CHAPTER - 4

The Vasai Campaign

The Historical Outline

(5th April, 1737 – 16th May, 1739 A.D.)
4.1. The Maratha Preparations –

According to the Maratha records, preparation of Maratha offensive on *Firangan* started in the second half of March, 1737 A.D. (फाल्गुन वद्य) when on receiving the information of arrival of informers, Chimaji Appa sent a team of Maratha commanders comprising Chimanaji Bhivrao, Ramchandra Hari and Krushnaji Keshav to Sashti island which was followed by Chimaji Appa himself, who started for *Firangan* on 4th April, 1737 A.D. Two separate teams were made for the Maratha offensive on the Province of the North which were tasked to launch simultaneous attacks on Sashti island and Vasai. The first team was under the command the Shankaraji Keshav Phadke and the second was led by Khandoji Mankar. Shankaraji Keshav Phadke who was given the task to attack Vasai, was assisted by a local informer Gangaji Naik Anjurkar and Khandoji Mankar, who was ordered to target Thane was assisted by Honaji Balkawade. These two teams were ordered to reach their destinations through different routes, the army of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke was to first halt at in the forest of Mahuli Fort (at present in Taluka – Shahapur, District – Thane, Maharashtra) while the army of Khandoji Mankar was to camp near Rajmachi Fort (at present in Taluka – Karjat, District – Raigad, Maharashtra). To assist and guide the force of Khandoji Mankar, Gangaji Naik Anjurkar sent his two brothers, Fakir Muhammad Jamatdar, Dhaknak Parwari, men from the local *Koli* (Fishermen) community with one hundred and fifty men and after Rajmachi, the camped near Baba Malang Wadi (at present in Taluka – Panvel, District – Raigad). The force which camped at Baba Malang Wadi was led Khandoji Mankar, Ramchandra Hari Patwardhan and Ramaji Mahadev while Honaji Balkawade was following them from behind and had camped at Prabalgad Fort (at present in Taluka – Panvel, District – Raigad). The front team of Khandoji Mankar and Ramchandra Hari reached the Sashti region on 5th April, 1738 and camped there (Kelkar 2008: 101 – 103). The Maratha team headed by Shankaraji Keshav Phadke tasked with attacking Vasai, in accordance to the plan, first halted in the forest of Mahuli Fort (at present in Taluka – Shahapur, District – Thane, Maharashtra) and from there, in the night of 4th April, 1737 A.D. it started for the forest area of Ghotwada. It reached the forest of Ghotawade in the morning of 5th April, 1737 A.D. and spent the entire the day in the forest. Due to hot summer and scarcity of water in the forest area, two to four persons in the Maratha army died in the forest of Ghotawade. Even after faced with such extreme situations, the Maratha army continued its march onwards Vasai and left the forest region of
Ghotawade for the forest area of Tungar-Kaman (at present in Taluka – Bhiwandi, District – Thane) in the night of 5th April, 1737 A.D. They reached the forest area of Tungar-Kaman on the morning of 6th April, 1737 A.D. and spent the entire day there. In the evening, they made two teams of their force and started to proceed to Vasai. The first team was headed by Shankaraji Keshav Phadke himself and the second team was led by Balaji Keshav and Khandoda etc. By the 10th hour in the night of 6th April, 1737 A.D. they reached the shore of Rajavali near Vasai (Ibid 107).

4.2. Entering in Sashti and Vasai –

The team tasked with making entry to Sashti island and capturing Thane achieved the feat and with initial successes in Thane creek finally made their way to Thane in the night of 5th April, 1737 A.D. and eventually captured the town and the incomplete Thane Fort on 8th April, 1737 A.D. (detailed information about Maratha offensive in Thane is given in the next Section). Sensing the trouble and possibility of Maratha success in Thane, Portuguese General of the Province of the North Dom Luis Bottelho quickly escaped to Karanja island with a handful of soldiers, officials, individuals and families on 6th April, 1737 A.D. wherein he stayed for next days. Meanwhile, after the capture of Thane, Chimaji Appa sent his forces to various parts of Sashti island and adjoining area to attack important Portuguese strongholds like Versova, Vanare and Belapur. As he instructed various Maratha commanders to join the Maratha offensive in the Province of the North, many started joining and the same can be seen from this letter of Barwaji Tapkir dated 6th April, 1737 A.D. (चैंजी आप्पा) wherein he responds to the order of Chimaji Appa informing that he joined the front with his men, ammunition and guns as instructed by Chimaji Appa. He writes that the Portuguese do not have much men force with them in Vasai. About Mandavi Fort, he writes that only hundred to two hundred soldiers are deployed there. He says that by the valor and pious deeds of his master (Chimaji Appa), soon success would be achieved (Sardesai 1933: 71). In the process, Marathas captured Parsik and Firangipada from Portuguese and laid siege to Portuguese Defense structures in Versova, Vanare and Belapur. On the Vasai front, the team headed by Shankaraji Keshav Phadke which had planned to secretly enter the outskirts of Vasai by crossing the creeks which could be walked in low tide to capture Vasai Fort by scaling it in the cover of night, found their plan spoiled due to heavy deployment.
of Portuguese soldiers on the bridge of Rajawali and Gokhvire. Shankaraji Keshav Phadke had no way but to take the Portuguese posts by force which created much commotion, alerted the Portuguese in Vasai and delayed Marathas entry in Vasai (details of the offensive in Vasai is given in the next Section). The Maratha army, with much effort could enter the outskirts of Vasai island in the morning of 7th April, 1737 A.D. and camped at Papadi-Manikpur. The moves contemplated by the Maratha command after their entry in Vasai region can seen in this undated letter (from the content of the letter, it seems to have belonged to the month of April, 1737 A.D.) of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to Chimaji Appa in which the situation in Vasai and surrounding region is reported. Phadke says that the entire population in the coastal area fled after the Maratha attack and very few quantity of grain and cattle are being supplied to the Maratha troops by the local villagers. He writes that the local citizens could not be trusted at the moment due their dual affiliations and thus, suggests whatever that has to be done by the Marathas in Vasai then it should be done solely by their own strength. On the issue of occupying Dharavi (more details are given in the next Section), he suggests Chimaji Appa that first a fortification wall with four bastions on the corners should be constructed by deploying stonecutters and masons and later a larger fortified structure should be constructed. He says that on this issue, he is awaiting directions from Chimaji Appa and requests for an early reply. While crossing the creek, headgears robes and weapons of many soldiers were drowned, so he requests Chimaji Appa to send one thousand robes, five hundred headgears and twenty five swords for soldiers. He requests Chimaji Appa to send eleven thousand rupees to pay daily wages to his two thousand and two hundred soldiers (five rupees per soldier) as he had to pay injured soldiers as well. (Sardesai 1933: 116–117). The policy adopted by the Maratha command for the local population after the entry of Marathas in the region can be known from the letter of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke dated 7th April, 1737 A.D. (ताल ६ जििहेज) to Chimaji Appa wherein he suggests Chimaji Appa that the local residents should be assured of their safety by the Maratha command as it would be beneficial for Marathas. He informs Chimaji Appa that he has instructed his soldiers to not touch any belongings of the local residents ("शाहारात सिरते समई आम्ही लोकांस ताकीद केली कीं, रची छेड़े येक्कदर हात न लावणे"). He further says that if any soldier had looted some ordinary belongings of the local subjects, the same would be returned to them (Ibid 14). After camping in Papadi-Manikpur, Shankaraji Keshav sent a force comprising Maratha commanders like Mahadaji Keshav, Khando Chimanaji, Moraji Shinde, Balajirao, Rajbarao
Burudkar to Bahadarpura (ibid 108 – 110). Bahadarpura was the village of a noted Portuguese noble Martin Silveira de Menzes and it is around the fortified estate of Menzes in Bahadarpura that Marathas initially camped. The estate was under the range of cannon fire from Vasai Fort. As Portuguese noticed the movement of enemy in Bahadarpura village without estimating the numerical strength of the Maratha force, the Captain of the Vasai Fort Pedro Guedes da Magalhaes who had earlier gained reputation during his tenure as the Captain of the Sea and War, decided to confront the enemy. He aided by a company of grenadiers and four companies of native soldiers came out of the Fort to attack the Maratha force camping in Bahadarpura but when he noticed the presence of cavalry in the Maratha camp, he had no option but to make orderly retreat back to Vasai Fort (Pissurlekar 1975: 190). According to Maratha documents, a group of Portuguese soldiers from Vasai Fort came out near the lake where Maratha force lay in ambush waiting for Portuguese soldiers to come more close in the range of their attack. The moment they came near, a Maratha cavalry contingent swiftly attacked the company of Portuguese soldiers who baffled with the surprise attack retreated back to Vasai Fort (Kelkar 2008: 109 – 110). The current situation can be fairly known from the joint letter dated 11th April, 1737 A.D. (चै० शुद्ध एकादशी गुरवार सकाळचा प्रहर) written by Chimanaji Bhivrao and Shankaraji Keshav to Chimaji Appa in which the military situation in Vasai and Sashti island and the measures that needed to be taken up for the early capture of Firangan region from Portuguese are reported. Bhivrao and Phadke write that exchange of information from Vasai to Sashti island and vice-versa has stopped and suggests Chimaji Appa that all information and updates - which place has been captured, which place should be targeted, what is the strength of Portuguese etc. should be shared with them in detail. About Vasai, they write that the place is tightly defended by Portuguese and on the daily basis, five to seven Maratha soldiers are being killed on the Bahadarpura frontline. For capturing Vasai, they write that all commanders were thinking to occupy Dharavi (a strategic place opposite Vasai) as it would help in breaking the Portuguese supply line. Besides, they suggest that grain stock stored by Portuguese in Ghodbandar should be burnt as it is from Ghodbandar that Vasai was receiving supplies. They even suggest burning all grain stocks in the coastal villages in Sashti island to stop their supply to Vasai. They again stress that without breaking the Portuguese supply line from Dharavi to Vasai through the Vasai creek, the supply of material to Vasai would not be stopped and the enemy would be reinforced from time to time. They inform Chimaji Appa that Portuguese from Vasai had sent twelve thousand
rupees to Mumbai a day before writing the letter for obtaining reinforcement and had sent two
days before two Patemari type of ships to Goa for recruiting more people in their force. They
fear that if the same trend continues then there would be continuous arrival of reinforcement to
Vasai but in contrast, they write that the Maratha camp was lacking in reinforcement and
supplies. About the numerical strength of Maratha soldiers in Vasai, they inform Chimaji Appa
that two thousand and two hundred soldiers were camping at Vasai but write that the available
troop would help only in covering the coastal region of Vasai and not for the straight attack on
Vasai Fort. They also write that due to long sandy terrain around the Fort, it was difficult for
them to plant mines. They inform Chimaji Appa that Portuguese had kept their fortifications in
Jivdhan and Mandavi in the alert mode and they were unable to send a force to capture these
places due to less number of soldiers in their camp which they would be primarily requiring in
the coastal area of Vasai itself. They inform Chimaji Appa that they would require another five
thousand soldiers to capture Vasai Fort as Portuguese will not voluntarily come out for surrender
and thus, they request to be reinforced. They say that as Marathas had not captured Portuguese
strongholds in the nearby region, the strength of Portuguese would not be weakened. They
suggest Chimaji Appa to send five hundred men of Manaji Aangrey, from Rajashree Harabaji
Patil and to bring Aakolkar. If a force of twelve thousand soldiers is deployed to Firangan then
there are chances to get the place, they write. They suggest Chimaji Appa to depute a contingent
to Manor region too. About getting additional force, they request Chimaji Appa to think over the
issue seriously and to supply them with two thousand musketeers, to ask Rajashree Malharpant
to send soldiers and to employ local fishermen for the purpose as attack has to be launched from
all directions. They request Chimaji Appa to send supplies and funds as they were searching a
good place on the coastal area of Vasai to secure the area. They also request for masons and
stonecutters, bullets and ammunition and to deploy a contingent of five thousand soldiers in the
region (Sardesai 1933: 18 - 19).

