CHAPTER - FOUR

PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AND SUBSEQUENT SCENARIO

Since 1945, United Nations peacekeepers have undertaken 63 field missions (For details refer Appendix 'C') and participated in the implementation of 172 peaceful settlements that have ended regional conflicts, and enabled people in more than 45 countries to take part in free and fair elections. It is, thus, an undisputable fact that since the end of the Cold War there has been a dramatic increase in the UN activities related to the maintenance of peace and security\(^1\). The subject of United Nation Peacekeeping Operations has thus become relevant particularly in the context of the New World Order. In the immediate post World War II, the Cold War had led to a virtual freeze on most of the effective activities in this area. For nearly half a century, the Cold War pitted groups of nations against each other, transforming the world into an ideological battleground. It created a Bipolar World based on a balance of absolute terror and we have come a long way ever since then. The disintegration of Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the subsequent end of Cold War set in motion a process of rethinking and flux in International relation. Today, most Nation States no longer feel obliged to subordinate their policies to the imperatives of the old ideological divide. In so far as the international community is concerned, it is seen to be moving towards an era of collective security\(^2\). Today, no longer does zero sum politics which were endemic during the Cold War decision making process of the Security Council automatically result in non-agreement, thereby blocking the collective efforts of the international community to end conflicts and solve regional disputes.

Peacekeeping operations are thus becoming increasingly complex, their objectives more sweeping and their implementation more difficult. Their arena is enlarged since they involve a combination of activities (apart from traditional peacekeeping) such as relief activities, repatriation of refugees, disbanding of armed groups, monitoring and control of police forces etc. The implication is that military peacekeepers be completely integrated with civilian experts in all areas for achieving better results and fulfilling the laid down goals. Needful to further state those peacekeeping operations owe their origin way back to the League of Nations. The method propagated by the League to prevent escalation of a crisis or conflict was ‘Peace Observation’, where-in, the international community could provide third party intervention for mediating/resolving potential or actual conflict. The concept proved to be a failure and lacked the capability to maintain world peace resulting in formulation of more effective system of international peace and security. The Charter of the United Nations having been was signed on 26\(^{\text{th}}\) June 1945\(^3\).

Necessity of United Nation Peacekeeping

It is essential to analyze the necessity of UN Peace Keeping. The ground realities do confirm that when and where inadequate political structures fail to provide for the orderly transfer of power, where dissatisfied and vulnerable populations are manipulated and when competition for scarce sources intensifies the anger and frustration among people trapped in poverty, armed conflict will continue to flare. These elements provide fuel for violence within or between States since countless numbers of weapons and modern gadgetries are readily available throughout the world.

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\(^1\) Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, p.7
\(^2\) Kochhar, MR, op.cit, p. 15
\(^3\) Ibid, p.36.
The results are human sufferings often on a massive scale, threats to wider international peace and security and the destruction of the economic and social life of entire population leading us to find ways and means of maintaining universal peace and world order. Many of today’s conflicts may seem remote to those not immediately in the line of fire. The nations of the world must weigh the risks of action against the proven dangers of inaction. Failure by the international community trying to control conflicts and solve them peacefully may sometimes result in wider conflicts, involving more actors. Recent history has shown how quickly civil wars between parties in one country can destabilize neighbouring countries and spread throughout entire regions. Few modern conflicts can be considered truly ‘local’. They often generate host of problems such as illegal traffic in arms, terrorism, drug trafficking, refugee flows and damages to the environment. The repercussions are felt far from the immediate conflict zone. International co-operation is needed to deal with these and other global problems.

United Nations Peacekeeping, built on over a half century of experience in the field, is an indispensable tool. Its legitimacy and universality are unique, derived from its character as an action taken on behalf of a global organisation comprising 191 member States. UN peacekeeping operations can open doors, which might otherwise remain closed to efforts in peacemaking and peace building, to secure lasting peace. Hence, it is felt that the necessity of United Nations peace keeping is a must for the peaceful growth of humanity.

PEACEKEEPING

What is peacekeeping?

Needful to state that peacekeeping is a technique, which is neither defined nor is even mentioned in the United Nations Charter. However, a widely accepted definition is the one formulated by the International Peace Academy. It is pertinent to mention that peacekeeping, in the view of many it is often thought of as an unwritten Chapter six and a half, because it goes beyond peace making and stops short of peace enforcement. We may further elaborate that the essential difference between the two chapters i.e. Chapter VI empowered the relevant organs the General Assembly and Security Council to deal with potential breaches. Chapter VII allows the Security Council alone to deal with actual breaches of peace.

Having seen why UN peace keeping is essential and considered as an obligatory necessity, let us cast a glance as to what infact is peace keeping all about. Peacekeeping is a way to help countries torn by conflict, create conditions for sustainable peace. United Nation peacekeeping soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post conflict situations and assist ex-combatants to implement the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms including confidence building measures, power sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law & economics and social development.

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4 loc. cit
5 It defines it as, the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace
6 Stephen, M. Hill and Shahin P. Malik, op.cit., p.8
The Charter of the United Nations gives the United Nation Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain peace. International community usually looks to the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping operations.

Most of these operations are established and implemented by the United Nations itself with troops serving under UN operational command\(^7\). In other cases, where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate or feasible, the Council authorizes regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty organisation, the Economic Community of West African states or coalitions of willing countries to implement certain peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions.

**Evolution of Peacekeeping**

Basically, Peacekeeping emerged during the Cold War as the principle tool through which the UN attempted to fulfill its primary goal of maintaining *International peace and security*\(^8\). We may thus, infer that the United Nations peacekeeping initially developed during the Cold War era as a means to resolve conflicts between States by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries under UN command. Peacekeepers could be called in when the major international powers tasked the UN with bringing closure to conflicts threatening regional stability and international peace and security, including a number of so called ‘proxy wars’ waged by client States of the superpowers.

Peacekeepers were not expected to fight fire with fire. As a general rule, they deployed when the ceasefire was in place and the parties to the conflict had given their consent. UN troops observed from the ground and reported impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other elements of the peace agreement. This gave time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict. The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in UN and multilateral peacekeeping. In a new spirit of co-operation, the Security Council established larger and more complex UN peacekeeping missions, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra State conflicts. **Peacekeeping further comes to involve more and more non-military elements so as to ensure sustainability\(^9\).**

There are a number of other allied terms which have different meanings like the terms preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping are all inter related. ‘Preventive diplomacy’ may be defined as an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. ‘Peacemaking’ is an action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Further, ‘Peacekeeping’ is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned normally involving United Nations military and or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is thus a **technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace**\(^9\).

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\(^7\) loc. cit

\(^8\) Stephen, M. Hill and Shahin P. Malik, op.cit., p.25

\(^9\) The United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations was *created in 1992 to support this increased demand for complex peacekeeping.*

\(^9\) Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, op.cit., p.45
It can also be rightly called the invention of the United Nations which has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the world and afforded opportunities for peaceful co-existence. According to B.N Mehresh, a Canadian General who had commanded United Nation Operations refers peacekeeping as the process of 'de-escalation'. According to Larry L Fabian, UN peacekeeping is 'a process involving multiple-layered responsibilities.' However, peacekeeping is habitually associated with the name of Hammarskjold,† who exerted enormous influence both in refining concepts about peacekeeping and in applying them as no one before him had done.\textsuperscript{10}

It is indeed worth noting that Peacekeeping is one of the major mode by which the United Nations helps to maintain international peace and security. In the UN context, peacekeeping has traditionally been defined as the 'use of multinational forces, under United Nation command, to help control and resolve conflict between hostile countries'. Sometimes, these forces may even be interposed between hostile communities, within a single country. \textit{Peacekeeping is a technique pioneered by the United Nation, the soldier as catalyst for peace rather than as an instrument of war}. A peacekeeping mission may also consist of military observers at the rank of officer, monitoring a ceasefire accord or verifying Human Rights Agreements. Peacekeepers have come to be known as ‘Blue Helmets’ or ‘Blue Berets’ because of the distinctive headgear they wear\textsuperscript{11}. This dress code aids in ease of re-organisation and binds soldiers all around the world to strive for the maintenance of ‘world peace’ for sake of humanity.

Yet another question gets to our mind i.e. once a peacekeeping operation is established, who has the right to take the day-to-day decisions on military and administrative problems, is it the Security Council or the Secretary General? This question can well be addressed if we also look at the fact that in 1960, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold enjoyed this right. This would be evident from the fact that Security Council Resolution 143 authorized the Security General to take necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as might have been necessary. Dag Hammarskjold indicated his intention to seek in the first place, the assistance of African States for the United Nations Force in Congo\textsuperscript{12}. The Force was mainly composed of military units from African States.

However, during the United Nations action in Congo, the Soviet Union took the view that these matters were for the Security Council alone\textsuperscript{13}.

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\textsuperscript{†} Peacekeeping, as Hammarskjold envisaged ‘is a matter of preventing engagement or facilitating disengagement on the part of the Superpowers when and where they are rational enough to see the advantage of mutually standing back or stepping aside. It proposes a preemptive and neutralizing collective intervention to forestall a unilateral intervention, designed to establish dominance, or a competitive intervention destined to raise the temperature of the Cold War’.

\textsuperscript{10} Shreesh Juyal & Ramesh Babu B, op.cit, p.98.

\textsuperscript{11} Kochhar MR, op.cit, p.22

\textsuperscript{12} United Nations, The Blue Helmets (1985), p.221

\textsuperscript{13} 1\textsuperscript{st} Emergency Special Session, 567\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, 7\textsuperscript{th} November 1956
The Western Nations took the view that although it was for the Security Council to establish a Force and indicate its functions and tasks, the Secretary General must have operational freedom on matters relating to composition, size, duration and all the unforeseen circumstances that inevitably arise. However, the Security Council had the power to countermand the operational freedom of the Secretary General.

The United Kingdom subsequently adopted a third opinion that those matters which had traditionally been dealt by the Secretary General would fall to the Security Council to decide, but without allowing any veto. In actual practice, since the Congo action the Security Council has strengthened its control over peacekeeping operations, especially over the composition of the peacekeeping forces and made its decision in terms of the composition, task and duration of the peacekeeping forces more and more precise. In its Report in 1976, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Forces confirmed the trend that the Secretary General, when instructed, should report to the Security Council on the composition of the forces on the basis of geographical distribution, consultation by the Security Council, which shall, however, decide upon the composition of the force. Future Secretary General will not enjoy as free a hand as Dag Hammarskjold had in Congo.

Next question which we need to address is as to who decides to dispatch a United Nations peacekeeping operation and under whom? Well, the fact is that the United Nations Security Council normally creates and defines peacekeeping missions. It does this by providing the mission with a mandate description of the mission’s tasks. To establish a new peacekeeping mission or change the mandate or strength of an existing mission, 9 of the Security Council’s 15 member States must vote in favour. However, if any one of the five permanent members, China, France the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom or the United States, votes against, the proposal fails.

Further, the Secretary General directs and manages peacekeeping operations and reports to the Council on their progress. Special Representative of the Secretary General heads most large missions. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (For details of organisation refer Appendix ’D’) assists the Secretary General in formulating policies and procedures for peacekeeping, making recommendations on the establishment of new missions and in managing ongoing missions. The department also supports a small number of political missions such as the United Nations mission in Afghanistan. Senior military officers, staff officers and military observers serving on United Nations missions are directly employed by the United Nations usually their national armed forces. Peacekeeping troops participate in United Nations peacekeeping under terms that are carefully negotiated by their Governments and remain under the authority of those Governments.

15 A. Cassese, op., cit, pp.10 - 11
16 Louis B. Sohn, The United Nations: The Next Twenty Five Years, p.152
17 loc. cit
The troops and their Commanders are deployed as national contingents, which report on operational matters to the mission’s Force Commander and through him to the Special Representative of the Secretary General. **The authority to send or withdraw peacekeepers remains with the Government that volunteered them, as does responsibility for pay, disciplinary and personnel matters.** Civilian police officers are also contributed by member States and serve on the same basis as military observers i.e. as experts on mission paid by the United Nations.

Needful to highlight the fact that peacekeeping has indeed proved its worth by having saved countless lives. In many cases, it has proved to be invaluable in creating the necessary conditions to settle disputes peacefully through negotiation and in monitoring the implementation of an agreement between hostile parties. As per available statistics, the service to the cause of peace-by more than 650,000 soldiers and civilians since 1948 was formally recognized when **UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize**\(^{18}\) in 1988. It is a matter of pride for the United Nations that the speed with which peace keeping has evolved in response to the new political environment, resulting from the end of the Cold War is indeed appreciable. The last few years have confirmed that respect of certain basic principles of peace keeping are more essential to its success. **Three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, impartially and the non-use of force except in self defence.**\(^{19}\)

Critical analysis of various successes and failures that have taken place to date shows that in all the successes those principles were respected. However, in most of the less successful operations one or the other of them was not adhered to in letter and spirit. This fact further highlights the importance of these principles for **Peace Keeping Operations.** However interestingly, there are three aspects of mandates that in particular have led peacekeeping operations to **forfeit the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that was perceived to be partial and or to use force other than in self defence.** These have been the tasks of protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept. **The cases of Somalia and that of Bosnia and Herzegovina are cases in point.**

It was thus in the above two cases that existing peace keeping operations were given additional mandates that required the use of force and therefore could not be combined with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non use of force. It was also not possible for such operation to be executed without much stronger military capabilities that had been made available as the case in the former Yugoslavia. In reality, **nothing is more dangerous for a peace keeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition armament, logistic support and deployment deny in the capacity to do so.**\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) Basic Facts about the United Nations in ed, Kochhar MR, p.22


\(^{20}\) Ibid, p.15
The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement and the dynamics of the later are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate†. In this new era, peacekeeping does not involve only keeping warring parties apart. These day’s tasks have become multidimensional including verifying compliance with agreements, supervising elections, promoting respect for human rights, disarming factions, monitoring and training local police authorities; protecting vulnerable population and ensuring delivery of humanitarian assistance.

**Peace making and Peacekeeping**

It is pertinent to further highlight the fact that throughout its history, the United Nations has often been called upon to prevent a dangerous situation from escalating into war, to persuade opposing parties to use the conference table rather than weapons and to finally help restore peace when conflict occurs in spite of all efforts. This has not been a cakewalk for the United Nations as it has been forced to use various methods and machinery for preventing and ending conflicts. In various disputes, the United Nations has dispatched the force in varied variety of forms to include peacekeeping forces, observers or fact finding missions, good offices missions, mediators and special representatives. In other cases, it has provided the forum for debates, negotiations and a channel for quiet diplomacy,21 to achieve the desired aim of establishing and restoring peace and harmony, where needed.

The differences between collective security and peacekeeping are conspicuous. Peacekeeping is progressively more closely identified with politically impartial and essentially non-coercive United Nation behaviour in conflict management. The military or quasi-military institutions needed to perform the task of peacekeeping are qualitatively different from the ones envisaged in the Charter. Collective Security armies were to be largely Big five armies. The permanent members of the Security Council were to be the ‘mainstay’ of United Nation striking forces because they were thought to possess the political and military weight to enforce the United Nation’s collective will. But the permanent members have been excluded from participating in most peacekeeping missions. This has led to one of the most important of all developments in United Nation peacekeeping activities: the emergence of a group of like minded, dependable peacekeeping nations from among the middle and smaller powers at the UN22.

† Peacekeeping today has become far more complicated, stemming from quantitative and qualitative changes in the conflict that take place. Confrontations with State borders are now more common than confrontations between States. In recent operations, peacekeepers have been sent to places where there are no agreements; where consent to a United Nations presence is sporadic; and where Governments do not even exist or have limited effective authority.

21 Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, op.cit, p.29

22 BN Mehresh, in ed., Shreesh Juyal and Babu Ramsh R, op.cit, p. 98
Further peacekeeping is distinguishable from collective security by two integral qualities, political impartiality† and non-coerciveness. Political impartiality is the ‘sine qua non’ for whatever effectiveness, authority, and leverage peacekeepers have. Peacekeeping is a distinctive kind of conflict control activity. Thus, a dilemma, as has been rightly observed, is inherent in every United Nation mission: an effective peacekeeping mechanism inevitably affects the balance of interests among the parties, the local scale is tipped in favour of one side and this redistribution in turn tends to reduce the willingness of the disadvantaged party to continue good faith cooperation with the United Nation. Peacekeepers cannot escape this dilemma; they can only try to compensate by creating as many incentives as possible for all parties to settle their differences. To be impartial is not to be devoid of all interests or preferences. In this sense the impartiality of the international decision-maker is ‘not the absence of partiality rather a partiality to the values of the international community. This international bias manifests itself in peacekeeping policies that favour order over disorder, negotiation among contending parties over their non contract and third party supervision of local agreements over unilateral verification by the disputants themselves.

Needful to state that one of the ways in which the United Nations help maintain international peace and security is through peacekeeping operations. Such operations are mounted to help control conflicts that threaten international peace and security, while lasting political solutions are sought. Peacekeeping Operations do fulfill the role of an impartial third party to help create and maintain a cease-fire. It further aids in forming a buffer zone between warring States and parties, thus facilitating the search for a peaceful settlement of conflicts through diplomatic channels. Such operations are established by the Security Council and directed by the Secretary General. It must have the consent of the host Governments and also of the other parties involved. The basic thumb rule remains that, such an operation must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country and must not be used in any way to favour one party against another. Even an un-intentional move in this regard is likely to compromise the position of United Nation, which is neither desired nor acceptable.

It is a matter of precedence and methodology adopted by United Nation that Peace keeping operations may involve military observer missions, made up of unarmed officers, peace keeping forces or a combination of both. Peacekeeping forces are made up of contingents of troops provided by member States and financed by the international community. The soldiers of the United Nations peacekeeping forces have light weapons but can use them only in self defence and not as a matter of routine or by way of any right conferred on them. Further, as per existing records, by the end of the Cold War the demand for United Nations peacekeeping had increased dramatically. In 1988-1992, 13 new peace keeping operations were mounted compared with 13 such operations over 40 years period prior to it. Further, even the character of peacekeeping operations has also changed.

†Political impartiality means that peacekeeper’s policies, attitudes, and demeanor must not be tended to further the interests of any contestant in the dispute.

23 Ibid, p.99
24 Boutros, Boutros-Ghali., op.cit. p.30
Of the 13 operations, which were set up before 1988, all except one were traditional operations\textsuperscript{25}. They were largely military in composition\textsuperscript{†}. With regard to the nature and type it may be noted that Peacekeeping contingent of any country may be dispatched as unarmed observers or a lightly armed peacekeeping force. They might be assigned to observe a situation and report to the Secretary General to supervise troop withdrawals, or to help ensure compliance with other arrangements. \textbf{They might investigate cease fire violations, patrol buffer zones or monitor the maintenance of law and order\textsuperscript{‡}.}

However, the new outlook towards peacekeeping highlights the point that peacekeepers are taking on new tasks that often go far beyond traditional activities. \textbf{They may also be required to enforce embargoes, remove mines and seek to disarm warring parties in addition to military related aspects. Many United Nation operations now also involve a large civilian dimension: election monitoring, human right verification, humanitarian relief, administrative management, institution building and the restoration of infrastructure and services and of course, they serve to remind disputing parties that all the world is watching what they do\textsuperscript{26}.}

Around the world, respect for the United Nation’s peacekeeping activities is growing. As the tensions of the Cold War recede, the international community is turning increasingly to United Nation peacekeepers to help resolve regional crisis. In 1988 and 1989 alone, there were five new operations, which doubled in two years. Thus there is a growing demand for peacekeeping to perform an increasing variety of functions, which will require new combinations of defence, police and civilian personnel.

The United Nation has an important role. The success of the peacekeeping force depends not only, on the parties’ consents but also on their full co-operation, especially regarding freedom of movement of United Nation personnel within their territories and making provisions for the facilities necessary to carry out the mandate. Further, United Nation peacekeeping is not based on the principle of dispatching a fighting force to put out a conflict that is raging. Rather, the basic premise is that the insertion of an impartial presence in the region of conflict would allow the parties to try and settle the dispute peacefully through discussion and negotiations and avoids loss of men and material. When a United Nations Member State or group of States, or the Secretary General proposes the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, a number of basic conditions have to be met. \textbf{First}, the proposal must command the consent of the parties to the conflict.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p. 30

\textsuperscript{†}Their tasks were to monitor cease-fire, control buffer zones and prevent a resumption of hostilities, thereby forming way for negotiations and settling of disputes very smoothly.

\textsuperscript{‡}In addition, they often provide emergency medical services; assist in the resettlement of refugees and work to restore normal civilian activities in strife torn areas of any affected part of the world.

\textsuperscript{26} Kochhar, M.R, op.cit. p. 23
The operation must neither interfere in the internal affairs of the host countries nor favour one party against another. **Second**, the proposal must enjoy broad support from the international community specifically; the Security Council must adopt it. **Third**, member States must be ready to volunteer personnel to serve the command of the United Nation Secretary General. The success of a peacekeeping operation also requires a few critical issues to be addressed like clear and practical mandate, the co-operation of the parties in implementing that mandate, effective United Nation command at Headquarters and in the field and adequate logistic and financial support. It needs to be noted that **out of the 15-member Security Council to adopt a proposal for a peacekeeping operation, there have to be at least nine votes in favour and no negative vote from any of its five permanent members**\(^{27}\), as already referred earlier too. The Secretary General reports to the Council on how the operation can be launched and carried out. Subject to the Council’s approval, he must then make the necessary arrangements; choosing the head of the mission and asking member States to provide troops, police or other civilian personnel, supplies and equipment, transportation and logistics support. He also consults with the parties to the conflict about the troop contributing countries.

In approving the Secretary General’s report, the Council also decides how the operation will be paid for; on a voluntary basis or as is usually the case on an obligatory basis as expenses of the organisation in accordance with provisions in the Charter. In the latter case, the General Assembly decides how those costs are apportioned among the member States. It is also worth noting that the **Secretary General is thereafter responsible for mobilizing the Security Council, drawing out the agenda, deciding on the type of operation, refining and interpreting the mandate and recommending the action plan including composition of the force and selection of Force Commander**\(^{28}\). Above all, organize funds for the envisaged operations which play a vital role during execution of such mission.

**Procedural Issues and allied actions by Member Nations.**

Security Council having approved establishment of a particular mission, the Status of Force agreement is executed. The United Nation than makes an informal request for troops/material to various National Governments who in turn may accept or decline a commitment. The UN first makes an informal request to the member nations. On receiving such a request, a typical sequence of activity of the member nations is resorted too\(^{†}\). This is followed by a formal request to volunteer National Governments to deploy troops in accordance with a specified time schedule. It takes approximately about two months to deploy military observers and about three months to move unit contingents.

\(^{27}\) Ibid, 29

\(^{28}\) Ibid, 30

\(^{†}\) **Sequence of activity of the member Nations:-**

- Action is taken by various Departments/Ministries for according approval in principle for deployment of troops for the specific UN mission and UN communicated suitably.

- Various agencies i.e. Defence Forces, Foreign Affairs Ministry, involved are suitably informed of impending operation. Normally, a member nation would require one to two months for actual deployment of troops.

- UN than forwards formal request to member country.
**Action on Receipt of Formal Request**

The following actions may be taken by member Nations at this stage:-

- Deciding on composition of Force based on nature of operation.
- Identification of units.
- Warning order issued to armed forces units selected including arms and ammunition to be carried, medical examination and immunization, movement details and provisioning.
- Selection of personnel.
- Equipment Management to include making up deficiencies in vehicles and equipment, stocking of spare parts etc.
- Administration of personnel.
- Briefing about Mission Area and other operational details.
- Training for the ensuing peacekeeping operations.
- Move to Mounting Base (Airport/Seaport).
- Final preparations and Briefing.
- Move to Mission Area by transportation (air/sea) arranged by UN.

**Financing of Peacekeeping Operations**

Since the final United Nation peacekeeping operations were established, member States have had serious differences on how to finance them. In practice, the expenses of the United Nation peacekeeping operations are normally shared by member States at a rate ratified by the General Assembly. There are some exception: the expenses of the United Nation Yemen Observation Mission (1963-64) were supported by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, States that were directly involved: those of the United Nation Security Force in West Iran (1962-63) were Jointly borne by Indonesia and the Netherlands; those of the United Nation Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964) were voluntarily Offered by certain States. However, for political and financial reasons, some States refused to pay their shares, and year-by-year the uncertain and unsatisfactory financing of peacekeeping operations became a very difficult problem. It even brought the UN into some serious financial and constitutional crises\(^{29}\). (For financial details concerning Peace keeping Operations, refer Appendix ‘E’).

