CHAPTER - 3

Crossing the Swords
The Reasons Behind the Vasai Campaign
(1737 - 1739 A.D.)
Introduction -

The famous and conclusive Maratha offensive against Portuguese in the Province of the North (1737 - 1739 A.D.) had curious historical antecedents of which origin goes back to the rule of Chhatrapati Shivaji (1630 - 1680 A.D.). After the death of Shivaji, the similar issues in varying degrees continued in the reign of Chhatrapati Sambhaji who fought a long war against Portuguese in the North and South Konkan. After the death of Chhatrapati Sambhaji (1689 A.D.), it was not until the accession of Chhatrapati Shahu (1708 A.D.) that Marathas could concentrate again on these issues related to the tribute and taxation in the North Konkan and could mix them with their imperial ambitions which were best exemplified in the form of Peshwa Bajirao I (1700 - 1740 A.D.). It is this historical overview of the Maratha - Portuguese relations centering on the Portuguese Province of the North which presented below in brief.

3.1 Chhatrapati Shivaji (1630 - 1680 A.D.)

Shivaji Bhosale and his Conquest of the North Konkan (1657 A.D.) -

Shivaji Bhosale, an astute Maratha leader and fighter had an aspiration for forming an independent state without bowing to the mighty imperial monarchies of the contemporary period and it this ambition of him which made him to cross swords with the all principle political powers in the Deccan and Konkan for all his life. The volatile relation between the Mughals and Vijapur Sultanate was proved to be a winning jackpot for the young rebel. Through the treaty in 1636 A.D. the dominion of the erstwhile Ahmednagar Sultanate was divided between the Mughals and Vijapur (Bijapur) Sultanate, with Vijapur being the absolute owners of Ghat and Konkan region. The Mughals eyed on Konkan region but the Vijapur Sultanate never handed it over to them (Gordon 2009: 47 - 49). Be it succession disputes among the rival political dynasties, court intrigues or fight for supremacy with each other, Shivaji, taking the advantage of his region being unsuccessful for the main stream war tactics and aloof from the main political theatres of the Deccan, had successfully begun to carve his own niche by slowly cutting through the Vijapur dominions in the Ghat region and Konkan. The time onwards 1655 A.D. was high and confusing too in the geo-politics of the Deccan and Konkan, as the ailing Vijapur ruler...
Muhammad Aadilshah Ghazi was on death bed and Aurangzeb, then the Mughal in-charge of Deccan was thundering his wrath on the Bijpaur Sultanate. The newly anointed Vijapur Sultanate ruler, Ali Aadil Shah II was a minor and was ruling with the help of a regent. The critical condition was avoided with the Mughal-Vijapur treaty in 1657 A.D. by which Vijapur Sultanate was agreed to pay rupees one core as a tribute and handing over the former Nizamshahi dominions held by it to Mughals which included the North Kokkan too (P.S.S, 727). Aurangzeb was too in hurry to negotiate as major succession dispute arose in Agra once the news of ailing Mughal emperor Shahjahan broke out. He hurriedly left to Agra, leaving the chaos of Deccan geo-politics and newly acquired Vijapur dominion as it is. 

During such claims and counter claims, it is good to know about the contemporary geo-political equations which then existed in Konkan, primarily in the North Konkan. Portuguese's Province of the North was controlling the major cities on the North Konkan coastal strips such as Daman, Dahanu, Kelve-Mahim, Vasai, Thane, the islands of Sashti (Salestte), Mumbai, Karanja and thereafter the lower Chaul called as Revdanda and Korlai from its headquarter at Bacaim (Vasai). The interior forested land region located immediate East to the Province of the North was held by the ruler of Ramnagar who used to extract *Chauth* tribute from the villages under the district of Daman. The Siddi family of Danda-Rajapuri (presently in Taluka - Murud, District - Raigad) was ruling the surrounding coastal strip from its invincible sea fort, Janjira. The rest of the parts of the North Konkan such as Kalyan and the South Konkan were majorly in possession of the Vijapur Sultanate which they had recently turned over to the Mughals as a part of the war and diplomatic treaty. Though they were handed over to the Mughals but condition was delicate as no stable Mughal administrative system was in place owing to the Mughal succession dispute. It is in such confusing and chaotic conditions that Shivaji turned his eyes on the North Konkan.

By 1657 A.D the Maratha horses rode straight up to the shores and creeks of the Arabian sea and controlled important cities such as Kalyan (presently in Taluka - Kalyan, District - Thane), Bhiwandi (presently in Taluka - Bhiwandi, District - Thane), Pen (presently in Taluka -Pen, District - Raigad) and Upper Chaul (presently in Taluka - Alibag, District - Raigad). Astute enough, Shivaji was in correspondence with the new Mughal emperor Aalmagir Aurangzeb in 1658-59 A.D. for legitimizing his claim on the newly conquered Vijapur territories in Konkan in return to his services of offering trained troops to the imperial Mughal army for guarding the Mughal boundaries though no concluding results came up despite Aalamgir Aurangzeb offering
robes of honor to Shivaji and asking for surety of his loyalty (Gordon, 70 and P..S.S). Nevertheless, how the Mughal and Maratha relations under Shivaji lasted is a history. It is through the letters of the acting Portuguese Governors Francisco de Castro and Antonio da Souza Coutinho dated 15th May, 1658 to the King of Portugal that we come to know about Shivaji, styled in their letter as "...a son of Shahaji" who has rebelled against the Vijapur Sultanate and is on the spree to acquire its territories, thus bringing some respite to Portuguese by diverting the Vijapur Sultante's attention as they were attempting to wage a war against Portuguese" (Desai 1977: 2). The letter went on to inform that Shivaji did not obey his father and had molested territory near the Portuguese Province of the North and which had forced Portuguese to keep eighty soldiers in Chaul during the winter season for keeping watch on the camps as well as in Korlai (Pissurlekar 1975: 3-4).

Shivaji's Attempt to Build Navy (1658 - 1659 A.D.) -

The entry of Shivaji into the geo-politics of Konkan brought him to in acquaintance with the sea powers in Konkan such as the Portuguese who by that time too used to claim themselves as the absolute power in the sea, the other newly emerging European sea powers such as the Dutch, who were in attempt to undermine Portuguese, the English and the most formidable among the regional sea powers in Konkan, the Siddi of Janjira to whom he addressed as "a rat in Swarajya" and against whom he waged unsuccessful wars throughout his life. However, Shivaji was not just satisfied with conquering the sea bound regions. He understood the importance of navy for its utility to secure the coastal area conquered by him and to conquer more coastal territory and thus, he attempted to build his own naval command even though he was aware of his own limitations in 1658-59 A.D.

It is well known that the very first reference of Shivaji's attempt to build navy comes from the Portuguese sources. In the letter of Governors Francisco de Melo de Castro and Antonio de Souza Coutinho to the king of Portugal dated 16th August, 1659 A.D. it is mentioned that Shivaji who had rebelled against the Vijapur Sultanate, had conquered the area near Vasai and Chaul and that he maintained ships in the ports of Bhiwandi, Kalyan and Panvel. This action of Shivaji had forced Portuguese authorities to issue alert to their commandants of the forts and to order them to be watchful of Shivaji's activities in the sea (Ibid 4). In the 17th century A.D, a number of
Europeans who had entered into the Indian sub-continent were busy in earning fortunes either by entering in services of the Indian political dynasties or even resorting to the illegitimate jobs like pirating. One such group of Portuguese ship builders headed by Roe Leitao Viegas and his brother Fernao Leitao Viegas were employed by Shivaji to construct his first contingent of twenty small war boats at Kalyan, Bhiwandi and Pen. Scared of such attempt of Shivaji to start building his own naval command which may undermine Estado da India's marine interests in Konkan, the Portuguese Captain of Vasai sent Joao de Salazar de Vascocelos to the camp of Viegas to persuade him to not engage in such anti-Portuguese State activities. Joao de Salazar de Vascocelos reminded Roe Leitao Viegas that he was an abiding citizen of his Portuguese king and he if leaves the project of Shivaji then he would serve a noble purpose of safeguarding his king's interest. Paying heed to the pleading of Joao de Salazar Vascocelos, Roe Leitao Viegas fled with his family members and work force which numbered approximately five hundred to Mumbai (Desai 1977: 3 - 5). Faced with such alarming condition, the Captain of Vasai asked for permission to build ten to twelve warships which could be utilized for the safety of Portuguese merchant ships. Not only this, through the resolution dated 19th July 1659 A.D. adopted by the Estado da India on the advice of its State Advisory Committee, it was decided that timber meant for construction of Shivaji's armada should not be passed from the Portuguese territory. The orders were passed on to the Captain of Vasai that Shivaji's vessels should not be passed from Thane and Vasai rivers and if they pass in spite of warnings then they should be attacked. The extra armadas were deployed at Mazgaon, Mumbai and Karanja to prevent the entry of Shivaji's boats sailing from Pen. Nevertheless, Shivaji did not give up his hope and went on to build his navy. Scuffle and friendship between Shivaji and Portuguese continued in one way or other which had direct repercussions on the geo-politics of the North Konkan. The Portuguese and Maratha armadas frequently met in the sea of the North Konkan where they exchanged fire, fought directly and regularly captured battle or cargo ships of each other. Portuguese, however, anyhow wished to destroy the armada of Shivaji of which they were apprehensive due to his growing power. In one instance, the Portuguese Governor Antonio de Mello de Castro through his letter dated between April or May, 1662 A.D. even suggested the respective Portuguese officer to find one courageous man who could set on fire Shivaji's six battle ships which were then trapped in the Karanja river. The Portuguese Governor was requested by Ragho Ballal, an official of Shivaji posted at Dabhol to allow the ships to sail in the Arabian sea. But for the
misfortune of Portuguese, it seems that the plan did not materialize. Portuguese even could not muster courage to oppose the armada construction project of Shivaji in the upper Chaul in 1664 A.D. which consisted of around fifty small battle ships (taru in Marathi and Pataxo in Portuguese). The Captain of Portuguese Chaul Joao Borges De'silva had informed the Portuguese authorities in Goa about the ship construction project of Shivaji in Upper Chaul and despite this, a fleet of seven battle ships of Shivaji entered the Arabian sea. In 1666 A.D. Shivaji had asked the Captain of Chaul, Antonio Galavao through a letter that he may be paid rupees two lakhs as a "loan" from the Gujarati merchants in Chaul though the Captain did not trust about Shivaji's word for repayment. As the Captain of Chaul requested directions from the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa on the demand of Shivaji, through the resolution adopted by the State Advisory Council of Estado da India on 22nd March, 1666, it was decided that reinforcement from Vasai should be sent from Vasai to Chaul considering Shivaji's threat to the city (Ibid 17 - 18). Such was the treat of Shivaji's navy that even the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de S. Vicente in his letter to the king of Portugal dated 20th September 1667 acknowledged that he was afraid of Shivaji's navy as due to Portuguese inaction, Shivaji's grew in power on the coast of Konkan where he had not only constructed forts but also built his own armada containing many battle ships though of small size (Pissurlekar 1967: 43).

The Chauth, Ramnagar Kingdom, Shivaji and Portuguese (1671 - 1680 A.D.) -

Shivaji fought on a major and long lasted battle front in the North Konkan (particularly in the present Thane district) against the king of Ramnagar and the Koli king of Jawhar on the confidential request of Daman Fort's Captain Manuel Furtado de Mendonca in June 1671 A.D. According to the Portuguese Historian Diogo Couto, in the 13th-14th centuries, a large Rajput hoard came to South and entered in Gujarat. Since the local residents of Gujarat were non-combatants, therefore they employed those Rajput personnel for protection of their villages and agreed to pay one fourth portion of their agricultural produce to them. According to Couto, these Rajputs were the ancestors of the king of Ramnagar and this is how the tradition of paying one fourth of produce/income to the king of Ramnagar, who was called popularly as the "Chauthiya King" (as they were paid one fourth part), was formed in the region (Desai 1977: x - xi). According to Prof. Pissurlekar, the king of Ramnagar was one of the ancient rulers in Konkan.
During the Gujarat Sultanate period, his region was invaded by the king of Cambay but the Cambay force was powerful and thus, the Ramnagar king could not hold before it and fled to the forest region. After the king of Cambay went back leaving behind his some generals and force in the Ramnagar's territory that the king of Ramnagar, who had taken shelter in the forest region started to plunder the area and to which the officials Cambay's ruler failed to control. Thus, to stop this menace, it was decided through a treaty that the king of Ramnagar should keep one fourth portion of the produce of the region and should not trouble the nearby region by the act of plunder. This tradition continued in the Portuguese period too when the region of Daman and the surrounding territories came in their control in 1559 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1967: 80). The king of Ramnagar continued to extract tribute "Chauth" (a quarter portion from income) from the villages under the Daman district with a minor difference in the Portuguese period as Portuguese paid him the tribute for only that region which they were unable to protect and they stopped paying for those region which they brought under their protection (Desai 1977: 39 - 40). But on the issue of how much tribute should Ramnagar King charge from Portuguese in Daman, there were frequent skirmishes between the both parties and the issue was letter settled in treaties concluded between Portuguese and the Ramnagar king wherein the exact portions of tribute which to be collected and the mode of payment was decided. As per the treaty between the Portuguese Captain of Daman and the king of Ramnagar dated 26th November 1670 A.D. we come to know that the amount of Chauth collected from the region of Daman varied from village to village, such as from 14% to 12.5% but it was never a one fourth of the yield. Though the term Chouth meant that one fourth portion from the total produce, the amount in a course of period was reduced from 12.5% to 17% and 17% to 1/8 and lastly to a certain amount of money even though it retained all along its original terminology. The overall arrangement was in force till 1719 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1975: 43 - 44). It was also fixed that in return, the Ramnagar King would protect Daman from menaces of thieves and robbers. It is important to note that according to Prof. Pissurlekar, in the Portuguese document the term Chauth is mentioned as a pension or quitrent but never as a tribute which Shivaji collected from the kingdom of Aadilshah or Bednur at the point of his sword (Ibid 43).

The serious problem started when the official of Ramnagar king from Jawhar (presently in Taluka - Jawhar, District - Palghar) rebelled against his master and demanded tribute from Portuguese which they used to pay to the Ramnagar king. But when Portuguese refused, they
plundered and burnt the Portuguese territory from Dahanu to Kelve-Mahim (Pissurlekar) and to which Portuguese could not resist due to their less manpower (Pissurlekar 1967: 81). The Portuguese Captain of Daman, Matheus De'Souza, to settle the issue with the rebel Koli king of Jawhar went to Karamale village where Portuguese had treaty with the king of Ramnagar in April, 1671 A.D. The joint Portuguese and Ramnagar forces attacked and ransacked the territory held by the rebel Koli king of Jawhar in July, 1671 A.D. but no conclusive result came and even the Ramnagar forces could not defeat the rebel Koli king of Jawhar completely. Due to such situation, it was also thought from the Portuguese side to pay tribute to the rebel Koli king of Jawhar. It is in such crucial moment that Manuel Furtado da Mendoca was appointed as the Captain of Daman in December, 1671 A.D. Faced with this complex situation, the Portuguese Captain of Daman, Manuel Furtado de Mendonca secretly called on Shivaji for help in December, 1671 A.D. In response to the request, Shivaji deputed Peshwa Moropant Pingale who was Prime Minister in his court against the Koli king of Jawhar. Moropant captured Jawhar in June, 1672 A.D. which forced its Koli king to run from Jawhar. Thereafter, Moropant attacked the kingdom of Ramnagar and conquered a large portion of his kingdom but still, the king of Ramnagar did not surrender to Shivaji and continued his fight against him. After conquering a major portion of the kingdom of Ramnagar, Shivaji demanded Chauth tribute from Portuguese according to the prevalent tradition. Portuguese did not accept the demand of Shivaji in its entirety as he had not completely conquered the kingdom of Ramnagar but they agreed to put the tribute payment on hold and in their custody from 1671 A.D. (Desai 1977, Pissurlekar 1975).

