CHAPTER-II
ANCIENT INDIAN SUPERSTITION IN BUDDHISM

All ailments have cures but not superstitions. And if for some reason or other, any superstition crystallizes into a religion, it easily becomes an almost incurable malady. In the performance of certain religious functions, even educated people of today forget their human dignity to accept the most ridiculous, superstitious beliefs. Superstitious beliefs and rituals were adopted to decorate a religion in order to attract the multitude. But after sometime, the creeper which is planted to decorate the shrine outgrows and outshines the shrine, with the result that religious tenets are relegated to the background and superstitious beliefs and rituals become predominant.

The foundation of some religious systems and worship is based on the instinctive fear of the unknown. The fear created by religion is the worst form of fear since it imprisons and ensnares the mind. Fear fertilizes the growth of superstition that flourishes in the fog of ignorance. People yearn for security for themselves and their loved ones in a world of constant flux which can offer no permanent solution to problems. The moment a person thinks that he or she has solved a particular problem, the conditions surrounding the original circumstances will change and yet another set of problems will then emerge. Leaving them confused and lost as ever before. They are anxious, like a child who builds sand castles on the beach and is afraid of every wave that comes in.
In this craving for security and fear of death, humans fall prey to superstitions. Surrounded by the mystery of the universe, they develop faith in things that they fear. It is ignorance and fear of the unknown that gave rise to early religious beliefs, and the workings of the universe are explained in terms of infallible supernatural gods who are supposed to control everything that happens. Even though science has done much to dispel such myths and improve the knowledge of modern people, many myths much of the superstitions inherited from the past still continue to remain and we have yet to break free from the self imposed bondage to such beliefs. Superstitions weaken and enslave the mind. Superstitious ideas, beliefs and practices are ingrained not only amongst uneducated people but, strangely enough, the well-educated as well.

Sometimes when taken to extremes, fear may arise because of attachment or association with specific objects or situations which are harmless in themselves. Such cases are known as phobias, like fear of darkness, fear of enclosed spaces, fear of open spaces, fear of heights, fear of enemies, fear of charms, and illusory fear of being attacked or killed by someone lurking in the background. Of those who believe in superstitions, Buddha said: “where fear arises, it arises in the fool and not in the wise person”.¹

Superstition is excessively uncritical belief in and reverence for the supernatural. The Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines superstition as follows: “belief which is not based on human reason or scientific knowledge,

but is connected with old ideas about magic, etc., according to superstition; if you walk under a ladder it brings you bad luck.”

And Oxford Advanced Dictionary also defines such as “the belief that particular events happen in a way that cannot be explained by reason or science; the belief that particular events bring good or bad luck.”

This chapter portrays the rituals in Buddhism, the wrong views of ‘six teachers, who were contemporary to Buddha, who had mentioned in the Samaññaphala sutta, and various worships during the period of Buddha in India.

2.1. The understanding of Rituals in Buddhism

In examining the attitude of early Buddhism towards religious ritual an important aspect that can be observed in the early texts is the attempt at ethical interpretation of Brahmanic rituals. One of the most important examples of this could be seen in the Śīṅgālovāda Sutta. The main ritual is called the “closing of the six quarters i.e.” ensuring the safety and security of the individual at the center by closing, as it were, the six gates on the six sides. Sigala tried to do it by worshipping the guardian deities of the six of the most important social groups intimately related to the individual, viz. the parents as the east, the teachers as the south, wife and children as the west, the friends and companions as the north, the workers and servants as the nadir and the religious as the zenith. Instead of worshipping the guardian deities as in Sigala’s ritual, here the individual performs one’s duties by each group. They reciprocate by bestowing compassion on him by

1 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Third Ed)
performing their own duties by him. Thus each quarter is made safe and secure for the individual at the centre.

There are also several preliminaries that have to be observed by a performer of a ritual and also by the participating priests. The first is the purification acts. In the case of Sigāla he accomplished this by bathing. According to the aṣṭālayana Grhya Sutra\(^1\) one should bathe before a recital of the Vedas. Before the commencement of the aṣvayuji ceremony one should adorn the house, bathe, and put on clean garments\(^2\). But Buddha replaces this external purification by a spiritual purification. Sigāla is instructed to first abandon the four defiling actions and refrain from evil actions from the four motives. In Brahmanic ritual there are also many taboos to be followed by the performers which includes the person to be avoided or be associated in it. According to aṣṭālayana the sacrifice should choose priests, for officiating at the sacrifice, with neither deficient nor superfluous limbs.\(^3\)

The officiating priest should not eat flesh nor have intercourse with a wife until the completion of the sacrifice. Aggikabhāradhvāja Brahmin did not wish Buddha to come to his house where he was performing a sacrifice. He called Buddha ‘mean shoveling’ and ‘a mean outcaste’.\(^4\) This shows that Brahmans regarded recluses with shaven heads as undesirable persons during their ritual performance. But Buddha replaces those taboos with the avoidance of the six

\(^2\) Ibid.p.203
\(^3\) Ibid p.193.
doors for the dissipation of wealth. In one discourse he says that he neither praises sacrifices nor does he not praise all sacrifices. In the Aśvalayana Gṛhya Sutra is a reference to five oblations enjoined on the devotees, viz. oblation to gods, beings, fathers, Brahmans and men. These five are explained, as sacrifices over fire, bali offerings, panda offerings, study of Vedas and gifts to men respectively. Buddha also has recommended five oblations to be made to relatives, visitors, the departed, kings and deities.

Buddha has in many places condemned the major sacrificial rites of the Brahmins which involved the slaughter of animals. Possibly these were the so-called śruti karmas based on the early Vedic texts and the Brahmana texts. With regard to them Buddha states that great seers do not go to these sacrificial. By the word “mahesi” Buddha probably meant here Arahants, for he says in another discourse that arahants do not go to such sacrificial rituals. He also says that a person who lights the sacrificial fire and sets up the sacrificial post accumulates much demerit even before the sacrifice. In the Kūṭadanta Sutta, having first rejected the Brahanan Kūṭadanta’s idea of an elaborate sacrifice involving the slaughter of many animals, Buddha instructed him, by citing an ancient story, how a sacrifice free from the obnoxious features of animal slaughter, cutting down trees and grass, and the harassment of workers and slaves, could be performed.

