INTRODUCTION

Russia underwent a drastic transformation with far-reaching and controversial consequences for its domestic and foreign policies. Russia's foreign policy risks did not change even after the bipolar world order had come to an end. International terrorism was growing. On the other side there was instability in the borders of Russia. At the same time international crisis created by then United States led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military action against the sovereign state of Yugoslavia severely undermined the post Cold War framework of security. In Russian view the New World Order was to be based on an enhanced role for the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), strict compliance with the UN Charter joint peacekeeping operations and comprehensive arms control and disarmament measures. It was against this background that the 1999 war in the Balkans triggered a major revision of the Russian National Security Concept, Defence Doctrine and Military Policy. Russia kept adopting western schemes and playing a controversial partner in the marriage of convenience with NATO.

The critical question, as NATO proceeded to enlargement at the Madrid Summit, is how enlargement and specifically the role of Russia and other states on the space of the former Soviet Union find their place in the new European security framework. If the capabilities are the test of Europe's commitment to NATO, the handling of the enlargement will be a test of America's. Meanwhile Richard Lugar, in the past one of the Senate's strong supporter of a bigger NATO argues that in the

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1 Keller, Catherine McArdle, "NATO Enlargement and the Role of Russia in Europe" Source: http://www.ndu.edu/insl/books/Books%20-%201998/NATO%201997%20Sept%2098/ atoch7.html;
wake of September 11 enlargement should be pursued only in a way that “strengthens not weakens the alliance in its new military missions, and that new members must meet new NATO requirements.” Eager to join NATO, the Central and Eastern European states were not in a position to impose conditions on the alliance. And what of Russia? Vladimir Putin said he wanted his country to play a more constructive role in Europe, politically, economically and in security too. Some smaller members and newer ones for which NATO membership was a means to escape Russia’s shadow, were also hostile. But the idea to work together at problems of common concern such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional peace keeping, missile defence, search and rescue and air space management, reaching joint decisions where possible.

Having fully supported the international operation to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Russia did not approve of American’s actions in Iraq and spoke up against the use of military force to solve the problem. It is also believed that the preservation of international law and the prestige of the UN is among the key interests of Russia today. A decisive and very heterogeneous opposition is growing stronger in Belarus and Ukraine, which are Russia’s main partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Whatever happens, the protection of Russian interests in these countries will be a key foreign policy of Putin. Russia is also worried by the actions of its main partner in the war on international terrorism, the USA. Though it has agreed to allow military presence of the West in Central Asia, many observers in Russia feel that this presence would be for a long time.

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This chapter relates to the security and foreign policy dimensions of the problems and their impact on the approach adopted by Russia with the outside world. Identity and self-perception become issues of not so much about societal development but about Russia’s place in the post-Cold War international environment. At the beginning of the year 2000, Russia faced a serious situation from the foreign policy viewpoint. New challenges appeared to which there was no adequate response. On July 12, 2004, Putin mentioned that “In modern conditions the line between the domestic and foreign policy becoming thinner. The strengthening of Russian statehood and economic growth have had a positive effects on the international standing on the country as well. Russia is now viewed as a serious partner in solving major international problems. At the same time, the increased foreign policy resource has played a vital part in the revival of the country as a whole.” At the same time Russia has launched vigorous diplomatic efforts to develop relations with Europe, Japan, China and India.

**NATO’s NEW CONCEPT AND ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS**

On April 24, 1999 NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the military grouping as full members. Solana described the announcement as a ‘defining moment’ in the organization’s 48-year history. Declaring that an “open door” would be kept available to future

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8 *Kessings Record of World Events News Digest* for July 1997, Vol.43, No.7/8, p. 41756.
members, Solana specially named Slovenia, Romania and the three Baltic states as strong candidates for future membership.

NATO also established the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in order to prepare aspiring states for membership in NATO. There were currently nine members of it: Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia. It is very likely that membership will be extended to these states at the Prague Summit meeting. Criteria for membership include: (1) a functioning democratic political system, (2) democratic civil-military relations, (3) treatment of minority populations in accordance with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) guidelines, (4) commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, and (5) a military contribution to the alliance and a willingness to achieve military interoperability with other alliance members. NATO enlargement has been controversial. The much respected American diplomat and scholar George Kennan called enlargement "the most fateful error of American foreign policy in the entire post-Cold War era." Critics argued that enlargement was undesirable for four fundamental reasons. First, enlargement weakened NATO because decision-making within the alliance is made by consensus and as NATO grows larger, consensus becomes harder and harder to achieve. Second, enlargement changed the mission of NATO from a military mission to a political mission. Third, there were substantial costs associated with enlargement. The U.S. Department of State estimated that the cost of the initial enlargement was $1.5 billion over ten years and of this, the U.S.

share was $400 billion. For example, new members pledge to achieve interoperability with other members' military equipment; however, many new members simply do not have the resources to achieve interoperability. The only way that they can do so is to have the equipment given to them by other members. Lastly, some have expressed concern about Russia's opposition to enlarging NATO membership. To be sure, in the past Russia and President Vladimir Putin in particular were vociferously critical of enlargement.

In dealing with the transformation of NATO from a primarily Western European military alliance to a broader, more ecumenical political alliance, NATO has created a number of organizations to assist with this transformation.

Besides this, the participants in the North Atlantic Summit Alliances (50th Summit), adopted a New Strategic Concept. A special reception was held for CIS leaders at NATO’s Washington meeting against the backdrop of Russia’s boycott of the anniversary celebration, indicating that Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union countries was dissipating.

On the final day of the Fiftieth Anniversary Summit of NATO’s Alliance at Washington on April 23-25, 1999; Heads of State and Government of the Alliance approved the new “Strategic Concept” that embraces, for the first time, ‘military missions in volatile regions’ beyond their borders.12 NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, termed the new ‘strategic concept’ as a road map to navigate the security challenges of the next millennium. President Bill Clinton reaffirmed the readiness to address regional and ethnic conflicts beyond the territory of NATO members. The new

strategic concept also stated that members can act against ‘out of area problems that threaten the security and stability of Europe’. At the Summit meeting they also decided to intensify the aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia, and to enforce an oil embargo. NATO’s naval fleet would forcibly search ships on the Adriatic Sea carrying fuel to Serbian ports. While NATO’s leaders had publicly gone along with their US host at the summit, particularly in view of the need for public solidarity. In the face of the crisis in Kosovo, European diplomats, especially those from France and Germany, had for some time been expressing concern about what they thought as a US tendency to push too hard for NATO to become involved in the missions outside continental Europe. Many Eastern diplomats had been “insisting that there be an identifiable link to NATO’s own security before any such (‘out of area’) mission can be launched.” Its threat to impose a naval “oil and economic blockade” on Yugoslavia and to launch a ground offensive, is volatile of several international laws and treaties and also of the NATO charter itself. The cost of intervention is reported to have exceeded the US $100 billion mark, without achieving tangible progress in resolving the ethnic Albanian crisis in Kosovo province.