The correspondence, diplomatic delegations continued for years from Shivaji's side in the Portuguese court for claiming his right on Chauth and also for its payment. In 1677 A.D. Shivaji claimed complete victory over the king of Ramnagar and again demanded his right over the tribute. This time, his demand cum claim was forwarded by the Daman Municipality with positive remarks to the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa. Still, the debate continued on the issue of what should be the cut of date and year in the Portuguese court for paying the tribute. For the same, the Viceroy instructed his officials in Vasai through his letter dated 15th September 1677 A.D. to keep ready the tribute income for Shivaji and have an agreement with him which they used to have with the king of Ramnagar. But the Viceroy made it clear to the General of the Province of North in Vasai that payment should be made from the period of Shivaji's completely take over the Ramnagar king's territory and not for the period before it. Meanwhile, the some
officials of Shivaji and his army had entered a village under the Daman's jurisdiction while following the enemy Koli. Reacting to such act, the Viceroy instructed the military officials in the Province of North to oppose any such act of Shivaji (Pissurlekar 1975, Desai 1977). However, it appears that the exact status of victory was uncertain as the both parties, Shivaji and Ramnagar king were claiming for victory and used to demand _Chauth_ from Portuguese, leaving them confused about to whom actually they have to pay the tribute. The Portuguese authorities in Goa used to refer this issue to its provincial government in the Province of North at Vasai or Daman for confirming the exact winner of the battle and the other revenue related information. It seems that in year 1677 A.D. too, when Shivaji claimed his overall victory against Ramnagar, the Ramnagar king was in correspondence with the General of the Province of North, Dom Manuel Lobo da Silveira to whom he informed that he was still in war with Shivaji for re-capturing his area which Shivaji earlier had conquered and he had recruited _Bhill_ soldiers in his army to fight Shivaji. The king of Ramnagar requested Silveira for granting asylum to his family members (i.e. wives and kids) in St. Jerimio Fort at Daman or in the vicinity of Fort as it was difficult for him to keep them with him since he was on constant move. He had also asked for four to five thousand rupees from the pending _Chauth_ tribute to meet the expenditure of his family. Deciding on the request of Ramnagar King, the Portuguese authorities in Goa through the resolution dated 30th September, 1677 A.D. refused to give asylum to his family by citing the treaty with Shivaji and told him to keep them in forest region only where they had taken refuge. However, Portuguese were agreed to pay Ramnagar king four thousand rupees from the royal treasury of Daman as the issue was under their jurisdiction and the king of Ramnagar had claimed that he had not taken even a single penny before from Portuguese for the duration of his battle with Shivaji. Portuguese also decided to help the king of Ramnagar according to the progress of war (Desai 1977: 40 - 41). In the year of 1677 A.D. Shivaji had collected tax _"Gram Kandil (Kandi)"_ from the Portuguese villages in Thane and Daman district. In one such correspondence, Bajipant and _Havildar_ of Kolvan (the conquered territory of Ramnagar) (the officials of Shivaji) had asked the Portuguese about the quick payment of this tax. The Portuguese Captain Joseph de Mello Castro protested though his letter dated 16th August, 1677 A.D. to Dom Manuel Lobo de Sequiera, the General of the Province of North about the act of Marathas to collect _"Gran Kandil"_ directly from the villages in Thane and Daman districts in addition to collection of many extra things. He informed the General that he banned Marathas
from entering the villages for collection of tax and instead had asked Bajipant to collect the tax from the border post at Saivan (Ibid 37 - 38).

To get back to the issue of *Chauth*, in an another letter dated 15\textsuperscript{th} April, 1677 or 78 A.D. (the year is uncertain) which the Ramnagar king, Narayan Dev Rane, first time mentioned with his name, asked for the payment of *Chauth* from Portuguese. In the response, the Portuguese authorities conveyed to the king of Ramnagar that the payment of *Chauth* could not be made to him as the result of his war against Shivaji was yet uncertain and as Shivaji was too claiming for *Chauth* by declaring his complete victory against him. And if the payment is made to the wrong, especially to the party of defeated then in overall, the poor villages under the Daman jurisdiction would suffer as the opposing party would march on it. Besides, the problem of thieves and dacoits troubling the region was still there. Therefore, instead of paying him *Chauth*, Portuguese agreed to assist him with the financial help from the amount meant for *Chauth* payment and from which, the Ramnagar King was already paid with four thousand rupees. Considering the good and courteous conduct of the king of Ramnagar, Portuguese agreed to pay him two thousand rupees from the balance amount of three thousand rupees for the purpose of continuing his war against Shivaji (Ibid 44).

Like the king of Ramnagar, Shivaji was also demanding persistently *Chauth* tribute from the Portuguese State through his Ambassador Pitambar Shenvi. Shenvi reached Goa with the letters from Shivaji and his Chief Minister Moro Pandit Peshva containing the demand for *Chauth* tribute from Portuguese. Responding to it, the newly appointed Portuguese Viceroy, Dom Francisco da Almeida through his letter dated 10\textsuperscript{th} January, 1678 A.D. wrote that since he was new to the administration, he would first get acquainted with the issue after going through the older correspondence and the reports received from the respective Captains of Daman and Vasai and thereafter would send reply to Shivaji. He continued that if Shivaji had become the absolute master of the Ramnagar region then there was no problem for paying him *Chauth*. He asked him to depute a person with necessary powers for talks on the issue of *Chauth* (Pissurlekar 1975: 44 - 45). After the short stay of the said Viceroy in India, the charge of Portuguese State in India came in the hands of Dom Frei Antonio Brandrao and Antonio Pais de Sande. It appears that till the last, no conclusion was reached over the issue. From the letter dated 13\textsuperscript{th} April, 1678 A.D. addressed by the Governors Dom Frei Antonio Brandrao and Antonio Pais de Sande to Dom Manuel Lobo de Silveira, the Captain General of the Province of the North, the actual situation
comes to forefront. Silveira had informed them that in the war between the kingdom of Ramnagar, the Koli king of Jawhar and Shivaji, Shivaji had emerged victorious. In the war, the Koli king was imprisoned and his infantry comprising of eight hundred soldiers acting under the command of Vithuji 'Zunzar Rao" had revolted against him. But sounding a word of caution and citing the information received from other sources, the Governors in the above mentioned letter informed Silveira that it was not appropriate time to pay Shivaji the *Chauth* tribute as he had not become the absolute ruler of the Ramnagar kingdom and the king of Ramnagar kept on re-occupying the region after the army of Shivaji conquered the land and moved ahead. This resulted in continuation of war, they opined in the letter (Ibid 52).

In between, the reply as promised by the former Viceroy Dom Francisco da Almeida did not reach on time to Shivaji. Therefore, Pitambar Shenvi wrote a letter to the new Portuguese Governors about non-receipt of the reply and demanded the settlement of the issue of *Chauth*. The Portuguese Governors, however, in strict words reminded Shenvi through the letter dated 12th July 1678 A.D. that the Portuguese State in India was not a tributary to any neighboring king and thus, the obligation to send a prompt reply or to get collect information for a quick reply to Shivaji did not arise. They informed that the delay overall was caused due to the departure of the former Viceroy and the indifference of Captains of Vasai and Daman for sending information to Goa. They informed Shenvi about the tradition of *Chauth* in Daman region by highlighting that *Chauth* was paid by the villages under the district of Daman to Chauthiya king directly under the convention of the villages and the Ramnagar king without any information to the Viceroy or Governors of the past or their consent. The Governors also informed Shenvi that the amount of tax was varied from village to village. Before concluding the letter, the Governors asked Shenvi to inform Shivaji to depute a person of his choice to the Captain of Daman for negotiations. It was informed by the Governors that they would instruct the Portuguese Captain of Daman to inquire into the every aspect of *Chauth* and its contemporary aspect related to Shivaji (Ibid 46 - 47). The last available letter on this topic is dated to 20th March 1679 A.D. and is written by Antonio Pais de Sande to Shivaji or his officials wherein he requested to depute a representative to decide the terms and conditions of the issue. In the same letter the Governor strongly raised his word for unjust action of Shivaji's officials about the Portuguese ships. The letter is concluded by the Governor by saying that "the Portuguese have no fear of any powerful enemy and no dispizal for a weakened friend"(Ibid 50). Shivaji did not send any reply to the above
mentioned letter and which was construed by the Portuguese State as Shivaji's intention to start a war with Portuguese. Due to such soured situation, Governor Antonio Pais de Sande too ordered for preparation of war but it was suspended due to death of Shivaji (Ibid 50).

Despite such long and repeated claims made from the sides of king of Ramnagar and Shivaji, no conclusion was reached till the death of Shivaji in 1680 A.D. and no Chauth tribute was paid to Shivaji by the Portuguese State. According to the revenue records of the Daman division, by the end of 1681 A.D. the amount meant for tribute was estimated to around eleven thousand seven hundred and twenty eight Xerafins which equaled to five thousand eight hundred and sixty four rupees (Pissurlekar 1967: 83).

3. 2 Chhatrapati Sambhaji (1657 - 1689 A.D.)

Sambhaji and Portuguese - The Beginning (1681 - 1682 A.D.) -

Sambhaji ascended the throne of the Maratha state in a rather hostile atmosphere on 16th January, 1681 A.D. At the time of Shivaji's death, the territory of the Maratha state consisted of Kalyan and Bhiwandi region in the present Thane district, most of the area in the present Raigad, Ratnagiri, Sindhudurg, Nashik, Pune, Satara and Kolhapur districts in Maharashtra and the area between Tungabhadra and Kaveri rivers in Karnataka consisting of Koppal, Belwadi, Hoskote, Shire, Kollar, Vellore and Jinji (Kulakarni 2009: 95). The crisis for succession is not a new phenomenon in the feudal monarchies and for the newly founded Maratha state, the power struggle was more deadly. So, naturally Sambhaji had to overture for friendship on the Portuguese front, in view of the warlike like atmosphere that prevailed on the both sides at the time of his father's death. In a series letters addressed to the Portuguese Governor Antonio Pais de Sande in the year of 1680 A.D. and 1681 A.D. and sent through his envoy Ramaji Naik Thakur, he wished for peaceful and friendly relations with the Portuguese State on condition that Portuguese should not assist his enemies. He even desired to have a long lasting treaty and peace agreement with Portuguese. The Portuguese authorities too, were happy to welcome the friendly gesture with certain precaution considering the past experience of his father (Pissurlekar 1975). The Portuguese administration had bitter moments with the local Maratha commanders administering the neighboring Maratha territory in the North and South Konkan on the numerous
occasions on the issues of land and marine trade, tax and customs related matters, intrusions etc. And according to them, it were these regional commanders and some top officials of the Maratha state that paused major hindrance for forging peaceful Portuguese and Maratha relations (Pereira 1968).

The major demand that the Portuguese authorities headquartered in Goa always insisted during the diplomatic talks with Marathas was that the envoy representing the Maratha state should compulsorily bring with him sufficient credentials and delegated powers from the State authorizing him to talk and negotiate with the Portuguese authorities for finalizing the terms of treaty and for signing the agreement on behalf of the Maratha monarch. On the visit of Sambhaji's first envoy to Goa, Ramaji Naik Thakur in May, 1680 A.D. though the Portuguese Governor Antonio Pais da Sande forwarded through him the terms from the Portuguese side, he had expressed the same wish that the Maratha state should depute a responsible person with delegated powers so that certain confidential issues could be discussed and terms of the treaty could be finalized. With the same intent he even wrote to Sambhaji and his top officials like Rayaji Pandit and Annaji Pandit in a series of letters in 1680 A.D. and 1681 A.D. However, no concrete response was received from Sambhaji. Meanwhile, when the first envoy, Ramaji Naik Thakur found guilty in the plot against Sambhaji, the Portuguese authorities got more cautious in their approach to the Maratha envoys from the year of 1681 A.D. Though Sambhaji deputed Yesaji Gambhirrao in June, 1681 A.D. to Goa considering the repeated insistence of Portuguese, he too did not bring credentials required by the Portuguese State. Therefore, in the letter dated 26th July, 1681 A.D. the Portuguese Governor Antonio Pais de Sande informed Annaji Pandit, a top official of the Maratha state that henceforth without sufficient credentials certified by the Maratha State, none of its envoys would be granted appointment with the Viceroy (Pareira 1968: 29 - 30). Soon, even Annaji Pandit was too persecuted by Sambhaji for his activities against him and his rule. No conclusive response was thereafter received from Sambhai to Portuguese. When the Conde de Alvor Francisco de Tavora assumed the Viceroyship of Estado da India, in the beginning of 1682 A.D. Sambhaji wished to fortify the desolate Angediv island which according to the Portuguese was their territory even though unoccupied. Sensing the rising Maratha-Arab proximity and Angediv island's strategic location to the nearby Goa, Portuguese decided that it would not be good to let an island of such strategic importance to fall in the hands of either Sambhaji or Siddi in view of the past experiences of disturbances to marine traffic and the
coastal settlements like at Chaul caused by Maratha fortifications at Underi and Khanderi islands in the North Konkan. The Portuguese authorities ordered for construction of fortification, garrisoning it with troops and six cannons through the government meeting resolution dated 27th April, 1682 (Ibid 31 - 32). With a multitude of burning issues concerning trade, custom duties, movements of merchant ships, intrusions, confrontations in the areas immediate in the neighborhood of Portuguese-Maratha States, the Angediv island controversy remained an undetonated bomb for a considerable time. Nevertheless, the new Viceroy through his letter dated 28th July, 1682 A.D. thanked Sambhaji for his wishes on his appointment. He also praised the prudent behavior of Yesaji Gambhirrao. In the second letter dated to the same date, the Viceroy granted favors which Sambhaji had requested for ordering the free movement of Maratha ships and small crafts containing ammunition, cannons, food etc. arriving to Vengurla and Sawantwadi from Malbar and Karnataka. At the same time, the Viceroy reminded the Maratha monarch that Portuguese did not receive the similar co-operation from Marathas and about the obscure prospectus of peace agreement in the atmosphere of hostilities committed mainly by the regional commanders and ministers of Sambhaji. He also dispatched a draft letter of credit which had to be brought by the Maratha envoy for holding talks and concluding the long pending peace agreement (Pissurlekar 1975: 67 - 70). Despite this message sent by the Portuguese Viceroy, no response was received from Sambhaji to the Portuguese State even after the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb declared war against Sambhaji in the mid of 1682 A.D. as Sambhaji had sheltered his rebel son prince Akbar for his fight against the Mughal emperor. Through this campaign against Sambhaji, Aurangzeb had initiated an offensive against the all rival monarchies in Deccan. It is after the commencement of Aurangzeb's military operation in Konkan and Deccan that the North Konkan was directly brought under the Portuguese-Maratha conflict which lasted for a year.

The Mughal Army Enters In North Konkan and the Mughal/Maratha Diplomacy for Portuguese Support (1682 - 1683 A.D.) -

