, depending on the
level of considering it evil, reaction to it would be different. The fourth stage is stage of showing symbolic power of that ideology. At this period, people are trying to use the symbols of his power to revolt against the evil. This stage can include protest and marches and even change of officials and governments and in more radical stages leads to terrorist actions\textsuperscript{24}. This factor is reinforced when individuals or groups have access to weapons of mass destruction and are trying to dictate their identity through extensive damages to others. Importance of this issue is so much that in all documents and security strategies of western countries, WMDs have been considered as one of the most serious terrorist threats\textsuperscript{25}.

**Evolution of Terrorism**

Before discussing conceptual models of global terrorism and globalization, it is worthy to mention David Rapaport in reviewing historical evolution and place of new terrorism considering international system. According to Rappaport, modern terrorism started from the 1870’s and has had many effects on the international system. Modern terrorism has occurred in a historical cycle. Characteristic of any period of terrorism should be studied in the conditions of international system in that period. He refers to the four waves of modern terrorism from the beginning of formation. The first wave of modern terrorism in the 19th century and by non-state actors has happened. In this period, the world saw the formation of the revolutionary waves of anti-monarchism, especially in Tsarist Russia and throughout Europe and eventually the United States. The second


\textsuperscript{25} Sajjadpour, Seyyed mohammad kazem, and Ejtehadi, Sayideh(2009), Westerner’s Security perspectives and international challenges after ends cold war, Danesh siasi magazine, year 6, vol. 1, pp. 38-39.
wave of terrorism has come to existence following the anti-colonial and imperial currents and attempt to determine right of destination in different countries. After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles (after WWI), various movements were shaped particularly in Europe which had anti-colonial purposes and many of terrorist attacks happened in Pakistan, India, Ghana, Nigeria and... . However, whereas these anti-colonialism efforts were considered valuable in many cases and accompanied with support of world public opinion. This wave of terrorism is perceived as a more legitimate and found political supporters. The third wave of terrorism (1960s and 1970s) occurred in conditions of the competition of the Cold War era and from Rappaport’s viewpoint Vietnam War was the most important political current which had direct impact on this wave. Also, in this period in West, informative currents about the situation of Third World grew, Western populations especially young people become sensitive to the fate of the Third World.

At this period, new leftists criticized the West approaches to the domestic and international issues of Western society and perpetrated terrorist actions. According to Rappaport, fourth wave of terrorism (which we call it new global terrorism) started since 1979 and is still continuing and intensifying. Rappaport called it ideological terrorism. Generally, wave of terrorism theory’s Rappaport by relating developments of system to terrorism, has conceptual innovation. However, this theory is incomplete, because for instance, it does not explain the behavior of terrorist groups who have nationalist, anti-capitalist or ideological thoughts. On the other hand, he considers every wave of terrorism in terms of time for a generation and sees 2025 end of the fourth wave.

Question is, what does the milestone of this division and what is the basis of defining end of this period?

**A Model of Analysis**

In this section, we review and introduce theory model to examine global terrorism. Based on this model, effective model of globalization (economic, political, cultural and technological) has been affected formation and development of violent behaviors and new terrorism. The collection of these factors or part of it can cause frustration and alienation and identity crisis in individuals and groups in various countries, especially South undeveloped countries and if the conditions are realized, the individuals and groups seeking to revive identity are forced to do violent and terrorist actions. In this respect, globalization that is thought to be the cause of these actions helps terrorists and provides for them the technological and communication tools which are necessary to perform fatal attacks. Globalization has changed the structure of terrorist organizations and their operational way has changed. Also due to the process of globalization and the decline of state authority and its dignity of office, terrorist groups through public and private smuggling networks will gain weapons of mass destruction and with resorting to ideological justifications for high volume of victims and in this process, they attack on symbols of globalization. In addition, they present their actions through world media for billion viewers and try to take political advantage of their actions. As mentioned, the globalization process and its consequences can affect different individuals and groups who are in favorable environmental conditions and facilitate their move toward the radicalism and behaviors based on violence and terrorism.
The most important elements of globalization in the political sphere, which can cause frustration and crisis of identity for individuals and groups and led them to terrorism, are summarized as follows:

1. **Crisis of National Government**

The forces of globalization are clearly under the influence of national economies and with dominance of the government on its revenue sources and control of the domestic economy, are incompatible. National laws and regulations gradually under the shadow of international agreements and laws fade. Wherever there are transnational agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, the legislation forces countries to perform legislative function with doubt and flexibility. Responsible individuals of country’s economy should consider carefully international impacts of their economic action about allocating budget, tax and reforming distribution of incomes. Because of this, in last two decades many countries of the South have been confused in planning and performing. In the new situation, governments, organizations, national idolatry skills, compelled to redefine their position\(^27\). According to Hobsbawm, transnational forces are weakening governments thorough three ways:

First, creating international economy, which the majority of its transactions take place outside the governments’ audits and even their control is out of the government’s ability. Therefore, it limits the ability of governments in the context of national economy’s management. The main reason for the dominance of social-democratic policy and Kinsey in the third quarter of the twentieth century on capitalism of West is governments’ ability to adjust employment levels, wages and welfare costs in their own

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\(^{27}\) Ebrahimi, Shahrooz(2005), Post Westphalia sovereignty, Jahan Danesh magazine, year 2, vol.4, p. 12.
territory (from economies produce cheaper and better quality) have been weakened.
Second, the emergence of regional and global institutions such as European Union and international banking institutions, have weakened governments. Small countries as part of a large block are forced to enter in the international competition. Economy of this kind of governments sometimes is so weak, which makes them dependent to loans limiting political conditions. Third, with the technological revolution in the field of transportation and communications, territorial borders have lost their relevance largely. Today most people in parallel in several countries live or travel between the countries. It is perfectly natural that an individual from middle class have residence and income in two or more countries. This issue affects the relationships between immigrants and the immigrants’ countries of residence and also between immigrants and their origin governments. In addition, it can weaken structure of governments, which traditionally control all of their territorial affairs.

2. Formation of Bankrupt and Quasi-Governments

Governments traditionally have been the most important and most powerful actors in the international system. However, some scholars of international relations know bankrupt and failed governments, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, the important factor in the formation of new terrorism. Social and economic conditions in some countries and weak states and unable to establish security and control of their territory, have created desirable environment for growth of terrorist groups. According to


some statistics, such areas have been identifiable in about 50 countries that in fact have no government. U.S. counterterrorism strategy document has emphasized on these weak governments as the cause of formation of terrorism and global instability. This document has recommended for necessary efforts for nation-state building in these countries. The government’s inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens and deteriorating economic and social situation in these countries have caused deteriorating situation and losing the place of government for their people and people efforts for meeting their needs causes chaos and deteriorating the situation. However, other factors such as civil war and foreign intervention, and issues such as the formation of failed states cannot be taken out of consideration. In this regard, some writers emphasis on cooperation of the some states with non-state actors in the formation of terrorist actions. Some states are not completely failed, but their internal coherence is low and also their governance capacities are weak. In this condition, society has been in transition and governments do not perform political, economic, social duties and there is possibility of violence formation and strengthening terrorist groups and their use of the existing space. Such governments due to the structural weakness are exposed to actions of international criminal gangs and organized crimes. Reason of this issue is lack of legitimacy of the state, the lack of border controls, inefficiency and lack of necessary legislation, bad economic conditions of the citizens, lack of support for businesses of individuals and lack of the necessary social control through effective judicial system. Terrorist groups tend to develop their influence networks in such a weak and corrupt quasi-governments like Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, Guinea etc. These groups tend to work within the corrupt governments instead of free societies. In general,
terrorists prefer quasi-states for three main reasons: First, the governments partly support terrorists. Second, quasi-states mostly have a large number of foreigners and different ethnics and languages that makes it easier for terrorists to travel. Third, corruption of quasi-governments easily bribed by terrorists and this could facilitate terrorist actions.  

3. Growth of Sectarianism and Ethnic Tendency  
The dominant culture of globalization process has assimilation effect and never does not mean that it trains humans who are not in conflict with one another. Assimilation creates selfish people that only think of themselves and their groups. This selfishness is incompatible with the idea of globalization. It seems that the explosive growth of the nationalism and ethnic claims that challenges the process of globalization, have root in this issue. Separatism in Basque (Spain), Sicily (Italy), Quebec (Canada), and even Scotland (UK) shows that even in affluent countries are under the effects of this outcome. Ethnics with nationalist beliefs, which coexist in the past, now that they see no reason to share with others. Therefore, diversities increase constantly that are backgrounds for future conflicts. Increasing ethnic, religious and sectarian awareness and feeling backwardness in comparison with others in the world make these groups (with modern tools in their hands) try to gain their real share from the world and founders of globalization. The inevitable result of this issue would be resorting to terrorist acts.

4. Increasing Humanitarian Interventions

One of the effects of globalization in political dimension relates to domestic developments of countries; it means that these developments influenced by technological advances and international media are rapidly becoming international events. From this perspective, they can influence international public opinion and force countries and relevant international organizations to respond to affecting the internal processes of countries particularly in cases of human rights violations. Obviously, such trends in the international system can be intensified and we can see numerous humanitarian interventions, or at least in the name of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and other areas. This issue can have negative effects and oppositions in these countries and other countries and provide backgrounds for violence.

5. Reducing Qualification and Increasing Vulnerability of Governments

Another political consequence of globalization is result of the increasing number of international organizations and increasing their jurisdiction, decreasing influence of governments even in the internal affairs of states. In many cases, governments are limited by the international laws and regulations and should be responsible for their action in international arena. This indicates a reduction in government competence in some issues and increasing of their vulnerability. It means that governments are no longer able to solve new problems arising from globalization and they need to comprehensive international cooperation. This cooperation involves delegating some of competence cases to the transnational institutions and organizations. On the other hand, as mentioned before, the role of NGOs in the international system has increased,
and complex international and regional social networks have been formed and one of the examples of this issue is increasing immigration and higher fluidity of the population in comparison to the Cold War era.

**Defining Features of New Terrorism**

Although it is difficult to say where and when ‘new terrorism’ exactly started, many point to the mid1990s, and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 as well as the Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo underground by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995. It is said, that this terrorism has a different set of new characteristics in comparison to the traditional or ‘old terrorism’ mentioned above.\(^{31}\)

Many supporters of the concept ‘new terrorism’ point to the prominence of religion, mainly radical Islam, as one of its main characteristics.\(^ {32}\) Whereas ‘old terrorism’ was primarily secular in its orientation and inspiration, terrorism linked to religious fanaticism is on the increase. According to Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole only two out of sixty-four international terrorist organizations in 1980 could be classified as religious. This figure has risen sharply to twenty-five out of fifty-eight by 1995.\(^ {33}\) ‘New terrorism’ is often portrayed as a terrorism, which rejects all other ways and promotes an uncompromising view of the world in accordance with the belief of the religion. Bruce Hoffman believes that this religious motivation is the defining characteristic of ‘new terrorism’, which


produces “radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality and, world view”.

Related to the religious motivation, many in the ‘new terrorism’ supporters point out that another of the main features of ‘new terrorism’ is the increasing willingness to use excessive indiscriminate violence. Laqueur argues, “The new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population.” Hoffman highlights that these groups have caused 60 per cent of all fatalities while only being responsible for a quarter of the terrorist actions. It has been argued, “for the religious terrorist, violence is a divine duty … executed in direct response to some theological demand … and justified by scripture.” As Audrey Cronin points out, religious terrorists see their struggle as good against evil, therefore dehumanizing their victims and considering non-members of their group to be infidels or apostates. As a result indiscriminate violence may not be only morally acceptable, but amount to a righteous and necessary advancement of their religious cause. ‘Old terrorists’ tended to strike only selected targets, while ‘new’ terrorism has become increasingly indiscriminate and tries to produce as many casualties as possible. Religious terrorists are often their own constituency, not concerned about alienating their supporters with their acts of

34 Laqueur, New Terrorism, op. cit., pp. 81.


destruction, and holding themselves accountable only to God. For the similar reasons ‘new terrorists’ do not always claim and sometimes even deny responsibility for their actions. They see the action itself as important and not the claim to it. They are not interested in any sort of negotiation. “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it”. Moreover, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler point out that ‘new terrorists’ are a lot more willing to engage in risky and more complex acts. Whereas most actions by ‘old terrorists’ involved an escape plan, ‘new terrorists’ seem more willing to give their own life while orchestrating a terrorist act. They believe that ‘new terrorists’ are more prepared to die because martyrdom is seen as a way of reaching heaven.