In addition to enlarging the membership of NATO, representatives to the conference discussed a number of other issues confronting the Alliance. Also it was decided to hold another important summit meeting in Prague in November the same year. Sixty heads of state and 3,000-4,000 governmental representatives are expected to attend the summit. In addition, several thousand journalists and thousands of protestors are expected to attend. It was ironic that Prague was the location of the first

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NATO summit in 2002 meeting in an Eastern European country because the Warsaw Pact, was formally disbanded here. Among the likely issues to be addressed at the summit were European defense issues, operations in the Balkans, the further enlargement of NATO, the newly established NATO-Russia Council, NATO-Ukrainian relations, terrorism, and the growing gap between U.S and European military capabilities.

Managing these new challenges—both in the East and beyond Europe’s borders—would require enlightened and sustained U.S. leadership. The United States, however, had sent mixed signals regarding NATO. While official U.S. statements continue to stress the continued importance of NATO, some U.S. policy makers seem to fear that operating jointly with America’s NATO allies will restrict America’s freedom of action. Such a view, however, is shortsighted. While the United States is the world’s sole remaining superpower, it cannot solve all problems on its own. Moreover, many of the challenges the United States faces—especially the war on terrorism—require cooperation with America’s European allies and other partners on a broad range of issues that extend beyond the military realm. Hence, NATO will remain an essential forum for coordinating Euro-Atlantic strategic cooperation as well as a vehicle for developing the military capabilities to deal with both old and new challenges. In many instances, NATO as an organization is unlikely to act collectively outside of Europe. Most non-European operations will be conducted by “coalitions of the willing.” However, U.S. and European forces will be better able to operate together in such instances if they have trained together and have similar operational doctrines and procedures. NATO’s patterns of multilateral training and joint command
structures provided a firmer basis for shared military actions beyond Europe than any other framework available to the United States and its allies. Thus, NATO will remain a critical vehicle for ensuring interoperability between U.S. and European forces. Indeed, this may prove to be its most important military function.

Collective defence remains the core purpose of NATO enlargement and was a part of a broader strategy of projecting stability and working together with partners to build a united and free Europe. The ongoing enlargement process strengthens the Alliance and enhances the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. The three new members would not be the last. Those nations that had expressed an interest in becoming NATO members will remain under active consideration for future membership. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic locations, each being considered on its own merits. All states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security of all Allies.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone a major process of adaptation and change. One of the key elements of this transformation has been the development of a new “Eastern agenda.” The centerpiece of this new agenda has been NATO’s eastward enlargement. The Prague summit in November 2002 opened a new

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16 Ibid. P.D 3.
18 Ibid., p. D 3.
19 Ibid., p. D 3.
stage in NATO's approach to the East. At the summit, the NATO Heads of State and Governments agreed to extend membership invitations to seven countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In inviting these new countries to join the Alliance, the NATO Heads of State and Government took a major Step toward overcoming the division of Europe and creating a “Europe whole and free.” However, NATO’s Eastern agenda is by no means finished. It has simply been transformed. In the wake of the Prague summit, NATO still faces a number of critical challenges in the East.

Seven Central and East European countries became new members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on March 29, 2004. These are Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The admission ceremony held at the US Department of Finance, where Prime Ministers of these countries gave ratification documents to American Secretary of State Colin Powell. The US is an official custodian of all protocols on admissions to NATO, and all countries are considered to become NATO members from the minute when the documents were passed to the American secretary of state. Prime ministers of three other states seeking the membership of NATO – Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, as well as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer attended the ceremony. Members of the American administration and Congress, numerous foreign guests and representatives of Washington’s diplomatic corps were invited to the ceremony. The new member countries added a total of 190,000 servicemen to the Western alliance’s armed forces.
The US planned using them in NATO-led operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq.\(^{20}\)

In an interview with *Interfax*, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov discussed the prospects for Russia's relations with an expanded NATO and European Union. Russian attitude to NATO expansion indeed remained negative. A veiled signal of this was the presence of Prime Ministers from three more countries: Albania, Macedonia and Croatia.\(^{21}\) Chizhov said "with regard to our practical concerns, Russia indeed does see a qualitative distinction between the current wave of expansion and previous ones. The difference here is that out of the seven countries that have entered NATO, only three of them - Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia - are parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreement (CFE). The three Baltic countries and Slovenia are not. Consequently, these latter countries are not bound by any of the limits stipulated by the CFE and fall outside the sphere of arms control".\(^ {22}\)

Naturally, the appearance of a "gray zone" in direct proximity not only to Russia's borders, but to such important cities as St. Petersburg, cannot but cause concern. Moreover, according to Chizhov, this zone has been formed in a place, which had met previously announced armed forces reductions. And really, the Northwest and the Baltic Sea are regions of light military presence on all sides because they are not regarded as a flash point for conflict on European territory.\(^ {23}\)


\(^{21}\) In an interview with *Interfax* correspondent Ksenia Baigarova, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov discussed the prospects for Russia's relations with an expanded NATO and European Union. [http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/29.html](http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/29.html)

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.
The appearance of four planes in Lithuania will not in themselves change the balance of forces, but this is a symbolic event that does not make Russia overjoyed. Russian military will quite possibly take measures in case of a military buildup. 24

He also said “we want to make it clear that we do not see danger in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania obtaining vast numbers of tanks and fighter planes overnight. We are concerned about the possibility of armies of third countries being in direct proximity to our borders”. 25

PUTIN’s SECURITY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

Russia entered the new century with an energetic young leader Vladimir Putin (He took over from Boris Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation in September 1999). Since taking over as President Vladimir Putin has revised basic documents on diplomacy, National Defence and Security: Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, National Security Concept of the Russian Federation and military doctrine. The drafting of the Russia’s new General Principles of National Security document had begun during Putin’s own tenure as Security Council chief and proceeded under his guidance. 26 The new official concept was adopted by the National Security Council in January 2000 and the new military doctrine a month later. The document was officially approved by President Putin shortly after his inauguration in May 2000.

The principal point of the new Security Concept (compared with its 1997 version) was the supposition that the military threats to Russia were growing and that

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Current Digest, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 19-20.
these new ones emanated from the West. An obvious way to respond to this threat was
to enhance Russian nuclear forces to deter not just nuclear, but also large-scale
conventional attacks of the type manifested in the Balkans. The new Military Doctrine
indeed reserved for Russia the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of
nuclear and other mass destruction weapons against Russia and its allies, as well as in
response to a large scale conventional aggression in critical situation for Russia and its
allies.

The Russian military reform was a subject of serious reassessment. It was
realized that conventional forces might once again be oriented to high technology
warfare against NATO in the West, in addition to involvement in local conflicts in the
south and in the east. Nonetheless, the development and deployment of sophisticated
capabilities analogous to NATO’s massive precision-guided conventional air and
naval potential will clearly be beyond Russia’s financial capacity for a long time.

Hence the most probable response, which was already taking shape, was an
even greater emphasis on nuclear deterrence, relying on enhanced strategic and
tactical nuclear forces and their C31 systems. Accordingly, in 1999 a new law on
financing the defence contract for strategic Nuclear forces, was adopted by the Duma
and approved by the President. This law envisioned, stable long-term funding for
strategic forces and procurement at a level of about 40 percent of the investment
portion of the defence budget.27

Nevertheless, some Russian critics claimed that the threat of nuclear first use
would not be a credible deterrent against NATO, which would acquire nuclear strategy

27 Alexei, Arbatov, "The Transformation of Russia’s Military Doctrine in the Aftermath of Kosovo
and Chechnya" in Gabriel Gorodetsky,(ed.), Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign
and tactical superiority over Russia by 2010 because of the shortage of funding for maintenance and modernization suffered by the Russian nuclear forces. This explains the new emphasis on the build up and modernization of Russia’s conventional air defence, air force and naval assets. 28

Another crucial provision of the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine, which was clearly spelled out was the possibility of employing armed forces in domestic conflicts. But it was a dilemma for Russian domestic and military policy. The question was whether the domestic employment of armed forces is to be legalized, with all the political dangers and devastating implications of such action.