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\(^{29}\) Shreesh Juyal and Babu, Ramesh B, *op.cit.* p.104
If we accept the affirmative view it does not however mean that a Member State has the financial obligation to pay its share of the expenses of peacekeeping operation merely because United Nation decided establishment of the operation. As a precondition for this obligation, a peacekeeping operation must be established in accordance with the purpose and principles of the United Nations. It is the right of a member State to refuse to pay its share if it thinks that a peacekeeping operation violates the purposes and principles of the United Nations. States are free to make political judgments for each peacekeeping operation. In addition, although it is the General Assembly, not the Security Council that has the power to examine and apportion the expenses of the peacekeeping operations among member States, this does not mean that the Security Council has nothing to do with this problem. Financing of Peace Keeping operations is indeed a very critical issue. Hence, whenever the Security Council votes to create a peacekeeping operation, the Council also now decides how that operation will be financed. Usually, this is done on an obligatory basis. Countries required paying for the cost of peacekeeping operations and the General Assembly decides how these costs are divided among members. However, in the past, peacekeeping operations have also been financed by voluntary contributions although only in certain exceptional cases.

Further, Peacekeeping operations are normally financed under an obligatory scale of assessments, which takes into account the relative economic wealth of member States, with the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The developing and least developed countries pay a little less than the percentage they are assessed, for the United Nation's regular budget.

Cost Effectiveness Factor

As per available information, United Nation peacekeeping is highly cost effective. The United Nations spends less per year on peacekeeping worldwide than the City of New York spends on the annual budgets of its fire and police departments. Further, United Nations peacekeeping is far cheaper than the alternative, which is war.

30 Ibid, p.105

31 Kochhar, M.R. op.cit. p.24
United Nation peacekeeping cost about $2.6 billion in 2002\textsuperscript{32}. In the same year, Governments worldwide spent more than $794 billion on arms, a figure that represents 2.5 percent of world gross domestic product and shows no sign of decreasing. In 1993, annual United Nation peacekeeping costs peaked at some $3.6 billion, reflecting the expense of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. By 1998, costs had dropped to just under $3 billion. The approved peacekeeping budget for the year 2004-2005 was $2.80 billion.

All member States are legally obliged to pay their share of peacekeeping costs under complex formula that they themselves have established. Despite this legal obligation, member States owed approximately $1.20 billion as peacekeeping dues as of June 2004\textsuperscript{33}.

**Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations**

A look at the figurative increase of personnel at random basis can well be gauged when we see for ourselves that at the beginning of 1992, 11,500 men and women were serving in UN peacekeeping operations. As of December 1994, more than 80,000 people were engaged in 17 peacekeeping operations worldwide. Hence, in addition to the traditional core group of military personnel, there are also civilian police monitors and civilian support staff. The military and police contingents are contributed by Governments, which might also send civilians to serve, for example, as election monitors. Staff members from the United Nation Secretariat and locally recruitment employees constitute the bulk of civilian employees.

Occasionally, volunteers may be recruited to serve in the civilian functions with peacekeeping operations. However, on the military side peacekeepers are usually regular soldiers whose units are assigned to serve with UN peacekeeping operations for a specified period, the standard tenure of duty being six months. They continue to be paid by their Governments, based on the ranks and the salaries that prevail in their national armed forces. Others are reservists who volunteer to be sent by their Governments to serve with reimburses troop contributor countries at a flat rate per soldier per month. Some countries maintain units and individuals on stand by for United Nation services to be deployed at short notice. The requirements of peacekeeping can be very different from those of normal soldiering; diplomacy and tact are needed more than combat skills. Some of the major troop contributors, such as the Nordic countries, provide special training programs for United Nation service. But these soldiers of peace can also find themselves under fire in dangerous situations. Several hundreds of them have already given their lives while serving with the United Nation and the process is unending\textsuperscript{34}.

\textsuperscript{32} loc. cit

\textsuperscript{33} loc. cit

\textsuperscript{34} Kochhar, MR, op.cit. p.25
Compensational aspects of Peacekeepers

The payment schedule to the peacekeepers is yet another aspect needing attention. The Peacekeeping soldiers are in fact paid by their own Governments according to their own national rank and salary scales. Countries volunteering uniformed personnel to peacekeeping operations are reimbursed by the United Nation at a flat rate of a little over $1,000 per soldier per month. The United Nation also reimburses countries for equipment. Reimbursements have been deferred at times because of cash shortages caused by member States failure to pay their dues on time. Since the great majority of troops in United Nation peacekeeping operations are contributed by developing countries, this places an additional financial burden on member States that can least afford it. Civilian police and other civilian personnel are paid from the peacekeeping budget established for the operation\textsuperscript{35}.

Use of Force by Peacekeeping Force

Since the task assigned to the contingents pertains to peacekeeping, the United Nation observers thus, normally do not carry any arms at all. United Nation troops however, do carry light arms and are allowed to use them only in self-defence or if armed persons try to stop them from carrying out the orders of their commanders. They use force only in exceptional circumstances and with due regard for the impact of their actions on the overall operation. Peacekeepers do not take the initiative in using force against those threatening peace. They rely on the consent of the parties and the moral authority, which is crucial to their success. The most basic principle is that using arms and force is not the best way of solving any conflict; it is the last resort when self defence is necessary.

To quote an example, the operation in Korea was a military enforcement action. In 1950, the Security Council authorized member State to furnish ‘such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack\textsuperscript{36} against it and said making military and other assistance available could do so to a unified command under the United States. Peacekeeping operation on the other hand, is created with the consent of the parties, use of force in self defence and is under the command of the Secretary General. However, in Korea none of these principles were applied.

Can UN Peacekeepers use force?

The concept of traditional United Nation peacekeeping holds that peacekeepers are unarmed or lightly armed and can use force only in self defence. In the last few years, however, events have led to debate on how to make United Nation peacekeepers more effective in dangerous and complex mission while ensuring their impartiality. Under resourced and under sized peacekeeping operations with weak rules of engagement have proved to be ill suited to contain armed factions arising in the period following civil wars. In some cases, United Nation peacekeepers themselves have come under attack and sustained casualties.

\textsuperscript{35} loc. cit

\textsuperscript{36} Kochhar, M.R, op.cit. p.25-26
Increasingly, the Security Council has mandated peacekeeping operations on the basis of Chapter VII† of the United Nations Charter, allowing peacekeepers to adopt a robust posture with weaponry that creates a different effect. **Rules of engagement** governing the use of force have been strengthened, allowing peacekeepers in missions where this is warranted ‘to use all necessary means’ to protect civilians in their immediate vicinity and prevent violence against United Nation staff and personnel. **United Nation missions** in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Burundi, Haiti and Cote d’Ivoire operate under ‘Chapter VII’ mandates.

While affirming the ‘Blue Helmets’ right to defend themselves and those they are mandated to protect, the Secretary General has stressed that this new ‘doctrine’ should not be interpreted as a means of turning the United Nation into a war fighting machine, and that the **use of force should always be seen as a measure of last resort**37. A very pertinent question is raised in one’s mind i.e. how many peacekeepers have been killed since peacekeeping operationere started? Well, in the view of the UN, one death is one death too many. As of now, **2386 Peacekeepers** have lost their lives while serving with United Nation peacekeeping operations since its inception. (For details of casualties, refer **Appendix ‘F’**).

**Increasing demands**

United Nation can well gauge a close look at the increasing demand of United Nations Peace Keeping and its financial effects through a report. It states, ‘Thirteen peace keeping operations were established between the years 1945 and 1987; 1 other since then till 1992. An estimated 528000 military, police and civilian personnel had served under the flag of the United Nations until January 1992. Over 800 of them from 43 countries have died in the service of the organisation. The costs of these operations had aggregated some $8.3 billion till 1992. The unpaid arrears towards them stood at over $800 million, which represents a debt owed by the organisation to the troop-contributing countries. Peacekeeping operations approved in 1995 estimated to cost to $3 billion in the 12-month period, while patterns of payment were unacceptably slow. Against this, global defence expenditures at the end of the decade had approached $1 trillion a year, or $2 million per minute38. Not withstanding the above, it was pointed out by Boutros Boutros Ghali that ‘The demands on the United Nations for peace keeping and peace building operation will in the coming years continue to challenge the capacity, the political and financial will and the creativity of the Secretariat and member States. Like the Security Council, the Secretary General welcomed the increase and broadening of the tasks of peace keeping operations39.’

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†Chapter VII of the UN Charter is entitled ‘Actions with respect of threats to the Peace Breaches of the peace and Acts of Aggression’. Chapter VI deals with the ‘pacific settlements of Dispute’. Chapter VII outlines when the Security Council may authorize armed force to give effect of its decision in threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression.

37 **loc.cit**

38 Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, op.cit. p -57-58

39 **Ibid,** p. 58
Contribution of UN personnel

The United Nation Charter stipulates that to assist in maintaining peace and security around the world, all member States of the United Nation should make available to the Security Council necessary armed forces and facilities. Since 1948 over a hundred nations have contributed military and civilian police personnel to peace operations. While detailed records of all personnel who have served in peacekeeping missions since 1948 are not available, it is estimated that up to one million soldiers, police officers and civilians have served under the United Nation flag in the last 56 years¹. Despite the large number of contributors, the greatest burden continues to be borne by a core group of developing countries‡.

Needful to state that the Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Under Secretary General Jean Marie Guehenno, had reminded member States that ‘the provision of well equipped, well trained and disciplined military and police personnel to United Nation peacekeeping operations is a collective responsibility of member States. Countries from the South should not and must not be expected to shoulder this burden alone’. As of May 2004, in addition to military and police personnel, more that 3,400 international civilian personnel, 1,500 United Nation volunteers and nearly 6,500 local civilian personnel worked in United Nation peacekeeping missions⁴⁰. (For details as on date refer Appendix ‘G’).

Logistics

It is a well recognized fact that not all Governments can provide their battalions with the equipment they need for service abroad. While some equipment is provided by troop contributing countries, a great deal has to come from the United Nations including equipment to fill gaps in under equipped national units. The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment⁴¹. Orders need to be placed with manufactures, which in turn create a number of difficulties. A pre-positioned stock of basic peace keeping equipment should be established, so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, generators, etc. would be immediately available at the start of an operation. Alternatively, Governments should commit themselves to keeping certain equipment specified by the Secretary General, on standby for immediate sale, loan or donation to the United Nations when required. Member States in a position to do so should make air and sealift capacity available to the United Nations free of cost or at lower than commercial rates, which would aid in sharing the financial burden and ultimately reduce the said liabilities.

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¹ As of June 2004, 97 countries were contributing a total of more than 56,000 uniformed personnel the highest number since 1995.

‡ The 10 main troop-contributing countries to United Nation peacekeeping operations as of 30th June 2007 are Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Jordan, Ghana, Uruguay, Italy, Nigeria and France.

⁴⁰ loc. cit

⁴¹ Boutros, Boutros-Ghali,op. cit. p. 6
Safety of Personnel

There is a dire need to provide optimum safety to those United Nations personnel who are deployed in conditions of strife, whether for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building or humanitarian purposes. Depending upon the nature of the situation, different configurations and compositions of security deployments will need to be considered. As the variety and scale of threat widen, innovative measures will be required to deal with the dangers facing United Nations personnel. The ultimate aim is to maintain peace without shedding a drop of blood of either side.

The United Nations Concept of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping as a concept is not specifically described in the United Nations Charter, but it has evolved over the years as an internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts. Since the advent of UN peacekeeping, for the first time military forces have been used not to wage war, establish domination, serve the interests of any power or group of powers rather to control and resolve conflicts between States or communities between States.

The main responsibility for peacekeeping lies with the Security Council. The UN Charter states when the council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, it shall decide what the UN should do to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council looks first for peaceful settlement of the dispute. If the parties involved do not follow its recommendations, it can call for action by the international community, which might include asking member States to make armed forces available to enforce its wishes.

\(^{42}\) Ibid, p. 65
PEACEKEEPING : TRAINING ASPECTS

United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)

Needful to state that following 1963 decision of the General Assembly, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research† (UNITAR) was established in 1965 as an autonomous body within the framework of the United Nations. Its purpose has been to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in achieving its major objectives, particularly the maintenance of international peace and security43 and the promotion of economic and social development. The institute’s training programs deal with subjects of practical value to members of permanent missions to the United Nations‡. Further, UNITAR was restructured by the General Assembly and from 1987; training has been the main focus of activities.

Needful to further state that there is a dire need for further improving the training for peacekeeping operations. This need is felt since civilians from the Secretariat and from Governments such as election monitors, human right monitors and political officers are required to join military personnel in ever large numbers. Civilian police may need additional training with special emphasis on language training. The military command and control capabilities at UN also need to be expanded44. Training and standby arrangements are complementary to each other. In any event, specialized training at various levels is needed ‘for peacekeeping dutiesי. Further, the special committee on peacekeeping operations established by the General Assembly in 1965 had offered comprehensive recommendations regarding training. The United Nations Secretariat had appointed a senior training staff member for this purpose. His responsibilities include, developing policy guidelines, helping organize training seminar for UN personnel and assorting existing regional centers45. This has been a good start but much more needs to be accomplished to reach desirable standards. Training must be included as appropriately, in the training of those military, civilian and police personnel being sent on peacekeeping operations. They must also encourage member States that have already developed such training to share information and experience with other member States46.

†UNITAR is supported by voluntary contributions from member States inter governmental organisations, private foundations and other non-governmental sources.

43 United Nations, op.cit. p.143

‡They include orientation courses on the United Nations, courses on international economics, workshops on the drafting and negotiation of international legal instruments, on dispute settlement and on United Nations documentation, as well as issue oriented training on peace, security, human rights economic and social development, and humanitarian assistance.

44 Kochhar, MR † United Nations, op.cit. p.28

יNordic countries are in the vanguard, while Canada, Nigeria, Ghana and several other countries have introduced partial Training syllabus at their command and staff colleges.


46 Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, op.cit. p.108
Keeping in mind the ever growing need of result oriented training, the General Assembly on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1989 adopted Resolution 44/49 on the ‘Comprehensive Review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’<sup>†</sup>. In the fast moving world of 21<sup>st</sup> century, training has indeed gained vital importance for achieving success. Hence, many armies today have sophisticated training and experience in techniques of low intensity conflicts and aid to the civil power. For such armies only a change in emphasis is necessary, as they already have well-honed skills, directly applicable to peacekeeping<sup>47</sup>.

However, notwithstanding the above, whenever a new peacekeeping operation is established or when a member State contributes for the first time to an existing operation, the Secretariat will endeavor to provide a checklist of any additional points, which should be covered in national training, programs being planned by the concerned nation. It is a well-established fact that the troop contributing governments do provide necessary training to their military personnel at the time that they are to be concentrated, processed and kitted before deployment to the mission area. However, it is recognized that in some cases it may not be possible, for a variety of reasons including lack of equipment used in the peacekeeping operations, for the contributing government to provide all the necessary training. Where possible, any gaps in training will have to be filled by the peacekeeping operation after the troops have been deployed. To this end, it is important that on joining its peacekeeping operation, a contingent or unit should be able to report clearly to the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer what training it has received and what gaps remain to be filled in. It must, however, be emphasized that, given the short period of time for which contingents usually serve in a peacekeeping operation, it is essential that the bulk of the training they require be provided in their home countries before deployment for the peacekeeping operation on the foreign land. This would aid them to become effective from day one and would thus enhance their overall efficiency. Needful to further state that a set of rules for code of personal conduct for Blue Helmets have already been laid down by the United Nations. (For details refer Appendix ‘H’). Also, distinct training norms have been specified which have to be religiously adhered to by all peacekeepers. (For details refer Appendix ‘J’).

**Training Facilities**

Yet another important aspect of training is the availability of training facilities. It is highlighted that due consideration needs to be given to this important issue before any worthwhile training is carried out. Thus, training may normally be imparted in any military garrison which has all the facilities available<sup>‡</sup>.

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<sup>†</sup> Operative paragraph 6 of the Resolution encourages member States to establish national training programs for military and civilian personnel peacekeeping operations and, in this connection, requests the Secretary General to prepare training manuals which member States might wish to use as guidelines for their national or regional training programs.


<sup>‡</sup>The available facilities should include, accommodation for student officers, classroom with projection facilities for transparencies and video, group work facilities with flipcharts, Communications and language teaching facilities and an access to a major exercise area where cross country patrols, checkpoints, observation posts, mine field simulation exercises and cross country driving can be carried out. This world gives the troops a realistic feeling, conduct of exercises with live ammunition also needs to be planned.
Needful to further state that peacekeeping training must adhere to principles that are different from the military concepts and do demand knowledge that is not acquired through military training. Thus, troops participating in peacekeeping operations need to be educated about the principles to be followed by them during tenure of their duties. By so doing, the attitude and conduct of United Nation peacekeeping personnel at all levels is likely to be consistent with the United Nation concepts of Neutrality, Reliability and Impartiality, which indeed is much desired.

**Familiarization Training**

Training must always include weapon training and familiarity with weapons, vehicles and equipment in use in the theatre, more so in the pre-deployment phase. All soldiers serving in a peacekeeping force in units or staff appointments are expected to have attained acceptable levels of competence in weapon training before arriving in the area of operations. Hence, efficiency in this regard must be a pre-requisite for selection. It is thus, necessary during concentration time to check if all soldiers have attained the minimum standards outlined above. If they have not, this must be included in the pre-deployment training. It is also very much desirable that all military personnel in a peacekeeping operation should be familiar with the weapons, vehicles and equipment being used in the area of operation by the parties, throughout the peacekeeping operation. It is needed because for a new peacekeeping operation in a new area of operations, research will be necessary, possibly at Defence Forces HQ Intelligence level, to ascertain the weapons, vehicles and equipment in use by the parties. The next step is to get further technical details from the standard texts such as ‘Jane’s’, ‘National Defence Review’ or other similar publications.

**Mine Awareness Training**

It is alarming and indeed disheartening to note that United Nation peacekeeping operations have over the years suffered relatively heavy casualties i.e. if one considers that their mission is that of peace rather than belligerence. Some of these casualties have been avoidable, especially those sustained by mines and other similar devices. Peacekeeping operations are normally deployed in the vicinity of former battlefields. Therefore, they have to contend with old minefields and many other types of dangerous battlefield debris. They can also find themselves in a situation where some elements among the parties are still engaged in lob intensity operations. This can involve the laying of mines, roadside bombs and other explosive devices, directed against each other or against members of the peacekeeping operation. Needful to state, the United Nation will never have the resources to deal with the whole problem of mines, roadside bombs and miscellaneous battlefield debris.

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† The areas covered will not automatically be included in all programs of training but may be included selectively in certain modules directed at particular training needs.

‡ These texts cover important areas pertaining to service elements such as Infantry weapons, armour; artillery, military vehicles, aircraft; naval vessels and other weapon systems.

48 Ibid, p.33
**Map Reading**

At the face of it, such training may not seem to be so important, however, a good standard of map reading is an important pre-requisite for all Non Commissioned Officer ranks in most Defence Forces. In Peace Keeping Operations, private soldiers may be required to read maps, which would usually be for reporting purposes rather than in order to determine routes, an activity in which an Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) would normally accompany them. Hence, imparting of map reading training becomes a necessity and does demand due attention at all levels.

**First Aid Training**

The basic object of first aid training is to train a soldier in rendering first aid to himself/herself or to his/her comrades at the need of the hour. It is, thus important that first aid training covers important areas†. It is pertinent to state that peacekeeping operations do often operate in geographical areas and conditions outside the experience of many of the military participants. The pressure of peacekeeping may impose prolonged periods of strain on individuals. Other dangers to health will also be prevalent. In these circumstances, a preventive medical care Programme is implemented during the pre-deployment phase. This Programme can be implemented by a series of health awareness lectures and the provision of individual information packs‡. Thus, awareness imparted through training programs will go a long way in keeping the forces ready to be launched, when and where necessary.

**Training In Operating Techniques**

Thus, it is factually correct that the level of training required varies from one contributing country to another. **Full time professional soldiers will require less grounding than reserves.** Full time professionals with experience in aid to the civil power or internal security would have encountered the techniques before but will be required to direct them towards peace keeping, which may involve a less aggressive mode.‡

**Negotiations/Liaison Training**

This is yet another important aspect of United Nations training since liaison with the parties is an essential element of United Nations Peacekeeping. All peacekeeping operations will have a liaison system in place to provide a structured link between the United Nations and the parties through which negotiation of mutual problems can take place. The training for negotiation and liaison will of necessity be restricted.

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† This includes principles of first aid, use and application of field dressings on wounds, slings and knots, hemorrhage control by use or pressure on various pressure points, treatment for shock, fainting, epilepsy, fractures, types and symptoms, treatment including improvised splints, poisons and treatment, artificial respiration to include mouth to month and cardiac massage.

‡ The areas covered should include personnel hygiene and sanitation, food hygiene, water hygiene, avoidance of heat injury, utilization of rest and recreation to combat stress, recognition of stress in self and others, alcohol and/or drug abuse and sexually transmitted diseases.

49 Ibid, p.45
Use of force

It is a very sensitive issue and needs to be well understood by all ranks in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Thus, discussion on the use of force within a peacekeeping operation forms a very important part of the training program. The whole ethos of peacekeeping is that it be achieved without the use of military force. United Nations peacekeeping operations are thus, normally carried out by unarmed observers, armed forces equipped only for self-defence, or combination of both. It is also of concern to note that where armed troops are part of a United Nations peacekeeping operations, the topic of ‘Use of Force’ must be covered in pre-deployment training.

Leadership

Leadership is a very vital ingredient of any meaningful training, since peacekeeping places a large amount of responsibility on leaders at all levels including at the junior officer and non commissioned officer level. Unlike conventional operations where senior leaders will very often be near at hand, peacekeeping is often carried out in isolated positions; scattered checkpoints, small patrols, etc, requiring initiative and decisions to be arrived at by subordinates. Experience also indicates that it is not necessary, in most cases, to undertake separate instructions in leadership in the pre-deployment phase. What is required is an emphasis on the exercise of responsibility and command. Close supervision of junior leaders should be exercised by those responsible for the training.

Specialized Training Areas

Certain specialized training will be required to be completed by military personnel, ideally before commencing service with peacekeeping operations. This type of training may not always be possible during pre-deployment training due to lack of relevant equipment/facilities in the contributing country. In this situation some training will be possible only after arrival in the operational area, which should be an exception rather than the rule.

Driving (Specialist Skills)

At the face of it, skill in driving may not appear to be vital. However, a critical look at its need tells that for military observers, especially for those who may not be used to driving the relevant vehicles, a short familiarization course on four-wheel drive, gearshift and light operational vehicles may be necessary. It is assumed that these officers drive regularly but have limited opportunities to drive military vehicles.

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50 Ibid, p.59

† The subject be dealt by educating troops about definition of force, when force can be used, principles in the application of force, how force is to be applied, authority for the use of force and actions after force has been applied etc.

‡ The training should aim at familiarization followed by driving practice over variable terrain.
Helicopter Training

This is an important training issue since in most Peacekeeping Operations; helicopters are used for reconnaissance, logistics support, casualty evacuation and tactical lift. Troops are thus required to be well versed with operations of helicopters. First priority should be given to unit’s medical personnel in the area of casualty evacuation by helicopter. Support training for casualty evacuation by helicopter covering such aspects as the characteristics of permanent helipads, characteristic construction and operations from temporary helipads, and emergency lighting of helipads, should also be covered. In addition, some training in reconnaissance procedures from helicopter should be conducted for selected officers.

Staff Training

UN Procedures and Reports and Language Training

Experience has dictated that the key to success with international staff officers is correct selection based on qualifications, competence, experience and knowledge of the working language. Staff training should therefore be directed towards revision of the subject area followed by familiarization with UN towards procedures and use of various United Nations reports and returns. For aspiring United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), familiarization with United Nations reporting formats is essential. Likewise, language training can only afford to concentrate on revision and practice of already achieved linguistic skills.

Media Reports

United Nations Peacekeeping operations have always been a media interest area. During a tour of duty it is almost inevitable that there will be a media visit to units of a peacekeeping force. Observer missions can similarly expect visits in the field. In addition to officers filling Media Relations appointments, officers and soldiers in the field can expect to be interviewed by the media and thus a general briefing during pre deployment training should be essential as a minimum. For personnel’s most likely to be the focus of media attention, every effort should be made to provide some media training for all ranks and specific issues for a selected few.

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51 Ibid, p.74

† Helicopter training should include preparing casualty for evacuation by helicopter, how to approach the helicopter with the casualty and the use of specialized evacuation equipment (mountain rescue stretchers, winching etc).

52 Ibid, p.74

‡ At unit level, it is important also to have a staff officer trained in media relations. At that level it would be unusual to have an actual appointment of press officer but the position would normally be filled by one of the four main staff officers. The usual appointee is the information officer or any other suitable and capable officer

‡ Commanding Officers, Operations Officers, Company Commanders and Support Commanders would generally be the focus of media.
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON BALKANS
UNSCOB : 1947 – 1951

Needful to state that, Germany’s occupation of Greece during World War II, gave rise to an underground resistance movement known as the National Liberation Front. Although National Liberation Front and its military wing the National People’s Liberation Army operated under the auspices of the Greek Communist Party there were many non-communists in its ranks. Differences between communists and non-communists developed, from 1944, into open civil war. Further, in due course of time, as the civil war spread northwards the communist guerillas were to start receiving military help from the newly established communist States of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. This had the effect of raising tensions to such an extent as to warrant United Nations action. As per the historical records, United Nations for the first time setup a Special Commission on Balkans (UNSCOB) in 1947, wherein, only a few independent and impartial observation groups were used. It is indeed debatable whether the said United Nations action qualifies to designate UNSCOB as a peace keeping operation or not, although, the mission had demonstrated the United Nations first step towards peacekeeping.

