CHAPTER - 2

SOVIET SECURITY CONCEPT
INTRODUCTION

For centuries the question of Russian security has been a central issue. In the Cold War period the Soviet Union controlled over half of the European continent. It was widely perceived as an alien force in Europe. The Soviet Union espousing Marxism-Leninism was considered with European values.

The break-up of the colonial system in the aftermath of the Second World War created opportunities for the Soviet Union to further expand in the Third world. In the post-war era, the Soviet leadership chose to pursue a foreign policy that was very different from the strategy employed by Tsarist rulers. Imperial Russia grew through the gradual accession of adjoining land and their integration into Russia. The Soviet Union’s efforts to build up a sphere of influence especially on a nation’s periphery was largely focused on regions and countries that never crossed the minds of even the most ardent champions of Russia’s expanding influence in the Tsarist rule. Not only the economic but also the pressing geopolitical interests of Russia were sacrificed just to satisfy the ideological goals of the times.\(^1\) The Soviet military and security doctrines were highly ideologised. Ethics and morality were totally absent in the making of foreign policy and conflict took the most acute form.\(^2\) Nevertheless Russian existed as the dominant power of Eurasia, bound especially to the West and Southwest by wide plains and undefined by clear ethnic or geographical boundaries. It occupied a central geographic position and it directly bordered on twelve neighbouring states and looked out across enclosed seas at additional seven states. Thus, Soviet interests and concerns range from the Scandinavian neighbors of Norway and Finland in the Northwest,

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through the then communist regimes of Eastern Europe on to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan in the Near East, Pakistan and India in South Asia, and China, North Korea and Japan in the Far East. The majority of these frontiers are marked by no significant geographical barriers thus contributing to the historical perceptions and reality of Russian vulnerability to overland invasion. It is from the critical “heartland” location, the leaders in the Kremlin confronted a multitude of challenges and opportunities along this lengthy frontier. So it has been argued that Russia feels compelled to expand its frontiers. In addition a rival ideology which led to a bipolar world was also a significant factor that contributed to the Soviet sense of insecurity. In this conception of security Russia inevitably clashed with the existing maritime and colonial powers of Western Europe and North America, whose role was to contain Russian expansionism. Moreover, military power played a critical role in the growth of Soviet influence in the world. The Soviet Union was one of the world’s leading industrial nations and it had a substantial political and ideological component.

After the war the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant military power on the Eurasian continent. The world socialist system began to take shape and friendly neighbors appeared along the Soviet Union’s western border. The Western powers on the other hand had begun planning to counter the growing Soviet influence in the years that followed and these plans became a reality in the Cold War that followed. The Cold War reflected the ideological divide.

In western eyes, the expansion of the sphere of Soviet influence reached critical dimensions with the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In earlier

times, this could have served as an occasion for unleashing a war. But threat of nuclear
destruction kept the West from resorting to frontal military clash with the USSR.

In the course of the 20th century, the nature and content of the struggle for
social progress changed substantially. Since 1945, the Soviet Union played the role of
a military guarantor of socialism in the world. As a result, it had been drawn into an
extremely acute confrontation with the main forces of imperialism. Nuclear missiles
had made this confrontation exceptionally dangerous and risky. One of the
manifestations of the Cold war was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) with the specific purpose to roll back communism. It was a
military organisation and its Article 5 was to check aggression from the Soviet Union
or the socialist bloc.

The main concern of the Soviet leadership was United States political –military
strategic intentions. It was also concerned over growing US counter force capabilities.
The reversal of US stated policy on the destabilizing nature of counter force
capabilities after 1974 considerably raised Soviet suspicions especially because it
initially accompanied the failure in the latter half of the 1970 to reach a Strategic Arms
Limitations Talk (SALT), agreement based on the Vladivostok accords.

The most significant development of the United States President Ronald
Reagan Administration was the President’s advocacy of a Strategic Defence Initiative
(SDI), as it came to be called officially, better known and termed in most Soviet
commentary as “star war”. The star wars initiated directly challenged the whole
rationale of Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) banning a ballistic Missile defence of

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4 Ibid. p. 5.
the territories of the two countries. Thus the real American objective was perceived as a defensive shield to augment and strengthened sword and permit use politically or even military, of a coercive first strike capability. ⁵

This chapter attempts to examine the Soviet perception of security and its changing nature in the last days of the Soviet Union.

**FORMATION OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION AND WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION**

After the World War II, the United States of America emerged as the leading capitalist country. It had cast its lot with Western Europe bearing in mind a possible renewal of German aggression and increasing fear of Soviet power. The United States has cast its military lot with Western Europe in the belief that such a union would be the greatest deterrent to war and that sufficient strength to resist possible aggression could be achieved only by collective defense strength.

Though the military and defense organs were formed under the Brussels Pact, concluded in 1947 by Britain, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Despite the process began with Britain and France, which both signed the Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947, pledging “alliance and mutual assistance”. Then Stalin’s creation of Cominform in September 1947 pledged to fight the Marshal Plan as “an instrument of American imperialism” spurred Spaak and other smaller European states to join. In March 1948, the three Benelux countries joined Britain and France in

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Spaaks. It was a great achievement of the Brussels Treaty of mutual defense. It was also encouraged by the Vandenburg resolution of June 1948 and the Rio Pact of the following September, it was mentioned in the resolution that the United States Senate expressed its approval of "the association of the United States ...... with such regional other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as affect its national security". That resolution was barely agreed when the East Germans and Soviet troops sealed the roads leading to West Berlin and the Berlin blockade began on June 24. Twelve days later, Europe's ambassadors met at the State Department in Washington and began drafting what became NATO's founding document, formally signed as the Treaty of Washington on April 4, 1949. The five powers of the Treaty of Brussels, joined by the United States with Canada, formally invited Italy, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal to join them. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, and the new federal republic of West Germany was invited to join, after considerable hesitation by France, in 1954.

Originally, NATO was simply a diplomatic alliance, which called for its members to support one another in case of attack. What made NATO unique was the way, under the Lisbon Agreements of 1952, this treaty became a coherent system of unified command and control of the various national military forces. In effect, NATO became, under its first supreme commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the general staff of all the national armed forces gathered in Western Europe.

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6 Walker, Martin, From Cold War to Kosovo, EUROPE Magazine, April 1999, Issue No. 385. p. 28.
7 Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1948.
9 Walker, Martin, opcit., p. 28.
Americans agreed to keep a permanent garrison of troops and warplanes in Europe under NATO command—some of whose grandchildren are serving today at the NATO military headquarters at Mons, Belgium.\textsuperscript{10}

North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949 to protect the countries of Western Europe against Soviet expansion. The core of the treaty’s military provisions is the common pledge to consider the armed attack against all and to develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. It is to be consulted if any of the group finds its independence or security threatened and to take such individual and collective action, including the use of armed force as each country considers necessary to restore. Also it is to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Thus, the Treaty contains a solemn pledge to defend against aggression. NATO’s formation reflected a coincidence of interests between the United States and the states in Europe. America’s involvement in two world wars during the first half of this century convinced American policy makers that the security and well being of the United States and of Western Europe were inextricably intertwined. The vital interest of the United States in protecting the countries of Western Europe against Soviet Union expansion coincided with their (European Countries) determination to preserve their independence. By committing itself, in advance, to the collective defense of a threatened member state, NATO was designed to prevent the piecemeal loss of territory to the Soviet Union and to bind the United States formally to the defense of Western Europe. Thus, with the support of Britain and France, the United States filled the power vacuum that had been formed after the defeat of Germany. The military and

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 28.
political presence of the US on the European continent became a powerful and long-term factor. Sixteen countries—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and United States, joined by Greece and Turkey in 1952, the federal republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982—have agreed to resist collectively an armed attack against any one of them. All the western powers united in the NATO military-political bloc, which was aimed against the Soviet Union. West Germany, with its own mighty potential, was drawn into this bloc as well. In this way, a united front of western powers against the USSR came into being. An anti-Soviet coalition unprecedented in its makeup and in its might was formed.\footnote{\textit{Literaturnaya gazeta}, May 18, p. 14; as translated in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XL, No.24, July 13, 1988, p. 3.}

As a response to this security development the Soviet Union signed an extensive series of treaties. The most prominent of these is the Multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and cooperation signed in Warsaw, Poland, on May 14, 1955. This alliance, commonly known as the Warsaw Pact or Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). It commits the Soviet Union and the communist regimes of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania to the joint defense of their European territories. Originally it was conceived that WTO was created as a response to the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and its admission into NATO. This treaty became over the years, a major policy instrument for the Soviets’ domination of their communist client states in Eastern Europe.