The growing distance between Russia and the West was reflected in the new official documents on the highest level. the national security concept and the military doctrine. Their emphasis on nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use as principal pillars of Russian security, on robust conventional defence against the NATO threat, as well as on the regular employment of armed forces to deal with domestic conflicts, all reflect Moscow’s great security concerns and have huge economic, foreign and domestic political implications.

What was unique about these general principles of Russian National security, according to the Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was that they had taken into account both foreign and domestic threats. The authors believed that Russia faced much greater threat than anyone else in the world. There was another threat lurking – economic disarray, crime, terrorism, drugs, environmental damage and the deteriorating relations between the Federal center and the regions, which in turn were

28 Ibid., p. 31.
eroding Russian single legal space and perpetuating the danger of internal conflicts. As President Putin had ordered it reworked so as to more clearly define “terrorism”, the meaning of a “multipolar world” and the methods by which could guarantee national security. The amended concept allowed the Ministry of Defence to deploy nuclear weapons against any truly dangerous attack, nuclear or conventional. The authors have taken into account both foreign and domestic threats. Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov stressed on terrorism, NATO aims of expansion and military superiority. He also Russia being forced out of its traditional interest zone, urged START II ratification to counter United States missile shield plans. This was borne out by NATO’s recently adopted strategic doctrine, which called for substantially expanding the alliances so called zone or responsibility and asserted its right to make decisions without regard for the UN, a right it tested first in Iraq and then exercised in full measure in the Balkans. As a result, recent progress in international relations toward multipolar world could be rolled back, giving as a unipolar would be based on military force, without checks and balances, group of states own national interests and security without regard for the interests of other countries. Russian position is such that the subordination of a majority of states to the will of one state or of bloc of states, especially a bloc founded on military force, is a highly dangerous state of affairs.

32 Ibid.
Russia was one of the world's largest countries, with a long history and rich cultural traditions. Despite the complicated international situation and internal problems, it continued to objectively play an important role in world processes, in view of its considerable economic, research-technical and military potential and unique situation on the Eurasian continent.  

In the future, Russia would become deeply integrated into the world economy and develop its collaboration with international economic and financial institutes. Objectively, there is a community of the interests of Russia and the interests of other states on many problems of international security. It includes resistance to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, prevention and settlement of regional conflicts, struggle with international terrorism and drug trafficking, the solution of acute global ecological problems, including problems of ensuring nuclear and radiation safety. At the same time, some states have stepped up their efforts to weaken Russia's positions in the political, economic, military and other spheres. The attempts to ignore the interests of Russia when tackling major problems of international relations, including conflict situations, can undermine international security and stability and slow down the ongoing positive changes in international relations.

The other major draft of new military doctrine was brought before the Russian Security Council on February 4, 2000. It was seen differently in Moscow and the West. As Alexi Arbatov put it, the new doctrine served as a warning to the United States that Russia would react if pressured too strongly. Otherwise, the only thing

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
innovative in the doctrine was its somewhat more strident tone. Several mainstream analysts linked the changes closely to the growth of new threats to Russia, including the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance. One of the doctrine’s chief architects Col. Gen. Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the Armed forces General Staff, later noted that the new doctrine emphasized the prevention of conflict, partnership with all states that do not contravene the UN charter, and deterrence. The Pentagon’s complaints were ludicrously hypocritical. He argued, for the United States still had first-strike policy of its own. Indeed some writers are worried that with its technological superiority, NATO could have ultimate control over Russia’s defence-related surveillance and electronic communications systems.

Military commentators tended also to emphasize the transitional nature of the new military doctrine and insisted that it would be revised again when Russia’s military situation was stabilized. Several political authorities saw the doctrine as a compromise between defence officials and government bureaucrats, and suggested that Moscow’s version was in part a response to NATO’s one year old new strategic doctrine. In fact most strategic analysts in Russia agreed that the doctrine simply brought Russia’s strategic principles into line with those of the United States, Britain and France.

During the release of the draft rendition had domestic political implications. Russia’s presidential elections were scheduled for March and Putin had the opportunity for campaign. In an ‘open letter to Russian voters’ he spoke of both the

Military Doctrine and security Concept as means by which Russia could regain respect in international affairs. He lauded the army for recovering from a long crisis with honour, and explained that Russia and Russians could no longer be ignored as they had been when the UN and NATO made decisions concerning Iraq and Yugoslavia. It is not hard to understand Putin’s popularity with the armed forces, who voted for him at a noticeably higher rate than the civilian population.\(^\text{37}\)

In its final rendering, the often mentioned endorsement of nuclear first strike reads as follows:

“The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of mass destruction against it (or) its allies, as well as in response to large scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”

This cannot be said to differ substantially from the military doctrine adopted by the United States, or by NATO.\(^\text{38}\)

Despite the now almost draconic status of Chechnya as a symbol of Russian military ineptitude, senior officers continue to stress the overriding importance of numbers-based mass in their doctrine. This continued preference is surreal given that the Russian defense budget needs to grow at least by a factor of 10 to reverse its decline; that the Russian army has 20,000 increasingly outdated tanks but almost no ammunition for their guns; that the Russian Air Force has 30 fighter regiments, but over 50% of their aircraft are in serious disrepair; and that the Russians continue to


\(^{38}\) Ibid. p. 191.
maintain five paratrooper divisions, although the airlift required to transport them is now inadequate, etc.

Finally, xenophobia and suspicion continued to pollute Russian military culture. Any discussion of military modernization was top secret, and therefore jealously shielded from public debate. At the same time, out-of-country assignments (including NATO and assorted educational opportunities) are still considered a form of career-ending exile by many. The above examples represented the absolute tip of the iceberg when it came to the problems associated with Russian military reform. A senior member of the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy has developed one possible option for the Russian MoD's consideration, but he is not necessarily optimistic about its possible success.