It is worthwhile to highlight the fact that ever since United Nations came into existence in 1945, UNSCOB was the United Nations first attempt at placing observers on the ground to determine facts. However, it was inevitable that the operation would not contain all the elements of what was later to be a peace endeavor. Subsequently, UNSCOB was accused of biased reporting in favour of the Greek government. Further, although United Nations peacekeeping during the Cold War was to be based upon the principle of consent, Albania and Yugoslavia never allowed UNSCOB observers on their territory. Despite these and many other problems, UNSCOB did provide the United Nations with invaluable experience by successfully indicating how difficult it was to influence the activities of States. This, in itself, contributed greatly to the emergence of the element of impartiality in peacekeeping, which proved in due course to be one of the most dedicated principles of the United Nations peacekeeping, to date.

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION
UNTSO : 1948 – TODATE

With the fog of confusion which prevailed for quite some time about the status of the United Nations first observer mission (UNSCOB), the debate led to various renounced military historians and other academicians to believe UNTSO to be the first United Nations mission during the Cold War Period.

53 Higgins, R., ‘United Nations peacekeeping, documents and commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979, p.5-7
55 Stephen, M. Hill and Shahin P Malik, op.cit, p.28
Thus, it can well be inferred that UNTSO, has been identified as the first peacekeeping operation, which continues ever since than to-date to operate in the Middle East. It initially came into being during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 to supervise the truce called for in Palestine by the Security Council. UNTSO’s activities have been and still are spread over territory within five States and therefore it has relations with five host countries namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic.

Observer Group’s

The, Truce Commission was established by the Security Council in May 1948. It brought to the Council’s attention the need for control personnel for effective supervision of the cease fire, which the Council had called for when it created the Commission. As the situation worsened, the Commission, on 21 May formally asked the Council to send military observers to assist it.

The observers remained under their respective army establishments, for the purpose of their administration, receiving their normal remunerations from their Governments but getting a daily subsistence allowance from the United Nations, which also met extra expenses resulting from the mission. Since, the distinctive blue beret with United Nations badge was not in use at that time, the observers wore their national uniform with United Nations arm bands. During their assignments with the organisation, the observers were to take orders only from the United Nations authorities and the parties to the conflict were required to co-operate with them. It was the first group of 36 observers, which arrived in Cairo by mid June 1948 and they were immediately deployed in Palestine and some of the Arab countries. The number of observers was subsequently further increased to 93, where in each of the States members of the Truce Commission contributed an equal number of 31 observers to UNTSO.

The methodology of operation has been simple i.e. these observers were and do remain unarmed to date. They operated then, as they still do, with the consent of the parties and have to dependent on the co-operation of the parties for their effectiveness. Thus, they had no power to prevent a violation of the truce or to enforce any decisions and there was no element of enforcement in their functioning although their very presence was something to a deterrent to violations of the truce. In the case of any complaint or incident where they could not achieve a settlement between the parties on the spot, their only recourse was to report the matter to their supervisors and ultimately to the Mediator. By so doing i.e. the observers were and the truce had been in a position to ensure maintenance of peace and order in the affected region.

† In 1949 its military observers remained to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and Arab neighbours, which remained for many years the main basis of the uneasy truce in the whole area.

57 United Nations, op. cit, p.16

58 Ibid, p.17

59 Ibid, p.18
As the observers for the first truce and their equipment had already left the area, the new operation had to be created and equipped from scratch. However, profiting from the experience gained earlier, the Mediator† was able to set up a larger and more effective operation in a relatively short time. Increased tension led to renewed fighting in October in Jerusalem, the Negev and to a lesser extent, the Lebanese sector. The Security Council adopted a series of decisions and resolutions to restore the ceasefire and strengthen the observation operation.

It is indeed, heartening to note that UNTSO played a crucial role in helping to bring the June 1967 war to an end and thus aided ultimately in prevention of further loss of men and material on both sides. It did its assigned task with efficiency and provided results by conducting cease-fire observation operations from 1967 to 1973.

Activities since 1973

On commencement of the YOM KIPPUR WAR between Egypt and Israel in October 1973, as far as UNTSO was concerned, Security Council resolution‡ provided for an increase in the number of UNTSO observers in the Egypt-Israel sector and gave them the task of assisting and co-operating with UNEF II in fulfillment of that Force’s mandate. During the initial phase, the observers manned certain checkpoints and observation posts in the area controlled by UNEF II. They also assisted in exchanges of prisoners of war and undertook search for bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities⁶⁰. In addition, some observers were assigned duties of staff officers at UNEF II headquarters.

Later on the observers conducted patrols in the buffer zone established in Sinai and carried out inspections of the date of limitation of forces and armament on both sides of the buffer zone. Pertinent to state that while the observers remained administratively attached to UNTSO, they were placed under the operational control of the Commander of UNEF II to ensure optimum utilization of such nominated observer staff.

Observer Group Egypt

Observers in the Egypt Israel sector are organized as Observer Group Egypt (OGE) operate six outposts in the Sinai, one outpost being at Ismailia and conducts patrols in most parts of the Sinai, except for an area under the Multinational Force and Observers. OGE headquarters in Cairo maintains liaison for UNTSO with the Egyptian authorities.

† Mediator was assassinated in Jerusalem by Jewish terrorists belonging to the Lehi organisation, also known as the Stern Gang on 17th September 1948. Ralph Bunch took over the Mediator’s duties and was appointed Acting Mediator.

‡ 340 (173) of 25 October 1973

⁶⁰ Ibid, p.36
Assistance to United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

When the Security Council established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in March 1978, UNTSO cease-fire observation in the Israel-Lebanon sector was discontinued and the observers were assigned to assist UNIFIL in the fulfillment of its tasks. It was stipulated, however, that the military observers of UNTSO would continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of the mandate of UNIFIL as per directions given in United Nations document S/12611. The observers assigned to assist UNIFIL were formed into Observer Group Lebanon† (OGL) and were placed under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL. They continue to man the five observation posts along with the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation Line and operate four mobile teams in parts of the UNIFIL area of operation, including those that are under Israeli control and where UNIFIL units are not deployed.

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN UNMOGIP : 1949- TODATE

The ‘Kashmir Issue’ has its roots directly related to the actions that took place at the time of division of India and the sequence of events that followed after its independence. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was an Indian princely State, which became free, under the partition plan and the Indian Independence Act of 1947, to accede to India or Pakistan, on both of which it borders. Geography and religion however has made it relatively difficult and thus one of the most serious outstanding issue even today is that of Kashmir61.

However, due to the failure on the part of Kashmir’s Hindu ruler to take into account the wishes of the predominantly Muslim population, the majority of who sought union with Pakistan, resulted in riots breaking out. This led to invasion by Pakistan, forcing Kashmir’s ruler to turn to India for military assistance, which agreed on condition that the State accede. The subsequent accession of Kashmir to India resulted in war breaking out between India and Pakistan on 24th October 194762. This United Nation involvement came about as a result of India’s complaint to the Security Council in early 1948 that Pakistan was threatening international peace and security through its invasion of Kashmir. As per available detailed information, the question first came before the Security Council in January 1948,63 when India complained that tribesmen and others were invading Kashmir and that extensive fighting was taking place. India charged that Pakistan was assisting and participating in the invasion. Pakistan denied India’s charges and declared that Kashmir’s accession to India following India’s independence in 1947 was illegal.

† OGL comprises of 65 military observers.

61 James, A, ‘Peacekeeping in International Politics’, p.158


63 United Nations document, S/628
Thus, having found the need of its intervention, the Security Council set up a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to investigate and mediate, first on the Jammu and Kashmir situation and, when so directed by the council, on other situations complained of by Pakistan. The Council recommended various measures, including the use of observers, to stop the fighting and to create conditions for a plebiscite. To assist in carrying out these measures, United Nations instructed the Commission to proceed at once to the region and place its good offices at the disposal of India and Pakistan.

Accordingly, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan arrived in the subcontinent on 7th July 1948 and immediately engaged in consultations with the Indian and Pakistan authorities. On 20th July, the Commission asked the Secretary General to appoint and send, if possible at once, a high ranking officer to act as a military adviser to commission and further to appoint officers and necessary personnel who would be ready to travel to the Indian subcontinent at a moments notice in order to supervise the ceasefire if and when it was reached64.

The Military Adviser defined the tasks of the observers†. Any direct intervention by the observer between the opposition parties or any interference in the armies order were to be avoided since the local commander might bring alleged violence of the cease-fire by the other side to the attention of the observer for their action. These arrangements remained in effect until the conclusion of the Karachi agreement. Accordingly, it was as an outcome of United Nations decision that the third and final peacekeeping mission was set up by the United Nations during the first period in 1949. Its mandate was similar to that of UNTSO‡. Needful to state that UNMOGIP and UNTSO both have demonstrated that without a lasting political settlement between the disputants themselves, peacekeeping operations have the potential for continuing for decades. In the case of UNMOGIP, settlement over the Kashmir issue has not been forthcoming ever since 1949 although both India and Pakistan had gained independence from the British soon after adoption of the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

The Commission made proposals to both India and Pakistan on a ceasefire and troop withdrawal, and proposed that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir be decided by plebiscite. Both sides accepted. The ceasefire came into effect on 1st January 1949, and United Nations military observers were deployed in the area to supervise it. In July 1949, a ceasefire line was established in Jammu and Kashmir, under an agreement between the two countries reached in Karachi under the United Nations Commission.

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64 United Nations documents, S/1100, annex 25

† The tasks were to accompany the local authority in their investigation, gather as much information as possible, and report as completely accurately and as possible to the observer in charge of the Group.

‡ The mandate being, to oversee the ceasefire between the two ex-belligerents, to prevent minor incidents from escalating into major conflicts and to report on each side’s compliance with the arms limitation agreement.
With conclusion of the Karachi agreement in 1949, the situation along the ceasefire line became more stable. Incidents took place from time to time but they were generally minor and were dealt in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. This situation continued until the new Secretary General issued a report on 3rd September 1965\textsuperscript{65}.

Unfortunately, hostilities between India and Pakistan had broken out in August 1965. The Security Council called for a ceasefire, and fighting was brought to a stop in September with the assistance of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which had been set up under the Council’s 1948 resolution establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. At the same time, the Secretary General organized observers to supervise the ceasefire along the India Pakistan border, through a mission which came to be known as the United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM).

\textbf{UNITED NATIONS INDIA PAKISTAN OBSERVER MISSION}  
\textbf{UNIPOM : 1965-1966}

At a series of meetings of India and Pakistan, convened by the representative of the Secretary General in January 1966, a plan and ground rules for withdrawals were worked out. On 10\textsuperscript{th} January, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan had agreed, in a joint Declaration at Tashkent, where they met under the auspices of the Soviet Union that their armed personnel would be withdrawn no later than 25\textsuperscript{th} February to positions held before 5\textsuperscript{th} August 1965\textsuperscript{66}. The withdrawal of troops was carried out in February 1966 under the supervision of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM military observers.

\textbf{Establishment of UNIPOM}

The established machinery of UNMOGIP in Kashmir exercised the supervision called for by the Security Council. For this purpose, its observer strength was increased to a total of 102 from the same contributing countries, as before\textsuperscript{67}.

The ongoing hostility between India and Pakistan provides a classic example of the failure of both the disputants and the Security Council to address long term issues. Mediation efforts during the 1965 war clearly indicated how long term solutions were overlooked in exchange for short term gain in the form of a ceasefire. The intention here is not to place the blame on the United Nations but to point out how weakly placed the Security Council was during the Cold War to coerce the disputants to compromise.

\textsuperscript{65} United Nations document, S/6651

\textsuperscript{66} United Nations, op.cit., p.165

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, p.163
The Security Council established another observer mission to complement the work of UNMOGIP. UNIPOM was thus established as a temporary measure for the purpose of supervising the ceasefire along the border between India and Pakistan, outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir,\textsuperscript{68} basically to supervise withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops and equipment. The main function of UNIPOM was to observe and report on breaches of the cease-fire called for by Security Council\textsuperscript{69}. Despite numerous ceasefire violations during the course of its existence, UNIPOM finally reported, on 26\textsuperscript{th} February 1966, that the disputants had completed their withdrawal.

On 26\textsuperscript{th} February 1966\textsuperscript{70} the Secretary General reported that the withdrawal of the troops by India and Pakistan had been completed as scheduled i.e. by 25\textsuperscript{th} February, and that the withdrawal provisions of the Security Council’s Resolutions had thus been fulfilled by the two parties. As planned, UNIPOM was terminated on 22\textsuperscript{nd} March 1966 and the 59 additional observers appointed in September 1965 to the Military Observer Group were gradually withdrawn. From that date until December 1971, UNMOGIP functioned on the basis of the Karachi Agreement in much the same way as it had done before September 1965.

Later, in October 1971, the Secretary General offered his good offices to India and Pakistan in dealing with the deteriorating situation but this was not accepted by India. In December, when full scale hostilities broke out between the two countries, he notified the Security Council under Article 99 of the Charter that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security.

After a ceasefire had put an end to the fighting on 17\textsuperscript{th} December, the Security Council demanded its strict observance until withdrawal of all armed forces to their territories and to positions respecting the ceasefire line in Kashmir supervised by UNMOGIP. The Council also called for international assistance to relieve the suffering and authorized the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative to aid in solving humanitarian problems.

In July 1972, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan signed at Shimla, an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir which with minor deviations, followed the same course as the ceasefire line established in the Karachi agreement of 1949\textsuperscript{71}. Also in 1972, with United Nations assistance, refugees returned to their homeland while the United Nations relief operation aided the war shattered economy of Bangladesh, which became a Member of the United Nations in 1974.

\textsuperscript{68} United Nations document, S/6699/Add.3

\textsuperscript{69} United Nations, op. cit., pp.164

\textsuperscript{70} United Nations document, S/6179/Add.6

\textsuperscript{71} United Nations, op.cit, p.170
Functioning of UNMOGIP

On 12th May 1972, Secretary General reported to the Security Council that, while the Pakistan military authorities continued to submit to UNMOGIP complaints of cease fire violations by the other side, the Indian military authorities had stopped doing so. The situation concerning the functioning of UNMOGIP remained unchanged and as a result, the Secretary General could not keep the Council fully informed of developments relating to the observance of the ceasefire. The Secretary General expressed the hope that, in keeping with the demand of the Security Council, the ceasefire would be strictly observed and that both sides would take effective measures to ensure that there was no recurrence of fighting. He noted and ensured that the UNMOGIP machinery continued to be available to the parties.

In the absence of an agreement, UNMOGIP observers continued to be deployed along both sides of the cease-fire line established under the Shimla agreement. As of March 1992, UNMOGIP had strength of 39 observers from various contributing countries. The number of observers, which stood at 44 at the end of 1971 had been reduced to 36 by June 1990 as a result of a decision by certain contributing countries to withdraw their observers, as of the later date, the observers were provided by eight contributing countries.†

Current status

As on 31st January 2007 the strength of the mission consists of 44 military observers, supported by 23 international civilian personnel and 49 local civilian staff.

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE I

UNEF I : 1956-1967

At the very outset of the assertive period i.e. in October 1956 itself the United Nations faced a major crisis. The 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded and supervision by the United Nations collapsed when Israel and two major Powers occupied large portions of Egyptian territory. The organisation reacted to the crisis with speed and firmness and to overcome it, conceived a new form of peacekeeping and set up its first peacekeeping emergency force. This historic development was made possible mainly through the vision, resourcefulness and determination of the then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.

Following Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Israel and later France and the United Kingdom intervened militarily against Egypt. The General Assembly, meeting in an emergency special session, called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of those forces from Egyptian territory and authorized the establishment of the United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF-I), the first United Nations peacekeeping force. UNEF supervised the troops withdrawal and was then deployed on Egyptian territory with Egypt’s consent, to act as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Its international frontier south of the Gaza Strip brought relative quiet to the area.

72 United Nations documents, S/10467/Add.4
73 United Nations, op.cit., p.169
† The contributory countries being Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay.
74United Nations, op.cit., p.16
The Canal, blocked as a result of the conflict, was cleared by the United Nations. Needful to state that there were significant differences between, UNEF-I and the peacekeeping operations, which preceded it. The size and the complexity of the force itself were suggestive of the magnitude of the problem.75

Yet, another example of the UN’s strengthened objectives was that role played by the Secretary General during this crisis far outweighed any functions that he fulfilled during the preceding years.76 This was largely due to the fact that the need for careful diplomacy was much greater particularly as two western members of the Security Council, Britain and France had militarily invaded a Third World country, and in doing so had increased the potential for a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and some western nations. It was on 1st November 1956 that the General Assembly adopted a resolution, which proposed an immediate ceasefire and instructed Israel to withdraw behind the Armistice lines. It also called upon Britain and France to halt their advance on Egypt. Other resolutions were adopted between 2nd and 5th November which called upon the Secretary General to submit a plan for the setting up of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.77 Resolution 1000, adopted on 5th November, accepted the Secretary General’s plan and established a United Nations Command.

UNEF-I is particularly important for United Nations peacekeeping as it established a number of principles which were used in subsequent operations. These included questions concerning the status of the Force, privileges and immunities for the Force, civil jurisdiction and freedom of movement. As regards to UNEF-I itself, the Chief of Command for the Force was to be appointed by the UN, and he was authorized to recruit officers from UNSTO. These conditions were designed to ensure that his position remained independent of the policies of any one nation. In addition, despite proposals that UNEF-I guaranteed the rights of passage through the Canal, its functions rested upon two basic factors: first that the Force was to be an emergency one and second, it was to be temporary in nature, as its mandate was not intended to influence the military balance in the region.78

UNEF was finally withdrawn in May 1967 since armed hostility between Syria and Israel resulted in Egyptian demands for the withdrawal of UNEF I. Thus, the Force did nevertheless, successfully demonstrated both the importance of peacekeeping operations and its limitations and provided valuable lessons. On the one hand the United Nations presence helped maintain peace in what was otherwise a volatile situation, but in being unable to address the underlying reasons for conflict, the United Nations did not contribute to a lasting peace, which in fact was actually aimed at.

75 Burns, A.L. and Heathcote, N., ‘Peacekeeping by UN Forces,’ p.9
It was during the month of May 1958 that an armed rebellion broke out in Lebanon when President Camille Chamoun (a Maronite Christian) made known his intention to seek an amendment to the Constitution, which would enable him to be re-elected for a second term. The disturbances, which started in the predominantly Moslem city of Tripoli, soon spread to Beirut and the northern and northeastern areas near the Syrian border and assumed the proportions of a civil war, resulting in loss of men and material.

However, immediately on the occurrence of these untoward incidents, Lebanese Government on 22\textsuperscript{nd} May\textsuperscript{79} requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaint ‘in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’. It charged that the United Arab Republic was encouraging and supporting the rebellion by supply of large quantities of arms to subversive elements in Lebanon, by the infiltration of armed personnel from Syria into Lebanon, by conducting a violent press and radio campaign against the Lebanese Government thereby making shape of things indeed very difficult for Lebanon.

Later, the Security Council on 27\textsuperscript{th} May decided to include the Lebanese complaint on its agenda but at the request of Iraq, agreed to postpone the debate to permit the League of Arab States to try and find a settlement to the dispute. After the League had met for six days without reaching an agreement, the Council took up the case and on 11\textsuperscript{th} June, adopted resolution 128 (1958),\textsuperscript{†} which was supported by both Lebanon and the United Arab Republic and formed the basis for the establishment of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).

**Creation of UNOGIL**

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold told the Council that as a result of adoption of the Security Council's resolution, all the necessary preparatory steps had already been taken\textsuperscript{80}. Keeping in mind the need of the hour and without loosing time, 10 observers were immediately detached from UNTSO for assignment with UNOGIL. Five of them arrived in Beirut on 12\textsuperscript{th} June and began active reconnaissance on the following morning. The plan was to cover as many areas as possible and to probe further each day in the direction of the Syrian border so as to observe any illegal infiltration of personnel and supply of arms across the border. The number of observers was rapidly increased with new arrivals and reached 100 by 16\textsuperscript{th} June.

\textsuperscript{79} UN document S/4007

\textsuperscript{†} Through this resolution it decided to dispatch urgently to Lebanon an observation group ‘so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders’.

\textsuperscript{80} United Nations, op.cit, p.176
These observer were drawn from 21 countries.† Two helicopters were placed at the disposal of the Group on 23rd June and they were supplemented shortly thereafter by four light observation aircrafts, thereby enhancing their physical observation and surveillance capabilities.

Method of Operation

So as to ensure better understanding and smooth functioning of plans, the three members of UNOGIL assembled in Beirut on 19th June under the personal Chairmanship of Dag Hammarskjold, who had arrived in the area the day before. As outlined by the Secretary General, the role of UNOGIL was strictly limited to observation, to ascertain whether illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders was occurring. It was not UNOGIL’s task to mediate, arbitrate or forcefully to prohibit illegal infiltration, although it was hoped that its very presence on the borders would deter any such traffic81. The borders meant those between Lebanon and Syria, since the Armistice Demarcation Line between Israel and Lebanon was covered by UNTSO and not involved in the present case.

Later, in order to have uniformity of actions and clarity of directions, it was decided that the Group should discharge its duties by the specified methods82 which were full proof in their implementation‡.

† These countries being Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma (now Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden and Thailand.

81 United Nations, op.cit, p.177

82 UN Document S/4040

‡ The methods specified were that UNOGIL military observers would conduct regular and frequent patrols of all accessible roads from dawn to dusk, primarily in border districts and the areas adjacent to the zones held by the opposition forces.

- A system of permanent observation posts was to be established and manned by military observers. There were initially 10 such stations. The observers at these stations attempted to check all reported infiltration in their areas and to observe any suspicious development.

- An emergency reserve of military observers was to be stationed at headquarters and main observation posts for the purpose of making inquiries at short notice or investigating alleged instances of smuggling.

- An evaluation team was to be set up at headquarters to analyze, evaluate and coordinate all information received from observers and other sources.

- Aerial reconnaissance was to be conducted by light aero planes and helicopters, the former being equipped for aerial photography.

- The Lebanese Government would provide the Observation Group with all available information about suspected infiltration. The Group would also request the military observers to make specific inquiries into alleged activities as occasion required.
First UNOGIL Report

Immediately after having got the foothold in the initial stages, it was on 1st July 1958 that UNOGIL submitted its first report to the Security Council. The report, which dealt with the problems of observation arising from the political, military and geographical circumstances prevailing in Lebanon, indicated that the observers were facing difficulties in gaining access to much of the frontier area held by the opposition forces and could provide no substantiated or conclusive evidence of major infiltration.

It is a fact that at the initial stages of its formulation, the military observers encountered serious difficulties in approaching the eastern and northern frontiers, where large areas were in opposition hands. Arrangements were also made for inspection by military observers of all vehicles and cargoes entering Lebanon across the northern frontier. This ensured transparency to quite an extent and enhanced confidence of the affected lot. With the sudden changes in environmental sphere, new complications arose outside Lebanon's borders. On 14th July 1958, the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq was overthrown in a coup d'état and replaced with a Republican regime. This event had serious repercussions both on Lebanon and Jordan. On the same day, President Chamoun requested United States intervention to protect Lebanon's political independence and territorial integrity.

Secretary General's Plan

A very deliberate thought having been gone in the Secretary General's plan was to increase the strength of UNOGIL as soon as possible to enable it to carry out fully its mission and thus expedite the withdrawal of the United States troops. The number of personnel, which stood at 200 on 17th July 1958, was increased to 287 by 20th September and to 591 in mid-November including 32 non commissioned officers in support of ground operations and 90 such officers in the air section. In November, UNOGIL had 18 aircrafts, 6 helicopters, 290 vehicles and 49 permanently manned posts of all types had been established. This increases of men, material and machines aided in carrying out the mission with optimum efficiency.

Further UNOGIL Report

After having observed and making reasonable headway, it was on 30th July that UNOGIL submitted a periodic report on its activities and observations. Later, in a report of 14th August, UNOGIL indicated that just before the election of President Chehab, there had been a noticeable reduction of tension throughout the country and a comparable absence of armed clashes between Government and opposition forces. Since 31st July, there had been a virtual nationwide truce with only occasional reports of sporadic firing in some areas.