To tighten the grip on the Maratha war front, Aurangzeb, after declaring war against Sambhaji in the mid of 1682 A.D. deputed his ambassador Sheikh Muhmmad to the Portuguese court in Goa. It was the principle wish of Aurangzeb that Portuguese should start war against Sambhaji which
would force Sambhaji to fight on two war fronts, the first against the Mughals and the second against Portuguese. Through the letter dated 20th June 1682 A.D. to the Portuguese Viceroy, Aurangzeb had desired that the Portuguese State should start war against Sambhaji and free passage and other necessary assistance should be provided to the marching Mughal troops for the land and sea routes passing through the Portuguese territory (Pissurlekar 1967: 90). But before Aurangzeb’s said letter reached the Viceroy, the Mughal forces were on march by way of the land route to the North Konkan and Deccan while its large armada was ready to sail from Surat to Mumbai. The armada comprising mostly of large and small logistic ships was required to pass through the creeks and rivers of Sashti and Mumbai islands to reach Kalyan and Bhiwandi where the initial Mughal assault was planned. Portuguese came to know about the Mughal campaign against Sambhaji in August, 1682 A.D. from the various sources, including a communication in that regard which Estado da India received from the British Governor of Mumbai island and to which the Portuguese Viceroy replied on 20th September 1682 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1975: 70). Thus, to avoid open conflict with the Powerful Mughal army and according to the instructions received from the king of Portugal for the issues related to Mughals, the Viceroy ordered the Captain General of the Province of the North Manuel Lobo da Silveira, the respective Captains of Chaul, Vasai and Daman to allow free passage to the Mughal forces by the way of land and sea routes from the territory of the Province of the North. Though the Mughal troops crossed the Province of the North after taking permission from the regional Portuguese authorities, it was also desired from the Portuguese side that that the Mughal army should not harass and rob the local subjects as any army would do in the similar circumstances. On the most of the occasions, the Mughal troops marched peacefully from the Portuguese controlled territory in the North Konkan on its way towards Kalyan and Bhiwandi. The Mughal army under the commandship of Bahadur Khan captured Bhiwandi and Kalyan from Marathas without much difficulty. Marathas retaliated against the Portuguese policy of allowing free passage to the Mughal army through its territory in the North Konkan by attacking, plundering, burning many villages and settlements in the Province of North, by confiscating ships, small crafts and imprisoning two Portuguese missionaries in the month of December, 1682 A.D. (Ibid 90). It was the start of the celebrated Maratha-Portuguese war which later lasted for complete one year in the North as well in the South Konkan and had multiple repercussions not only on the Maratha-Portuguese relations but also on the overall geo-politics of North Konkan.
In the month of January, 1683 A.D. the Viceroy through his letter to the royal court of Portugal dated 24th January, 1683 informed about the recent tumultuous events taking place in the geopolitics of Konkan and also requested for necessary help in view of the Mughal military operation. By the time he dispatched the letter, he was yet to have talks with Sheikh Muhammad who had arrived on 20th January, 1683 A.D. in Goa onboard the Northern Province armada commanded by Manuel de Souza Pereira. This Northern fleet had not only brought the aforesaid Mughal ambassador but also the news of the fall of Kalyan and Bhiwandi to the Mughals and arrival of the Mughal armada in the coast of Vasai and Mumbai. Interestingly, at that time, also present in his court was the Ambassador of the Marathas Yesaji Gambhirrao. While the proposed treaty with Maratha was nowhere on paper owing to the non-response of Sambhaji besides the other hostile issues of trade, custom and intrusion, it was probably for the first time in the history of Portuguese diplomacy in the Konkan and Deccan that the Estado da India sided with Mughals in their attack campaign against Marathas. After being granted appointment by the Portuguese Viceroy on 5th February, 1683 A.D. the Mughal Ambassador Sheikh Muhammad conveyed the wish of Aurangzeb for complete Portuguese assistance, including declaration of war by the Estado da India against Sambhaji. The Portuguese response to the Mughal proposal was rather cautious. Meanwhile, the Viceroy also called on Yesaji Gambhirao probably on 10th February, 1683 A.D. and informed him about the recent diplomatic request and development from the Mughal side for their war against Sambhaji. Sambhaji too made representations to the Portuguese authorities for not allowing and assisting the Mughals against him. In the response to one such letter by Ramchandra Pandit, dated 17th February, 1683 A.D. the Viceroy complained bitterly about Sambhaji's lacklaid approach for the Maratha-Portuguese relations and his laxity in the policy matters which had delayed the proposed Maratha-Portuguese treaty till date without any conclusion. He also reminded that the country crafts captured by the Maratha troops in the Province of North in the attack following the Mughal army’s entry in Kalyan and Bhiwandi were neither released by Marathas nor any compensation was paid for damages caused by burning villages in the same territory. He desired that before he could answer to the Mughal ambassador, Ramchandra Pandit should expedite the matter by better representing the contemporary geopolitics to Sambhaji for arriving at any favorable conclusions which then could be discussed with Portuguese, (Ibid 72 - 80). It appears that no such concrete or favorable response was received to the Portuguese from the Maratha side. By judging the strength and preparedness of
Mughal army engaged against Sambhaji, the Viceroy and other Portuguese authorities were of the sure opinion about the defeat of Sambhaji. Also in the background of renewed hostilities from the Maratha side, it was the mixture of anger cum opportunism which shaped the Portuguese policy decision after the end of ambassador level talks between the Mughals and Portuguese. But in the final response to the Mughal proposal, Portuguese declined to start war against Sambhaji on the ground of peace which existed between the Portuguese and Marathas States and an absence of any justifiable reasons for declaring the war. Nevertheless, the Viceroy after consulting the issue with the council, assured safety to the Mughal armada for purchasing necessary war campaign related material from its territory and allowed free passage to the Mughal logistic ships loaded from Bhiwandi and Kalyan to pass through the Mumbai creek on its way to the respective army camps. Sheikh Muhammad left Goa in April, 1683 A.D. onboard the Portuguese frigate commanded by Feleciano Capella, Captain of Sea and War. The letter dated 12th April 1683 A.D. by the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Alvor Francisco de Tavora to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb conveying the decision of the Estado da India for the Mughal-Maratha war echoed in many respects the strategy adopted by the Estado da India for the circumstances prevailing that time. Portuguese for a long time eyed on the Konkan region down from its southern boundary of Province of the North and when such golden opportunity arose in the form of Mughal invasion on Sambahji, they did prospectively look forward for any favorable war spoils that could have come out of the Mughal-Maratha conflict. It was Sambhaji who in the actuality controlled almost the entire Konkan strip except of the small pocket in the present Raigad district which was under the command of Siddi of Janjira. Therefore, without losing the precious opportunity that had come before the Portuguese camp, the Viceroy in return of the Portuguese support to the Mughals, desired for the share of the lands in the Konkan which Mughals would conquer from Marathas and relief in taxes that Christians in the state of Mughals paid for the Islamic holy place of Macca. He also pressed on for more ordained and concentrated attack on the Marathas than the present one adopted by the Mughal forces which had allowed Marathas to hit back. He also informed the Mughal emperor that he had ordered the Captain General of the Province of North Manuel Lobo da Silveira in Vasai and other captains of the forts in the Province of North for providing required assistance to the Mughal forces. The Viceroy not only showed to the Mughal emperor how he had ordered for the safe return journey of the Mughal Ambassador Sheikh Muhammad by arranging a Portuguese war frigate along with
the additional fleet of the Province of the North for the purpose but also asked for the compensation considering the heavy expenses which were incurred for its preparation and assigning the same to the Mughal service instead of its original assigned task. He also asked for compensation for damages caused by the Mughal army in the Province of the North. He also wished for similar compensation if the Mughals wanted to keep the same frigates for their services. Further, he showed willingness to mediate in the dispute of Aurangzeb and his rebel son, prince Akbar who had then taken refuge in Sambhaji's territory (Ibid 81-87). After Portuguese officially sided with the Mughals in their offensive against Sambhaji, the conflict between Marathas and Portuguese intensified which originally was started way back in December, 1682 A.D.

**Marathas Attack the Province of the North and fate of the Maratha-Portuguese Treaty (1682 - 1687 A.D.) -**

Marathas retaliated harshly on the Province of North in December, 1682 A.D. when they saw the Mughal army marching to Bhiwandi and Kalyan from the Portuguese territory in the North Konkan by the way of land and sea routes. Still, the attacks were not widespread and it was a sporadic reaction from the Maratha side. The military tactics of Marathas was mostly centered on the rapid movement of its mobile army through the enemy territory to destroy the country side which served as the base for territory's farming economy. They had seized some country crafts too. The Marathas also had attempted to construct a fortification at Parsik which was located on Kalyan creek (presently in Thane, District - Thane) to obstruct the Mughal ships sailing to Kalyan-Bhiwandi. But seeing the danger, Portuguese rushed to the site, captured it from Marathas and constructed a fort there (Pissurlekar 1967: 91). Once the official side of Portuguese became clear in April, 1683 A.D. the Marathas resolved to take on Portuguese in the North Konkan, which was then the main arena of the Mughal-Maratha war centering on Bhiwandi-Kalyan.

By 2nd April, 1683 A.D. a large Mughal force stationed in Bhiwandi and Kalyan retreated from Kalyan Fort. Before retreating, the Mughals first set on fire the Kalyan Fort and thereafter demolished it. The retreating Mughal force was chased by the Maratha army who killed many Mughal army personnel. According to the Portuguese Viceroy, it was not the fear of Maratha
retaliation but the bribe which Sambahji paid to the Mughal commanders in Kalyan which in actuality was the reason behind the sudden Mughal retreat from Kalyan. Once Kalyan and Bhiwnadi were relatively freed from the Mughals, Marathas turned to Portuguese who had allowed the Mughal forces to pass through its territory and had assisted them in the all possible ways. To seek revenge, the Maratha forces rode freely into the relatively defenseless Province of the North and carried out many attacks on the Portuguese settlements besides plundering and destroying the region. They captured many large and small merchant ships and boats of Portuguese subjects in the Province of the North and in some instances even carried out beheading of people present there in the ships. The Portuguese Viceroy had condemned this act of Marathas in the Province of the North through his letter to Ramchandra Pandit dated 12th April, 1683 (Pissurlekar 1975: 89). On 15th April, 1683 A.D. Maratha attacked Tarapur (presently in Taluka - Dahanu, District - Palghar) with a force of one thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry. The settlement was mainly consisted of four thatched houses with mud walls not enough to protect itself from the large enemy assault. The Captain of the Portuguese fortification at Tarapur, Manuel Tavares da Gama still defended the place for eight days against the all odds and challenges thrown by the enemy. The Portuguese fortifications and settlements such as Dahanu (presently in Taluka - Dahanu, District - Palghar), Shirgaon (presently in Taluka - Palghar, District - Palghar), the hill fort of Asheri (presently in Taluka - Palghar, District - Thane) and Saivan (presently in Taluka - Vasai, District - Palghar) were attacked and won by the Maratha forces. This time too, Maratha captured two Christian missionaries, the first belonging to the Jesuit order and the second belonging to the Franciscan order. The Portuguese-Maratha retaliations deteriorated to such extent that in May, 1683 A.D. the Portuguese authorities posted armed guards around the house of Maratha envoy Yesaji Gambhirrao in Goa to pressurize Sambhaji to free two Christian clergymen and a herd of cattle which was captured by Marathas from Bardez and Sashti in Goa (Ibid 89 - 90). But after some time, the Portuguese authorities in Goa allowed Yesaji Gambhirrao to go back to the Maratha dominion (Pissurlekar 1967: 92). Portuguese responded by capturing some Maratha merchant ships belonging to Vengurla. In May, 1683 A.D. the Captain of Revdanda Fort Dom Francisco da Costa ordered bombing the Upper Chaul controlled by Marathas which caused considerable damage to the settlement. Due to the presence of an imprisoned Jesuit priest in the Upper Chaul, the Captain of Chaul Fort could not intensify the bombing (Ibid 90). Around the same time, Portuguese presumed about a
powerful Maratha attack on Goa and thus, started preparing for it. On 2nd August, 1683 A.D. Moropant Peshwa laid siege to Revdanda and the Portuguese settlement with the army of two thousand horsemen and six thousand foot soldiers. It was the start of a long siege to Revdanda. The Marathas attempted to attack and capture the fort by scaling the walls but Portuguese resisted and beat back the Maratha attack in which many Maratha soldiers were killed. Though the Portuguese Captain Dom Francisco da Costa ordered for artillery fire against the enemy, it came to notice of him that the stock artillery and ammunition controlled by Jesuits in Revdanda was not of good quality and was poorly maintained. In such crucial moment when the Maratha force was standing next to the fort, it was decided by the Portuguese authorities in Revdanda to purchase required war material from Vasai at the cost of three thousand crusados. Responding to the call of help, the Captain General of the Province of North Manuel Lobo da Silveira promptly dispatched the war material along with the reinforcement of two hundred persons experienced in artillery handling. Besides Revdanda, the Marathas also attacked unsuccessfully the Korlai Fort (presently in Taluka - Murud, District - Raigad). To distract the Maratha force engaged in the siege of Revdanda, the Portuguese troops repeatedly entered in the Maratha controlled territory in the North Konkan and carried out the acts of destruction and plunder. The same pattern was followed in the South Konkan wherein the Viceroy himself ordered the Portuguese subjects to destroy and loot the Maratha region in the nights of 7th and 8th September, 1683 A.D. (Pereira 1968: 45). In one such incident in Anjur (presently in Taluka - Bhiwandi, District - Thane) on 12th September, 1683 A.D. fifty Maratha soldiers entered in the village and started destroying the full grown crops in the fields. On noticing it, the Portuguese Captain of the newly constructed Parsik Fort deputed twenty five soldiers for scaring away the Maratha soldiers. But after the Portuguese force chased the Maratha soldiers for a considerable distance, it became clear to them that they were drawn in an ambush by Marathas and in which nineteen Portuguese soldiers were killed and the rest become successful to escape to the Portuguese camp. Despite such Portuguese maneuvers to distract Marathas, the Maratha siege of Revdanda showed no sign of relief to Portuguese. The help promised by Captain General of the North Manuel Lodo da Silveira did not reach Revdanda on time. In this crucial time, Siddi rulers of Janjira came forward for Portuguese assistance in Revdanda and sent his force to protect Revdanda Fort from the Maratha attack and siege. Janjira was ruled that time by Khairat Khan whose elder brother Siddi Yakut Khan was the general of the Mughal navy. The Portuguese Viceroy Dom Francisco
Tavora thanked to Siddi Yakut Khan and his brother Siddi Khairat Khan for their timely help to Revdanda Fort through his letter dated 13th November, 1683 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1975: 108-109)

Sensing the criticality, the Portuguese Viceroy Dom Francisco Tavora decided to attack Phonda Fort to divert attention of Marathas who were resolutely laying siege to the Revdanda Fort and were involved in the parallel military offensive in the region of Vasai. Despite launching spirited attack on Phonda on 1st November, 1683 A.D. Portuguese had to retreat on 10th November, 1683 A.D. This Portuguese failure in Phonda affected the Viceroy so much that he confided himself to the Jesuit house for complete four days (Ibid 108). Whether it was in the Province of the North or in Goa, Portuguese were facing loss everywhere in their war against Marathas due to their less manpower and rapidly exhausting treasury. The lest that the Portuguese Viceroy could hope from his parent state of Portugal was funds and necessary men power which too was nowhere in the sight. After the failed Phonda offensive, the Viceroy somewhat relieved by Siddi's help to the besieged Revdanda. He kept on arranging reinforcements and logistic support and had ordered fitting of the armada of the North. The only hope that Portuguese had this time was of the Mughal assistance. Therefore, in a letter dated 13th November, 1683 A.D. to the Mughal General of Navy, Siddi Yakut Khan (who was then stationed at Vengurla with his fleet to attack Sambhaji from the land and sea side), the Viceroy proposed for simultaneous attacks on the territory of Sambhaji in the North and South Konkan after the arrival of Mughal prince Shah Alam's army in the Konkan for the complete defeat and destruction of Sambhaji (Pissurlekar 1975: 108 - 112). The Portuguese Viceroy had thought that Sambhaji had moved to Panhala but Sambhaji instead turned to Goa for attack. By 24th November, 1683 A.D. the Marathas had attacked and captured St. Stevens island which was located very near to the islands of Goa. But shortly thereafter, sensing the Mughal trouble, Marathas proposed for a treaty with Portuguese through Prince Akbar. But the envoy of Marathas, Ray Kirti Singh was turned down by the Portuguese Viceroy as he did not bring necessary diplomatic credentials along with him. So, here again the talk remained unconcluded between Portuguese and Marathas.

When the Viceroy was becoming restless for the downfall of Sambhaji, Sambhaji's top official and the General of the Maratha operations in the Province of the North, Peshwa Moropant was thundering havoc on Portuguese in the North Konkan. According to the British dispatches from Mumbai to Surat Factory dated 28th November, 1683 A.D. the Peshwa had taken into control most of the Portuguese territory in the Province of North. He had by then captured Taloja
(presently in New Mumbai), Kalwa (presently in Taluka - Thane, District - Thane) and was
drawing closer to Thane and Sashti island. In the next dispatch dated to 23rd December, 1683
A.D. from Mumbai to Surat, it was informed that Marathas had captured by then the all major
settlements in the Province of North such as Shirgaon, Mahim, Kelve, Datvire, Sopara, Belapur,
and Karanja. In between, Sambhaji had even attempted to capture Goa before the arrival of Shah
Alam's army in Konkan. The Maratha forces attacked Salsette (Sashti) and Bardesh in Goa on
11th December, 1683 A.D. with a force of one thousand horsemen and three thousand foot
soldiers. and had ransacked the comparatively defenseless territory. In Sashti the defense was
rested on a small Portuguese force and mainly on the fortified churches, monasteries and the
armed local residents. In Bardez, the situation was much critical where the Portuguese army
commanding the key three Portuguese forts had either ran away or had surrendered the forts to
Marathas without much resistance. The Maratha forces plundered, destroyed and virtually took
control of Sashti and Bardez while the Portuguese authorities hoped nothing but for the divine
miracle or the Mughal assistance (Pissurlekar 1975, Pereira 1968). While the Maratha forces
were freely roaming in the Portuguese controlled territories in the North and South Konkan, the
Mughal army was coming closer to the battlefield. Sensing the trouble, Sambhaji came forward
to have a treaty with Portuguese and deputed his trusted lieutenant Kavi Kalash for the
diplomatic task. Portuguese knew that it was the opportunistic move from the Maratha side in
view of the Mughal threat. Still, to be relived of the present critical condition where the very
existence of Estado da India was in danger, Portuguese decided to negotiate with Marathas. The
dates of the arrival of the Maratha delegation in the Portuguese court vary in the Maratha and
Portuguese documents. According to Jedhe Shakavali, it was on 7th January, 1684 A.D. that Kavi
Kalash along with prince Akbar started the talk with Portuguese whereas according to the
Portuguese documents, on 3rd January, 1684 A.D. the delegation of four Maratha envoys
reached the Portuguese court (Pissurlekar 1975: 128 - 130). The Portuguese Viceroy deputed
Manuel Saraiva de Alberque for negotiations with Marathas. The Maratha-Portuguese
negotiations were held on between 7th January, 1684 A.D. to 4th February, 1684 A.D. at Phonda.
Though the talks were initiated by Marathas, Portuguese understood very well the circumstantial
nature of the treaty and its possible future violation from the side of Marathas after the
withdrawal of Mughal armies from Konkan. It was only after the Mughal forces started reaching
the North Konkan and a large army comprising of more than one lakh soldiers on foot and horse
commanded by Shah Alam reached Dicholi on 15th January, 1684 A.D. that Portuguese got some respite (Pereira 1968). After Shah Alam’s forces reached the South Konkan, the Maratha area bordering the Portuguese Goa was set upside down. The Maratha settlements such as Dicholi, Kudal, Sawantwadi were destroyed by the Mughal forces. Barely after three days, on 18th January, 1684 A.D. a large Mughal armada carrying food material and other logistic stuff for the camping Mughal army was in Goa and had brought on one of its ship, Sheikh Muhammad, the ambassador of Aurangzeb to Goa. Though Portuguese were in talks with Marathas, they were eagerly waiting to take advantage of the situation caused by Shah Alam’s entry in South Konkan. Portuguese had always cherished the dream to get complete control over the coastal strip of Konkan or its portion controlled by Marathas and when they had favored the Mughals by all the means during the Mughal-Maratha war, the realization of this dream did not seem much long to them. On 23rd January, 1684 A.D. the Portuguese envoy Joao Antonio Portogal was in the camp of Shah Alam. In the notes of Viceroy Francisco de Tavora, the mention of Portuguese demand for the region from Sawantwadi to Mirjan and region nearby Chaul and Konkan is present. Meanwhile, when the talks for the Maratha-Portuguese treaty were in progress, the cautious Portuguese authorities in Goa though wise enough from the past experience but still carried away by the Mughal might, allowed the Mughal ships loaded with food material to pass through the rivers of its territory. This time, the Portuguese authorities deliberately removed artillery from the fort guarding the river to enable Mughal ships to pass through it (Ibid 136). From the English dispatch of Mumbai to Surat factory dated 25th January, 1684 A.D. a miserable state of affairs in the Province of North can be seen. It is reported that the all major Portuguese settlements from Karanja to Dahanu had fallen into the hands of Marathas except the principal cities such as Daman, Vasai, Revdanda etc. (Ibid 126).