When the three airplanes crashed into the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001, the post-Cold War era had ended and a new one began. But uncertainty characterized this new era. The international alliances had completely changed since the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent war waged by the United States against terrorism. The problem of terrorism, which is transnational in nature and threatens stability in the world, has grown in many countries, including the Russian Federation, which calls for pooling the efforts of the international community and raising the effectiveness of the available forms and methods of combating this threat and taking emergency measures to neutralize it. 39

The September 11 tragedy had also given new purpose to Russia's military presence in Central Asia. In fact, two days before the terrorist planes hit the buildings

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in New York, the President of Tajikistan celebrated his country's independence with praise for Russia's help in their fight against extremism. All this followed a period when the CIS collective Security Group conducted a military briefing course on the concept of a one-and-a half war, that is, coordinating an National Missile Defence System (NMD) of their own against both NATO and Taliban. Russia took strong steps towards partnership with the West. Putin was quick to condemn the attacks on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon and was ready to enlist Russia in the United States anti-terrorist drive. On September 24, after deliberation, Putin announced that Russia would provide intelligence and air space for humanitarian aid for Afghanistan and would also support a United States military presence in Central Asia. Putin's opposition to NATO expansion became more muted and he increased support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Russian troops, tanks and military equipment moved to the border in September and surveillance equipment was updated. There were 10,000 border guards under Russian command on the Tajik/Afghan border and tanks along with several thousand crack troops were sent there from Moscow. The Russian 201st motorized Rifle division threw pontoon bridges across the Pyandzh River and established positions inside Afghanistan. Russian troops and air power were fighting the Taliban to defend the bridgeheads. In October, Russian Special Forces were reported on the ground in Afghanistan. Their task was to pinpoint targets for bombs to destroy Osama bin Laden's mountain strongholds. The common denominator of the partnership is the fight against terrorism. Besides this, in the first days after September 11, the Kremlin declared a new long-term course of constructive

41 [www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0%2c555510%2c00.htm](http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0%2c555510%2c00.htm)
dialogue and cooperation with the West. By participating in the anti-terrorist coalition, Putin could overcome the marginalization of Russia in international affairs. He pointed out that Russia had its own terrorist problem in Chechnya about which Western leaders needed to be more sympathetic.

As well as offering the United States condolences and support, Putin pushed the message that Russia was part of Europe. In October 2001 he spoke in German, Bundestag that Russia should be incorporated into economic-political and defence structures. Germany had always been more sympathetic to Russia's cause than had the United States and the context was a welcome one. Putin was consistent in driving his point a cross. In October, he told an EU-Russia summit that relations with Russia could indeed improve if NATO took due account of Russia's interest. He indicated that his country might be willing to reassess NATO expansion since a global anti-terrorist coalition was a top priority. Putin gave his agreement to monthly EU-Russia meetings on foreign and defence policy and concurred with a new NATO proposal for widening and deepening relations with Russia.

Despite the circumstantial coincidence of interests between Russia and the West, it was important to forestall the danger of escalating United States-Russia and Russian-Western differences. The security cooperation had to be patiently and consistently rebuilt step by step, on a pragmatic basis and without excessive expectations, gradually expanding the zone of cooperation and providing it with solid public support. Reviving the NATO-Russian Partnership for Peace would be encouraged by a thorough reorganisation of the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and other conflict ridden regions and a revision of the START-III/ABM package
agreements. Other steps should be a tacit understanding on no further NATO expansion over the next several years.

RUSSIA'S CHANGING THREAT PERCEPTION

In spite of drastic changes in the world and a different military and political context, traditional threat perception concerned with the West still persisted in Russia and featured in the basic political documents. The level and scales of military threats have been growing. The transition of NATO to the use of force (military force) beyond the zone of its responsibility and without the sanction of the UN Security Council, which has been elevated to the level of a strategic doctrine, is fraught with the destabilization of the strategic situation in the world. The growing technological surge of some leading powers and their growing possibilities to create new-generation weapons and military hardware are creating prerequisites for a qualitatively new stage in the arms race and a dramatic change in the forms and methods of waging hostilities.\textsuperscript{42} NATO's enlargement to the East the current Alliance, in other words, is no more an enemy than it is a friend. It is merely “a fact of life” that raises “concerns” only when it comes to the “post-Soviet space.” Will future Georgian and Ukrainian membership be too close for comfort (i.e., will these frontline states become, at least from a psychological perspective, new Berlin Walls)? Will Russia be able to react properly, in either case? These questions are germane, but since NATO-Russia cooperation will generally occur outside of Europe (Central Asia, etc.) and outside of the post-Soviet space, Russian leaders now believe the problems that come with Western enlargement will be

manageable and the possibility of appearance near the Russian borders of foreign military bases and considerable military contingents are listed among main international threats.\textsuperscript{43} That reflected the mood of preserving for Russia the role of global power and requires the focusing upon military capacity of the former rivals (United States / NATO). The Military Doctrine identifies the attempts to ignore the Russian Federation’s interests in managing international security, to counteract its reinforcement as one of the influential centers of a multi-polar world \textsuperscript{44} as one of the main threats just after territorial claims and intervention in the state’s affairs.

Some of the scholars are of the opinion that the military threats to Russia mainly emanate from the United States and NATO in general are potential ones, that they cannot be implemented in direct power confrontation of the sides gains more and more public support. Indeed, the changed military, strategic, political and socio-economic environment necessitates the re-evaluation of the whole realm of potential threats and a clear definition of military building priorities and objectives.\textsuperscript{45}

Conceptual re-evaluation of security threats and the corresponding tasks of the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) were necessary but not sufficient conditions for reforming the army. Quality modernisation of the RAF should be exercised on a complex basis in order to solve the scope of vital armed forces problems, representing in fact a crisis in the system of the state military organisation. The army degradation runs through all aspects of military building – politico-military planning, operational

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Military doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the president on April 21, 2000, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 25 2000, # 80 (2444), p. 5.
\end{itemize}
command, the financial and economic fields, armaments acquisitions and logistic
support, military training, social problems etc.\textsuperscript{46}

Currently Russian security priorities include Combating Terrorism (and the
related use of WMD). Terrorism poses a serious threat to the national security of the
Russian Federation. International terrorism has launched an open campaign designed
to destabilize the situation in Russia.\textsuperscript{47}

Since the perceived goal of transnational terrorists was the “destabilization of
state structures,” the Russian government “is at one” both with the United States and
the West on defeating this threat. However, the Russians are worried that the global
war on terror may, if not properly managed, unravel into total, inter-civilizational
warfare.

Significantly though, withdrawing the US’s military presence from Central
Asia isn’t part of this compromise. Russia is not loath, at least in the near-term, to
solve its terror-related problems at the expense of others.

Russian leaders are reportedly pursuing a “pragmatic approach” on this issue,
but when push comes to shove, they ultimately believe that a unipolar world poses a
threat to their nation’s sovereignty. Since Russia currently has few foreign policy
options, rules-based cooperative security is the one approach/model that will
maximize Russian foreign policy interests during a 10 to 20-year period of heightened
vulnerability.

Russian threat assessments and military procurements in both Asia and Europe
remain wedded to the threat of a great power war with the US and its allies. For

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 88.
\textsuperscript{47} National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, Opcit., p. 6.
example, a Russian air force threat assessment in 1994 argued that Japan could launch air offensive and amphibious attacks against the Kurlies and Sakhalin with US help. The objectives would to be seal off those islands and the Russian Pacific fleet and to destroy the Russian installations and forces in the Far East. Russian planners use this scenario, and the potential threat of NATO invasion and a possible Russo-Chinese war to gain a better deal for the armed forces. Alexei Arbatov observed that this threat assessment reflects the armed forces natural tendency to retain the maximum number of traditional strategic roles and operational missions.