As Marathas were tightening their grip on Sashti island and Vasai, some Maratha commanders
and officials were suggesting Chimaji Appa to extend Maratha operations further North of Vasai.
One such suggestion was made by Balaji Govind, Sabnis (Accountant cum Clerk) of Mahuli Fort
(at present in Taluka – Shahapur, District – Thane, Maharashtra) who had visited Maratha camp
in Vasai and from his undated letter to Chimaji Appa, condition of the Maratha army deployed in
Vasai and the situation in the region is reported. His observations expressed in this undated letter

(from the content of this Letter, it seems have belonged to the Month of April, 1737 A.D.) are important to know the inner contrast of the Maratha army deployed at the crucial front of Vasai. In the letter, he requests Chimaji Appa to permit him to raid the region of Daman, Kelve-Mahim, Chinchani, Tarapur and Dahanu by providing him a force of two thousand cavalrymen and two to four thousand infantrymen and sufficient funds. About the Maratha camp in Vasai, he writes to Chimaji Appa that the soldiers from Karnataka deputed by Chimaji Appa due to their valor are of no use in the actuality as the soldiers from Mawal and Konkan always take lead in the attack while the soldiers from Karnataka remain at their rear. He also states that at the time of fight, the soldiers from Mawal and Konkan bear the all responsibility and the soldiers from Karnataka do not treat the former well. It is due to such differential treatment that out jealousy, many good soldiers die in the battle, he writes. Considering the strategic importance of Dharavi, he suggests Chimaji Appa to direct Rajashree Khandoji Mankar who by that time had gone to meet Chimaji Appa, to strengthen Maratha posts at Dharavi as by doing it; Marathas could restrict the supply of wood, water and food material to Vasai (Sardesai 1931: 98 – 99). In one more such suggestion made by an unknown Maratha commander (Shankaraji Keshav Phadke ?) to Chimaji Appa through an undated letter (the letter belongs to the month of April, 1737 A.D.), a plan to raid to Manor, Mahim and Tarapur region is suggested. The author says that for the task at least five hundred to seven hundred cavalrymen would be needed. The writer says that the force could be commanded by Rajshree Pantaji Moreshvar and he should be accompanied by Gopal Mahadev for capturing the place like Tandulwadi. Considering the scope of the work, the writer suggests that men force and funds should be regularly provided. The writer cautions Chimaji Appa to be careful owing to the presence of the Portuguese General of the North Dom Luis Bottelho in Uran (in Taluka – Panvel, District – Raigad, Maharashtra) who was in talks with the East India Company authorities of Mumbai to counter the Maratha attack and had offered Sashti island in return. The writer also says that the Portuguese command in the Province of the North may engage English in Mumbai and Siddi of Janjira against Marathas, thus, Chimaji Appa should be careful and should not easily trust the ruling polities of the Western coast. To make the mission successful, a force of five thousands men should be kept ready, the writer suggests Chimaji Appa (Ibid 31 – 32).