Bilateral treaties of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and each of the other member states reinforced the common defense
commitments of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets have also signed bilateral status of force agreements with East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia that provide for the stationing of Soviet troops in these countries. Soviet military forces were permanently deployed in Eastern Europe and a tactical air army in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) was deployed. It relied almost exclusively on the possibilities of the Soviet Union.

The preamble of the Warsaw Treaty stated that its ultimate aim was to create a system of collective security in Europe based on the participation of all European states, irrespective of their social and political structure. The seven signatory states claimed that the Paris Agreements had created a new situation, 'the necessary step to safeguard their security and to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe'. The allies provided both a defensive buffer zone and an offensive launching platform for the Soviet Union. The pact, as a whole, enjoyed the advantages of centralized control from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets and the fraternal parties of Eastern European relied on a common WTO doctrine. It assured an unopposed Soviet capability for military intervention by configuring Soviet forces for offence and preempting East European capabilities of defense. Also it ensured mobilizing the elite units of the East European forces to enhance the credibility of the USSR/WTO forces directed against the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO as a whole.

For Soviet purposes, the most critical issue in defining WTO military doctrine was not whether the doctrine was offensive, or defensive, or counter offensive, or

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nuclear or conventional, the most critical issue was whether there was one coalition
doctrine or a series of independent national military doctrine. The Soviet position,
resisted by the Romanians, was that there should be one common doctrine for the
entire alliance.

In the Soviet definition, a state military doctrine had elements: a military-political component and a military-technical component. Although these two components were said to be mutually dependent, the Soviets claimed that the military-political component was the more decisive in the formulation of the overall military doctrine of a state. The military-political component of USSR/WTO doctrine consisted of a circular set of axioms variously described as “the Marxist–Leninist teaching on war and armed forces”, “joint defence of the gains of socialism against internal and external reaction”, an obligation stipulated in the Soviet bilateral treaties with every WTO states or the joint defence of the socialist fatherland”, an entity the Soviets defined very broadly. The commitment to joint defence of socialism within the collective borders of the socialist common wealth against the encroachments of internal and external enemies was a Soviet security guarantee to the ruling communist parties that accepted the common WTO doctrine.

The similarity of organizational structures (despite vast differences in population and geography) permitted the construction of WTO agencies which linked corresponding Soviet and east European agencies. (This did not apply to Romania, which had an independent military doctrine and a very different national defence structure). The WTO commander, always a Soviet officer with the title of Deputy Defence Minister of the USSR, also had at his disposal the WTO staff, headed by the
first deputy, also a Soviet officer. The WTO staff (responsible for joint exercise and a multitude of joint activities) pre-empted the responsibilities of national General staffs. The linkage of corresponding Soviet and East European military bureaucracies through the agencies of the WTO would not have been possible without a common theory of the organisation of a national system.

Moreover, the theory of troop training and military education justified the existence of the WTO’s military council, an agency in charge of coordinating national training programs. The recommendations for the Military Council were only advisory, a formula that permitted the Romanians to avoid the recommendations of the Military council. Romanian objections probably prevented the formal recognition of two de facto agencies concerned with the implementation of theory of troop training and military education. One of these was a commission of the chiefs of the WTO’s main political administrations. This commission which met publicly, conducted a wide range of activities based on the common military-political component of WTO doctrine. These activities included the political indoctrination of WTO personnel, the monitoring of the political attitudes of WTO officers and the writing of joint works on WTO military affairs. During joint exercises, joint Main Political Administration (MPA) commanders were established to manage joint political activities and the complexities of multinational/multilingual interaction.

Another theory of the military technical component of doctrine was “military art”. Military Art was concerned with fighting an external opponent. This is why NATO has consistently treated WTO military art as if it were the whole of WTO military doctrine. USSR/WTO military art constantly changed in response to
technological innovations of both sides and in response to doctrinal changes within NATO. It consisted of tactics, operational art (large-scale actions within a theatre) and strategy. The offensive nature of WTO military art before the announcement of a new military doctrine in 1987 and post 1987 "defensive counter offensive "military art both had the practical effect of keeping Soviet forces poised for offensive actions against East Europe and West Germany while simultaneously denying East European defence ministries (except Romania’s) the right to plan national defence of national territory by national means.

Though Soviet security guarantee to the ruling communist parties of Eastern Europe had required these parties to impose on their national defence ministries a common WTO military doctrine virtually identical with Soviet doctrine. WTO doctrine had two mutually – dependent elements, a military political component and a military technical component. The military –political component of the common doctrine required the member states to prepare for joint defence of the gains of socialism against internal and external reaction. This principle in turn required that the military technical component of doctrine provide for a series of joint WTO agencies and programs that linked the key structures of the Soviet forces assigned to the European theater.

The practical effect of the common WTO doctrine was a fragment national control over national armed forces. WTO thus pre-empted organised national military resistance to USSR/WTO interventions. The client regimes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union supported the common doctrine of the WTO precisely because it pre-
empted national defence systems capable of resisting Soviet interventions in support of the local party or the pro Soviet faction of the local party.

Romania, formally a member of the WTO had adopted a doctrine of national resistance to such interventions, as had Albania, a former member of the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia, the first communist state of Eastern Europe to demonstrate that national sovereignty was based on national control over national armed forces. Each of these three independent parties denied the WTO the use of its national armed forces for use in joint activities aimed at enhancing the Soviet capability vis-à-vis NATO. Each of these parties also pursued an independent European security policy that challenged the legitimacy of both the NATO and Warsaw pact military alliance system.

SOVIET PERCEPTION OF SECURITY

The Soviet perception of security contains an amalgam of traditional Russian and Marxist-Leninist ideological elements. As the early notions constituted perhaps the most radical departure from the conventional conception of security which had evolved historically in the system of nation states that had developed since the middle ages. Security to the Bolsheviks meant the physical survival and the further development of the regimes' that had been established in a part of Russia. It also meant safeguarding the regimes' ability to institute the societal and other changes it planned but still in the context of a broader, revolutionary environment. Security perception was neither confined within the old frontiers of Russia, or within the areas where the Russian revolutionaries held sway. Yet the capacities of the Russian
revolutionaries to affect events beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, and even within their own areas of more or less tenuous control, were highly circumscribed.\textsuperscript{13}

The Soviet conception of security, while heavily conditioned by anxieties about external dangers (as well as internal threats from residual capitalist elements), retained offensive aspects harking back to earlier notions of spreading communist revolutions and class alliances transcending national borders. In the Soviet period Communist sought to retain their separate identity to avoid contamination by other groups and theories. It should be noted that Soviet foreign policy similarly is all but fully explicable with reference to the general. Security perception in the age of nuclear parity was based on the mutual acknowledgement of equality and the abandoning of the aspiration for superiority.

Thus there emerged an extended concept of security that involved the territorial integrity of both the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. The needs and concerns of the USSR were, however, given a top priority.

The Soviet conception of security, and the actions designed to safeguard socialist bloc and their territorial boundaries were the essence of Soviet security. Often Russian concern for its security verged on fear psychosis. Throughout its history it has espoused primarily security concerns that made the rulers of Moscovy expand in diverse directions. Even after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the beginning of Soviet era the security question did not get settled. The ideological divide added a sharper edge to the security question. It may be added that Russia’s present day

boundaries are such that natural barriers do not provide a dividing line. This fact had compounded Russian security question.