When the talks between Maratha and Portuguese were going on, some translation and communication gaffes had turned the very treaty meant for establishing peace between the both states into the future battle ground. The issues which caused confusion was the question of Angediv island and the rich present which Portuguese were supposed to offer to the Maratha ruler Sambhaji. Though Albereque meant to have stated that Portuguese would be forced to leave Angediv island in the probable next two years due to unhealthy climate, diseases and rising number of deaths, Marathas took it in the way that Portuguese would leave island which was a bone of contention between Portuguese and Marathas in 1682 A.D. Another point of debate was
about offering a rich present amounting to rupees one lakh *Hon* to Sambhaji by Portuguese. Prince Akbar, the principle mediator had also mentioned that Sambhaji too would send a gift to the Portuguese Viceroy. When the prince Akbar asked for such present, Alberque replied about the generosity of the Portuguese Viceroy and how he would never exempt from offering a rich present to the Maratha ruler and if not, then Alberque himself would present it to the Maratha ruler. The Marathas construed the reply of Portuguese to prince Akbar as the obligation of Portuguese instead of the possibility. Though these two articles did not feature in the final Maratha-Portuguese treaty, miscommunications and translation mistakes lead to Maratha expectation of Angediv island and a rich present from the Portuguese State (Pissurlekar 1967: 119 - 120).

The circumstantial treaty which the Portuguese and Marathas signed had brought with itself the tall promises from the both sides, especially from the beleaguered Marathas. Portuguese consented to not allow the Mughal ships to pass from the areas guarded by its forts and fortresses but also made it clear that this term would not be applicable to those areas where Portuguese do not maintain artillery equipped forts and fortresses. It was agreed by Marathas that besides withdrawing their army and artillery from the Revdanda Fort, they would free the area and forts which they had captured from Portuguese in the North Konkan and South Konkan and would hand over to them to Portuguese along with war material such as artillery and ammunition. The both sides agreed to release the prisoners captured in the Maratha-Portuguese war. The Marathas and Portuguese agreed to release ships which they had captured from each other in the course of war. The both states agreed to restore free trade which existed between them before the war. Portuguese agreed to pay *'Gaokhandi'* tax from the jurisdiction of Vasai and *"Chauth"* from the jurisdiction of Daman to Sambhaji in lieu of the Maratha protection to the said area. Though Portuguese used to pay the tax *Gaokhandi* from the jurisdiction of Vasai to Marathas from the Shivaji's period, it seems that the issue of paying *Chauth* from the Daman jurisdiction was not resolved till the time of Maratha-Portuguese war. Still, the amount of *Chauth* was actually not in accordance to its literal meaning and was to be paid to Sambhaji from the villages in varying proportions which ranged from 17%, to 14% and 12 and half percent. Sambhaji had also pardoned the rebel Desai group, who were his own subjects from the South Konkan and to whom Portuguese had granted refuge in Goa. It was also decided that the Marathas would not construct a fort on the frontier of the Portuguese held territory (Pissurlekar 1975: 131-134).
The both sides started to implement the terms of treaty. Marathas had already withdrawn their forces from Sashti and Bardez and had freed some detainees but they had not handed over the artillery pieces and ammunition which they had captured from the forts in Bardez. The condition in the Province of the North was still unsettled. The payment of Chauth and Gaokhandi tribute to the Marathas from the jurisdiction of the Province of the North started. The Portuguese authorities ordered to free the Maratha war prisoners kept under their custody. The directions for starting the free trade as it existed before the Maratha-Portuguese war were issued to the respective officials (Ibid 132-133). In spite of such outwardly overtures, the both states were determined to take on each other. Portuguese knew that once the powerful army of Shah Alam leaves Konkan, Marathas would again start troubling them. Therefore, Portuguese tried at every level to convince the Mughal prince for the complete destruction of Marathas and insisted him to stay in the winter season for carrying out the assault. The Viceroy Conde de Alvor Francisco de Tavora even presented a proposal for continuing war against the Marathas before the Mughal prince and asked him for financial assistance and six hundred horses. The Mughal prince however did not pay attention to the Portuguese proposals and after a short time left to the Ghats with a promise to return in Konkan in the summer season. When negotiations were going on between the Mughals and Portuguese, besides the Mughal Ambassador Sheikh Muhammad who was in Goa by that time, the Portuguese court was also visited by the envoys of the rebel prince Akbar and Sambhaji - Rai Kirti Singh and Madaji Naik respectively in the first week of February, 1684 A.D. To make the relations between Portuguese and Marathas better and for pressing Sambhaji to observe the terms of the treaty which was just concluded, the Viceroy sent the Maratha ruler a gift through Madaji Naik. The Viceroy also wrote a letter in the same regard to Kavi Kalash, the most trusted advisor of Sambhaji and Gangadhar Pandit, an official of Sambhaji on 23rd February, 1684 (Ibid 142-143). As the Mughal army of prince Shah Alam had mostly withdrawn from the Konkan region and went to Ghats, there was no option before the helpless Portuguese than to keep on reminding the Marathas for the strict observance of the treaty. But Maratha had once again taken the charge of field after the departure of Mughal forces from the Konkan. The Marathas had captured Portuguese merchant boats loaded with food material and had started construction of a fort in the South Konkan on the Maratha-Portuguese boundary which according to the articles in the treaty was prohibited. Therefore, it is not surprising to find pro-Mughal stand of Estado da India in the letter dated 20th March, 1684 A.D.
of the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Alvor Francisco de Tavora to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. Besides re-iterating the loss that the Portuguese State in India suffered due to Portuguese assistance to the Mughals during the Mughal-Maratha war, the various means for incorporating the discontented local rulers and land lords from the Konkan into the Mughal service for their proposed use against the Marathas were also suggested by the Viceroy. Though Portuguese had sided with the Mughals, they did not stop persuading the Marathas for the implementation of the Maratha-Portuguese treaty. In a letter dated 26th March, 1684 A.D. to Narahari Pandit, the Viceroy again took up the issue of constant violation of the treaty by Marathas (Ibid 144 - 145). By the end of March, 1684 A.D. the Portuguese Viceroy deputed an Augustinian missionary, Friar Antonio de Sao Joseph, with some Portuguese persons and a translator Ramkrushna Naik Barve to convey the message of implementation of treaty to Sambhaji. At Raigad, some serious differences were surfaced between the Portuguese delegation and the Maratha officials for the issues of Angediv island and present for Sambhaji. The Marathas were determined for the issue of Angediv island and a rich present to Sambhaji. Prince Akbar too wrote a letter dated 18th April, 1684 A.D. on these issues to the Portuguese Viceroy. But the Portuguese authorities declined to accept the demands of Marathas and informed that these articles were not mentioned in the final Maratha-Portuguese treaty (Pissurlekar 1967: 120). The Portuguese envoy for the Maratha-Portuguese treaty, Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque by his letter dated 24th April, 1684 A.D. to Kavi Kalash, offered his clarifications over the issue and blamed the translators for the overall confusion (Ibid 122).

The Maratha court politics and rivalry had also casted shadow on the actual realization of the Maratha-Portuguese treaty. As earlier mentioned, the entire treaty issue was handled from the Maratha side by Kavi Kalash whereas prince Akbar had acted as the mediator between the Portuguese and Marathas. Kavi Kalsash’s prominence in the Maratha court had already irked the local Maratha officials and veterans. One such was Peshwa Moropant, who was handling the Maratha operations in the Province of the North and with whom such development with a lead role of Kavi Kalash did not go well (Ibid 115). It is to note that despite the finalization of treaty, the Maratha hostilities in the Province of the North did not stop and were on the rise. From a letter dated in the month of May, 1684 A.D. by the Secretary of the Portuguese Viceroy, Dr. Luis Goncalves Couto, we can get information of the cotemporary state of affairs in the Province of the North. Though the Maratha forces had given up the siege of Revdanda six months ago, he
wrote, they had caused heavy destruction in the Vasai region and had captured its surroundings up to Madrapur. The Maratha forces had re-conquered Saivan and Manor and were arduously fighting in Sashti island which was captained by Antonio Camello, Belapur Fort captained by Antonio Texeira de Machado, Karanja, Mahim and Tarapur. The Marathas had re-conquered Ashei Fort and had killed its Captain while its Portuguese garrison had fled to Tarapur. In Manor, Marathas destroyed the fort and demolished the Church. According to one Christian missionary named Padre Antonio Vaz Risead from Vasai, Marathas had imprisoned many Portuguese subjects, be it men, women, kids, had mutilated many of them by severing limbs, ear, nose and thus had spread panic everywhere. The Marathas had also captured many churches in the Province of the North (Ibid 125).

It appears that by the month of September, 1684 A.D. Portuguese and Maratha reached an accord. On 6th September, 1684 A.D. for settling the dispute, it was decided between Antonio Joseph and Kavi Kalash that Maratha envoys would be sent along with Joseph to Goa for negotiations and till then the on-going Maratha-Portuguese war would be stopped. Nevertheless, the Maratha envoys did not accompany Joseph on his return journey, who reached Goa in November, 1684 A.D. The Maratha envoys, Rangaji Laxmidhar (a person who knew Portuguese) and Sidhoji Farjad came to Goa in December, 1684 A.D. and informed the Portuguese authorities about their arrival by a letter dated 29th December, 1684 A.D. The Portuguese authorities in turn informed the envoys that since the Portuguese ships were supposed to sail for Portugal on 20th January, 1685 A.D. they would be given appointment after 20th January, 1685 A.D. and therefore, the envoys should not come before this date. Meanwhile, infuriated Portuguese who by March, 1684 A.D. had suffered financial losses estimated to twenty lakhs xeraphins in the Maratha-Portuguese war, were in talks with a powerful lobby of Desai’s of South Konkan for supporting them against Sambhaji. They were supposed to carry out raids in the Maratha territory, destroy and capture the Maratha region and for the same had asked for the Portuguese assistance, by the means of both money and logistics. While doing so, they were asked not to harm the English, French and Dutch trading companies operating from the territory of Sambhaji. In return, Portuguese were supposed to get a portion of the captured Maratha territory in Konkan. What could have been the better chance for Portuguese who although superior by military and naval technology did not have sufficient troops and with a fractured financial condition could not have put a long fight against the numerically superior Marathas;
than to support the disgruntled Desai’s. On 8th February, 1685 A.D. Portuguese and the Desai’s of South Konkan headed by Khem Sawant signed a treaty for actuating the talks that they were holding from some month for the destruction of Marathas in Konkan. To initiate what was planned in the treaty, on 12th February, 1685 A.D. Desai’s revolting against Marathas, attacked and plundered inside the Maratha territory. Since Desai’s were the subjects of Sambhaji and whose estates used to fall in the Maratha dominions, as a matter of precaution, they had sent their families to Goa for refuge by 18th February, 1684 A.D. This coordinated Portuguese-Desai plan brought much destruction in the Maratha held dominions of South Konkan and also invited Marathas ire, who on 23rd February, 1685 A.D. attacked Bardez in Goa. The revolt of Desai’s in the South Konkan was followed by Desai’s of Karwar also. Desai's of Karwar inflicted heavy losses on Marathas, captured a large region and set on fire a contingent of Maratha navy. On seeing the Maratha attack on Bardez, the Portuguese authorities deployed armed guards outside the house of Maratha envoys who by that time had reached in Goa for initiating talks. And thus, a souring point once again was reached between the Portuguese and Marathas, which never thereafter achieved normalcy till the end of Sambhaji's reign. The Maratha delegation in Goa complained acridly to Joseph for the treatment met out to them in Goa by letters dated 10th March, 11th April and 13th May, 1685 A.D. The height of vitriolic talks between the Portuguese and Marathas reached in May, 1685 A.D. Referring to the earlier correspondence done by some Maratha officials such as Ramchandra Pandit with the Portuguese authorities for the Maratha-Portuguese relations which the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Alvor considered as the highly arrogant, the Viceroy warned sternly to Dharmaji Nagnath, Sarsubhedar of Phonda that though Sambhaji had directed his personals to build horse stables in Sashti and Bardez (both were under the Portuguese control), he should never think of its conquest as it was he (the Viceroy) who was guarding it. He further went on speaking on the same note that instead of Marathas putting stables for their horses in the Portuguese dominion, he would be having stables for his horses in the mountains controlled by Marathas and in the court of Raigad. In the same letter, before warning Dharmaji Nagnath and Ramchandra Pandit for refraining to write him in arrogant tone, he called on to god to humiliate Sambhaji's pride and arrogance (Pissurlekar 1975: 146). Nevertheless, the issue of Maratha-Portuguese treaty persisted in a letter dated 27th June, 1684 A.D. by the Viceroy to Kavi Kalash, wherein the Viceroy protested again for non-implementation of treaty by the Marathas. In July, 1685 A.D. Maratha attacked some villages in
Goa and returned with handsome loot. The condition in the Province of the North was still unsure but Portuguese were able to re-capture Jivdhan Fort from the Marathas on 27th August, 1685 A.D. On 12th September, 1685 A.D. Portuguese were able to re-gain Kamandurg from Marathas (Pissurlekar 1967: 127) and on 19th September, 1685 A.D. they re-took Karanja island from Marathas and imprisoned the entire Maratha garrison on the island (Ibid 145). Desai of South Konkan and Karwar who later on accepted the Mughal services, were in constant war with the Marathas and had captured considerable portion in South Konkan with such effect that the Portuguese Viceroy wrote to the King of Portugal by a letter dated 24th January, 1686 A.D. that except of Phonda, the Maratha rule was virtually vanished nearby Goa. The Maratha-Portuguese war persisted in the Province of the North for a long. It was in October, 1687 A.D. that Portuguese could re-conquer Asheri Fort from Marathas. It is written by the Viceroy that though the Maratha troop was ready to hand over the fort for money, Portuguese captured it by force (Ibid 127). Till the execution of Sambhaji by the Mughals in March, 1689 A.D. there was no peace between the Maratha and Portuguese.