When the Maratha forces were busy in launching attacks on various Portuguese strongholds in the Province of the North in the summer season of 1737 A.D. Chimaji Appa and Peshwa Bajirao
I were regularly receiving requests from the regional commanders to provide them with musketeers to meet the fire power of Portuguese troops. From this letter written by Narso Kukaji to Chimaji Appa dated 12th April, 1737 A.D. (चैत्र बहुल १२ शुक्लवार) (but the day is not in कृषणपक्ष but in शुक्लपक्ष), we come to know about how Chimaji Appa was attempting to source musketeers from the outer areas for the Vasai campaign. A person named Narso Kukaji, writing from Chakan (at present in Taluka - Khed, District – Pune, Maharashtra) informed Chimaji Appa that how it was difficult to get a sizable number of musketeers from a single place. Narso Kukoji who had his son and force employed with Chimaji Appa says that for hiring musketeers from the places like Vaijapur, Gandapur, Yewale Sangamner, the regional warlords are coming up with strict conditions like two months’ pay in advance, surety for regular payment and written order about hiring of musketeers. He informs that as the hired soldiers are ready to die if they receive payment and as they are new to the Firangan region (Province of the North), Chimaji Appa should send a special Clerk for the task of hiring musketeers, especially for fixing the terms of hiring (Sardesai 1931: 45 - 46). Apart from the good quality of musketeers, arms and ammunition, the other important part in which Marathas lacked was artillery. Here too, the Maratha command made their attempt to cast cannons and for the purpose, hired Portuguese cannon caster. One such cannon manufacturing centre was set up at Malad (at present in Taluka – Malad, District – Mumbai Suburban, Maharashtra) and information about the activities in this factory can be obtained from the letter of Krushnaji Naik Anjurkar and Ramaji Mahadev dated 15th April, 1737 A.D. (छ १४ जिल्हे) to Chimaji Appa. Anjurkar and Mahadev report the progress of woodcutting work in Malad for the foundry. They write that a Portuguese cannon caster had arrived in their camp with Ratan Puro and he would be starting foundry related work on the next day. They inform Chimaji Appa that five hundred laborers had reached the camp and they were dedicatedly performing their duty. About the woodcutting job for the foundries, he informs that nineteen laborers had come from Bhivandi and they had started the wood cutting job from 29th March, 1737 A.D. (छ २७ जिलकाद). They suggest Chimaji Appa that they should not be employed anymore due to their high wages and their inability to perform other tasks. He says that woodcutting has been done in enough proportion and if required then he would get the work done from his soldiers (Sardesai 1933: 23). Meanwhile, General Dom Luis Bottelho who had stayed in Karanja island for eight days returned to Vasai with the surviving soldiers from Thane to oversee the Portuguese operations in the region more effectively. His entry in Vasai Fort and
maneuvers of Pedro Guedes da Magalhaes gave direction to Portuguese response to Maratha operations in and around Vasai (Pissurlekar 1975: 191). How Marathas were producing bullets in the region under their control on the East of Province of the North and were supplying them to Maratha troops can be known from the letter dated 26th April, 1737 A.D. (ता चून २५ जिज्ञ) of Keshav Sajanaji, a Maratha official in Bhiwandi to Chimaji Appa. Keshav Sajanaji informs Chimaji Appa that according to the order of the latter, the bullets were made from lead sent from Kalyan and he dispatched ten thousand bullets to Vasai on a ship (Sardesai 1933: 138-139).

4.3. In Goa –

As Marathas stormed Thane and sent their forces to different parts of Sashti island and Vasai to attack Portuguese positions, the General of the Province of the North Dom Luis Bottelho who had retreated to Karanja island, sent a communication of contemporary circumstances by a ship from Mumbai to Goa. The ship reached Goa on 12th April, 1737 A.D. and conveyed the news to the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Sandomil who received the news with much sadness considering the sizeable contribution of Province of the North to the economy of Estado da India. The Maratha offensive on the Portuguese principality in the North Konkan had created a precarious situation as the region was home to many influential and wealthy nobles, officials and Christian religious organizations owing to fertility and strategic importance of the region. The Viceroy instead of being swayed away by the unfortunate news concentrated his efforts to raise assistance to the besieged Portuguese principality in the North Konkan which had to be dispatched immediately. He instantly ordered the construction of a war ship named Nazareth which would be carrying two hundred soldiers and financial aid of one hundred and fifty sheraffins under the command of an experienced Portuguese noble Pedro de Mello to whom the Viceroy elevated to the post of Field Master, a rank which from the foundation of the Estado da India was second in command after the Viceroy. But while doing so, fearing that capable Pedro de Mello would outshine his relative Dom Luis Bottelho during whose rule Marathas had descended on the Province of the North creating widespread disaffection in the Portuguese camp, the Viceroy degraded the post of Pedro de Mello by making it subordinate to the General of the Province of the North. Despite such degradation, sensing the difficult situation being faced by the Estado da India, Pedro de Mello accepted his posting, especially at the time when a majority
of Portuguese officials in Goa were expecting change in the leadership in the Province of the North. The Viceroy, besides making arrangement for the defense of the Province of the North, had to also look for fixing up the finance and military resources which would be steering up the Portuguese operations in the region. Given the weak situation of Royal Treasury and Ammunition Depot, the Viceroy called a meeting of Councillors in which finance of total sheraffins three lakhs and twenty thousand was promised by Municipalities and subjects in Goa (the promised contribution was – The General Municipality of Salsette eighty thousand sherafins, the Municipality of Bardez fifty thousand sherafins, Municipality of Goa sixty thousand sherafins, eighty thousand sherafins from Hindu and fifty thousand sherafins from Portuguese inhabitants). It was also proposed by the participants that loan should be taken from Churches to raise sufficient amount for the Portuguese operations in the North Konkan but after discussing the issue at length, it was found that a stable source of finance was necessary which would be backing up the war efforts for a long period. Since the issue remained inconclusive in the first meeting, the second meeting was called in which it was decided to charge additional tax of one tenth of the revenue and other recoveries of the three provinces under the Portuguese control in Goa – Bardez, Salsette and Islands of Goa. Also it was decided to raise loan on terms of interest from Churches, Municipalities and wealthy individuals. To ensure fair repayment and terms of loan and supervising the collection of additional tax, Justice Jose Pedro Emans was given the responsibility while for the scheme’s effective implementation in the three provinces under Portuguese dominion in Goa, the Viceroy appointed Justice Jose Pedro Emams in Salsette, Justice Jose de Aranjo Col. in Bardez and Justice Jose Pedro de Olivera e Brito in the Islands of Goa. For the overall implementation of the scheme, a committee of councilors present in the meeting under the chairmanship of a Minister was formed.

The Viceroy was also finding at diplomatic levels ways to contain Marathas in the Province of the North.

For this purpose, in detailed instructions to Pedro de Mello dated 28th April, 1737 A.D. for handling the military affairs in Vasai, the Viceroy had advised him on several issues in which he was primarily directed to discuss with East India Company Governor in Mumbai for providing necessary assistance to besieged Portuguese in regard of men force, food stock, war material, arms, ammunition etc. The Viceroy had also hoped that Siddi of Janjira would also be contributing his resources for this task. Relying on the experiences of his military commanders,
the Viceroy had asked Pedro de Mello to check the possibility of attracting Marathas for fight to the locations favorable to Portuguese, especially with the help of their artillery and gunners. Karanja island was favored by many Portuguese military commanders due to its deep sea water surrounding the island and the second choice was of Elephanta island. In case this does not happen then the Viceroy had asked Pedro de Mello to find the means of cornering Marathas in the island of Salsette by blocking all ways of exit and supply routes with the help of East India Company’s General in Mumbai. The Viceroy had thought that if Portuguese Fortifications on the island at Versova, Bandora (Vanare), Sabajo (Belapur) and Karanja island are supplied with food stock and war material by the English in Mumbai then it would be possible to encircle Maratha forces in Salsette island only. On diplomatic level, considering the animosity between Aangrey brothers (Sambhaji and Manaji Aangrey) and Peshwa Bajirao I, the Viceroy advised Pedro de Mello to persuade English in Mumbai to not follow up with their hostilities against Sambhaji Aangrey as he may launch, on the insistence of Portuguese and English, raids on Peshwa’s territories which would help in cooling down Maratha pressure on Sashti island and Vasai. Armed with these instructions, on 18th May, 1737 A.D. Field Master Pedro de Mello started his journey for Vasai onboard the warship Nazareth in which Felico Jose was given the charge of the Captain of the Sea and War.