The threat of mass destruction by terrorists is a fundamental part of the concept of ‘new terrorism’. Many theorists believe that due to their motivation to use extreme violence, ‘new terrorists’ are likely to try to obtain and use biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Hoffman warns that “many of the constraints (both self-imposed and technical) which previously inhibited terrorist use of WMD are eroding.” With the collapse of the Soviet Union acquiring material which


could be used for WMDs or even a complete WMD has become easier and does not need the co-operation of a state sponsor anymore.\textsuperscript{40}

Another of the characteristics of ‘new’ terrorism is precisely this inherent lack of state backers. Some believe that the willingness to use extreme violence shows that new terrorists no not have an organization or state sponsor to protect, so they see no reason to limit their violence as they do not fear a backlash.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, the financing of ‘new terrorism’ is not based on money received from state sponsors, but on other illegal sources such as drug trafficking, video piracy and credit card fraud, as well as legal business investments, donations from wealthy individuals, charities and Diaspora.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to this the lack of state sponsorship ‘new terrorists’ are seen to be predominantly amateurs that operate on a part time basis and have not dropped out of society totally. The new amateur terrorists only come together to conduct their action and then disband. They predominantly not receive training or logistical support from state sponsors but rely on the network of supporters and information on the internet.\textsuperscript{43} Furthermore, the increasing use of information and communication technologies enables the new terrorists to communicate covertly and to bridge distances more easily.

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40 For a more detailed look at terrorism and WMDs see: Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, \textit{America’s Achilles’ heel: nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism and covert attack}, (Cambridge: MIT, 1998) and Gurr & Cole, \textit{The New Face of Terrorism}.


42 Nimrod Raphaeli, “Financi- ing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods, and Channels”, \textit{Terrorism and Political Violence} Vol. 15, No. 4, (2003), pp. 59-82.

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Although new terrorists might be part time amateurs, they show a higher degree of technological and operational competence. They use a vast range of communication equipment including mobile and satellite phones as well as email and web-sites to plan their next terrorist acts, communicate with other terrorist groups and spread their message around the world. Furthermore, ‘new terrorism’ also exploits the increase in intercontinental flight connections and the poor customs and immigration control in many countries to move around the world.

Finally, one of the most emphasized aspects of ‘new terrorism’ is its loose networked and less hierarchical organizational structure. Some authors believe that the amateur terrorist is a manifestation of a new network structure that is facilitated by the emergence of new advanced telecommunications technology. Each group within this network becomes relatively autonomous but are still linked by advanced communication and their common purpose. They thereby become a lot more flexible and can adapt and react more easily to different situations. Although members do communicate with their leadership, groups can, to a certain extent, operate self-sufficiently. Simon and Benjamin refer to this as a combination of “a ‘hub and spoke’ structure (where nodes communicate with the center) with a ‘wheel’ structure (where nodes in the network communicate with each other without reference to the center).” This type of integrated structure is a lot more difficult to identify and penetrate than a more traditional


hierarchical structure. It is far more resilient because each cell can still operate even if they lose the leadership of the organization.

Incidents such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the attack on Tokyo subway in 1995 with Sarin gas, all are the signs of a fundamental change in the terrorism and indicate the problem, which is known as modern terrorism. Term of postmodern (global) terrorism was used first time in an article by Walter Laqueur in 1996 in Journal of Foreign Affairs. He believes the terrorism have had developments with regard to the motives, strategies and tools (weapons). For instance, anarchist groups in 1970s replaced by fundamentalist groups, nationalists and millennium ideas. In order to reach an equal understanding of new terrorism, we can summarize it:

1. **New Terrorism; Rooted in Ideology**
   Basically, whereas in a great approach ideology provides a framework for describing and looking at the various issues, in the formation of new terrorism ideology element can has a key role in liberating from loss of identity and frustration (due to unfavorable factors of globalization) and could be a justification for violent groups and individuals in doing violent actions.

2. **New terrorists seeking to increase number of victims**
   This issue is one of the distinctions between new terrorism and traditional terrorism. In traditional terrorism, terrorist terrorists sought to increase the number of observers, while the new terrorism addition to this, they want to destroy large numbers of people. Thus, the new terrorism uses the most violent methods to achieve the objective.

In this regard, whereas terrorist groups seek to increase the number of victims, it is natural to use the weapons, which have more power of destruction, and with the least costs have the more destructive effects. In this regard, terrorist groups seek to acquire chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons. However, this means not using conventional tools and weapons.

4. New Terrorism, with Destructive Goals in International System

New terrorists have goals that are not achievable in the current international system and many principles, norms and values of the system are in conflict with these goals. Therefore, most of these terrorists have no tolerance and have destructive approach to the international system. Attempt to negotiate or compromise with them is usually fruitless. This is one of the most serious and dangerous characteristics of this type of terrorism. Groups such as al Qaeda consider terrorism as their targets and sacred issue and therefore they have no tolerance in their principles47.

5. New Terrorists and Lack of Specific Operational Zone

New terrorism has not limited itself to a specific territory or state and its activity zone is extensive and sometimes considers the whole international system as its operational area. Existence of people in different countries who have thoughts similar to new terrorists, have accelerated their activity and transfer and every target in different countries can be in their reach.


New terrorism largely lacks the support of government and military units due to several political and legal reasons, at least publicly, have no intention to support and equip

these groups. Therefore, capabilities of control or predict the actions of these groups strongly decreases; although it should be considered declared interests some states have been in the assignment of affiliation with these terrorist groups.

7. Flexibility of Structure of New Terrorist Groups
The organizational structure of new terrorist groups is capable of rapid transformation. Because of the severe governmental limitations, these groups cannot form a coherent and unified hierarchical command, generally distributed in the form of rings with local leaders and high flexibility. The new terrorist organizations have a simple structure.

8. New Terrorism; Using Virtual Space and Media in a Widespread Form
Borderless feature of Siber-space, decreasing cost of measures, possibility of economic damages without physical damages, providing commodities and necessary elements easily, global reflections of successes and hiding the defeats, possibility of attracting supporters from all over the world, doing monetary and banking in optimum level are the most important reasons which encourage terrorist groups to use virtual space.

9. Selecting New Terrorism Targets Symbolically
Whereas terrorist groups have not the ability to complete confrontation against governments’ power and destruction of so-called enemies, therefore they try to attack the symbols of governments ‘power and destruct them. In this regard, al-Qaida attacked world trade centers in New York as the economic symbol of US capitalism and pentagon as the US military symbol.

10. New Terrorism; Unpredictability

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Combination of aforementioned elements causes new terrorists gain capabilities which
doing actions by them have been predicted and possibility of their attack in every time
and place. This issue has caused to complicate fighting new terrorism.

Motivations, Methods and Strategies of Global Terrorism

The most meaningful examination of the impact of globalization to international security
is examined by reference to specific issue: the growth of international terrorism
especially with the spread of technologies. *Postmodern terrorism* as called by Laqueur
beyond the traditional terrorism we have known became the greatest security threat as
the terrorists’ motivations, strategies and weapons have changed in the last 30 years
compared to traditional terrorism. Thus, while terrorism is an age-old phenomenon, the
new elements of terrorism challenge the states.

The term terrorism has no precise or widely accepted definition. Laqueur de-fines
terrorism as “the substrate application of violence or threatened violence in-tended to
sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about
political change.” Terrorism can also be defined as acts of violence committed against
innocent persons or noncombat that are intended to achieve political ends through fear


51 Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism”, p. 151.
and intimidation. Laqueur and Beck emphasize that with the global terrorism or post-
modern terrorism as named by Laqueur, new concepts, terms and definitions may
have to be developed for new realities since studies suggest that there are changes in
traditional terrorist acts, motivations, strategy, means, weapons and aims.

According to Medd and Goldstein, the terrorist motivations in the 1970’s were political,
but in the 1980’s besides politically motivated terrorism, religiously and economically
motivated terrorism is observed, and this situation has continued during the 1990’s.
Also, Chalk, Kartha and Kronin emphasize the religious terrorism in the 1990’s.
According to Laqueur, extreme right groups have replaced the terrorism of leftist and
anarchic groups. In addition, ethnically motivated terrorism has in-creased. Today, the
global terrorists might be very small groups or even individuals.

Security and Globalization in the Context of International Terrorism

The state-sponsored terrorism and the individual terrorist are both flourishing. Kronin
emphasizes that by the late 1990’s there is growing target of Americans.

In the 1970’s hijacking, kidnapping, bombing, taking hostages were the most common
methods used by terrorists, in the 1980’s besides these methods chemical weapons


Implications of September 11th, (ed.) (Mark Leonard, 2002, London: Foreign Policy Center), p. 112-119; Ulrich Beck,

an); Tara Kartha, ‘Transnational Terrorism and Radical Extremism,’ Asian Journal on Terrorism and International
started to be used, in the 1990’s beyond these conventional methods, two other threats are seen. First is that terrorists started to acquire the WMD, and second is with the increasing use of Internet “information warfare” has emerged.\textsuperscript{55} The use of WMD by terrorist increases their potential harm.\textsuperscript{56} Terrorists have gained access to destructive technology by the information revolution and technological change. Thus, the new global terror uses technology in communication and knowledge-based technological developments, such as television, mobile phones, Internet and satellite. Even some of them have their own television and radio channels. In addition, these groups can easily save their money in international banks with safe havens and can transfer it all over the world. Thus, as its destructive potential increase through technological advances, the global terrorism has become more dangerous, though the number of attacks has decreased by the late 1990s. Besides, the increase in the number of suicide attacking is radical and dangerous since it is very difficult to take caution for.\textsuperscript{57} Looking at the strategies of terrorist groups, the terrorist groups have both political and terrorist wings, so they have the opportunity to disassociate political leader-ship from practicing terrorists if something goes wrong. Their operations also have changed their targets-widened their targets from political and economic elites of a nation to financial centers,


media, energy infrastructure, etc. Rather than attacking a specific target the global terrorists started more indiscriminative killing against the civilians. Today, it is difficult to trace the terrorists, since the new global terror acts decentralized and deterritorial. Furthermore, the terrorists are interested in publicity and violence, and they do get a lot of publicity in the recent years.

   Historically, from the early 1950s to the mid-1990s, the majority of Arab and Muslim states had been faced, at varying degrees, with steadily mounting Islamist opposition. The context of these conflicts was fourfold. First, in many of these places, the post-colonial governments that had inherited power following the countries' respective independence in the 1950s and 1960s had often simply succeeded over existing religious options put forth by alternative (Islamist) groups beginning in the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, the initial contest fought around the founding of the state persisted beyond the time of the induction of the nationalistic regimes; an often violent engagement playing out at times underground, other times on the front pages of newspapers.

   Second, the new nationalist regimes rapidly, if not immediately, displayed authoritarian tendencies of which the Islamist groups, by virtue both of their oppositional nature and of their threatening potential, bore, first and foremost, the full brunt. Egypt, in particular, was the theatre of a violent struggle between the regime of Jamal Abdel Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood. The writings of one of the leading figures and theologians of that

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
movement, Sayyid Qutb, executed in August 1966, would, in time, become a leading ideological reference for Al Qaeda and an influence on many of its actors, Ayman al Dhawahiri in particular (who often quotes Qutb’s major work *Ma’aleem Fil Tareeq* or “Milestones along the Way” published in 1964).