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2 Ibid .p.217.
4 Ibid.p.76, p.42.
5 Ibid.p.48.
6 Ibid iv .p.42.
One could, says Buddha, be reborn in heaven after death by performing such a sacrifice. Yet neither Arahants nor those on the path to Arahanthood come to those ritual grounds because they are not treated with respect and courtesy at such places.

There are however other sacrifices less difficult and less troublesome but of greater benefit and greater advantage. At the lowest scale of these is “perpetual gifts kept up in a family where they are given specifically to virtuous recluses”. Arahants and those on the path to Arahanthood go to such houses for alms as no disrespect or discourtesy is shown to them there. From that point onwards the word “yañña” is used in the discourse to each step on the path to the realization of “Nibbāna” which is called the highest “yañña” without any other “yañña” superior to it.¹ In one discourse Buddha says that there are three fires, viz. āhuneyaggi, gahapataggi and dakkhineyaggi, which without any doubt are adaptations of the Brahmanic ahavaniya, gārhapatya and daksiṇa fires. Buddha says that these three fires should be “esteemed, revered, venerated, respected and well looked after”. But he gives a different interpretation to the three terms. Āhuneyyaggi is interpreted to mean the parent; gahapalagaggi is taken to be wives and children, slaves, messengers and workers. The third, dakkhineyaggi, is interpreted to mean recluses and Brahmans.

Buddhagosa, while giving the Buddhist interpretation of the term Āhuneyya, indicates his awareness of the relation of this term to Brahmanic

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usages. He says that Brahmins have their fire named āhavanīya and, what is sacrificed to it was thought to bring great fruits. But he goes on to say that if something is to be sacrificed for the great fruits it brings then it should be sacrificed to the Saṅgha. Anyway it is clear that a Brahmanic ritualistic concept has been adapted by Buddhists. There are many other discourses which emphasize the significance given to these qualities in Buddhism. Thus once again we observe the re-interpretation of Brahmanic ritualistic concepts in Buddhism.

Purificatory ritual of bathing was given a significant place in the life of a Brahman. Some of them plunged in the cold water of rivers several times a day to wash away one’s sins. Questioned by Ven. Ānandā one of them said that he bathes in the evening to wash away the sins committed during day and once again in the morning to wash away sins committed during night. But Buddha had his own interpretation of this ritual. In the Vatthūpama Sutta, when asked whether he bathes in the Bahukā, Buddha answers that for one who is morally pure the purpose of bathing (to wash away dirt on the body) can be accomplished by bathing even from a well. In a religious sense Buddha never advocated the ritual of bathing. Instead he advocated a spiritual bath for inner cleaning. In Brahmanic traditions, one who has completed the primary brahmacarya āśrama concludes it with a ritual bath. Henceforth he is called a snātaka, “one who has bathed”, and becomes eligible for the grīhasta āśrama. Buddhists have taken over this epithet of

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1 V.Trenckner, Majjima Nikāya, Vol.,1,p.39.
the person who has completed the brahmacāri¹ stage, but uses it to designate an arahant or a Buddha. He also has accomplished the purpose of his ‘noble life’. Thus we see rituals in Buddhism and others.

The Pāli words “yañña” and “yāga” with the Sanskrit “yajña” and “yāga” designate sacrifices of varying types and degrees offered especially to gods and also to other species of non-human beings such as Fathers and various grades of demi-gods. However the use of the word has been extended to cover a number of other subjects as well. For instance in the concept of the five Grand Sacrifices (Mahāyaña) in Brahminism, “brahma-yajña” is defined as the recitation of portions of the Vedas and other sacred texts as a particular sacrificial ritual while “manushya yajña” is defined as hospitality to guests. “Deva-yajña”, “pitṛ-yajña” and “bhuta yajña” are the offerings made to gods, fathers and all created beings respectively.²

The sacrifice in which a man is sacrificed is called “Purisamedha”. Like in the horse sacrifice a gift of everything including land is offered at this sacrifice. “Among the victims of a sacrifice which included all imaginable kinds of domestic and wild animals,” says Barth,³ “is frequently mentioned a man.” Human sacrifice is mentioned not only in legends and the symbolism of the ritual but it is expressly mentioned and formally prescribed. In fact all the sama sacrifices included one or many human victims, but only one of them is called Purushamedha,

¹ A.P. Buddhadatta Mahāthera, Concise Pāli-English Dictionary, p.195
² Williams, Monier, Sanskrit-English Dictionary.
However it is very difficult to unravel the genuine position with regard to its prevalence in historical times. Some texts indicate that it was obsolete. One text actually names the sacrifice that performs it for the last time. The growing popularity of ahimsa may have weakened the brahmanical yearning for it. But details given in some texts are so precise that it is difficult to imagine it had completely disappeared from the sacrificial stage. We can also add that some of the “Jātaka,”¹ both “Pāli” and the “Mahāvastu” mention the sacrificing of human beings in brahmanical sacrifices. In Buddhist texts too the word Jañña sometimes is given a sort of symbolic interpretation. In the Kūṭadanta Sutta² yañña designates not only the offerings of food etc. given to gods, recluses etc. but also the various milestones on the Path to Nibbāna from the point of one’s conversion as a lay Buddhist.

Thus taking refuge in Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha is called a yañña in this symbolic sense from thence the taking one of the five precepts the realization of the First Jhāna, the second Jhāna, the third Jhāna, the fourth Jhāna turning one’s mind to vision through knowledge, turning one’s mind to the creation of mental image and creating such an image, turning one’s mind the practice of various psychic powers, turning one’s mind to the realization of the divine ear, turning one’s mind to the knowledge of penetration of another’s mind with one’s mind turning one’s mind to eh recalling of one’s previous birth of

¹ Jataka.Vol., VI.p.132.
beings and turning one’s mind to the destruction of the intoxicants. Through this last one the meditator realizes the four Noble Truths and the destruction of the intoxicants and attains total liberation. This is the highest of all yaññas and there is no other yanñña sweeter or higher than this.