The conduct of Dom Luis Bottelho at the time of Maratha offensive on Thane was seen as ineffective and unsuitable to his post and was thought as bad omen by many high ranking Portuguese officials in Goa prompting the Viceroy to change the head of the Portuguese principality in the North Konkan which was dear and precious to many in Estado da India. The new choice – Antonio Cardim Froes was an experienced official who was holding the post of General of the Rivers of Goa at the time of his appointment as the General of the Province of the North. He was conversant with the region and was known to Marathas also. Soon after his appointment as the General of the Province of the North, he left Goa too on 18th May, 1737 A.D. onboard an English ship and reached Vasai on 23rd May, 1737 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1975: 191 – 197).

4.4. In the Province of the North –
Marathas were keeping tab on Portuguese activities in Goa through their network of informers and spies. Keshav Sajanaji had informed Chimaji Appa about the aid being sent from Goa by his letter dated 26th April, 1737 A.D. (ता २५ जिल्हेज). Relying on the information he received from a merchant from Bhiwandi who was then based in Mumbai, he promptly informed Chimaji Appa that a spy ship sent to Goa from Mumbai by Portuguese and English had come back and the Portuguese Viceroy had asked his commanders in the Province of North to defend only larger Portuguese Forts at Belapur, Vanare (Bandra), Vesave, Madh and had sent Antonio Cardim Froes with thousand soldiers. He writes that Portuguese had asked the English in Mumbai to assist Portuguese in Vasai in all possibility and to provide men force, funds and material (Sardesai 1933: 138 -139). The Maratha officials posted on various locations on the Western coast were regularly updating movement of Portuguese armada en route to North Konkan. One such update is sent by Laxman Hari from Murud (at present in Taluka – Murud, District – Raigad, Maharashtra) by this letter dated 13th May, 1737 A.D. (छ२७ मोहरम) to Chimaji Appa about the arrival of Portuguese armada consisting of fifty six ships of different sizes at Kasa (an island and Fort near Murud) in the evening of 12th May, 1737 A.D. (छ२७ मोहरम). Laxman Hari says that the armada consisted of many merchant vessels from Vasai, Mumbai and Daman provinces and due to conflict with Aangrey, had accompanied the Portuguese armada. The armada consisted of one thousand three hundred to four hundred persons, Laxman writes in the letter. According to the news obtained by Laxman Hari, Antonio Cardim Froes, the newly appointed General of the Province of the North had reached near the port of Anjanvel (at present in Taluka – Guhagar, District – Ratnagiri, Maharashtra) from Goa. When the armada reached Kasa, Laxman says that people from Janjira Fort met the people onboard the Portuguese armada and cannon shots were fired from the both sides signaling wellbeing of the occupants of the ships. Laxman Hari cautions Chimaji Appa that Antonio Cardim Froes may attempt to strike Marathas after reaching Vasai and hopes that if Marathas persist in camping in Firangan then the region would be conquered. Due to the offensive, many articles, including grain stock, have become expensive, he notes in the letter (Ibid 97 – 98). The Maratha command in the North Konkan had alerted Maratha commanders engaged in anti-Portuguese operation and the Maratha officials in Kalyan-Bhiwandi in anticipation of Antonio Cardim Froes arrival in the region and the same can be seen from this letter dated 28th May, 1737 A.D. (छ२७ मोहरम) of Chimanaji Bhivrao and Shankaraji Keshav to the Kamavisadar of Bhiwand. In the letter, Chimanaji and
Shankaraji caution the Kamavisadar to tighten the defense of Diva creek in view of Antonio Cardim Froes’s arrival in Vasai. The duo inform the official in Bhiwandi that in the midnight of 27th May, 1737 A.D. (छ २६ मोहरम) Portuguese had boarded the ships and left for an unknown location and says that Antonio Cardim Frois who according to the reports they received had arrived in the area, may come to Diva creek and may attack the area. Thus they ask the Kamavisadar of Bhiwandi to increase security of the area by establishing posts on the coast and hill of Diva and Karivali (Sardesai 1933: 146). The new appointees, Pedro de Mello and Antonio Cardim Froes reached Vasai in the month of May, 1737 A.D. which energized Portuguese troops in Vasai and the Portuguese command in the Province of the North. Master of the Field Pedro de Mello, on coming to know about the sudden appointment of Antonio Cardim Froes as the General of the Province of the North by the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil, felt sidelined for the second time since his deployment in the North Konkan. The move came unexpected and Pedro de Mello considered the appointment of Antonio Cardim Froes as the new General of the Province of the North despite his presence in Vasai as a move of humiliation to his personality and service to the Portuguese Crown by the Viceroy and same he expressed to Froes during a meet in Vasai Fort. He conveyed to Froes his inability to perform his duties which were in serious violations to the post he held till he receives satisfactory explanation from the Viceroy himself. Froes had no option but to respect the decision of the man of the rank and distinction like Pedro de Mello and to start Portuguese operations in Vasai and Sashti island at his own (Pissurlekar 1975: 196).