The current situation in the Russian economy, the inadequate organization of state power and the civic society, the socio-political polarization of Russian society and the spread to crime to social relations, the growth of organized crime and terrorism, the aggravation of national and deterioration of international relations create a wide range of internal and external threats to the national security of the country. Threats in the economic sphere are comprehensive and determined above all by the considerable reduction of the gross domestic product, the investment and innovation activities and research-technical potential, the stagnation of the agrarian sector, the unbalanced bank system, the growing domestic and foreign debts, and the domination of fuel, energy and raw materials in Russia's exports, and of foods and consumer goods, including basic necessities, in imports. The weakening of the research-technical and technological potential of the country, dwindling research in the strategic spheres, the exodus of specialists and intellectual property abroad have threatened Russia with a loss of leading position in the world.
The threat of spreading crime to social relations, major mistakes made at the initial stage of reforms in the economic, military, law-enforcement and other spheres of state operation, the weakening of the system of state regulation and control, the inadequate legal base and the absence of a strong state policy in the social sphere, and the dwindling spiritual and moral potential of society are the basic factors facilitating the growth of crime, especially organised crime, and corruption. The consequences of these mistakes can be seen in the weakening of legal control over the situation in the country, the integration of some elements of the executive and legislative branches of power with criminal structures, the spread of crime to the control of banking and big business, major enterprises, trade establishments and producer networks. Consequently, the struggle against organized crime and corruption is not just a legal, but a political task. The scale of terrorism and organized crime grows owing to the frequent conflicts over the change of the form of property, the growing struggle for power on the basis of group and ethnic-national interests. The absence of an effective system for social prevention of transgression, the inadequate legal material and technical base of the efforts to prevent terrorism and organized crime, legal nihilism, and the exodus of qualified personnel from the law-enforcement agencies increase the influence of this threat on the individual, society and the state.48

The stratification of society into a small group of rich and the overwhelming majority of low-income citizens, the growth in the number of citizens who live below the poverty line and the growth of unemployment pose a threat to the national security of Russia in the social sphere.49

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
Threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the international sphere can be seen in the attempts of other states to hinder the strengthening of Russia as a centre of influence in the multipolar world, prevent the implementation of its national interests and weaken its positions in Europe, the Middle East, the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and Asia Pacific.\(^50\)

In this situation, the weakening of state control and the low effectiveness of the legal and economic mechanisms of preventing and liquidating emergency situations increase the risk of techno-genic catastrophes in all spheres of economic operation.\(^51\)

**CHANGING GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON WAR AND PEACE**

The new global contexts of inchoate and multifaceted international challenges in the wake of the 2001 terrorists attacks calls for new security structures and ensure global stability. In the face of a new kind of security concerns value to those alliances that can reliably support interests in the war on terrorism. But the attacks of September 11, 2001 served as a catalyst to accelerate pre-existing proclivities. The global war on terrorism has stimulated the rethinking of old relationships, created new ones- some of them with features that are quite different from traditional alliances in the nuclear family- and in some cases, given lower priority to inherited alliances that have less relevance to meet current global challenges.

The relationship of the United States and Europe has already been significantly affected by the war on terrorism and when the United States attacked Iraq it is affected even more. The bilateral relationship between the US and Germany, for example, had been significantly affected. Due to Prime Minister Tony Blair's support of President

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.
Bush's policies toward Iraq, the "special relationship" between the US and UK may survive an attack on Iraq, but that could be at the cost of Britain's relations with other European states, most notably France and Germany. The unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom could fundamentally change the relationship between the US and Europe. For half a century that relationship was cemented by the most successful alliance in history, NATO. If the US and UK "go it alone," they could be ostracized by other European states.

Europeans consider the war on terrorism and the war against Iraq to be related, but separate issues. Europeans were united in the sympathy and support for the United States following the September 11 attacks. The day after the attack, *Le Monde's* headline read "We are all Americans." A year after the attacks, while there is still sympathy for the victims of the attacks, there is not substantial European support for extending the war on terrorism to Iraq.

As the attacks in the US, Yemen and Indonesia demonstrate, terrorism is now truly global and its targets are no longer limited to the United States and Americans. The only way to confront such a threat is multilaterally; no one state—even the single most powerful country in the world today—can confront and lessen the threat of terrorism. Even an international coalition cannot ever eradicate terrorism; any time an individual is willing to commit suicide for the cause, it is impossible to stop such homicidal actions.

The United States, assisted by the United Kingdom, can attack and defeat Saddam Hussein's forces; however, such a victory could be short-lived if the costs of the attack include the US-European alliance that has kept the peace for more than half
a century and at the cost of the world's economy that, despite its shortcomings, has provided increasing prosperity for the world's population since the end of World War II. An attack on Iraq could result in major disruptions in the world's oil supply and this, in turn, could have significant ripple effects on the world economy given the central place of oil in the international economy.

How do the citizens regain a sense of security in the face of the new fear-inducing threat of terrorism? One way to do so is to seek greater cooperation with one another. A number of security analysts have focused on the need and advantages of "cooperative security". It is defined as "in essence, a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit." Its features are (1) the establishment of strict controls and security measures for nuclear forces, building on agreements of the recent past; (2) a regime for the conversion of defense industries whose excess capacity could lead to unwarranted global weapons proliferation and thus exacerbate international instability; (3) cooperative agreements regulating the size and composition of forces to emphasize defensive configurations and also to restrict the flow of dangerous technologies; (4) articulation of an internationally supported concept of effective and legitimate intervention, in which the use of force is always multilateral and elected only as a last resort; and (5) the promotion of transparency and mutual interest as the basis for monitoring agreed-upon constraints, including those on

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the diffusion of advanced technologies." The proponents of the cooperative security field in the past have focused primarily on Russia and its nuclear weapons as the single most important threat facing the U.S. This was certainly true during and immediately after the Cold War, but is no longer true today. Indeed, the United States and Russia are cooperating with one another extensively in the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, much remains to be done to make nuclear weapons safer. For example, experts believe that Pakistan has between twenty to fifty nuclear weapons and that the safety mechanisms called "permissive action links" (PAL) are not installed on these. On the assumption that centralized governmental control of nuclear weapons is desirable, the United States could provide Pakistan, India and other countries that request them rudimentary PALs.

Cooperative agreements are definitely needed in the post-September 11th environment; however, these agreements will most likely involve the build-up of military forces rather than their reduction, at least until the United States and its allies against terrorism conclude that terrorism is under control and that the threat from terrorism is reduced. Proponents of cooperative security did not have in mind military build-ups when they proposed this principle, but cooperation is just as necessary for military build-ups as decreases.

Cooperative security calls for the integration of the planning and implementing of security policies by states allied with one another. Many of the security threats, as conceived in broad terms, such as population growth, environmental degradation,

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cyber-warfare and terrorism can only be effectively dealt with on a multilateral basis. The unilateralist approach favored by the George W. Bush Administration during its first eight months in office was temporarily shelved following the attacks on the United States on September 11. Even though the United States is the world’s last remaining superpower, even it cannot “go it alone;” the cooperation of other states will be essential to dealing with these threats, and such cooperation must go beyond that of the past. For example, terrorist cells in Europe and Muslim countries cannot be identified and dealt with short of unprecedented international cooperation, and this fragile coalition will not stay together unless its members perceive genuine cooperation and that military force is only used as a last resort.

Proponents of cooperative security probably did not have in mind new partnerships with repressive regimes and/or nefarious individuals and organizations, but the war on terrorism and the threat that it poses to American society has driven the United States to conclude “new partnerships” that it would not have contemplated prior to September 11. It is a changed world, as the condemnations of the 9/11 attacks by Muhammar Kadafi and Hezbollah demonstrate.

