CHAPTER – 3

INTRODUCTION

The breakup of the Soviet Union led many analysts and scholars, both in Russia and in the West to believe that the security scenario and peace and stability in Europe would undergo a fundamental change. As a new Russia (the successor state of erstwhile USSR) tried to find its place in world politics, safeguarding and promotion of its national interests became the main focus of Russian foreign policy. The domestic conditions were conducive to the liberalisation to the Russian foreign policy because the democratic euphoria and expectation of a better life under new regime were very strong among the masses. On the other hand the conservative political elements were still in the state of shock after the August coup. Since the time of Mikhail Gorbachev, the ambition for stability in “Europe our Common Home” has elicited admirable rhetoric on both sides of the former iron curtain. Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ to put Soviet Union on the path of bargaining and partnership with the Western alliances continued. In the initial environment democrats followed a policy of ‘no enemy but all friends’ to convince the West that Russia is even more liberal, more market oriented and more European than Gorbachev’s Soviet Union.

Boris Yeltsin became the first post-communist President in 1991. He and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev perceived Russia’s acceptance and integration into a civilized international community mainly into Europe. It was believed that the West was the natural ally. He called for a much broader association with the Western states that had formerly been the USSR’s military and political antagonists. Yeltsin told the United Nations (UN) Security Council, that he saw the Western countries ‘not just as

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2 Ibid., p. 45.
partners, but as allies'. But soon nationalist pressure started mounting and Russia’s economic, political and cultural westward course started facing domestic problems. The hope that the end of the Cold War would bring universal peace in the world was over. The question often debated was the threat perception and with every political turn and with every measure undertaken, the common first question was – ‘Russian national interest in this field?’ 3 The Russian media also pointed out absence of a clear cut understanding of Russian national interest on the part of its leadership. They appeared most of the time ambiguous. 4 

In the wake of Russia’s increasing disappointment with the West, anti-Western feeling, particularly towards US was gaining ground amongst the Russians. When Yevgeny Primakov became the new Foreign Minister in Dec. 1995, he promised that he would seek “equal mutually beneficial partnership with the West and that his policy would reflect the country’s status as a great power”. Russians across the spectrum share the idea that the ‘near abroad’, the Baltic’s, and the former members of the socialist bloc, contained areas of special interests for Russian security. 5 Not surprisingly indeed, partly because of its domestic problems. Russia even under President Boris Yeltsin had begun to reassert its influence everywhere from the Central Asian Republics to Georgia, Armenia, Moldova and most directly Belarus and

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5 Teresa P. Johnson and Steven E. Miller, eds., Russian Security After The Cold War: Seven views From Moscow, (Washington DC, Brasseys with the Centre for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University), 1994.
Ukraine. Indeed, Russian military doctrine today legitimates intervention on behalf of Russians living in the near abroad. 6

Russian assertiveness in the post-Soviet space made the former socialist allies susceptible to Russia's dictates. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, notably Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had observed Russian assertiveness and petitioned for membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The Western response has been simply indecent. The EU has been stingy with trade. While NATO, under American guidance, offers only "Partnership for Peace" (PfP). It was launched in 1993 and on June 22, 1994, the Russian Foreign Minister endorsed the partnership extracting from NATO a separate channel of consultation 'enhanced dialogue' that reflected Russia's weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power. 7 The crux of the matter was that Russia wanted a 'special status' in any security arrangements in Europe that would reflect its 'position in world and Europe affairs' and its military might and nuclear status. 8

Notwithstanding all the right wing ranting and raving about the pernicious role of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the official opposition to membership of Visegrad countries in the Atlantic Alliance and the declared preference for all European institutions such as the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Russian government entered a formal partnership with NATO in June 1994, acceding to the PfP program. The appointment of the Deputy Foreign Minister

8 Interfax (Moscow), April 6, 1994.
Vitaly Churkin as liaison official lends weight to the idea that Russia is intent on cooperation with NATO in a constructive spirit. Kozyrev said that Russia in Brussels stands by its choice of principle—the carrying out of national and state interests through cooperation rather than confrontation. In May 1997, the new National Security Doctrine was adopted. It identified major threats, not only external in nature but also those emanating from socio-economic instability. It was termed as a Primakov doctrine. In a multi-polar world, Russia was to play the role of an independent center of power and influence, enjoying diversified and multiple contacts and partnership with other world powers. It was necessary to find the right balance between the West and the East. Nuclear deterrence remains an effective means of self-defence. In Europe, Russia naturally had promoted the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as the leading institution in new European security architecture. The OSCE works on the principle of consensus so that no decision can be approved without Russia’s consent. NATO, however, is the most powerful security institution in Europe. Russia is not a member. In May 1997, NATO-Russia Founding act allows it a consultative role, but it remains at best on the periphery of the organization, if not its opponent.

Nevertheless Russian policy emphasizing partnership with the West and the aspiration for Russia to become a member of the civilized western international system reflected the view of a very narrow elite around Yeltsin. As competition in Russia’s domestic political and economic arenas developed in the period 1993-97, multiple views of Russia’s national security policy based upon diverse sets of political,

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economic, and societal interest emerged. By 1997, a synthesis had emerged which still emphasized cooperation and integration, but with a strong measure of Eurasianism.

Besides this, the most important implication for security policy is the need to understand that the Russian leadership links national sovereignty and territorial integrity, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), instability and conflict in the Caucasus/Caspian region, NATO’s membership and mission enlargement, and US unilateralism. With sources of tensions, however, defining the nature and location of the threats to the collective security factors for securing the objectives – the threat is the new geopolitical and international situation of Russia.

The focus of this chapter is to understand Russian security concerns especially vis-à-vis NATO. A brief understanding of the various structures of NATO has also been discussed.

RUSSIAN SECURITY PERCEPTION

After the break up the threat of a military intervention on ideological grounds had ceased, new threats such as the rise of religious extremism, separatism terrorism began to rise. The NATO on the other hand had not been disbanded and subsequently began to enlarge its membership. This was a matter of concern to Russia. NATO’s plan to expand began after the Budapest Summit in 1994. The reaction in Russia to the possible expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe has been very different. President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev were rather vague about Russia’s attitude towards NATO expansion. However, Russian opposition to NATO’s expansion plan was loud and clear. Privately and publicly, the Russian government firmly opposed the extension of the NATO membership to the states of Eastern Europe. Hence, the idea
of constructing a New World order in collaboration with Western countries, in particular the USA, was actively pursued. A further step on the path to a definition of a Russian sphere of interests in the post-Soviet context to the near abroad provoked concern, especially outside Russia’s borders.

A study on Eastward expansion produced by the intelligence service of the Russian Federation States stated that that the transformation of NATO and the expansion of the Alliance should not be expected to occur synchronously. The danger to Russian interests was it reduced the chances of overcoming the divisions in which NATO’s area of operation is extended right up to the borders of the Russian Federation. Kozyrev in December 1992, in Stockholm denounced Western interference in the territory of all former Soviet Republics and stated that the territory of the former Soviet Union cannot be a zone in which Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe norms are applicable. At the NATO Summit in Brussels on January 10-11, 1994, alliance heads of state and government broke partial silence on a fundamental issue to enlarge the Atlantic Alliance once again by admitting the new democracies of Central Europe formerly member states of the Warsaw Pact. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace played an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.\(^{10}\) Russian opposition to NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe – its old area of influence accurately reflects the complex nature of Russia’s present relations with the West. Russia had its own distinctive interests and

perspectives that set it apart from the West and prevent it from fully sharing the West a sense of common identity and purpose.¹¹

Former communist states, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had been pleading for admission into NATO. Fearful of instability and potential aggression emanating from the East, they wanted the security guarantees that would accompany membership. NATO membership would also signify the full acceptance of these nations by the West. It would strengthen the case for their eventual membership in the European Union, and it would be popular domestically, paying significant political dividends to the politicians who were able to bring this about.¹²

**Russia’s Fear of Isolation**

Despite occasional half-threats by Russian politicians to the effect that their country could apply for membership to NATO – no other members of the CIS have followed the example of the Central and East European countries. Meanwhile within Russia two distinct schools of thought emerged around 1992-93- Pro-West or Atlanticists and the Eurasianists. In their thinking about foreign policy issues and problems relating to NATO were rather prominent. One of the more important semi-official attacks on the Atlanticist orientation and the new thinking had been launched by the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP) in its ‘theses’ on a Strategy For Russia.