3.3. The Diplomacy of Chhatrapati Shahu and the Peshwas - Balaji Vishwanath and Bajirao I in the North Konkan (1719 - 1737 A.D.)-

Marathas under the leadership of Peshwa Bajirao I (in the office from 27th April, 1720 A.D. - 28th April, 1740 A.D.) of Pune had started to target the Province of the North systematically on the plea of demanding the tribute (one tenth of the revenue income or production) from Estado da India by citing the royal Mughal order of the year 1719 A.D. The royal order had granted the Sardeshmukhi rights of the Konkan region to Chhatrapati Shahu of Satara; which is needless to say, was successfully mediated by the first Peshwa of Shahu - Balaji Vishwanath (in the office from 17th November 1713 - 12th April, 1720 A.D.). Besides this tribute, Marathas through Peshwa Bajirao I were also pressing hard the Portuguese for their old demand of Chauth payment (one fourth of the revenue income or production) for the Portuguese territory of Daman and the area bordering the region of the Koli king of Rampur. Portuguese opposed the both demands as according to them, their possession in the North Konkan was never a part of the Mughal empire and they were never feudatory of the Mughals, so the question of paying one tenth of revenue or production to Marathas was nowhere in their policy framework. For the
Chauth issue, they had maintained their old position that it was paid in various proportions to the Ramnagar king from the Daman territory. They held the view that if Chhatrapati Shahu conquers the land of Ramnagar king then they would consider the payment of tribute to the Marathas (Pissurlekar 1975). Besides these issues, when Marathas captured Kalyan and Bhiwandi in the year 1719-20 A.D. the threat to the Portuguese Province of the North increased manifold. Kalyan became the de facto administrative and military capital of Maratha maneuvers in the North Konkan. The person who had captured these strategic ports - Ramchandra Mahadev Chaskar (Joshi) was a close relative of Peshwas. He was loyal to the camp of Balaji Vishwanath and later to Bajirao I. The inner factions and conflicts in the royal Maratha court at Satara were well known, not to mention the factionalism within the sub-ordinate ranks. To name a few, Khanderao Dabhade of Talegaon and Pilaji Jadhavrao were the strong contenders for Bajirao I in the Satara court politics. The rivaling factions did not miss any chance to downplay each other. Shahu and Bajirao I were at odds with Angrey family of Alibag too. Bajirao I was eagerly exploring all possible options to get at least one prominent coastal port in Konkan under his control (Pissurlekar 1967). Though Kalyan and Bhiwandi were now a part of the Maratha dominion but they did not control the outer maritime activities and trade of the Western coast. Therefore, Peshwas hunt for a coastal port was on. The Maratha success in the North Konkan had sent a wave of relief to the disgruntled regional players who had lost their traditional family entitlements and rights in a course of time in the Portuguese controlled Province of the North. Besides the major prevalent resentment related to estate and entitlements, the Portuguese prosecution of Hindu religion and intolerance in the Province of the North was also adding fuel to the conflict. The entire regional landed elites were largely the upper class-caste Hindus who found their religious beliefs and practices being offended on the regular basis by the ultra-conservative Portuguese establishment. A few of them such as Naik/Anjurkar family of the village Anjur (Taluka - Bhiwandi, District - Thane) had approached earlier the Aangrey family of Alibag (District - Raigad) and Dabhade family of Talegaon (District - Pune) for the military assistance and intervention in the Province of the North (Kelkar 2008). But when the immediate Eastern region of the Province of the North - Kalyan and Bhiwandi was captured by the faction loyal to the Peshwas of Pune, they lost no chance in estimating the rising power of Bhat family (holders of the Peshwa post in the court of Chhatrapati Shahu at Satara) and groups loyal to the Peshwas and thus decided to side with them. In such process, one more affected prominent
landed elite family from Salsette (Sashti) Island - Kavale from Malad (at present in Mumbai Sub-Urban District) also threw their weight behind the rebel faction. The rebel faction was lobbying hard in the high office of Peshwas at Kalyan and Pune for launching the anti-Portuguese mission in the Province in the North. Their proposed strategy was all clear and simple - the rebels will provide all required information related to geography, topography, approaches, location of the Portuguese strongholds and posts etc. to Marathas and will supply them necessary manpower, infrastructure and logistics for invasion wherever necessary and possible. In the return, the Chhtrapati Shahu and the Peshwas have to acknowledge their contribution in the mission and will have to reinstate their entitlements, estate holdings etc. in the newly conquered region. Bajirao I upon verifying the authenticity of the claims and strengths of the rebel faction in the Province of the North through his trusted representatives approved their plan and assured recognizing the estates, titles of the local landed elites and offering rewards to those who would assist Peshwas in their expedition against the Portuguese in the Province of the North. He also agreed to honor the entitlement granted in the period of Muzaffarid dynasty of Gujarat to the local landed elites and families (Ibid). This acted as the most driving impetus for the local landlord families and defectors for joining the Peshwa side in the offensive against Portuguese in North Konkan. Though the rebel camp was energetic in expecting the prompt Maratha offensive headed by Peshwa Bajirao I in the Province of the North, the Maratha response was much slow owing to their parallel offensives at various fronts across the country and region. Still, working on the line of action, Maratha's first direct attack on the Province of the North took place in 1724 A.D and the second in 1730 A.D. In the second attack, there was all possibility of losing the Sashti island to Marathas if the timely intervention of the English from Mumbai had not come across to mediate between the warring parties. But it did not end there. Pursued constantly by the rebel faction headed by Naik/Anjurkar and Kavle family for planning the larger and decisive offensive in the Province of the North, Bajirao I had planned for greater third offensive in the Province of the North in the year 1733 A.D. But as Marathas got heavily engaged in the expedition against the Siddis of Janjira in 1733 A.D. that lasted up to 1736 A.D. the planned offensive in the Province of the North was put on hold. From the available documents, it is come to light that Marathas for once again plotted to attack the Province of the North in 1535 A.D. but this time, it was postponed. The delay made the rebel faction from the Province of the North further restless. But once freed from the Janjira expedition, Marathas
though overtly represented by Chhatrapati Shahu of Satara but in the reality controlled by Peshwa Bajirao I of Pune had turned their full attention on the Portuguese front. As Bajirao I was keen in getting possession of an island or sea abutting land in Konkan for trading activities in addition to the Maratha controlled Kalyan and Bhiwandi, Marathas demanded a portion of land at Vasai from Portuguese. Portuguese authorities not only communicated a stern rebuff but also said to had made a derogatory personal remarks against none other than Bajirao I. Coupled with already existing indignation from the Portuguese authorities for not complying with the demand of Chhatrapati Shahu of Satara to present him a lavish gift, the present event accelerated the chain events, which later culminated into the full scale Maratha offensive under the command of Chimaji Appa, the younger brother of Peshwa Bajirao I in the Province of the North in 1737 A.D (Pissurlekar 1967).

It is this process and the chain of events starting from the first interaction between Portuguese and Peshwa Bajirao I in 1722 A.D. ultimately culminating into the final and conclusive Maratha offensive in the Province of the North in 1737 A.D. which is presented in brief below. A separate note on Anjurkar family and Antaji Raghunath Kawale is given at the end of the section.

The First Interaction between Portuguese and Peshwa Bajirao I (1721 - 1722 A.D.) -

It was due to the joint offensive planned by the Estado da India and East India Company against Kanhoji Aangrey of Alibag in 1721 A.D. that Bajirao I got the chance to intervene directly in the geo-political issues of the coastal North Konkan. As said earlier, Kanhoji Aangrey had emerged by then an independent marine power on the coast of Konkan and whose powerful and influential existence was proving difficult to Portuguese, English and the Maratha Chhatrapatis of Satara and Kolhapur to achieve their respective geo-political goals on the coast of Konkan. Thus, to end the political existence of Kanhoji Aangrey, the joint armies of Portuguese and English sailed to Colaba (at present Alibag in District - Raigad, Maharashtra) in which the Portuguese army was commanded personally by the Viceroy Senhor Francisco Jose de Sampaio e Castro who sailed with Portuguese armada to Alibag from Goa on 22nd November, 1721 A.D. When this joint Portuguese-English attack against Kanhoji Aangrey was in progress, according to the Portuguese documents, the Chhatrapati Shahu sent a message to Portuguese in Province of the North through his Governors in Kalyan and Bhiwandi - Ramchandra Pant and Damaji
Krushna who met the Captain of Saivan (at present in Taluka - Vasai, District - Palghar) and conveyed him the message of joint Maratha-Portuguese offensive against Kanhoji Aangrey. It was proposed from the Maratha side that if the mission succeeds then Portuguese and Chhatrapati Shahu will divide the territory held by Kanhoji Aangrey among them. Portuguese, however, did not accept the plan of Marathas as they did not want Chhatrapati Shahu to neighbor their territory on the Western coast (Pissurlekar 1967: 142).

The information of the joint Portuguese and English offensive against Kanhoji Aangrey in Colaba and its result comes from the letters dated 24\textsuperscript{th} January, 1722 and thereafter on 14\textsuperscript{th} September, 1722 A.D. written by the Portuguese Viceroy to the King of Portugal Joao V (John V). After reaching Alibag on 1\textsuperscript{st} December, 1721 A.D he was joined by the Portuguese fleet from the Province of the North and the English armada consisting of four ships commanded by Thomas Matthew which came directly from Europe for anti-piracy operations. Meanwhile, Kanhoji Aangrey requested Chhatrapati Shahu and his allies for help. Responding to the call, Pilaji Jadhavrao, a prominent Maratha commander arrived in Colaba with a force of two thousand horsemen and many foot soldiers. The joint attack against the Colaba Fort started on 18\textsuperscript{th} December, 1721 A.D and continued till 30\textsuperscript{th} December, 1721 A.D. in which the both sides exchanged gun and cannon fires and were involved in some direct confrontation. The English were determined to end the existence of Kanhoji Aangrey and desired the same approach from Portuguese. But in the mid of attack, the Portuguese Viceroy Francisco Jose de Sampaio e Castro fell ill on 28\textsuperscript{th} December, 1721 A.D. and offered the command of war to Portuguese and English officers. On 29th December, 1721 A.D. the joint armies and armadas started bombing operation against Alibag and while this operation was ongoing, they joint-command received the news that Chhatrapati Shahu had deputed his Prime-Minister Bajirao I with a large force to help Kanhoji Aangrey who by then had accepted the suzerainty of the Chhatrapati Shahu. Peshwa Bajirao I had arrived in Alibag with seven thousand horsemen and had deployed his force in Alibag which was estimated by Portuguese of having total twenty five thousand armed combatants. The arrival of Bajirao I with such large force changed the result of joint English-Portuguese expedition against Kanhoji Aangrey which till then was largely in the favor of Portuguese and English. After his arrival, Bajirao I informed the Viceroy that he came to Alibag to acknowledge the suzerainty of Chhatrapati Shahu from Kanhoji Aangrey as Aangrey had accepted to become a feudatory of Shahu. In such position, he asked the joint-command for ceasefire. The Portuguese
Viceroy, keeping in mind the large reinforcement commanded personally by Bajirao I which had come to rescue of Kanhoji Aangrey and the treaty of peace which Portuguese had with Chhatrapati Shahu, though to accept the demand of ceasefire as violating it would have led to the direct confrontation with Chhatrapati Shahu, who by that time had emerged as the independent regional imperial power in the Deccan. Besides announcing the ceasefire, Bajirao I had also asked the Portuguese Viceroy to depute an official for holding negotiations on the issue. While this talk was in progress, on 2\(^{nd}\) January, 1722 A.D. a high ranking commander in the army of Kanhoji Aangrey was killed in the fight between the joint-armies and Aangrey which further deteriorated the situation. Thus, Bajirao I again asked for an immediate ceasefire on 3\(^{rd}\) January, 1722 A.D. Responding to this tense situation which could have escalated into a major war to which Portuguese were not prepared to face, the Viceroy accepted the offer of negotiations and appointed his officer General Antonio Cardim Froes for this task. English were infuriated with this approach of Portuguese and held the view that in accordance to the treaty of friendship which existed between them and Portuguese, Portuguese should not have accepted the Maratha demand of negotiations. Even if Portuguese had accepted the demand then the terms of treaties should have been favorable to English considering the damage caused to East India Company by Kanhoji Aangrey. Portuguese, as explained before, were not in position to accept open hostility against Chhatrapati Shahu and his Prime Minister Bajirao I and thus, proceeded with the negotiations. To observe the ceasefire, Portuguese sent their five representatives to the camp of Peshwa Bajirao I and Marathas sent their five representatives to the camp of Portuguese. Fearing the betrayal from the Maratha side, the ailing Portuguese Viceroy Franciso Jose de Sampaio e Castro ordered a mud fortification to be built around the Portuguese camp to face any emergency (Pereira 1968: 179 - 185). English were highly miffed with the Portuguese approach to the issue and angrily left Alibag for Mumbai without even informing the Portuguese Viceroy. The same was protested by the Viceroy Francisco Jose de Sampaio e Castro by his letter dated 15\(^{th}\) January, 1722 A.D. to the English General (in-charge of joint Portuguese-English operation in Alibag) Robert Cowan wherein the Viceroy cleared his stand that he did not conclude agreement with Kanhoji Aangrey but with Chhatrapati Shahu through Bajirao I and the treaty was not just limited to Portuguese but to English as well as he had incorporated English too in the treaty (Ibid 178 - 179). In these dramatic circumstances that the first treaty between Portuguese and Chhatrapati Shahu through Peshwa Bajirao I was concluded on 9\(^{th}\) January, 1722 A.D. at Varsoli
near Alibag (according to the Maratha copy of the treaty). The treaty was signed by Mahadaji Krushna Chaskar on the behalf of Peshwa Bajirao I and Antonio Cardim Froes on the behalf of the Viceroy Francisco Jose Sampaio e Castro. The treaty, however, does not contain signature of the representative of the East India Company but was consented by English as an ally of Portuguese. The treaty is reproduced below.

The articles of the treaty concluded between the Viceroy Senhor Francisco Jose de Sampaio e Castro and the Pradhan of Shahu Raje and General Bajirao (in accordance to power delegated by Shahu Raje) in the camp of Alibag (in the village of Varsoli according to the Marathi copy of the treaty) on 9th January, 1722 A.D.

1. Marathas should not demand tribute from the region ruled by the King of Portugal and from his ships. The same section applies to Portuguese as well for the affairs related to Marathas.

2. If Marathas and English need help of each other’s on the sea and on the land then it should be extended. But this section will not apply for the Nation with whom this State has a treaty of peace. The same will apply to Marathas as well. Means the enemies of Marathas with whom Portuguese have a treaty, in such case Portuguese will not side with Marathas for fight against the respective Nation.

3. Portuguese will not charge direct tax on the revenue collected by the State (Maratha) in the Portuguese controlled ports. Likewise, the State of Chhatrapati will not charge direct tax on the revenue collected by Portuguese in the ports controlled by Chhatrapati.

4. As the security provided by the Portuguese admirals to the ships of Marathas' enemies is harmful for Marathas, so the Portuguese Viceroy should warn his admirals to not provide security to the ships of Marathas' enemies.

5. As the this peace agreement is concluded at the bilateral level, so the both parties will have unrestricted trade with each other. The ships of the both states can export and import from the ports under the jurisdiction of the respective states. The trade will include the articles such
ammunition, cannons, medicines etc. The both parties should charge the appropriate price for these articles.

6. The merchants of this State will have liberty to trade with any port which they wish. But they cannot trade with the port with which this State is not related.

7. Marathas should release the captured Portuguese ships. Similarly, Portuguese will release the captured Maratha ships.

8. As the warships from Colaba have sailed for war, so if they capture Portuguese ships then Marathas should release all Portuguese ships along with the cargo loaded therein.

9. The Senhor Viceroy and the Pandit Pradhan Bajirao are bound to follow the articles of this treaty. The articles which are related to the respective parties should be strictly followed. (Pereira 1968: 174 - 176)

The First Maratha-Portuguese Confrontation in the Province of the North (1723 A.D.) -

Not a year passed into conclusion of treaty between Portuguese and Marathas that violent confrontation between them started in the Province of the North. The inter-border raids by Marathas and Portuguese used to happen at various points of time due to several reasons. As we will see in the next Section, the motives behind raids, from the Maratha side, were either due to factional rivalries at the regional levels or to entice Portuguese into large conflict. Portuguese were accused by Peshwa Bajirao I through his letter dated 5th December, 1723 A.D. of raiding the Maratha held Taloja Paraganah which then used to come under Bhiwandi division and arresting several farmers and landlords from the region. It is written by Bajirao I in the aforementioned letter that despite the request made by the Governor of Kalyan Ramchandra Pant, Portuguese did not release the captives. When the army ordered by Peshwa Bajirao I to attack the kingdom of Jawhar reached Taloja while on its way to Jawhar, the residents of the area complained to Maratha commanders of the Portuguese raid and arrest of their persons. Thus, in retaliation, the Maratha commander Pilaji Jadhavrao raided the Portuguese held region on 26th
November, 1723 A.D. According to the Portuguese records, Pilaji Jadhavrao with an army of approximate three to four thousand cavalrymen, at 9 A.M. in the morning attacked the border post of Saivan and finding no resistance from Portuguese, as the Captain of Saivan had no means of defense to resist such large army, reached by 2 P.M. in afternoon to Gokhavire village and set the village on fire. According to Portuguese, the treaty was firstly violated not by them but by Marathas and the Portuguese documents cite the raid by the Governor of Kalyan (Ramchandra Pandit or Ramchandra Mahadev Joshi Chaskar) in Daman division of the Province of the North without any provocation from the Portuguese side (Pissurlekar 1975: 171 - 172). Luis de Melo de Sampaio was the General of the Province of the North at the time raid by Pilaji Jadhavrao. Bajirao I warned through his above mentioned letter to the General of the Province of the North Luis de Melo de Sampaio that Portuguese should release captives they arrested from Taloja Paraganah or else he would instruct his army to attack Portuguese if Portuguese desired so ("...बिघाड करावा हा तुमचा मकसूद असले तरी तैसेच साफ कलमी करणे म्हणजे तस्करात तेच तिंहून पाठउं...".–). He also wrote that if Portuguese desired to make rapprochement then they should negotiate treaty with Pilaji Jadhavrao and for this purpose, should depute an envoy (Pissurlekar 1967: 144). Accordingly, the General of the Province of the North agreed to enter into an agreement with Pilaji Jadhavrao. From the Maratha side, the terms of the treaty were submitted to the General of the Portuguese Province of the North by Ramchandra Pant Mahadev (Ramchandra Mahadev Joshi, the Governor of Kalyan) in the presence of Sardar Pilaji Jadhav and Sardar Dhavalji Somvanshi Rustamrao Samsher Bahadur. From the Portuguese side, the Member of the Advisory Council of the Province of North Dom Luis da Costa was present and suggestions of Luis/Jose Pereira da Vasco Salios (the Captain of Saivan) were taken for drafting the articles of the Treaty. It was suggested from the Maratha side that an influential Envoy/Ambassador should meet Chhatrapati by the month of May, 1724 A.D. and should take his approval for the terms of treaty. Till then, in accordance to the articles of the treaty, it was assured by the Maratha commanders that their forces would not molest the region under the Portuguese control. The second treaty concluded between Portuguese and Marathas in Kambe (Taluka - Bhiwandi, District - Thane) on 10th January, 1724 A.D. is reproduced below.