Gone are the days of the President of the United States Ronald Reagan saying that proliferation of nuclear weapons is other states’ business. In a world in which terrorists are actively seeking control of nuclear weapons, nonproliferation becomes vital, and the United States both as the “world’s last remaining superpower” and the biggest target of international terrorism has a vital interest in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. The future challenge will be to continue to shape American security
policies so that they are responsive to the changing conditions and realities of the future.

There are some of the principles of the cooperative security approach that do not appear nearly as important after September 11, as before. For example, cooperative security advocates called for further agreements on conventional force deployments in Europe. Ironically, terrorism could contribute to the achievement of this objective because there will be substantial pressure on American and European military forces, and some of these may have to be moved from Europe to the Middle East and South Asia to meet the demands of missions there. Cooperative security proponents have also called for the conversion of excess defense capacity to civilian uses. This is not an objective that is likely to be important for some time due to the increased threat to American and NATO interests.

Cooperative security was developed as a new way of thinking about the threats and opportunities facing the United States and NATO in the future. This approach emphasized different elements than the traditional approach to the study and implementation of security. The events of September 11 have changed the security priorities of the United States, and it is tempting to go back to the traditional security approach; however, that is not viable because the same threats that existed on September 10th including environmental degradation, demographic pressures and cyber-threats still exist today. To be sure, they are given different priority, but they remain and must be dealt with in the future. The cooperative security framework provides one means to begin to think about how the United States and NATO might
deal with the vastly complicated and threatening world of the twenty-first century.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO invoked for the first time in its history the provisions of Article V of the NATO Treaty. For its part, the United States acted decisively against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Time was of the essence, for there was a major concern that Al-Qaeda could have further plans for inflicting damage on the magnitude of September 11. As a consequence, the U.S. acted without much consultation with its European allies. This caused some in Europe to criticize "American unilateralism," but the Bush administration was willing to accept these criticisms in light of the clear and present danger facing the U.S. Few American allies could coordinate their military operations with the U.S. Even though seventeen of the U.S.' eighteen NATO allies had forces in Afghanistan, only the American and British forces were able to engage in large-scale combined operations.

Since September 11, there has not been much discussion of the European Security Defence Policy. Former U.S. ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, has noted: "If European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) goes into the deep freeze for a time, that would not be a bad thing from NATO's perspective; it would put aside the vexatious issues of competitive operational planning; it would restore primacy to NATO on issues of significant importance to allies; and it would help to ensure that the United States would see the relationship with the EU in this area as a matter of cooperation, compatibility, and complementarity, rather than competition."\[56\] Whether the ESDP is explicitly discussed at the Prague Summit or not, the underlying issues

between Europe and American will be present, as they have since the beginning of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Balkans Conflict in the Balkans in the early 1990s caused NATO to re-invent itself. As scholars and journalists have noted, "The eruption in 1991 of conflict within the former Yugoslavia provided a long and painful learning process for the European allies and the United States, from which new concepts of joint task forces and peace-enforcement operations have evolved."57 But this evolution was not easy or smooth and only occurred after the death consequences of military personnel and civilians in the Bosnia war. In addition, between 900,000 to 1.2 million people fled Bosnia.

The situation in the world is noted for a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Two mutually excluding trends dominate them now that the age of bipolar confrontation is over.

Russia and many other countries, including India and China, suggested a different global model. This model would ultimately lead to the creation of a multipolar world. Russia's foreign minister Igor Ivanov very rightly stated that interdependence and sovereign equality of all the members of the international community would bring together the potentials of all the states and regions in order to meet the present challenge, and create efficient instrument able to combine national and international efforts. Thus the national interests and specific features of every country could be fully taken into account, and all of them could be ensured equal security and a dignified place in the world community. It would also allow the preservation and the strengthening of international peace and strategic stability. The question of humanitarian intervention needs to be debated, and clearly defined by all

57 Ibid., p. 176.
countries and only then humanitarian measures may be selectively applied under the aegis of the UN. 58

In February 2003, Germany and the Netherlands took over command of the 31-member, 5500-strong force from Turkey for a six months period. This was the first time that two countries had shared the command responsibility for an international force. It was also the first time that NATO capabilities (force generation; logistics; and command, control and intelligence) had been used to prepare an out-of-area mission. Following NATO’s decision, taken ‘in principles’ on 6 October, to give International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) a larger mandate for its peacekeeping mission, on 13 October a UN Security Council resolution extended the remit of ISAF beyond Kabul.

NATO began military planning in three fields – the operation in Kunduz under German leadership, a comprehensive plan for extending the ISAF mandate, and the development of Kabul airport to cater for increased movement resulting from such an extension. In December 2003 NATO normally adopted an operational concept authorizing the pilot project in a gradual process and would include the establishment of other Provincial Reconstruction Team’s (PRT’s) in the future. On November 19, 2003, NATO appointed its senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, thus emphasizing the non-military aspects of its mission. The issue of the supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) operational plan for the extension of ISAF had to wait until December because of the lack of offers of reinforcements, particularly additional helicopters and military personnel, from member states. There was also a lack of agreement concerning the member of new PRTs.

58 Ibid., p. 176.
The suggestions made by United States Secretary of state Colin Powel and Donald Rumsfeld at the Brussels’ ministerial meeting in December about increased NATO responsibility in Afghanistan indicated a United States willingness to revamp NATO for Its new role.

In November 2002 at the Prague Summit several strategic decisions regarding enlargement, a new expeditionary force, drastic reform of the command structure and a new style capability commitment focusing more narrowly on overseas operations were taken.

While expanding its missions out of Europe, NATO took further steps to scale down its involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where post –conflict stabilization and security had advanced sufficiently to allow a hand over to the EU. The decision came in parallel with the adoption by Bosnia and Herzegovina of its first central defence law unifying the command of its separate ethnic armies that also opened the way for it to participate in the 46-state Partnership for Peace.

Developments in 2003 put NATO to an existential test as a security actor both in Europe and elsewhere. No longer openly opposed by its former main adversary, Russia, it suffered a further political shock by being reduced by its leading member, the USA, to a military tool box for building coalitions of the willing in time of need rather than a political forum or vital partner. It also faced challenges related to the significant divisions among its members and, as a result, was often by passed in major political decisions. NATO’s prolonged crisis, the roots of which goes back to the end of the Cold War, and its ensuing gradual marginalisation in trans-atlantic relations
have made the key questions regarding NATO’s *raison d’etre*, mission and capabilities more acute.

The attack on Iraq and the disputes during its buildup precipitated a profound rift among NATO’s members—epitomized by United States’ defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between old’ and ‘new’ Europe—which created new doubts about the organisation’s viability. At the extremes, United States officials disparaged the organisation while France rejected United States plans to involve NATO in what it regarded as ‘exotic’ operations. None the less, among NATO’s efforts during 2003 to maintain its relevance and seek a new role, it was the initiative launched outside of its treaty area of activity that gave hope for its revitalization. In the last months of the year there were signs of recovery as the United States and France adopted a more positive attitude to the organisation.

The effort subsequently made to rebuild Euro-Atlantic and European consensus and to retrieve the institution’s relevance resulted in major new adaptations by both EU and NATO to the challenges of a world combining transnational and regional threats. NATO’s problems did not discernibly affect progress in the other areas of its adaptation to the new security environment—enlargement and the transformation of its forces and structures—on which significant new decisions had been made at the end.