To counter possible isolation Russia proposed to upgrade the CSCE into a new collective security organization – a Northern Hemisphere community. The fact that it was not accepted by the West was perceived in Russia as a deliberate decision to leave


¹² Ibid., p. 743.
Russia outside security related coordination structures in Europe so that it has no opportunity to present and defend its point of view. Russia would always be presented with a *fait accompli* leaving it the choice between acceptance and rejection.

Russia's Military Doctrine was enunciated in 1993. The document analyzed in detail the threats posed to the security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. A feature of the Military Doctrine of November 1993 was its classification of the existing of military blocs and alliances and then expansion. It was to the detriment of the Russian Federation. On his visit to Warsaw on August 25, 1993, President Yeltsin had formally assured President Walesa that Poland could set about securing NATO membership without coming into conflict with the interests of Russia. Foreign Minister Kozyrev and other Russian politicians soon contradicted this. It is an assumption that Russia could agree to an eastward expansion of the Atlantic Alliance only on two conditions. If the Alliance admitted the Russian Federation as well, and if at the same time, it changed its function from that of a defensive alliance to that of a system of collective security.

In Russia, the possibility that NATO’s eastern boundary may eventually be on the border of its periphery was seen as a potential threat. NATO already has military superiority over Russia, with new members drawn from Central and East Europe closer to the borders of Russia. The early national security policy recognized this situation. This very first unpublished version of the new Military Doctrine (March-April 1992) listed NATO as a source of military threat because it was militarily strong and located close to Russia. In a subsequent and more comprehensive document on Russia’s national security policy, NATO was classified as a challenge – meaning that
it did not have plans to hurt Russia's interests but was potentially capable of doing just that. A memorandum to Yeltsin by the then first Deputy Foreign Minister, Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev, pointed out the 'threat from a potential Baltic to Black Sea' coalition of east and central European states and Ukraine aligned with NATO. Yet Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov has a different perspective, NATO's highly propagated peace keeping role is all too obviously a shame. The bloc's continuously growing military potential gives the United States no cause to believe that slogan of peace persistently declared by NATO leadership, expanding NATO's zone of responsibility eastward would result in a situation reminiscent of the Cold War.13

During 1992 the 'near abroad' remained a main source of threat for Russia. The Ministry of Defence attempted to protect Russian interests in the countries through bilateral agreements. In accordance with its interests in April 1993, President Yeltsin signed the document entitled 'The Conceptualization of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation'. This represented a further step on the path to a definition of a Russian sphere of interest in the post-Soviet context. In it, all actions that might jeopardize the process of integration of the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) were classified as threats. The documents described Russia as the guarantor of stability in CIS. The step from this to the new Russian military doctrine, partly unveiled in November 1993, was not a great one. The attention that that documents devoted to the 'near abroad' provoked concern, especially outside Russia's borders.14

The 'near abroad was recognised as a region of vital interests and later in 1996 Primakov’s foreign ministry tenure brought greater consistency to the Russian foreign policy with respect to the ‘near abroad’. When it was becoming clear that NATO was likely to expand eastward, Russia began a vigorous attempt to woo back the countries of the CIS. These countries on its periphery were considered as a belt of stability and security for Russia. Russian security interests lay in seeing that these countries were not attracted towards the West and NATO in particular.

However, the linking of the use of Russian ‘peace keeping forces’ to the maintenance of spheres of influence had already been justified by Foreign Minister Kozyrev on the grounds that Russia might lose positions which it had built up over centuries. In view of the prospects of Russia’s losing its influence to its rivals, or indeed to potential enemies, in a region where it had traditionally geopolitical interests, other countries may have to seek or approve Russia’s taking whatever action it deemed necessary in its own ‘backyard’.

Although Russia formally acknowledged the principles of respect for territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders in relation to the members of the CIS, its claim to influence in these countries was historical. The Chairman of Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee V.Lukin, interpreted good neighborly relations with the ‘near abroad’ as ‘a clear system of reciprocal obligations between the large state and its smaller neighbors, whereby the latter obtain security guarantees in exchange for acknowledgement of the special interests and influence of their ‘big neighbour’.

Russia was keen that its claim to be virtually the sole guarantor of security and stability in the erstwhile Soviet region should receive the support of the CSCE. As a
result the Alliance, the Council of Ministers of the CSCE meeting in Rome at the
beginning of December 1993, showed itself more or less willing for Russia, using
'peace keeping forces', to intervene de facto on its own in former Soviet Republics.

*Strategy for Russia – A Response*

As mentioned already a group of analysts and specialists representing a school of
thought had come into existence on the question of Russian foreign policy. Since they
represented a sizeable opinion in Russia, we shall consider their views later in the
thesis. The complete departure from Soviet conduct in international affairs and the
ambition to forge 'a strategic partnership', both economically and militarily with the
United States was emphasized by President Yeltsin. In his address to the United
Nations at the beginning of 1992, he stated that Russia regarded the Western countries
as 'allies'. Such perceptions found some practical expression in an agreement reached
at the June 1992 Russian-American Summit in Washington 'to work together along
with the allies and other interested states to develop a concept for a global protection
attack. The policy change was particularly evident in Russia's approach to the newly
independent countries of the region – the 'near abroad' in current Russian parlance
and in the assertion of 'special rights' in that area. The more assertive stance in the
'near abroad' has intimately been connected with the issue of military bases. It was a
part of the settlement of the conflict in Georgia in November 1993 was the legislation
of the presence of 20,000 Russian troops at three major bases in Georgia, with no date
set for their withdrawal. Russia also gained the right to use the Black Sea naval base of
Poti. In April 1994, President Yeltsin approved a Russian Defence Ministry plan to
create military bases in other CIS countries and Latvia for the security of those states
and for the testing of new weaponry and military bases by the alleged need to protect the rights of the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation.

The law on defence adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet in February 1993 ordered the military to cut the overall strength of the armed forces by nearly half to 1.5 million. However, in December 1993, Defence Minister Grachev announced that the figure decreed by the defunct parliament was far too low and that Russia needed a force totaling 2.1 million officers and men. Yeltsin had raised soldier's salaries and pensions, exempted them from income tax, paid high-profile visits to military bases and scaled back plan for converting factories from defence to civilian production.

The Russian military repositioned forces returning from central and Eastern Europe along the country's northern and southern flanks. The redevelopment at present exceeds ceilings scheduled to take effect in 1995 under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Russia had made more stringent attempts at maintaining its military-industrial research, design and production capacity by increasing arms exports. Advocates of a return to 'great power' policies have claimed that the military-industrial complex, despite all the evident disruptions was the only sector of the economy that was efficient and could earn foreign exchange.