**Stalin Period (1928 – 1953)**

Even during the Soviet period the security question was a top-most priority as in the past. Lenin’s ideas of *Peaceful Co-existence* and Stalin’s enunciation of Collective Security were steps in the direction of solving the vexed issue of security concerns. To an extent Soviet concerns were not misplaced: the civil war in 1918-1920, of the Hitler’s invasion of Soviet Union in 1941. With the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Cold War began and his heightened Soviet security concerns. To use Churchill’s famous phrase “an iron curtain has descended over Europe”. One of the highlights of the Cold War was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) in 1950. NATO was specifically created to contain communism so as to check its further advance into the heart of Europe. NATO was primarily a military organisation with developed structures over the years.

NATO definitely posed a threat to Russia on its Southwestern flank. The member countries of NATO were well-developed industrialized countries of the West. They possessed the latest weaponry and with the backing of the United States of America easily were superior to the Soviet Union and its East bloc allies. Hence the nature of threat to its South-West flank was basically in conventional countries that separated the Soviet Union from Europe that was part of NATO. The Soviet response was to launch the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) in 1955. The developments of NATO and Warsaw Pact have been discussed earlier in the chapter.
It can be seen that Stalin’s conception of security in the postwar world was not confined to the physical protection of the Soviet Union against renewed military threats. Stalin saw the East European countries more as a military buffer zone.\(^\text{14}\) He regarded it also as constituting the outer lines of defense against various forms of ideological and psychological challenge that emanated from the “capitalist” world. Protecting its Western periphery also became one of the security objectives of Soviet policy. The regime pressed forward with reconstructing the industrial base of the country and the maintenance of large military forces. Thus, there emerged an extended concept of security that involved the territorial integrity of both the Soviet Union and the newly acquired countries of the socialist bloc and its subordination in all major respects to the needs and concerns of the USSR.\(^\text{15}\)

Stalin had increased substantially the sphere of influence and dominant Soviet power and had thereby seemingly strengthened the physical security of the USSR. Yet he never lost the siege mentality that had marked the Soviet evolution in the 1920s and 1930s. ‘Capitalist encirclement’ remained for him a reality, both in terms of the military threats to the Soviet Union that he envisaged and in terms of potential connections between internal opposition to the regime and external enemies. The creation of a new western alliance system, including after 1950, the permanent stationing of a large number of American combat forces on the European continent. Besides this the gradual incorporation of West Germany in the alliance system and the development of a potent American nuclear arsenal. So it was together with systems

\(^{14}\) Jonathan Alford, p. 7.
\(^{15}\) Ibid. p. 8.
capable of delivering these new weapons on to Soviet soil. The immediate post war period saw the extension of the USSR's security perimeter, but by 1953 the process had run about its course. The limits had been determined first in Iran, then in Greece and Turkey, then in Germany and finally in the Far East.

**Nikita Khrushchev Period (1955 – 64)**

Stalin's death in 1953 led to Nikita Khrushchev becoming the next General Secretary (1955 – 64) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). However, towards the end of Stalin's regime a new factor had emerged having implications on security policies. It was the advent of nuclear weapons, which made war seem no longer inevitable. In a nuclear war there were no winners. Hence Khruschev formulated Soviet thinking on foreign policy and ushered in the concept of 'Peaceful Co-existence' which unlike the earlier concept was permanent and not temporary. These fundamental changes were introduced at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. This concept held that war between the Soviet Union and the capitalist powers was not inevitable. It implied that class struggle had shifted to the economic plane. It also signaled the Soviet desire for better and closer relationships with the Capitalist world, in all fields, except in ideology.

The transition from Stalin to Khrushchev reflected the shift from a regional conception of security to a global one; from the era of Second World War to the nuclear rocket age. As a consequence of the development between 1949 and 1953, an exclusively European framework proved too weak to contain a prospering Germany and equally a European alliance could not act as a deterrent to Soviet expansion.

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16 Ibid. p. 9.
The threat of revived German militarism was countered by dredging up the Brussels Pact concluded in 1948. At the Paris conference of 1954, the Brussels Pact was expanded by the inclusion of West Germany and Italy. It became the West European Union, which was intended to expand collective European control over German Naval and ariel armament. At the same time, West Germany agreed to produce any nuclear or chemical weapons within its own borders. In exchange for this containment, NATO admitted West Germany as an equal member.

A review of the Khrushchev’s period proffers certain conclusions that the Soviet Union began to view its security in much broader geographical and functional terms, and in doing so it accepted commitments and risks that made the management of national security policy more complex. The nuclear issue assumed more urgency and the competition with United States came to be judged more and more in terms of the strategic nuclear balance.\(^{17}\) In effect stimulating pluralism and a shift from regionalism to globalization cost the Soviet Union a great deal. It imposed a new military-economic burden but yielded only a marginal weakening of the regime’s main adversaries abroad. By 1964 national security for the USSR was a complex equation. It involved calculations concerning the internal repercussions of foreign policies. The cost of sustaining large economic and political commitments in Eastern Europe as well as much more remote areas. The accumulation of military force and the extension of its reach beyond the Eurasian landmass thus had not overcome some of the inherent flaws in the polity that the Soviet rulers had constructed over half a century. At the same time, the sense of power conferred on the Soviet Union by the steady shift in the

\(^{17}\) Ibid. p. 13.
military balance increased the Soviet appetite for tangible pay-off.\textsuperscript{18} As the power grew so did the definition of security. The safety of the homeland was the principal consideration; the inviolability of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe was a close second. Friendly powers elsewhere on the Soviet periphery were next and entitlement to a role at least equal to that of the United States elsewhere came last. Security had thus become a goal whose attainment would require ever-increasing measures of military power.

\textit{Leonid Brezhnev Period (1964 – 1982)}

Leonid Brezhnev the successor to Khruschev (1964 – 1982) and his colleagues had thus inherited from Khrushchev the conviction that Soviet Union could not and should not be satisfied with securing the borders of the homeland and its western outposts, but showed strive for a status resembling that of the United States. Khrushchev had had the notion that the Soviet Union could match and overtake the economic strength of the United States and that this would render the Soviet example irresistible elsewhere in the world. Military power, which Khrushchev did not neglect but which he had tried to channel into particular areas, would have been the concomitant of economic power. The concept of \textit{Peaceful Co-existence} continued. In the 1970s, the two super powers began to co-operate more closely with each other. In 1972 President Nixon traveled to the Soviet Union, the first American President to do so. The Moscow Declaration of 1972 conferred on the Soviet Union the status of a global power.

Brezhnev was realistic enough to see the failings of this conception. Once he had consolidated his political position at home, he muted the themes of economic and

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p. 15.
ideological competition and generally sought to avoid head-on-collisions with Soviet adversaries. It was this strategy that was shaped in the period leading up to the Twenty Fourth Communist's Party Congress in 1971 and proclaimed in programmatic terms on that occasion.\textsuperscript{19} Scholars blame Brezhnev for inducing a new arms race, it was costly for Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{20} Thus the Brezhnev – Kosygin period saw a massive investment in the military sphere.

\textit{Mikhail Gorbachev Period (1985 – 1991)}

The last General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko (1985 – 1991) and he changed the concept of security. Gorbachev did not withdraw the USSR/WTO military guarantee to ruling communist parties. There was no sudden disintegration of command structures, discipline, reliability, technology or intelligence. There was non-doctrinal rebellion like that attempted by the Czechoslovak Officer Corps in 1968 or the Polish Officer Corps in the early 1960s. The Warsaw pact in late October, 1979 remained capable of initiating a military intervention to save any East European communist party from a popular uprising because military might was established.