Meanwhile, the condition in the Maratha camp in Vasai was not well and the same can be seen from a joint letter dated 18th May, 1737 A.D. (ता छ १७ माहे मोहरम) penned by the all Maratha commanders to Chimaji Appa wherein the latter was requested by the all Maratha Commanders camped in Bahadarpura to send at the earliest wages to pay their soldiers. The commanders write that they had not received wages for the month and it has caused much agony among their soldiers. They inform Chimaji Appa that when they requested Shankaraji Pant for the wages, he replied that he would pay their wages after receiving the funds from the Peshwa. They write about how expensive the daily articles had become and how it is difficult for them to procure the daily provisions. They inform Chimaji Appa that due such situation, approximately forty to fifty soldiers from the company of Rajashree Ladko Hari had fled from the camp and how it is becoming difficult for them to convince their men to not desert their positions due to non-
payment of wages and the lack of supply of daily articles. They sent specimen of rice which they intended to purchase along with the letter to Chimaji Appa (Sardesai 1933: 46). In Vasai, after taking over the charge from the outgoing General Dom Luis Bottelho, Froes started to acquaint with the Maratha operation in Sashti island and Vasai and the military situation of the region. By the time he arrived in the Province of the North, Portuguese had lost the control of important locations namely Thane, Parsik, Firangipada, Marol and Marathas had besieged Vasai, Versova, Vanare and Belapur (details are given in the next Section). To restrict the aid coming via sea route to Vasai, Marathas had taken possession a hill point opposite the Vasai Fort at Dharawi (presently called Chauk in Utan) and had started bombing ships coming in the Vasai creek (ibid 191, 196 – 197). In Belapur, Narayan Joshi was leading the Maratha siege which Marathas started from 11th April, 1737 A.D. After a prolonged battle, Belapur finally fell to Marathas on 10th May, 1737 A.D. (more details are given in the next Section). The next to fall was the mountain of Santa Cruz which Marathas captured on 11th May, 1737 A.D. (details are given in the next Section) followed by Saivan (details are given the next Section) on 14th May, 1737 A.D. Soon a Maratha army led by Barawaji Tapkir, Aawaji Kawade and Vitthal Vishwanath attacked Manor and laid siege to it on 17th May, 1737 A.D. (more details are given in the next Section). With such pressing situation in the Province of the North, Antonio Cardim Froes arrived in Vasai wherein he found about Maratha occupation Dharavi across the Vasai creek and their attempt to fortify the place. Froes left no time and on 26th May, 1737 A.D. in daring raid which he himself led, he freed the place from Maratha occupation and destroyed the fortification which Marathas had built by that time (more details are given in the next section). But the success Portuguese achieved in Dharavi was not to last long as even though Marathas had retreated from Dharavi but had not left the place altogether and were waiting for favorable time to recapture the hillock. Back in Manor where the Captain Bernando Mesquita Pimental had requested aid from Vasai was struggling hard to contain Maratha encirclement of the Fortress. By the time aid sent by Antonio Cardim Froes under the command of Antonio Brito da Sylva reached Manor on 31st May, 1737 A.D. Captain Pimental had surrendered the Fortress to Marathas (more details are given in the next section). Froes felt dearly the loss of Manor and ordered an inquiry against Captain Bernando Mesquita Pimental who fled to Tarapur after his failure to defend Manor. The month of June came with more losses to Portuguese side as Marathas captured the mountain of Santa Maria on 13th June, 1737 A.D. (more details are given in the next section).
With the start of monsoon, it was thought by the Portuguese command in the North Konkan that Maratha operations would be confined to their camp and minor activities. But the Maratha command had known that till the Portuguese strongholds in Sashti island, Vasai region and surroundings are captured they would not be able to isolate Vasai. They also took in consideration the inability of Portuguese to move aid from Goa to Vasai in the season of Monsoon and went on to intensify their war operations in the region. As early on 1st June, 1737 A.D. Shankaraji Keshav received forty pouches of explosives and fifteen thousand bullets from Bhiwandi and the same he confirms in his letter to Chimaji Appa dated 1st June 1737 A.D. (ता छ २ सफर) written from his camp in Papadi (Ibid 99). As a part of their military plan, the Maratha command decided to launch a surprise attack on the Vasai Fort in the night of 9th June, 1737 A.D. The attack, however, failed and Marathas suffered losses (more details are given in the next section). Froes, on knowing the Maratha plan to re-occupy Dharavi, sent a force under the command of Manuel Barbosa de Carvalho to secure the area of Murdhe on 23rd July, 1737 A.D. but here the Portuguese force landed in ambush set up by Marathas and faced defeat (more details are given in the next section). Marathas paralllelly attempted to capture Vanare and Vesave in Sashti island but were unable to capture them due to their strong supply line. In Vasai, Marathas attempted to storm the Fort for second time in the month of September, 1737 A.D. and Peshwa Bajirao I even deputed his close confidant Baji Bhivrao for the mission. Accordingly second attack on Vasai Fort was made on 15th September, 1737 A.D. in which Marathas faced strong opposition from Portuguese troops commanded by Antonio Cardim Froes and had to retreat after suffering significant losses (more details are given in the next section). The Maratha command in the North Konkan had made its mind to intensify Maratha operations in the region North of Vasai and sent forces to conquer Portuguese strongholds in Kelve-Mahim, Shirgaon and Tarapur (more details are given in the next section). Besides these military activities, Marathas were busy in constructing and enlarging fortifications in Thane, Arnala, Ghodbandar and Vajragad respectively. With such expansion of Maratha operations in the Province of the North, Antonio Cardim Froes had tough time to deal with.
4.5. The Situation in Goa (September to December, 1737 A.D.) –

Viceroy Conde de Sandomil concerned over the worsening situation in the Province of the North had not lost hope and like other nobles and officials in Goa had confidence in the capability and leadership of General Antonio Cardim Froes. Resources in Goa were already scarce and with much difficulty he could arrange and collect aid for Province of the North earlier and in such situation, he was hoping for assistance from Portugal which was delayed. Added to this pressing condition was the possible invasion by the King of Saunda on Goa which prompted the Viceroy to deploy the remaining forces and private individuals for protection of the forts bordering the kingdom of Saunda. It is in this situation that aid to Goa was received from Portugal through the ship named Sao Pedro de Alcantara commanded by Lino de Faria Coelho (also named as Lino de Faria Roiz) on 15th September, 1737 A.D. the date on which Marathas attacked Vasai for second time. The ship had left Lisbon early on 25th April 1736 A.D. but due to unfavorable winds was stuck in Mozambique till August, 1737 A.D. Due to prolonged voyage, many of its crew members died and the ship was thereafter manned by a company of soldiers from Mozambique. One more ship called Nossa Senhora da Madre de Deus commanded by Antonio de Figueredo, General of the Fleet in the Strait which sailed from Lisbon on 6th May, 1737 A.D. reached Goa due to favorable winds on 1st October, 1737 A.D. and brought four hundred and thirty eight soldiers. This aid boosted the confidence of Viceroy who till then was consulting with his Council and distinguished persons over the issue of Province of the North and was yet to reach the conclusion due to diverse opinions expressed by the Councilors and distinguished individuals. The Viceroy was aware of the strength of Marathas led by Chhatrapati Shahu, especially the prominent Maratha commanders such Peshwa Bajirao I and his younger brother Chimaji Appa who had invested his energy in the Maratha offensive in the Province of the North. The two sets of opinions prevalent then in Goa can be summarized as below –

1. According to the first view, the Portuguese command in the Province of the North should concentrate on the major Portuguese fortifications in Diu, Daman, Vasai and Chaul and should demolish and abandon smaller fortifications like in Dahanu, Tarapur, Shirgaon, Mahim, Kelve, Wanare etc. The command should move cannons, bullets, ammunition and garrison from these smaller fortifications to the larger ones as their capture by
Marathas, especially pieces of artillery, guns, ammunition etc. would strengthen the enemy who would employ the similar equipments against Portuguese.

2. According to the second view, the Portuguese command in the Province of the North should not abandon any fortification in the region and should defend all fortifications with all determination as their abandonment would undermine the authority and prestige of Estado da India in the entire Asia.

Whilst these contrasting opinions were expressed before the Viceroy who was unable to take the final decision, he was informed by Antonio Cardim Froes of his plan to attack Thane which according to him was not sufficiently guarded by Marathas due to disbursal of their force to various locations in the Province of the North. Froes was ready to attack Thane if he was provided a separate company of trained five hundred Portuguese soldiers by the Viceroy. The Viceroy too was ready for the proposal of Froes but had to postpone the plan due to non-arrival of warships from Portugal. Also he had to take precaution to guard Goa from the possible Maratha invasion in case Peshwa Bajirao I decided to block Goa from the Eastern side to prevent aid reaching to Vasai from Goa. The other important update which the Viceroy received was the possible invasion of Nadir Shah on Delhi which would have forced Chhatrapati Shahu to direct Peshwa Bajirao I to confront him and would have ultimately resulted in deintensification of Maratha operations in the Province of the North. The Viceroy after discussing the situation with the Council of the State finally decided to aid the Portuguese command in the Province of the North in all possible capacity. The first shipment of aid containing ammunition, seven thousand sacks of rice and one thousand sherafins in cash was sent onboard the ship called Nazareth commanded by Fernando de Costa Loure, Captain of Sea and War in the beginning of October.

The second aid comprising eight hundred soldiers (five hundred soldiers were dispatched by Factor in Mangalore Pedro de Aguiar and the rest three hundred soldiers were recruited in Goa by Dom Antonio Henriques) led by Dom Antonio Henriques was dispatched to Vasai onboard the ships which sailed to the coast of North for trade purpose under the command of Jose Antunes Branco, Captain of Sea and War in the month of December, 1737 A.D. As Peshwa Bajirao I became involved in Maratha operations in Northern India and it became evident that he would not move his forces to blockade Goa, the Viceroy decided to send more aid to the Province of the North. In the third installment of aid comprising of two hundred white men, three hundred thousand sherafins in cash, gunpowder worth five hundred thousand sherafins and
ammunition was shipped to Vasai onboard the ship Sao Pedro de Alcantara under the command of Caetano Correia de Sa, Captain of Sea and War again in December, 1737 A.D.