In 1993 and early 1994, as part and parcel of the shift away from Atlanticism, the Russian government revised its attitude towards NATO. In November 1993, a widely publicized Foreign Intelligence Service characterized NATO as the biggest military grouping in the world that possesses an enormous offensive potential. It called the alliance an organization wedded 'to the stereotypes of bloc thinking. It also charged that NATO wanted to remain a defensive alliance rather than embark on the
‘creation of a mechanism for the support of international security’. The intelligence service’s preference was clear of a system of collective security that would somehow range between NATO on the one hand and the CSCE and the United Nations on the other.\(^{15}\)

The authors of the study were emphatic in their opposition to membership of NATO for Central and East European countries. Furthermore, President Yeltsin’s press spokesman reacting to Lithuania’s official request for membership of NATO, even warned that the expansion of NATO into areas in “direct proximity to the Russian borders would lead to a ‘military political destabilization in the region’, and in respect of its possible participation in the Partnership of Peace (PFP), Russia’s stance was characterized by indecisiveness and ambiguity, and replete with contradictory statements.\(^{16}\)

The crux of the matter was that Russia wanted a ‘special status’ in any security arrangement in Europe that would reflect its ‘position in world and European affairs’ and its military might and nuclear status. It was only in response to political pressure exerted by the opposition, notably by vociferous hard-line factions in the Parliament, that a draft document, ‘concerning the Basic Points of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, was submitted to and discussed by the parliamentary Foreign Affairs committee in February 1992. The draft document was amended and resubmitted without major changes and with detailed explanatory notes, to the committee in April. It was approved in October 1992 and published in early 1993. In competition with the Foreign Ministry, the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy a

\(^{15}\) ITAR-TASS, 5 January, 1994.

group of influential political leaders, administrators, diplomats, military officers and foreign policy experts, established upon Karaganov’s initiative, in August 1992 issued a foreign policy concept of its own, entitled ‘Strategy for Russia’. This effort in turn was superseded by an even more authoritative document than that of the foreign ministry—the ‘Basic Principles’ of a Foreign Policy concept of the Russian Federation agreed upon by all the major institutions directly involved in Russian Foreign policy-making, including the foreign ministry for foreign economic relations, and on defence and security. Yury Skokov, the then Secretary of the Defence council, had over-all responsibility for drafting the document. There are several noteworthy features that distinguish the defence council’s document (and also the CFDP’s ‘Strategy for Russia’) from the Foreign Ministry’s concept. First, the document displayed a greater sense of self-confidence. It claimed that Russia despite the crisis, which it was experiencing, remains one of the great powers because of its potential as well as its influence on the course of world events. Second, it enumerated among the developments that would threaten Russia’s vital interest’s obstruction of integration processes in the CLS, violation of human rights and freedoms; and military conflicts in neighbouring countries’. Third, it reversed the relative priorities accorded to the United States and Europe, focusing less on the American orientation and more on Europe, advocating close cooperation with Western Europe and pointing the desirability of re-establishing Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the document declared Russia’s relationship with the countries of the former Soviet Union to be of crucial importance, on the grounds that Russia itself could not develop normally if the post-Soviet geopolitical house were not put in order. The
document also advocated the further development of a ‘peace creating mechanism in
the framework of a new integration with the participation of Russia and on the basis of
a mandate by the UN or the CSCE’.

Notwithstanding all the right wing opposition to the pernicious ‘role of
NATO’, the government did not favour the membership of the Visegrad countries in
the Atlantic Alliance and declared its preference instead for all-European institutions
such as the CSCE, the Russian government entered a formal partnership with NATO
in June 1994, to the Partnership for Peace Programme. The appointments of Deputy
Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin as liaison official lend weight to the idea that Russia
is intent on cooperating with NATO in a constructive spirit rather than attempting to
play. “Russia”, Foreign Minister Kozyrev said in Brussels, “stands by its choice of
principle – the carrying out of national and state interests – through cooperation rather
than confrontation”.17

On the other hand Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov put forward his views
more forcefully; he said: “NATO expansion eastward is unacceptable to Russia”. Elaborating further he said, the military strategic equilibrium in Europe would be
upset as a result of the de facto undermining of a number of international accords in
the field of arms limitations. If new states were to join NATO, this would strengthen
NATO’s ground, air and naval forces, the basic indices of their combat potential
would grow by 15% to 20%. Igor Rodionov noted, even if one takes into account the
revision of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe, the ratio of armed
forces and armaments on the continent certainly will not be in Russia’s favour.

The deployment of other countries’ armed forces in the new territories would objectively make it possible to deploy tactical nuclear weapons there too and prepare them for combat use. The Russian Minister of Defence pointed out that at that point of time Russia was just beginning to withdraw its troops from the countries of Eastern Europe.

Russia regarded the aforementioned risk factor and a possible threat to its national interests and its security a challenge. And the challenge came from the West. In that situation Russia would be forced to take necessary measures to meet this challenge.

RUSSIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE

The first Russian Concept of National Security was adopted in 1992, which later became a ‘law on security’ by the end of the year. This Law on Security was the departing sign of the former narrow interpretation of national security. The law interpreted security as the protection of vital interests of individual society and the state against domestic and external threats. This Law of Security declared, the goal of national security policy is to provide security of and for the personality, society and state.\(^\text{18}\) Scholars of national security considered this law on security premature and unrealistic because the country had yet to form its elite, interests and identity.

Besides, in May 1992, a draft version of the Russian Military Doctrine, was published. This was approved by the Russian Security Council and adopted by a Presidential decree on November 2, 1993. This Military Doctrine was termed as

defensive in nature. It envisaged no threat of attack from the West or a global war. However, it identified that the main source of danger was from the local wars and regional conflicts, and that this danger was constantly growing. According to the Doctrine this danger was most pronounced in the Southern direction that is, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Another salient feature was a more assertive Russian policy with regard to the former Soviet republics and *blizhny Zarubezh* (Near Abroad). Yeltsin for the first time expressed the Russian interests in the near abroad in an appeal to United Nations in early 1993 to entrust to Russia the mission of ensuring stability in the former socialist bloc is geopolitical space.\(^{19}\) Basically the new geopolitical situation dictated that Russia not only decide what role to play in traditionally defined international politics, but also work out its relations with the so-called ‘near abroad’ – the other republics of former Soviet Union. Russia had to determine the balance between these states. As Sergei Stankevich, political advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, posed the question, should Russia pursue an “Atlanticist” (pro-Western) or a “Eurasianist” (Asian and southern oriented) foreign policy.\(^{20}\) In 1992, these two broad theoretical viewpoints emerged in the debate on Russian national security. One broadly termed as the “Atlanticist”. It is related to ‘New Thinking’. It emphasizes the common Russian interest with those of Western countries and its trust in various international organisations i.e CSCE, NATO, International Monetary Fund and World Bank to provide for Russian security and economic recovery. Moreover it provided opportunity for domestic reforms and

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Russian security through the prism of international law, with the UN playing the central role. These approaches have been associated primarily with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. The other approach termed “Eurasianist”, stresses Russia’s unique place between Europe, the Islamic world of Central Asia and the Pacific Rim countries. The proponents of this approach advocate a security policy for Russia independent of Western organisations.  

President Boris Yeltsin tried to bridge the gap between divergent trends in Russian politics by proposing a plan combining “Atlanticist and Eurasianist” approaches to Russian security. According to this plan, the UN is supposed to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in regions of the former USSR. But on the contrary, Ukraine denounced the proposal as a pretext of Russian intervention in Ukrainian affairs. Even UN could not approve such a role for Russia, especially no other USSR successor states (even those who support security cooperation within the CIS) made a similar request. Despite this response, Russia in its Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 mentioned that priority will be given to the relations with “nearby foreign countries”, especially for those, which are of “geopolitical” importance to Russia, and has “a direct bearing on both the fate of international transformations in Russia and its position in the international arena”. Russia with the countries of immediate geopolitical environment will pursue its “strategic goal” by

forming a “belt” of good neighborliness around it. It further says that in the long run the CIS will be an influential regional and international organisation.25

The Concept further proposed that Russia will actively participate and help the countries of near abroad in stabilizing their domestic situations, settling and preventing conflicts, defending their borders and providing military political cooperation, and organizing mutually advantageous economic cooperation with states that pose significant financial and credit possibilities.26

Russia is a country in the midst of great change in a world that is itself rapidly changing. Russia's security environment has drastically changed since reunification of Germany and the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe.27 On December 17, 1997, the Russian President Yeltsin signed a presidential decree establishing the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. It is stated that the most threats to Russian threats lie not in the international system but in Russia's internal conditions. Since Russia's internal threats arise from economic decline, instability and societal problems such as poor health and employment, they must be addressed through economic reform. Although economic reform is primarily an internal matter, it can be supported by a non-threatening international environment and by Russian integration into international economic institutions. The concept takes distinctly liberal turns.28 It is emphasized that Russia does not come to the international community as