The USSR/WTO offensive threat compelled the Eastern and Western states of Europe to accept a political status quo that lacked indigenous support in the two Germanys and Eastern Europe. By revoking the Soviet security guarantee to the ruling East European parties, Gorbachev destroyed the capability of these parties to maintain the WTO agencies and joint programs required by the common military doctrine. There was no sudden disintegration of command structures, discipline, reliability,

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. p. 17.
technology and intelligence (although ethnic tensions within the Soviet army had become greatly exacerbated during 1988-89.) There was no doctrinal rebellion like that attempted by the Czechoslovak officer corps in 1968. The Warsaw Pact in late October, 1979 was capable of initiating a military intervention to save any East European communist party from a popular uprising.

The second was the diplomatic program designed to build a common European home from the Atlantic to the Urals. The third program, which linked Gorbachev's intra-bloc and east -west policies, was the security program based on NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control and the adoption of a new USSR/WTO military doctrine of reasonable and reliable sufficiency."

To guard against an unwelcome increase in Western political and cultural influence in a common European home Gorbachev simultaneously sought an extraordinary expansion of intra-bloc programs aimed at intensified integration of economic, scientific, technical and military institutions of the WTO states. As the USSR, Gorbachev sought to diminish the role of the apparatus bloc affairs in favour of more organic ties of corresponding institutions with common interests. The goal was to promote the emergence of genuinely competent regimes in East Europe that would free the USSR of the economic burden of subsidizing poorly managed socialist economic systems.

In his arms control program, which he began to develop in January 1986, Gorbachev had sought a more rational and proportionate relationship between the conservative political objectives of the USSR in Europe and the explosive and

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expensive dynamics of the NATO-WTO military confrontation. That is, he wanted to disengage Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe from the East West arms race but leave them in place to provide security guarantees to the ruling East European parties. This revised USSR/NATO military posture was based on a new military doctrine that emerged in late May 1987. The new doctrine sought to combine a defensive posture toward NATO as a whole with a counter offensive capability in Central Europe. The justification for the counteroffensive capability was the alleged threat of “German revanchism”. The practical effect of the counter offensive capability was to maintain the Soviet security guarantee to the ruling parties of the Soviet bloc. His arms control policy toward the west called for disproportionately large reduction of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces in Europe in exchange for western support for stability in Eastern Europe. In July 1989, in a speech to the west European parliamentary assembly in Strasbourg, he promised both Western and Eastern audiences that the USSR would no longer execute military interventions against ruling communist parties. As the USSR did in 1968 against the Dubcek government in Czechoslovakia.

Gorbachev's objective in the spring and summer of 1989 was to stabilise and revitalize the internal political systems of Eastern Europe by transforming NATO-Warsaw pact relations through arms control agreements and by transforming the EC and CMEA blocs into a common European home. On the eve of Gorbachev's 1989 trips to Bonn, Paris and Strasbourg to promote both his arms control agenda and the concept of a Common European Home, Vitali Zhurkin, director of Moscow's new institute on European Affairs, explained in Pravda how east and west were to conduct themselves.

after the achievement of substantial arms reduction. But Gorbachev’s program for arms control, for construction of a Common European Home and for domestic reforms within the Soviet bloc were not only interdependent but mutually contradictory. And each of the three lines of policy had become hostage to the other two. The Polish political crisis of August 18-19 forced Gorbachev to acknowledge the contradictory directions of his policies and to choose which he would continue to follow.

For Gorbachev to have used armed force against the Mazowiecki government would simply have been to exacerbate the intractable socio-economic crisis in Poland that had festered since the declarations of martial law in 1981 armed repression of the Solidarity government almost certainly would have put a halt to Gorbachev’s domestic reform programs in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Military action would have unquestionably destroyed all of the arms control and diplomatic policies aimed at securing western support for perestroika and the construction of ‘a Common European Home”.

When Gorbachev announced his decision not to use Soviet military power to keep East European regimes in power, his press spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, described the new Soviet policy as the Sinatra doctrine. Gerasimov explained that he was referring to the classic Frank Sinatra song, “My Way.” According to Gerasimov, Gorbachev had authorized Poland, Hungary and other East European states to conduct their affairs “their way”.

Gorbachev’s promulgation of the Sinatra doctrine was the obituary of the Warsaw pact as it had been structured from 1955 to 1989. Gerasimov’s casual

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24 “Gorbachev Addresses the Council of Europe” CDSP, Vol. 41, No. 27 August 2, 1989, p. 6.
explanation of Gorbachev's historic declaration was delivered with a nonchalance worthy of Sinatra himself.

From the early 1970s to the early 1980s the Soviet Union sought to acquire the means both to wage and win regional *Blitzkrieg* campaigns around the Eurasian periphery and to deny the Western Alliance any continentally attractive options for nuclear employment. In the 1980s Soviet strategy reflected mature consideration of the associated dangers. However, the preference was encouraged by the contemporary Soviet belief in conventional alternatives for success in land warfare. The exaggerated Soviet anxiety over the West's Advanced Conventional Munitions (ACMs), the multiplying geo-strategic uncertainties about the terms and future of the Warsaw Pact including the evolving balance of military force levels induced Soviet reconsideration of the nuclear ordinance.\(^{25}\)

The Soviet military build-up was estimated to have begun in the 1959-60 period and it continued into the late 1970s.\(^{26}\) This turnaround in military production had coincided with Khrushchev's Seven-Year Plan for 1959-65. Since 1959, all sectors of Soviet military production had exhibited periods of rapid growth. The pace of missile development and production proceeded with several ups and downs. It was because of the large scale of the missile programmes had influenced the estimated aggregate expenditure curves. The total expenditures followed the rapid rise in Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and submarine launched missiles that peaked in 1968-69, and more compelling evidence is found in the evolution of Soviet military forces and doctrine. The emergence in 1980s of a large soviet force structure to fit


\(^{26}\) Swift, Dean, "Soviet Military Capabilities" *Current History*, October 1976, p. 98.
their doctrinal view of nuclear war presented the West with a qualitatively new defence problem for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{27}

Nevertheless Soviet Union achieved the capability to produce supplicated high-tech equipment, an attainment of which few industrialized nations could boast. Yet that important Soviet/ Russian achievement was barely tapped to develop the national economy as a whole and improve the well being of the Russian people. Technological advances were primarily applied in the military and nuclear fields. And the achievements of the Soviet nuclear power industry were darkened by the Chernobyl tragedy.

The changes in Soviet conventional capabilities, however, produced leaner and substantially more formidable forces. There was nothing new in the Soviet emphasizing tactical excellence. The more credible the conventional force, the more distressingly real became the contingency that the NATO allies might have to play the ultimate nuclear card. Nor did a restructuring of forces mean that the Soviets we excluding the possibility of nuclear war in Europe. A terrain seared by the nuclear fires would be so dreadful that merely to follow-up would require conventional forces to be superbly effective.

The Soviet Union had been a vocal champion of arms control and disarmament for many years. The development of arms control policy appears to be an area in Soviet defense policy making that is open to a wider circle of organizations beyond the familiar line-up of the Ministry of Defense, the defense – industrial organs. Since contemporary arms control involved extended international negotiations, the Ministry

of Foreign affairs has played a major role. There has also been a substantial involvement of various scientists and scholars. Senior representatives from the foreign ministries have been in charge of all Soviet negotiating delegations and have provided the majority of the delegates. This latter pattern was most notably breached during the two lengthy rounds of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), SALT I and SALT II, when the military provided two of the six chief Soviet delegates and the defense -industrial sector an additional two. Nevertheless, even in SALT, the delegation chief was a career diplomat.

During the 970s, the major efforts of Soviet arms control policy were focussed on the bilateral SALT negotiations with the United States and the multilateral East-West talks on Mutual and Balance Force Reductions in Central Europe. In these negotiations, the Soviets sought to attain both broad political goals and narrower security related objectives. On the political side, they sought to confirm visibly the position of the Soviet Union as one of the world two superpowers, being treated as fully equal by the United States. In addition, the Soviet leadership clearly recognized, and thus supported, the key arms control negotiations as the centerpiece of their efforts to cultivate East-West détente, which has intended to yield a variety of additional political and economic benefits. Finally, with regard to SALT in particular, despite their doctrinal preparations and ideological assertions about the “winnability” of general nuclear war, such a conflict are likely to view the major arms limitations talks as a useful means to promote this objective.