83 United Nation Documents S/4040 and Add.1.

84 United Nation Documents S/4069

85 United Nation Documents S/4085
The report also indicated that by dint of their perseverance and tact in dealing with difficult and often dangerous situations, the observers had won back the ground lost. After 15th July most of the permanent stations in opposition held areas envisaged by the Group had been established, and other stations were expected to be set up shortly. In its next report to the Security Council, which was circulated on 29th September 1958, UNOGIL stated that during the period being reviewed, its military observers had not only been able to re-establish confidence in the independent nature of their activities, but had won for themselves the trust and understanding of all sections of the population. Despite the presence of a considerable number of men under arms, there had been no significant clashes between the Lebanese Army and organized opposition Forces. No cases of infiltration had been detected and yet infiltration was still taking place. Its extent must be regarded as insignificant, which clearly shows the effectiveness and efficiency of UNOGIL.

Stage was now finally set for things to take appropriate shape. Hence, in a letter dated 1st October the United Kingdom informed the Secretary General that it had agreed with the Jordanian Government that the withdrawal of British troops should begin on 20th October. On 8th October the United States announced that, by agreement with the Lebanese Government, it had been decided to complete the withdrawal of United States forces by the end of October. The withdrawal of United States troops was completed by 25th October and that of the British troops by 2nd November. Interestingly, the historical records do confirm that in a letter dated 16th November 1958. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon stated that cordial and close relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic had resumed their normal course. In order to dispel any misunderstanding which might hamper such relations, the Lebanese Government requested the Security Council to delete the Lebanese complaint from its agenda.

Based on the above developments and having achieved the assigned task, in its final report, dated 17th November 1958 UNOGIL recommended that the operation should be withdrawn since its task might be regarded as completed. On 21st November, the Secretary General submitted to the Security Council a plan for the withdrawal of the operation formulated by the Observation Group, which was acceptable to Lebanon. Thus, it was in accordance with that plan, the closing down of stations and substations preparatory to the withdrawal of UNOGIL which began on 26th November and were completed by the end of the month. The observers were withdrawn in three phases i.e. the key staff, the personnel required for air service and the logistic components leaving last. The withdrawal was completed by 9th December 1958 and the mission had very successfully achieved its assigned task within a short span of merely six months.

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86 UN Document, S/4100
87 UN Document, A/3937
88 UN Document, A/3942
89 UN Document, S/4113
90 UN Document, S/4114
91 UN Document, S/4116
It is important to overlook the importance of both UNEF-I and UNOGIL for United Nations peacekeeping as a whole. Both operations, though significantly different from each other, were to provide a set of guidelines and principle upon which subsequent peacekeeping operations could be formed. In addition to formalizing the principles of host nation consent and the use of armed force only in self-defense, other factors were to become peculiar to peacekeeping during and after the 1960s. Amongst these were right conferred upon United Nations personnel, which made them immune from prosecution in local courts. Connected to this was a provision, which ensured freedom of movement for United Nations personnel within the area of operation. As mentioned earlier, one crucial development for peacekeeping had been the principle of maintenance of strict impartiality. In order to ensure this neutrality, units from Permanent member States were excluded from field operations. It is pertinent to note that, the only time when a Permanent member was involved as part of a UN peacekeeping operation during the Cold War was in the case of the UN Mission in Cyprus which contained British Soldiers.

**UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO**

**ONUC : 1960-1964**

Since its inception, United Nations peacekeeping operations had different tasks to perform with a view to ultimately bring in peace and harmony. Thus, we may say that the United Nations peacekeeping operations before 1960 had included monitoring ceasefires along tense structured ceasefire lines and borders such as those in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan. Also, peacekeeping had in most cases, revolved around keeping two belligerents apart. The Congo presented a much more complex and rapidly changing environment with little or no structure with the function of ONUC to save a country from disintegration in the face of an imperfect decolonization effort.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nation Unies au Congo, or ONUC), which took place in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from July 1960 until June 1964, by far is one of the largest peacekeeping operation ever established by the United Nations in term of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operations and the manpower involved. Originally mandate was to provide the Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance which it required following the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops, ONUC became embroiled by the force of circumstances in a chaotic internal situation of extreme complexity and had to assume certain responsibilities which went beyond normal peacekeeping duties. The policy followed by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in the Congo brought him into direct conflict with the Soviet Union and serious disagreement with some other Powers.

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92 Burns and Heathcote, op. cit, p.19  
93 Stephen M. Hill and Shahin P. Malik, op.cit, p.37  
† In addition to a peacekeeping force which comprised at its peak strength nearly 20,000 officers and men, it also included, an important Civilian Operations component.
Apart from being one of the most complicated of all peacekeeping operations, it cost the UN dearly in terms of finances and lives including that of the Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. Also it finally led to a grave political and financial crises within the UN itself. It was, the United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjold, who saw the crisis in the Congo as an opportunity to test the principle of preventive diplomacy since, in his opinion, it was of special significance in areas where the crisis was said to be the direct result of the creation of a power vacuum. Further, Congo presented just such an example where the termination of the colonial system was leading to serious conflict and a breakdown of society. The UN’s institutional intervention, therefore, was aimed at temporary filling the power vacuum created by the withdrawing colonial power.

Thus, giving the newly independent State time to develop its own political, economical and geographical cohesion Ralph Bunche, a senior United Nations official was appointed as Special Representative and Commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo by Hammarskjold. The establishment of this office itself was a new invention for United Nations. Peacekeeping missions had initially been headed by government representatives answerable to the Security Council but in Congo since the task had been entrusted to the Secretary General by the Council, his representative was answerable to him alone.

In his first report on the implementation of the resolution, the Secretary General outlined the principles which would govern the organisation and activities of the United Nations Forces in the Congo, its composition and the action he had taken or envisaged taking to establish it. The principles, which had governed the peacekeeping action taken by UNEF-I were to be the basis for ONUC. UNEF I had set the pattern for preventive diplomacy through peacekeeping. The Security General invoked other principles of peacekeeping, which had been established in preceding operations. These included factors such as firstly ONUC was to have the status of a temporary security force deployed with the consent of the host State. Secondly, the UN was to retain command of Force and even though it was to aid the Congolese Government in the maintenance of law and order, it was not to become involved in any internal conflict, thus maintaining an air of impartiality. Thirdly other important factors included the provisions that ONUC was to have free access to areas of operation and the normal rules of engagement (use of force only in self defence for instance) were to apply.

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94 United Nations, op.cit, p.215


96 Ibid, p.5

97 Dayal, R, ‘Mission for Hammarskjold, the Congo crises’, p.7

98 United Nations, op.cit, p.220
Having emphasized on the principle to be adhered and with the aim of setting up the Forces speedily, the Secretary General had accepted offers of troops by Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia. These five countries were to provide seven battalions; with a total strength of 4,000 men. Arrangements were to be made to airlift the battalions to the Congo as soon as possible. An offer of troops from Mali had also been received and the same was to be activated at a later stage.

Need for more troops were felt since the responsibilities of the United Nations in Congo had further expanded. Thus, the Secretary General requested and obtained more battalions and support personnel. In addition to the military units, ONUC had a Civilian Operations component, which employed some 2,000 experts and technicians to provide the Congolese Government with extensive assistance in the administrative, technical and humanitarian fields. This was one such joint operation at a massive scale where the overall efficiency of planning and effective execution of United Nations missions may be said to have been tested.

Mission Objectives

It is indeed very important to analyze the major objectives which the Force was to undertake. Basically, the two main objectives of ONUC during the initial phase were to help the Congolese Government restore law and order and bring about the speedy withdrawal of the Belgian forces. These objectives were closely related.

Withdrawal of Belgian troops outside Katanga

The withdrawal began in a very systematic way. To start with, the first troops of the United Nations Force arrived at Leopoldville on the evening of 15th July and were deployed the next morning. Their presence indeed had an immediate calming effect in an extremely tense situation. On 16th July consequent upon the arrival of the United Nations troops, the first contingents of the Belgian Armed Forces had left Leopoldville and returned to their bases on the same day.

The detailed planning done came very handy since the original plan continued without change. As soon as new United Nations contingents arrived, they were deployed in the positions occupied by Belgian troops.

99 Ibid, p. 221

† The Force reached a total of 19,828 at its peak strength by July 1961. From then on, as some of its responsibilities were fulfilled, the strength of Force was proportionately reduced.

100 United Nations, op. cit., p.222

‡ They brought about the complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Leopoldville and the surrounding area on 23rd July 1960, and from the whole of the Congo, except Katanga and the two bases, by the beginning of August 1960.
Withdrawal from Katanga

A difficult task lay ahead before ONUC with regard to the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga. Thus, the next step was the entry of United Nations troops into the province of Katanga. The Secretary General had hoped for a peaceful United Nations entry into Katanga. He viewed ONUC as Force established under the recommendatory powers of Chapter VI\(^{101}\). The Katanga authorities strongly opposed the entry of United Nations troops and, citing this opposition, the Belgian Government was reluctant to withdraw its Forces from Katanga. However, the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga on 12\(^{th}\) August 1960 set off a process of withdrawal of Belgian troops from the province. It is heartening to note that, despite difficult circumstances, ONUC brought about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the whole of Congo within six weeks. However, the secession of Katanga did remain unresolved for some more time to come\(^{102}\).

Out of all the above stated assigned tasks, the maintenance of law and order was the heaviest of all the tasks falling upon ONUC. In order to carry out this task the Secretary General set up a United Nations Force\(^{†}\). This major responsibility could not have been carried out without deliberate action and clear directions. Thus, immediately on their arrival in the Congo, United Nations soldiers were officially instructed that they were members of a Peace Force, not a Fighting Force, that they had been asked to come in response to an appeal from the Congolese Government, that their task was to help in restoring order and calm in a troubled country and that they should give protection against acts of violence to all the people, Africans and Europeans alike. They were also told that although they carried arms, they were to use them only in self-defence; they were in the Congo to help everyone and to harm no one\(^{103}\).

Adherence of clear orders and instructions and by following the laid down detailed procedures, the Force restored law and order, protected life and property and ensured the continued operation of essential services wherever it was deployed. While, the tasks assigned to ONUC were of carrying out its mission of peace, the United Nations Force suffered many casualties. On 8\(^{th}\) November 1960, tribesmen in northern Katanga ambushed a patrol of 11 Irish soldiers and eight of them were killed. Another incident occurred on 24\(^{th}\) November when Ghanaian Embassy in Leopoldville was attacked. The Tunisian unit that guarded the Embassy incurred several casualties, including one fatality\(^{104}\).

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\(^{†}\) Said UN Force at its peak strength numbered nearly 20,000. But even at its peak strength, the Force was hardly sufficient and was severely strained, in as much as its responsibilities had to encompass such a vast land as the Congo.

\(^{103}\) Ibid, p.226.

\(^{104}\) Ibid, p.230
The period after Lumumba's death\textsuperscript{105} followed the adoption of UN Resolution 161 of 21\textsuperscript{st} February 1961, which stressed the threat to international peace and security and advocated the use of Force, as a last resort. The difficulties were compounded by the hostile attitude of the de facto authorities of Leopoldville and Elizabethville. These authorities interpreted the Council's new resolution as an attempt to subdue them by force and in retaliation, ordered a number of harassing measures against ONUC and its personnel. The most serious of these was an attack on the United Nations garrison in Matadi on 4\textsuperscript{th} March 1961 which forced the garrison to withdraw from the port city\textsuperscript{106}.

The limited use of Force as authorized by the Council was resorted to by ONUC at the beginning of April 1961 to stop the civil war which was spreading dangerously in northern Katanga. Since mid-March 1961, Katangese gendarmerie led by foreign mercenaries had launched an offensive against the anti-Tshombe force in northern Katanga in a determined effort to crush all opposition there. At the end of April, a tragic incident occurred when a Ghanaian detachment of ONUC in Port Francqui was suddenly and ruthlessly massacred. It was generally agreed that this was a brutal assault. Thereafter, the ONUC Command made it a rule not to station small units in isolated areas. Further, Resolution 169 was adopted on 24\textsuperscript{th} November 1961, which authorized the secretary General to use Force of necessary to end Katanga's succession and expel and foreign military personnel not operating under UN authority\textsuperscript{107}.

Withdrawal of the Force

On 30\textsuperscript{th} June 1964, the United Nations Force in the Congo withdrew from that country according to plan. With the completion of the Military Phase of ONUC, the Civilian Operations Programme was formally discontinued. However, the overall programme of technical assistance, which had been supplied by the United Nations family of organisations, continued under the responsibility of the Office of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme\textsuperscript{108}.

A look at the geographical background does confirm the fact that the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) had been in the possession of Netherlands since 1828. Thus, the status of West New Guinea (hereafter referred as West Irian) remained unresolved after Indonesia gained independence from the Netherlands. In 1949, the Dutch who viewed themselves as an administrative authority over a colony awaiting self-determination disputed claim that West Irian was legally a part of Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{105} James A, op.cit. p.295

\textsuperscript{106} United Nations documents S/4761

\textsuperscript{107} White, op.cit, pp. 235-236.

\textsuperscript{108} United Nations op. cit, p.259
As such their readiness to make West Irian independent was based upon the premise that the territory would be placed under temporary United Nation control. However, Indonesian government refused to agree to the proposal stressing that West Irian was legally a part of Indonesia. Increased tensions resulted in a naval clash and a campaign of armed intervention into West Irian by the Indonesians. At this point, the Dutch accused Indonesia of aggression and requested the United Nations to provide military observers†.

The spirit of communications having been well understood by both, the negotiated settlement between the Dutch and Indonesia established UNTEA and UNSF, agreed that after a period of United Nations administration there was to be a transfer of control to Indonesia who agreed to provide certain guarantees for the population, including provisions for self determination. Therefore, since UNTEA was to emerge out of a bilateral agreement between the Dutch and the Indonesians (as UNMOGIP had in the case of Indian and Pakistan) it met the condition of consent109. The bilateral agreement also meant that the issue was kept outside the Cold War boundaries of the Security Council and as a result these factors combined to give UNTEA and UNSF the reputation of being the United Nation's most ambitious and successful peacekeeping ventures.

The United Nations was therefore entrusted with a dual peacekeeping role, in addition to its administrative responsibilities as the executive authority. The Secretary General, U Thant appointed Brigadier-General (later Major General) Indar Jit Rikhye, an Indian Army Officer as his Military Adviser, to head the military observer team that was to supervise all arrangements for the ceasefire‡. They were drawn from troops of these nations then serving either in the United Nations Emergency Forces or the United Nations Operation in the Congo110. Thereafter, the United Nation operation proceeded in three stages. First, it provided administration and security for the territory during a seven month transition period starting in October 1962 and ending in April 1963. This was followed by a transfer of administration to Indonesian authorities and the local police force. The third stage concerned Indonesian obligations, with the United Nation assistance. Indonesia was to provide guarantees for self-determination to the population of West Irian111.

† At this point, the Secretary General, however, in clinging to the principle of consent, refused on the grounds that UN troops could only be sent if both the Netherlands and Indonesian governments had made the request.


‡ Six member States (Brazil, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden) agreed to provide 21 observers for this purpose.

110 United Nations, op.cit. p.266

111 Durch, W.J, op cit, pp 288-289
It was by 21st September 1962 that General Rikhye was able to report that all Indonesian forces in West Irian had been located and concentrated and that re-supply had been assured and that over 500 Indonesian political detainees had been repatriated in accordance with memorandum. The observer's mandate had thus been fulfilled and all actions concerning the cession of hostilities had been completed without any untoward incident\(^{112}\). It was immediately on the completion of UNTEA that the Secretary General declared, \(^{113}\) that it had been a unique experience which had once again proved the capacity of the United Nations to undertake a variety of functions provided it received adequate support from its member States.

In continuation of the happenings, it was in accordance with the Indonesia-Netherlands agreement that the Secretary General on 1st April 1968 appointed a representative, Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, to advise, assist and participate in arrangements which were the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice on retaining or severing ties with Indonesia. Further, In a report submitted to the then Secretary General, the Government of Indonesia stated that between 14th July and 2nd August 1969 the enlarged representative councils (consultative assemblies) of West New Guinea (West Irian), which included 1,026 members, were asked to pronounce themselves on behalf of the people of the territory whether they wished to remain with Indonesia or sever their ties with it. Further, the representative of the Secretary General reported\(^{114}\) that within ‘the limitations imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political situation in the area, an act of free choice had taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice in which the representatives of the population had expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia’. The Secretary General to the General Assembly, by Resolution 2504(XXIV) of 19th November 1969, acknowledged with appreciation the fulfillment of the task entrusted to them under the 1962 agreement.

**UNITED NATIONS YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION**  
**UNYOM : 1963 - 1964**

When we cast a glance at the history of Yemen, we do tend to realize the fact that the civil war which broken out in Yemen in September 1962 contained the seeds of a wider conflict with international dimensions because of the involvement of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. Saudi Arabia shared an extended border with Yemen, much of it still undefined. The United Arab Republic (Egypt) had a special relationship with Yemen in the past. In March 1958, Yemen joined it to form the United Arab States but this association was dissolved in December 1961, shortly after Syria succeeded from the United Arab Republic. It was a little later that the Secretary General U Thant undertook a peace initiative which eventually led to the establishment of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission namely UNYOM\(^{115}\).

\(^{112}\) United Nations, *op.cit.* p.267

\(^{113}\) United Nations documents A/5501, chapter-II, p.15

\(^{114}\) United Nations documents A/7723, annex I

\(^{115}\) United Nations, *op.cit.* p. 187-188
Establishment of UNYOM

Thus, in due course, the Secretary General appointed General Von Horn as Commander of UNYOM and took further steps to provide the Mission with the required personnel and equipment. The Resolution had requested the Secretary General to establish UNYOM as he had defined it in his report on 29th April 1963\textsuperscript{116} and had selected various components of the mission accordingly\textsuperscript{†}.

It is interesting to note that UNYOM’s mandate, established on 11th June 1963, was to remain very limited. The observers were merely to report on the status of disengagement agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, its functions were clearly limited to observing, certifying and reporting on whether Saudi Arabia ceased its support for Yemeni Royalists and whether Egyptian troops were being withdrawn or not. Ground patrols of 100 Yugoslav were transferred from UNEF for this purpose and a 20-mile wide demilitarized zone on either side of the Saudi Yemen border was established.

However, the detailed analysis and review of the situation confirmed that UNYOM failed to fulfill the provisions of its mandate for three main reasons. Firstly, the area, which was being patrolled by the UN observers, remained very unsettled. The Saudis and Egyptians continued to accuse each other of violating the disengagement agreement. The Saudi government even went as far to threaten to withdraw its funding of UNYOM as it became increasingly disenchanted with Egypt’s promises of withdrawal. In consequence, Saudi Arabia refused to stop aiding the Royalists. Secondly, it was clear that even though both Egypt and Saudi-Arabia had expressed a willingness to co-operate with UNYOM, there was reluctance on the part of both sides to fulfill their obligations before the other side had done so. This in turn seriously frustrated UNYOM’s efforts. Thirdly, the resources available for UNYOM for even its limited mandate of observation were far from adequate. A much bigger Force was, required to ensure the detection of movement of men and equipment from Saudi Arabia to Yemen\textsuperscript{117}.

Notwithstanding the above and the hard fact that despite its very limited success, UNYOM remained an important part of UN peacekeeping, clearly highlighted the central role played by the Secretary General. The position of Secretary General had acquired an important level of personal authority over the years, which contributed much too U Thant’s ability to set in motion such an operation. This level of independence for the Secretary General had also been shown in West Irian and the Congo. The operation in Yemen also reaffirmed that for a peacekeeping operation to be successful there had to be a combination of local consent and co-operation and it had to be backed up with adequate resources. These were just some of the assets which the observer mission in Yemen lacked\textsuperscript{118}.

\textsuperscript{116} UN Documents, S/5298

\textsuperscript{†}In selecting those components and the contributing countries, Secretary General informally consulted the parties concerned. Practical considerations were also taken into account, including the proximity of the existing United Nations peacekeeping operations, namely UNTSO and UNEF.

\textsuperscript{117} Birgisson, Karl Th., ‘United Nations Observation Mission’, p.210-211

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, p.215
Termination of UNYOM

The Secretary General in his final report dated 2nd September 1964,\(^{119}\) again acknowledged the failure of the parties to implement the disengagement and the difficulties UNYOM faced in observing and reporting these matters. On 4th September 1964, the activities of UNYOM ended and its personnel and equipment were withdrawn. Shortly the relations between the parties steadily improved and issues were resolved between them. There has been no consideration of the matter in United Nations ever since the termination of the said Mission\(^{120}\).

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS
UNFICYP : 1964 – TODATE

Detailed study of Cyprus brings the fact to our notice that the Republic of Cyprus became an independent State on 16th August 1960 and a member of the United Nations one month later\(^{121}\). The Constitution of the Republic, which came into effect on the day of independence, was intended to balance the interests of both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom entered into a treaty to guarantee the basic provisions of the Constitution and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. However, things did not move so smoothly, as they appeared. The application of the provisions of the Constitution, indeed, encountered difficulties from the very beginning and led to a succession of constitutional crises. The accumulated tension between the two communities resulted in outbreak of violence on the island on 21st December 1963\(^\dagger\).

Establishment of UNFICYP

A series of attempts were made to ensure peaceful co-existence. On 15th February 1964, after all attempts to restore peace on the island had failed, the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council. Thus, on 4th March 1964, the Council unanimously adopted its Resolution 186 (1964), by which it recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), initially for a period of three months\(^{122}\). The Force became operationally established on 27th March 1964 and was given a very clear mandate to adhere. However, not with standing the above, a coup d’etat in Cyprus on 15th July 1974 by Greek Cypriot and Greek elements favoring union with Greece was followed by military intervention of Turkey, whose troop established Turkish Cypriot controls over the northern part of the island. The Security Council called for a ceasefire and laid the basis for negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. It was in fact, on 16th August 1974 that a de facto ceasefire came into being.

\(^{119}\) UN Document, S/5927
\(^{120}\) United Nations, op.cit. p.197
\(^{121}\) United Nations, op.cit. p.281

\(^\dagger\) Immediately thereafter, on 27th December, the Security Council met to consider a complaint by Cyprus charging intervention in its internal affairs and aggression by Turkey. However, Turkey maintained that Greek Cypriot leaders had tried for more than two years to nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and clearly denied all charges of aggression.

\(^{122}\) Stephen M.Hill and Shahin P. Malik, op.cit. p.45
As a result of follow up of the de facto ceasefire, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Forces and ceasefire lines. Thus, a buffer zone was established between the areas controlled by the opposing forces. The ceasefire lines extended approximately 180 kilometers across the island. The buffer zone between the lines varied in width from less than 20 meters to some 7 kilometers and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land. Strict adherence to the military status quo in the buffer zone, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time has become a vital element in preventing a recurrence of fighting†. It was in April 2002 that UNFICYP destroyed some 4,500 assorted weapons purchased by the Government of Cyprus in 1972 and later placed under lock and key in the United Nations Protected Area under UNFICYP guard. The decommissioning ended on 21\textsuperscript{st} May 2002.

**Humanitarian Activities**

In addition to maintenance of **Ceasefire and Military Status Quo**, UNFICYP also discharges certain humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots and a small Marinate community living in the northern part of the island. It also periodically visits Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and helps them maintain contact with their relatives in the north. It has been providing humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus. More so, with the United Nations Development Programme in particular it is facilitating projects involving both communities. These actions of United Nations have been worth praising.

**UNFICYP Mandate**

It is seen that in the absence of a political settlement to the Cyprus problem, the mandate of UNFICYP has been periodically extended. At the end of every six month mandate period, the Secretary General has been reporting to the Security Council, that in the light of the situation on the ground and of political developments, the continued presence of the Force remains indispensable, both in helping to maintain calm on the island and in creating the best conditions for his good offices efforts. For its part, the Security Council has regularly extended the mandate of the Force for six month periods, which has practically become a regular feature to-date.

**Secretary General’s Mission of Good Offices**

It is, indeed, very heartening to note the achievements of peace that have prevailed to-date. More so, since the events of 1974, the situation in Cyprus has remained calm, although, tension has arisen periodically. Both sides have generally respected the ceasefire and the military status quo. But, as the Secretary General has repeatedly stated, the continuing quiet should not obscure the fact that there is only a ceasefire in Cyprus, not complete peace.

† UNFICYP maintains surveillance through a system of observation posts, and through air, vehicle and foot patrols.
The Security Council has declared on numerous occasions that the status quo is not an acceptable option. In the absence of progress towards a settlement between the two sides, the overall situation remains subjected to sudden tensions generated by events outside as well as within Cyprus. The Security Council requested the Secretary General after the events of 1974 to undertake a new mission of good offices with the representatives of the two communities. Since then, the successive Secretaries General and their Special Representatives have also tried to find a formula acceptable to both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, an intensive effort was undertaken between 1999 and early 2003. This initiative was undertaken in the context of a unique opportunity which if had been seized, would have allowed a reunited Cyprus to sign the Treaty of Accession to the European Union on 16th April 2003.

On 14th April 2003, the Security Council expressed regrets that due to the ‘negative approach’ of the Turkish Cypriot leader, it had not been possible to put the Secretary General’s settlement plan to simultaneous referenda by Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As a result, there would be no comprehensive agreement on reunification of the island before 16th April the date that Cyprus’s accession treaty to the European Union was to be signed. In his report, the Secretary General concluded that there was ‘no apparent basis for resuming the good offices effort while the current stalemate continued’. He added, however, that given the watershed that had been reached in efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, a review of the full range of United Nations peace activities in Cyprus was timely.