25 Ibid., p. 15.
26 Ibid., p. 15.
a subordinate member, but as one of the major players whose active participation is necessary for solving problems in political, economic and military affairs. In defining the state of the international system, Russian national interests, threats to Russia, and its means for securing Russian interests and coping with threats, the National Security Concept serves not only as an official guide to foreign policy but establishes the basis for Russian military doctrine and practical matters such as the shape of its military and the parameters of military reform. The document clearly articulates the government's view of the international system in which Russia operates: "in the present time the situation in the international arena is characterised first of all by the fundamental tendency towards the formation of a multipolar world". Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov writes "the concept of multipolarity is not promoted in abstract discussions but as part of the process of seeking joint solutions to the most serious and complex international issues, issues that directly affect Russia's vital interests. These issues are ensuring strategic stability, regulating local conflicts under the auspices of the UN, and establishing an overarching, unified system of security of Europe. It is diplomatic efforts towards the fair resolution of these issues that lay the foundation for a multipolar international system." The concept recognizes that there have been difficulties in creating this comprehensive cooperative basis for accepting Russian participation and involvement — especially with NATO enlargement. It noted, "the prospect of NATO expansion to the East is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a

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29 Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a Presidential Decree establishing the National Security Concept of Russian Federation, 1997.

threat to its national security." It further pointed out that NATO's eastward expansion would "create the threat of a new split in the continent which could be extremely dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike grouping of troops and nuclear weapons and also the inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace." From early 1993 on, Kozyrev consistently maintained that any eventual extension of NATO alliance eastward had to be rooted in a broader concept and framework of European security, taking Russia's special status as nuclear power into account. In fact, Russia wanted to develop multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace and security at the global level through the United Nations and at the regional level through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For Russia, NATO is not an organization that takes decisions objectively on the ways of maintenance of peace and security in a conflict situation. Moscow expressed its displeasure on NATO's military decision to bomb Russians' brother Slavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 without any legislative and public debate. Above all, Russians argued that when they allowed the reunification of Germany (and for the United Germany to remain in NATO) Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and other Western leaders had promised not to expand NATO eastwards. Moreover, with the dissolution of the socialist bloc and in the post-Cold War period, it was widely felt that NATO had lost its raison d'etre.

32 Ibid., p.S2/1.
The Founding Act on Mutual Relationship in 1997 addressed concerns on both sides. It commits the signers to "democracy" and the establishment and maintenance of market economies. As expected, the document requires parties to respect principles of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, and it establishes the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which links Russia to the alliance structure in a formal way. In this way, Russia and NATO are sworn to work together in fostering European security in the post-Cold War period.

The Russian Security Concept would be incomplete without a discussion of the economic agenda of the Russian state that primarily hinges on development of deeper economic relationship with Russia and the West. Russia is interested in resolving problems of mutual trade, undertaking steps for increased access to each others market and ensuring "most favoured nation" status for itself. It is also no secret that Russia largely depends today on western aid and assistance. Therefore, economic aspects occupy one of the central places in the discussion of the issue of Russia’s national security. In April 1996, a presidential decree on “state strategy of economic security of the Russian Federation”, articulated the goals and objectives of the state strategy in the field of economy, characterized the threat to Russia’s economic security, formulated the criteria and parameter of the state of the economy corresponding to the demands of the nation economic security and described the mechanisms and measures of economic policy directed towards ensuring economic security. Besides, Russia’s economic diplomacy has been aimed at better conditions for integrating the Russian Federation into the world economy.
As it is expounded by Primakov and endorsed by Yeltsin that Russia is a great power and that its role must reflect that status. Primakov insists that Russia must pursue the foreign policy of a great power and that this policy must be active and must be conducted in all directions, that is Russia must claim an influential place in global affairs. Primakov and other Russian officials believe that this foreign policy line is facilitated by the trend towards multiplicity in the world policies, thus allowing Russia to diversify its foreign relations, ties and abandon its former excessive leaning towards the West. However, the limits of this cooperative endeavor are seen in the prohibition against either side being able to dictate the actions of the other. Russia now has a "place at the table" as regards continental security, but it has few perceived opportunities for serving itself. The 1998-99 period was a turning point for Russian assessment of its international environment, and for the composition of its governing coalition.

THE EMERGING NEW GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

The geopolitical situation in Eurasia and in the whole world was in the process of change which had an impact on international affairs. This change, however, started long before the demise of the Soviet Union. Theoretically, Russia still remains the geographic "heartland" of the global landmass. But what was at that time of Halford Mackinder- a crucial geopolitical factor defence wise, does not have much significance in the nuclear age. More than that, the very core of the heartland Russian -

35 Evgeniy Primakov, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 17, 1996 quoted by Goure, Leon “NATO Expansion And Russia: How will Their Relations Change?” in Blank Stephen J., From Madrid To Brussels: Perspectives on NATO Enlargement, (Strategic Studies Institute, United States PA, June 15, 1997), p. 64.

Siberia remains an underdeveloped, sparsely populated territory, which despite its underdevelopment is totally polluted, and its ecosystem has been heavily damaged by the widespread exploitation of its natural resources.

However, Russia has the potential to emerge as a great power, with all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union on its territory and according to other criteria Russia is not a medium power. It has a colossal military and supporting industries. The important thing is that, despite its territorial shrinkage and major economic difficulties, Russia, per force its location in-between the two different global civilizations- Oriental and Western, still remains one of the main elements of the Eurasian and global geopolitical picture and it still occupies the position of civilization equilibrium, and it remains a pivotal weight in the global balance of power. Its role in the multi-polar balance of power is no less crucial than that of the Soviet Union’s role as the second “super power” in the Cold War period of the bipolar global confrontation.

On the other side of Eurasia, a new politico economic European Union had emerged. A unified and a more assertive Germany, whose economic aspirations were aimed Eastward was a factor to reckon with. The so-called military vacuum of the successor states of East Europe, including the Baltic republics, has become the main zone of contention for influence between the east and west. Russia’s military planning has to treat these countries as foreign states. In a volatile European south-east, Russia now has to compete for influence in the Trans-Caucasus Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia with an increasingly active Turkey and Iran. In the former Soviet-Central Asia all the indications suggest that the region might turn into a new
unstable Middle East of the globe, with Muslim influence on the rise and with many outside powers strongly competing for control of the region and South West Asia, Russian borders on Kazakhstan, where the Russian population nearly equal the numbers of indigenous Kazakhs, while in the northern border regions, Russians significantly outnumber Kazakhs. Kazakhstan and four other Muslim republics of the Former Soviet Union (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) do not have strong military forces. The danger lies in the fact that these five Republics with a combined population of 45 million and a territory of more than 1.5 million square miles, represent a proverbial “geo-political vacuum”, very tempting for militant Muslim states such as Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as for China which has a common border with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and quite a sizable population of Kazakh and Kyrgyz in its own Xinjiang province. Thus far Russia is filling that Central Asian vacuum by providing troops to guard the troublesome Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and military officers for fledgling armies of other Central Asian Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics.

The Tashkent Treaty on Collective security, signed on May 15, 1992 by the representatives of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (it left in 1999), Belarus and Armenia, provides a legal basis for the Russian military presence in the area. While Russia has settled its own 2725 mile border with China, responsibility for the demarcation of the borders between China and the other three other Former Soviet republics is now a subject of bilateral negotiations between the corresponding parties. As Gerald Robbins notes this amounts to a tacit understanding between China and Russia concerning the “rearrangement of their zones of influence”.

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This is why the security of Russia in its present dual incarnation of the single state and as the unofficial leader of the CIS is a great problem for Russia. It is doubtful that the implications of the problem are as yet fully appreciated and thought through by Moscow itself. Perhaps for this reason, the Russian Duma established a special parliamentary Committee on Geopolitics.