Third, the failed political performance by the regimes and poor socioeconomic record pushed many segments within these societies into the open arms of the Islamists. From a peripheral option, the alternative choice and social services offered by the groups therefore gained ground, ultimately reaching mainstream appeal in many a Muslim theatre. In Algeria, for instance, a better organized and more committed Islamist Salvation Front (FIS) than the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) earned in the period 1988-1991 the support of vast numbers of Algerians, leading to an electoral victory in December 1991 thwarted by the military. Finally, the multifaceted association – political, economic, military and of a security type – that most of these governments came to enjoy with the United States allowed, insofar as that country provided support to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the Islamist groups to denounce the “corruption” and “crimes” committed against both their specific countries and the *Umma* (Islamic community) at large.

Underlying this tapestry were accusations leveled by the Islamist groups at unmet expectations and ineffective state building conducted by the post-colonial regimes. Religiosity aside, the arguments centered on the fact that in failing to resist the influence of the United States (and the West generally), the successive and different governments in the region had defrauded their populations. Consequently, it was argued, these states were illegitimate and had to be removed, including by forceful measures.
It is important to recognize this oft-overlooked motivation of most Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda, which, as it were, claim much legitimacy from the very illegitimacy that resulted from the post-colonial state performance and behavior.\textsuperscript{60} In addition, this state-building dimension ought not – particularly in the aftermath of the 2003 US war on Iraq – be confused with the state fragmentation scenario. When the contemporary Islamist movements were set in motion, dispute resolution procedures did exist and the differences were merely concerned with the identity of those who would be allowed to capture the state and conduct the “building” work. In a context like the one in Iraq after the American and British invasion of 2003, or indeed in Afghanistan for most of the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century and into the 21st, the contest was far more primal and encompassed wider ethnic, tribal and sectarian dimensions.

In contradistinction to most previous forms of Islamism, Al Qaeda was therefore inherently and eminently martial in its conception and outlook. Whether in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq or elsewhere in the Muslim world, the leading Islamist groups that had seen the day over the past half century had overwhelmingly been characterized by solid social anchoring in their national environment, and the presence of a program of societal reform which expressed itself in ideological and religious terms. Groups like \textit{Al Ikhwan al Muslimeen} (the Muslim Brotherhood) rose up, as popular movements in 1930s Egypt, grew radical in the midst of mid-1950s nationalist turmoil and Nasserist repression and embraced violence temporarily before renouncing it formally. Others like \textit{Al Jabha Al Islamiya lil Inqadh} (Islamist Salvation Front (FIS)) in

\textsuperscript{60} For a comprehensive history of contemporary Islamist movements, see F. Burgat, \textit{Islamism in the Shadow of Al Qaeda}, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2008.
Algeria built a large infrastructure of social welfare services at the communal level in response to the severe socioeconomic crisis that rocked that country throughout the 1980s, and hoped, to no avail, to achieve political power through the ballot in 1991.

The Birth of Militarized Islamism If, however, the Islamic Brotherhood ended up transcending Egypt’s borders with the founding of sister organizations in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, thus expressing an early form of transnationalism and pan-Islamism, and if the Algerian FIS had come in the late 1980s on the heels of Mustapha Bouyali’s early 1980s crime-driven *Al Jama’a Al Islamiya Al Musalaha* (Islamic Armed Movement) in that country, both were undeniably first and foremost the expression of local Egyptian and Algerian socioeconomic frustration and political anomie wherein religious revival was seen as remedying state failure and embodying hopes for a better future for the nation.

Removed from such, admittedly limited, belief in the reform of the system on the part of those Islamist factions that began by playing by the rules, Al Qaeda, for its part, was never concerned with electoral contests or national development questions. Al Qaeda started as an Arab-dominated group set up outside of an Arab country with a global Islamist program of action meant first to counter perceived Western hegemony in Muslim lands, and to respond to that dominion by terroristic force targeting centrally the United States and its allies.
AL Qaeda as a Global Terrorist Group

By the late 2000s, the group created and led by Osama Bin Laden and his associate Ayman al Dhawahiri\(^{61}\) had grown into a *sui generis* powerful global private entity, the transnational war inaugurated by Al Qaeda in the late 1980s represented initially merely a change of scale and nature of the post-colonial struggle in the Arab and Muslim region. This genesis owed much to an original displacement of the focus of opposition of several Islamist groups from battling local regimes, denounced as authoritarian, corrupt and repressive, to fighting directly the United States for their support of said regimes. Such evolution – a so-called move from *al adou al qareeb* (the near enemy, i.e., the local dictatorial regimes) to *al adou al ba’eed* (the far enemy; i.e., their Western supporters), as referred to in the literature of the Islamist groups\(^ {62}\) – represented a conscious choice on the part of a number of Islamist leaders that had come to cluster in Afghanistan during the period of the Soviet invasion. The strategic shift was also the objective result of the standoff and at times counterproductive results of the domestic campaigns, which many of these Islamist groups had led in their respective countries, notably in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Algeria.

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61 A surgeon by profession, al Dhawahiri (usually misspelled al Zawahiri due to colloquial Egyptian pronunciation) is a radical Egyptian Islamist theologian who, after having been imprisoned in Egypt in the early 1980s, moved to Afghanistan where he merged his Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization into Al Qaeda associating himself with Bin Laden (whom he had first met in Saudi Arabia in 1986).

Founding a Terrorist Group. “History of Al-Qaeda”

The primary founder of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was born in July 1957, the 17th of 20 sons of a Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin. Most Saudis are conservative Sunni Muslims, and Bin Laden, conservative from a young age, appears to have adopted militant Islamist views while studying at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There he attended lectures by Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb, the key ideologue of a major Sunni Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.63 Another of Bin Laden’s inspirations was Abdullah al Azzam, a major figure in the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Azzam is identified by some experts as the intellectual architect of the *jihad* against the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and ultimately of Al Qaeda itself; he cast the Soviet invasion as an attempted conquest by a non-Muslim power of sacred Muslim territory and people.64

Bin Laden made his first visit to Afghanistan a few years after the December 1979 Soviet invasion, and then relocated to areas of Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan by 1986. He reportedly used some of his personal funds to establish himself as a donor to the Afghan *mujahedin* and a recruiter of Arab and other Islamic volunteers for the war.65

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63 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt, and it has since spawned numerous Islamist movements throughout the region, some as branches of the Brotherhood, others with new names. For example, the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas traces its roots to the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1966, Sayyid Qutb was tried and executed for treason for his opposition to the government of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al Nasser.
65 The September 11 Commission report says that U.S. officials obtained information in 2000 indicating that bin Laden received $1 million per year from his family from 1970 (two years after his father’s death) until 1994, when his citizenship was revoked by the Saudi government. *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. July 22, 2004. p. 170.
The origins of al-Qaeda as a network inspiring terrorism around the world and training operatives can be traced to the Soviet War in Afghanistan (December 1979 – February 1989).\(^{66}\) The U.S. viewed the conflict in Afghanistan, with the Afghan Marxists and allied Soviet troops on one side and the native Afghan *mujahideen*, some of whom were radical Islamic militants, on the other, as a blatant case of Soviet expansionism and aggression. A CIA program called Operation Cyclone channeled funds through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency to the Afghan Mujahideen who were fighting the Soviet occupation.\(^{67}\)

At the same time, a growing number of Arab *mujahideen* joined the *jihad* against the Afghan Marxist regime, facilitated by international Muslim organizations, particularly the Maktab al-Khidamat, which was funded by the Saudi Arabia government as well as by individual Muslims (particularly Saudi businessmen who were approached by bin Laden). Together, these sources donated some $600 million a year to jihad.\(^{68}\)

In 1984, Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign *mujahideen* for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, by bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian Islamic scholar and member of the Muslim Brotherhood. MAK organized guest houses in Peshawar, near the Afghan border, and gathered supplies for the construction of paramilitary training camps to prepare foreign recruits for the Afghan war front. Bin Laden became a "major financier" of the

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mujahideen, spending his own money and using his connections with "the Saudi royal family and the petro-billionaires of the Gulf" to influence public opinion about the war and raise additional funds.

From 1986, MAK began to set up a network of recruiting offices in the U.S., the hub of which was the Al Kifah Refugee Center at the Farouq Mosque on Brooklyn’s Atlantic Avenue. Among notable figures at the Brooklyn center were "double agent" Ali Mohamed, whom FBI special agent Jack Cloonan called "bin Laden’s first trainer,”69 and "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel-Rahman, a leading recruiter of mujahideen for Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda evolved from MAK. Azzam and bin Laden began to establish camps in Afghanistan in 1987. U.S. government financial support for the Afghan Islamic militants was substantial. Aid to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghan mujahideen leader and founder and leader of the Hezb-e Islami radical Islamic militant faction, alone amounted "by the most conservative estimates" to $600 million. Later, in the early 1990s, after the U.S. had withdrawn support, Hekmatyar "worked closely" with bin Laden. In addition to receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in American aid, Hekmatyar was the recipient of the lion’s share of Saudi aid.70 There is evidence that the CIA supported Hekmatyar’s drug trade activities by giving him immunity for his opium trafficking, which financed the operation of his militant faction.

MAK and foreign mujahideen volunteers, or "Afghan Arabs," did not play a major role in the war. While over 250,000 Afghan mujahideen fought the Soviets and the communist Afghan government, it is estimated that were never more than 2,000 foreign mujahideen

70 Bergen, Peter L.(2001), Holy war, Inc.: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden, New York, Free Press, p. 69
in the field at any one time. Nonetheless, foreign mujahideen volunteers came from 43 countries, and the total number that participated in the Afghan movement between 1982 and 1992 is reported to have been 35,000.\textsuperscript{71} Bin Laden played a central role in organizing training camps for the foreign Muslim volunteers.

The Soviet Union finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. To the surprise of many, Mohammad Najibullah’s communist Afghan government hung on for three more years, before being overrun by elements of the mujahideen. With mujahideen leaders unable to agree on a structure for governance, chaos ensued, with constantly reorganizing alliances fighting for control of ill-defined territories, leaving the country devastated.

Toward the end of the Soviet military mission in Afghanistan, some mujahideen wanted to expand their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, such as Israel and Kashmir. A number of overlapping and interrelated organizations were formed, to further those aspirations. One of these was the organization that would eventually be called al-Qaeda, formed by bin Laden with an initial meeting held on August 11, 1988, at Peshawar, Pakistan.

Notes of a meeting of bin Laden and others on August 20, 1988, indicate al-Qaeda was a formal group by that time: "basically an organized Islamic faction, its goal is to lift the word of God, to make His religion victorious." A list of requirements for membership itemized the following: listening ability, good manners, obedience, and making a pledge to follow one’s superiors.

According to Wright, the group’s real name wasn’t used in public pronouncements because "its existence was still a closely held secret." His research suggests that al-Qaeda was formed at an August 11, 1988, meeting between "several senior leaders" of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Abdullah Azzam, and bin Laden, where it was agreed to join bin Laden’s money with the expertise of the Islamic Jihad organization and take up the jihadist cause elsewhere after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.

Bin Laden wished to establish non-military operations in other parts of the world; Azzam, in contrast, wanted to remain focused on military campaigns. After Azzam was assassinated in 1989, the MAK split, with a significant number joining bin Laden’s organization.

In November 1989, Ali Mohamed, a former special forces Sergeant stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, left military service and moved to California. He traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and became "deeply involved with bin Laden’s plans." A year later, on November 8, 1990, the FBI raided the New Jersey home of Ali Mohammed’s associate El Sayyid Nosair, discovering a great deal of evidence of terrorist plots, including plans to blow up New York City skyscrapers. Nosair was eventually convicted in connection to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1991, Ali Mohammed is said to have helped orchestrate bin Laden’s relocation to Sudan. After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan was effectively ungoverned for seven years and plagued by constant infighting between former allies and various mujahideen groups.

73 Ibid. p. 181.
Throughout the 1990s, a new force began to emerge. The origins of the Taliban (literally "students") lay in the children of Afghanistan, many of them orphaned by the war, and many of whom had been educated in the rapidly expanding network of Islamic schools (madrassas) either in Kandahar or in the refugee camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border.