On the military side, despite their repeated calls for agreements based on the principle of equal security, the Soviets have persistently sought to gain the most
advantageous terms possible within the negotiations. They have consistently tried to eliminate or reduce current or projected Western military capabilities—such as the air launched cruise missile, U.S. forward-based fighter bombers, or NATO's proposed deployments of ground-launch cruise missiles and Pershing IIs—while seeking to avoid any constraints on their own extensive force modernization efforts. Nevertheless, when confronted by steadfast resistance to these demands, the Soviets have proved grudgingly willing to agree to compromises that involved reciprocal limits on both sides. Such was the pattern that emerged in the development of the SALT I and SALT II agreements, although there is considerable dispute in the West regarding the overall equity of the agreements eventually signed.

Thus Soviet arms control policy was an instrument of strategy, even when it was propounded as an end in itself. As a response the Soviet Union had demanded a ban on production, storage and use of nuclear weapons and for their destruction before the introduction of control measures. It had taken the initiative to get a Peace Pact by the five great powers and a number of treaties limiting the arms race were subsequently signed as a result of the constructive and invariably vigorous diplomacy of the USSR and fraternal socialist nations. These included the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (1963), and Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972). Besides this the Soviet-US Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms (1972), and the Soviet-US Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973). Also the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (1975), which may be called the *Charter of Peaceful coexistence*. 29

Mutual deterrence in Soviet writings had usually been expressed in terms of assured retaliatory capability because this formulation was more responsive to ideological sensitivity over the idea that the USSR could be considered a potential aggressor and thus needs to be deterred. In addition, this formulation avoids identification with the specific content of the American concept of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) often expressed in terms of a counter-value capability for destroying a specified percentage of the opponent industry and population. This US interpretation was more limited than the Soviet recognition of mutual deterrence which rests on mutual capability for devastating retaliation unacceptable to a national potential initiator of war without calculations of arbitrary industrial population loses that theoretically would be acceptable costs.

The revised USSR/NATO military posture was based on a new military doctrine that emerged in late May 1987. The new doctrine sought to combine a “defensive” posture toward NATO as a whole with a “counter-offensive” capability in Central Europe. The justification for the counter-offensive capability was the alleged threat of “German revanchism”. The practical effect of the counter-offensive capability was to maintain the Soviet security guarantee to the ruling parties of the Soviet bloc. Gorbachev’s arms control policy toward the West called for disproportionately large reductions of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces in Europe in exchange for western support for stability in Eastern Europe.

In July 1989, in a speech to the West European parliamentary assembly in Strasbourg, he promised both Western and Eastern audiences that the USSR would no longer execute military interventions against ruling communists parties, as the USSR did in 1968 against the Dubcek government in Czechoslovakia. Gorbachev’s objective in the spring and in the summer of 1989 was to stabilize and revitalize the internal political systems of Eastern Europe by transforming NATO/WTO relations through arms control agreements and by transforming the EC and CMEA blocs into “common European home”. On the eve of Gorbachev’s 1989 trips to Bonn, Paris and Strasbourg to promote both his arms control agenda and the concept of a Common European Home, Vitalii Zhurkin, Director of Moscow’s new Institute on European Affairs, explained in Pravda how the East and the West were to conduct themselves after the achievement of substantial arms reductions. The complex of relations that had been established in the West was an important element in the stability of the situation as a whole. Therefore, the East must conduct itself in such a way that this stability was not disturbed; it must proceed form the premise that the status and development of relations among the Atlantic states were the West’s concern. This applies equally to stability in Eastern Europe and in turn had a right to expect the same attitude on the part of the west. But Grobachev’s programs for arms control, for construction of a common European home and for domestic reforms within the Soviet bloc were interdependent.

In the Soviet period, the ideological premises predetermined the nature of most Soviet strategic concepts and plans, as well as the composition, organizational
strength, and deployment patterns of the Soviet armed forces. They were viewed more as a tool of the Communist Party than as an instrument of the state, which ruled with absolute authority. It was managed through the agency of a broad network of political organs that had grown out of the revolutionary military councils and the institution of political commissar of the civil war years, as well as via the security services, which were also subordinate to the party. It made important contributions to the fulfillment of the regime’s internal objectives as well. It had been involved in the maintenance of domestic orders. Over the decades their activity in this regard has been limited to occasional use in extraordinary circumstances, such as their reported involvement in the forcible suppression of striking workers and protesting rioters.

The integration of nuclear weapons in a combined arms approach at the strategic, operational and tactical levels designed to achieve the objectives, created a new dimension in the political-military sphere by boosting the destructive power of weapons by several orders of magnitude. But the theory of nuclear deterrence remains insufficiently developed and poorly understood by the political elite and military command. This eroded the political efficacy of nuclear weapons in Moscow’s quest to further its national security objectives, and visibly devalued the large infusions of resources made by several generations to build the nuclear arsenal.

The Soviet military thought closely followed the development of NATO/U.S military doctrine after the advent of nuclear weapons. According to Soviet classifications, the US has been following a doctrine of nuclear deterrence and NATO

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31 Ibid. p. 2.
32 Ibid. p 3.
33 Ibid. p. 4.
doctrine of *massive retaliation* was officially replaced by *flexible response*. In the beginning of the seventies, NATO introduced *realistic deterrence* and came up with *countervailance strategy* for application to strategic nuclear missiles. Reagan’s strategy according to Soviet experts could be called the strategy of *countervailance*. The essential point about these strategies was the use of concepts like *limited* and *protracted* nuclear wars on global and regional scales with a view to achieve nuclear superiority over the USSR. In the realm of conventional forces, the concepts of *horizontal* and *offensive* actions were formulated.\(^{34}\) Faced with such a deterrence doctrine, the USSR itself evolved a deterrence doctrine in its search for parity in nuclear and conventional weapons.

In 1979 USSR and its allies headed a policy of isolation from the rest of the world. Besides the Brezhnev doctrine preferred using military might to solve the foreign policy problems, and expansion came together in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Afghanistan was a nominal socialist state and the Soviets invaded to force its ruling communist party to follow its directives and to shore up its crumbling rule.) The invasion pushed the fragile relationship between the USSR and the United States over the edge into a fresh round of arms build-ups, covert warfare in the Third world and paranoia about nuclear attack.

The New Thinking in foreign policy, encouraged by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze was basically an examination of the cost-effectiveness of Soviet involvement and commitments.\(^{35}\) It brought a perceptible change in the Soviet thinking on security and military doctrine. This culminated in the complete

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replacement of the imperial and ideological paradigm. The theme of New Thinking had been articulated, in Gorbachev’s several writings principally in his book on *Perestroika*. In the sphere of security Gorbachev moved away from the idea of international class struggle to an interdependent world. According to Karen Dawisha, ‘Gorbachev realized that the Europeanization of the Soviet Union could not proceed without the de-Sovietization of Eastern Europe’.36 Gorbachev’s maneuvers in the policy are viewed as successes more in the West than in the Soviet Union. Renee de Nevers talks about ‘the catalytic role played by Gorbachev’s New Thinking’.37 One of the main factors that forced Gorbachev to his New Thinking was the beginning of the New Cold War and the American decision to go in for “Star Wars”. It would have been a big drain on Soviet resources. The notion of an interdependent and an integral world, which emerged from Gorbachev’s New Thinking, was the single most important theoretical shift in the ideology underlying the Soviet foreign policy.

Within less than a month of assuming office, Gorbachev declared in April 1985 an immediate six month freeze on the deployment of missiles in Europe, to expire in November 1985 only if the NATO deployment of Cruise and Perishing II missiles was halted.