The fact is that Soviet / Russian political leaders and military strategists, who for more than a generation focused their attention on the US and NATO, and who did so within the framework of east-west bipolar confrontation, adopted a quite different continental and global outlook, when pathways to security are not as clearly defined as before, and when a number of things depend on the right geopolitical choice. This process of necessary accommodation to the new strategic environment is a difficult one, especially in a situation whereby the Russian leadership (both political and military) has concentrated on the internal struggle for power. Meanwhile Russian security in Asia and elsewhere also suffers from triumph of a world view that still sees Asian security mainly in military terms. This prevailing view also reflects the prior institutional failure and inhibits a rethinking of security policy and domestic reform.

Felgengauer’s Report highlights several key aspects of the militarizing view. Minister of Interior, General Anatoly Kulikov, wrote that virtually all of Russia’s neighbors and other interested powers actually or potentially threaten Russia’s integrity. Therefore, the main basis of threat assessments must remain the geopolitical one, which emphasizes the use of force in reply. Such thinking also unduly emphasizes Russia’s standing as a great power equal to the US, even if reality belies such pretensions.
A new NATO-type alliance system covering all the territory of the former Soviet Union or even the European part of it that was proposed by Yeltsin to his colleagues from other republics in Minsk and Alma-Ata in December 1991 and was persistently pushed forward by the Commonwealth and Russian military leaders did not work out. It was not practical not only because of the Ukrainian or the Azerbaijani quest for uncompromised independence in military decisions. It was also impractical because of diverging security interests, in the "common defense space" of the former USSR.37

As the Clinton and Yeltsin eras came to an end in America and Russia, along with far reaching changes in European regime, relations between NATO countries and Russia had degenerated, in the words of a leading US official to a state of 'mutual strategic mistrust'. Where not long ago both sides nourished hopes for a durable strategic partnership, they now approach each other with far more modest expectations and far more grudging acknowledgement that they cannot avoid doing some business together. The dynamics between NATO and Russia have shifted to a more benign and mutually advantageous direction will require a prodigious salvage job. The Russian Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev stood for a comprehensive partnership with western countries and complete integration with them. That policy was rooted in what had been Gorbachev's similar ideology of 'universal human values'. Russian politicians in the infant democratic Russia tried to emphasize the differences from the previous political system and foreign policy. In their opinion even Gorbachev's approach was still based on a bi-polar world system with the final goal of building

37 Kortunov, Andrei, 'RUSSIA and the "NEAR ABROAD": Looking for a Model Relationship, U.S.-Russian Partnership: Meeting the New Millennium
communism. The Russian President Boris Yeltsin stressed that in the changed circumstances of 1991 Russia had no ideological battle to fight with the West and repeated many times that Russia and the US have ‘common interests’. In his report to the UN Security Council meeting on January 31, 1992 he said that Russia considers the USA and other Western countries not only as partners but also as allies. Moscow shares the main western values, which are primacy of human rights, freedom, rule of law and high morality.

The democratic leaders of Russia at that time saw a strategic partnership as necessary to internal democratic reform, and recommended that the protection of national interests should not be promoted too aggressively. The democratic part of the Russian political establishment at that time openly wished to westernize Russia, to make it a member of the “western prosperity zone” and the cooperation with the West was continued and was marked by several considerable steps. In 1997, the agreement between Russia and NATO was signed, Russia continued to seek loans from International Monetary Fund (IMF), and joined the G-7 group of nations.

Primakov’s foreign policy can be called the ‘policy of alternatives’, instead of animosity towards the west, alternative steps to those of the western offered, contention with the West reached its peak of 1999, with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. In the two weeks after 24 March 1999, the number of people with anti-American feelings doubled, from 32 percent to 64 percent. The two main cause of stronger anti-western feeling in the second half of the 1990s were two folds: - First, the continuation of a severe economic crisis, ‘Shock Therapy’, combined now with

39 Ibid., p. 15.
frustration at the lack of economic assistance from the west. For various reasons, the Marshall Plan for Russia, more expected by the Russian government elite than promised by the West, did not happen. Second, several steps by the West, such as plans for NATO enlargement and the bombing of former Yugoslavia, increased support for nationalists within the establishment. To them these steps proved that the west was selfish and militant and a natural enemy of Russia. Particularly in the case of Kosovo, the UN or international law, it was taken into consideration.

The situation in 1999-2000 looked very much like a return to the Cold War, especially Russia-US relations. The nationalistic ideology of ‘Great Russia’ gained adherents among Russian political elite.

The concept of an ‘alternative foreign policy’ used the theory of “Eurasia” as its philosophical background. In accordance with the ideas of past thinkers like Leonid Karsavin and Petr Savistskiy, Russia cannot be included in a European civilization. From a social and cultural point of view, continent Eurasia is a unique phenomenon.40 The closing decade of the twentieth century has seen real and dramatic achievements in bolstering European security. Russia and NATO are still searching for ways to shape a common approach to the security of Europe.

JOINT APPROACH FOR SECURITY AND PEACE

As we have seen earlier, Russia had publicly expressed the concern that NATO could use armed force to settle conflicts on the territory of the former USSR and to prevent Russia from emerging a power. In addition, nuclear proliferation inevitably provoked United State’s opposition, resulting in increased military political tensions near

40 Ibid., p. 16.
Russian borders. But Russia’s security also depends on real and potential outside military dangers and threats, as well as their sources. In 1992, military leaders believed Russia’s security remained threatened by the West, particularly the NATO and the United States as well as by Russia’s southern neighbours. Military spokesman argued that the Former Soviet Union should be maintained indefinitely as a common strategic space for military purposes and that Russia had an abiding interest in maintaining close ties with the Central Asian states to keep the threat of radical Islam away from its territory. This implied an inclination to change the basing structures and military planning that had been established to defend the USSR, and which were no longer appropriate to Russia’s changed territory and threat perceptions.

The Security Council was established in 1992, and appeared to be modeled after the United States National Security Council and a foreign policy commission was formed within the security council in 1993, apparently to oversee both foreign and security policies and decisions.

While the new parliament was not officially involved in foreign policy formulation, it had significant influence over the direction and tone of Russia’s foreign policy. Even early in 1992, the vocal criticism of prominent spokesman in the CPD’s international affairs committee began to affect official policy positions. The Foreign policy and Defence Policy Committees of the new Duma have played a similar role since early 1994. The focus of discussion in 1993 –1994 reflected the shift from the liberal, pro-western positions towards the central and nationalist view. On the positive side, this growing consonance of views indicated that Russian policy makers were starting seriously to come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union and were
formulating new foundations and goals for Russian foreign policy. Yeltsin’s ascension to power in 1991 and his visit to the European Parliament in Strasbourg and to Paris in April, Prague in May and Washington in June 1991 and the talks between the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet’s security committee, Sergei Stepashin, and NATO officials in Brussels, with the purpose of achieving observer status for Russia in the Atlantic Alliance. In December 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin chose to make relations with NATO the subject of his first significant foreign policy initiative. He dispatched a letter to the leaders of NATO governments, then meeting in Brussels declaring that the question of Russia’s membership of NATO was a long-term political aim. The letter was seen as a strong political diplomatic signal to the effect that the new Russian state saw good relations with NATO and its member as a key foreign policy priority. It played an important role in creating the honeymoon atmosphere in relations with NATO, right at the start of independent existence. Ironically President Yeltsin initiated the debate. On an official visit to Poland in late August, he agreed to joint declarations with the then Polish President Lech Walesa that included the statement that: the President touched on the matter of Poland’s intention to join NATO. President L. Walesa set forth Poland’s well-known position on this count which was met with understanding by President Yeltsin. In the long-term, such a decision taken by a Sovereign Poland in the interest of overall European integration does not go against the interest of other states including the interest of Russia.