According to Ahmed Rashid, five leaders of the Taliban were graduates of Darul Uloom Haqqania, a madrassa in the small town of Akora Khattak. The town is situated near Peshawar in Pakistan, but largely attended by Afghan refugees. This institution reflected Salafi beliefs in its teachings, and much of its funding came from private donations from wealthy Arabs. Bin Laden’s contacts were still laundering most of these donations, using "unscrupulous" Islamic banks to transfer the money to an "array" of charities, which serve as front groups for al-Qaeda, or transporting cash-filled suitcases straight into Pakistan. Another four of the Taliban’s leaders attended a similarly funded and influenced madrassa in Kandahar.

Many of the mujahideen who later joined the Taliban fought alongside Afghan warlord Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi’s Harkat i Inqilabi group at the time of the Russian invasion. This group also enjoyed the loyalty of most Afghan Arab fighters.

The continuing internecine strife between various factions, and accompanying lawlessness following the Soviet withdrawal, enabled the growing and well-disciplined Taliban to expand their control over territory in Afghanistan, and it came to establish an enclave which it called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In 1994, it captured the

regional center of Kandahar, and after making rapid territorial gains thereafter, conquered the capital city Kabul in September 1996.

While in Afghanistan, the Taliban government tasked al-Qaeda with the training of Brigade 055, an elite part of the Taliban's army from 1997–2001. The Brigade was made up of mostly foreign fighters, many veterans from the Soviet Invasion, and all under the same basic ideology of the mujahideen. In November 2001, as Operation Enduring Freedom had toppled the Taliban government, many Brigade 055 fighters were captured or killed, and those that survived were thought to head into Pakistan along with bin Laden.

Eventually On May 1, 2011 in Washington, D.C. (May 2, Pakistan Standard Time), U.S. President Barack Obama announced that Osama bin Laden had been killed by "a small team of Americans" acting under Obama’s direct orders, in a covert operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, about 50 km (31 mi) north of Islamabad. but this is not the end of Al-Qaeda’s story. The Al-Qaeda is still alive under leading rest of remaining leaders and tries to regain its power and capability of doing terroristic action as an international terrorist group.

Al Qaeda’s difference specific as a transnational Islamist army was characteristically illustrated by the first set of programmatic actions it undertook during its set-up phase. Between 1989 and 1995, the group’s focus was to staff this army and train its men. As Al Qaeda saw it, it had been born as a result of the failure of discredited Arab governments to defend their countries. The evolution towards armed politics of a group of Arab Islamists from the Middle East and North Africa allied with Asian and African
Muslims was, in its eyes, the consequence of a dual realization, wherein private actors came to the conclusion that their states were too weak to defend their citizenry, but equally too strong to be overtaken. At the core of the group’s genesis stands, thus, a mixture of defiance, not, as is often argued, hopelessness and despair.\textsuperscript{75}

The strategy meant, too, the husbanding of financial and logistical resources and the formation of professional, disciplined and dependable soldiers, as well as a corps of officers and permanent contacts. The assertiveness of the movement sprang as well from its battle-hardened status. Starting in the early 1980s, a number of these Islamist militants began migrating to Afghanistan to take part in the resistance against the Soviet occupation. Later known as the “Arab Afghans”, these operators formed rapidly a relatively contiguous group, which achieved both regional notoriety and some success in its jihad against the Soviets. In particular, and while liaising with the local Afghan Islamist factions – in time building an alliance with the Taliban (who would take over the country in 1996) and influential local leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf – these Arab fighters came to be organized under a loose coordination. A Palestinian named Abdallah Yusuf Azzam, who had emerged as leader of these “Arab Afghans” set up the office that functioned as an international bureau and serviced some twenty thousand individuals.

Under Azzam’s leadership, the matrix for Al Qaeda thus materialized as a replenishing way station for fighters on their way to the Afghan-Soviet front. Known as \textit{Maktab Al} Rehman.

\textsuperscript{75} A portent of this strategy was the operation conducted by Hezbollah in Beirut on 18 April 1983 against the US Marine barracks and the French paratroopers’ headquarters, which had killed 241 Marines and 58 paratroopers and led to the United States’ withdrawal from Lebanon.
Khadamat lil Mujahideen Al Arab (Office of Works for the Arab Combatants) and sometimes referred to as Maktab Al Dhiyafa (Hospitality House), this office had been set up in Kabul in 1983 to coordinate the increasingly organised activity by those Islamist operatives that had travelled to Afghanistan since the early 1980s to battle, in the name of Jihad, the Russian troops.

To the extent that the “Arab Afghans” were indeed the core membership of Al Qaeda and that their role was instrumental in subsequently establishing Al Qaeda as a successful venture throughout the 1990s and more so in the 2000s, it is important to note that we can, in retrospect, identify three such successive waves of “Arab Afghans”. A first group establishing itself as early as 1980, following Abdullah Azzam’s fatwa declaring it a “fard ayn” (personal obligation)\(^76\) on all Muslims to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan was comprised of readymade Islamists, in majority from the Persian Gulf and the Nile Valley, who had already gone through significant engagements with the local governments during the 1970s. As much as these individuals brought in a seasoned dimension to their militancy, they also looked upon the migration to Afghanistan as relief from the stalemated fight against their “near enemy”\(^77\).

\(^76\) Underscoring the flight logic, Azzam had declared: “Whoever can, from among the Arabs, fight jihad in Palestine, then he must start there. And, if he is not capable, then he must set out for Afghanistan.”

\(^77\) Recently the concept and the aim of word “Near Enemy” has been changed to Shiite Muslims due to some challenges in-between by extremist Sunni members of al-Qaeda especially in Iraq and Syria.
The addition of a second contingent, largely North African, clustered in mid-1986 in the aftermath of the successes encountered by the original group in its involvement in the insurgency against the Soviets, and ahead of the increasing prospects of the latter’s withdrawal. Following the formal set up of Al Qaeda in 1988-1989, a third layer, including arrivals from Europe and the United States, added strength to the organization and was instrumental, in particular, as preparations were underway for a series of assaults on US targets around the world.

Moreover, with the departure of a number of first and second wave fighters (either to their home countries, notably Algeria where the Islamist Salvation Front was becoming engaged in a violent conflict with the government, or to take part in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina), there was a measure of natural filtering among the fighters of the new generation. In sum, whereas the first group brought in commitment and energy, and the second added numbers and dedication, the third group injected renewal and focus, at a crucial phase.

Hence, the initial Al Qaeda army took the form of a transnational grouping of some twenty thousand men that sprang from three distinct horizons: (i) disbanded, aging, but battle-hardened “Arab Afghans” available in the wake of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan; (ii) new, younger recruits lured by the appeal of the Afghan “success” story and functioning as mid-level operational actors under the supervision of a guild of senior managers (Abu Ubaida Al Banshiri, Abu Hafs Al Masri and Abu Zubayda); and, increasingly after the mid-1990s, (iii) secret transnational cells immersed in the Middle East, Europe and Eastern Africa waiting to be activated for a new type of attacks in the Western metropolises. The latter subgroup, which would be best embodied in the
Hamburg cell led by Mohammad Atta and which would in time produce the model for the decentralized Al Qaeda from 2006 onwards, was to become the vehicle for the series of spectacular operations led by Al Qaeda in the 1995-2005 decade.

Capitalizing on waves of riots and uprisings (notably in Cairo, Casablanca and Algiers in the 1980s), which had sealed the historical failure of the post-colonial Arab state – painting a compelling picture of accumulating resentment, alienation and anomie which would eventually lead to the popular revolutions in 2011 – a modern-day Islamist movement came to be born on the very factor alternatively enabling state-building, namely the reinvention of the “political” sphere through the export of terrorism.

In that sense, Al Qaeda’s action was something akin to a statement that there is nothing inevitable about the vulnerabilities of the states; that their conditions are but products of a history and as such can be remedied similarly, and, more revolutionarily, that violence – including offensive international force – is not solely a state prerogative. Thus usurping authority that traditionally accrued to the state and offering a prescriptive agenda unacceptable internationally, Al Qaeda was from the very beginning immune to statist deterrence.
Figure 4: Map of Al Qaeda Attack Points

KC Johnson, Core 2.2—December Classes, URL: http://kc-johnson.com/fall-2009-courses/core-2-2/core-2-2-december-classes/
The impact of Al Qaeda on global politics is then a long standing affair. Its inception reaches back decades to the contemporary emergence and transformation of a non-state armed group that has sought to create unprecedented regional and international dynamics anchored in a privatized usage of force for a political purpose. Beyond solely triggering domestic or foreign crises, this organization has aimed, in particular, to adapt, achieve and prosper open-endedly as it pursued such novel strategy. It is in that sense that the metamorphosis of Al Qaeda was planned for all along. From the very beginning, this was an inevitable way for the group to ensure its presentation and set it apart from previous and subsequent Islamist factions.

Whereas traditional Islamist groups began establishing themselves through a combination of religious preaching, political discourse and, most importantly, networks of domestic social services, Al Qaeda’s first embodiment was to serve as a welfare service provider originating in the rentier state Persian Gulf but one whose action was fundamentally oriented outwardly and militarily with the Jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The ascendancy of this rationale meant not the primrose of a frustrated local ambition but, rather, that domestic opposition to the “near enemy” should be separated strategically from the “far enemy”.

In such a general context of failed Arab and Islamic state-building, Al Qaeda sprang forth as a politico-religious project built upon (i) the relocation of authority, (ii) the circumventing of the state, and (iii) the militaristic empowerment of a non-state actor.

However, the early “successes” of Al Qaeda masked a self-inflicted structural defeat. If initially the rapid proliferation of the five regional representations of Al Qaeda were
arguably an added indication of the organisation’s impressive global reach (in Europe, the Nile Valley, the Levant, the Maghreb and the Persian Gulf) and its ability to operate transnationally years after a War on Terror had been launched against it, it gradually emerged that the regional entities differed significantly and their relationship to the mother Al Qaeda was, at best, tenuous.

Whereas in its first fifteen years Al Qaeda had been able to advance globally, cumulatively, and against important odds – for each tactical loss, Al Qaeda came to earn a strategic gain: retreat in Afghanistan but advance in Iraq; confined leadership but proliferating cells; curtailed physical movement but global, transnational impact; additional enemies but expanding recruits – in the period 2006-2011, its leadership had morphed into a meta-commandment ultimately offering only politico-religious and military-strategic commentary, not operational direction.

All in all, what can be read as a regionalization strategy of Al Qaeda ended up confusing the global picture of the organization. The necessary elasticity the group adopted, partly voluntarily, partly as a way to adapt to the international counter-terrorism campaign, created an ever-growing distance with already independent units.

Osama Bin Laden’s disappearance from Al Qaeda and the War on Terror scene marks therefore the end of the era of the original group set up in Afghanistan. It opens a new phase in which the regional franchises will enact further their existing independence and in so doing endow the conflict with a new configuration by stretching the centre of gravity of transnational terrorism.
By the summer of 2011, Al Qaeda had completed the mission it set out to achieve in the summer of 1989 and ten years after it had conducted its most lethal attack in New York and Washington. Against all odds, the latter phases in the conflict with its foes outliving the George W. Bush administration; engineering further political decrepitude in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; attempting new attacks on Western targets; and expanding into new territories such as the Sahel – were but additional opportunities to the group’s global gains in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The death, on 2 May 2011, of its founder and leader, Osama Bin Laden, would essentially confirm the formal close of that saga, as the man had in many respects become obsolete in relation to his own organization.

Osama Bin Laden’s saga has been about changing war and global politics. He has wrestled an embryonic and local group of aging, if battle-tested, “Arab Afghans”, merged it with a younger generation of transnational fighters and transformed the whole into a full-blown, dynamic and technologically advanced organization (Al Qaeda), before embracing the loosening and diffused expansion of that matured structure into an umbrella federation (which can be termed the mother Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda Al Oum).