2.2. Buddhist attitude to Brahmanical Sacrifice

Once a Brahman who was preparing to make a grand sacrifice where many animals were to be immolated went to Buddha and entered into conversation on the sacrifice with him “I have heard good Gotama” ha said “that the laying of the fire and erection of sacrificial posts is very fruitful and is of great benefit”. Replying that he has also heard the same, Buddha went on to critically examine the brahmanical ritual. Buddha directly condemned the brahmanical ritual saying, “he who plays the fire and sets up sacrificial posts, even before the sacrifice, sets up three swords, which are evil, yielding pain, resulting in pain, viz. the three swords of deed, word and thought”.

One who intends on performing a Grand Sacrifice first conceives in his mind that so many animals of different kinds should be immolated. This is the thought sword. Then he gives verbal instruction that so many animals should be immolated and set up the sword and finally he himself stars the killing saying “let so many bulls be immolated” and so forth. This is the deed-sword. Thus thinking of doing meritorious deeds he actually does de-meritorious deeds, seeking the path to a happy aboad he really paves the way to miserable existence. By thought, word and deed he accumulates demerit and cuts a path to misery. In the same discourse
Buddha also gives his ethical interpretation to the three sacred fires of the Brahmins.¹

Questioned by brahmin youth Puṇṇaka about the purpose of the many sacrifices to gods made by brahmin and khattiya sages, Buddha replied that they did so desiring life here on earth. But these, although they hope for, laud, pray and sacrifice, praying to be repaid in pleasures of the senses; these sacrifices attached to future becoming did not go beyond birth and old age, adds Buddha.² This shows that the brahminical ritual is not the cure for the saṃsāra ailment of birth, old age, death and rebirth. The bloodless sacrifice recommended to King Mahāvijita by his Brahmin chaplain could take one to heavenly rebirth but apparently not Nibbāna.³ Mahāvijita, in fact, planned originally to hold a sacrifice for his benefit and happiness for a long time.⁴ Probably this was also the intention of the sages referred to by Puṇṇaka above.

2.3. Wrong Views of Six Teachers

The researcher here discusses the wrong views of ‘six teachers’ who were contemporary to Buddha, which have been stated in the Sāmaññaphala sutta. These views deny that actions have consequences, and they deny the law of Karma. The group of six views is well-known throughout Buddhism as a whole, as the extant

² L. Feer, Samyutta Nikāya, Vol., I, p.200
⁴ Ibid, p.143.
Pāli, Tibetan and Chinese sources show. In the Samaññaṇaphala sutta¹ each are
given as the view of a certain teacher:

1. The view of Ajita Kesakambala
2. The view of Purāṇa Kassapa
3. The view of Makkhali Gosāla
4. The view of Pakudha Kaccāyana
5. The view of Nigantha Nāṭaputta
6. The view of Saṅjaya Balatthaputta.

The group of six views are well-known throughout Buddhism as a whole,
as the extant Pāli. And these views deny that actions have consequences; they
deny the law of Kamma. The view of Ajita Kesakambla is the following:

Nothing is given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; there is no
fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world;
no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no
good and virtuous recluses and Brahmins in the world who have
themselves realized by direct knowledge and declare this world and
the other world. The person is composed of the four elements; when
he dies, earth returns and goes back to the element of earth, water
returns and goes back to the element of water, fire returns and goes
back to the element of fire, wind returns goes back to the element of
wind, while the sense disappear into space. Four men with the bier
as a fifth take up the corpse, the funeral orations last as far as the
burning ground, his bones are a dull whit, his offerings end in ashes.
They are fools who teach alms-giving. The doctrine of affirmation is
empty and false banter. Fools and wise alike are destroyed and
perish at the breaking up of the body; they do not exist after death.²

² Ibid.Ip.55
Three versions of this formula are found: the first is this one from the Samaññaphala sutta where the view is attributed to Ajita Kesakambala.\textsuperscript{1} A shorter version is often used which consists of the first paragraph.\textsuperscript{2} In the Vibhāga classification this is the ‘wrong-view that has ten bases, (Dasavatthukā micchā-dhīthi), also simply called ‘wrong-view’ (Micchā-dīthi) A third version, which is very short, consists of the following:” “there is no other world, there are no spontaneously born beings, and there is no fruit or result of good and bad action.”\textsuperscript{3}

The early Pāli canon seems to have understood the view of Nihilism quite literally as the view that ‘there is not’. Action does not have consequences. There is no point in giving to others. There is no path to purity. There are no enlightened beings. There is no cessation of Dukkha. The Dhammasāṇgaṇī uses the phrase

\textsuperscript{1} It is termed ‘the doctrine of annihilationism’ (uccheda vāda)The formula is not specifically introduced asadīthi. In the Sandaka sutta (M I 513-24) at MI 515 the view is not attributed to anyone. It is introduced as being the ‘doctrien’ (vāda) and ‘view’ (dīthi) held by a certain ascetic. It is called one of the four ways which ‘negate the living of the holy life, (abhrmacariyavāsa). The other three are the view of non-doing, the view of non-causality and the view of Pakudha Kaccāyana, which I will consider below. In the dīthi-saṃyutta (S III 201-24) at S III 205 the view is not (SIV340 -59) at S IV 347 ti is described as a vāda and dīthi.

\textsuperscript{2} In the Sāleyyaka sutta (MI 285-90) at MI287 (see also AV 265) it is called one of the ‘three kinds of mental conduct not in accordance with the dhamma, unrightous conduct,(tividā maṇaśā adhamma-cariyā- visamacariyā) . The other two are to covet the wealth and property of others and to have ill-will and hatefull intentions. It is called both ‘wrong, -view’ (micchā-dīthi (MI400-3) at MI 401 it is introduced as a vāda and dīthi. It is called the doctrine of nihilism’ (natthika-vāda , MI403). In the Cūḷapaṇḍama sutta (M III 22 it is introduced in the following way: ’and how, bhikkhu, does an untrue man hold views as an untrue man? Here, bhikkhus, someone holds such a views as this’ (katha ca bhikkhuave, appuriso asappurisadiṭṭhi hoti: idha bhikkhaye, appuriso evamadiṭṭhi hoti, M III22). The formula is then given. In the Sevittabbāsevitabba-sutta(M III 45 -61) at M III 52 the two following introductory formula is used: And what kind of acquisition of view causes unwholesome states to increase and wholesome states to diminish in one who cultivates it? Here someone holds such a view as this (kathāṁ rūpaṁ bhante dīthi paṭilābham sevato akusalā dhammā abbhaṇḍhanti, kusalā dhammā parihaṁanti: idha bhante, ekacco evamadiṭṭhiko hoti). The formula is then given. In the Mahācattārīṣaka-sutta (M III 71 -8) at MIIL 71 the question is asked: ‘What, Bhikkhus, is wrong –view?’ (katamā ca bhikkhave micchādīṭṭhī). The formula is then given. The Sāmaohavinodani explains the view that has ten bases, (dasavatthukā micchā-dīthī).Vibh-a 181).