**Situation with UNFICYP**

Review of the situation has been carried out from time to time. In his periodic report to the Security Council on the activities of UNFICYP dated 26th May 2004, the Secretary General noted that the situation along the ceasefire lines remained calm†. At the same time, the Secretary General urged the Turkish Cypriot authorities to provide full freedom of movement for UNFICYP so that it could carry out its mandate more effectively. On 11th June, unanimously adopting Resolution,‡ the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15th December 2004 and to consider the Secretary General’s recommendations in his review of the Force and to act on them within on month of receiving them. The Council also urged the Turkish Cypriot side and the Turkish Forces to rescind without delay all remaining restrictions on UNFICYP and called on them to restore in Strovilia the military status quo, which existed there prior to 30th June 2000.

**Unficyp’s Latest Developments**

It was in the recent past that following a review of the mandate, force levels and concept of operations of UNFICYP, the Secretary General, in his report‡ recommended that the Security Council should reduce the military component of the mission to 860, down from 1,224, while extending its mandate until mid 2005 to foster conditions conducive to a comprehensive settlement.

† The Secretary General said that the continuous flow of people from both sides through the crossing points had become a regular feature on the island and there was a further decrease in the already low number of incidents related to the crossings compared to the previous reporting period.


‡ Security Council Resolution (S/2004/756) dated 24 September 2004,
He also proposed a more mobile and efficient concept of operations. At the same time, the Secretary General recommended that the current deployment of 45 UNFICYP civilian police, who lived within the community and performed a wide range of local services, be increased to the mandated ceiling of 69. The Secretary General also called for a boost in the number of civilian affairs officers working in the mission that their work had grown qualitatively and quantitatively as they interceded on behalf of members of one community or the other to ease specific situations.

‘These practical measures would allow UNFICYP to continue to carry out the whole range of its mandated tasks while taking into account the changed environment and achieving a more efficient utilization of resources,’ he said. ‘They will also provide the basis for a further transformation of the mission, as warranted by developments on the ground, after a further review, which had to take place before the end of the next mandate period, in mid 2005.’

On 22\textsuperscript{nd} October, the Security Council, by its Resolution\textsuperscript{†}, endorsed the Secretary General’s recommendations for amending the concept of operations and reducing the force level of UNFICYP and extended the mission’s mandate through mid June 2005. The Council took note of the assessment that the security situation on the island had become ‘increasingly benign’ over the last few years, and that a recurrence of fighting was increasingly unlikely. It welcomed the Secretary General’s intention to review further the operation’s mandate, force levels and concept of operation before the next renewal of UNFICYP’S mandate, taking into account developments on the ground and the views of the parties. The Council also urged the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces ‘to rescind without delay’ all remaining restrictions on UNFICYP, and called on them to restore in Strovilia, a small hamlet inhabited by Greek Cypriots, the military status quo that existed there prior to 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2000.

\textbf{UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE II}
\textbf{UNEF-II : 1973 - 1979}

A critical look at the United Nations peacekeeping role in the 1970 and a detailed analysis of the events between the years 1967 and 1973 clearly demonstrate the weaknesses of peacekeeping. These became evident since two more Arab-Israeli Wars started and finished between 1967 and 1973. They first came about as a result of increased hostility between Syria and Israel, prompting Egypt to demand the withdrawal of UNEF-I, which then paved the way for armed conflict between Egypt and Israel. \textbf{The fact that UNEF I had to withdraw upon Egypt’s insistence conclusively illustrated the limitations of peacekeeping.} In addition to the above and further the failure to address the underlying problems between Israel and its neighbours meant that conflict was always conceivable. This included the bitter artillery exchanges between Egypt and Israel during the lengthy War of Attrition\textsuperscript{123}. The second war, which resulted in the creation of UNEF II and UNDOF, began when Syria and Egypt launched surprise attacks against Israel in October 1973.

\textsuperscript{123} Stephen M. Hill and Shahin P. Malik op.cit. p.47
In the Israeli Egyptian sector, UNEF II was not only important in re-establishing a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt but it also helped to diffuse a crisis which had threatened to bring about direct superpower confrontation in the Middle East. Thus, the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel had to be diffused quickly. UNEF II was hence to concentrate on consolidating short term peace by interposing itself between the Egyptian and Israeli Force, setting up observation posts, and investigating complaints. Consequently, the acceptance by Israel and Egypt of a UN presence not only had the effect of diffusing the local crisis but also helped reduce superpower tensions.

Following the Israeli withdrawal from much of Egyptian territory in the Sinai desert, UNEF II assumed the long term functions. Its mandate successfully performed now that a much wider UN buffer zone had been established. Military Observer from UNTSO also worked with UNEF II to observer various checkpoints. The Force continued to fulfill its functions until 1979 when the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt rendered its mandate redundant.

Establishment

On 25th October 1973, on a proposal by a number of countries† the Security Council adopted Resolution 340 (1973), the council also requested the Secretary General as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides. Further, having taken emergency measures, the Secretary General had now to secure other contingents and build up the Force to its authorized level of 7,000 all ranks124.

In accordance with the guidelines approved by the Security Council, the Force was to be composed of contingents from countries selected by the Secretary General, in consultation with the parties and the Security Council, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation. A number of terms of reference were spelt out for UNEF II‡. The terms of reference were approved by the Security Council on 27th October and remained unchanged during UNEF’s entire mandate. The Secretary General’s report requested by the council set out the proposals regarding the guide lines for the functioning of the Force125. However, within this general framework, the activities of the Force varied considerably over the years in the light of prevailing circumstances and of agreements reached between the parties. In the face of changing developments, the activities of UNEF II were divided into four main phases.

† The countries namely Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia.

‡ These terms of reference being to supervise the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), which demanded that an immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22nd October 1973. The Force would use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and in the fulfillment of its tasks it would have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO, UNEF II was also to co-operate with the international Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavors in the area.

124 United Nations, op.cit. p.83

125 United Nations documents No. S/11052/Rev.1
Phases of Operation

The first phase is considered from October 1973 to January 1974. Following the establishment of UNEF II, its immediate objective was to stop the fighting and prevent all movement forward of the troops on both sides. Urgent measures also had to be taken to provide Suez city and the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank of the Canal with non-military supplies. Immediately on their arrival, the troops from Australia, Finland, Sweden and later Ireland were dispatched to frontline. They interposed themselves wherever possible between the forward positions of the opposing Forces. Observation posts and checkpoints were setup and patrols undertaken, with the assistance of UNTSO observers in sensitive areas. These activities were carried out in close liaison with the parties concerned. With these measures, the situation was however stabilized. The ceasefire was generally observed and there were a few incidents which were resolved with the assistance of UNEF II.

During the next phase from January 1974 to October 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a joint effort to promote the implementation of Security Council Resolution 338 (1973), which called for negotiations to start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Later, during the first half of January 1974, the United States Secretary of State undertook a new mediation effort. In negotiating separately with the Governments of Egypt and Israel, in what was known as his ‘Shuttle Diplomacy’, he worked out an agreement on the disengagement and separation of their Military Forces. The whole operation was carried out smoothly according to plan and was completed by 4th March 1974. As a result of this disengagement, the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector became much more stable. The main task of UNEF II was the sector manning and control of the zone of disengagement. To do this it established static checkpoints and observation posts and conducted movable patrols. It also carried out with the assistance of the UNTSO observers, weekly and later bi-weekly inspections of the areas of limited forces and armament (30 Kilometers zone), as well as inspections of other areas agreed by the parties.

In the next phase from November 1975 to May 1979, the Force maintained close contact with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavors and extended its assistance in providing facilities for family reunions. All these tasks were carried out efficiently. There were few incidents and problems and whenever they occurred they were resolved without difficulty with the co-operation of the parties’ concerned. The efforts were worth appreciating.

The last and final phase lasted till July 1979. The peace treaty concluded in March 1979 between Egypt and Israel as a result of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United States and entered into force on 25th April. It had a direct bearing on the termination of UNEF II and affected its activities during the final period.

126 United Nations, op.cit. P.92-93

127 UN Documents, S/11056/Add-13

128 United Nations, op.cit. p.97
After the mandate of UNEF II lapsed in July 1979, various contingents were rapidly repatriated, except for a Swedish guard unit and limited groups of the Canadian & Polish logistics contingents which remained in the area to assist in the winding up of the Force.

**UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE**

**UNDOF: 1974 - TODATE**

UNDOF was the second peacekeeping operation to emerge out of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. UNEF II had been deployed between the Egyptian and Israeli armies in the Suez Canal area. UNDOF was established to supervise the implementation of a disengagement agreement between Israeli and Syrian Forces in the Golan Heights. Although tension in the Israeli-Egyptian sector was diffused rapidly with the arrival of UNEF II, the tension in the Israeli-Syrian sector remained high and even increased in March 1974\(^{129}\).

Accordingly, it was on 30\(^{th}\) May, the Secretary General transmitted to the Security Council the text of the Agreement as well as the protocol to that agreement which dealt with establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force\(^{130}\) (UNDOF). The strength of UNDOF was set at 1,250 men, to be selected by the Secretary General\(^{131}\) in consultation with the parties, from member States of the United Nations which were not permanent members of the Security Council. The need for extension of the mandate was felt since the initial six month mandate of UNDOF expired on 30\(^{th}\) November 1974. Thereafter, the mandate has been repeatedly extended by the Security Council to-date on the recommendations of Secretary General and with the agreement of the two parties concerned\(^{132}\).

**Initial deployment**

It was with the signing of the Agreement on Disengagement that all firings ceased in the Israel-Syria sector on 31\(^{st}\) May 1974 and the same was confirmed by the United Nations military observers stationed in the sector. These observers, who were later incorporated into UNDOF, continued to man selected observation posts and patrol bases along the cease-fire line while the newly arrived contingents of UNDOF began deployment in the area. Needful to further state that, the main function of UNDOF is to supervise the area of separation with a view to make sure that there are no Military Forces within it. This is carried out by means of static positions and observation posts which are manned 24 hours a day, by foot and mobile patrols operating along predetermined routes by day and night. Temporary outposts and additional patrols may be set up from time to time, as occasion requires\(^{133}\).

\(^{129}\) Stephen M.Hill and Shahin P. Malik, op.cit. p.48

\(^{130}\) United Nations document, S/11302/Add-I, annexes I & II

\(^{131}\) United Nations, op.cit. p.101

\(^{132}\) Ibid, p.103

\(^{133}\) Ibid, p.108
Incidents and casualties

The mission by no chance has been free of accidents or casualties as during the initial period itself there were a number of serious incidents. Four Austrian soldiers were killed and one was wounded in a mine incident on 25th June 1974. Another mine explosion occurred on 20th April 1977 in which an Austrian officer was killed and an Iranian officer was wounded. Despite the mine clearing operations undertaken by the Syrian Forces in 1974, there were still many unexploded mines in and near the area of separation. The engineers of the Polish logistic unit continue to search for defusing unexploded mines, shells and bombs in and near the area.

It was later during the month of August 1974 that a United Nations aircraft, flying from Ismailia to Damascus in the established air corridor, crashed as a result of anti-aircraft fire, north-east of the Syrian village of Ad Dim†. Later on, again in November 1975, there was a shooting incident in which two Syrian shepherds were killed by an Israeli patrol. There were also alleged crossing of the area of separation, resulting in one case the death of three Israeli citizens. In November 1977, two members of the Iranian battalion came under fire from the Israeli side and both were wounded. Whenever such incidents occur, UNDOF seeks to resolve the situation by negotiation and appropriate corrective measures. The incidents have neither seriously affected the operations of the Force nor the morale of officers and men forming part of UNDOF.

It is heartening to note that since November 1977 generally there have been no major incidents. However, the main problems in the area arise from the presence of Syrian shepherd grazing their flocks near the western edge of the area of separation. They sometimes cross the line in ignorance. Shepherds have also been reportedly killed as a result of detonating mines in the area of separation. On the whole, UNDOF encounters no serious difficulties that would affect its smooth functioning. In his periodic report on the activities of the Force, the Secretary General has been able to report that the situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet and that UNDOF has continued to perform its functions effectively with co-operation of the parties134.

It is pertinent to highlight that UNDOF even today continues to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation. Within the means available, medical treatment is provided to the local population on request. Further, in UNDOF’s area of operation, especially in the area of separation, minefields continue to pose a threat to personnel of the Force and local inhabitants. In consultation with the Syrian authorities, UNDOF instituted a minefield security and maintenance programme in the area of separation to identify and mark all minefields. The Force also supports the activities of the United Nations Children’s Fund to promote mine awareness among the civilian population. Yet, another priority of the mission is to address the environmental consequences of the Force’s activities and presence in the area of operations. The Force is taking steps to ensure that its presence does not contribute to further environmental pollution of the area.

†All nine Canadians aboard were killed in this accident on 9th August 1974.

134United Nations, op.cit. p.110
Current status

The total strength of the mission as on 31st January 2007 is 1,042 troops, assisted by some 57 military observers of UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan; also supported by 39 international civilian personnel and 107 local civilian staff. So far, a total of 42 causalities have occurred. With regard to financing of the mission, an amount of $39.87 million stand approved in the budget from 1st July 2006 to 30th June 2007.

UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON
UNIFIL : 1978 - TODATE

Once UNDOF had been set up, the UN withdrew considerably from new peacekeeping operations. From 1974 to the end of the Cold War only one new operation in the form of UNIFIL was created. This significant withdrawal from peacekeeping appeared to be a reaction to the fact that the United Nations had overstretched itself considerably. Financial crises and disenchantment on the part of contributing States had set in. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) itself demonstrated all that had gone wrong with United Nations Peacekeeping.

Refusal on the part of member States to pay their high cost assessments and lack of constant co-operation on the part of the disputants showed that peacekeeping operations could only fulfill their mandates successfully if most of the criteria for peacekeeping were present. UNIFIL was set up in order to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Lebanon and restore peace. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) repeatedly conducted raids into Israeli territory from bases in surrounding countries. Lebanon, itself a highly unstable State was ill placed to play host to a powerful organisation, and the presence of the PLO had the effect of accelerating the already tense condition throughout the country. Civil war in 1975 between Christian and Muslim groups introduced Syria into the highly complex equation when it sent troops into Lebanon claiming that its intention was to stabilize the situation. However, the Syrian action did nothing to limit the PLO’s attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory.

With the situation extremely tense and Jewish deaths high, Israel decided to invade Lebanon on 14th March 1978 with the intention of destroying PLO bases. This unilateral action, however, considerably concerned the US, which feared that the invasion would upset the chances of concluding a peace treaty with Egypt. Consequently, the US turned to the UN and within four days the Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426, which called upon Israel to immediately cease all military activity and withdraw its Force from Lebanon. The Security Council also decided to establish immediately a Force in light of the request of the Government of Lebanon under its authority. A United Nations interim Force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose for confirming the withdrawal of Israeli Forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area was thus enforced.

† Other missions such as UNTSO, UNMOGIP, and UNFICYP remained in existence.


As such, this region in Southern Lebanon was to remain under Israeli control, thus frustrating UNIFIL’s chances of fulfilling its mandate. The UN mission found that it could not move freely and members of numerous factions regularly fired upon its troops. There were also different interpretations of UNIFIL’s mandate. The Israeli’s justified their own continued presence in South Lebanon on the grounds that UNIFIL had failed to clear the area of PLO fighters. The PLO on the other hand, continued to maintain that the Cairo Agreement of 1969 had allowed them a semi-autonomous regime in the refugee camps in Southern Lebanon and that UNIFIL had no mandate superior to this. Israeli troops overran UNIFIL position entirely and reached the outskirts of Beirut in early July. It would be inappropriate to blame UNIFIL for not stopping the Israeli invasion, as it neither had the mandate nor the means with which to oppose a large force. The invasion drastically altered UNIFIL’s position because for the next three years the UN Operation was to remain behind Israeli lines.

In 1985 the Israeli’s did begin a partial withdrawal but continued to maintain a so-called security zone in the border area. This meant that UNIFIL was still unable to complete its mandate. As a peacekeeping force, UNIFIL’s record has not been good. Nevertheless, even in this case, its failure has been less to do with its own ability to carry out its functions and it should be judged within the context of existing conditions.

Despite being able to return some areas to Lebanese authority, the security zone in the south in particular, remained under Israeli control and thus UNFIL has not been in a position to occupy this region. Another major problem during the 1980s was the Lebanese Government’s own inability to manage and administer. Without effective central control UNIFIL’s mandate did not have a chance of being fulfilled. As such, UNIFIL has clearly demonstrated that peacekeeping operations can only be successful if the appropriate conditions exist. Conditions such as co-operation among the disputants, which UNIFIL has lacked, are essential indeed for success of any peacekeeping mission of this nature and magnitude.

It is pertinent to state that UNIFIL has been constantly monitoring the area through ground and air patrols and a network of observation posts. It has acted to correct violations by intimating to the side concerned and used its best efforts through continuous close liaison with both sides to prevent friction and limit incidents. However, it has not been able to persuade the Lebanese authorities to assume their full responsibilities along the Blue Line.

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137 Evron, Y., 'War and intervention in Lebanon', p.8
Reconfiguration of UNIFIL

As of 31st March 2001, the Force comprised of over 5,700 troops. The reconfiguration envisaged in the report called for deploying most troops in protected positions close to the Blue Line, while leaving UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura covered by a separate guard. The demining unit had also to be maintained. Through a gradual reduction, the Force was to eventually comprise 2,000 all ranks, including troops from France, Ghana, India, Italy, Poland and Ukraine. The reconfiguration was to be achieved in the course of normal troop’s rotation.

It was observed that UNIFIL area of operations had generally continued to be calm, with low incidents and lesser tension levels recorded since July 2001 except air violations, along the Blue Line. Later, covering the period since 24th July 2003, in his report dated 20th January 2004 the Secretary-General said that the relative calm that had prevailed in the first half of the year gave way to renewed exchanges of fire in the Sheba farms area. **Air strikes and shooting incidents across the Blue Line resulted in the deaths of three Israelis, two soldiers and a civilian, and three Lebanese civilians.** Further, reporting to the Security Council on 20th January 2005, the Secretary General said that, over the period from July 2004 till January 2005, the Blue Line had enjoyed a prolonged period of relative quiet. Later, Secretary General again in his report on UNIFIL dated 18th January 2006, recommended to extend the Force’s mandate for a further period of six months, until 31st July 2006. Describing the political and security environment as still fragile, the Secretary General pointed particularly to the November 2005 Hizbollah attack, which had led to a heavy exchange of fire with IDF. He also warned that the rocket firing incidents by unidentified armed elements of August and December 2005 had significant potential for military escalation. Persistent Israeli air incursions into Lebanese airspace also disrupted the fragile calm. The Council expressed its intention to keep UNIFIL’s mandate and structures under regular review, taking into account prevailing situation on the ground.

New Crisis Erupts

It was on 12th July 2006 that new hostilities on the Israeli-Lebanese border started when Hizbollah launched several rockets from Lebanese territory across the Blue Line towards IDF positions near the coast and in the area of the Israeli town of Zarit. In parallel, Hizbollah fighters crossed the Blue Line into Israel, attacked an Israeli patrol and captured two Israeli soldiers, killed three others and wounded two more. The captured soldiers were taken into Lebanon. The start of the new hostilities on 12th July 2006 indeed had ‘radically changed the context’ in which the mission operated.

The Council also expressed the deepest concern at the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and Israel and urged all concerned parties to avoid any action that might endanger the safety of its personnel. The Secretary General said that the ‘tragic 34-day conflict has thrown the region back into the instability that prevailed for decades’. Stressing that security, stability and comprehensive peace remained the over arching goals, he said ‘a start has been made’ while cautioning that ‘many other steps are required’.
Outcome of the war

It is seen that 1,187 people had died and 4,092 had been injured in Lebanon as a result of the conflict. Many of these victims were children. The United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that one million Lebanese were displaced between 12\textsuperscript{th} July and 14\textsuperscript{th} August 2006, with some 735,000 seeking shelter within Lebanon and 230,000 outside. It is further estimated that in Lebanon the conflict caused physical damage amounting to $3.6 billion, including the destruction of 80 bridges, 600 km of roads; 900 factories, markets, farms and other commercial buildings; 31 airports, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, dams and electrical plants; and 25 fuel stations. Unemployment is currently as high as 75 per cent in some parts of the country. An estimated 15,000 homes were destroyed.

However, for the same duration on the Israeli side, 43 Israeli civilians and 117 IDF soldiers were killed. In addition to large numbers of people have been treated for shock and anxiety, 33 Israelis were wounded seriously and 68 moderately. During that time, 3,970 rockets landed in Israel, 901 of them in urban areas; 300,000 residents were displaced and more than a million were forced to live for some time in shelters, according to official Israeli figures. However, it is heartening to note that even since the cessation of hostilities went into effect, the nature of the humanitarian response in Lebanon has seen a rapid transition to early recovery activities and short-term intervention to provide assistance to the large numbers of returnees.

Current Status

As of February 2007, the total strength of the mission is about 12,500 military personnel, including 178 staff officers, 10,479 troops and 1,772 maritime task force, assisted by 53 military observers from UNTSO and also supported by some 118 international civilians and 304 local civilian staffs. The record of fatalities todate is as high as 258 which include 249 troops, two military observers, three international civilian staff and four local staff.

UNITED NATIONS GOOD OFFICES MISSION IN
AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN
UNGOMAP : 1988-1990

With a critical look at the happenings of the period commencing from 1980’s it is seen that the first three new peacekeeping operations established by the UN in nearly ten years were all to be Observer Missions. As such, UNGOMAP was to be the first ever-United Nations Mission to be conducted in a conflict, which had involved either of the Cold War superpowers. Soviet Union, which had invaded the country in 1979, ostensibly to aid the nominal government of Afghanistan maintain law and order, had redefined its geo-political goals and sought to extract itself from a conflict, which had brought heavy casualties and increasing domestic unrest. The Geneva Accord, formally known as the Agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, consisted of four instruments. The first was a bilateral agreement between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, particularly the principles of non-interference and non-intervention; the second consisted of a declaration on international guarantees, signed by the USSR and US; the third was another bilateral
agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, this time on the voluntary return of refugees; and the final instrument was the agreement on the inter-relationship for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan and witnessed by the USSR and US.\textsuperscript{139} This final instrument was the most important for the UN because it covered the provisions for the phased withdrawal of approximately 103,000 Soviet troops based in 18 garrisons in 17 of the 30 Afghan Provinces.\textsuperscript{140}

With the above backdrop seen at a glance, it is noticed that, on 27\textsuperscript{th} December 1979, Soviet Forces entered Afghanistan, in response to a reported request from the Afghan Government for assistance against insurgent movements. More than 100,000 Soviet troops were eventually deployed; they soon became embroiled in a protracted conflict with the factions of the Afghan resistance or mujahedeen and the same continued for long.\textsuperscript{141} It was, however, in April 1988, that the efforts of the United Nations to end the war in Afghanistan were enhanced and a group of military observers was deployed to monitor their situation. While the mission was considered to be an extension of the exercise of the Secretary General’s Geneva Accords, its use of military personnel brought it within the definition of a peacekeeping operation and it functioned in a manner similar to other such operations.

Further, ground realities do confirm that despite some delays in prior notification of the withdrawal and the need occasionally to limit UNGOMAP’s movement for security reasons, the mission concluded that the withdrawal of Soviet troops had been completed in compliance with the fourth instrument of the Geneva Accords. After the completion of the withdrawal, UNGOMAP closed its three outposts at Hayratan, Torghundi and at the Shindand air base\textsuperscript{142}. The Memorandum of Understanding provided that UNGOMAP’s operation would cease two months after the completion of all the time frames envisaged for the implementation of the instruments. The longest explicit time frame contained in the instruments was the 18 months provided in the third instrument for the arrangements to assist the voluntary return of refugees. Accordingly, on 9\textsuperscript{th} January 1990, 20 months after May 1988, the Secretary General having consulted the parties and having obtained the concurrence of the countries contributing UNGOMAP’s military personnel, sought the consent of the Security Council to an extension of UNGOMAP’s mandate, indicating that more needed to be done for the implementation of the Geneva Accords. Two days later, the Council adopted resolution 647 extending the existing arrangement for two months\textsuperscript{143}.

\textsuperscript{139} United Nations, op.cit, p.316
\textsuperscript{141} United Nations, op.cit. p.315
\textsuperscript{142} United Nations, op.cit, p.320
\textsuperscript{143} UN Documents, S/21071
In March 1990, the Secretary General again held consultations with the signatories of the Geneva Accords but was unable to obtain the consensus necessary for a further extension of UNGOMAP’s mandate. Consequently, in view of the mandate he had been given under General Assembly Resolution 44/15 of 1st November 1989 to encourage and facilitate the early realization of a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan, he informed the Security Council that he intended to redeploy 10 military officers as military advisers to his Personal Representative in Afghanistan and Pakistan (a post established in May 1989 and held since then by Mr. Benon Sevan) to assist in further implementation of his responsibilities under the Assembly’s resolution. For this purpose one officer was retained from each of the 10 countries, which had contributed military observers for UNGOMAP’s mandate which finally came to an end on 15th March 1990. The last soldiers left by mid February, by way of a well planned sequence of withdrawal actions.