In that context, the conventional wisdom rehearsed from 2004 onwards held that it was the transformation of Al Qaeda that had been the key reason for its survival in the face of the massive international War on Terror campaign. Close examination of the group’s history reveals that the strength of Al Qaeda has laid, in point of fact, not so much in its post-11 September mutation but more so in its faculty to innovate constantly. In contradistinction to its state adversaries who professed to be on the offensive but were
more often than not confined to a structurally defensive position, this transnational terrorist group had been writing its own story all along.

Al Qaeda reached, however, a paradoxical milestone. In spite of the constant augmentation of its global impact, the organization ultimately found itself immersed in the local management of conflicts. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks it conducted on the United States, this strategic about-face had played out with an urgent concern; the avoidance of predictability. Whereas the raid on New York and Washington had endowed them overnight with global notoriety, the group’s leaders did not seek to replicate those strikes in the United States. Blurring the picture, the group opted to shift its attention to Europe targeting those states – Spain on 11 March 2004 and the United Kingdom on 7 July 2005 – whose leaders had assisted the United States in its war in Iraq.

When that pattern proved successful, putting on high alert other European states, Al Qaeda did not expand it. Ushering another phase in its post-11 September strategy, it proceeded to concentrate on the conflict in Iraq. After spearheading the insurgency in that country, it took a back seat and moved on, from 2006 onwards, to support the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.79 By 2011, the United States had lost more than two thousand men in Afghanistan with 2009 and 2010 as the two deadliest years. This scheme has had an unexpected twist illustrated by the return of Al Qaeda to its initial ground and to the very aim; it had originally sought to steer away from, namely the engagement of local rulers. What, in the 1990s and early 2000s, constituted the group’s

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unique strength -thought-out geographic expansion on a rebooted transnational terrorist mode—ended up, in the mid to late 2000s, being held back by the immediacy and “provincialism” of the various franchises’ immediate concerns.

Paradoxically, twenty years into this design, the dominant narratology about Al Qaeda almost systematically takes on the form of an awkward scientific resistance to registering the innovation of Al Qaeda’s terrorist project. From hatred, barbarity and irrationality, we are merely being presented with a brew of elements rooted in denial, reductionism, and personalization of that martial revolution of terror.

Some attempt to discern the mechanics of what would make Al Qaeda disappear thus bypassing the lasting impact of a group which has already reached the status of being emulated (in Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq, Somalia, Indonesia, etc.). Hence, “attacking the ideology”, “breaking links”, “denying sanctuary” or indeed “engaging peripherally” remained policy options that held sway within many quarters.

These analyses share a common emphasis on locating the initiative on the states’ side, painting the misleading portrait of a reactive Al Qaeda only moving about along gaps created by these states’ actions and inactions, when it is precisely the opposite that has so often proved true.

Though there has been an increasing recognition of “structural” reasons that allowed Al Qaeda to blossom, the overall perception persists that this “super empowered

80 During the 1970s, terrorism experienced a first moment of transnationalism wherein various groups with different identities and objectives, such as Baader-Meinhof, Black September, the Japanese Red Brigades, and Carlos, had collaborated, often joining forces during coordinated attacks to constitute a global threat against a number of states.
competition” is a reality guided by the center. Whereas it can be argued that by forcing its enemy to allocate attention and resources (including political capital and military materiel) to areas unforeseen originally in this conflict, Al Qaeda impacted events more consequentially from the periphery in a full decade after Al Qaeda struck in the heart of the United States triggering worldwide transformations, seasoned observers of the organisation would admit that Al Qaeda was far from defeated, that it may take years before its founding leaders could be apprehended or killed and that name-calling and self-imagined moral superiority would certainly not win the day against Al Qaeda.\(^8\)

There is partial truth in that, for Osama Bin Laden’s disappearance may well come to sound the death knell for the mother Al Qaeda (\textit{Al Qaeda al Oum}) while simultaneously releasing the lethal energy of mini-Al Qaedas round the world with more unpredictability and proliferating counterterrorism fronts.

In so autotomizing the use of force in the 1990s and generating mimetism on the part of several other regional groups in the 2000s, Al Qaeda had taken the international system to pre-Westphalia notions of legitimacy in the conduct of warfare. It also led itself into an impasse as the US-led Global War on Terror replied in kind to the group’s transnational attacks with extraterritorial operations that targeted Al Qaeda’s leadership and membership throughout the world (with drone attacks in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and secret prison sites in Eastern Europe), ultimately leading to Bin Laden’s arrest and killing in Abbottabad Pakistan in May 2011. What is more, as an actor whose very violence was anchored in its ability to disrupt and paralyse its enemies

through regular restatement of its indefatigability, Al Qaeda faced a new challenge of its own, namely how to sustain its increasing empowerment without succumbing to overstretch. In that respect, the 7 July 2005 bombings in London arguably represented the last operation initiated and coordinated directly by the central Al Qaeda organization. In July 2006, Ayman al Dhawahiri released a videotaped message aired on the Al Jazeera network in which he threatened the United Kingdom of further attacks and presented video footage of a statement by London underground bomber Shehzad Tanweer on the same filmed testament model that the organization had used for some of the 11 September commando members and released through its Mouassassat Al Sihab media branch. In that respect, the attacks which took place, beginning with the 1 October 2005 bombings in a shopping mall and beachside restaurant in Bali, have arguably been the works of local organizations – which became more prominent in their standings – now loosely inspired by Al Qaeda and acting on their own (even when, for publicity sake, they claimed Al Qaeda links). This development, the result of two coincidental phenomena, namely Al Qaeda’s conscious strategy of regionalization and decentralization, and a franchise demand within regional Islamist organizations themselves after the 11 September attacks, would nonetheless paradoxically yield a weakening and confused picture for the original Al Qaeda group. In subsequent years, it would become impossible to speak of Al Qaeda in the singular.

As early as 2002, seemingly compelled as it was to enact a strategic retreat in the face of advancing US and British troops in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s leadership appeared to have realized the value of multiplying the number of its operational sites, both as a
survival mechanism and as a force-multiplier. However, increased surveillance of Islamist pockets in both the Western and Muslim worlds (in mosques, universities, businesses and other organized public venues) rendered the work of the cells far more dangerous and harder to supervise from headquarters under assault in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In such a context, Al Qaeda appeared then to order, in the period 2002-04, a series of operations in the periphery of Western states (in Tunisia, Pakistan, Yemen, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) in order to spread militarily the center of gravity of the engagement and confuse its opponents, who consequently found themselves unable to know precisely what to expect, where, when and under what guise.

Though a substantial measure of independent decentralized decision-making was already in place, notably in the case of Saudi Arabia, the attacks usually but not exclusively targeted countries whose governments Al Qaeda accused of enabling the US war against it (Germans in Tunisia; Australians in Bali; Israelis in Kenya; Spaniards in Morocco; and so forth). All these attacks were claimed and regular pronouncements made by the organization in videotaped messages released – usually to Middle Eastern media outlets, notably Al Jazeera – by Al Qaeda’s official media branch. The group’s savvy use of technology, including sporadic postings on Islamist websites (e.g., ansar.info, al-ekhlaas.com, ansarnet.info, alneda.com, jehad.com and azzam.com), was also a distinctive feature of the organization’s modus operandi transcending boundaries. To the extent that these operations necessarily relied, in the post-11 September context, on increased independence by mid-level operators (who could select, for instance, the nature of targets), they ended up highlighting to the mother Al Qaeda the
value of decentralization setting the stage for a strategy of regionalization which appeared to have been pursued actively from 2005 onwards.

Ideology of Al-Qaeda

Ideology is a powerful message that motivates and propels ordinary human beings into action. Ideology, a dynamic and an evolving brief system, is created by the interpretation of events by ideologues. Ideology, not poverty or illiteracy, is the key driver of politically motivated violence.\(^2\) Ideology frames organizational structure, leadership and membership motivation, recruitment and support, and shapes the strategies and tactics adopted by the group. Jihadi ideologues and group leaders craft their ideology by interpreting, reinterpreting or misinterpreting religion and politics. Ideology is used to attract and retain recruits as members, supporters and sympathizers. The personal history and worldview of an individual may make him or her more or less susceptible to a particular terrorist or extremist ideology.

Using ideology, contemporary Jihad groups recruit followers from a cross-section of society – the rich, the poor, the educated and the less educated. To generate both recruits and support, they indoctrinate their potential and existing support base. Ideology is inculcated by disseminating it in the form of information or propaganda using lectures, speeches, pronouncements, writings, etc.

\(^2\) In the pre-9/11 environment many scholars attributed terrorism to poverty and lack of education. Osama Bin Landen, Emir-General, Al Qaeda comes from the richest non-royal Saudi family and Dr Ayman al Zawahiri from one of the most educated families in Egypt.
Al Qaeda is a jihad organization with a global reach. In keeping its original mandate, its principal aim was to inspire and incite Islamic movements and the Muslim masses worldwide to attack those who threaten Islam and Muslims. As they say; “In defense of Islam and its adherents”, al Qaeda conducts attacks on iconic targets of the US, its allies and friends to inspire and instigate a perpetual campaign. Although al Qaeda does not enjoy widespread support among the Muslim masses worldwide, it seeks to exploit the anger, suffering and the resentment of Muslims against the United States. America’s lack of understanding of the Muslim world – for instance its invasion of Iraq - has given a new lease of life to terrorism and extremism. Considering the support for the global jihad movement in Asia, Africa, Middle East, and elsewhere, the campaign has been a partial success. While al Qaeda conducted one major attack every year prior to 9/11, al Qaeda and its associated groups conducted one attack every three months after 9/11. Many of these groups today seek to emulate al Qaeda tactics, and more importantly believe in the global jihad. The most hunted terrorist group in history, has spawned several similar groups.

Al Qaeda inherited a global infrastructure from the anti-Soviet multinational Afghan mujahidin. Its real strength is not al Qaeda membership per se but its overarching highly appealing ideology. Instead of building support for al Qaeda the group, it seeks to reinvigorate the global jihad movement. In addition to training its own members – 4,000 (October 2001 estimate, Western intelligence community), al Qaeda, Taliban and other groups trained 20,000 members in its camps in Afghanistan from 1989 to 2001. Most of the mujahidin that fought against the Soviets disagree with al Qaeda and its associated groups.
Today, al Qaeda’s real power is the disparate groups it had trained, financed, armed and most importantly ideologized. The al Qaeda network (al Qaeda group + its associated groups) and ideologically affiliated cells comprise the al Qaeda movement. Since al Qaeda attacked America’s most iconic landmarks, the threat posed by al Qaeda has been surpassed by the emergence of a global jihad movement, consisting of al Qaeda and other groups that advocate global jihad. The global jihad movement has four overlapping components.

The founding charter of al Qaeda was formulated by Abdullah Azzam probably in late 1987 and early 1988 and published in Al Jihad, the principal journal of the Arab mujahidin in April 1988. He envisaged al Qaeda as an organization that would channel the energies of the mujahidin into fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims worldwide, an Islamic “rapid reaction force”, ready to spring to the defence of their fellow believers at short notice. Azzam described his original concept:

“Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy task and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer, endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifests itself. This vanguard constitutes Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah for the expected society.”83

The forceful words articulated to shape the organization did not generalize the means to include terrorism. He was a firm believer that “the end does not justify the means”. Jihad as he saw it was invoked as a religious obligation in defence of Islam and Muslims against a defined enemy, not a speculative one. This is best demonstrated in the Afghan-Soviet war, to which he dedicated his life immediately before his death. Any attempt to speculate beyond this perimeter, would be out of proportion. Azzam rejected a proposal by MAK’s Egyptian members – Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, Abu Hafs alias Muhammed Atef, and subsequently Dr Ayman al Zawahiri - to utilize jihadi funds to train mujahidin in terrorist techniques and tactics. He went so far as to issue a fatwa (religious decree) ruling it as a violation of Islamic law. Azzam was against the killing of non-combatants and would never endorse the current terrorist tactics.