**IMPLICATIONS ON RUSSIAN SECURITY PERCEPTION**

The events of September 11, 2001 seemed to offer Russia the opportunity of cooperation with USA on a basis of partnership. Many of the moves associated with what may be called a policy of dignified cooperation were dictated by the
extraordinary and rapid changes in the international environment. Some observers speak of the Kremlin as having made a strategic choice in favor of the West away from the politics of competitive multi-polarity that defined much of the conduct of external relations under Yeltsin. Implicit in this view is the premise that Russian Foreign Policy post-11 September differs fundamentally in philosophy, orientation and execution from its previous policies. While the new version is by no means the finished article, a process of far reaching transformation has been launched. On the other hand, however, there is a growing body of opinion that argues that the real impact of September 11 was to catalyze existing trends in Russian Foreign Policy, rather than a revolutionize its basic principles or modus operandi. According to this interpretation, the pro-Westernist approach of the Putin administration that emerged so publicly after September 11 had already been in place some time before. When the Bush administration first broached the possibility of using bases in the Central Asian Republics for the military operation in Afghanistan, Russia’s response was negative. Defence Minister Ivanov and chief-of - Staff Kvashnin indicated that Russia would view such moves as intruding on its natural sphere of influence. This position was grounded in traditional Soviet and Yeltsin era geo-political logic, remained in the place for sometime. But following a meeting of security heads in Sochi on September 22, 2001 and subsequent telephone conversations with the five Central Asian leaders, Putin agreed to allow the military presence of the West in Central Asia. He had decided that Russian interests were best served by an openly and consistently

cooperative approach with the United States Although elite and public opinion may have harboured uncharitable thoughts towards the United States in particular, such sentiments were less significant than recognition of the need to find a better way of managing the interaction with Washington and major Western European Capitals.62

There have always been influential pro-Western elements in and around the Putin administration. They have helped determine the positive tone and much of the content of Russian policy towards Western Europe and, from around the time of the Slovenia summit in June 2001, with America. Suggestion that Putin was more or less on his own in conceiving of, and then prosecuting, a cooperative line with Washington after September 11 effectively over looks the role of this group of advisers.63

Putin faced political and institutional opposition to his overtly pro-American stance, but this was never either serious or influential enough to deflect him from what was the only practical course of action. Far from being an aberration, Putin’s actions September post-11, flowed logically from an ever more Western centric attitude in Moscow.64 Russia’s policies in 2003 generally followed the road mapped out in preceding years. Its pragmatic pro-western line combined with an authoritarian domestic course remained unchanged in principle of its influence in its direct geographical milieu. Domestically the dominant influence of the Russian President Vladimir Putin was reasserted with the victory of the Kremlin-backed power parties – such as the unified Russia – in December 2003 State Duma elections, opening the way for his re-election in 2004 and further consolidating his personal power. The Kremlin’s

63 Ibid., p. 119.
64 Ibid., p. 119.
strengthened domestic position was accompanied by growing regression in Moscow's record on human and political rights. The rigged local and presidential elections in Chechnya; the continuing suppression of media freedom, the progressively increasing strength of the power agencies, especially the federal security services, widespread bureaucratic corruption, the possible misuse of state powers in pursuit of Putin's desire to break the independent power of economic oligarchs and so on, all drew protest from pro-democracy lobbies within Russia — and from western observers as well. The Yakus oil company affair, in particular the arrest of its chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who openly supported the liberal opposition, aroused particularly wide debate about the motives of the administration. Along with the inequitable December parliamentary election all these factors demonstrate even more strongly that the managed democracy pursued by Putin is far from Western standards and from the declared goal of the rule of law in Russia. At the end of 2003 with continued uncertainty as to the motives and directions of the Putin's policies — strategic orientation or electoral expediency. Some observers expressed the hope that Russia's behaviour might at least become easier to read after the presidential elections.

The Iraq crisis was an interim test of Putin's foreign policy. Russia decided to straddle the division within NATO, striking a delicate balance between the quarrelling Western partners and seeking national advantage from the intra-NATO rift. It chose


not to openly confront the United States, while joining with France and Germany in advocating a leading role for the UN. By forming an expedient trio-R with the two big European states, however, Russia made itself more follower than leader in the anti-Iraq coalition. Such a stance revealed the lack of a long-term policy on the issue other than that of the de facto alignment with the Euro-Atlantic community. Nevertheless, many Russian analysts took pride in Russia allegedly having developed better relations with the United States and Europe than the two had with each other.

The alignment with France and Germany during the Iraq war did not visibly harm Russia's relations with USA. It was treated leniently compared to the punishment Washington administered to Russia's fellow trio members, in line with the publicised advice ascribed to United States' National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice—'punish France, isolate Germany, forgive Russia'. However the mood of the post-11 September 2001 Russian—United States and Russian disappointments. Developments in 2003 such as the opening of the Russian-CIS Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) airbase in Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Mafia scandal around Lithuanian President Ronaldas Pakasa, the Krech Strait-Azov Sea border dispute between Russia and Ukraine, the unilateral attempt to settle the Moldova problem and the meeting of Georgian separatists' leader in Moscow led a prominent Russian observer to conclude that Putin's Russia while returning to the past becomes not only an authoritarian, but also an expansionist power. In turn, Russia was disappointed by the perceived United States—European lack of even-handedness regarding minority rights in Estonia and Latvia, the prolonged United States


deployments in Central Asia Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) flights over Georgian territory, the United States takeover of Georgia after the fall of Shevardnadze and the Western rejection of Moscow’s peace plans in Moldova. In the light of these and other developments, a new mood is emerging in some quarters in Moscow which perceives the growing scope and strength of the EU (and NATO) as an inherently threatening development.

A symbolic event in the scaling down of its active security involvement outside the CIS premier was Russia’s final withdrawal from the Balkans, announced in May 2003, bringing home its peacekeeping contingents that had been stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996 and in Kosovo since 1999. Russia continued to stick to its calmly negative attitude to NATO enlargement. In spite of the earlier voiced concerns about the future of the NRC, the year witnessed enhanced cooperation ‘at 20’ and considerable progress was made in cooperation on defence and military issues. At the same time, however, as part of the general revision of Russian military doctrine, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov announced on October 2, 2003, a review of Russia’s nuclear strategy in the light of NATO and United States offensive military doctrine, thus indicating that he still regarded the West as Russia’s most likely major adversary.

In 2003 there was an intensification of Moscow’s policy in its ‘near abroad’, aimed at strengthening its strategic positions east and south of its borders in order to both secure its interests and stave off alleged western attempts to squeeze Russia out of the southern part of the post–Soviet space. Already relatively successful in

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Armenia, Belarus and Central Asia, Russian policy now aims to reinvigorate its engagement in other states of the volatile south Caucasus region and Moldova, especially in view of the USA's growing involvement and perceived strategic competition there. The issue of transportation corridors from the Caspian Sea basin to Central and Western Europe becomes crucial. Of particular concern are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Odessa-Broody oil pipeline routes that bypass Russia—potentially jeopardising both the large profits it currently earns and its political influence in the former Soviet republics.