UNITED NATIONS IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP

United Nations intervention for maintenance of peace has been a welcoming step since its coming into existence and UN can be proud of its contributions. Likewise, attempts made by the United Nations to seek an end to the war dates back to 1980, when an outbreak of armed conflict between Iran and Iraq prompted Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to offer his good officers to work for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Through Resolution 479 of 28th September 1980, the Council, inter alia, called upon Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means to avoid any further loss of valuable human blood.

Accordingly, it was in the year 1984 that establishment of the first resident United Nations presence was made in the area. On 9th June, Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar appealed to both sides to refrain from deliberate military attacks on purely civilian centers of population. When both Iran and Iraq agreed to this, the Secretary General informed the Security Council of his decision to deploy inspection teams in the region. Their task would be to investigate alleged attacks on civilian areas. This became known as the truce in the 'War of the Cities' and lasted for some nine months duration or so. It was between March 1984 and August 1988, the Secretary General dispatched seven fact finding missions to investigate allegations by Iran or Iraq on the use of chemical weapons.

144 Ibid, p.322.
† On 23rd September 1980, in accordance with Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim brought to the attention of the Security Council the threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.

145 UN Documents, S/16611
‡ The reports indicated that chemical weapons had been used. The Security Council and the Secretary General condemned the use of such weapons and all violations of international humanitarian law and called for strict observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons.
The Secretary General dispatched to the region additional fact finding missions in connection with allegations of attacks on civilian areas and the treatment of war prisoner and civil detainees. **UNIIMOG supervised, verified the withdrawal and defused local tension that had occurred.**

The second observer mission, the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, was established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 598 on 8th August 1988, to monitor the ceasefire, which had been accepted by both sides at the culmination of the eight-year-old Gulf war. **The mandate of UNIIMOG included** the establishment of ceasefire lines in co-operation with the parties; monitoring compliance with the ceasefire; investigation of violations; prevention, through negotiation of any other change in the status quo pending withdrawal of their respective forces to internationally recognized boundaries: to supervise, verify and confirm the withdrawal of all forces to these internationally recognized boundaries: and to obtain the agreement of the parties to other arrangements which, **pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement, could help reduce tension and build confidence between them**. UNIIMOG consisted of 350 observers from 26 countries with 105 international and 93 local staff, together with 53 military staff.

It was a challenging task to undertake the stretched out border assignment, to look into the ceasefire violations, if any. **The ceasefire lines extend approximately 1,400 kilometers, covering a wide variety of terrain. UNIIMOG’s method of patrolling was adapted accordingly.** A detailed study of the operation highlights the facts that the success of UNIIMOG was, as in all observer missions, totally dependent on the co-operation of both parties.

**Worries were, therefore, increased when several hundred prisoners of war were captured by Iraq on 23-24 August 1989,** only a few days after UNIIMOG had deployed. Violations of the agreements did continue, but apart from the flooding of an area of no mans land in the Kursk region by the Iranians, in order to create a water obstacle between the two opposing armies, the majority were to be only minor contraventions. UNIIMOG’s mandate also included the oversight of exchange of PW’s, an initial action which did not bear well for the mission’s future. However, subsequent co-operation allowed UNIIMOG to acquit its mandate successfully, although the final momentum to seek a permanent peaceful solution was only to be provided by Iraq’s need to pacify the border so that it could transfer troops to fight the coalition forces during the Second Gulf War 1990-1991. It was, therefore, a little ironic, that whilst the UN was mandating a coalition of multinational forces to urge Iraq to withdraw behind its border with Kuwait, it was also monitoring the peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi troops behind it’s internationally recognized border with Iran.

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† **UNIIMOG’s method included,** teams of two or more military observers conducted mobile patrols by vehicle, by helicopter, by boat in the southern marshes, and by mule-back or on foot in the mountains of the north. In winter some patrols used skis. UNIIMOG deployed, a daily average of 64 patrols, which operated around the clock which needed to be monitored to obtained valuable information pertaining to the assign tasks.

147 United Nations, op.cit. p.332
It may, thus, be justified to state that out of the several peacekeeping missions established since 1988, UNIIMOG conforms more closely than most to the traditional concept of peacekeeping. The tension which remained in the area highlights the need for mediation and peacemaking. Yet it also testified to the value of the observer, without whose prompt actions, hostilities could have broken out once more. To enable it to perform this valuable role effectively, UNIIMOG was dependent upon the full co-operation of both parties, the continued commitment of the troops contributing countries and the financial security essential for all peacekeeping missions.

**United Nations Angola Verification Mission**

United Nations Verification Mission has indeed been of great concern since it took place as the first stage of comprehensive political settlement designed to bring independence to the South-West African State of Namibia. This mission began after signing of peace agreements among the States of South Africa, Angola and Cuba on 22nd December 1988 and was mandated through Security Council Resolution 626 (1988) of 20th December to verify the redeployment northwards and phased total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola in accordance with timetable agreed between Angola and Cuba. At its peak, UNAVEM consisted of 70 unarmed military observers, 22 international and 15 local staff. Thus, it would not be out of place to say that the deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) in January 1989 resulted from a complex international diplomatic process, which initiated both the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) leading to the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Further, with other events in progress in response to above resolution, the Secretary General dispatched a mission to Luanda to hold technical discussion with the Angolan Government. The mission, which spent one week in the region in early December 1987, composed of United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. It received detailed briefings on the continuing hostilities and traveled to Cuban province to investigate the situation on the ground. Upon its return to New York, it reported to the Secretary General the details of South African troop concentrations and military activities in Angola, which were indeed of concern.

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1 The United Nations military observers are deployed to monitor a cease-fire between two hostile parties, while diplomatic initiatives are pursued to reach a comprehensive settlement.

148 Ibid, p.333


150 United Nations, op.cit. p.335

151 United Nations document S/19359
The Bilateral Agreement signed between Angola and Cuba established a 27 month long four phased withdrawal. The first phase lasting from April to October 1989 was to see 50.3 percent or 25,181 combatant repatriated at a rate of over 3,600 per month. The second phase, covering October to 30th March 1990 ended one month late due to the actions of the resistance group Uniao Nacional para a Independencia total de Angola (UNITA). As had been the case in Afghanistan, the resistance faction in Angola, UNITA, which had previously been supported by South Africa and the United Nation, was not party to the settlement negotiations. It therefore, on occasions, continued to attack Cuban troops. On 23rd January, the Cuban military authorities in Angola informed the Chief Military Observer that withdrawal of their troops would be suspended in reaction to a UNITA attack two days earlier against a Cuban water purification plant near Lobito in which four Cuban soldiers had died. However, it was obviously not in UNITA’s long term interests to prevent the Cuban from leaving and so a resumption of process took place on 25th February 1990 after an agreement mediated by the Secretary General. By the end of April, 33,048 troops 66 percent of the total number had been withdrawn. By the end of the third phase in September 1990, 76 percent had been repatriated, and by the culmination of the final phase in May 1991 the total had reached 47,090. The final Cuban soldier left on 25th June 1991 with the Cuban authorities declaring that; on that date, the government of the People’s Republic of Cuba and the government of the Republic of Angola would have honoured in exemplary fashion, 36 days before the deadline, the bilateral commitment, which they undertook before the UN and the international community.

Thus, the efficiency of UNAVEM had been facilitated by Angolan and Cuban co-operation; in fact, the Secretary General had singled out the mission’s success as demonstrating, ‘what can be achieved by it receives the full co-operation of the parties’ concerned. It was an advance stage operation which was to follow in due course.

**UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE GROUP**

**UNTAG : 1989-1990**

United Nations had carried out a number of peacekeeping operations in the pre era and also during the Cold War. However, the first major peacekeeping operation to be undertaken by the UN in the post-Cold War period was to be the effective ‘decolonisation’ of South West Africa into the independent State of Namibia.

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The first suggestions for the UN to become involved in Namibia were made as early as 1978 when the group of States known as the ‘Western Five’† proposed a settlement plan to the Security Council which envisaged the creation of a UN peacekeeping body to supervise free and fair elections of Constituent Assembly. It was, thus, during the post Cold War that, on 16th January 1989 the Security Council adopted Resolution 629 specifying that the implementation of Resolution 435 should begin on 1st April. On its establishment UNTAG was given three main objectives‡ These duties were to be the respective responsibility of UNTAG’s civilian electoral personnel, civilian police monitors and military component. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were subsequently held from 7th to 11th November 1989 and were declared free and fair.

The monitoring of the South West African Police (SWAPOL) was the responsibility of the United Nations Police Monitors (CIVPOL), one of the six elements within UNTAG’s civilian components. The military component of UNTAG was charged with the duty of monitoring African troops to recognized bases and eventually overseeing their phased withdrawal, monitoring the conduct of those South African military personnel who continued to perform civilian duties, dismantling the command structures of citizen forces, commando units and ethnic forces and confinement of their arms, disarming SWAPO guerillas before their repatriation and the restriction of remaining SWAPO troops to bases in Angola and Zambia. It was also responsible for monitoring the border to prevent infiltration and for the protection of entry points and reception centers for returning refugees.

However, the importance of UNTAG can well be appreciated from the fact that the United Nations operation in Namibia marked the culmination of 70 years of pressure by the organized international community through the League of Nations and then the United Nations to enable the people of the territory to live in peace, freedom and independence. Further, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was an extremely political operation, in which the tasks of each element i.e. civilian, police, military were bonded together in the field under the Special Representative, with a view to achieving a structural change in society by means of a democratic process and in accordance with an agreed timetable.

† The group of States included West Germany, Canada, France, Britain and the US

‡ The objectives were to monitor democratic elections, to monitor the actions of the South West Africa Police (SWAPOL), and to monitor the ceasefire.


Mission’s Mandate

The nature of this UN operation was essentially political and its basic mandate was to ensure that free and fair elections could be held in Namibia. Further, UNTAG had to monitor the cease fire, which was supposed to come formally into effect on the first day of the mandate. It had to monitor the rapid reduction and eventual removal of the South African military presence in Namibia, which was an essential condition for free and fair elections and the subsequent transition to independence. It also had the difficult task of ensuring that the remaining security forces, the South West Africa Police, carried out their duties in a manner which were consistent with free and fair elections.

Over and above, UNTAG had the political task of ensuring that a major change in political atmosphere took place so that there could be a free and fair campaign in a full democratic climate. Numerous changes in law, attitude and society had to take place. Namibia had no tradition of political democracy and had been subjected to a harsh and discriminatory system of administration for a hundred years. Statistics do show that with maximum deployment, during the elections from 7th to 11th November 1989, UNTAG’s overall strength was almost, consisting of just under 2,000 civilians, 1500 police and approximately 4,500 military personnel. Since police force was a vital element, it had to be headed by a competent authority. Thus, the UNTAG civilian police (CIVPOL) was commanded by a Police Commissioner, who, as Police Adviser also provided needed advice on all police related matters. Commissioner Steven Fanning (Ireland) was appointed to hold this post on 23rd March 1989. The 1,500 police officers who served in CIVPOL were contributed, at the request of the Secretary General, by the 27 member States including India.

The major role to be played was that by the military component which was responsible for all military aspects of the Settlement Plan. The most important of these were monitoring the ceasefire and the confinement of the parties’ armed forces to base; monitoring the dismantling of the South African military presence in Namibia; and maintaining some degree of surveillance over the Territory’s borders by the Secretary General after consultation with the Security Council commanded the military component.

†† It may be worth noting that, Lieutenant General Prem Chand of India had been appointed as Force Commander-designate in 1980 and had played an active part in the preparations for the UNTAG operation. He was later appointed by the Secretary General after consultation with the Security Council as the Force Commander.

† In addition, it was as also to create the conditions for such elections required to be carried out with a wide variety of tasks, many of which went well beyond those previously undertaken by the more traditional peace-keeping operations described earlier.

159 United Nations, op.cit. p.353

‡ More so, almost all CIVPOL personnel remained in Namibia until independence, after which they were rapidly repatriated, with the exception of officers from Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan who, at the request of the incoming Government, remained in Namibia under bilateral arrangements for further time being.
The military component, as deployed, consisted of three elements; 300 military monitors and observers; three infantry battalions; and a number of logistics units. The strength approved by the Security Council for initial deployment was 4,650, but the maximum number actually deployed was 4,493, this being due to a reduced requirement of personnel for air support.\(^{161}\)

Finally, the independence ceremony, which took place just after midnight on 21\(^{st}\) March, was attended by the Secretary General, who administered the oath of office to President Sam Nujoma, in accordance with the terms of Constitution, and by many other leaders from around the world. In his final report to the Security Council, on 28\(^{th}\) March 1990, the Secretary General reported, ‘thus was achieved, in dignity and with great rejoicing, the goal of independence for Namibia for which the United Nations and its member States have striven for so long’.\(^{162}\)

Worthwhile to note that the UNTAG operation had many novel features and constituted an evolutionary step beyond the ‘United Nations’ traditional role of peacekeeping and the monitoring of self-determination processes. This was because of the far reaching mandate given to the Secretary General by the Security Council. UNTAG’s principal function was to create the conditions for the holding of free and fair elections. This meant that it was required to be and was deeply involved in the whole political process of Namibia’s transitions from illegally occupied colony to sovereign and independent State. UNTAG thus had to play its part in monitoring and implementing a ceasefire, the withdrawal and demobilization of troops, monitoring a local police force, managing a political ‘normalization’ process, supervising and controlling the resultant elections and assisting the transition to independence. Because of the vast international interest in Namibia, a territory with a search light of public security and comments. The mandate made it one of the most political of United Nations operations and the logistical dimensions, together with the strict timetable involved, which was indeed one of the most demanding in the field.

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA**
**OUNCA : 1989 - 1992**

Needful to state that years of turmoil in Central America inspired peace initiatives in 1983 by the Government of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, known as the Contadora Group. Then, the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, after preliminary consultations in Esquipulas, Guatemala, in 1986, drafted a comprehensive regional peace plan, based on the principle of solving several interrelated problems simultaneously. The plan, for which President Arias of Costa Rica was awarded the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize\(^{163}\), was embodied in the final declaration of a summit of the five Central American Presidents held in Guatemala in August 1987.

\(^{161}\) United Nations, op.cit. p.359

\(^{162}\) United Nations Documents, S/21215

\(^{163}\) United Nations, op.cit, p.389
It was, thus, that the negotiations between the five Central American States eventually produced an agreement signed in August 1987, which committed each of them to a number of pledges. This agreement came to be known as the ‘Esquipulas II’. The Five States promised to work towards national reconciliation, the cessation of hostilities, democratization including freedom of the press and political pluralism and the ending of states of emergency the holding of free and fair elections, ending support for irregular and insurrectionist forces and the prevention of the use of their territory for attacks on other States, and finally to provide support for refugees and displaced persons.

However, in the sequence of events to follow, the lack of adequate conditions to verify the implementation of the Esquipulas II was recognized by the joint United Nations Organisation of American States (OAS) inspection team which had been sent to Central America following the signing of the agreement. In light of this, the Secretary General refused to initiate a peacekeeping mission until circumstances produced a more conducive environment. The situation was to change after a meeting held at Tesoro Beach in El Salvador in February 1989. At this meeting, an agreement was reached to hold democratic elections in Nicaragua no later than 25th February 1990. In response to this the other four States agreed to develop a plan within 90 days for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of the Nicaraguan resistance and their families. The Secretary General responded to the Nicaraguan government’s request for the UN to monitor the election by establishing the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) which became operational on 25th August 1989.

Notwithstanding the above during the same month, at a summit in Tela, Honduras, the Presidents of the Five Central American States issued a Declaration and ‘Joint Plan’ for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance and their families, as well as assistance in the demobilization of all those involved in armed actions in the countries of the region when they voluntarily seek it. To provide support for this process the Secretary General’s of the UN and OAS were requested to create an International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV). The establishment of the CIAV was announced on 25th August and was to take effect from 6th September.

Further, ONUCA established pursuant to Security Resolution 644 (1989) of 7th November 1989 mandated only to conduct on site verification of the security undertaking contained in the Esquipulas II Agreement. It could not proceed with the demobilization of the Contra rebels until the Resistance members themselves agreed to it.

† States of Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador.

164 White, op.cit. p.226


166 ‘ONUCA’ in the blue helmets, op., cit, p.392

ONUCA was to be responsible for implementing the military aspects of demobilization process i.e. taking delivery of weapons, material and military equipment, including military uniforms. All the civilian aspects of the process, including the repatriation, relocation and resettlement and subsequent monitoring of the welfare of members of the resistance were to be the responsibility of CIAV. Further, it is worth noting that to accommodate for the creation of five ‘Security Zones’ within Nicaragua, within which the Contras would immobilize, the Secretary General sought approval for an expansion of ONUCA’s mandate†.

The composition of ONUCA’s military strength included 260 military observers, as well as crews and support personnel for an air wing and a naval unit‡. A helicopter unit was contributed by Canada. Argentina provided four fast patrol boats, with crews, for maritime patrolling duties in the Gulf of Fonseca. The Federal Republic of Germany provided a civilian medical unit and a fixed-wing aircraft with civilian crew. The mission also included international and locally recruited staff. After the enlargement of ONUCA’s mandate, Venezuela contributed an infantry battalion to undertake the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance from April to June 1990. It is indeed noteworthy that in fulfillment of ONUCA’s original mandate; mobile teams of military observers did patrol from the verification centers, each of which was manned by up to 10 observers, and smaller operational posts in forward areas. Patrols were carried out daily by land, by air and occasionally by river.168

A critical look at the achievements of the UN does reflect that in ONUCA a total of 19,614 armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance had been demobilized in Nicaragua and 2,759 in Honduras‡. It indeed was a matter of vital concern for all. The United Nation’s involvement in the Central American peace process vividly illustrated the increasingly complex demands made of the organisation’s peacemaking and peacekeeping skills. Although ONUCA was initially established with the limited mandate of verifying only one aspect of the Central American peace process, the tasks entrusted to it had been further evolved and it had been able to play an important part in assisting the parties concerned to control and resolve the conflicts in the region169.

† This approval was granted through SC Resolution 653 (1990) of 20 April 1990.
‡ Initially, military observers were contributed by Canada, Colombia, Ireland, Spain and Venezuela; subsequently they were joined by military observers from Brazil, Ecuador, India and Sweden.
168 United Nations, op.cit. p.395
‡ The number of weapons handed over to ONUCA by members of the Nicaraguan Resistance included 15,144 small arms (including AK 47s, other assault rifles, rifles and light machine-guns), as well as heavy machine-guns, mortars grenade launchers, grenades, mines and missiles.
169 United Nations, op.cit, p. 401
A look at the history of Angola confirms that the resistance groups, which had fought to end Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, had already turned on each other before independence was declared in 1975. For 16 years the nominal government of Angola fought a bloody civil war with the US and South African supported UNITA. A combination of military stalemate and the cessation of military and financial support at the end of the Cold War persuaded both parties to engage in dialogue leading to a negotiated peace settlement in 1991.

Thus, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was originally established by the Security Council on 20 December 1988 at the request of the Governments of Angola and Cuba. Its task was to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two Governments. Later, it was on 30 May, following the Secretary General’s recommendation, the Security Council adopted its resolution 696 (1991), entrusting a new mandate to UNAVEM (thereafter UNAVEM II) and establishing the mission for a period of 17 months, until the general elections were held in Angola in 1992.

Immediately on its establishment, the United Nations verification operation began as soon as the Angolan Peace Accords were formally signed on 31 May 1991. Advance parties of observers were deployed to the field on 2 June 1991. Subsequently, UNAVEM II teams of unarmed military observers were deployed at some 46 Assembly Areas locations where the troops of the two sides were assembled during the cease-fire, as well as at several critical points like certain seaports, airports and border posts. In essence, their task was to verify that joint monitoring groups composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Angolan Government and UNITA responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the cease-fire, carried out their responsibilities. Working closely with these monitoring groups, UNAVEM II verification teams provided support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the ceasefire. They responded to requests for assistance and used their good offices to resolve problems within monitoring groups. In the meantime, within a short span of barely four months on 1 October 1992, the Secretary General’s Special Representative issued a statement in which she noted that the great majority of the registered voters had cast their ballots in peaceful and orderly conditions, despite organisational and logistical difficulties.

170 Fortna, op.cit, p.288
171 United Nations Information Notes, United Nation Peacekeeping, p.23.
172 Ibid, p.23-24
† In addition, UNAVEM II took the initiative in monitoring some aspects of the accords such as, regular counting of troops and weapons in the assembly areas as well as monitoring of unassembled troops, demobilized troops and troops selected to join the new Angolan Armed Forces.
On 30th October, the Security Council, faced with further alarming reports of resumed hostilities in many parts of the country. However, on expiry of the earlier granted extension, it was on 15th July 1993 that the mandate of UNAVEM II was further extended for a period of two month until 15th September by Security Council. In recommending the extension, the Secretary General noted that UNAVEM II had become an essential factor in a continuous United Nations effort to facilitate the resumption of negotiations, to support humanitarian activities in the country, as well as an indispensable channel for communication between the parties.

The need for putting in more efforts became evident since the military situation in Angola remained volatile. Fighting in many provinces of the country continued and intermittently intensified. Several major cities remained under siege by one or the other side resulting in increased hardship for the civilian population and aggravating the already disastrous humanitarian situation, which was getting bad to worse.

The Secretary General reviewed negotiating process, the military and humanitarian situation in Angola. He again recommended that the Council must extend UNAVEM II at its existing strength for an additional three months. The additional personnel were to be deployed when an overall settlement was agreed or when the Secretary General advised the Council that the successful conclusion of the Lusaka talks were imminent.

During the same month, on 16th March 1994, the Secretary Council adopted its Resolution 903(1994). The Council also declared its readiness in principle to consider promptly authorizing an increase in the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level following a report from the Secretary General that the parties had reached an agreement. More so, demanding the end to all offensive military actions, the council called upon both parties to honours commitments already made, and urged them to redouble their efforts to complete the remaining points on the agenda of the Lusaka talks, attain a sustainable cease fire and conclude a peaceful settlement.

† It adopted Resolution 785 (1992), extending the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 30th November 1992, and endorsing the statement by the Secretary General’s Special Representative on the elections having been generally free and fair.


†† The Secretary General also recommended that the Council ‘authorize in principle’ an increase in the operation’s existing strength to its previous level of 350 military observers, 126 police observers and 14 military medical staff, with an appropriate number of international and local civilian staff.

‡‡ By this resolution it decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II until 31st May 1994 and not to impose, at that time, additional measures against UNITA.

173 United Nations Information Notes, op.cit. p.32
Originally, UNAVEM II’s authorized strength was 350 military observers and 90 police observers. There was also a civilian air unit and a medical unit as well as some 87 international and 155 local civilian staff†. Needful to reiterate that, the task of the UN was only to verify that the joint monitoring groups which were responsible for monitoring carried out their duties. UNAVEM II was not, therefore, to have a direct role in the implementation of the Peace Accords but was intended to monitor the monitors.¹⁷⁴

In addition, UNAVEM II took the initiative in monitoring some aspects of the Accords, such as the regular counting of troops and weapons in the assembly areas, as well as monitoring of unassembled troops, demobilized troops, and troops selected to join the new Angolan army. On many occasions UNAVEM II conveyed to both sides suggestions to overcome difficulties related to the assembly and the demobilization of troops, the proper custody of weapons and the monitoring of the Angolan police, as well as other matters. The United Nations also helped with the provision of food in the assembly areas. The mission after having carried out its assigned task was terminated in 1995.

**UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVER MISSION**
**UNIKOM : 1991 - 2003**

An overview of the historical backdrop confirms that Kuwait was invaded and occupied by Iraq on 2nd August 1990. It was on the same day, the United Nations Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal. A few days later, the Council instituted economic sanctions against Iraq. The Council subsequently adopted a number of Resolutions on various aspects of the situation. On 29th November 1990, it decided to give Iraq until 15th January 1991 to implement those resolutions. However, Iraq did not respond to adhere to United Nation’s demands. In the mean time the deadline passed and the next day on 16th January 1991, the armed forces of the States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait began air attacks against Iraq, followed on 24th February by a ground offensive.

† In May 1992, on recommendations of the Secretary General, the Security Council agreed to increase the police strength of the Mission to 126 affairs. Military and police observers were provided by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. In addition, during the polling, the Election Division fielded a total of 400 electoral observers. They were some 90 nationalities and included staff members from the United Nations system and observers contributed by Members States UNAVEM II’s, military and police observers also participated in the observation of the electoral process.