The same, however, cannot be said of Dr Ayman al Zawahiri. He is the person largely responsible for the al Qaeda’s mutation into what it is today. He not only filled the vacuum left by Azzam but transformed Bin Laden from a guerrilla who killed soldiers to a terrorist who killed civilians. Before al Zawahiri joined al Qaeda, he was already a practising terrorist, the mastermind of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one of the most deadly organizations in the Middle East. Al Zawahiri’s experience against oppressive and repressive political regimes in Egypt made him “battle hardened”, compelled to continue the struggle against the present day jahilia at all cost.

With the mobility of al Qaeda leaders confined to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Abu Musab al Zarkawi in Iraq has emerged as al Qaeda’s de-facto operational commander. Zarkawi seeks to wage a global jihad but disagrees both with Bin Laden and Zawahiri on the issue of the Shias. While al Qaeda core would like Zarkawi to target the new Iraqi
government and the coalition forces, Zarkawi also targets the Shias. Nonetheless, both Zarkawi’s and his mentor’s – Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi - commitment to global jihad is unequivocal.

Al Qaeda’s worldview has changed over time. It perceives the US and Israel leading a global conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims, and perceives American hegemony as affecting the Muslim nation. Al Qaeda detests America’s presence in the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Saudi Arabia; US support for the Israel state; US assistance to pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East, and since the first Intifada in 1987 Bin Laden highlighted the neglected future of the Palestinians. Al Qaeda blames the US for everything and holds the US government, American people, and US foreign policy responsible for bringing chaos to the Muslim world. The only way the Muslim nation could live under the shade of Islam, al Qaeda ideologues argue, is to be united and work towards the establishment, by force if necessary, of an Islamic nation adhering to the rule of the Caliphs. It is with this in mind that Bin Laden issued the 1988 fatwa. Al Qaeda targets both non-Muslims and Muslims that do not share al Qaeda’s worldview. To Bin Laden and al Qaeda, it is a religious duty of Muslims around the world to wage jihad on the American land, American citizens, Israel and Jews. After 9/11, the targets include US allies, primarily Europe, Canada and Australia and friends, primarily Muslim countries that support the West. Those Muslims who do not heed this call are declared apostates, people who have forsaken their faith.

Al Qaeda’s main aim is to establish Islamic states wherever Muslims live. The methodology for achieving this is jihad. Al Qaeda’s ideology, often referred to as “jihadism”, is marked by a willingness to carry out armed struggle against those who in
their view try to prevent the establishment of an Islamic state. “Jihadism” is at odds with nearly all Islamic religious thought. “Jihadism” as practised by al Qaeda has its origins in the Middle East. As a concept, it is often associated with the work of two modern Sunni Islamic thinkers: Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab and Syed Qutb. Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab was an 18th century reformer. He claimed that Islam had been corrupted a generation or so after the death of the Prophet Mohammad. He denounced any theology or customs developed after that as non-Islamic, and in doing so tried to reform more than 1,000 years of religious scholarship. He and his supporters took over what is now Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism remains the dominant school of religious thought. Syed Qutb is an Egyptian scholar of the mid 20th century. He declared Western civilization an enemy of Islam and denounced leaders of Muslim nations for not following Islam closely enough. He preached that jihad should be undertaken not just to defend Islam, but to purify Islam. Other contemporary ideologues – Abu Mohamed al Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al Filastini and Abu Hamza al Masri – contributed significantly to al Qaeda’s worldview.

As an extension of these ideologies, al Qaeda often couches its grievances in “Third Worldist” terms familiar to any contemporary anti-globalization activist, often framing modern political concerns, including social justice, within a divine and religious narrative. Jihad in the form of armed struggle in the name of God then becomes the means to attain freedom and rid the ummah of injustice. It is a way to punish the cruel as they have inflicted cruelty upon the ummah.84 The jihad they wage is a “defensive jihad” in the face of perceived aggression by the enemies of Islam and the Muslims. The

presence of US and other non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War was a turning point in the life of Bin Laden. Although the US troops established a presence at the invitation of the Saudi royal family, Bin Laden justified his fight by renewing his commitment to “defensive jihad”. He publicly criticized the Saudi royal family and alleged that their invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian Peninsula constituted an affront to the sanctity of the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the Global Islamic community. As the Saudi government rendered him stateless, Bin Laden advocated violence against it and the United States. As it was difficult to strike inside Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden’s ire increasingly focused on the United States. Following a period of exile in Sudan and Afghanistan his radical views sharpened. Jihad to al Qaeda followers was deemed justifiable in order to defend the dignity and pride of the nation, a noble duty which had been neglected by the Muslim leaders. Al Qaeda’s conviction to political ideology couched in religious terms is therefore not easily swayed by cheap promises and materialistic gains. So long as there is no sincere attempt to meet its demands, al Qaeda will have sufficient support for the continuity of the jihad.

In May 1996, after Bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan he became more violent. He issued a declaration of war against the United States in August 1996. By moving to Afghanistan, he became an internationally recognizable figure with the opportunity to openly present his views. As the leader of al Qaeda, he underlined its resentment towards the US, described as the “alliance of Jews, Christians, and their agents”. Even though he did not possess Islamic religious credentials or authority, Bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998. He claimed that the United States had made “a clear

declaration of war on God, His messenger, and Muslims” through its policies in the Islamic world. This is another example of al Qaeda’s jihad ideology which set the organization in motion.

With jihad comes the belief in martyrdom. Al Qaeda’s operatives firmly believe that Allah guides and rewards those who sacrifice themselves for a noble cause. They are ever willing to sacrifice themselves without hesitation. The notion of a noble and blessed death achieved through martyrdom has been firmly embedded in their collective psyche. They view their acts as a sacrifice which is needed in order to achieve the goal of establishing the religion of Allah on earth. Their struggle yields one of the two things: victory or martyrdom.

The baiah or the pledge of allegiance serves as an assurance that those affiliating themselves to the organization are committed to the organization’s ideology. By instituting it, the organization is freed from conceptual problems arising from differences in opinion. To a certain degree, through it an acceptable level of uniformity is maintained which contributed to the organization’s stability and ease of management and administration.

They also have the notion that “true Islam or pure Islam” can only be established if the essence of Islamic society and its fundamentals are instituted. This requires the setting up of an Islamic state. Of course to achieve this end, the present Muslim society needs an Islamic movement which will provide leadership and the spiritual guidance.86 The Islamic movement is needed to keep in check the threat posed by a global conspiracy, trying to eradicate the Muslim identity by spreading godless and atheistic views among the Muslim masses. The arguments articulated in support of the ideology provide

additional momentum for it to travel far and wide. As a result, a pan-Islamic ideology developed. In view of the prevalent animosity and prejudice against Islam, and the western hegemony, Islamic governments can never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. The battle concept was total war, “by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth”.87 Re-creating the Caliphate thereby uniting the completely Muslim world into a single entity, is a logical conclusion drawn by al Qaeda to help bring the Muslim communities out of this dilemma.

What actually motivates al Qaeda is not power, wealth or fame but an ideological belief in their struggles. The trap to be avoided by Western scholars is the common assumption that al Qaeda and other jihad groups are driven by publicity in pursuit of their broader goal. These groups fight existing governments they perceive as hostile to Islam and governments that have departed from the course of God and refused to apply the Shari’ah. They feel that their mission is legitimate and embark on actions which reflect the bitter historical and practical experience of those involved in the struggle.

To build support for their fight against the West, al Qaeda presents a common grievance that Muslims are the ones on the receiving end and therefore actions against the Muslim’s enemies are worthy. Drawing lessons from the worldwide Muslim response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda ideologues now seek to unite the Muslims in a jihad against the West. In the last century, the many mujahidin factions that existed allied together to face the Soviets, a common enemy. They put aside their differences. Muslims could, regardless of nationality, fight side by side and attain victory for all. The individuals that filled the ranks of the mujahidin during this war, who came from all strata of society proved that greater achievements could be attained through

unity based on common objectives. Momentous events such as the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan, the collapse of communism, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War precipitated the creation of over one hundred contemporary Islamist movements in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, the Balkans.

The victory is often interpreted by al Qaeda ideologues as the will of men being singlehandedly defeated by the will of God. The internalization of the victory brought about a feeling of power derived from the belief that their effort had received divine legitimacy and a clear indication that the path they had taken was guided. Bin Laden’s followers believe that it was the action of the mujahidin primarily supported by the Muslim world that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. They also believe that the US had achieved its goal of becoming the sole global superpower through what Bin Laden and his fellow mujahidin had achieved in Afghanistan. Bin Laden later justified his actions by stating that MAK and its Islamist allies were being persecuted by “an ungrateful US” which had also taken credit for the defeat of the Soviets.

The presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s at the height of the Gulf War and likewise the US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were perceived by al Qaeda as acts of aggression.88 Such perceptions generated widespread support and propelled al Qaeda forward, and helped it transform into its present state. The US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan has been instrumental in decentralizing al Qaeda’s members but also dispersed them across the globe. Fragmentation and difficulty in

communication with the central command forced them to reorganize into smaller, manageable and fluid groups, which focused on attack against American interests worldwide as a form of retaliation. The US invasion and occupation of Iraq has widened the theatre of conflict. Today, there is unprecedented support for jihad groups, including al Qaeda. The deteriorating situation in Iraq is producing greater unity among disparate groups and galvanizing greater support for extremism and terrorism. Today, al Qaeda working with Abu Musab al Zarkawi’s Tawhid Wal Jihad has urged its followers to target both the domestic governments and Western interests.

**Al-Qaeda and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Although we always witness terrorist explosions that lead to massacre of people in most countries. However, with three main reasons we can be sure that over the time number, quality and complexity of these attacks will increase:

1 – Possibility of more groups’ access to weapons of mass destruction including NBC weapons or other kinds of these weapons such as cyber terrorism which its sequence is horror and obstruction of everyday life.

2 - Considering high power of countries’ military forces to control their borders by using space technology and satellite and other means, it may lead international enemies to have alternative but to harm these countries by unconventional attacks, including terrorist attacks with the use of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, the developed

89 Zawahiri videotape broadcasted by Al Jazeera. URL: [http://alsaha.fares.net/sahat?128@209.WcGqojKhRA5.0@.1dd6a9e9](http://alsaha.fares.net/sahat?128@209.WcGqojKhRA5.0@.1dd6a9e9).
countries of the world with high military power (such as the U.S., Britain and other developed European countries of...) probably are exposed to threats and vulnerabilities more than other countries.

3 - The nature of non-state elements’ violence is changing in a way that even individuals with no organizational affiliation solely on the basis of individual motivations (ideological, sociological, psychological, etc.) can do terrorist violence with using weapons of mass destruction. In general, any group that has capacity of production, gaining and using of NBC weapons, with relying on ideological justifications, can make conditions catastrophic.

However, all human societies are vulnerable to the NBC terrorist attacks (and any type of weapons of mass destruction). Currently, a number of countries have these deadly weapons. Over the time, technology of building and development will be available more people. A country cannot have a completely safe defense against these attacks, and even trying to do this will lead to further limitation of freedom and democracy. Therefore, all the potential invaders will be able to do attacks with very high probability of success. Terrorist attacks with using NBC weapons (very destructive) are the important vulnerability of all countries, especially Western postindustrial countries.

Al Qaeda which has descended to the lowest possible level in these years in terms of operational power, through spreading its ideology to local groups around the world, adapted itself to the new conditions. Al Qaeda leaders continue to play the role as the source of inspiration and support for groups affiliated with A Qaeda and local extremist organizations. Al-Qaeda’s salafism ideology that almost considers its opponents infidel and apostate and essentially they believe that there are two worlds; one is a world
belongs to the Salafist supporters and other one belongs to the infidels world (of course, the Muslims who cooperate with US and Israel belong to the second world. They know jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam and as oxygen for every Muslim and they believe that infidels has no right to live.\textsuperscript{90} These beliefs provide all conditions for the use of all weapons of mass destruction by this group; as a result, many countries, especially Western countries have warned. This issue made more critical the need for more international cooperation to suppress violent extremist groups; particularly still many senior Al Qaeda leaders are free and continue to plan attacks and seek to provoke radical Sunni Muslims to do violent attacks against their enemies in the name of jihad throughout the world.