Yeltsin’s apparent endorsement of Polish aspirations to NATO membership was not instrumental in transforming the political landscape. Yeltsin himself quickly
reversed his opinion on the Polish membership in a letter to NATO, and instead proposed joint NATO-Russian guarantees for the security of the East Central European states. After August 1993, however, enlargement was to become increasingly the dominant theme in the whole NATO-Russia relationship. In a commentary published in Segodnya in early September 1993, Foreign Ministry official Vyacheslav Yelagin set out the ministry's line. This was first, one opposing the rapid enlargement of NATO membership while recognising the former Warsaw Pact states had the right to join if they so chose. Second, according to Yelagin, the Foreign Ministry's preference was for strengthening and improving such structures as Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, that is bodies within which Russia had a seat. Finally, implicit in Yelagin's argument was that Russia, a great power, should develop some kind of special relationship with NATO before any enlargement into Central Europe was considered. In mid September 1993, President Yeltsin addressed a letter to the United States, Germany, France and UK, setting out similar views on the future of European security. Its core message was that security must be indivisible and must rest on pan-European structures. Otherwise, he asserted, there was a risk of neo-isolation of Russia as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space. Sergei Karaganov a member of Yeltsin's Presidential Council argued that NATO enlargement in Central Europe alone means a strengthening of nations opposition here and also geopolitical isolation of the country, so what are offering – why no Russia. Russia has asked for membership two years ago. Yeltsin himself, although not

reiterating the Russian membership theme indicated that he expected a letter response from NATO. As he put it in his September 1993 letter to the United States, Germany, France and UK states that, 'we favour a situation where the relations between our country and NATO would be by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliances and Eastern Europe. NATO leaders could not have asked for a clearer statement of what the President wanted: 'a special relationship which elevated Russia’s status above that of NATO’s other Eastern interlocutors and so recognised its status as a great power.

The rapid transformation of Russia’s external relations was highlighted on June 22, 1994 when Russia acceded in principle to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program for former Soviet-bloc and neutral European states and on June 24, 1994, Kozyrev eventually signed a new partnership and cooperation agreement with the European Union. President Yeltsin attended part of the G-7 Summit at Naples, Italy, with the confirmation that Russia would be a full participant in the “political” sessions of future summits and on May 31, 1995, Russia signed two detailed PFP agreements with NATO, but Russia continued to oppose any eastward expansion of alliance.

The ‘Partnership for Peace’ started out simply as a diplomatic device but was taken in hand by the NATO authorities to become more than initially intended, that is a “vehicle for enlargement”.

The Russian leadership was keen on building bridges between Russia and the West, especially the USA, for not only securing economic cooperation with the West but also to conclude nuclear arms control agreements. While the economic relations
began to improve haltingly, US President George Bush and President Yeltsin signed the treaty on further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, popularly known as START-II, in Moscow on January 3, 1993. It was the most sweeping nuclear arms reduction treaty in history but is yet to be ratified by the Russian Parliament (the National Duma) which is dominated by communists and nationalists who are against START-II because it undermines Russian security interests.

While the Russians were generally suspicious of the ulterior designs of the US, fearing that they would be against Russian national interests, the ruling Russian leadership was leaning towards the US. In such a political scene, when in January 1994, the PFP framework document was published and the Partnership for Peace was actually launched, the anti-NATO campaign began to intensify in Russia. The PFP was the first step in the direction of the expansion of NATO.

Once the PFP was formalised, the US raised the issue of NATO expansion. The immediate reaction of Russia on the issue of NATO expansion was hostile but the Russian leadership could not oppose the proposal with conviction perhaps because of the economic and military weakness of the country and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower. Moreover, there was a lack of consensus on the issue within the government as was evident from various statements made by the Russian leaders. The Russian Defence Minister, General Pavel Grachev, warned that counter measures would be taken if NATO expanded too quickly. Almost at the same time, the pro-west Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, cautioned against the danger of the rush to expand NATO by bringing in former communist countries of eastern Europe. But a few days later, on May 31, 1995, he signed two-cooperation agreements with NATO.
that he had refused to sign earlier in December 1994, pending classification of plans to expand NATO, though he maintained that Russia still opposed eastward expansion by the alliance. President Yeltsin himself was also not consistent in his opposition to the enlargement of NATO.

In the meantime, Russia announced on April 2, 1996 that Russia and Belarus would form a Community of Sovereign Republics (CSR). Apparently Moscow wanted to convey a message to the West that there was a move on unity amongst some of the former Soviet Republics and that a strong grouping of countries would emerge to challenge the expanded NATO. The West viewed it merely as a declaration in response to the move against the expansion of NATO and felt that such a grouping would not enhance in anyway the military capability of Russia. At the same time, Russia’s threat to terminate arms control agreements and deploy nuclear weapons on new sites failed to dampen the West’s determination to expand NATO eastward.

On the heels of the announcement of the signing of the Union Treaty between Russia and Belarus, President Yeltsin along with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, announced a new “strategic partnership between the two countries, spanning economic and security ties and intended to last into the Twenty first century”. The Joint Communiqué included an implied complaint against the USA and the West in general that “hegemonism, power politics and repeated impositions of pressures on other countries have continued to occur”. Yeltsin offered his unequivocal support for China’s claims on Taiwan and Tibet.

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43 Ibid., No.4, April 1996, p.41062.
The West was neither disturbed by the move of Russia to bring the former Soviet Republics together nor intimidated by growing Sino-Russian strategic cooperation.

The main hurdle in the process of NATO expansion was removed when in Paris on May 27, 1997 the sustained Russian position on NATO’s expansion led to the formation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of the 16 NATO countries signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russian Federation. On the other hand, it must be emphasised that on December 17, 1997, the Russian President approved the text of the national security blueprint of the Russian federation. The Founding Act spoke of the beginning of “a fundamentally new relationship” between Russia and NATO based on a strong stable and enduring partnership “developed on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency”. The founding act provided for the establishment of a Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) to discuss issues of common security interest, such as terrorism, nuclear safety and conventional military doctrine and peace keeping operations. A US government briefing paper emphasized that while Russia would work closely with NATO, the Act made clear that Russia had no veto over NATO decisions. NATO confirmed that it had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy” nuclear weapons and to establish nuclear sites on the territory of new members. It also assured Russia that it would not station permanently “substantial” numbers of conventional forces “in agreed regions of Europe, including the Central and Eastern Europe”. Russia had previously

44 The English-language text of the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation’ may be found at www.nato.int/docu/basic-txt/fndact-a.htm.
demanded many more assurances, including guarantee that NATO would never deploy or install nuclear weapons, foreign forces or military infrastructure on the territory of any new member state. The US also made clear that it would like to restrict new entrants to three (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), arguing that the process of expansion should not weaken the Alliance.

Henry Kissinger said, immediately after the signing ceremony of the NATO-Russia Foundation Act in Paris in May 1997: The so called founding Act seeks to reconcile Russia by diluting the Atlantic Alliance into a UN style system of collective security. 45

The Madrid NATO Summit in July 1997 was the beginning of the end of the divisions created at Yalta. While Russia continued to look suspiciously at NATO’s eastward expansion, Romania Slovakia and Slovenia were impatiently knocking at the doors of NATO for an early entry and the Baltic countries and Bulgaria were queing up close behind. In order to allay Russian fears about the intentions behind NATO’s eastward role, a Joint NATO-Russian Council was created in 1997 to enable Russia to scrutinize, but not veto, NATO policy. NATO has also undertaken to desist from deploying nuclear weapons and combat units on the territory of its three new member states. Moscow has said that a ‘red line’ would be crossed if “Ukraine was to join the alliance”. 46 Fears of NATO creeping close to Russian frontiers made the Russian leaders apprehensive. The tangible negative fallout of NATO’s eastward expansion had been that Russia was forced to reverse its “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons

46 Russia Resigned to NATO membership for Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic”, Times of India, March 12, 1999.
and to modernize its nuclear forces. Also, the Russian Duma was now extremely reluctant to ratify the START II Treaty. The framework of NATO-Russia cooperation established by principal the Founding Act is a compromise solution, it is a reasonable quid pro quo which takes into account Russia’s real and even apparent strategic concerns without sacrificing the principle aim of strengthening European security. The clear prospects of NATO enlargement for April 1999 made Russian policy towards Central Europe even more ambivalent.

Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia would work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on shared values, commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all states. NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strengthening the OSCE, NATO and Russia will cooperate to prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.

Consistent with the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, and taking into account the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a Charter on European security, NATO and Russia sought the widest possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE with
the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state. NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries required a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes. These pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability. It cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security. In implementing the provisions in this Act, NATO and Russia observe in good faith their obligations under international law and international instruments, including the obligations of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

A decade after the end of the Cold War, are Russian and Western security priorities the same or different? They are different, because the objective situation of both the countries has undergone a change. A change that favours the West particularly the United States.

Closely associated with Russia's growing sense of insecurity is the imbalance in strategic weapons. For Russia the growing imbalance in strategic weapons is of serious concern, since this is one of very few, if not the only, remaining pillar of its status and role in the world. There is a commonly accepted perception in Moscow, that without this pillar it would be ignored by the West altogether (or worse in the view of communists and nationalists, treated like Yugoslavia or even Iraq.) Without robust
nuclear deterrent Russia would feel still more vulnerable facing conventional superiority across its borders in the West and in the East and proliferating local conflicts in the South. From Moscow's angle the START III negotiations are aimed at correcting deficiencies of the START II. As a matter of fact, the value of START II is not so much in its terms, but in its opening the door to the follow-on treaty. The START II, the United States does not physically destroy the majority of its weapons: they fulfill reductions largely by downloading, i.e. removing warheads from their missiles and converting part of strategic bombers for the so called non-nuclear missions. The warheads are not physically destroyed but kept in storage. It permits, if necessary, up-loading back to missiles quickly. As a result of such redeployment, the United States could easily reconstitute their strategic forces to a size even exceeding the START I ceilings. Russia, on the contrary, has to destroy physically vast majority of its missiles in the course of reductions, which puts it in a very disadvantageous position.

Finally, Russia wants to achieve more tangible assurances, than those in START II provisions that the US would not eventually withdraw from the ABM Treaty in a unilateral mode. No doubt, Indian-Pakistani nuclear debut in 1998, as well as probable China's reaction of accelerating its strategic program, would largely contribute to this probability. China's build-up on its own terms would radically change Russia's strategic environment, since in the extreme case China might be able to inadvertently achieve something close to nuclear parity with Russia after 2010. In parallel India-Pakistani-China's offensive missiles deployment would make some kind of US national strategic defense unavoidable. Although in Helsinki the two Presidents
agreed to synchronize deadlines for implementing both START II and START III by December 31, 2007, Washington refuses to initiate formal negotiations on the new Treaty before the START II enters into force. In its turn, Moscow is ready to commence the actual START II reductions only upon getting some certainty with regard to START III. The situation is further complicated by disputes between the executive branches and legislators in both countries. However, if there is no further deterioration of US-Russian relations or new regional crisis with ensuing unilateral Western use of force this issue would reappear sooner or later. The United States and Russia agreed that negotiations covering tactical nuclear weapons as well as long range sea-launched cruise missiles could be conducted separately from the START III. Russia's approach to the issue is shaped by two main considerations. On the one hand, it is interested in binding provisions that would prevent NATO nuclear deployments in new member states and could lead to the dismantlement of the US long range sea-launched cruise missiles.47

Thus, real progress in building legally binding tactical nuclear arms control regime could be strategically linked with forging a satisfactory compromise at the CFE adaptation talks. Moreover, there are significant technical challenges in negotiating a tactical nuclear arms control agreement. Here, very different principles of control and accounting will be needed compared to the strategic arms control. In the latter case, the counting rules and verification provisions were focused on deployed delivery systems, whereas all carriers of tactical nuclear weapons are dual use, and warheads attributed to them are not constantly kept on delivery vehicles.

47. Ibid.
Another important step could be aimed at formalizing the Founding Act provision on nuclear non-deployments on the territories of the new members and across the whole area of Central and Eastern Europe. For Russia, it would represent legally binding and verifiable guarantee against such deployments. In exchange, NATO would receive a guarantee that the nuclear weapons would not be returned to Belarus or Kaliningrad region. The enlargement of NATO should be de facto, if not de jure, channelized into predominantly political parameters, without involving considerable military alterations. This could hardly be translated into any formal commitments, as initially requested by Russia. However, the goal should be that the enlargement of NATO reduces rather than increases its military advantage over Russia. Otherwise, suspicions and non-cooperative moods would be hard to avoid in Russia.\(^{48}\)

Russia should also be more actively involved in the modernization of the armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe. This would alleviate Russia's military-industrial complex opposition to NATO enlargement and could shift domestic political perceptions of this issue. The interests of potential western suppliers might suffer, although not excessively: they would keep a monopoly on all sophisticated equipment, whereas Russia's involvement would be focused upon more traditional items, such as heavy weapons. Even more importantly, Russia's re-emerging threat perceptions with respect to NATO would be thus practically eliminated (since joint air and missile defence is by definition only possible between non-enemies). Also significant is the

\(^{48}\) Ibid.
fact that Russia's involvement into the project would by no means be symbolic - its superb S-300 and S-400 systems might eventually constitute its core. 49

On the other hand, in response to Western concerns, first of all, Russia must establish much more stringent domestic control on the export of nuclear/chemical materials and equipment, missile and dual use/sensitive technology. Russia's strict adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear weapon state, and its membership in several multilateral discriminatory export control regimes, like Wassenaar agreements, MTCR, NSG, is indispensable to secure Western cooperation on Russian security concerns. Without reneging on Russian-Iranian or Russian-Indian cooperation, Moscow should be more sensitive to Western objections: Russia sought to cooperate with these countries in a vain hope that a joint approach is the right one.

From the above developments it was clear that NATO was determined to play a role in international politics, a role that went beyond its original aims when NATO came into existence. The structures of NATO were indeed expanding. We now turn to the expanding structures of NATO in the next section.

STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATO

Since the unification of Germany and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union removed the central threats that held the alliance together. Article 5 of NATO shrank in importance as the likelihood of an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or United States got diminished. Whereas Article 4 which committed member governments to consultation on security issues, became more central and Article 10 under which the member states may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other

49 Ibid.
European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area to accede to the treaty became a issue.\textsuperscript{50} By July 1990, during NATO’s London Conference, a senior review group was established to redefine the alliance’s operational doctrines and strategic concepts and to allow for a greater European identity. \textsuperscript{51} In addition, the London declaration outlined NATO’s plan to develop regular contacts with the states of the former socialist bloc. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision resulted in the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps-ARRC) comprising forces from most staunch European Atlanticist states, Great Britain and Netherlands. The creation of the ARRC demonstrated that NATO was able to adapt the changing circumstances after the Cold War, and thus, was not simply the relic of the bipolar conflict. The ARRC also gave NATO the means to address out-of-area issues.\textsuperscript{52}

The alliance’s New Strategic Concept was agreed to in November 1991, in the Rome Conference a month before European governments completed their parallel negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. It declared the purpose of the alliance to be the establishment of a just and peaceful order in Europe. ‘Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance by NATO’s daily work in both the political and military spheres’, provided it argued – the secure foundation on which members of the


alliance, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for Europe.\textsuperscript{53}

Nevertheless the post–Cold War Europe, the Atlantic Alliance has already proven that it has a continued role as the region’s principal provider of security. A process of double enlargement that was launched in 1990 highlights the changed role. The PFP initiative has altered the very character of the NATO alliance. In certain quarters it was believed that Russia was led into a "trap" to endorse the NATO expansion. In fact, Russian leaders sent mixed signals to the west about their opposition to the expansion of NATO eastward. Russia maintained that the expanded NATO would pose a threat to its national security and it vigorously opposed deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet allies, yet it would not oppose the enlargement of the alliance if the expansion was done slowly and no nuclear weapons were deployed on the territory of the new members of NATO.