‘non-accomplishment in view (Diṭṭhi-vippatti) to refer to the view of Nihilism and ‘accomplishment in view’ (Diṭṭhi-sampadā) to refer to the opposite view, the right-view which affirms that ‘there is what is given’, etc. This right-view shall be referred to as ‘the view of affirmation’ (Atthika diṭṭhi) According to Dhammasaṅgaṇī, all wrong-views are non-accomplishment in view, and all right-views are accomplishment in views. Holding that actions have consequences, an effect on the mind of the one who holds this view. Buddhaghosa explains why it is better to have the view of affirmation than the view of Nihilism, which may be summarized: accomplishment in view is opposed to attachment to view.

For this reason it is accomplishment in view.1 He also explains that whereas we know we can give to others, some grasp the idea that there is no fruit and result of these actions.2 Our actions do produce consequences, and this is what this view-holder primarily denies. Indeed the view of Nihilism is sometimes used to explain attachment. For example, the Vibhaṅga considers four attachments (Upādānas): ‘attachment to sensuality’, ‘attachment to view’, attachment to precepts and vows, and ‘attachment to the theory of self (Kāmupādānaṃ, diṭṭhupādānaṃ, sīlabbatupādānaṃ, attavādupādānaṃ).3 The attachment of wrong-view is explained, first, as the view of Nihilism, then it is stated that all wrong-views are a form of greed and attachment.

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3 Vibhīnaṅga, p. 375.
Wrong-views are then opposed to right-view in the sense that right-view, the view of affirmation, is closer to non-attachment. One should practice right-view because it promotes a certain course of action, and in practicing right-view there is the realization of the nature of non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion (alobha, adosa, amoha). To deny that actions have consequences is, in a certain way, an expression of greed, hatred and delusion. Wrong-view prevents the very first stage of the path from being realized, the beginning of the transformation of action which eventually will lead to insight. There has been some scholarly debate on the nature of the view of Nihilism. Jayatilleke holds that the doctrine as a whole is based upon the epistemological motive that ‘perception’ (Pratykṣa) alone is the only valid means of knowledge.¹

Since perception is the only valid means of knowledge, ‘higher perception’ (Abhiññā) is denied. The view of Nihilism claims that the person is composed of the ‘four great elements’, hence there is no self. Morality has no value.² The view that ‘actions have consequences’ (the right-view of affirmation) is denied because this law cannot be known by ‘perception’. It cannot be known by any’ valid means of knowledge, hence it does not exist. It is generally held that this type of thinking reflects the views of the Lokâyata, Cārvâka schools, or so-called ‘Indian

² Did Ajita reject karma because it could not know be know, or were there other reasons? If ‘sensual pleasure’ (kamma) were the goal, then its pursuit could not be impeded by ethical concerns. In A.K.Warder’s terms. Ajita’s view would ‘sanction the pursuit of pleasure without fear of kamma’. A.K Warder, ‘On the Relationship between’ Early Buddhism and Other Contemporary Systems’. Bellet in of School of Oriental and African Studies, 18 (1956), pp. 43-63 (p. 55, note 3).
Materialism’,¹ and there are Lokāyata doctrines which may be compared to the view of Nihilism. For example, the doctrine of Yadṛcchā vāda denies cause and effect and proposes that all relationships are accidental. The Lokāyata doctrine of Svabhāva Vāda holds that things operate without a cause, and change according to their ‘won nature’.

According to Warder, the doctrine of Svabhāva-vāda could then have been used to replace the theory of Karma.² Tucci holds that the essential part of the view of Nihilism is the phrase ‘no fruit or result of good and bad actions’ and that this is in fact the central idea of Indian Materialism. He also thinks that if the view of Nihilism was derived from real existing doctrines, this would help explain the parallel with Jain source. The main point made by these scholars is that the view of Nihilism denies that actions have consequences. The view Nihilism runs contrary to the experiential and empirical nature of early Buddhist thought. Actions are held to shape the conduct of body, speech, and mind. This process must begin with the transformation of action. The view of Nihilism denies the possibility to transformation. It is a view that produces an unwholesome course of action and it is a wrong-view.

¹ An Anthology if Source Materials and Some Recent Studies, By Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (New Delhi, 1990).
² A.K. Warder, On the Relationship between Early Buddhism and Other Contemporary Systems, pp.43.
The view of Purāṇa Kassapa

The wrong-view of Nihilism primarily denies that actions have consequences. The second wrong-view also denies that actions have consequences and is described as ‘the view of non-doing’ (Akiriya diṭṭhi):

When one acts or makes others act, when one mutilates or makes others mutilate when one tortures or makes others inflict torture, when one inflicts sorrow or makes others inflict sorrow, when one oppresses or makes others inflict oppression, when one intimidates or makes others inflict intimation, when one kills living beings, takes what is not given, breaks into houses, plunders wealth, commits burglary, ambushes highways, seduces another’s wife, utters falsehood - no wrong is done by the doer.

If, with a razorrimmed wheel, one were to make the living being on this earth into one mass of flesh, into one help of flesh, because of this there would be no wrong and no outcome of wrong. If one were to go along the south bank of the Ganges killing and slaughtering, mutilating and making others mutilate, torturing and making others to truer, because of this there would be no wrong and no outcome of wrong. If one were to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving gifts and making others give gifts, making offerings and making others make offerings, because of this there would be no merit and outcome of merit. From giving, from taming oneself, from restraint, from speaking truth, there is no merit and no outcome of merit.¹ This view denies morality by denying that action has

¹ T.W.Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter Diśha Nikāya, Vol.I,p. 52-3. In the Samaṇa phals sutta(DI 47-86) at DI52-3 this view is attributed to Purāṇa Kassapa. It is called simply akiriya. In the Āpanakaka sutta (MI 400-13) at MI 406 it is called akiriya vāda. In the Diṭṭhi samyutta (S III 201-24) at S III 208 it is called karato. In the Sandaka sutta (MI51324) at MI 516 it is the second way which ‘negates the living of the holy life’ (abrahamacariyavāsa). In the pāṭali sutta (S IV320-59) at S IV 347 it is described as a
meaning. To call someone an Akiriya-vāda appears to have been a term of disparagement, used by different traditions. For example, the Jains called Buddhist Akiriya vādins, because of the Buddhist denial of self: ‘the Akiriya vādains who deny karma, do not admit that the action the future moments.