In July 1985, Gorbachev expressed support for a global ‘zero option’ on the elimination of intermediate nuclear force from Asia and Europe. This finally resulted in the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty in Reykjavick in 1987, considered a major break through in the area of arms control. In March 1988,

Gorbachev proposed a freeze on the level of Naval forces in the Mediterranean. He announced a peace plan under which the USSR would stop using its naval bases in CamRann bay in exchange for US agreement to eliminate its bases in the Philippines.

Security concerns framed the bed rock of the Soviet relations with USA and also in Europe. The Twenty Seventh Congress of the CPSU in 1986 put forward the idea of universal Comprehensive Security – a new concept. Although the Concept of Military Security which underlined Brezhnevian détente was not altogether dropped, it never the less was mentioned that if the arms race continued, “even parity will ease to be a factor of military political deterrence”. Proceeding from this premise, it is being stressed that genuine equal security is guaranteed not by the highest possible level of strategic parity, from which nuclear and other types of Weapons of Mass Destruction must be totally excluded. It was also maintained that a comprehensive system of security should not only take into account the military and political factors also but also the economic environment and human factors too. In other words, a mere reliance on military’s political factor was considered as no guarantee of security. A further aspect of comprehensive security concept was that security must be universal, and in case of USA and USSR reciprocal. The concept of universal security, which incorporated the ideas of collective security, was considered to be a new and higher philosophy of world politics that give primary to universal values.38 In short it laid emphasis on equal security. No nation can be secure at the cost of the other. The de-ideologization of foreign policy reinforced this aspect.

A direct outcome of the Comprehensive Security aspect was that of defensive military doctrine and the principle of *Reasonable Sufficiency*. As mentioned in the Twenty Seventh Congress report military security in the changed world situation should be based on the recognition that nuclear war was unwinnable and should not be fought, preventing arms race in outer space ending all testing of nuclear weapons and fully eliminating them, banning and destroying chemical weapons, the dissolution of military alliances and as a step to it, the remuneration of their extension and formation of new ones, a proportionate and consummate reduction of military budgets and lowering of the military capabilities of countries to reduce them to the level of reasonable sufficiency. These were the elements on which the new military doctrine for Warsaw Pact brought out in May 1987 was based. This doctrine was evolved in accordance with the Marxist–Leninist teaching that it is possible to avert war and save mankind from nuclear catastrophe. This is the historic mission of socialism.39

The concept of *Reasonable Sufficiency* led to drastic restructuring of the Soviet armed forces, unilateral defence cut and the beginning of cardinal military reforms in the country. This was a break from the past when expansion in armaments and numerical parity at high level were the norm.

Even more important consequences of the new understanding of concepts like parity at a low level and reasonable sufficiency was to extricate USSR from a crippling arms race in unfavourable economic situation at home. The calculation of reasonable sufficiency in armaments has proved to be a highly complex task as it was related to the concept of parity. Moreover, till such time as nuclear weapons were to

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be actually eliminated from the world, the Soviet Union's priority task was considered to be to maintain reliable deterrence to a probable nuclear aggression through maintenance of strategic equilibrium.\(^{40}\)

Thus actual implementation of the concept of reasonable sufficiency despite unilateral defence cuts was dependent to a large extent upon its acceptance by other parties too. The USSR has by unilaterally cutting down its armaments in East Europe, Asia has taken initial steps towards the reasonable sufficiency goal.

At the Twenty Seventh Congress of the CPSU in 1986 Gorbachev outlined the framework of the Soviet foreign policy as consisting of the following components security, the European direction, the Asia Pacific direction, relations with the international communist movement and social democratic movement. In the party congress, he not only spoke of "the complete unacceptability of nuclear war" but also of the insufficiency for security of defense or deterrence in the nuclear age. He also said, "The character of the contemporary weapons does not permit any state hope of defending itself by military-technical means alone, even by creating the most powerful defense".\(^{41}\) While accepting the reality of mutual deterrence "when the whole world has become the nuclear hostage" he argued that "security cannot indefinitely be built on fear of retaliation that is based on doctrines of deterrence or intimidation". Moreover "these doctrines (deterrence encourage the arms race, which sooner or later can get out of control)". Rather, "ensuring security more and more becomes a political task and can only be solved by political means. Above all, the will is needed to take

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\(^{40}\) G. Arbatov, "Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency", *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1988, p. 82.

the path of disarmament."\textsuperscript{42} And "it is more than time to begin a practical withdrawal from balancing on the brink of war, from a balance of terror, to normal civilized forms of mutual relations between states of the two systems."\textsuperscript{43}

In this new thinking it is necessary to understand that for reliable defense a considerably reduced number of arms is sufficient. Indeed, the present level of the balance of nuclear potentials of the two sides is much too high. For the present this ensures both sides with equal danger. A continuation of the arms race will inevitably increase this equal danger and it could lead to such extremes that even parity would cease to be a military-political deterrent.

Similarly, the new Party program adopted at the Twenty Seventh Congress of the CPSU in 1986 described "the establishment of military strategic parity between the USSR and the US and the Warsaw pact and NATO" not only as "a historic achievement of socialism," but also argued that the preservation of parity is "an important factor for safeguarding peace and international security".

Yet parity itself, as traditionally conceived, has come under challenge by the new thinking. In delivering the political report of the Central Committee to the Party Congress, Gorbachev introduced the concept of \textit{Reasonable Sufficiency} as a criterion in determining military requirements. He did not spell out how reasonable sufficiency itself would be determined, and encouraged an open discussion of the issue. The military soon began to stress that the foundation for reasonable sufficiency was maintaining strategic parity. General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, Minister of Defense, emphatically expressed the continuing view that "Military strategic parity remains the

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. pp. 81-82.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. p 15.
decisive factor in preventing war at the present time, that is, serves as the key to deterrence of war.” Another irritant that Gorbachev addressed was he revoked the Brezhnev Doctrine of “limited Sovereignty”. It was the enunciation of this concept that justified the Soviet military intervention in Prague in 1968. This revocation helped Gorbachev to come closer to his allies in Eastern Europe and the Western as well.

Some of the scholars mention the influence of the various opposition movements in Eastern Europe on the opposition groups within the Soviet Union: ‘In the early stages of ‘Perestroika’, many in the Soviet Union dreamt that there might come about some movement in Eastern Europe like Solidarnosc had been briefly in Poland in 1980 or like the Prague Spring in 1968; if such developments occurred, it would greatly influence our own chances. This would push the USSR very strongly towards a democratic solution and that might precipitate things, the current Russian revolution is related to the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe. It was related in two ways: as ‘cause’ and as effect. Piontkowsky points to a great paradox that ‘the same Gorbachevian government simultaneously lifted the threat of armed intervention from Eastern Europe, yet refused to accept the logic and moral imperative of liberalisation at home’. Robert Legvold has observed important changes in the policy of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe in the beginning of 1989.44

The new party Programme adopted at the Party Congress in 1986 described “The establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO” not only as “a historic achievement of socialism,” but also argued that the preservation of parity is “an important factor for

safeguarding peace and international security.” It is difficult to overstate the importance of strategic parity in Soviet thinking, as traditionally conceived, it has come under challenge by new thinking. A relatively conservative military writer by 1989 accepted the idea that the traditional quantitative approach must be replaced by a qualitative one based on “reasonable sufficiency for defense,” although “the measure of reasonable sufficiency is defined not only by us but also by the other sides of the action.” Most important, however, is the recognition that parity is defined in mutual deterrent capabilities. The new approach “requires that parity be regarded as a correlation of the two side’s strategic potential that provides capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike.” This acceptance of a retaliatory deterrent capability as the essence of parity has also been reflected in confidential internal military discussions. In 1988, this approach was made crystal clear in a discussion in the General Staff journal Military thought: “Military strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, and between the WTO and NATO, has decisive significance for deterrence of aggression and prevention of war. Maintaining military strategic parity doesn’t mean an absolute equality of forces, but requires capabilities for assured dealing of an unstoppable retaliatory strike. The acceptance by the military of mutual assured destruction capability as the foundation for parity and Reasonable Sufficiency of strategic forces underlies Gorbachev’s efforts to reduce strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to the fullest extent negotiable.