The new NATO integrated command structure that was formed consisted of two overarching Strategic Commands, one for the Atlantic and one for Europe. The Strategic Command Atlantic consists of three Regional Commands and two Combatant Commands. The structure of Strategic Command Europe is somewhat more elaborate with only two Regional Commands but with two Component Commands and a number of Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRCs) reporting to each of them.

The new command structure is comprised of a wide distribution of integrated command capabilities and promotes Alliance cohesion with a single, militarily-effective, multi-capable and flexible structure able to undertake the complete spectrum

\textsuperscript{53} Forster, Anthony and Wallace, William, opcit., p. 114.
of alliance roles and mission requirements—Collective Defence, Peace Support Operations, Expansion of Stability Tasks and Counter-Proliferation—of which Collective Defence remains the core. The structure contributes to the fundamental operating principles of the Alliance: common commitment and mutual co-operation amongst sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all its members. It is the most explicit signal of cohesion and gives substance to solidarity within the Alliance, ensuring that no single ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges, without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the realm of defence.54

This development of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is to be reflected in new geopolitically rationalized structures for commands, forces and missions as through the use of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and by giving the structures an enhanced European character. The Concept of CJTF provided a road map for a more flexible NATO and a rationale for American semi-detachment form of regional security operations. It was launched by the Americans at the Brussels NATO summit in January 1994 and approved at the Berlin Summit in June 1996. It permitted coalitions of the willing using national forces assigned to NATO supplement by the right request the use of NATO headquarters, command and communications facilities and logistics support for non-NATO, Western European Union (WEU) missions.

The foregoing military assessment would indicate that the new command structure has more than sufficient inherent structural and organizational flexibility to

54 Ibid.
fully address the demands of the future. However, just as importantly, if not more so, are the operational level doctrinal concepts that have evolved in the process of developing the new structure. They are the enduring elements that guarantee the ability of the Alliance to effectively undertake the full spectrum of roles and missions into the next century; they are the tools that will allow us to innovate, adjust and overcome the challenges, some of which, at this point in time. It cannot even be conceptualized. They reflect new thinking, a paradigm shift in the manner in which the Alliance will both conduct exercises and undertake operations. Four briefly deserve mention. 55

As NATO Foreign minister said the Alliance’s taking on of new missions in Afghanistan. The Foreign Ministers met in the Spanish capital to review the implementation of decisions and initiatives launched at the landmark Prague Summit. At the Summit, Heads of State and Government endorsed a far-reaching transformation of the Alliance to meet new security threats. “The Foreign Ministers of the Alliance took stock of how the Alliance has dealt with this demanding period of change and the conclusion was that NATO is bouncing back. NATO has weathered its storms in remarkably good shape,” said NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at a press conference. The discussions focused on the future of the Alliance, with Ministers reaffirming NATO’s readiness to take on new roles and missions in other parts of the world. This resolve was demonstrated by three recent landmark decisions: the agreements on cooperation with the European Union, the decision to take over of the command of the ISAF peacekeeping force in Afghanistan this August, and to assist Poland in its Iraq mission.” These decisions demonstrate a deep practical consensus on

55 Ibid.
the future of the transatlantic relationship, based very much on the vision that was set out at Prague," Lord Robertson told reporters. Ministers also discussed progress achieved in strengthening NATO's partnerships with their counterparts in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. A special NATO-EU meeting confirmed the progress achieved in practical cooperation between the two organisations. Regular meetings of NATO Foreign Ministers are held twice a year to review the current development.

**KOSOVO CRISIS**

Kosovo, a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had an increase of Western sympathy and support for ethnic Albanians and hostility towards the leadership of Yugoslavia, which reached a climax on March 24, 1999 with NATO's launch of airstrikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The airstrikes were terminated 11 weeks later, after intense diplomatic activity on the part of leading NATO members and Russia. NATO air strikes against the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia at the end of March 1999 had come as a shock to many in Russia. The use of force without the express sanction of a United Nations Security Council resolution, devalued not only the Russian veto right but also the former superpower's actual international weight.

The adoption of NATO's new strategic concept at the Washington Summit in 1999, and the alliance's stated willingness to intervene anywhere in Europe to uphold stability and human rights raised dark suspicions about where NATO might strike next, perhaps even closer to Russia's borders. Such suspicions were only strengthened when, while Russia declined the invitation to attend the Washington Summit, the
leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Maldova (GUUAM) chose to attend and decided to use the US capital as the venue for a meeting among themselves.

Former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydin’s diplomacy, which helped end the crisis, was never popular among the Russian elites. Desperate for a say in a final settlement for Kosovo, the Russian military made a surprise dash for Pristina’s airport with 200 of its paratroopers, who were based in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of SFOR (Stabilization Force).\(^56\) This intended show of strength, however, ultimately exposed the Russian military’s weakness.

By the end of 1999, Russia-NATO relations had not fully recovered from the blow dealt by Kosovo. The word “Partnership” was no longer mentioned, cooperation and dialogue were still limited to the two ongoing peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, NATO-Led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Keeping Force (KFOR). Interaction between Russian and NATO peacekeepers in both cases was generally good, but that is not enough to build the momentum needed to restore a full relationship.\(^57\)

The international implications of the Kosovo crisis are that a prolongation of the NATO’s presence in Kosovo may affect NATO-Russia relations. Hence, a restructuring of the international order is required.

Russia views the NATO’s strategic expansion in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe as a confrontation act.\(^58\) In Kosovo, NATO has, under the supervision of the US, effectively bypassed the United Nations Security Council. Two permanent council


\(^{58}\) Frontline, 26 March, 1999, p.51.
members, Russia and China had been vociferously criticizing NATO’s proposal to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav leadership was forced to regard Chernomyrdin’ statement as Moscow’s official position and, after agonizing reflection, advised the parliament to approve the proposed peace plan.

The plan coordinated with the American military experts’ specified tasks that the Yugoslav People’s Army units would perform. The strength of the Yugoslav forces allowed to remain was to be determined by each sector commander on the basis of the actual situation in his zone of responsibility.

Russia’s firm initial stance gave the world community hope that the aggression would be decisively rebuffed. The damage to Russia’s international reputation was immense. There can be no doubt that Russia could possibly be the next target of NATO’s policies. Russia would also lose the last vestiges of its status as a significant player both in international relations, including the ‘near abroad’ and on the territory of the Russian Federation itself. Consequently, it is clear to all realistic analysts and politicians that the US must be stopped in Yugoslavia not out of love for Milosovic and the communists, and not even love for the Serbs and Yugoslavia but because this is in Russia’s own self-interest, since after a successful operation in Yugoslavia the US and NATO “will wipe their feet on Russia”.

CONCLUSION

Thus, we find that in the events that unfolded in Europe in the last decade of the twentieth century, Russian role was basically reactive. It either had to back NATO’s

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policies or remain on the sidelines. Russia’s initial backing for NATO has gradually given way to hostility. This is understandable since NATO’s expansion has left Russia with a sense of vulnerability while Russia will have to improve its economy and overcome its deficiencies till then, Russian military strength will have to be given priority and augmented. Meanwhile Russia will have to augment its political and diplomatic tools so that NATO remains a friendly and a co-operative organization as far as Russia is concerned.

It appears that CIS countries are learning certain lessons from the Balkan crisis and are beginning to pool efforts to augment their defence potential. NATO’s aggressive policies have demonstrated the need to accelerate the creation of a Union of state of Belarus and Russia. It is often interpreted that in Yugoslavia, NATO is fighting not only against the Serbs, but against the entire Slavic and the orthodox world. Many observers feel that the US, which initiated the air strikes against Yugoslavia and backs the Albanian separatists, has interests in weakening Europe; creating a so-called Muslim “arc of instability”. Russia showed willingness to cooperate with NATO despite its opposition to expansion. Russia has a weakened economy and is in the midst of transition. Its military is in the process of re-adapting. Russia is using diplomatic means to find the solution to peace and security.