1. When the General of the Province of North Luis de Mello Sampaio was acting in accordance to the treaty concluded between Shrimant Pandit Pradhan Bajiaro and Portuguese at Colaba, the
said treaty between Portuguese and Pandit Pradhan was violated due to the former's raid into Taloja Paraganah of Kalyan where some revenue officials were taken into the Portuguese custody. The Member of the Advisory Council of the Province of North Dom Luis da Costa agreed to meet at Kamba Village and there meeting between him and Ramchandra Pant, Pilaji Jadhav and Dhavalaji Somvanshi took place and accordingly it was decided that new treaty should be concluded in the reference to the earlier treaty signed at Colaba. Here are the terms of the treaty -

2. As tension is prevailing between the two States, you should depute a powerful Envoy/Ambassador to meet Maharaja Chhatrapati and Shrimant Bajirao Pandit Pradhan by the Month of May. After your Envoy/Ambassador visits the Darbar (Court) of Chhatrapati, care will be taken to not attack your region.

3. There should not be any obstruction in the region controlled by Portuguese to the movement of the articles of the Government which go there from Bhiwandi and Kalyan and on the purchase of ammunition, sulphur and the parts of cannons. And also, no rights should be declared on these articles.

4. The persons taken into custody by our forces from the region controlled by you and cattle and four cannons confiscated by us will be returned to you.

5. You can collect the routine commercial taxes from the merchant vessels of Bhiwandi and Kalyan sailing to Vasai, Mumbai and other parts under your control. There should not be any obstruction to their incoming and outgoing from your side. You should not obstruct the vessels if they contain tobacco or two Ser (शेर) (empty space).

6. The vessels from Bhiwandi and Kalyan should not be forced to carry load or to do work (वेठी) in the Portuguese controlled region.

7. We shall return Negro, slave prisoners and negro women fleeing from your region to ours and you should return the slave servants or Negro women fled to your region form ours.
8. You should not obstruct in the way the to and fro trade between us (Bhiwandi and Kalyan) and Mumbai and also should not charge taxes. (Pereira 1968: 201 - 203)

The issue of deputing an influential envoy to the court of Chhatrapati Shahu was discussed in the meeting of councilors called by the Viceroy on 18th March, 1724 A.D. in which the majority of members held the view that since Chhatrapati Shahu was the feudatory of the Mughal Emperor, it would not be in accordance to protocol to depute an envoy to his court at Satara. Also, the main motive of Maratha hostilities in the Province of the North was estimated by the Portuguese authorities in Goa with their old demand *Sardeshmukhi* or the hefty tribute which they wanted to extract from Portuguese. Peshwa Bajirao I had also asked the General of the Province of the North Dom Luis da Costa to depute an influential envoy to the royal court in Satara (Pissurlekar 1967: 144 - 145). But Portuguese did not send their representative to Satara.

**The Second Maratha-Portuguese Confrontation in the Province of the North (1728 A.D.)**

In 1728 A.D. the Maratha Governor of Kalyan Ramchandra Mahadev Joshi Chaskar died and in his place, his younger brother Krushnarao Mahadev Chaskar was appointed as the Governor of Kalyan. Krushnarao Chaskar started to administer the Kalyan province with the assistance of experienced officials in the office of Kalyan named Vitthal Pant and Chimanaji Pant. By this time, the Portuguese Viceroy Joao de Saldanha da Gama through his letter dated 10th May, 1728 A.D. informed the General of the Province of the North Dom Antonio Castro de Mello that Chhatrapati Shahu had assured him that Marathas would not harass Portuguese to the level that if this assurance is broken then the Viceroy can behead the Maratha envoy in Goa. Still, the Viceroy advised the General of the Province of the North that if Marathas attack the Portuguese territory in the North Konkan then in retaliation, the General should raid and devastate the Kalyan region (Pereira 1968: 265 - 266). Not much time passed for the General to put into action the advice of Portuguese Viceroy as Pilaji Jadhavrao and Krushnarao Mahadev Chaskar while returning from their offensive against the kingdom of Ramnagar raided two villages in the Daman division of the Province of the North. After coming to Kalyan, Krushnarao Chaskar went away from Kalyan in the season of Monsoon. The Portuguese General of the Province of the North to avenge the Maratha raid in the Daman division raided the Kalyan region and attacked
the Durgadi Fort in Kalyan in the early August, 1728 A.D. The fort at the time of attack was guarded by the Maratha commanders such Shankaraji Keshav Phadke, Gangaji, Shivaji and Narayanaji Anjurkar, Dadaji and Mahadaji Krushnaprabbhu. Such was the tense situation that Shankaraji Keshav Phadke and others had to offer their jewelries as reward for soldiers and musketeers guarding the Durgadi Fort (Kelkar 2008: 74). The Viceroy had congratulated the General of the Province of the North Dom Antonio Castro de Mello his raid and plunder of Kalyan by his letter dated 17th August, 1728 A.D. (Pereira 1968: 268 - 269). According to the Viceroy, Pilaji Jadhavrao had attacked the Daman division in the Province of the North in violation of the orders of Chhatrapati Shahu and Peshwa Bajirao I (Ibid 266). According to the Portuguese records, this Portuguese attack on Kalyan had pressurized the Peshwa Bajirao I to enter into an agreement with the General of the Province of the North but no record of this treaty is available in present (Pissurlkear 1967: 146).

The Third Maratha - Portuguese Confrontation in the Province of the North (1730 A.D.) -

As Marathas had anyhow decided to capture the Province of the North, barely after two years, the next Maratha attack (the third in the series) on the Portuguese Province of the North took place in the year of 1730 A.D. again under the command of Pilaji Jadhavrao and this time he was assisted by the native dissidents - Gangaji Naik Anjurkar and Antaji Raghunath Kawale. Kelkar says that the assault on Kambe, a fortified settlement on the North-West of Bhiwandi across the creek took place in May, 1730 A.D. and Marathas decided to lay siege to the fortress at Kambe. Accordingly Pilaji Jadhav, Vitthal Pant and Chimanaji Pant came to Kambe from Kalyan and started to build their fronts around the fortress. On one unspecified day, a Portuguese reinforcement came to the rescue of the besieged Kambe Fortress in two Galivat type ships but before it could reach the creek, the Maratha forces captained by Pilaji Jadhavrao and Gangaji Naik jumped into the creek and captured the ships. A huge quantity of war material, and twelve cannons were found on them and Marathas aimed the same twelve cannon towards the fortress and blasted it. The helpless Portuguese force trapped inside the fortress had no any option but to surrender. Marathas arrested eight Portuguese officers, one thousand and six hundred soldiers and one thousand Portuguese subjects (Kelkar 2008: 76). But the same is not reported from the Portuguese records. It is in this way that the third Maratha offensive in the Province of the North
had started. As usual, Portuguese and Marathas again blamed each other for the start of hostilities.

After attacking Kambe, Marathas raided twice the Sashti island and stormed Saivan (which then came under Vasai sub-division), Jivdhan (which then which then came under Vasai sub-division) and Manor (which then was headquarter of Manor sub-division of Vasai division). The Portuguese forces in the Province of the North under the command of General Martin da Silveira de Menzes also retaliated and after freeing some territory from the Maratha forces, raided Bhiwandi in the month of April-May, 1731 A.D. The Marathas continued to occupy some Eastern bordering portion of the Province of the North and continued to collect revenue from the local villages up to the year of 1732 A.D. Had not Portuguese received reinforcement and aid from the East India Company's Mumbai principality, this time, there was all possibility of losing the Sashti island to the Maratha forces (Pissurlekar 1975: 172 - 179). Seeing the stiff Portuguese resistance and the another war front which could have opened in Deccan due to souring of relations between Peshwa Bajirao I and Nizam ul-Mulk, Peshwa Bajirao I pressed for truce with the Portuguese authorities in the North Konkan and appointed his younger brother Chimaji Appa for the task. Accordingly, the treaty was concluded between Portuguese and Marathas after the successful mediation of the English in Mumbai on 10th February, 1732 A.D. The treaty between Marathas and Portuguese was mediated by Robert Cowan, the Esquire President and Governor General of the island and Castle of Bombay and from the Portuguese side was signed by Senhor Francisco de Melo de Castro, Commissioner General of the Cavalry of the North and Chief Captain of the island of Sashti (Salsette) island on the behalf of Martinho da Silva de Menzes, Captain General of the forts and lands of the North and by Shivram Pandit and Rayaji Naik on the behalf of Krushnarao Mahadeo, the Governor of Kalyan with its forts and territory of Konkan at Mumbai on 10th February, 1732 A.D. The respective representatives had brought their diplomatic credentials from their respective States and the same were submitted at the time of diplomatic welcome. The treaty was signed in the presence of Robert Cowan, the Esquire President and Governor General of the island and Castle of Bombay (Mumbai) and he also signed on the treaty papers. This treaty is reproduced below.
Articles of the Treaty -

1. Tensions had prevailed between the two Nations of Portuguese and Marathas on the issue of Northern region. Keeping in view the common welfare of the both nations and the good state of affairs of their respective regions, it is decided to conclude an effective, everlasting, authentic and honest peace treaty. By this treaty, there will be free trade between the both parties and there will be increase in contacts and communications between them.

2. As causalities, many injuries and the acts of plundering are reported from the both parties during the war, thus, the both parties are hereby agree to follow peace and will take care to not repeat the earlier incidents.

3. In this war, Marathas captured the forts of Chandrawadi (?), Takmak, Kamandurg, Kaldurg and Badagad (Jivdhan ?). They should vacate these forts and should remove their troops in accordance to this treaty. Also, these forts and the area of Portuguese occupied by them should be handed over to Portuguese. The rice and ammunition on these forts or its price should be paid by Krushnarao Mahadev.

4. The cannons belonging to Portuguese captured by Marathas from Kambe, Firangipada and Saivan should be returned by Krushnarao Mahadev to the Captain General of the Province of North Martinho da Silva de Menzes. These small and big cannons were fourteen in number. They should be returned to the person nominated by Martinho da Silva de Menzes.

5. The prisoners of wars of the both parties should be exchanged. Those deserters who have fled to the regions controlled by two parties should be handed over to the respective party at Mumbai.

6. Portuguese had captured many ships from Kalyan and Marathas had also captured two Portuguese frigates and one boat and boats of the Portuguese subjects. All these vessels should be handed over to the respective parties.
7. Portuguese had captured two horses belonging to Marathas. They are kept in a stable at Vasai. The Governor of Vasai Martinho da Silva de Menzes should hand over these horses to the Governor of Kalyan Krushnarao Mahadev.

8. Count de Tilher road will be opened to Marathas and they will be allowed to sail in Nadurkhi and other rivers. But the State will take care to prevent any harm to the revenue department and its subjects.

9. The subjects of this state will be granted the concession to travel and transport for trade purpose in the rivers and in region of Kalyan province. By this way, the subjects of the both states will get the similar concessions in the each others' regions.

10. If Kalyan requires ammunition, Sulphur, lead etc. articles then concession will be granted on purchase these articles from this State. Here these articles will be available at reasonable rates. The same will apply to cannons.

11. If the vessels from Kalyan and Bhiwandi sailing (to and fro) in the rivers of the Portuguese State are carrying tobacco up to five Sher (शेर) then no obstruction or disturbances will be made to them.

12. It is being declared that after due observance of the terms of the treaty, the traders from Kalyan and Bhiwandi will be allowed to take rest in the Vasai city during the time of their trading related travel and movement.

13. The vessels from Kalyan and Bhiwandi will be allowed to sail (to and from) from the Portuguese region after its due checking during day or night. Like the older practice, this checking will be done through an eligible officer. No disturbances will be caused from them to the vessels.

14. Those horses which will be brought from the Portuguese controlled region or from other regions by the land or water route will be allowed to pass without any obstructions. But regular
taxes have to be paid. This term is applicable to the private persons also. But for the Governor of Kalyan, the old term will be applicable.

15. All people should wish for the endurance of this treaty because it is necessary for the common benefits of the both States. Thus, for the purpose to remove any doubt arising for each other at the bilateral level, it is decided that respective Martinho da Silva de Menzes and Krushnarao Mahadev will return captured runaway soldiers of the both States to each other. And also, respective Krushnarao Mahadev agrees that hereafter Marathas will not invade the Portuguese region. Not only this, he gives promise that if anyone attacks the Portuguese territory then he will consider it as the attack on himself and will try to repulse the attack. In this regard, the policy of Marathas should be same like the Portuguese.

16. The participant representative in this treaty Senhor Francisco de Mello and Shivram Pandit and Rayaji Ramji declare that to get approval for this treaty, on the behalf of Portuguese Senhor Martinho da Silva de Menzes and on the behalf of Marathas Shri. Krushnarao Mahadev should sign the treaty within ten days after the conclusion of this treaty and should be enforced as early as possible. (Pereira 1968: 355 - 358)

The Situation in the Province of the North after February, 1732 A.D. -

It seems that the Peshwa Bajirao I was not satisfied with the articles of the treaty and doubted whether truce can be concluded with Portuguese. He thus, had maintained the stand to keep dissidents and the local informers with him as they would be needed for launching offensives ("...फिरंगी लोग सल्लाचे नकंकी झाले नाही व होईलसारखा भरवसाही नाहीं! महूनच हवेलागे राखूनच ठेवले पाहिजे. कारण मोहिमा करवा लागणारच..."). Immediately afterward the conclusion of the above mentioned treaty, the Peshwa Bajirao I removed Krushnarao Mahadev Chaskar from the Governorship of Kalyan and appointed in his place Vasudev Joshi Murudkar (Kelkar 2008: 81). According to the Portuguese documents, Krushnarao Mahadev Chaskar was considered as a friend of Portuguese in Vasai. Peshwa Bajirao I had even planned to attack the Province of the North through Sashti island on 13th March, 1733 A.D. But due the start of hostilities with Siddi of Janjira, he had to withhold his plan of offensive (Pissurlekar 1967: 148 - 149).
**Peshwa Bajirao I Demands a Place for Factory in Vasai from Portuguese Viceroy (December, 1734 A.D.)**

In December, 1734 A.D. Peshwa Bajirao I, by citing the Maratha-Portuguese treaty concluded in the year of 1732 A.D. had asked to the Portuguese General of the Province of the North Dom Luis Bottelho for a place in the port city of Vasai for construction of factory for the merchants from Kalyan and Bhiwandi. Dom Luis Bottelho did not entertain the request of Bajirao I and instead used a derogatory word "Negro" for the Peshwa (Pissurlkear 1967: 153). This angered the Peshwa camp and the same can be seen from the letter of Vasudev Joshi to the Peshwa Bajirao I in which he talks of punishing Portuguese for their defiance. He reports to the Peshwa Bajirao I by his letter dated 31st January, 1735 A.D. (ता छ ६ माहे रमजान) that Portuguese had not favorably responded to the Peshwa’s communication and thus, expresses his desire to punish Portuguese for their defiance. For this purpose, Joshi requested for a force of at least two thousand and five hundred foot soldiers and at least two thousand cavalrymen to launch the attack against Portuguese (Sardesai 1931: 12).

**The Proposed Maratha Offensive in the Province of the North in 1735 A.D.**

Some available Maratha documents provide us information of another Maratha offensive planned for the year 1735 A.D. when Peshwa Bajirao I intervened in the internal dispute of Aangrey brothers - Sambhaji and Manaji which started in November, 1734 A.D. In the beginning, Manaji Aangrey sought refuge with Portuguese in Chaul (at present in Taluka - Alibag, District - Raigad) against Sambhaji Aangrey but later on, over the dispute of Rajkot, he fought against Portuguese and sought the assistance of Peshwa Bajirao I. The Peshwa had chosen the side of Manaji Aangrey in his dispute with his brother and sent his commanders Shankaraji Keshav Phadke, Khandoji Mankar, Narayan Joshi etc. for the assistance of Manaji Aangrey. To conclude the dispute between Sambhaji and Manaji Aangrey, Peshwa Bajirao I himself went to Colaba in the month of February, 1735 A.D. (Parasnis 1900: 69). It is during this period of Maratha intervention in the internal feud of Aangrey brothers that we find a correspondence between Vasudev Joshi, the Governor of Kalyan, Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa over the
issue of launching an attack on the Province of the North from Thane. This correspondence of Vasudev Joshi, Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa is reproduced below in brief from which we come to know about the various stages of its planning and its ultimate outcome.