The view of Makkhali Gosāla

The third wrong-view, which is occasionally found together with the view of Nihilism and the view of non-doing, is the following:

There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings; beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purification of beings; beings are purified without cause or condition. There is no self-power or other-power, there is no power in humans, no strength or force, no vigor or exertion. All beings, all living things, all creatures, all that lives is without control, without power or strength they experience the fixed course of pleasure and pain through the six kinds of rebirth. There are one million four hundred thousand principle sorts of birth, and six thousand others and again six thousand. There are five hundred kinds of Karma, or five kinds, and three kinds, and half Karma, sixty-two paths, sixty-two intermediary a eons, six classes of humans, eight stages of human progress, four thousand nine hundred occupations, four thousand nine hundred wanderers, four thousand nine hundred abodes of Nāgas, two thousand sentient existences, three thousand hells, thirty-six places covered with dust, seven classes of rebirth as sentient beings, seven as insentient beings, and seven as beings ‘freed from bonds’, seven grades of Devas, men and

vāda and diṭṭhi. At S III 69 is found the first two lines of Makkhali Gosāla’s view (the view of ‘non-causality’.) from the Samaññaphala sutta attributed to Purāṇa Kassapa. At S V 126 is found another formula attributed to Purāṇa Kassapa. This formula is part of the view (the first two lines of the Pāḷi) attributed in the Samaññaphala sutta to Makkhali Gosāla (however, for ‘defilment’ (samkilesa) is found ‘ignorance and lack of discernment’(aṭṭhaṇāya adassanāya) with other minor differences). At A III 383 is found a discussion to Purāṇa Kassapa. Because of some of the confusion noted in these references we may surmise that Purāṇa Kassapa’s view was similar to Makkhali Gosāla’s: see Basham, History and Doctrines of the Ājīvakas, p.84. For details of Pūrṇa Kassapa see Ibid.pp.80-90
demons, seven lakes, seven great and seven and seven small dreams, eight million four hundred thousand aeons during which fools and wise run on and circle round till they make an end of suffering. There is no question of bringing unripe Karma to fruition, or of exhausting Karma already ripened, by various conduct, by vows, by penance, or by chastity. That cannot be done. Saṃsāra is measured as with a bushel, with its joy and sorrow and its appointed end. It can neither be lessened not increased, nor is there any excess or deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread will, when thrown, unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow.¹

It refers to this Micchā-dhiṭṭhi as ‘the view of non-causality’ (Ahetuka-dīṭṭhi). In the Sāmaññaphala sutta, this view is also described as purification through Saṃsāra’(Saṃsāra-suddhiṃ). This may have been a familiar term for Ājīvaka ideas. It contains the wellknown Ājīvaka notion of ‘destiny’. Pande notes that this could reflect a central tenet of Ājīvaka, ‘the unalterable working out of a coiled up necessity’. This notion is reflected in the last phrase of the view in which Saṃsāra is compared to a ball of thread which, when thrown, will unwind naturally to its full length. In a similar fashion, fools and the wise are heading towards an end to sorrow, towards purification (Visuddhi).²

² A.L.Basham considers possible reasons as to why Māgadhism are found in the formulation of this view. They could be used in order to mock the speaker, as in Sanskrit drama, where the Māgadhī dialect was reserved to intimate low lines (Basham, History and doctrines of the Ājīvakas, p.240. or there is the possibility that this passage comes from a different source. Hence, by implication, they may be echoes of the original language of the teachers of these doctrines. As Norman argues: ‘it seems to me that the words attributed to the six teachers probably reflect the actual dialect of their teachings, at least as they were remembered at the time of the composition of the texts’(A Philological Approach to Buddhism,p. 73). In the first part of the formula there are few-e endings. They are found only in the phrase in nattihi atta –kāre, natti pha karāre. In the second per they are very prevalent. This suggests that the two parts originate from a different source (Basham,History and Doctrines of the Ājīvaka, pp.24-5). If the reason for the Māgadhism was to mock the speaker, all six teachers ‘views would be caricatured in a similar fashion. It seems more likely that there was an independent source for this formula. Norman has
I have now considered three wrong-views the view of Nihilism, the view of non-doing and the view of non-causality, which each deny that actions have consequences in their different ways. These views are wrong because by denying the importance of action, they lead away from what is wholesome. Action can produce both what is unwholesome and wholesome. In characterizing suffering as being caused by both craving and ignorance the Suttas are suggesting that a course of unwholesome action increases both craving and a lack of knowledge. These views, then, not only increase unwholesome action but also craving and ignorance. In this way, they lead away from the true state of things.

**The view of Pakudha Kaccayana**

The fourth wrong-view is the following:

The seven elementary categories are neither made nor ordered, neither caused nor constructed; they are barren, as firm as mountains, as stable as pillars. They neither move nor develop; they do not injure one another, and one has no effect on joy, or on the sorrow, or on the joy and sorrow of another, what are the seven. The elementary category of the earth of water, of fire, and of air, and joy and sorrow, with life as the seventh. No man slays or causes to slay, hears or causes to hear, knows or causes to know. Even if a man cleaves another’s head with a sharp sword, he does not take life, for the sword-cut passes between the seven elements.\(^1\)

This view is attributed in the Samaññaphala sutta to Pakudha Kaccayana. In the Samaññaphala sutta unlike most of the other views, it is not given a name, the

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considered this issue. He agrees with Basham that in this formula we can indeed find borrowing from anon –Pāli source. In fact, due to the –o and –e endings there are probably two sources (Basham’s argument), if not more (Normand, ‘Pāli and the Language of the Heretics’, in Collected Papers, Volume I (Oxford, 1990), pp.238-46; see also Norman, ‘Māgadhisms in the Kathāvatthu’, in collected Papers, Volume II (Oxford, 1991), pp.59-70. In this later article, Norman notes the first scholars to recognize-e as Māgadhī for Pāli nominative singular-o were, in separate works, Kuhn and Trenckner in the 1870s).