¹⁷⁴ Stephen M.Hill and Shahin P. Malik, op.cit. p.72

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p.73

‡ Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait were authorized to use ‘all necessary means’ to uphold and implement the Council’s Resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.
Offensive operations were suspended as of midnight on 28th February 1991, by which time Kuwait City had been liberated and all Iraqi armed forces had vacated the territory of Kuwait. On 3rd April 1991, the Council adopted Resolution 687 (1991), setting detailed conditions for a formal ceasefire to end the conflict and establishing the machinery for ensuring implementation of those conditions. Following Iraq’s acceptance of the Resolution’s provisions, the ceasefire became a formal one, which was to be adhered to in letter and spirit by the concerned parties.

Establishment of UNIKOM

In addition to all ongoing activities, the Council established, among other things, a De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, to be monitored by a United Nations observer unit and requested the Secretary General to submit a plan for the unit’s immediate deployment†. It decided further that the modalities for the mission should be reviewed every six months but without requiring in each case a formal decision for its extension. The Council’s formal decision would be required only for UNIKOM’s termination, thus ensuring the indefinite duration of the Mission, its termination being subject to the concurrence of all the permanent members of the Council.

Deployment of UNIKOM

Having earmarked the composition of the mission force, its advance party arrived on 13th April 1991 and by 6th May the mission was fully deployed. UNIKOM then monitored the withdrawal of the armed forces that were still deployed in its assigned zone. That withdrawal having been completed, the DMZ established by the Security Council came into effect on 9th May and UNIKOM assumed in full its observation responsibilities‡. On 2nd April 1993, the Secretary General informed the Security Council of his intention, in the first phase, to retain the military observers and to reinforce them by one mechanized infantry battalion. The Council concurred with this recommendation. In response to the Secretary General’s request, the Government of Bangladesh agreed to contribute a mechanized infantry battalion to UNIKOM176. An advance team arrived in the mission area in mid-November 1993, followed by the remainder of the battalion during the month of December and early January 1994.

By now, conceptually a number of changes were visible. With the addition of the mechanized infantry battalion UNIKOM’s concept of operations was modified. It was now based on a combination of patrol and observation bases, observation points, ground and air patrols, vehicle checkpoints, roadblocks, a force mobile reserve, investigation teams and liaison with the parties at all levels.


‡ UNIKOM’s observation responsibilities included initially, providing essential security during the setting up phase, UNIKOM included five infantry companies, drawn from the United Nations peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These troops were, however, withdrawn by the end of June 1991 by which date UNIKOM had fully established itself.

176 United Nations Information Notes, op.cit, p.21
Situation in the DMZ, February 1993 – March 2003

During this long spell of a decade, the overall situations in the DMZ remained generally calm. Although there were periods of tension in November 1993 resulting from the demarcation of the Iraq Kuwait boundary and in October 1994 in connection with reports about the deployment of Iraqi troops north of the DMZ. Otherwise, there were only a limited number of incidents and violations of the DMZ. These involved mainly over flights by military aircraft and the carrying or firing of weapons other than small arms. UNIKOM investigated all ground violations and communicated its findings to the parties. It also investigated all written complains. In the performance of its functions, UNIKOM received the cooperation of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities, which aided it to carryout its assigned tasks without any hindrance or slowing down its momentum†.

UNIKOM’S operations suspended

With the latest developments on the scene, it was on 17th March 2003 that in advance of the military campaign against Iraq by a coalition led by the United States, the Secretary General decided to suspend UNIKOM’s operations and to withdraw the Mission due to the risks to its security and also because UNIKOM could no longer operate in the DMZ. The majority of UNIKOM personnel returned to their countries of origin or to previous assignments. However, a small headquarter, consisting of 12 military officer, 20 essential civilian staff and some local staff, remained in Kuwait City as the hub control center of day-to-day activities.

Needful to state that throughout the operation UNIKOM had been careful not to create the impression that the de-militarized zone had come under UN authority, thereby attracting refugees seeking international protection. The responsibility for the maintenance of law and order had remained with the governments of the respective areas. UNIKOM, therefore, needed to post only one observer for every ten kilometers with only the most basic of equipment, usually a pair of binoculars and a passive night vision device for each fixed observation post177.

Mandate completed

As an after effect of the suspended mission following its operations and the subsequent evacuation of most of its personnel to their home countries of safe havens in Brindisi, Italy, or Dhaka, Bangladesh, UNIKOM continued its operations in a small rear headquarters retained at the Kheitan support center. Under the modified mandate provided under Security Council Resolution 1490 (2003), UNIKOM undertook military and political liaison duties and carried out residual tasks for the mission such as recovery, reconciliation and disposal of assets and provided support to other entities of the United Nations system in the region. At the same time, UNIKOM took the measures necessary for the termination of its mandate by 6th October 2003 and undertook arrangements for liquidation of the mission in accordance with United Nations procedures.

†UNIKOM maintained contact and provided technical support to other United Nations missions working in Iraq and Kuwait, in particular to the Iraq Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission throughout the mission until its dissolution in May 1993.

In his last and final report\textsuperscript{178} the Secretary General stated that until March 2003, UNIKOM did not encounter major obstacles in implementing its mandate. It functioned as an established mission with adequate facilities for its operations and the welfare of its personnel.

Secretary General concluded by saying that the United Nations could be proud of the achievements of UNIKOM. In its last phase, as a residual peacekeeping presence operating in a difficult environment affected by the conflict in Iraq from mid March 2003 until the completion of its mandate, UNIKOM proved to be a significant source of support for humanitarian agencies deployed in Iraq and Kuwait. Having thus accomplished the tasks mandated by the Security Council in its Resolution\textsuperscript{179} the mission was closed on 6\textsuperscript{th} October 2003 to utmost satisfaction of all.

\textbf{UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA
MINURSO : 1991- TODATE}

At the very outset, it would be prudent to highlight the fact that following the agreement between the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, MINURSO was deployed in September 1991 to monitor the ceasefire and to organize and conduct a referendum which would allow the people of Western Sahara to decide the territory’s future status. We may, thus, say that as the first mission instituted in 1991, MINURSO was mandated to conduct, organize and verify a referendum designed to decide the political future of the indigenous population of the northeast African territory of Western Sahara. As colonial rulers since 1884, the Spanish, under pressure from both the international community and the internal liberation group Frente Popular para la Liberation de Saguia el-Hamay de Rio (POLISARIA), had decided to allow a referendum to take place in 1975 so as to resolve the question of the future status of the territory. For this purpose the Spanish administration conducted a population census which stated that in 1974, Western Sahara had 95,019 residents of which 73,497 were indigenous\textsuperscript{180}. The validity of this census has created the greatest debate and formed the major stumbling block of the whole MINURSO operation.

This happened before the Spanish sanctioned referendum could take place, Morocco conducted a ‘Green March’, in which 350,000 ‘volunteers’ crossed into Western Sahara in order to reclaim the territory on historical grounds. Whilst Morocco, invaded from the north, Mauritania invaded from the South. This joint invasion seemed to be the result of secret negotiations between the three countries, which compensated the Spanish with special trade agreements for its withdrawal from the territory\textsuperscript{181}. Supported by Algeria, Libya and Cuba, POLISARIA continued its fight for independence against the two invaders.

\textsuperscript{178} UN Document, S/2003/933 dated 2\textsuperscript{nd} Oct 2003
\textsuperscript{179} UN Resolution 1490 (2003)
\textsuperscript{180} Chopra, J, ‘Breaking the stalemate in Western Sahara’ International peacekeeping, Vol 1, no. 3, Autumn 1994, p.310
Morocco’s unwillingness to talk directly with POLISARA was overcome by a compromise deal in which direct talks took place, although they were not officially recognized as such. Needful to highlight, the fact that the architecture of MINURSO was to be one of a quasi-governor-in-trust, responsible for administering-in-transition the last colony of Africa. As such, MINURSO was to be the first UN operation charged with the authority to restrain local forces, identity and register voters; conduct a referendum: certify the results and supervise the losing side’s withdrawal or disarmament. It was at a later point of time on 24th May 1991, in accordance with plan; the Secretary General proposed that the ceasefire should enter into effect on 6 September. However, it soon became clear that MINURSO would not be able to complete a number of tasks, including the preparation of a list of voters, the confinement of combatants to barracks and the repatriation of refugees before the ceasefire was to take effect. Despite violations of the informal ceasefire which had held for over two years, the Secretary General insisted that the settlement plan ceasefire should still come into effect on 6th September, although the transition period leading to the referendum would not begin until the outstanding tasks were completed. Despite the effective stability of the ceasefire from this date the referendum, initially planned for January 1992, and has not been held. This has been due to the lack of co-operation which the UN has received from both parties, under the wide divergence of opinion between the Moroccan authorities and POLISARIO on the criteria, which should be applied for voter eligibility.

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

Civil War in El Salvador was to see an American supported normal government fighting against a leftist resistance faction, the FDR-FMLN (Democratic Revolutionary Front-Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation). With sides unable to make significant military advances, a stalemate had been reached on the battlefield by the mid 1980s. However, despite the willingness of the FDR-FMLN to seek a negotiated settlement, the influence of the US was to prevent any form of compromise until the demise of the Reagan administration in 1988. By that time the FDR had split with its former ally to form the Convergencia Democratica and entered democratic politics, and the right wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) had won an impressive victory in the legislative elections of the same year. Together with the election of the ARENA party leader, Alfredo Cristiani, to the presidency in 1989. These victories were to greatly enhance the confidence of the Right to enter some form of democratic political system. Equally, the FMLN’s ‘increased awareness of the possible loss of prestige and support that would ensure from the continuation of a civil war with little prospect of success’, helped encourage the faction to enter into negotiations. Despite these incentives a deep mistrust remained between the parties.


182 cf.Chopra, op.cit, p.308

It is pertinent to highlight the fact that the United Nations involvement in the conflict began in early 1990 when it organised secret meeting between the government and FMLN, which eventually led to formal talks in April 1990. On 26th July 1990, an Agreement on Human Rights signed between the two parties in San Jose, Costa Rica, provided for the establishment of a UN verification mission to monitor nationwide respect for, and guarantee of, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although the agreement envisaged the mission would begin at the cessation of the armed conflict, the Secretary General was requested by both parties to send a preliminary mission to assess the feasibility of deployment before fighting had actually stopped†. Finally, the Chapultepec Agreement‡ signed on 16th January 1992 in Mexico City, which ‘brought the parties to the end of more than a decade of internal conflict’184. The Security Council through Resolution 729 accepted this enlarged mandate two days before the Chapultepec Agreement was finally signed.

Cambodia has been one country which remained torn apart for over twenty years by despotic rule and civil war. Moreover, it had also long been a playpen for international Great Power rivalry and petty vendettas. Despite population of only nine million, the perceived strategic importance of Cambodia was such that within thirty years, the French, the US, the Chinese and the Soviet Union had all attempted to control it through their respective puppet regimes. Perhaps the worst of these was the Chinese backed Khmer Rouge, who having seized power in 1975 when the North Vietnamese captured Saigon continued on a series of purges forced collectivization and urban expulsions, which in their four year tenure left an estimated two million fatalities.

Further, the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia left the international community divided and diplomatically strained. The Chinese, the US and the majority of UN members manifestly refused to recognize the new Vietnamese installed regime. Despite this situation a number of attempts were made by the UN to negotiate peace between the nominal Cambodian government and the three internal resistance factions within the country. By 1988 the Secretary General had invited his Special Representative to travel to South East Asia to relay to the Cambodian parties concerned, and to regional government, ‘certain concrete ideas which might serve as a framework for a comprehensive settlement plan’.

† This mission was sent in March 1991 and the UN Operation in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was officially launched on 26th July 1991 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 693. Its initial mandate was to verify the parties’ compliance with the commitments made under the San Jose Agreement.

‡ This final agreement required a substantial enlargement of ONUSAL’s mandate so as to include the verification of all aspects of the ceasefire and the separation of forces, and the monitoring of the maintenance of public order during the transition period whilst the new National Civil Police was being established.

These ideas, it was hoped would lead to the establishment of an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodian State\textsuperscript{185}. \textbf{Talks involving all of the Cambodian parties took place in Jakarta, Indonesia, in July 1988}\textsuperscript{†}. In January 1990, the five permanent members of the Security Council i.e. China, France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States started a series of high level meetings on Cambodia. They \textbf{called for a major United Nations role in bringing peace to the country}, including peacekeeping forces supervision of free elections and an administrative structure in the period leading up to the elections.

On 23\textsuperscript{rd} October, the parties signed in Paris the Cambodia Agreement a peace treaty to end the conflict and prepare the country for elections. The Agreements assigned to the United Nations an unprecedented role. The United Nations was to set up an operation, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which would; supervise the cease-fire, the end of foreign military assistance and the withdrawal of foreign forces; regroup, canton and disarm all armed forces of the Cambodian parties, and ensure a 70 percent level of demobilization; control and supervise the activities of the administrative structures, including the police; ensure the respect of human rights; and organize and conduct free and fair elections. \textbf{In the ensuing year, talks between the four Cambodian factions and the permanent five continued under the joint chairmanship of France and Indonesia, in order to find solutions to problems which had arisen because of the newly proposed UN role}. These eventually culminated in the Paris conference on Cambodia in October 1991, at which eighteen nations, together with Cambodia, signed CPSC i.e. the Comprehensive Political Settlement of Cambodia.

Generally known as the \textbf{Paris Peace Accords} the CPSC comprised four documents: the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia; the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian conflict; the agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia, and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. The Accords committed the four Cambodian factions to a ceasefire, an end to their acceptance of external military assistance, the cantonment and disarmament of their military forces, the demobilization of the remaining 30 percent or their incorporation into a new national army immediately after the election and the release of all prisoners of war and civilian political prisoner. Each faction was to retain its own administration and territory pending the election and the formation of a new national government. \textbf{The agreement also stipulated that all foreign forces were to be withdrawn and that the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, inviolability, neutrality and national unity} of Cambodia was to be respected.

\textsuperscript{185} cf. The Comprehensive Settlement Plan for Cambodia (CSPC), 23\textsuperscript{rd} October 1991

\textsuperscript{†}In juxtaposition with the continuing meetings of the Cambodian factions, the \textbf{five Permanent Members of the Security Council held high level talks in order to discuss a potential settlement of Cambodia}. The five eventually announced that they had reached an agreement on a framework for a comprehensive political settlement after their sixth meeting in August 1990.
UNTAC’s mandate, apart from the traditional role of supervising the ceasefire also included the supervision, monitoring and verification of the withdrawal and non return of foreign military forces, the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of the four faction’s armed forces (Phase II), the location and confiscation of caches of weapons and military supplies. It also included the conduct of a free and fair election, the promotion and protection of human rights; the oversight of military security and civil administration and of the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, assistance with mine clearance and the establishment of training programs in mine clearance and awareness, and the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure and the commencement of economic reconstruction and development. To implement this mandate UNTAC was composed of seven components†. Together they were to require the deployment of over 20,000 UN personnel. However, recognizing that the deployment of these components would take some time, the Secretary General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) which would be able to conduct assessments of UNTAC’s future requirements and represent his good offices to the Cambodian parties. In October, the Security Council established a small advance mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), to assist the Cambodian parties in maintaining the ceasefire‡.

The development of UNTAC began officially on 15th March 1992, with the arrival in the capital city of Phnom Penh of Head of UNTAC, the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Cambodia. The first contingent of UNTAC’s military component had also arrived, and by early May, some 4,000 United Nations personnel, including some 3,600 troops, were in place. The United Nations also started a Programme of repatriation and re-settlement of some 375,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in Thailand, with UNHCR as the lead agency. The Programme, which started in March, was completed before the 1993 elections.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA
UNOSOM: 1993- 1994

The history of Somalia in the 1990’s has been indeed very tragic. In January 1991, the downfall of its President resulted in power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of the country. In November 1991, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions i.e. one supporting interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Alidid. Since then fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Further, to add to the existing miseries, existence of numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem.

†These components were the military, police, human rights, civil administration electoral, rehabilitation and repatriation components.

‡On 16th October 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 717 establishing UNAMIC.
As a result of the above, the hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Almost 4.5 million people in Somalia over half of the estimated population were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition related disease, with the critically most effected living in the countryside. It was estimated that perhaps 300,000 people died since November 1991, and at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk. Almost one million Somalian sought refuge in neighbouring countries and elsewhere.¹⁸⁷ We may say that the worst probably had happened to this country and its grief stricken citizens.

Intervention by United Nations gained more momentum.⁶ Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-government organisations. Further, the deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary General; in co-operation with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) substantially increase assistance. However, intensive looting by heavily armed gangs of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by over land transport. Further, on 8th September, the Security Council also approved the Secretary General’s plan to deploy three logistics units totaling up to 719 personnel to support the enhanced UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM was to be 4,219 all ranks, including the unit of 500 authorized in Mogadishu and 719 for logistic units. This came handy for protection of humanitarian convoys and distribution centers in Somalia.

Later, a 100 days action programme was launched which sought to highlight priority actions, needed to prevent famine and the unacceptably high levels of deaths and deprivation in Somalia. The emphasis was placed on those areas and populations of the country needing priority attention. The Programme also identified the additional resources required to met its eight main objectives to include massive infusion of food aid, aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding; provision of basic health services and mass measles immunization campaign; urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene, provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes; simultaneously delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations; prevention of further refugee outflows and promoting returnee programs; building institution and civil so city rehabilitations and recovery. Donor’s response to the Programme was generally prompt and generous.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ *United Nations Information Notes, op. cit, p.127

† The fact is that despite the turmoil that ensured after the over throw of President Stand Barre; the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia.

‡ In order to get the situation under control, the Secretary General put in his bid for additional troops. Thus, on 28th August, the *Secretary Council, by its Resolution 775 (1192)*, approved the Secretary General’s report and authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p.130-131
Keeping the above deteriorating condition in mind, it was on 3rd December that the Security Council, unanimously by its resolution 794 (1992) authorized the use of ‘all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’†. As per the available information the original authorized strength of UNOSOM II was approximately **28,000 military personnel and some 2,800 civilian staff. Military personnel were provided by the 29 countries‡** The civilian component of UNOSOM II consisted of staff members of the United Nations and of personnel seconded from member States. In addition, there were approximately 17,700 troops in the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia, which did not form part of UNOSOM II and were not under the operational command of the UNOSOM II Force Commander. This number included the Quick Reaction Force, deployed in support of UNOSOM II.

The Force was seen to be gaining momentum as was evident from the fact that immediately following the adoption of resolution 837 (1993), UNOSOM II began preparations for its implementation. On 12th June 1993, it initiated decisive military action in south Mogadishu. In a series of air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II removed Radio Mogadishu from its control of and disabled or destroyed militia weapons and equipment in a number of storage sites and clandestine military facilities. On 18th November 1993, the Security Council, action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, renewed the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of six months, expiring on 31st May 1994. By adopting fresh Resolution 189 the Council decided fundamentally to review that mandate. The Council further requested the Secretary General to supply, as part of his report, an updated plan for UNOSOM II’s future humanitarian, political and security strategies to follow in due course.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE
ONUMOZ : 1992 - 1994

Keeping in mind the ill effects of 14 years of devastating civil war in Mozambique, need was felt for establishing the principles and modalities for the achievement of peace in the country. The agreement called for United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, in providing technical assistance for the general elections and in monitoring those elections. It was, thus, on 9th October 1992, United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali submitted to the Security Council a report on the proposed United Nations role in Mozambique, in which he recommended an immediate plan of action and stated his intention, subject to the Council’s approval

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‡ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized the Secretary General and the participating member States to make arrangements for ‘the unified command and control’ of the military forces that would be involved. It called on all Members States that were in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make contributions in cash or in kind.

These countries was namely Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States and Zimbabwe.

to appoint an interim special representative to overseas United Nations activities in that country\(^\dagger\). In the events to follow and after detailed deliberations, it was on 3\(^{rd}\) December 1992 that the Secretary General submitted to the Security Council his further report in which he presented a detailed operational plan for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Describing the difficulties of the operation, he referred to the size of the country, the devastated State of its infrastructure, the disruption of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new tasks arising from the General Peace Agreement and the complexity of the processes envisaged in the Agreement. The matter was put before the Security Council as Mozambique had suffered from 16 years of bloody and brutal civil war. On 16\(^{th}\) December 1992, the United Nations operation in Mozambique was established pursuant to Resolution 797 (1992)\(^{190}\).

In accordance with the Rome Agreement, ONUMOZ was assigned a wide range of tasks, these included inter alia: the verification of the maintenance of the ceasefire; the assembly and demobilization of troops; collection of weapons; verification of military locations; assistance in the formation of a new Mozambiquan Defence Force; monitoring of security along the corridors and main routes; maintenance of police functions in those areas where the Mozambique police was unable to establish its presence; monitoring of the activities of the Mozambique national police; co-ordination and monitoring of humanitarian assistance operations; implementation of a mine-clearing programme, including the build up of a Mozambique de-mining authority; technical and financial assistance in the electoral process; and the monitoring of the elections to be held on 27-29 October 1993\(^{191}\).

In addition to various political aspects to be looked into, detailed planning was carried out for various military aspects\(^\ddagger\). ONUMOZ was to monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons, monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, and provide security in the four transport corridors, monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups, authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process.

\(^\dagger\) As a result of it, the Interim Special Representative and the team of 21 military observers, drawn from existing United Nations peacekeeping missions, arrived in Mozambique on 15\(^{th}\) October 1992, the day the General Peace Agreement entered into force.


\(^{191}\) See Kurzidem, T, ONUMOZ, How to make a successful peacekeeping operation, International peacekeeping, vol.1, no.4, September – November 1994, p-133

\(^\ddagger\) With regard to the military aspects of the United Nations operation in Mozambique was to be closely linked with the humanitarian effort. Approximately 100,000 soldiers who were to come to the assembly areas were to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society.
ONUMOZ was composed of military as well as civil persons and the original authorized strength of ONUMOZ was between 7,000 and 8,000. On 23rd February 1994, the Security Council\(^{192}\) authorized the establishment of a 1,114 strong civilian police component. The initial reduction of the military component of ONUMOZ, amounting to some 2,000 troops of all ranks, began in April and was completed in July 1994. Following the election, the Mission started the major withdrawal of its personnel. It was on 15th November the Security Council\(^{193}\) decided to extend the existing mandate of ONUMOZ until the new government took office, but not later than 15th December and authorized it to complete residual operations prior to its withdrawal on or before 31st January 1995. On behalf of the United Nations, the Special Representative finally declared that the elections held in Mozambique were free and fair and that the assigned tasks had been effectively accomplished\(^{194}\).

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA
UNOMIL : 1993 - 1997

It is worth highlighting the fact that UNOMIL is indeed the first United Nations peacekeeping mission undertaken in co-operation with a peacekeeping operation already set up by another organisation. Having being established in September 1993 by the Security Council, worked with the Economics Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a sub regional organisation, in assisting the Liberians to establish peace in the country and overall harmony for its people. Unfortunately for the country, the civil war in Liberia broke out in 1990,\(^{‡}\) when the government headed by President Samuel Doe was overthrown, causing a complete breakdown of law and order in the country. With regard to the question of Liberia, the Security Council after lots of deliberations and details having gone into it, adopted Resolution 788 (1992)\(^{‡‡}\) on 19th November 1992.

\(^{192}\) United Nations, Resolution 898 (1994)

\(^‡\) As of 30th November 1994, the military component of ONUMOZ totaled 204 military observers and 3,941 Infantry and military support personnel. There were also 918 police monitors.

\(^{193}\) United Nations, Resolution, 957 (1994)

\(^{194}\) United Nation Information Notes, op.cit, p.126

\(^‡\) The war claimed human lives between 100,000 and 150,000 of civilians, and displaced scores of others both internally and beyond the borders, resulting in some 700,000 refugees.

\(^‡‡\) Imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia – except for those destined for the sole use of the peace keeping forces of ECOWAS.
It was indeed very shocking that on the dreadful day of 6th June 1993, nearly 600 Liberians, mainly displaced men, women, children and the elderly, were killed in an armed attack near Harbel, Liberia. In response the Security Council strongly condemned the killings and warned that those responsible would be held accountable for the serious violations of international humanitarian law. It was on 22nd September 1993 that the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for an initial period of seven months, UNOMIL was to work with ECOMOG in the implementation of the Colonou Peace agreement. The prime task given to the military component of UNOMIL was basically to monitor and verify compliance with the cease fire, the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment, as well as the Cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants.

Likewise the civilian component of UNOMIL included political, humanitarian and electoral personnel. The humanitarian assistance element worked closely with the United Nations specialized agencies and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in assisting in the co-ordination of relief activities and facilitating the return of refugees, the resettlement of displaced persons and the reintegration of ex-combatants. With regard to the deployment of UNOMIL, the Secretary General reported that following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 856 (1993) on 10th August 1993, the advance party of military observers began arriving in Liberia. The Chief Military Observer arrived in the country on 10th October 1993.