The New Thinking also calls for going beyond mutual deterrence to mutual security. Again the basis for a new approach was provided by Gorbachev’s earlier

cited declaration at the Party Congress that “security cannot indefinitely be built on doctrines of deterrence,” but “more and more becomes a political task,” based on recognition that “security can only be mutual” or general.46 Various Soviet writers have stressed different aspects of this matter; the overall conception that has been emerging has four elements: strategic stability, national interests of the parties, increased reliance on international institutions, and increased trust. These are mutually reinforcing elements and movement in each can have a synergistic effect on the others.

In December 1988 he announced in the UN a unilateral decision to reduce Soviet conventional forces including withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe, the agreement to on-site inspection of military facilities at the Stockholm Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) conference in 1986, the scraping of the Soviet Union intermediate range nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1987 Washington Treaty, and it resulted finally in the dismantling of preponderance in Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Gorbachev also gave East-European allies a free hand. Gorbachev’s New Thinking policy was seen as being contrary to the state interests. Another important component of the policy was the re-establishment of friendly relations with the former Soviet Republics.

The acceptance by the military of mutual assured destruction capability as the foundation for parity and reasonable sufficiency of strategic forces underlies military support for Gorbachev’s efforts to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (and indeed all nuclear weapons) on both sides to the fullest extent negotiable.

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46 Gorbachev M.S., p. 15 and pp. 81-82.
How do the Soviets envisage mutual security serving as a replacement for mutual deterrence? While various Soviet writers have stressed different aspects of this matter, the overall conception that has been emerging has four elements: strategic stability, national interests of the parties, increased reliance on international institutions, and increased trust. These are mutually reinforcing elements, and movement in each can have a synergistic effect on the others. A military balance, and strategic parity in a qualitative deterrence sense, retains an important and at least crucial, role. As colonel Strebkov has put it, “a qualitative approach to parity requires the creation of an integral system of strategic stability on the basis of military equilibrium.” As the military factor diminishes importance, “as parity falls to lower and lower levels, on the basis of reasonable sufficiency for defense and balance of interests, there will be corresponding increase in stability in relations between the USSR and US and the WTO and NATO as a whole. A policy of strength will give way to political and legal means of settling problems that arise.”

Stressing the role of reliance on reasonable sufficiency in reducing mutual threat perceptions thereby lowering tensions, Soviet analysts have begun to emphasize the need to accommodate the national interests of the sides. Reasonable sufficiency, they note, “presupposes that in order to prevent aggression it is necessary not only to balance forces, and to evaluate the hypothetical capabilities of the other side, but above all to restrain its leadership from unleashing war, by taking into account its real intentions, and most important its interests.”

The combination of reciprocally reducing and restructuring military forces in accordance with reasonable sufficiency, and political measures based on mutual
accommodation of national interests, would thus become "the shaping of a new model for ensuring security not by means of mutual deterrence but by the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust.

Finally as a concomitant to this diminished military capability and diminished perception of a threat with increased mutual trust and accommodation, the very role of deterrence will be increasingly assumed by the changing world order and the role of deterrence in the new world order will no doubt have to be played by political and legal instruments. An important role must be played by international law and international institutions. The increased attention being given by the Soviet Union to international institutions, including the resolution of regional conflicts is relevant in this connection.

Parallel with these developments, General Kozlov, former First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, wrote that the Soviet Union considers military strategic parity only as a definite frontier beyond which it is necessary to move to achieve a reduction, and ultimately even a complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war. He also said "our country is doing everything possible to get out of the situation of Mutually Assured Destruction" (MAD). The aim of the policy of the USSR is to exclude nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states and in the final account their complete elimination. In the mean time Soviet Union is also moving to change its military objective not only in terms of parity at reduced levels, a defensive and strategic doctrine, and reducing and restructuring elements of their force posture that appear especially threatening to the west, but also is designing its strategic concept to facilitate conflict termination rather than victory, as the operative objective in case
hostilities were to occur. That, however, is a subject beyond the scope of this discussion.

THE END OF WARSAW PACT

The consequences of the revocation of the Soviet military security guarantee to the Socialist Bloc allies were historic. By mid June of 1990 the communist's parties in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had almost completely disappeared. The Berlin wall had crumbled in 1989 leaving elected non-communist governments in power. In late 1989 popular uprisings swept away the Ceausescu and Zhivkov rule in Romania and Bulgaria respectively. The Communist Parties in Eastern Europe were renamed; the national salvation front in Romania and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, clung tenuously to power during 1990 in uneasy truces with their societies. Gorbachev's revocation of the Soviet military security guarantee to Communist Parties in Eastern Europe and his endorsement of the principle of national self determination then produced events of even greater significance: the unification of Germany and the beginning of the disintegration of the USSR, and finally the collapse of the country.

Without the support of the Western group of forces (formerly the group of Soviet forces in Germany), the Socialist Unity Party (SED) collapsed in 1990. The collapse of the SED in turn resulted in the rapid collapse of the state structures of the German Democratic Republic. A series of plebiscites culminating in the all-German elections of December 1990 transferred power to parties advocating incorporation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the Federal republic.
In the USSR, Communist Parties disintegrated in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldovia and Georgia, followed shortly by the collapse of the local political structures previously sustained by the Communist Parties of the Union Republics. Plebiscites brought non-communist organisations into power and into direct confrontation with the central government of the USSR. In a declaration of independence (March, 1990) the non-communist successor government of Lithuania claimed the same right of complete national self-determination ceded by Gorbachev to several of the other east European states recognized by the 1918 Treaty of Versailles.

The Warsaw Pact had military forces directly linked to the Soviet Defence Ministry ultimately sustained an alliance of the socialist bloc countries led by the USSR. If the Warsaw Pact, as an alliance of ruling communist parties, had not actually surrendered in October 1989, the surrender of the WTO was in contestable by June 1990 at the Moscow meeting of the political Consultative Committee (PCC). The heads of four non-communist governments—a voting majority—dismissed a communique, written by Czechs and Hungarians, that declared the Cold War over, called for drastic reduction in deployed armed forces of the WTO members and recommended the rapid dissolution of the Warsaw Pact itself.

The most striking symbol of the disintegration of the WTO was the new Head of the GDR defence ministry, Ranier Epplemann, a clergyman who had previously led the East German pacifist movement. Following the merger of the National Peoples Army in to the Bundeswehr in September of 1990 sharp differences emerged in the WTO over the quota for Soviet troop levels in the zones to be established by the final round of the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). The differences
were between the Soviets on the one side and, on the other, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs
and Slovaks.

Earlier in 1990 the Soviets had signed agreements with Czechoslovakia and
Hungary to withdraw all Soviet forces by July 1, 1990. Soviet troops were to withdraw
from Germany by 1994 under terms set by the Soviet German agreement of
September, 1989 which provide for payments of 12 billion marks to maintain and
relocate the WGF on Soviet soil over a four year period. Following the conclusion of
the CFE Treaty, the Poles began negotiating with the USSR for the complete
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.

Just prior to the conclusion of the CFE treaty, barely a year after the PCC
meeting in Warsaw, low-level representatives of the WTO met in Budapest to abolish
the Warsaw pact. The WTO representatives agreed to complete the dismantling of the
former communist alliance system no later than July 1, 1990. Six weeks later the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance also agreed to disband.