text simply states that when Pakudha Kaccāuana was asked the fruits of the homeless life he ‘answered with something quite different’ (Aññena aaññaṃ vyākāsi.).¹ A wrong-view appears in the Diṭṭhi saṃyutta² and is called the ‘great view’. This view consists of the first half of Pakudha’s view, as found in the Sāmaññaphala sutta, with some differences.³

Bhikku Bodhi refers to this view as ‘the doctrine of seven bodies’.⁴ Basham describes Pakudha’s view as ‘fantastic atomism’, a ‘Parmenidean doctrine of immobility’⁵ and ‘Eleatic atomism’.⁶ Jayatilleke prefers to call it ‘proto-Vaiśeṣika Realism’.⁷ I would like to consider the view of Pakudha with two other wrong-views, the first from the Diṭṭhi Saṃyutta and the second (group of four) from the Brahmajāla sutta. The first is from the Diṭṭhi-saṃyutta: The winds do not blow, the rivers do not flow, pregnant women do not give birth, and the moon and sun do not rise and set, but stand as stable as a pillar.⁸ This view is simply given the name ‘wind’ (Vātam). This formula is called a Diṭṭhi, and is introduced as such. Bhikku Bodhi notes that the commentarial definition of Vātam is ‘untrue representation’ (lesa): although the wind appears to blow and the sun and moon

¹ T.W.Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter, Diṭṭha Nikāya, I.p.56.
² L. Feer, Saṃyutta Nikāya, Vol.III. p.211
³ There is the following omission: tattha n’atthi hantā vā ghātētā vā sotā vā sāvetā vā viññātā vā viññāpetā vā of Pakudha’s view in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta does not appear, but SII 210 does have the following: yo pi tiṇhena saṭṭhena saṃsā ṇ chiṇḍati na koci kheci ji vīta vīro pēti, sattānaṃ yeva kāyanaṃ antareṇa saṭṭha-vivaraṇa anupaṭṭati of Pakudha’s view as in the Sāmaññaphala sutta. The Saṃyutta formula then changes to the second half of Makkhali Gosāla’s view as found in the Sāmaññaphala sutta, with minor different readings. In a similar way the Sandaka sutta (MI 513 – 24) at MI 517 -18 has the first half of Pakudha’s view with very minor variations.
⁴ Bhikku Bodhi, Connected Discourses of the Buddha, p.1094.
⁵ A.L.Bassham, History and Doctrines of the Ājīvaka, p.17.
⁶ Ibid. p.262.
appear to rise, they are an untrue representation of wind (Vāta-leśa), sun and moon.\(^1\) In the Brahmajāla sutta four ‘externalist-views’ (Sassata-diṭṭhi) are found. As they are similar to the view of Pakudha and the Diṭṭhi- saṃyutta view, all four views can be summarized here in the following way: The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.\(^2\) I have given three views: that of Pakudha Kaccāyana, the view from the Diṭṭhi - saṃyutta called Vātam and the four externalist-views from the Brahmajāla sutta (understanding the four externalists-views as one wrong-view).

All these wrong-views share at least part of the following: ‘barren, as firm as a mountain, as stable as a pillar, (Vañjhō kūṭṭha eso hiṣṭhāyuṭṭhito). This Micchā-diṭṭhi denies motion and change. They may contain speculations of a similar nature to the late Jain- Ājivakka Avicalita-nityatvam, ‘unchanging permanence’.\(^3\) Jayatilleke believes that the simplest way of understanding these views is to regard them as expressions of the most prevalent doctrine of this period: that the real is being.\(^4\) If the real is being, then all movement and change is unreal. All three views deny, again, that actions have consequences, but in a

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\(^{2}\) D.I. 14-16. Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views: the Brahmajāla Sutta and its Commentaries* p.62. The first three views are realized through meditative experience, divided according to the number of past births which can be remembered. By samādhi the holder of the views attains one of the six abhiṣes that of realizing former births (pubbenivāsañña). Dutt observes *Early Monastic Buddhism*, p.43. The final view is based upon ‘reason ‘and ‘reflection’ (takki and vīmaṇsi).


different way to the nature of the denial proposed by the views of Nihilism, non-doing and non-causality. Instead of simply denying the law of Kamma, they deny any effect of actions, even denying that action itself exists. This appears to be an extreme version of the denial of action proposed in the first three views.

The View of Nīgāṇṭha Nāṭaputta

The fifth Micchā-diṭṭhi found in the Sāmaññaphala sutta is usually understood as being the view of the Jains:

A Nīgāṇṭha is bound by a fourfold restrain. What four? He curbed by all curbs, enclosed by all curbs, cleared by all curbs, and claimed by all curbs. And as far as a Nīgāṇṭha is bound by this fourfold restrain, thus the Nīgāṇṭha is called self-protected, self-controlled, self-established.¹

This view, in the Sāmaññaphala sutta, is called the ‘fourfold restraint’ (Cātuṣyāma- saṃvaraṃ).² This is a difficult passage. In fact, to classify it as a type of Micchā-diṭṭhi is problematic. The view appears to be a parody of Jain practice, not an expression of a view-point, a Micchā diṭṭhi. Basham calls the passage ‘obscure’.³ Rhys Davids attributes the difficulty of this passage to the idea that it is intended to be an ironical imitation of the Jains’ way of talking.⁴ The phrase ‘curbed by all curbs, enclosed by all curbs, cleared by all curbs, and claimed by all curbs, may involve a pun on the word Vāri, which can mean ‘water’ or ‘restraint/curb’. Following Walsh, the passage is perhaps meant to parody one free

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from bonds, and yet bound by the bonds of restraint, bound by the very restraints that are meant to bring freedom. Its classification as a wrong-view is perhaps due to the fact that it denies what is wholesome: the practice of the Buddhist path.