On being asked for suggestion to attack Firangan, Vasudev Joshi replied Peshwa Bajirao I by his letter dated 31st January, 1735 A.D. (माघ सुध सप्टम्बर) wherein he gave his opinion for launching military offensive against Portuguese in Firangan. Joshi said that the time was appropriate for attacking Thane and it could be done with proper planning. He suggested Peshwa Bajirao I to keep ready the force of two thousand cavalymen from which thousand soldiers could be deputed to Daman-Vasai region and the rest of thousand soldiers along with two to three hundred infantrymen could be utilized for the Thane region. In the letter, Joshi says that he had already communicated the places and areas where the force should be deployed and suggests Peshwa Bajirao I that the rumor of force being deployed for Nawab (Siddi of Janjira ?) or Anjanwel should be circulated and the force should be sent to Firangan via Pabal and Avsari and it should reach the region within two to two and half days on the day fixed by Joshi for the mission. Joshi suggested Peshwa Bajirao I that the later should camp outside for four to eight days to assemble the force and should make arrangement for wages amounting to five to seven thousand rupees. The Peshwa thought that the work could be done with thousand to one thousand and two hundred soldiers in a period of eight to fifteen days and to which Joshi responds by saying that he had enclosed a detailed list for the purpose and accordingly force should be assembled and prepared for the mission. Joshi wrote that for launching attack on Thane, the period of 20th February 1735 to 9th March, 1735 A.D. (माघ वद्य हरिद्वार-फालगुन सुध प्रतिपदा) was fixed and accordingly the local Informers were kept ready. Joshi suggested Peshwa Bajirao I that the later should start for Thane on 17th or 18th February, 1735 A.D. (माघ वद्य दशमी अथवा एकादशी) and he even could start early after finding the appropriate auspicious time. Joshi wrote in the letter that a period of fifteen days was available and accordingly Peshwa Bajirao I should make preparations for the mission. Joshi says that by the valor of Peshwa Bajirao I, the success would be achieved and he suggested Peshwa to call back Baji Bhivrao if he had gone to his house (Sardesai 1933: 1 -2). At the same time, it seems that Vasudev Joshi wrote a letter to Chimaji Appa who was also contemplating to start attack on the Province of the North and had communicated his thought to Vasudev Joshi. Joshi in his undated reply to Chimaji Appa (received the letter on 2nd February, 1735 A.D. छठ रमजान) had opined that the campaign to capture Firangan should be taken up at
the earliest as completion of Thane Fort’s construction will strengthen the region’s defense. Accordingly, Vasudev Joshi chalked out a plan for assembling the army to attack Thane and communicated his plan to Peshwa Bajirao I by his undated letter (received by Bajirao I on 2\textsuperscript{nd} February, 1735 A.D. पो 7 रमजान). Vasudev Joshi provided information of the Maratha forces deployed in various places of Konkan and Pune region and suggested how army should be assembled to launch an attack on Thane. The assembling of the attack force according to the letter was suggested like below.

400 appointed from 700 men at Purandar Fort
150 appointed from 250 men at Fort Lohgad
100 appointed from 200 men at Korigad
25 from Ghangad Fort
35 from Narayangad Fort
50 Laxmanrao Pasalkar and Aabaji Dalvi Sarnobat Kohojgad Fort who are without job should be brought in. They are brave. (The original remarks of Vasudev Joshi)
700 Rajpurikar Mokasi
200 Moroji Shinde and Aarboji Sawant etc. Soldiers
1000 Raghunath Dalvi etc. at present with Swami (PeshwaBajirao I), Karnataki (Soldiers from Karnataka) at Pune and with Shankaraji Pant (The original remarks of Vasudev Joshi.)

2650

300 Appointed from 800 Men at Bankot
300 from HonajiBalkawade
300 KhandojiMankar

3550

From the Maratha force engaged in the battle of Rajkot at Chaul, according to Joshi, five hundred foot soldiers and three hundred cavalrmyen should be kept at Rajkot and the remaining force should be brought to Kalyan region via Umbarkhind (near Pen in Raigad District) in four
days advance of the attack. He opined that the force should be brought secretly without leaking any information of their movement in the forest of Malanggad and at least a force of two thousand men was required to be brought in secretly for launching the attack on Thane. He cautions the Peshwa to not publicize this mission in the letters and requested to depute a clerk to bring in the Maratha force to Kalyan region on the day communicated by him (Ibid 25 – 26). Probably as a supplement to this earlier mentioned letter, Vasudev Joshi wrote to Peshwa Bajirao I by his undated letter (received by Bajirao I on 2nd February, 1735 A.D. पोळी छ ८ रमजान) informing him that the Portuguese General from Vasai had employed a Gujarati brahmin spy at the rate of rupees twelve per month and had sent him to Peshwa Bajirao I to get information. The Brahmin spy is mentioned as a person wearing a necklace of Rudraksh and slender in physique and short in height. Joshi alerted Peshwa to not publicize the mobilization of forces (Ibid 24).

What happened to Vasudev Joshi’s suggestions is not known at present due to unavailability of documents but we get the correspondence between Vasudev Joshi and Chimaji Appa belonging to the month of March, 1735 A.D. from which we come to know that Peshwa Bajirao I had summoned Joshi to Alibag to discuss the issue with him. The same is communicated by Joshi through his letter dated 8th March, 1735 A.D. (ता १३ सवाल) to Chimaji Appa wherein the outcome of his meeting with Peshwa Bajirao I in Alibag on the issue of launching military campaign in Firangan is reported. Joshi wrote that after being summoned by Peshwa Bajirao I, he left Kalyan to reach Alibag, where he reached on 6th March, 1735 A.D. (छ ११ सवाल) and thereafter met the Peshwa. As Chimaji Appa had asked Peshwa Bajirao I to discuss the issue of Firangan with Vasudev Joshi, Peshwa asked Joshi to express his view on the issue to which Joshi replied that Peshwa should think properly of the mission so that the places tasked to win during the campaign could be conquered without incurring significant expenditure. Joshi opined that it was not possible to get the control of main place (Thane?) and the campaign would cost a large amount. He suggested Peshwa that he should take decision accordingly. During this meet with Peshwa Bajirao I, Joshi gave four thousand rupees to Peshwa and hoped that he would pay about one thousand Hon more and the same he informed to Chimaji Appa (Sardesai 1933: 2). It seems that by the time Joshi reached Alibag, he received a letter of Chimaji Appa sent through a special courier for the issue of Firangan. Joshi replied to Chimaji Appa by his letter dated 9th March, 1735 A.D. (छ १४ सवाल) that he was called by Peshwa Bajirao I for the same topic and they had discussed the issue after which Bajirao I had asked Joshi to make an inquiry and to send him the
report. In the letter, Joshi says that Bajirao I had asked him to take care of Antaji Raghunath and Gangaji Naik Anjurkar. About the report, Joshi wrote that he would communicate his observations for the issue of launching attack on Firangan to Peshwa Bajirao I in a week or fortnight (Ibid 14). It appears that Vasdev Joshi had made observations on the proposed Maratha attack on the Province of North and had come to some conclusions as it is evident from his letter to Chimaji Appa (received by Chimaji Appa on 11\textsuperscript{th} March, 1735 A.D. (पौ १६ सवाल)). In this letter, he suggested Chimaji Appa to launch the attack on Firangan only after a deep thought as it would involve heavy expenses and for which loan would have to be borrowed from the market. Besides this financial issue, Joshi also expressed possibility of Marathas entering into fight against the trio - Portuguese, British and Siddi who would come together against their common enemy – Marathas after the attack on Firangan (Sardesai 1931: 21). What made Joshi to change his earlier stand to launch immediate attack on Thane is not known at present.

By his one more letter dated 22\textsuperscript{nd} March, 1735 A.D. (छ २७ सवाल), Vasudev Joshi informed Chimaji Appa that Antaji Raghunath and Gangaji Naik were entrusted with the political affairs in Vasai and after proper planning, the day for the attack was set on चैत्र शुद्ध पौर्णिमा (7/4/1735). He opined that the time of attack was good as the necessary force was available to Marathas and there was a chance to get money after capturing Thane. At the same time, he reported that there would be difficulty to get Thane if construction of the fort completes. He informed Chimaji Appa that that Peshwa Bajirao I was also of the similar opinion. At the end of the letter, Joshi requested the opinion of Chimaji Appa on this issue (Ibid 8). In the month of April, 1735 A.D. Peshwa Bajirao I asked Vasudev Joshi who at that time was with Peshwa to go back to Kalyan and to send – Antajipant Kawale, Gangaji and Bhikaji Naik to his court. Accordingly, Vasudev Joshi started for Kalyan and left Rajamachi on 13\textsuperscript{th} April, 1735 A.D. (छ १९ जिल्काद) and reached Dahivali (near Karjat, District – Raigad). At Dahivali, he met Bhikaji Naik. He took Bhikaji Naik along with him. While on the way, near Neral, he met Antaji Raghunath Kawle. He took Kawle along with him and reached Kulgaon (near Badlapur, District – Thane). Gangaji Naik, who was that time in Kalyan, was called by Vasudev Joshi to Kulgaon for talk. It is from his camp at Kulgaon village that Vasudev Joshi wrote to Peshwa Bajirao I on 15\textsuperscript{th} April, 1735 A.D. that he has met with all three dissenters and had sent Antajipant Kawale and Bhikaji Naik to the
Court of Peshwa. He also informed that he would be taking Gangaji Naik along with him to Kalyan and he would send Gangaji Naik to the Peshwa’s court after three or four days (Sardesai 1931 : 27-28). What happened thereafter is not known at present. But Vasudev Joshi by his undated supplement to Peshwa Bajirao I (received on 16th May, 1735 पौ 23 जिल्हेज) suggested the latter that the time was opportune to strike Portuguese as there was less force and armada with Portuguese and the Portuguese General was going to Vasai from Thane. He wrote that fifteen to sixteen days had been passed from the departure of Gangaji Naik Anjurkar but no update was received from him (Sardesai 1933: 30).

It seems that all preparation made for the offensive were postponed by the month of May, 1739 A.D. and the same is evident from the letter of Chimaji Appa to Peshwa Bajirao I. Chimaji Appa communicated to Peshwa Bajirao I by his undated letter (received by Bajirao I on 29th May, 1735 A.D. (छ 6 मूहर्म) that as per the orders of Bajirao I, when he was to leave for Firangan to start the campaign on वैशाख वद्य अमावस्या (22/4/1735), he had to go to Satara. After reaching Satara, he could not proceed to Firangan as Chhatrapati Shahu detained him at Satara. He informed Bajirao I that if he is granted leave from Satara then he could act according to instructions of Peshwa Bajirao I on Firangan but if not then the task would be postponed. He said that though he wished to go first, if he was unable to go then he wished that at least Rajashree Pilaji Jadhavrao should be deputed to Firangan. But he informed Peshwa Bajirao I that Chhatrapati ordered Pilaji Jadhavrao to go to Gowalkot. He said in the letter that in the absence of him and Pilaji Jadhavrao, there was no assurance of effective result of attack on Portuguese and thus, the force could not be sent (Sardesai 1931: 17 - 18).

So much frustrated was Antaji Raghunath Kawale over the repeated cancellation of Peshwa's offensive on the Province of the North that in the same year, he approached Dabhade family of Talegaon, one of the arch rivals of Peshwa Bajirao I. He negotiated the issue with Umabai Dabhade and made a pact with her on the issue of Firangan. In return, as a sign of sealing the pact, Umabai gifted Antaji Raghunath honorary robes and ornaments (Kelkar 2008: 86 - 87). Soon, Kawale ran out of money and had to mortgage the gift to borrow loan. To get the money, he approached Vasudev Joshi with a fabricated storey but somehow, Joshi realized the plot of Kawale and informed the same through his letter dated 5th June, 1735 A.D. (छ 13 मौहर्म) to Peshwa Bajirao I of how Antaji Raghunath cleverly tried to deceive him. Joshi wrote that Rajashree Antaji Raghunath came to him with some ornaments of pearls (medal and necklace)
and requested him to mortgage them for loan as Peshwa had ordered him to come back to Pune with his family. Joshi said in the letter that Antaji Raghunath told him that the ornaments were gifted to him by the Peshwa and he took those ornaments personally with him as Peshwa told him that Joshi would not accept his demand draft. Joshi said that one more reason which Antaji Raghunath told him about why he brought those ornaments personally with him that Peshwa asked him not to do so as Chimaji Appa would come to know about it. Joshi got suspicious of Antaji Raghunath’s conduct and wrote in the letter that how he would disobey Peshwa’s order and why Peshwa would hide such issue with his younger brother Chimaji Appa and thus, he started to search the real motive behind Antaji’s such act. Joshi wrote that after thorough search, he found that Antaji Ragunath had made a pact (as mentioned earlier with Umabai Dabhade) and it was from there that he got those ornaments. He said in the letter that that it would be improbable that he would not accept Peshwa’s demand draft and thus, he wrote that he had mortgaged the ornaments and had settled the issue. Seeing the conduct of Antaji Raghunath, Joshi cautions Peshwa Bajirao I not to trust Antaji Ragunath in totality ("याचा विश्वास धरावा असे नाहीं"). (Sardesai 1933: 45 – 46). Bajirao I after knowing the issue asked Vasudev Joshi to not let Antaji Raghunath know that Peshwa and his officials had come to know about the secret negotiations happening between Antaji and Dabhade family and directed Joshi to send Kawale to Pune. Accordingly, Joshi informed Peshwa Bajirao I by his undated letter that how he behaved in accordance to the instructions of Peshwa on the issue of Antaji Raghunath and had sent Antaji Raghunath to Pune with an escort. Joshi writes that he behaved in a way as instructed by the Peshwa but Antaji Raghunath had already spoken about the issue with other people and had spread the news. He wrote that while going, Antaji Raghunath came to meet him and gave him a pledge to not divulge the issue of mortgaging the ornaments to anyone which he again claimed to have presented by the Peshwa Bajirao I. Joshi says in the letter that he talked nicely with Antaji Raghunath and bid him adieu for his Pune journey and sent from behind a company of seven horsemen and Vyankojipant to escort Antaji Raghunath to Pune as he suspected that Antaji Raghunath may change the route and would go to Talegaon to meet Dabhade family ("त्याची बुद्धी क्षणिक आहे"). Joshi wrote in the letter that he informed Peshwa in advance as Antaji Raghunath may complain about it to the Peshwa (Sardesai 1933: 70).
The Situation Thereafter -

In September, 1735 A.D. Peshwa Bajirao I captured the strategic Mahuli Fort through his commander Shankaraji Keshav Phadke. In the same year, as mentioned earlier, the Peshwa Bajirao I who had intervened in the family dispute of Aangrey brothers - Sambhaji and Manaji Aangrey, temporarily mediated a truce between the warring brothers. With the approval from Chhatrapati Shahu, Peshwa Bajirao I created a new title cum post of Wazarat Ma-ab for Manaji Aangrey of whose authority was kept restricted in the North Konkan with his main base at Colaba. Manaji's elder brother Sambhaji was given the post cum title of Sarkhel (Admiral) and his sphere of operations was kept limited to the Southern Konkan with his main base at Vijaydurg (Parasnis 1900: 69). By doing this, Bajirao I had also divided the power of influence of Aangrey family which apart from Siddi of Janjira, was once the sole indigenous polity controlling the coast of Maharashtra.

A year later in April, 1736 A.D. Chimaji Appa defeated Siddi Saat who had attacked on Manaji Aangrey and later on a treaty between Siddi of Janjira and Marathas was signed in September, 1736 A.D. This treaty ended the three year long confrontation between Marathas and Siddi of Janjira. The conclusion of this treaty enabled Peshwa Bajirao, Chimaji Appa and Pilaji Jadhavrao to concentrate on the long pending affairs in Firangan. The pending offensive came rolling much faster as the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Sandomil, acting on the recommendations of Vasai's Factor Andre Ribeiro Coutinho had ordered construction of a large fort at Thane in 1734 A.D. Had the Fort been constructed then the possibility of entering or attacking Salsette (Sashti) would have become more difficult and thus could have endangered the proposed Maratha offensive. Therefore, the rebel faction frantically called upon the Peshwa to act timely. Besides the issues related to geo-politics and military Offensive, the new additional taxes and compulsory labor without food and wages imposed over the local population by the Portuguese State had taken the resentment up to the exploding level and it acted as an additional advantage for the Maratha offensive (Pissurlekar 1975). According to the Annals of Sashti, Gangaji Naik had with many local persons who assisted Marathas for their offensive on Thane. According to the Annals of Sashti (साष्टीची बखर), the names of those local dissidents were - Namaji Deshmukh, Bhikaji Haibatrao, Malji Jit, Hiraji Thakur, Murharaji Thakur, Bapuji Goregaonkar, Jaywantji Dahisarkar, Lakshmanji Raut Kalwekar, Yaisa Koli, Ganeshji and Raghujit Vasaikar, Lakham
Chaudhari and Khandoji Londhe. With this preparation, Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa selected the month of March-April, 1737 A.D. (चैत्र) as the time of Maratha attack on Thane.

According to the Portuguese documents, the wife of Kanhoji Aangrey named Laxmibai Aangrey had informed the Captain of Chaul Caetano de Souza Pereira in April, 1735 A.D. about Bajirao I's imminent attack on Vasai. On 11th September, 1736 A.D. the English Governor of Mumbai John Horne had informed the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Sandomil of Bajirao's plan to attack Thane and to enter in Sashti island. The Viceroy in turn had informed the General of the Portuguese Province of the North Dom Luis Bottelho on 24th September, 1736 A.D. about the Maratha offensive on Thane and Sashti island (Pissurlekar 1967: 154).