Russia also took further measures to consolidate its position in the post-Soviet space. In Tajikistan, Russia has sought to give its deployment of the 201st Motor Rifle division on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border the status of a military base. On April 28, 2003 at a meeting in Dushanbe, the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhsatan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the final documents creating the CIS Collective security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and agreed to establish a joint military command for a regional rapid reaction force to fight drug trafficking and terrorism in the CSTO area. Russia reiterated its offer to provide arms and military equipment to other CSTO members at the prices and on the terms at which the Russian military purchases them. At a press conference on October 9, 2003 Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that Russia retains the right to use military forces on the territory of the former Soviet republics. He expressed Russia's determination to boost its

military presence in the CIS, specially in Central Asia, and called for the ultimate withdrawal of military bases established there by the United States led international anti-terrorism coalition. He noted that Russia had only agreed to the presence of such bases for the period necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and to achieve the goals set by the coalition. Two weeks later a CSTO (Russian) airbase was inaugurated in the Kant, Kyrgyzstan, evidently as a political demonstration and a counterweight to the United States led coalitions airbase at Bishkek’s Manas airport. Officially, the purpose of the Kant airbase is to protect the borders of Russia and the CIS states but, in the long run, Moscow hopes that it may become an outpost of Russia’s interests in Central Asia.

Despite the CSTO’s expressed interest in closer cooperation with NATO, the latter dismissed the offer, making it clear that it has no plans to work with the group and prefers bilateral cooperation with its members.73

A NEW WORLD ORDER

The international community’s reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 was under dismay and incredulity at the barbarism; multiple expressions of sympathy and support came from around the world. The reactions from around the world condemned the attacks. Momentum and support for retaliatory measures in the United States were mounting. In fact, domestic political pressure for immediate military strike against the suspected perpetrators became overwhelming. The military build up in the United States and in allied countries was in full swing when a wave of attacks involving biological warfare agent anthrax swept through the western world. Many of the alleged

anthrax letters were hoaxes, but amid the many copycats were some determined individuals.

On the diplomatic front, the United States coalition-building efforts focused on generating consensus for military responses to the attack of September 11, 2001. The heterogeneity were reluctant to give the United States unqualified support to a military intervention, demonstrated by the soul-searching debates in the German Bundestag. Only Britain proved to be ardent, even to support the military component of the United States-directed war on terrorism. Despite assertions of loyalty and support for the United States, Arab allies were sitting on the fence and waiting to see how the United States would respond to Israeli overtures. Arab government willing to ally themselves with the coalition were in a difficult position, facing domestic pressure to break ties with the west from a population that was more inclined to Islamic fundamentalist precepts and preferences than Arab leadership.

The case of Pakistan, on which much of the United States diplomatic activities centered, illustrates the tensions between the governed and the government. While Pakistan supporters of the neighbouring Taliban regime rioted in the street of in the streets of Islamabad, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Pakistani leader, General Pervez Musarraf were negotiating the terms of using Pakistani military installation and military assistance, defining the staging areas for coalition assault troops and discussing the terms of exchanging intelligence between Pakistani intelligence and United States military and civilian intelligence. Ironically, Pakistan had been the principal supporter of the Taliban regime before September 11, and one of the few states to officially recognise the Afghan government. United States’
diplomatic efforts, however, were also directed at closer cooperation with the Central Asia republics such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Like Pakistan, these states adjoin Afghanistan and were thus of critical importance in coordinating a ground war in the area.

This was the time of the transformation of international relations, the end of confrontation, steady elimination of the consequences of the “Cold War,” and the advancement of Russian reforms have substantially broadened the possibilities for cooperation in the world arena. The world has become more complex and the dynamics of regional development are on a diverging path. There are three questions that have moved to the center stage in efforts to maintain international stability in the wake of the dissolution of the old order—problems arising from the nuclear legacy of the cold war, states approach to the amalgamation of terrorism, globalisation, and WMD, and interstate conflict. The threat of a global nuclear conflict has been reduced to a minimum. While the military power still retains significance in relations among states, an ever greater role is being played by economic, political, scientific and technological, ecological, and information factors. Coming to the fore as the main components of the national might of the Russian Federation are its intellectual, information and communications capabilities, the well-being and education level of the population, the degree of combining of scientific and production resources, and concentration of financial capital and diversification of economic ties. The overwhelming majority of states are firmly set on pursuing market methods of managing the economy and democratic values. The major breakthrough in a number of key areas of scientific and technological progress leading to the formation of a single,
worldwide information environment, the deepening and diversification of international economic ties add a global nature to the interdependence of states. Prerequisites are being created for building a more stable and crisis-resistant world structure.

According to Russian doctrine 'the world is dominated by strengthening of international cooperation, association and integration in a multilateral setting. It is also an attempt to create a structure of international relations based on the domination of developed western countries led by the United States with its penchant for military solutions, even in violation of fundamental norms of international law.

The National security concept also mentions that the national interests of Russia in the international sphere are focused on ensuring the sovereignty and reinforcing the position of Russia as a great power and one of the influential centers of the multipolar world, on developing equitable and mutually beneficial relations with all countries and integration association, above all the member countries of the CIS as well as with Russia’s traditional partners.

Compared with what happened in the real world in the last years it is obvious, that some of the threats or risks like the striving of individual states and inter-state associations to lower the role of the existing mechanisms of ensuring international security, above all the UN and the OSCE; the danger of weakening the political, economic and military influence of Russia in the world; the strengthening of military – political blocs and unions, above all the eastward enlargement of the NATO and the preparedness of NATO to use force beyond the zone of its responsibility have already materialized. Besides this, the other threats are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles; the weakening of the integration processes in
the CIS and the appearance and escalation of conflicts close to the state borders of the Russian Federation and the external borders of country’s members of the CIS. Some of these developments are simply part of the unavoidable adjustment process after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The increased engagement of regional organisation in the international peace and security is one of the most salient and discussed features of the post Cold War environment. While the primacy of the UN in the management of peace and security is set out in the UN Charter, the Charter explicitly recognises the legitimacy of regional activity in dispute settlement and conflict resolution, and the potential advantages regional organisations bring to peacekeeping activities are well known. Regional organisations, depending on their nature, size, capacity and location, may be able to make and implement decisions more cohesively, deploy faster to a conflict area, and undertake peace keeping and peace enforcement with greater skill and efficiency than a UN peacekeeping force. Attention has focussed especially on the relatively greater success of regional peacekeeping forces in dealing with the problem of spoilers in post conflict environments. 74

Lastly, the Beslan attack on September 2004 had shaken new convictions of strength and its strengthened the hold conviction on how to increase Russia’s power. Grasping how the Russian leadership has understood recent events is vital for understanding policy changes since the terrorist attacks.

CONCLUSION

The intensity of Russia’s current focus is on all spheres specially in those areas related to security modernization. Putin was able to create a more predictable climate for internal reform and aligning Russia more closely with the Euro-Atlantic community. After the Beslan tragedy Moscow’s insistence on internal security dimensions makes it to be more inward looking. Meanwhile the process of building up the state on a democratic continues. The transition has progressed, but not yet complete. Russia is presently expanding-its involvement in the Asia Pacific region’s effort to integrate. This is because Russia has vital interests in the Far East. But more importantly, in its efforts to befriend NATO and combat the various security threats a multilateral approach is necessary. Developing relations with Asian countries strengthens this process. It is progressively building up relations with the continent’s leading states – China, India, Japan, Iran and others. Russia is also counting on the dynamic development of cooperation with the countries of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. It would, however, be not wrong to state that among its numerous security concerns, NATO, a military grouping, would occupy a high priority in Russian strategic thinking.