The View of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta

The sixth wrong-view is that of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta. On being asked the fruits of the homeless life, he answered in the following way:

If you ask me: ‘Is there another world? – If I thought there is another world, I would declare that there is. I do not take it thus, I do not say it is true, I do not say it is otherwise, I do not say it is not so, I do not say it is no not so. Similarly, when asked any of the following questions, he resorts to the same evasive statements and to endless equivocation: ‘is there no world beyond?’ ‘Is it that there both is and is not a world beyond?’ ‘Is it that there neither is not is not a world beyond?’ ‘Are there beings spontaneously reborn?’ ‘Are there no beings spontaneously reborn?’ ‘Is it that there both are and are not beings spontaneously reborn?’ ‘Is it that there neither are nor are not beings spontaneously reborn?’ ‘Is there fruit and result of good and bad actions?’ ‘Is it that there both is and is not fruit and result of good and bad actions?’ ‘Is it that there neither is not is not fruit and result of good and bad actions?’ ‘Does the Tathāgata exits after death?’ ‘Does the Tathāgata not exist after death?’ ‘Does the Tathāgata both exit and not exit after death?’ ‘Does the Tathagata neither exist nor not exist after death?’

In the Sāmaññaphala sutta this formula is attributed to Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta. These views are not given a name. The Sutta states that when Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta was asked the fruits of the homeless life he ‘replied by

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equivocating’ (Vikkhepaṃvyākāsī)\(^1\) in the Brahmajāla sutta are found the wrong-
views of the ‘four endless equivocators’ (Cattāro amarā-vikkhepikā) which are
very similar to the wrong-view of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta. These are the views of
those who avoid answering questions. In general the endless equivocators held that
there was a ‘moral danger’ in making truth claims. The moral danger perceived
was worry or remorse. Jayatilleke has noted a ‘superficial similarity’ between
these ideas and those of Buddha.\(^2\) Some have found in this an expression of a
spiritual path. Though the view of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta does not express this
sense of despondency with debate and the making of truth claims, it is in this
context that I think the view should be considered.

I have now described a number of wrong-views. I suggested at the outset
that those views are, to a greater or lesser extent, views that deny that actions have
consequences. They are views which deny the law of Kamma. These views deny
what is of value, so they are wrong-views. However, I think there is something
more at stake than this. In the Sāmaññaphala sutta, King Ajātasattu asks each of
the six teachers to “point to such a reward visible here and now as a fruit of the
homeless life.”\(^3\) In the same way that Buddha refuses to answer certain question,
the six teachers appear to be unwilling to answer questions about the nature of
action and the effects of actions; and in the same way that Buddha refuses to
answer questions of an ontological nature, so the six teachers, in a sense, will only

\(^2\) Jayatilleka, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p.474.
answer questions of an ontological nature. In the Sāmaññaphala sutta Buddha’s answer to King Ajātasattu suggests that action influences the realization of knowledge.\textsuperscript{1} Buddha’s answer suggests the interplay of conduct and knowledge, but the answers of the six teachers deny this, and hence they are wrong-views.

2.4. Various Forms of Worships during the Period of Buddha

The concept of god originated from fear within human beings due to not knowing the true reasons. The Buddhist literature points out how human beings felt fear at their initial stage. “People, when threatened with danger, go to many a refuge to the mountains and forests, to parks and gardens, and to sacred trees”.\textsuperscript{2} The practice of god-worshipping remains and still becomes popular even today. Many a people worship gods and offer them for the purpose of appeasement and with the hope of obtaining the god’s good grace. Long, long time ago, people believed in gods. They, during the Vedic period, hold polytheism and they had many different gods. At the initial stage they looked upon natural forces such as fire, wind and rain to be divinities. Not only natural forces, but they looked upon places also such as mountains, forests, gardens, trees and so on to be divinities. People believed that those places were dominated by deities or these were assumed to be divinities. People paid respect and honored them. So they are well known “Cetiya” meaning “a holy place”.

\footnote{2} Fax. Muller, \textit{Dhammapadha}, p.5.
During Buddha’s time there was a Brahman hermit whose name was “Aggadatta”. He encouraged people to worship mountains, forests, gardens, and trees. He had many devotees from Aṅga and Magadha. When Buddha appeared, he along with his followers was converted to Buddhism. Rukkha-Devatā: The people in those days practiced to worship and honored trees in the form of tree-gods (Rukkha-Devatā). Buddha Gotama, as candidate of meditation for the Self-Enlightenment, followed asceticism for six years in Uruvela. When he had discovered the Middle Path, he gave up the asceticism. He followed his way. On the full moon day of Vesakha when he had attained the Fully Enlightenment, he was offered the milk-rice by Sujātā, a rich merchant’s daughter of Senāni, a market town. At that time she believed Buddha-to-be as a tree-god. She prayed to the tree-god for a child. She was full in wish and honored the tree-god.¹

Mahāsuvaṇṇa, a rich merchant of Śāvatthi, prayed to a big tree for a child after having honoured that tree near a river. He thought that in the big tree there might be a powerful god.² In those days there were Cetiya rukkhas which were honored by many people. In Vinaya Pitaka there is a story: “Then Channa cut down a certain Cetiya rukka which is honored by the people of village, of market town, of city, and of the kingdom.³ Yakhas or Yaksas: People believed that Yakhas were very powerful. Kuvera was regarded as the Lord of all Yakkhas and as the god of wealth. Some of Yakkhas and Yakkhinīs were cruel and fearful,

¹ V.Fausboll, Jātaka, Vol. I., p.79.
while others were of pleasant forms, mild and benevolent. There were some Yakkhas who were mentioned in Yakkha Saṃyutta. They are as follows:

(1) Indaka: He lived in his abode in the Indakūṇa Mountain, near Rajagaha. When Buddha was staying in his abode he questioned Buddha as to how the soul finds its material counterpart. Buddha, in reply, described how the embryo into its final shape by the laws physical growth and not by soul’s fiat.\(^1\)

(2) Sakka: He spoke to Buddha who was staying at the Gijjhakuta Mountain that instructing others is not good for a samaṇa who has removed all bondages. Buddha replied: It is not an attachment to it, if one gives instruction to others with pure mind.\(^2\)

(3) Suciloma: Buddha was staying in the abode of Suciloma, near Gayā. Suciloma together with Khara approached and frightened Buddha. Buddha was fearless. Knowing this Suciloma asked questions. Having heard Buddha’s discourse they became sotāpannas.\(^3\)