Although Al Qaeda for possible threats of weapons of mass destruction is in the first place, but the number of groups interested in developing such instruments and also technology and knowledge of weapons of mass destruction is spreading to smaller groups.

However, all human societies are vulnerable against NBC terrorist attacks and weapons of mass destruction. Currently, a number of countries have these deadly weapons. Over time, these technologies will be available for more people. One country cannot perform a reliable defense against these attacks. Thus, nearly all potential intruders will be able to do such attacks with very high probability of success. Terrorist attacks with very using destructive NBC weapons are one of the most vulnerable points of all countries, especially in Western postindustrial countries.

\textsuperscript{90} Abu Musab Zarqawi; Al Qaeda's Prince, translated by Mohammad Ali Firouzabadi, Shargh Newspaper, Tuesday 23 Khordad 1385, third year, No 781.
The important point is that after weakness of Al Qaeda due to killing or arresting of its leaders and members and also freezing its properties and properties of individuals and organizations which are suspected to assisting this group. At the same time, there are groups, which plan and perform terrorist attacks independently and its financial sources are supplied by dispersed and unknown supporters who are common people. This issue increase within these organizations and terrorist organizations. Encountering with this type of organizations which are acting in network system, is more difficult than coherent and concentrated organizations. Recent events and mutative evolution within terrorist organizations led many analysts to present a theory. This theory says terrorism has started a new phase; so that local groups with considering Al Qaeda as a model and with the help of al Qaeda or even independently, organize and perform their attacks; one of the reasons that today is called "age of terrorism", is this issue.

**Al Qaeda and Use of Internet**

Al-Qaeda organization with using internet has become a nightmare and dreadful tragedy for U.S. and the West. For western democracy, fighting against organizations such as "Irish Liberation Army" or "red Brigades" is easier than fighting against Al Qaeda. Italy and the UK governments by closing newspapers and magazines, which support them, or forbidding their publication and this issue led to their destruction. However, Al Qaeda due to using emails and websites has been able to take management of game. It means that on one hand has been able to send threatening messages for presidents of US and Europe and on the other hand has been able to make direct relationship with three billion Muslims and convey its ideology to them or respond to their questions by email in shortest time. Although spreading Al Qaeda's
websites does not lead to the overthrow of United States and Europe, certainly will make troubles for these countries and somehow will bring them to its knee. In addition, the closure of these groups’ websites not only is impossible, but is a pointless and useless action, because this group has necessary power to create new Internet sites within a few hours.

For example, "second Salah al-Din" who is Al Qaeda’s electronic expert, has urged Muslims of different countries to come together in an international Islamic press front (which has been established in recent years) and with unity and solidarity of the rotary press form press world brigades to end Zionism domination on the global media and intimidate the enemies of Islam. Ahmed al-Vategh, one of the Al Qaeda’s experts, in this regard says: "international Islamic press front is an Islamic Information center on the Internet". He adds: "our goal is fighting the Zionist enemy. This battle does not belong to a particular individual or group, but belongs to all Muslims. This battlefield has no geographical limitation and we want all new information and communication technologies’ experts and all producers and photographers to join us in this front. In fact, international Islamic press front is instead of "global front of war against Jews and Christians" which was established by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. According to Al Qaeda’s officials, the international Islamic press front produced a six-minute film titled "bloody commode" in five sequences that showed jihadists’ operations against British and American occupying forces in Iraq in different regions of Iraq.

Today, many websites around the world belong to Al Qaeda. Unlike the past that guerrillas carried only a Kalashnikov, today they have Kalashnikov in one hand and Lap Top in the other hand and they communicate with European, Asian, African, American
and Australian branches, exchange messages and also lead their operation through Lap Top from the remote mountain’s caves. In fact, in virtual space and at the same time in real world they fight with what they call infidels. With benefiting from electronic technologies, Al Qaeda has started an electronic war against US that has surprised industrial West.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who has been known as the Al Qaeda’s second generation has allocated to itself the largest share of internet. Ivan Kolvan, adviser of center of counterterrorism who monitors the websites closely, said: “Al-Qaeda organization was very eager to use internet technology in its business, but bin Laden era, was the era of fax and satellite televisions, but Al Qaeda’s new generation that al-Zarqawi was its representative, is considered the internet era and he benefited from it in the best way. The people who gathered around Zarqawi under twenty years old and see information means in a new form, but Bin Ladan and people like him were in Afghanistan Mountains; where there was not possibility for using new technology, but Zarqawi was in Iraq, where there was civil war. Insurgents easily can make use of new information technologies in cities. Al Qaeda simply uses famous internet websites for displaying its operations and makes them available to others including its advocates. "Showing scene of beheading Nicholas Burke by Zarqawi in “AnsarWeb” and distributing millions of CDs shows Al Qaeda views about internet".
Table 4: Types of Video Made and Published by Al-Qaeda Members on Internet\textsuperscript{91}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video Types</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violent Acts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentary</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage taking</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide attack</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beheading</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonviolent Acts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribute</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsletter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to these effects, Al Qaeda attempted to form an organization called "Global Front of Islamic Information". This Front declared in a statement: “… circulation of information technology has made all things easy… and webpages has provided the opportunity for all throughout the world to listen to Mojahedeen words”. According to the approved information, Al Qaeda's European branch alone had 27 websites that through it displayed images of the gruesome beheading of hostages in Iraq and caused panic among the people of Europe.

**Al Qaeda, Chemical and Biological Threat**

Force tools significantly have been developed. Parallel with increasing growth of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, we see losing traditional assumptions and

moral considerations in making use of them. It is as real fear that the evil states like Saddam Hussein or the United States (according to al-Qaeda’s claims) or terrorist groups such as Aum Shinriku use them. They can provide these weapons in black market or produced them in small and private labs. The easiness of obtaining these weapons especially chemical weapons which is known as poor people’s atomic bomb, has increased possibility of using it by terrorists.

Al Qaeda is the most important organization, which insists on the use of biological weapons and weapons of mass destructions. Nevertheless, there was still doubt in mind of realist analysts about the possibility of al-Qaeda’s use of chemical weapons that this doubt was removed because of Zarqawi’s words.

Below news sheds light on many new aspects of post-terrorism:

... Coincided with the fourth anniversary of the September 11 attacks and after U.S. forces attack on insurgents in Tal Afar, Iraq, the European branch of Al Qaeda and one terrorist group in Iraq threaten to do terrorist attacks. Islamic Army in Iraq with excuse of revenging on U.S. and Iraqi forces’ operations in Tal Afar, determined a reward for killing Ibrahim Jafari, Iraqi Prime Minister, Baqher Soulakh, interior minister and Saadoun al-Dalimi, Iraqi defense minister. Also this terrorist group claimed responsibility of assassination of a senior British officer with the statement.

Moreover, the European branch of Al Qaeda along with the fourth anniversary of September 11 attacks on New York and Washington warned to take revenge on murder and torture against Muslims throughout the world. This message that had been put on internet, had warned that will do attacks like July attacks in London.
Al Qaeda’s Global Network

One of the most important features is Al Qaeda’s following of network logic; it means that its structure and functions form around networks and currents apparently have a clear vertical and hierarchal structure, But in fact new type of organization in this group has evolved and developed that in general is different with modern organizations. One of the features of organization and management in the modern era is centralization, vertical hierarchy (i.e., the leader above as the head and respectively head of groups below and common people and so-called infantry in lowest level), symmetry and intense inflexibility. While Al Qaeda has a kind of the internal dynamics without limitations for itself, is also very asymmetric, inflexible and stretchable and has horizontal structure for organization and management. Enjoying the horizontal organization, prevent annihilation of these organizations and makes them immune against the risks and possible attacks of the enemies. For instance, in August 1998, one of bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, which targeted by US missiles. Still, many critics suspect whether this attack had results or not. Although Zavarkili camp belonged to bin Laden, but his organization did not have a single headquarter. This fact was sign of a network organization in a real sense. This network was able to operate independent of fixed infrastructure, because its members often used satellite cellphones to communicate with each another. Probably the most important thing about this network was that the leader of this organization has not nationality of other countries; Osama bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia and the because of terrorist attacks deprived of Saudi citizenship.

Thus, if part of the organization (or the leadership of organization) damage, other parts have the ability to compensate and heal the damages. Scattered terrorist cells are able
to hit invisibly in everywhere they can and with eliminating the feeling of insecurity, put fear and horror to the hearts of enemies throughout the world. In these postmodern organizations, cells are fragmented, dispersed and are autonomous. These cells design and perform all of their operations independently based on the ideological foundations; without having apparent relation with network leadership or having received direct orders from them or even having made aware leadership of network. This autonomy in addition to shortening communication issue ensures security and makes enemy incapable in discovering all of the cells of the networks and at the same time creates fierce competition among the different cores; an unwritten competition which constantly produces and reproduces each other and promotes the speed of interaction across the network. In modern era, vertical and pyramidal organizations are highly vulnerable, because with collapsing the leader, the entire organization is destroyed and paralyzed.

There is no doubt that many Al Qaeda operations such as bombings in Madrid, London, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Afghanistan, Iraq and ... were under influence of Bin Laden’s speech, but what should be noted that is Al Qaeda had control on the whole process from beginning to end and it has implemented it.

Or sub-groups, sub-organizations, followers and believers who know jihad their duties, perform these operations? From 2001 Al Qaeda has changed from a physical base (Al Qaeda in Arabic language means “base”) to a conceptual and ideological base. Therefore, we cannot attribute an operation to al-Qaeda certainly and directly, unless Al Qaeda claims its responsibilities. Now Al-Qaeda with using internet has no need to physical connections; unlike the past which electrons were carrying only a positive or negative charge, nowadays they carry the burden of cultural, intellectual and ideological
doctrines. Also Al Qaeda uses global infrastructures for globalization of its doctrines and disseminates freely its beliefs. Such a fluid and fragmented movement cannot have a coherent and strict management and leadership. It can be said that this organization through internet or mass media only outlines important points for its followers and want their supporters or members to behave in the general framework as they wish. It appears now that. Bin Laden had taken refuge in a distant place and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ayman al-Zawahiri threatened countries from their bases in Iraq, Afghanistan and South Asia and send their messages to their followers via internet and wait for news of suicide bombings throughout the world. Of course, in the information age, providing media coverage and an ideological justification for operations does not require physical intervention. Al Qaeda has experienced that it can empower scattered and self-sufficient cells via internet and forces them to perform operations, without having direct contribution in it.

We should not forget this fact that Al Qaeda has changed method of its activity. Today Al Qaeda works in two levels. On the one hand, it designs big attacks in the metropolises like London, New York, Madrid and ... and at the same time commit small and targeted attacks against trade companies and western diplomats and soldiers.

Al Qaeda’s goal in committing big attacks is increasing its credibility as a professional organization. But these attacks seldom occur, because it requires careful and complex planning; so the number of attacks is high, because these attacks need little planning. For instance, attack on a western company in Saudi Arabia or committing a suicide attack in Iraq is not too difficult. It should be reminded that Al Qaeda is an international network which operates through dependent small groups in the local and indigenous
levels. It is unlikely that Bin Laden personally was involved in attacks in Baghdad and Riyadh. These attacks are just part of daily and local work of this organization.

For instance, we can refer to 2003 strategy document of this organization which outlines fight against the U.S. and its traditional allies. We read in this document: "We believe resistance in Iraq can reach the U.S. costs to the determined level set by Washington for this war i.e. $ 400 billion.) One of the results of this strategy is attacking oil drilling facilities in Saudi Arabia and Iraq which were done by al-Qaeda and raised oil prices.