Viceroy Conde de Sandomil had made adequate arrangement to finance Portuguese war operations in the North Konkan. Additional tax of one-tenth of revenue was proposed and additional Ministers were employed in the project to execute it effectively. Besides imposition of tax, the Viceroy also collected funds from influential Portuguese nobles such as Dom Francisco Sottomayor, Justice Cristovao Luis de Andrade, Father Luis Sottomayor, Dom Luis Caetano de Almeida, Jose Pedro Emaus etc. and directed the Portuguese merchants and officials coming from Portugal to raise loan of three hundred thousand sherafins by promising them of repayment of their contribution on their return to Portugal. It is in month of December, 1737 A.D. that previous General of the Province of the North Dom Luis Bottelho returned to Goa from Chaul onboard the ship Nazareth which was returning to Goa after delivering the first shipment of aid to North Konkan. After coming to know about the inquiry constituted against him by the Viceroy for his unfair act in the Province of the North, he decided to reside in isolation in the Convent of Nossa Senhora do Cabo for impartial implementation of the inquiry against him made by Justice Sebastiao Pereyra de Figuero. Bottelho, however was not pronounced guilty in the inquiry and thereafter shifted to Viceregal Palace for residence (Pissurlekar 1975: 208 – 214).

4.6. The Emboldened Portuguese Operations in Kelve, Mahim, Shirgaon and Asheri (December, 1737 – January, 1738 A.D.) -

As mentioned earlier, Marathas had surrounded Portuguese fortifications in Kelve, Mahim, Shirgaon and Asheri (more details are given in the next section) and many notable Maratha commanders like Mahadaji Keshav, Karnaji Shinde, Ramchandra Hari Patwardhan, Malhar Hari, Vitthal Vishwanath etc. were leading the respective campaigns from September, 1737 A.D. and had hoped to move to Tarapur after capturing these places. Chimaji Appa was even contemplating to move further to the North and to capture Dahanu and had asked Vasudev Joshi who by that time was in the Maratha camp in Shirgaon and Mahim for opinion. Vasudev Joshi by his undated letter informed Chimaji Appa (received on 14th January, 1738 A.D. छ २३ रमजान) that Dahanu could be captured only after seizing the control of Tarapur from where it receives regular supplies and opined that Marathas should toughen their siege of Tarapur (Sardesai 1931:
Due to engagement of Maratha troops in Kelve, Mahim, Shirgaon and Asheri, it was not possible for the Maratha command to spare a separate force for laying siege to Tarapur and instead responded by deputing raiding parties in the area around Tarapur to interrupt Portuguese supply line from Tarapur to Asheri (Kelkar 2008: 159). Portuguese forces trapped in Kelve, Mahim and Shirgaon put up stern resistance to Maratha siege and had kept the hope of receiving aid via the sea route. After receiving the aid from Goa, General Antonio Cardim Froes left no time in dispatching the aid to Kelve-Mahim and then to Shirgaon. This time he requested none other than Master of the Field Pedro de Mello to lead Portuguese military operation in Kelve-Mahim and Shirgaon and to which Pedro de Mello agreed. On 3rd January, 1738 A.D. Pedro de Mello reached Mahim and the fierce battle that ensued thereafter, he was able to relieve Kelve-Mahim from the Maratha siege and in which prominent Maratha commanders like Mahadaji Keshav, the elder brother of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke was killed. In Mahim, Portuguese captured a Maratha commander and forty soldiers. On the next day, i.e. on 4th January, 1738 A.D. he lifted the Maratha siege of Shirgaon and forced Marathas to retreat (Pissurlekar 1975: 217 – 218). The situation in the Maratha camp after facing crushing defeats at the hands of Portuguese can be known from the letter dated 4th January, 1738 A.D. (ता छ १३ रमजान) of Vasudev Joshi to Chimaji Appa in which he writes that pessimism had gripped the Maratha soldiers and commanders and not a single capable commander had left in the contingent of horsemen. Thus, he requests to send Rajashree Chimanaji Bhivrao and Rajashree Vitthal Shivdeo to the camp and says that he is taking all care to console the demoralized troops. He informs Chimaji Appa that he needs to leave the camp on 21st January, 1738 A.D. (माघ शुद्ध प्रतिपद्द) to attend the family marriage (Sardesai 1933: 111 – 112).

After Kelve-Mahim and Shirgaon, the next that was to come on the target of Pedro de Mello was Asheri where Marathas had surrounded the hill Fort for a long time with the assistance of the ruler of Jawhar state. But before Pedro de Mello started his operation for Asheri, an incident of slaying of Maratha war prisoners in Mahim by the Portuguese Captain who was given the custody of Maratha war prisoners by Pedro de Mello himself happened and which is decried by both the Maratha and Portuguese chroniclers (Kelkar 2008: 161) (Pissurlekar 1975: 219). Pedro de Mello made preparations for his attack on Asheri at Tarapur and on 26th January, 1738 A.D. reached Asheri with a force of one thousand and six hundred soldiers in an orderly march and the mere spectacle of which made Marathas to desert their positions and flee. Such was the terror of
Pedro de Mello that Marathas even left Manor in complete disarray in anticipation of Portuguese attack. Manor that time was commanded by Vitthal Vishwanath who was entrusted with the responsibility of Kamavisdari (a task to collect the revenue for the State) of the Mahim-Manor region (Kelkar 2008: 162). With such roaring success, victorious Pedro de Mello returned to Vasai where he welcomed by the General of the Province of the North Antonio Cardim Froes in a ceremony befitting his stature. From the port itself, he was congratulated by many as he walked to the Convent of St. Dominican in a procession which consisted of Maratha war prisoners and war trophies captured from Marathas. To commemorate the victory scored by Pedro de Mello against Marathas, a mass was organized in the Convent of St. Dominicans where in the honor of Our Lady of Remedy, the hymn of Te Deum Laudamus (God, we praise thee) was recited. During the ceremony, Father Manoel de Trindade, Priest of the Order of Preachers delivered a speech to mark the Portuguese success (Pissurlekar 1975: 219 – 220).