Though the initial phase of war started in the North Konkan in 1737 A.D. Marathas opened a second front directed at Goa in the beginning months of 1739 A.D. to corner further the beleaguered Portuguese. The famous Maratha-Portuguese war was lasted for two years and in the year 1739 A.D. it resulted in the defeat of Portuguese. How the famous Maratha-Portuguese war took place in the North Konkan (Province of the North) is the topic of discussion of the next Chapter. Before turning to the next Chapter, a brief note on Anjurkar and Kawale families is given below.

1. Anjurkar Family -

Anjurkar were of Pathare Kshatriya caste and in the 16th c. A.D. were originally the resident of Vandre in Marol Paraganah. They were landlords and hold the rights of Sarpatil (सरपाटील) in Sashti island. In the Portuguese period, their traditional estate rights were denied and due to religious orthodoxy of the Portuguese State, they first had to move to Kalwe (at present in Taluka - Thane, District - Thane) and thereafter they settled in Anjur village (at present in Taluka - Bhiwandi, District - Thane, Maharashtra). In Anjurkar family, the anti-Portuguese activities were initially started by Nimb Naik who is said to had sent a person named Pralhad Joshi to the court of Chhatrapati Sambhaji to request the latter to launch offensive against Portuguese in the North Konkan. The anti-Portuguese objectives of Nimb Naik were continued by his five sons (he had six sons in total) named as - Gangaji, Bubaji, Murharaji, Shivaji and Narayanji among whom Gangaji emerged as the leader of the anti-Portuguese conspiracy. Before the rise of Bhatt family, especially of Peshwa Bajirao I in the geo-politics of North Konkan, Gangaji Naik had
approached Kanhoji Aangrey and Senapati Dabhade with a request to start anti-Portuguese mission in the North Konkan in which Gangaji Naik had assured them of providing all regional information and assistance and had requested them to continue his traditional estate rights after the success of mission. Senapati Dabhade had even shown interest in the request of Gangaji Naik. But after the faction loyal to the family of Bhatt who then hold the post of Peshwa (Prime-Minister) in the court of Chhatrapati Shahu at Satara, conquered Kalyan - Bhiwandi region in 1719 - 20 A.D. Gangaji Naik decided to side with more powerful Bhatt family. He approached the Governor of Ramchandra Mahadev Joshi Chaskar through a spiritual guru based in Chinchwad, Pune named Shri Dev Gosavi. Gangaji Naik explained his plan to Ramchandra Mahadev Joshi and through Joshi, went to meet Chhatrapati Shahu, Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa at Satara in 1722 - 23 A.D. Therein, he explained to Chhatrapati Shahu and Peshwa Bajirao I of how Portuguese had confiscated his traditional estate rights, how Portuguese denied religious liberty to the followers of other religions and destroyed temples, places of pilgrimage and how they had denied the traditional estate rights to other landed elites. He requested Chhatrapati Shahu and Peshwa Bajirao I to launch offensive in Firangan and promised of all internal help in the region of Sashti and Vasai, especially of Vasai and Thane. In return, he demanded that his traditional estate rights should be continued by Chhatrapati and Peshwa ("आपण पुरातन वसई प्रतांचे वतनदार आहों. ल्यास वसई प्रतांत फिरंगी याकडे आहे. ल्याणे देवस्थाने व तीरं यांचा व महाराष्ट्र धर्म याचा लोप केला. हिंदूलोक भ्रष्टाचून क्षार केले. आपण पुरातन वतनदार, देश-नागौडपणाचे वतन होते. ल्यास, फिरंगी याकडे तो प्रतांत जाहिलियापासून वातण चालू असत नाहीं. याजमुळे आपण कुठुंबसहायत्मक त्या प्रतांतांनून म्हणून कसंप्रांती प्रस्तुत राहिलो. वसईप्रतांताची हकीकत व अपलें वृद्ध निवेदन करून, स्वर्णस्थापना होय ते गोष्ट करावी. त्या प्रतांताचे कोट, किल्ले व जंजिरे वसई व कोट ठाणे या जागांचे लाग, माग व खड्डियांचे उतार व मार्ग वाढायला आपण माहित आहों. व ठाणे वसईकोटाचे लाग आपले स्वाधीन आहेत"). Chhatrapati Shahu and Peshwa Bajirao I after verifying the claims of Gangaji Naik, assured Gangaji Naik and his brothers of help (Parasnis 1900: 65). Peshwa Bajirao I ordered the Governor of Kalyan to make arrangements for livelihood of Anjurkar family and accordingly, Joshi made arrangement for residence and livelihood of Anjurkar family who thereafter moved to Kalyan in 1722 - 23 A.D. (Kelkar 2008: 71). After moving in Kalyan, Anjurkar brothers helped and participated in varying capacities in the every Maratha offensive on the Portuguese Province of the North including the
final conclusive battle fought against Portuguese in Vasai in May, 1739 A.D. in which Muraraji Naik Anjurkar was killed. For the Maratha attack on Province of the North in 1730 A.D. the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Sandomil blamed Ganesh Naik belonging to Anjurkar family as the person who persuaded Marathas to launch offensive against Portuguese in the North Konkan. According to the Viceroy, this Ganesh Naik was a very shrewd person who had lived in Goa after the Inquisitors from Vasai had arrested and sent him to Goa. Ganesh Naik had converted to Christianity in Goa and he knew Portuguese language. The Viceroy said that Ganesh Naik was so insidious that he could even prepare a fabricated letter of him as he had spent a good amount of time in his house. According to Viceroy, Ganesh Naik later fled from Goa and returned to North Konkan where he again became Hindu. After returning to North Konkan, Ganesh Naik became the enemy of Portuguese (Pissurlekar 1967: 148 - 149).

After Gangaji Naik and his family moved in the Maratha controlled Kalyan, in which situation they lived till Marathas conquered Vasai in 1739 A.D. can be known from some letters from which we come to know that Gangaji Naik Anjurkar had to face much hardships and financial insecurity in this period. In the first of such letters, an unknown person, through his undated letter had put up his petition before the Peshwa Bajirao I on the ownership of a farming land and the decision of Peshwa to grant the land temporarily for cultivation to Gangaji Naik. He wrote that Gangaji Naik despite his immense usefulness was a debt ridden person and hoped that the Peshwa would be taking necessary steps to elevate his financial status. The author informed the Peshwa that Gangaji Naik had forcefully taken control of his farm lands in Kalyan and had demolished his stable. He said in the letter that he had earlier complained about this issue to the Peshwa and the Peshwa had assured him of giving back the land confiscated by Gangaji Naik by saying that the issue was temporary and the author should not quarrel with Gangaji Naik. The author wrote that despite Peshwa’s assurance, he had not got his farm land back and said that Gangaji Naik had mostly spoiled his estate. He requested the Peshwa to give him back his farmland or he would start troubling Gangaji Naik. He requested the Peshwa’s to reply him over the issue. It is not clear to which year this letter belongs and who was the author of this letter (Sardesai 1933: 160). In the letter belonging to the year 1734 A.D. Peshwa Bajirao I was informed by an unknown author by an undated letter (received by the Peshwa on 24th June, 1734 A.D. पौ २४  मोहरम) that Rajashree Krushnarao Chaskar had come to Bhiwandi and was pressurizing Gangaji Naik Anjurkar for the repayment of debts. The author writes that Anjurkar
was in very difficult situation (Ibid 9). Peshwa Bajirao I after receiving the information of Anjurkar's harassment by creditors and bankers had asked Vasudev Joshi, the Governor of Kalyan to warn creditors to not harass Gangaji Naik Anjurkar. Joshi through his undated letter to Peshwa Bajirao I (received by Peshwa Bajirao I on 2nd February, 1735 A.D.) informed that according to instructions he received from the latter, he had warned the creditors from whom Gangaji Naik Anjurkar has borrowed money to not harass Anjurkar (Sardesai 1931: 25).

After Maratha victory in Vasai 1739 A.D. Peshwa Balaji Bajirao (Nanasaheb Peshwa I) had awarded the right of Sarpatil (सरपाटील) of Sashti Paraganah to Anjurkar brothers (Gangaji, Bubaji, Shivaji, Narayanji and the son of Muraraji named Janardan) along with some villages in the provinces of Vasai, Malad, Marol in Sashti Paraganah and Atgaon in Saivan Paraganah and the rights over custom duties and revenue collected therein (Jadhav 2011: 53 - 55). The members of Anjurkar family still stay in Anjur village.

2. Kawale Family -

Kawale family was originally the resident of Malad (at present in Taluka - Andheri, District - Mumbai Suburban) in Sashti island and were of Yajurvedi Brahmin caste. They held the traditional estate right of Sardeshpande and Sardesai of Malad. Antaji Raghunath Kawale, the main anti-Portuguese conspirator from Kawale family was one of the eighty four Sardeshpande of Firangan region. Antaji Raghunath Kawale joined the Peshwa camp for their proposed offensive in the Province of the North in 1729 A.D. along with his brothers Ramchandra Raghunath and Ganeshpant Raghunath. The Peshwa after verifying the claims of Antaji Raghunath Kawale had promised that in return of their services to the cause of Peshwa, he will award Ramchandra Raghunath and Ganesh Raghunath ten villages as per their estate rights of Sardesai and Sardeshmukh. In the year of 1729 A.D. the Peshwa Bajirao I had issued an order to the village headmen in the region of Vasai and Bahadarpura for continuing with the traditional estate rights of Antaji Raghunath Kawale (Kelkar 2008: 74 - 75).

After joining the camp of Antaji Raghunath, he along with his men came in the Maratha controlled territory of Kalyan. Like Anjurkar family, the stay of Antaji Raghunath Kawale was too not comfortable in Kalyan as he had relied on Peshwa Bajirao I, Chimaji Appa and his officials help for his financial and daily sustenance. There are few letters available of him from
where we come to know in which condition he was spending his time from 1729 A.D. to the start of Maratha offensive in the Province of the North in 1737 A.D. The officials of Peshwa Bajirao I, like Shankaraji Keshav Phadke, Pilaji Jadhavrao and particularly the Governor of Kalyan Vasudev Joshi had called Antaji Raghunath Kawale an opportunist, short tempered and unreliable in his correspondence with Peshwa Bajirao I.

Kawale along with Anjurkar brothers participated in leading position in the Maratha offensive led by Pilaji Jadhavrao on the Province of the North in 1730 A.D. But as mentioned earlier, the offensive was concluded in Maratha-Portuguese treaty in 1732 A.D. How Antaji Raghunath Kawale reacted to this situation can be found from his undated letter written probably in the year of 1732 A.D. to Peshwa Bajirao I in which he earnestly narrated the sad situation that he found himself in after Pilaji Jadhavrao fell ill and proceeded to his village Vagholi ("रंकास स्वामीपादंबुजावेगले दुसरे कोणी सरक्षण करी ऐसे नाही...तरी आम्ही केवल श्रमी असो"). Antaji Raghunath was burdened to keep a force on the orders of Peshwa Bajirao I and he had to borrow money as it was very difficult to keep his force without paying them regularly. He had to work under Krushnarao Chaskar, the Governor of Kalyan where he felt uneasy. He writes in the letter that he went to Pune along with his associates to meet Peshwa Bajirao I and to make him confident of the plan to take Firangan by introducing the native persons who agreed to be a part of the campaign. Bajirao I in turn, deputed Baloji Karala and Govind Brahman to verify the claims of Antaji Raghunath in the North Konkan. Thus, feeling trapped in the situation created due to delay in launching the promised attack on Firangan by Peshwa Bajirao I and his indebtedness due his borrowing of funds to maintain the force, Antaji Raghunath requested Peshwa Bajirao I to take necessary steps to free him from such painful situation (Sardesai1931 : 3- 5).

In the letter of Antaji Raghunath Kawale belonging to the year 1735 A.D. we can see how restless he had become owing to delay in offensive on the Province of the North from the side of Peshwa Bajirao. After receiving a letter from Dadba Gosavi, he felt energized and in reply wrote that Dadba Gosavi was very familiar with the past and present of him and how he had exerted himself for the cause till then (The Peshwa's mission to capture the Province of the North). From his letter we come to know that he worked under Pilaji Jadhavrao and paid the force of two hundred musketeers for five months. After ailing Pilaji Jadhavrao left for his village and the other commander Rajashree Balajipant also fell ill, he had to pay his soldiers after borrowing
money. He also had to feed from the last three years thirty four native persons who agreed to join him in the campaign to capture Firangan. For this task, the native persons with him had to leave their respective places and for their maintenance and other purposes, again he had to borrow a large sum of money from time to time. So Antaji Raghunath assured Dadba Gosavi that if given the approval, he could take the entire Sashti island consisting of four forts, one hundred and fifty seven villages in one night on वैशाख वद्य एकादशी (18/4/1735). He wrote that if still there was a doubt then the "patron" should send two persons to verify his claims and if found untrue then his tongue should be severed. He also said in the letter that if the "patron" provided the reason for funds then he could arrange the funds amounting to rupees one lakhs in a period of one month and could send the fund to any fort according to choice of the "patron". He also requested Dadba Gosavi to find any patron who could sponsor his cause and said in the letter that Dadba Gosavi could take him out of the sea of fast and insult ("अता उपोशणे व अपमान याच्या समुद्रातून काढावयासी आपण समर्थ असेत") (Ibid 5 - 6). Antaji Raghunath Kawale by this undated letter informed Peshwa Bajirao I about the hardship faced by him due to Peshwa’s delay in launching the offensive in Firangan and how internal squabbles in the Maratha court in Kalyan were affecting him. In the letter, he vehemently refused the charges of Vasudev Joshi according to which he was accused of looting a caravan of pilgrims and asked the addressee to behead him if the charges labeled against him are proved. He requested the addressee to launch the attack on Firangan as soon as possible and informed that how he was eagerly waiting for it. He informed the Peshwa that a person from Belapur who was willing to join the side of Marathas for their proposed offensive on Firangan, was waiting for Peshwa’s response and he was having fifty persons from his caste. According to Kawale, with fifty persons of his caste and the other one hundred fifty persons who were ready to side with Peshwas, the unnamed person was ready to capture Belapur for Peshwas by deploying the above mentioned soldiers in the deserted fort named Pandavgad which was on the East side of Belapur Fort (Sardesai 1933: 42 – 43). Vasudev Joshi through his undated letter, probably belonging to the year 1734 A.D. had cautioned Chimaji Appa about Antaji Raghunath Kawale by saying that Kawale was a very vacillating person and should not be trusted. He wrote that Kawale was unable to achieve what he claimed and he could be disastrous in the long turn ("यांच्याने होणे ती काहीं नाहीं, परंतु नाश मात्र करील"). Joshi had also communicated his observation of Kawale to Peshwa Bajirao I (Sardesai1931 : 7). Restless Antaji Raghunath Kawale deputed Rajashree Keshav Lingoji to the court of Peshwa
Bajirao I with a letter dated 17th February, 1735 A.D. (छ २३ माहे रमजान ) and urged the Peshwa to take immediate action by launching the attack on Firangan. He informed Peshwa Bajirao I that the Portuguese armada which earlier had come to Vasai had returned back to Goa. Kawale wrote in the letter that the Portuguese defense structures in the region from Daman to Chaul were manned by approximately one thousand and two hundred personnel and some native Christians and the native residents belonging to Bhandari, Kasar and Pachkalashe castes in Sashti island were ready to side with Marathas. In such situation, he said that if he could get the support of two thousand soldiers and fifty cannons by वैशाख वद्य एकादशी (18th or 19th April, 1735 A.D.) then they could capture the all four forts namely Vesave, Vandre, Mahale and Turbhe in the Sashti island. He claimed in the letter that if he failed to do so then he could be beheaded. He assured Peshwa Bajirao I that the victory in Sashti island would bring the amount of rupees twenty five lakhs at the minimum and the control over one hundred and fifty seven villages and eight ports. He further wrote that if these claims of him were found exaggerated then the Peshwa could depute his persons to verify the situation on the ground which in the earlier occasions were found verified. He says that the Peshwa should not pay attention to misguidance of persons like Vasudev Joshi and writes that that if funds are required then he could collect the fund of rupees one lakh and could send it to Sidgad. He requested Peshwa Bajirao I to keep the mission secret and even to not inform the Peshwa's office in Kalyan. At the end of the letter, feeling despondent, he says that even after knowing such situation, if no decision is taken by Peshwa then he should take a leave of Antaji Raghunath and his associates. He informed Peshwa Bajirao I that he could not tolerate anymore hardship and insult ("आमच्याने उपोशणे व कितीक अपमान हूं सोचत नाही") (Sardesai1931 : 19 - 20).

From the Portuguese records, we come to know that Antaji Raghunath Kawale had written a letter to the Portuguese Viceroy Joao de Saldanha da Gama in 1731 A.D. in which he assured the Viceroy that he was ready to serve the Viceroy from any location. Pilaji Jadhavrao in his letter dated 28th September, 1731 A.D. to the Portuguese Viceroy had called Antaji Raghunath Kawale a foxy (लबाड) (Pissurlekar 1967: 149).