Waves of terrorism already have come to New York, Washington, Bali, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Istanbul, Riyadh, London, Madrid, Sharm el Sheikh, Jordan, Iraq, Kenya, Tanzania, Pakistan, Indonesia, Somalia, Chechnya, Delhi and .... . Certainly list of Al Qaeda attacks against the cities will increase in the future. Osama bin Laden never dreamed his ideas spread with this speed in the world and become the origin of transformation. This issue has been possible in satellite and internet age.

Another feature and mystery that made Al Qaeda undefeatable and different with the modern organizations, is using the customs and traditions that were common in Islam. Leaders and members of these organizations with following Islam, spread family relationships to strengthen their relationships. This issue has improved security and physical protection of organization very much. For example, Zarqawi’s daughter married to one of his Palestinian comrades and other members of the leadership cadre have done such family ties (Bin Ladan’s marriage to the daughter of Mohammed Atef aka Abu Hefs which was known as al-Qaeda Emir). Thus, the main core and leadership of this organization are family members, friends, former combatants and prisoners in
Afghanistan. Tradition and modernism have been overlapped and tied in Al Qaeda and have made this organization a postmodern one. This organization unlike modern organizational structures that follow the logic of the machine, on the one hand with the establishment of family relationships and one the other hand the use of new technologies, have emerged as a new form of organization that is not tradition nor modernism, but belongs to an era that is called postmodern. This organization is very flexible, decentralized and horizontal. Members of this network have autonomy, responsibility and extremely internal motivations.

**Al Qaeda’s Global Behavior**

Terrorism in tradition and modern age of terrorism had a defined and fixed concept. However, today, its concept has become quite fluid. In the past, one of the most important characteristics of terrorism was that it acted locally and indigenously. But nowadays, it operates trans-locally trans-regionally. For example, some smuggling networks like the mafia that they rarely commit criminal acts, just create fear and horror among Italian citizens and citizens of other countries such as Iran or Britain were immune from their harm. Even among Mafia gangsters, there was an unwritten law that based on family members (women and children) were immune and did not enter them into their dangerous games and there was an attempt in terrorist wars not to harm them. Algerian militants were forced to stage street war in Paris, but never targeted London or Washington; but today Al Qaeda as a postmodern group, proclaim the entire world its battlefield and has made the world insecure for U.S. and its allies.
Five Activity Areas of Al Qaeda

Whereas the documents show, commanders of every area have absolute authority and in addition to in consultation relation with key leaders, have relation with the local independent networks; geographical distribution of these five areas is:

1. India and Pakistan Area

It Includes Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. The commander of this area is "Amin Al-hag" also known as "pure Mujahid" who has control over four local jihadi network. These networks are:

- "Army of Muhammad" and "Mulavi Masoud Azhar" as its commander.

- "movement of Kashmir combatants" and "Seyed Salahuddin" as its commander

- "Kashmir Islamic community" and "Abdul Rashid Altraby" as its commander.

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2. Central Asia Area

This area includes Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Georgia and South China. Commander of this area is "Tahir Yuldashief" who controls four local networks:
- "The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan", which is founded by Yuldashief.
- "Chechnya Arab Mujahedeen"; founder of this organization was "Amir Khatab" that after its death "Abu al-Walid Abdul al-Aziz Alghamedy" took command of organization.
- "Al-Tawhid and AL-Jihad Network" in "Benkisi" area of Georgia with "Abu Al-iyeh."
- "Uyghur Islamic Movement" in the China’s Sinkiang province.
"Aujimandy Abbas" is its commander.

3- East South of Asia Area

This area includes Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In the past, "Radwan Essam al-Din" called "Hanbali" elected by Al-Qaeda to command this area and after his arrest in Thailand (August 2002) closest person to him (colonel Somirou called "Zolqaranein") took control of affairs. Now he controls five local groups:
- "Indonesian Islamic Jimaat" and its founder is "AbuBakr Bashir" which due to oldness in 1994 gave the leadership to Hanbali. Also after arrest of Hanbali named "Zolmatin" who is called "genius" and is one of his relatives, took leadership of this group. "Genius" is that person who planned Bali bombing in October 2003. "Balinese" and guided the planning.
- "Universal Soldier" Group in Indonesia and is led by "Jafar Abutalib".
- "Malaysia’s Islamic Jimaat" is led by "Yazid Safaat".
- "Philippine’s Abusayyaf movement" is led by the "Abd al-Razzaq Janjalany who is known as "Abusbaya".
- "Moro’s Islamic Liberation Front " is led by "Oustafa Zarif Golabi."  

4. Middle East and Persian Gulf Area

The initial level of Al-Qaeda’s formation occurred in Middle East region. These regions include Yemen, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia which have been the main center of formation, recruitment, and activities of this organization. For Sunni people of this region, islamic extremist ideology of Salafism has been the most appropriate response and solution to the problems, injustices and humiliation that they have felt for years. For them Al Qaida’s extremist ideology is as a guiding light for fighting against the oppressors and arrogant powers of the world. Also for other Salafi Muslims throughout the world, this ideology can humiliate the infidels and restore the real place of Muslims to them. Israel’s actions and killing of Muslims which are done by support of US and its traditional allies, are the origins of the risings, resistances and unrests in the region that today have put the entire world in the fire. But for various reasons Saudi Arabia became the center of intellectual and political development of Al-Qaeda.

5. Western Arabia and Mediterranean Area

This area includes:

93 Al Qaeda's Multinational Organizational Chart, translated by Saeed Aghaalkhani, Shargh Newspaper, No. 505, Tuesday 31 Khordad 1384, and No. 506, Tir 1384, pp. 8, Main Source Al-Majalah.

چارت تشکیلاتی چند ملیتی القاعده، ترجمه-ی سعید آقا علیخانی،روزنامه شرق، شماره 505 سه شنبه 31 خرداد 1384، و شماره 506، پنجشنبه 1384، ص 8. برگرفته از المجله.
A) Six European states (Germany, France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain)

B) Five African countries (Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya)

A) Europe:

Recruitment of Europe’s Sunnis is very important for Al Qaeda, because it makes terrorist operations in Europe very simple. Given the importance of Europe’s role in international affairs, recruitment in this continent can complete an important part of the global network. Accordingly, the Al Qaeda recruits its members from muslim immigrants or residents who are affluent and educated. These members have played an important role in September 11 event, bombings in London and Madrid and have acted as intrusive in Europe. Although European governments and their intelligence agencies suspect all of the Muslims as terrorist, but nobody knows which of them is really terrorist. While Al Qaeda elements travel to European countries as merchant, work force or tourist and European governments cannot prevent their traveling. This problem is now one of the biggest problems and challenges for Europe and US in the Age of Terrorism.

Africa

There are 11 jihadi groups in this area that are closely related to each other and have active branches in all the above-mentioned countries.

- Algeria: "Algeria’s Salafist Jimaat of Da’wa and Ghital" led by "Abu Musab Zarkavi". He is the third person that after "Hasan Khatab", the founder of the group and Nabil
Sahravi” also known as “Abu Ibrahim Mustafa” (which recently was assassinated) was appointed as the commander of the group.94

History of Al Qaeda in Algeria backs to 1990s. In this decade, nearly three thousands of Algerian volunteers returned home from Afghanistan. After the military coup in 1992 against the Islamic Salvation Front which won the most votes in parliamentary elections, these people formed a jihadi group known as "Islamic Armed Group".95

This group due to adopting the most brutal ways in killing innocent people, incited hatred of so many people; so that bin Laden was forced to distance himself from this group and in 1998 encouraged Hasan Khatab, leader of this group’s European branch to establish Salafi Group of Propagation and War.96 Finally after suppression of Islamic Armed Group by Algeria government, some of its members joined Al Qaeda and also went to Hasan Khatab group. In 2000, some of them laid down their weapons after Algerian president’s amnesty order.97

- Morocco; "Morocco’s Salafist Faction”. Its spiritual leader is "Mohammad Al-fizary" who was sentenced to 20 years in prison after Dar Al-baida explosions.

- "Sirat Al-Mostaghim Organization" in Morocco, led by "Milody Zakaria".

- "Hijrat and Takfir Jimaat" in Morocco, led by "Davoud Makhmali".

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94 Al Qaeda’s Multinational Organizational Chart, Ibid.
- "Islamic Warriors Jimaat" in Morocco which was founded by Abdu Kareem Al-majay. Morocco’s counterterrorism organization says Mohammad Alkarbouzy (Moroccan dissident refugee in London) is the new leader of the organization. But he strongly denied this charge.

In this chapter, it was described that globalization of terrorism stated with phenomenon of hijacking and mass media (radio, television, newspapers) quickly dispersed its news throughout the world, and was accompanied by fear and horror of the world and in 1980’s and after that have gained particular international dimensions. Globalization of terrorism reached to its peak with formation of the al-Qaeda terror network.

In light of the new information and communication technologies, the single integrated world society was formed and its consequence was globalization of terrorism. In globalization process i.e. in parallel with the growing development of new technologies, especially "information revolution", "Media Revolution" and "science and knowledge" and "economy", terrorist groups benefit from such as new facilities such as facilitation of communication, flexible organization and surprise act in the global level; in a way that created a kind of terrorism which has mass and short-term losses. In fact, asymmetric and postmodern terrorism has become a new form war and therefore today’s era is called terrorism era.

Soviet Union’s collapse and the loss of balance of power created asymmetrical situation in the world. In this context, asymmetric terrorism emerged and replaced the Soviet Union as a balancing element of US’s main international policies. In other words, in globalization era of communication, science, technology, economy, it is possible for
everyone, including terrorists to have access to these technologies, terminate the technological monopoly of the states and those who have the necessary skills to create and develop telecommunication networks and global activities, will be able to control the power. As some experts have argued that today, unlike the past, non-state challengers have gained superiority over state agents. Postmodern terrorism with accurate understanding of the new technologies, know image war and the media war as the main war and considers using violence and killing force merely as a prelude for the main war and for attracting the attention of mass media and on this path impose asymmetrical war by denying moralities.

Postmodern terrorism (such as Aum Shinriku and Al Qaeda) with using new technologies and selecting suicide attack method takes and by imposing a zero-sum game, often defeats the enemy by its new threats.

September 11 event was the epitome of postmodern terrorism. Al Qaeda as a small organization showed that can maintain its traditional beliefs, but at the same time think and act globally. This event showed how a small organization can influence global economy by benefiting from new and advanced technologies and also weapons of mass destruction and at the same time contrary to US and its traditional allies’ will, influence the world’s political, cultural and military order and impose new order on the world; the order that has put the west in a deep confusion and worry. In a way that U.S. has been forced to start two great wars and to pay heavy economic, political and human costs. However, no only US has not been able to eliminate Al Qaeda network, but has provided opportunity for global growth of this organization; so that in many countries (U.S., Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa and especially Middle East) can commit terrorist
operation an threat global security completely and put all of the countries in fear and insecurity.

In this research question, an analysis was presented in order to answer the main question and the most important factors affecting the process of globalization were examined on various political, economic, cultural and technological dimensions and also the ways of their impact on individuals and groups for doing violent and terrorist actions. In this regard, this can be noted that globalization as a process is a context that facilitates the developments of new terrorism. As Cold War atmosphere contributed to the third wave of terrorism. In present conditions, new terrorism is affected by the rapid growth of non-state actors due to conditions which are created by globalization. Technological developments that are directly related to globalization have helped terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. In this regard, groups and individuals have been able, first, to obtain more powerful weapons; second, to gain a great change in communications and information processing. Third, to gain great ability in using civilian technologies for military industries. Globalization is a complex process that has affected modern terrorism by many aspects. In addition to the enhancing operational capabilities, globalization causes identity crisis and frustration among some individuals and groups, and ultimately their moving towards terrorism. In such conditions, the lack of congruity of the actors’ values around the world, especially in North and South countries, and also their non-state actors, leads to the formation of identity crisis and using of ideology for relieving this problem and as a result violent and terrorist approaches. By using WMDs and attacking the symbols of invasive countries, this approach emerges as the new terrorism.