4.7. Marathas Fortify Dharavi, Vasai, Vajragad, Arnala and Thane (December - January, 1738 A.D.) -

When the battleground in and around Vasai was being heated up, the Marathas were busy on the other relatively secret front too. The other front was of entrenching themselves more firmly in and around Vasai to prepare more formidable bases from where they could operate freely and boldly. The first in the series was Dharavi where previously Marathas and Portuguese had shows of strength and in which lately, as mentioned before, Marathas had established their claim to the worry of Portuguese. The Maratha activities in Dharavi in the first two weeks of January, 1738 A.D. are known from the undated letter of Vasudev Joshi which he wrote while being camped in Shirgaon to Chimaji Appa (Chimaji Appa received the letter on 14th January, 1738 A.D. छ २३ रमजान) and from which we come to know that the Maratha operations in Dharavi this time were commanded by Ramaji Mahadev Biwalkar. Joshi informs Chimaji Appa that work of construction of stockade was under progress at Dharavi despite a failed attempt by Portuguese to capture the place. From the letter, we come to know that along with Ramaji Mahadev Biwalkar, Khandoji Mankar was also visiting the place and was supervising the work of stockade’s construction (Sardesai 1931: 89-90). From the Portuguese records, information about the nature of Maratha fortification at Dharavi can be obtained in which it is mentioned that Marathas had
constructed fortification walls and bastions in lime and stone and its top was covered with the
nets which were placed on the poles. The fortification wall had cannons placed on it and on the
slightly lower level of the hill which had a Church and which was within the range of gunshot
from the upper side fortification, Marathas constructed a second layer of fortification with the
intention of protecting the larger upper side fortification from the enemy attacks. According to
Portuguese records, the place was manned by six hundred soldiers under the command of an able
commander (Pissurlekar 1975: 222). About Vasai, Vasudev Joshi informs Chimaji Appa by this
undated letter (received by Chimaji Appa on 14th January, 1738 A.D. पौ 23 रमजान) that
Shankaraji Keshav Phadke had opened a new front against Portuguese near the creek at Kolwadi
from where Marathas could target the Vasai Fort but also informs that Portuguese have made a
stockade on the island and they were firing on the Maratha post. Shankaraji Keshav Phadke
remained alert at Vasai after receiving the advisory from Vasudev Joshi (Sardesai 1931: 91 –
92). The next place where Marathas had started working upon was a hillock near Giriz area of
Vasai and the same can be known from the undated letter of Vasudev Joshi to Chimaji Appa
(Chimaji Appa received the letter on 14th January, 1738 A.D. पौ 23 रमजान) in which it is
informed that Shankaraji Keshav Phadke had started to construct a fortification on a hill in the
Giriz area of Vasai which existed at a distance of one Kos North of Bahadarpura. Joshi writes
that the foundation of the fortification is completed and the construction of fortification is
permanent in nature (Ibid 91 – 92). Arnala, the dream project of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke was
also bustling with construction activities and where Marathas had started to make their naval
presence felt. The place by that time was commanded by Bajirao Belose. From the letter dated
26th December, 1737 A.D. (ता ४ माहे रमजान) of Vitthal Vishwanath, it becomes clear that
majority of the construction material was being sourced from the region of Mahim and Manor
which was under his administration (Sardesai 1933: 109 - 110). The construction of Thane Fort
was also in full swing where Marathas had started to build two bastions from December, 1737
A.D. which they named as – Haunmant and Gagan under the supervision of a mason named
Nathuji. The Maratha operations in Thane this time were looked after by Khandoji Mankar
(more information is given in the next Section) (Kelkar 2008: 169). About the military matters,
Vasudev Joshi by this undated letter suggested certain measures to Chimaji Appa (Chimaji Appa
received the letter on 14th January, 1738 A.D. छ 23 रमजान) for distribution of forces which
could help Marathas in conquering the places in Shasti island. Joshi says in the letter a force of
eight to eight thousand five hundred soldiers is with Rajashree Khandoji Mankar at Thane from which two to two thousand five hundred soldiers are deployed at Dharavi. The remaining soldiers, according to Joshi, should be distributed like deploying thousand to one thousand and five hundred soldiers to Ghodbhandar, Turbhe (Trombay) and Marol, two thousand soldiers at Thane and the remaining thousand to one thousand five hundred soldiers should be deputed to conquer either Versova or Bandra. Keeping such a large force unutilized at Thane would not serve any purpose but would only increase the burden of wages, Joshi writes in the letter. He suggests that Rajashree Barwaji Tapkir who was at Kalyan without any significant task should be given responsibility to capture Bandra by allocating a force from Kalyan and Bhiwandi and Khandoji Mankar should be tasked to capture Versova. He requests Chimaji Appa to take a call on this issue as if the Maratha command spends such a considerable amount on a large force then by its proper deployment; few important places in Sashti island could be captured. From the letter, we come to know that Chimnaji Bhivrao was sent to the camp of Chimaji Appa (Sardesai 1931: 92).

4.8. Chimaji Appa arrives in the North Konkan and the Portuguese attack on Dharavi (February – March, 1738 A.D.) -

How much the Maratha commanders and soldiers were disheartened after suffering defeats in a series of battles which took place on the North of Vasai and around Vasai in the hands of Portuguese forces commanded by General Antonio Cardim Froes and Field Master Pedro de Mello is already reflected in the discussion mentioned above. The prominent Maratha commanders cum officials like Vasudev Joshi were requesting Chimaji Appa, the commander in chief of the Maratha’s campaign in Vasai to come to Firangan or the Province of the North as his arrival would bring confidence and encouragement in the demoralized Maratha troops. But due to engagement of the Peshwa Bajirao in the North and Central part of the India against the Mughals and the Nizam of Hyderabad from October, 1737 A.D. January, 1738 A.D. in which Chimaji Appa had to also render his assistance. After Peshwa Bajirao I was able to score victory against the Mughals and the Nizam Hyderabad in January, 1738 A.D. Chimaji Appa got the opportunity to devote his time to the mission which he personally commanding in the North Konkan against Portuguese. From the available correspondence, it seems that by the third week
of February, 1738 A.D. he arrived on the outskirts of the North Konkan and the same can be observed from his order dated 20th February, 1738 A.D. (छः जिल्काद) to an unnamed commander in which the commander is ordered to clear the road from Burhanpur to Tarapur. In the order, it is clearly written that the respective commander should camp at a distance of two Kos from Kohoj (at present in Taluka - Wada, District – Palghar, Maharashtra) and in the early Morning of the next day, should march to Burhanpur (near Asheri Fort, at present in Taluka - Palghar, District – Palghar, Maharashtra) and should annihilate Portuguese force on the way. If possible, the order says that the commander should send some persons to Mahim to fix affairs there. The Commander is instructed to complete the task in one day and Pantaji Moreshvar is directed to furnish information regarding the routes on which the mission was tasked on 21st February, 1738 A.D (Sardesai 1931: 61). The demoralized Maratha force and the commanders in Firangan found themselves energized after receiving the news of Chimaji Appa’s arrival in the region in February, 1738 A.D. The mood in Maratha rank and file is well reflected in the undated letter written by an unknown author to Chimaji Appa which states that force was in fear of getting killed by the master (Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa) as they had fled from the warzone due to enemy’s (Portuguese) terror - The author suggests Chimaji Appa that as the force is in high spirit after the arrival of Chimaji Appa, the latter should try to consolidate Maratha fronts in Firangan and should try to capture important Portuguese strongholds in the Sashi island. The author suggests that even if these strongholds are not captured then Marathas should strengthen their fronts against Portuguese which would act as a deterrent against English of Mumbai as they supply provisions to Portuguese. The author requests Chimaji Appa to stay at Thane and to direct his operations from there instead of going to Vasai as he was new to the region and in view of the contemporary development, it would be risky. The author suggests Chimaji Appa that Shankaraji Keshav Phadke should consolidate Maratha fronts on the sandy ground near the Vasai Fort. The author also states that as Marathas were not able to quickly capture Portuguese strongholds, the act would make the enemy bold and thus, to avoid this, Marathas by the all means should try to capture these places in the current period only (Sardesai 1931: 88).

Portuguese on the other hand had become apprehensive of the Maratha re-occupation of Dharavi and thus, had planned to oust Marathas from the strategic place to secure the sea traffic to Vasai. Accordingly, General Antonio Cardim Froes and Pedro de Mello attacked Dharavi in a well
executed plan in the early morning of 1st March, 1738 A.D. and captured the place. In the battle, Marathas suffered heavy losses (more information is given in the next Section). Even the attempt by Chimaji Appa to re-conquer the place with a force of three thousand soldiers on 12th March, 1738 A.D. did not yield any result as the fierce Portuguese bombing confined Marathas to a single place for three continuous days. Finally, Chimaji Appa had to retreat to Thane on 14th March, 1738 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1975: 222 – 225). Chimaji felt gravely the loss of Dharavi and the same can be seen from his letter dated April, 1738 A.D. (ताली छ २५ जिल्हेज) to Balaji Bajirao in which he laments the loss of Dharavi by saying that the only god knew his sorrow as he was helpless before the situation ("येक धारावीमुळे हठहठ लागली ते ईश्वरास ठाउकी! काय करावे? इलाज तो चालेल येसे नाहीं!") (Sardesai 1933: 91 – 92).