At the same time, UNOMIL had developed a plan for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society, covering the continuum from military disarmament to reintegration into civilian society and involving the coordination of activities to be implemented by United Nations agencies and non governmental organisations. Well appreciating the sequence of events to follow and in view of the uncertainty and potential for violence expected to accompany a military intervention in Haiti, United Nations agencies established a communication network among NGOs and public and private hospitals, made contingency plans for dealing with epidemics and built up decentralized stocks of medicines, health supplies, water supply equipment and food to the maximum degree possible in order to be fully ready for all eventualities and handled all type of situations which arose, in due course.

† It further requested the Secretary General to commence immediately an investigation into the massacre since such carnage was just not acceptable.


‡ By mid- December there were 166 UNOMIL military observers. UNOMIL was fully deployed by the end of December to take on the challenging tasks ahead.

196 United Nations Information Notes, op.cit p.206
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR : 1993 - 1996

The detailed study of history of Rwanda, an African State brings to our notice the fact that fighting between the Armed Forces of the Government of Rwanda and the Patriotic Front (RPF) first broke out in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbour, Uganda. Despite number of ceasefire agreements, hostilities resumed in the northern part of the country in early February 1993. These interrupted comprehensive negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and RPF were supported by the Organisation of African Unity (OUA) and further facilitated by the United Republic of Tanzania. Thus, in support of resumption of the negotiations, Rwanda and Uganda, in separate letters to the President of the Security Council on 22nd February 1993, called for the deployment of United Nations military observers along the 150 kilometers common border in order to prevent the military use of the areas, especially the transportation of military supplies.197

It was, thus on 5th October 1993 that UNAMIR was established by Security Council198 for an initial period of six months with the provision that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days only upon a review by the Council. In concern with this, the Secretary General would report on any substantive progress made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements. This was aimed at exercising effective control and ensuring transparency of actions.

Further, the Secretary General was encouraged by the fact that in spite of increasing tensions, the parties had maintained the process of dialogue. He believed that UNAMIR should continue to support dialogue to resolve the remaining difference in order to complete phase I of the implementation plan and to facilitate Phase II operations. Later, it was on 6th January 1994 that the Security Council adopted Resolution 893; ‘welcoming’ the joint statement made by both the parties in Kinihira on 10th December 1993 concerning the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and, in particular, the prompt establishment of a broad based transitional government.199 No body knew that was going to be the shape of things to come since all was going well so far. However, disaster struck on 6th April 1994 with the deaths of the Rwandan President Habyarimana and the Burundi President, Cyprian Ntaryamira since shooting down of their plane as it approached Kigali airport. The incident sparked a massacre by members of the Hutu tribe which within two days had claimed the lives of the Rwandan Premier and a few UN Belgian soldiers200. It is alarming to note that by the end of April, estimations of the number of civilians murdered ran as high as 200,000 refugees which had poured into neighbouring countries were Hutu, who feared reprisals from the advancing RPF led by Major General Paul Kagame.201

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197 United Nations Information notes, op.cit. p.207
Victims in the violence included Prime Minister Agathe Uwilinyimana and 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR. The Secretary General condemned the acts of violence and attacks on the members of UNAMIR in the strongest terms. As a follow up action and following the murder of the Belgian soldiers and threats to Belgian nationals, the Government of Belgium decided to withdraw its battalion. UNAMIR found it impossible to carry on with its original mandate, and instead concentrated on securing an agreement on a ceasefire to be followed by political negotiations; protecting civilians in all possible ways negotiating a truce with the two parties permit the evacuation of expatriates; assisting in evacuations rescuing those trapped in the fighting; and providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons under UNAMIR protection.\textsuperscript{202}

Keeping in mind the above existing state of things the Secretary General presented three future options to the Security Council. The First option envisaged a massive reinforcement of UNAMIR to enable the operation both to force the nominal Rwandan government and RPF into a ceasefire and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Such a force would also help to contain the conflict within the country’s borders. The second option proposed a small force stationed in Kigali in order to act as an intermediary between the parties. This option would require only a relatively small number of observers and an infantry battalion for protection. The final option was a complete withdrawal. Despite the Secretary General’s warning of the consequences the last option would have on Rwandan lives, it was initially preferred by the US for reasons best known to them.

Further, unwilling to become involved on the ground, criticism of the US position had caused it to offer ‘financial and logistical support’ to encourage African countries to organize a peace enforcement operation. However, leaders of the African nations were in no hurry to become involved themselves, especially as the western nations had refused before them. Meanwhile the UN described the exodus of refugees as the ‘largest and fastest ever seen’ as the RPF advanced further into Rwanda.\textsuperscript{203} In his report of 31\textsuperscript{st} May 1994 the Secretary General presented the findings of a special mission he had sent to Rwanda. The mission had reported that a significant number of the country’s seven million inhabitants had been killed. Together with confirmation that the areas controlled by the interim government had witnessed systematic massacres, the RPF was also condemned for its human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{204} Further, in order to save face, the United Nation announced plans for the establishment of a new Rwandan operation. UNAMIR II, which was to support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups in Rwanda, provide security assistance to humanitarian organisations and patrol and monitor protected areas along the Rwandan border.\textsuperscript{†}

\textsuperscript{202} United Nations Information Notes, op.cit, p.215

\textsuperscript{203} cf. Binyon, M., ‘America offers to finance African force for Rwanda,’ The Times 2\textsuperscript{nd} May 1994.


\textsuperscript{†} It was not envisaged that the \textit{UNAMIR II Force} would be involved in any form of peace enforcement operation, though action in self-defence, including against elements preventing the UN from implementing its mandate was encouraged.
The Secretary General proposed that UNAMIR II execute its mandate over three phases. These forces would establish the logistics and engineer advance basis in key areas around the country. It is pertinent to highlight yet another fact that the failure of the international community to provide the resources necessary to fulfill the UN’s commitments under Resolutions 918 and 925 caused the Secretary General to suggest that the Security Council consider an offer by the French government. Subject to Security Council approval the French had offered to make troops available as part of a Chapter VII multi-national operation, under which UNAMIR II could continue to operate to the greatest extent permitted by the resources made available. The French contended that the mission would be purely humanitarian. Further, the US supported the idea of setting up enclaves to protect refugees, and also due to lack of any credible alternative, the Secretary General gave his personal approval to the plan. Consequently, on 22nd June 1994, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorized the member States to establish a ‘temporary multinational operation aimed at contributing to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda’. Formalized in Resolution 929, the Security Council limited the operation to two months, enough time it believed for the UN to secure the 5,500 troops it required.

Accordingly, ‘Operation Turquoise’, was launched, where in the French and Senegalese troops were provided with logistical support from the Europeans and US. Once deployed, they found the RPF on the brink of capturing the capital city, with the fighting spreading south towards Burundi. As the RPF advanced the humanitarian situation worsened, as increasing number of refugees fled in fear of their lives. Through a letter to the Secretary General the French government sought approval to ‘organize, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994), a safe humanitarian zone where the population would be protected from the fighting’. This proposal was initially blocked by the RPF who accused the French of setting up roadblocks with militiamen who had been responsible for past human right abuses and of seeking to protect the regime responsible within their ‘safe zone’. Fears of a RPF confrontation with the French force, however, were unfounded, although a substantial amount of pressure was released after the fall of Kigali, the capital, and Butare, the second largest city, on 4th July. Ten days later, the RPF captured the last government stronghold in Gisenyi. The RPF now controlled all Rwandan territory except the French ‘safe zone’ in the southwest.

† For Phase I, expected to last for seven days, a Ghanaian battalion of 800 troops would be deployed in order to secure Kigali airport and other key sites in the city where displaced persons had sought UN protection. Phase II was to see the deployment of two more battalions, all of the force headquarters and the signal squadron. These troops were to secure areas of high security concern and provide protection to the majority of displaced persons. In the Final Phase, the remaining force, including the support battalion and two more infantry battalions would deploy.

It was a matter of grave concern in Rwanda and hence its government started becoming impatient at the slow progress being made with the repatriation of the refugees. It declared in June 1995 that the UN force had become ‘costly, useless, undisciplined and that it had caused tensions with the local population’\(^{210}\). In his report of 4\(^{th}\) June, the Secretary General noted that the RPF had continued to deny UNAMIR access to parts of the country had searched and seized its vehicles and other equipment and had even participated in anti UNAMIR demonstrations. In recognition that the host government no longer needed nor wanted the UN on its territory, the Security Council voted to cut the UNAMIR II force by half. From the force of 5,600, only 2,330 were to be left within three months and 1,800 in a time frame of four months. UN military observers and civilian police, however, were to remain at the level of 320 and 65 respectively i.e.to maintain status quo.

In concluding the happenings of Rwanda, it may not be out of place to highlight that the Rwandan operation had displayed the international community’s new cynicism towards involvement, in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. For two months in April-June 1994, whilst the Secretary General searched for troops with which to compose a force, the US refused even to authorize a United Nation deployment. Even when the US finally accepted the need for the United Nation to become involved, the Secretary General was thwarted in his attempts to find sufficient troops. The sight of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the escalating violence, and reports of massacres throughout the country, were no longer enough to ensure United Nation action. The Secretary General, therefore, was left with little option but to accept a French offer to establish a Chapter VII operation, whilst he frantically worked to persuade reluctant States to help him fulfill the commitments they themselves had made under Resolutions 918 and 925. And even when in July 1994 the US did finally become involved in the provision of humanitarian relief, it was evident that it intended to do as little as possible in order to ensure that it could conduct a quick and uncomplicated exit. If the catastrophe in Somalia had dealt a deadly blow to the proposed creation of a ‘New World Order’, then Rwanda was to be the place it finally died.

UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS IN HAITI

UNMIH : 1993 - 1996

Historical records confirm that after the departure of ‘Life President’ of Haiti, Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986, the country had a series of short-lived governments. In 1990, the country’s provisional government requested the United Nations to observe the December elections. Accordingly, on its request the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) observed the preparation and holding of the elections, which were termed as ‘highly successful’ by the head of ONUVEH. However, in 1991, a coup headed by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedars ended democratic rule. The President Jean Bertrand Aristide went into exile. The Organisation of American States (OAS) and the United Nations condemned the coup and began diplomatic efforts for the return to democratic rule. The Secretary General at the request of the General Assembly appointed a special envoy for Haiti\(^{211}\).


\(^{211}\) loc. Cit
Later in response to the worsening situation and on the request of Mr. Aristide, a joint United Nations and OAS mission the international Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was deployed in the country in 1993. Its task was to monitor the human rights situation and to investigate violations. The special envoy Mr. Dante Caputo sought to reach an agreement on the appointment of a Prime Minister at the head of a Government of national unity, an amnesty for the coup leaders and the return of the President, but his proposals were not accepted. Thus, in an effort to restore constitutional rule, the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti in June 1993. General Cedras then agreed to hold talks. Such talks, conducted in New York by the special envoy, led in July to an agreement, as per which Mr. Aristide would return to Haiti in October and appoint a new head of the armed forces.

As provided for by the agreements, the Security Council suspended the embargo following the approval by parliament of a new cabinet, and established the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to assist in modernizing the armed force and creating a new police force. But its mandate was undermined by non-compliance of the military authorities with the agreement. After a series of incidents, UNMIH, MICIVIH and other international agencies left Haiti in October 1993 and the Security Council resumed the embargo. Accordingly, the 20,000 strong 28 nation multinational force, led by the United States began deploying in Haiti, followed shortly thereafter by an UNMIH advance team. Soon General Cedras resigned and left Haiti along with the Chief of Staff. On 15th October 1994, President Aristide returned to Haiti and the following day the embargo was lifted. MICIVIH also returned, resuming its monitoring and promotion of human rights and providing assistance to institution. Further, as had been decided by the Security Council, UNMIH took over in 1995 from the multinational force to assist the Government to maintain the secure and stable environment established by the Force. UNMIH also helped to create, for the first time in the country’s history, a national civil police. The United Nations and OAS oversaw the 1995 parliamentary and local elections, won by a coalition associated with President Aristide.

Needful to state that the first in the series of peacekeeping operations in Haiti was the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), from September 1993 to June 1996. UNMIH was effectively suspended from October 1993. It was reactivated in March 1995 once a secure and stable environment had been established by the Multinational Force (September 1994 – March 1995). The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), whose mandate expired on 31st July 1997, succeeded UNMIH in July 1996. UNTMIH was the third in the series of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti†. UNTMIH was established on the basis of a July 1997 report by the Secretary General to the Security Council212. In the report, the Secretary General stated that Haiti had taken significant strides forward. Nevertheless, the country continued to face daunting political and economic challenges.

† It was established by Security Council Resolution 1123 (1997) of 30th July 1997 for a single four month period ending on 30th November 1997.

The basic consensus among Haitians for the reforms required to strengthen democratic institutions, generate economic growth and create jobs had yet to be built. Progress had also been made with regard to the establishment and training of the new police force. However, progress was slow, and the Secretary General shared the view of Haiti’s political leaders that, without steady and long-term support from the international community, the force might not be able to cope with serious incidents, risking deterioration in the security situation. The Secretary General shared the views expressed in November 1996 by the President of Haiti, Mr. Rene Preval, that a full 12 months would be necessary for the Haitian National Police (HNP) to be able to ensure a secure and stable environment without international support. Against that background, the Secretary General recommended that the Security Council to maintain United Nations support of HNP for a further period of four months i.e. from July to November 1997. The Security Council could establish a new mission to be known as the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH). The new mission would comprise both military and civilian police elements and would continue to support the Haitian authorities in the further professionalization of HNP. The Secretary General’s Special Representative would continue to coordinate activities in Haiti of the United Nations system related to institution, building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.

MIPONUH

The mission was located at Haiti with its headquarters at Port-an-Prince from December 1997 to March 2000 established to assist the Government in the professionalisation of the National Police. The mission placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Other tasks included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral donors. The United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) completed its mandate on 15th March 2000. Its main task was to assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police. MIPONUH, which succeeded the previous United Nations Missions in Haiti in December 1997, placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Other tasks included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in their day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the Haitian National Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral donors. MIPONUH’s special police unit was tasked with providing assistance to MIPONUH personnel and protecting its property.

Latest Position

Having determined that the situation in Haiti continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council† by its Resolution decided to establish the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorized by the Security Council in February 2004, to MINUSTAH on 1st June 2004 and there after mission remained active to fulfill its mandate.

Following the coup d’etat on 21\textsuperscript{st} October 1993 during which the first constitutionally elected Hutu President, Mr. Melchior Ndadaya, was assassinated, the United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB) was established at the request of the Security Council\textsuperscript{213} to facilitate the restoration of constitutional rule in Burundi. Since its establishment, UNOB has been actively involved in good offices and has actively sought to help the parties to the conflict build an internal political partnership and pursue the peace talks initiated by the region. On 12\textsuperscript{th} June 1998, the Secretary General\textsuperscript{214} welcomed the agreement reached between the Government and the Parliament for a new partnership. A few days later, Security Council members were briefed on the signing of a new political platform and the signing of a transitional constitution by the Government and Parliament and called on the international community to support the Arusha process.

In a letter to Mr. Nyerere, on 8\textsuperscript{th} July 1998, the Secretary General emphasized the interest of members of the Security Council in the situation in Burundi and the determination of the United Nations to continue providing technical assistance to the peace process. He appointed, on 20\textsuperscript{th} July, Ayite Jean Claude Kpakpo (Benin) as Senior United Nations Advisor to the Facilitator of the Burundi Peace process (S/1998/968) to succeed to Mr. Felix Mosha (Tanzania), who had been serving in the same capacity since October 1997. United Nations assistance continued to be provided to Mr. Mandela after the region appointed him in January 2000 as the new Facilitator of the Arusha Peace process, following the death of Mr. Nyerere on 14\textsuperscript{th} October 1999.

Intensive efforts by Mr. Mandela resulted in the signing on 28\textsuperscript{th} August 2000 of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi by 15 of the 19 parties. The Government and six Tutsi parties signed with reservations. The Secretary General welcomed the agreement and urged those who had not signed to do so as soon as possible. He also called on all armed groups to agree to a cessation of hostilities two of the parties who had refused to sign, did so within a week and the remaining two within a month. The Facilitator started consultations and negotiations aiming at resolving the differences among the Arusha signatories on the transitional arrangements as well as negotiations with the armed groups aimed at concluding a cessation of hostilities. He called for the organisation of a summit and issued a communiqué\textsuperscript{†}. On 29\textsuperscript{th} September Mr. Mandela briefed the Security Council. In a statement it issued after the briefing, the Security Council urged all parties to work towards resolving remaining differences over the peace accord and to proceed with its implementation\textsuperscript{‡}. It urged the regional States to continue to use their influence to draw the armed groups into the peace process.

\textsuperscript{213}Security Council S/26757
\textsuperscript{214}SG/SM 6596 AFR/73

\textsuperscript{†} In which it ‘called upon the parties to sign a ceasefire within 30 days’ and ‘declare immediate cessation of hostilities pending the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement’.

\textsuperscript{‡} It also reiterated its call, in Resolution 1286 (2000) of 19\textsuperscript{th} January 2000, on all parties to remain outside the peace process to cease hostilities and participate fully in that process.
It was on 10\textsuperscript{th} July 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, signed the Ceasefire Agreement for cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces in DRC. Later, based on the Secretary-General's recommendations in his report dated 15\textsuperscript{th} July 1999, the Security Council, by its resolution 1258 of 6\textsuperscript{th} August 1999, authorized the deployment of up to 90 United Nations military liaison personnel. On 24\textsuperscript{th} February 2000, the Security Council, by its resolution 1291 authorized the expansion of the Mission to consist up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 or more observers, provided that the Secretary-General determined that there was a need and it could be accommodate within the overall force size and structure. Further, Security Council by resolution 1445 of 4\textsuperscript{th} December 2002 authorized the expansion of MONUC to a level of up to 8,700 military personnel in two task forces.

Acting under \textit{Chapter VII of the Charter} of the United Nations, the Security Council also decided that MONUC may take necessary actions, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Later, by its resolution 1565 (2004) of 1\textsuperscript{st} October 2004, the Security Council revised the mandate of MONUC and authorized the increase of MONUC’s strength by 5,900 personnel, including up to 341 UN police personnel, as well as the deployment of appropriate civilian personnel, appropriate and proportionate air mobility assets and other force enablers. It also expressed its determination to keep Monaco’s strength and structure under regular review, taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground. Thus, in 2005-2006, the strength of the Mission was further temporarily increased.

On 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2006, the Security Council, by its resolution 1693 (2006), decided to extend the increased authorization. Further, \textit{the Security Council also authorized the temporary redeployment of a maximum of one infantry battalion, a military hospital and up to 50 military observers from the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) to MONUC}, until 1\textsuperscript{st} July 2006, with the intention of renewing such authorization following future decisions of the council concerning the renewal of the two mission’s mandates.
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN BURUNDI
ONUB : 2004 – TODATE

Having determined that the situation in Burundi continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, 215 decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in order to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement216.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
UNMIBH : 1995 - 2002

It is pertinent to highlight the fact that, fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina came to an end on 11th October 1995. From that date until 20th December 1995, forces of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) monitored a ceasefire put in place to allow for peace negotiations being launched in Dayton Ohio†. In signing the Agreement, the three Balkan States undertook a broad commitment to conduct their relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter i.e. fully respect the ‘sovereign equality of one another’, settle disputes by peaceful means, and ‘refrain from any action against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State’. A detailed analysis indicates that the UNMIBH’s mandate was to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina‡.

To start with, during the period of 1996 – 1999 UNMIBH began its operations under inauspicious conditions. As a result of the conflict, over 200,000 people had died, 20,000 were missing and 1.2 million were internally displaced. The country was divided along ethnic lines. The fratricidal war, in which civilians were the principal target and victims, had left a legacy of hatred and widespread fear of retribution. It is indeed alarming to note that, numbering over 44,000,†‡ the local police forces were mono ethnic paramilitary units, organized in three parallel structures, and entirely unsuited to civilian law enforcement. Instead of attempting to provide citizens of minority groups with some sense of security, police forces continued to discriminate against, harass and intimidate citizens who were not of their own ethnicity.

215 Security Council Resolutions 1545 of 21st May 2004,

216 loc. cit

† It was on 14th December 1995 that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the other parties signed the Peace Agreement in Paris.

‡ By assisting in reforming and restructuring the local police, assessing the functioning of the existing judicial system, monitoring and auditing the performance of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and other.

†‡ The said strength was three times the peacetime strength.
Within this highly volatile setting, UNMIBH focused on civilian security. The presence and intensive patrolling of almost 2,000 monitors made a crucial contribution to creating a stabile environment. As the immediate post conflict crisis began to subside, UNMIBH began addressing the broader issues of the mandate. It was by 1999 that the security had further stabilized and the first significant returns of displaced persons to their pre-war homes began. The mission then concentrated on implementing the substantive aspects of its mandate. It was evident that sustainable police reform and restructuring could not be tackled through training and intensive co-location alone. A conceptual model constituting the baseline of concrete police reform and restructuring was drawn up. This formed the basis of a two year mandate implementation plan comprising specific goals, projects, benchmarks and timelines. Three levels were addressed. The plan was organized in six core programme and its end goals were set. The plan became the primary reference document for the mission’s activities, both with local interlocutors and the international community. It brought transparency to UNMIBH work, engendered ownership, transparency and accountability amongst law enforcement personnel and institutions, and provided a clear outline for the Mission’s reporting mechanisms.

The contribution of UNMIBH was thus a part of a broader effort by the international community aimed at strengthening the foundations of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General stated that by improving public security and reforming and restructuring the police, UNMIBH helped lay the foundation for post-war recovery and development. The high standard of returnee security encouraged the return of over 250,000 refugees to their pre-war homes. Police reform and restructuring in accordance with international standards created in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was termed ‘A police fit for Europe’. The two trust funds both assisted police reform and contributed to the country’s wider post-conflict recovery.

It is worth noting that throughout its mandate, UNMIBH assisted and was assisted by most of the other members of the United Nations family: The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provided invaluable support in screening suspected war criminals within the police force. It was at the new year of 2003 that the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNMIBH and every effort was made to ensure seamless transition. UNMIBH fully co-operated closely with the EUPM planning and advance teams to ensure completion of the transition and deal with any residual issues that arose, in due course.

† These levels were the individual police officer, law enforcement institutions and the relationship between the police and the public.

‡ These programs being, certification of individual officers: accreditation of police administrations: and the establishment of self-sustaining mechanisms for State and regional level inter-police force co-operation.

217 loc. cit
Needful to state that after having determined the situation, Côte d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 of 27th February 2004, decided to establish UNOCI for an initial period of 12 months i.e. from 4th April 2004. Further, the Council authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. The mandate of the mission was originally stipulated by resolution 1528 and subsequently further developed first by resolution 1609 of 24th June 2005 and most recently by resolution 1739 of 10th January 2007. According to the latter resolution, the mandate of UNOCI was to be implemented in coordination with the French forces stationed in Cote d’Ivoire.

Tasking of the mission includes monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement, disarmament and dismantling of militias, operations of identification of the population and registration of voters, reform of the security sector, protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians, monitoring of the arms embargo, support for humanitarian assistance, support for the redeployment of State administration, support for the organisation of open, free, fair and transparent elections, assistance in the field of human rights, public information and law and order. By other provisions of resolution 1739, the Security Council authorized from the date of adoption of that resolution the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement reached between UNOCI and the French authorities.

When we critically examine the historical back drop of this country we find that Sudan has seen civil conflict for about 11 years since, it became independent on 1st January 1956. Generations of Sudanese have known nothing but the terrible consequences of perennial war. The main rebel movement in the South fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the State and self-determination. Over two million people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees. In its resolution 1556 of 30th July 2004, the UN Security Council, among other things, reiterated its grave concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations including continued attacks on civilians.

Establishment of the Mission

Keeping in mind the prevailing situation and various political developments that were taking place, it was on 24th March 2005, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The Council took this action in its resolution 1590 after determining that the situation in the country continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.
The tasks of UNMIS were to facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance. The mission was also to assist the parties in the mine action sector, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS’ capabilities.

**Expansion of the mandate**

However, it was on 31st August 2006, the Security Council, by its resolution 1706, decided to expand the UNMIS mandate to include its deployment to Darfur, without prejudice to the mission’s existing mandate and operations. The Council invited the consent of the Sudanese Government of National Unity, called on member States to ensure expeditious deployment and requested the Secretary General to ensure additional capabilities to enable UNMIS to deploy in Darfur. In due course the Council met again on 6th October 2006 and, by its resolution 1714, extended the mandate of UNMIS until 30th April 2007, while stating its intention to extend it further beyond that date, if necessitated.

**Current Status**

As on date, the mission is being led under the command of an Indian senior Officer, Lieutenant General Jasbir Singh Lidder who is the Force Commander of UNMIS. More so, the current strength as of 31st January 2007 is 9,977 total uniformed personnel, including 8,740 troops, 577 military observers, and 660 police; supported by 799 international civilian personnel, 2,234 local civilian and 178 United Nations volunteers. The mission so far has already suffered a total of 18 casualties.