The CFE treaty, signed in Paris at the November session of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) set equal levels of tanks, armored
vehicles, artillery, aircraft, and helicopters between the sixteen nations of NATO on
one side and, on the other, the six surviving members of what had been the WTO. The
Soviets were awarded two-thirds of the total allocated to the six eastern states; put
another way, the USSR was allocated one-third of all military forces in the entire CFE
zone form the Atlantic to the Urals. Even with this CSCE guarantee of the USSR's
status as the sole European military superpower, the CFE treaty required enormous
reductions in the inventory of Soviet weapons.
Following the CFE treaty, the United States and USSR appeared on the verge of signing a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that would cut the number of strategic nuclear war heads by almost 50 percent on each side. At the November CSCE session, the participants also signed "the Charter of Paris", a diplomatic document symbolically ending the cold war. The Charter of Paris established three new CSCE agencies: in Prague, a permanent secretariat for a newly created council of the CSCE; in Warsaw, an office for free elections and in Vienna, a conflict resolution Center to monitor military-security issues. The Charter also provided for a series of conferences on human rights and the rights of religious and national minorities that may eventually result in the establishment of a European Human Rights Commission. The CSCE session also refused, under heavy pressure from Gorbachev, to seat representatives of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. As an alliance of the ruling parties, the Warsaw pact had pursued the security interest of his regimes supported by Soviet military power. The previous security policies could not possibly endure beyond the collapse of the communist parties that had endorsed these policies. With the collapse of the fraternal parties noted by Gorbachev in his speech of early December, 1989 the entire interlocking system of military doctrine, alliance agencies and force postures began to disintegrate during 1990, leading to the Pacts dissolution in spring 1991. After October 27, 1989 the Warsaw pact could have remained a military alliance only if its member states could identify a new set of common security interests. But before common security interests could be identified, there would first have to be a playing out of the complex dynamics of national self-determination.
The development of an all-European collective security system through the mechanisms of the "Helsinki Two" conference, Gorbachev called for an enduring critical issue in such a conference would be the status of the non Russian republics of the USSR in a European collective security system. A possible security system for Eastern Europe could have been the adoption of non-aligned security postures by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. Such security policies would put these states in a loose association with Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania. This loose association already included the neutral democracies along the present East-West divide-Austria Sweden, Switzerland and Finland.

Gorbachev had anticipated such a neutral zone between the USSR and NATO in October, 1989 statement in Finland. In addition to issuing the joint Soviet –Finish declaration on the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev also provided Helsinki with the first unconditional Soviet recognition of Finland’s absolute right to military neutrality. Gorbachev tolerated the attempts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to secede from the USSR and adopt similar neutralist postures in the neutral zone between NATO and the USSR. Another possible security system for Eastern Europe might be voluntary union of various national states all committed to the prevention of existing territorial boundaries and mutual respect for national sovereignty. In evading the political crisis in Poland by granting East European nations the right of self-determination, Gorbachev linked the possibility of the disintegration of the USSR.

The underlying argument here is that the Cold War began and ended in Eastern Europe. The military – political dynamics of the USSR’s policies in Central Europe may have unintentionally precipitated a global military-political struggle which once
begun, seemed to have no identifiable beginning or end, no more than a sphere has an identifiable beginning or end.

Gorbachev realised that this situation and the budgetary strains that it put on the USSR were incompatible with reform of the USSR. Indeed, even before Gorbachev was sure of what the problems of the USSR were and how to solve them, he was convinced of the need to ease international tensions so as to reduce the burden of military competition. To do this he overturned Soviet thinking on international relations. In his “new political thinking”, Gorbachev strove to replace class analysis in foreign policy with a ‘common human values’. Common human values, Gorbachev argued, were those things that human beings shared irrespective of social class; they included such things as freedom from fear of nuclear war and military conflict, a desire to share of the wealth produced by economic development, and environmental security. Securing these common human values required an international politics based on cooperation through international institutions and multilateral policies. Military power, Gorbachev believed, was no longer a prerequisite for international influence and no longer a priority for development; influence would be better secured by showing the merits of one’s political and economic system and taking up a position of moral leadership. Soviet Union was successful at proposing solutions to global problems through international institutions because it was able to demonstrate its capacity for renewal as a social system that delivered a good standard of living to its people. There is also one school of thought which believes that Gorbachev was aware

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of the momentous development likely to take place if he lowered the level of coercion and gave importance to reforms. This was so, in their view, because the parameters of security were changing along with the advance in areas of high technology.

This was a revolutionary change of position. It brought Gorbachev great popularity in the West and helped affect major change in international politics. Conflict with the USA was reduced. A momentum for arms control was created and Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. In 1987, Gorbachev signaled that the Brezhnev Doctrine was defunct and in 1989 allowed the communist regimes of Eastern Europe to collapse. However, Gorbachev's ideas about multi-lateralism and cooperation through international institutions were taken up by the West, and the increasing political crisis in the USSR meant that there was no chance of its developing global leadership through demonstrating its efficacy as a social system.

The West supported Gorbachev's foreign policy agenda of reducing East-West tensions, but did not agree either that there should be less important as a foreign policy instrument. The former was not in the interests of western governments at the start of the 1990s because economic problems left them more interested in marshalling their economic resources and developing institutions like the European Union or the North American Free Trade Area that would help them cope with economic change. The need for the latter was demonstrated to the West in 1990-1991 by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and by the onset of state break down and communal violence in states such as Somalía and Yugoslavia.

The Warsaw Pact had become irrelevant with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Hungary contemplating withdrawal from the
organisation by the end of 1991. The Prague meeting of the WTO foreign ministers in March 1990 was the first one after the major changes in East Europe. According to Shevardnadze, it is concluded that "Warsaw Pact lives on and functions, and we need it but it needs updating."\cite{49} In a landmark meeting, in June 1990, the WTO Political Consultative Committee (PCC) adopted a declaration seeking to revise by the year end the character and functions of the Treaty.\cite{50} It also invited NATO to bring about changes in its own doctrines and character. WTO leadership hoped that a United Europe would be built without military blocs and on the basis of the institutionalisation of the CSCE structures. These were mere formalities. The WTO ended its formal existence in 1991.\cite{51}

With the end of the Cold War by Mikhail Gorbachev in the eighties it seemed that the nature of Soviet security concern had undergone a basic change. This hope was further strengthened when in 1991 the Soviet Union breakup and communism collapsed. The Cold War had finally ended, and the ideological divide which had also disappeared raised hopes for the newly emerged Russian Federation that its concern emanating from South-Western direction were over once and for all.

The end of East-West confrontation has given rise to the idea that NATO which was founded to counter Soviet threat might have been discontinued but NATO leaders approved a new "strategic concept" that embraces for the first time, "military mission in volatile regions" beyond their borders and also decided to intensify the

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\textsuperscript{50} Delaratsiya Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov Varshvskogo Dogovora", 	extit{Pravda}, 8 June, 1990 cited ibid., p. 169.

\textsuperscript{51} Gupta, Arvind, 	extit{Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy: Lenin to Gorbachev}, Opcit., p. 169.
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aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia. As for Russia's official security perception Yugoslavia crisis could lead to a grave disaster'. But, by pushing de facto military expansion through NATO's agreement, the west hits the most delicate of Russia's nerves. NATO seems to strengthen Russia's neighbours only in order to weaken Russia.

CONCLUSION
The military doctrine of the USSR/WTO had stated military action against any possible challenge to the system from within Eastern Europe. The USSR/WTO system remained capable of meeting this requirement. The one contingency Soviet/Warsaw pact doctrine did not anticipate was a challenge from the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In confronting in Poland the results of his attempt to come to a political solution of his security dilemmas in Eastern and Western Europe, Gorbachev appeared to have reached a conclusion unthinkable for the authors of the previous military doctrine of unreasonable sufficiency, the greatest enemy of Soviet interest in Europe was the Soviet imperial system itself.

In evoking the security guarantee to the Soviet viceroys in eastern Europe Gorbachev revoked the rationale for not only an offensive Soviet military posture toward both halves of Europe but also for the "counter offensive" posture adopted in 1987. But in abandoning the ruling Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev put the CPSU on a collision with the dynamics of national self-determination in the two Germanys and the USSR itself. The resolution of these questions will determine the futures of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and the European security system.