(4) Maṇibhadda: Buddha was staying in the abode of Maṇibha, which was called Maṇimāliya Cetiya, in Magadha. He approached Buddha and recited a verse thus. Buddha corrected

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2. Ibid.
his idea under the banyan tree near Ālavī. The Yakkha had been granted a boon the Yakkha-king, which allowed him to eat anybody who came within the shadow of the tree. When he had heard the Dhamma from Buddha he became Sotāpanna.¹

In Mahāsamaya Sutta some powerful Yakkhas, who attended the meeting of Arhants in Mahāvana near Kapilavatthu, are mentioned. They were seven thousand Yakkhas who were from Kapilavatthu, six thousands from the Himālayas, three thousands from Satāgira, five hundreds of Yakkhas under the name of Vesāmitta, and Kumbhāra who stayed on Vepulla Mountain near Rājagaha.² There are many other gods the people of in those days paid their honour to them. Indra, Soma, Varuṇa, Isāna, Pajāpati, Brahma, Mahiddhi, and Yama were popular among the god-worshippers. They say: “Indra we call upon! Soma we call upon! Varuṇa we call upon! Yama we call upon!”³ People in those days worshipped the sun and the moon turning round with clasped hands towards the place whence they rise and where they set. They praised and prayed to them.⁴

**Fire Worshipping**

The practice of fire-worshipping was flourishing during the Budha’s time. There were three brother hermits, named Uruvela Kassapa, Gayā Kassapa and Nadi Kassapa. Of them Uruvela Kassapa was master of five hundred hermits,

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⁴ Ibid.,p.22.
Gayā Kassapa of three hundred hermits and Nādi Kassapa of two hundred hermits. They were fire-worshipers. They were later converted to Buddhism by Buddha during the first year of Enlightenment. In Kosala there was a river, named Sundarikā. On the bank of the river a Brahman called Bhāradvāja was worshipping the fire with sacrifice butter (Habya). When he approached Buddha to offer the rest holy butter, Buddha refused it and talked Dhamma:

“Nay, Brahmin, deem not that by mere wood-laying comes purity. Verily that is external. To him who thus purification seeks by things without any is made pure, the wise say. I lay no wood, Brahmin, for fires on alters. Only within burnet the fire I kindle. Ever my fire burns; ever tense and ardent, I, Arahat, work out the life that’s holy. As yoke of grain surely is pride, O Brahmin. Thin alters’ smoke, anger; thy false words ashes. The tongue’s the priest’s spoon and the heart the alter, the fire there on: this is man’s self well tamed. The Norm’s a lake, with virtue’s strand for bathing, clear, undefiled, praised by the good to good men, Wherein in sooth masters of lore come bathing, so, clean of limb, to the Beyond cross over. The Norm is truth; discipline life in orders, best vantage-ground, Brahmin, the Path that’s Midway. Due honor pay thou to the upright-minded. Whoso doth this, him do I call ‘Flux-rider.’

Washing Evil away with water

People believed in the purification of evil by means of water. They were called “Udaka suddhika”, that means those who believe in purification of evil by water. According to them, they have to plunge in water morning and evening to wash away evils they have done. The evil that have been done in day time must be washed away in the evening. And the evil that have been done at night must be

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washed away in the next morning. In Sāvatthi there was a Brahmin who believed in water as a condition to purify evil. He practiced the yoga to plunge into water every morning and every evening in order to wash away evil what have been done. Later he gave up his practice after hearing the Dhamma from Buddha. What Buddha taught is thus:

“O Brahmin, Dhamma is a lake that has a strand for bathing which is morality. It is never polluted and is a sacred place. In that Lake Vedas take a bath, and cross over to reach the next bank without having the body gotten wet”. A religious practice of Brahmins is found in Cunda Sutta of Aṅguttara Nikāya.¹ It is the way of purity expounded by Brahmins of the west who carry water pots and wear lily-garlands, who are purifiers by water, fire-worshippers. The Brahmins instruct their followers Thus: “Come now, good fellows! Rise up earlier from your bed and do touch the soil. If you do not touch the soil, do touch the cow dung. If you do not touch the cow dung, do touch green grass. If you do not touch the green grass, do worship fire. If you do not worship fire, do homage to the sun with clasped hands. If you do not do homage to the sun with clasped hands, do descend into water for the third time in the evening”.

In this Sutta, Buddha explained purity and impurity in his teaching. There are three types of impurity: three physical impurities, four verbal impurities and three mental impurities. Three physical impurities are killing, stealing and unlawful sexual relations. Four verbal impurities are telling lie, slandering, harsh speech and vain talk. Three mental impurities are that: covetousness, ill will, and false belief. There are three types of purity: three physical purities, four verbal purities and three mental purities. Three physical purities are that abstaining from killing, abstaining from stealing, and abstaining from unlawful sexual relations. The four verbal purities are abstaining from telling lies, abstaining from

¹ Richard Morris, Aṅguttara Nikāya, Sundasutta, p.129
slandering, abstaining from harsh speech, and abstaining from vain talk. We find, in the Samyutta Nikāya, a religious practice expounded by Brahmans. This religious practice described as “Udayagāminī Paṭipadā” meaning “a practice that leads to prosperity”. That practice is said thus in that Sutta:

“Monks, the Brahmans proclaim this practice which leads to prosperity (Udayagāminī Paṭipadā). They instruct their disciples thus: “Come, my fellow! Rise up be times and go facing east. Don’t avoid a hole, don’t avoid a cliff, don’t avoid a stake, don’t avoid the thorny place, don’t avoid a village pool, and don’t avoid the dirty pool. There your death may occur where you may fall. My fellow! Through this practice you, after death, will be reborn in a blissful world”\(^1\)

There were some who believed in such a religious practice. Buddha criticizes this practice as a way of fools. That practice does not conduce to full comprehension and to Nibbāna. Then Buddha expounds the true Udayagāminī Paṭipadā which is conducive to full comprehension and to Nibbāna. According to Buddha’s teaching the Udayagāminī Paṭipadā is the perfect faith in Buddha, perfect faith in the Dhamma, perfect faith in the Saṅgha, and complete observation of the five precepts.

\(^1\) L. Feer, *Samyutta Nikāya*, Vol., I.p.201