4.9. The Situation in the Portuguese and Maratha Camps in and around Vasai (March – June, 1738 A.D.) –

The Portuguese command in the North Konkan had known that the resourcefully superior force of Marathas could be defeated only in the condition of the presence of a strong Portuguese army and the continuous flow of financial resources. And thus, Froes had recruited a large number of persons in the army to counter Marathas at the various places in the North Konkan. These appointments had consumed a large portion of finance which Froes had obtained from Goa and from the Church establishment in Vasai. By March, 1738 A.D. the situation in the Portuguese camp in Vasai was critical as the almost all funds meant for the defense of Vasai were exhausted. On the request of General Antonio Cardim Froes, the Viceroy Conde da Sandomil sent funds amounting to two thousand sherafins to Vasai but also made clear that it would not be possible him to send further financial aids due to constraints of resources which Goa itself was facing. Froes found it difficult to handle the Portuguese command in the Province of the North in the absence of required funds and aid, especially at the time of monsoon season when he needed it most due to suspension of communication between Vasai and Goa. In such hapless situation, finding no favorable solution, he offered his resignation to the Viceroy who had earlier too, faced such request from Froes. This time, the Viceroy accepted the resignation of Froes and appointed Field Master Pedro de Mello in his place on 2nd April, 1738 A.D. Pedro de Mello was a distinguished Portuguese military commander who came to serve in Estado da India in 1717 A.D.
in the capacity of Captain of the Infantry. Due his capability, he gradually rose in the rank and served in many positions like the Captain of Sea and War, Brigadier of Infantry, Royal Adjunt of the Order of the Viceroy and Captain General of the Islands of Sollor and Timor and lastly the Field Master in the Province of the North before being appointed as the General of the Province of the North (Pissurlekar 1975: 233). General Pedro de Mello, upon taking the charge of his new responsibility, first downsized the size of Portuguese army by retaining only those persons in the service whose capability and loyalty to the Estado da India was proven and noteworthy. This helped in reducing the financial burden which Portuguese were facing in the Province of the North (Ibid 226). The Maratha command too was curious to know the change in the leadership of the Province of the North and the Maratha commanders in Vasai were regularly updating Chimaji Appa on the issue and the same can be seen from these letters. On one such occasion, on being asked the reason behind the cannon shots fired from the Vasai Fort, Shankaraji Keshav presented his detailed submission to Chimaji Appa by his letter dated 24th March, 1738 A.D. (तारे छ ते माहे मोहरम). He says that total twenty seven cannons shots were fired from Vasai Fort in two different timings in which the first round consisted of thirteen shots and the second round was of fourteen shots. From Dharavi, he informs that seven shots were fired and ten to eleven shots were fired from the ships anchored in the Dharavi creek. Three to two shots fired from Vasai Fort struck the residence of Martin Silveira which Marathas were occupying, he writes. The reason behind firing cannons shots from the several locations, he says as guessed by many to the practice adopted by Portuguese in which gun salute is offered to an high ranking official from the places from where is passing by. As Antonio Cardim Froes, the General of the Province of the North was leaving the Vasai Fort, the cannons shots were fired, he assumes in the letter (Sardesai 1933: 81 – 82). In one more such letter dated 24th April, 1738 A.D. (छ न माहे मोहरम) Shankaraji Keshav replies to Chimaji Appa over the latter’s query for the update about the new General for the Province of the North appointed by Estado da India. Shankaraji Keshav by taking reference of the public talk on the issue writes that Pedro de Mello, the Portuguese General who broke the Maratha sieges in Mahim, Shirgaon, Asheri and Manor was appointed as the new General of the Province of the North and the former General, Antonio Cardim Froes had left for Goa from Vasai. He says that as in accordance to the Portuguese custom of offering gun salute to the departing dignitary from wherever he passes, total twenty seven cannon shots were fired from Vasai Fort in two different timings in the evening of 22nd April, 1738 A.D. (छ २ मोहरम
संध्याकाली) and simultaneously five to six cannon shots were fired from Dharavi and the ships in Vasai Creek, it was speculated by many that Antonio Cardim Froes had left Vasai for Goa. He says that on 23rd April, 1738 A.D. (छ ३ मोहरम) Portuguese armada comprising twenty ships left from Vasai (Ibid 100 – 101). Responding to the similar inquiry of Chimaji Appa, Vyankatrao Narayan Ghorpade by this undated letter (received by Chimaji Appa on 27th April, 1738 A.D. छ७ मोहरम) wrote him that Froes had left Vasai with his armada and before leaving Vasai for the final time, stayed for a day in the Vasai creek. From the information received from the persons of one Khand Patil, Ghorpade writes that on the insistence of English of Mumbai, Frois stayed there for some time but says that he is clueless about the whereabouts of the armada. It has been four days since the armada left; Ghorpade informs Chimaji Appa and writes that he would be communicating more information later after receiving the updates on the issue (Sardesai 1931: 97). Shankaraji Keshav Phadke by this undated letter (from the content of this letter, it appears to have been written in the month of April, 1738 A.D.) informed Chimaji Appa that Pedro de Mello has come to Vasai Fort and the former General of the Province of the North - Antonio Cardim Froes has left Vasai with some prominent Portuguese officials like Martinho da Silveira for Goa. He reports Chimaji Appa that Pedro de Mello is planning to attack Maratha positions at Vasai but Phadke says that by the blessings of his master (Chimaji Appa), de Mello’s attack would not be successful against the Marathas at Vasai (Sardesai 1931: 99).

With the bitter experience of Dharavi in hand, the Maratha command was concerned over the security of strategic hill forts situated North of Vasai which they had captured earlier from Portuguese and as evident from the letter mentioned below, the Maratha command was ensuring to deploy force there and thus, was making arrangement necessary for the stay of garrison. In this undated letter (Chimaji Appa received the letter on 2nd April, 1738 A.D. पो१ १२ जिल्हेज) written to Chimaji Appa Shankaraji Keshav Phadke requested Chimaji Appa to send two masons to furnish two tanks at Jivdhangad Fort, three masons to furnish two tanks at Kamangad Fort, five masons to furnish seven tanks at Tandulwadi Fort and two masons to furnish one tank at Kaldurg Fort in the month of April-May (चै०-वैशाख). According to Phadke, if he receives the masons in the time expected by him then the work could be completed in a period of one and half month and it would help to store water in the water reservoirs and tanks with the start of monsoon. This work, Phadke says, could be taken up in the monsoon season and thus, requests
Chimaji Appa to provide him the masons in the summer season (Sardesai 1931: 42). Similarly, Shankaraji Keshav Phadke requested Chimaji Appa by his undated letter (received by Chimaji Appa on 29th March, 1738 A.D. छ ८ माहे जिल्हेज) to instruct Rajashree Barwaji Tapkir to send two shops of blacksmiths for construction work at Tandulwadi Fort (Sardesai 1931: 28). During the fight with Portuguese in Dharavi, the Maratha command came to know about how Portuguese in Vasai were being secretly aided by the Siddi of Janjira and thus, Shankaraji Keshav by this letter dated 28th March, 1738 A.D. (छ ७ माहे जिल्हेज) informed Chimaji Appa of how Siddi of Janjira was supplying men force to Portuguese in Vasai. Shankaraji Keshav informs Chimaji Appa that as per the information he received from one Christian person, Siddi of Janjira was supplying men force to Portuguese and one thousand men had come to Portuguese camp from Janjira Panchmahal. He requests Chimaji Appa to send a warning letter to Siddi of Janjira by mentioning that he had sent men force of thousand soldiers to Portuguese in Vasai under the command of Siddi Mubaraq (he died in Dharavi) and it should be stopped (Sardesai 1933: 129).

As a reply to Chimaji Appa’s order dated 30th March, 1738 A.D. Shankaraji Keshav Phadke wrote a letter dated 1st April, 1738 A.D. in which he talks at length on the various issues of Marathas campaign in the Province of the North and from which we come to know of the existing situation in the Maratha camp. The points he made in the letter are mentioned below.

1. Phadke informed Chimaji Appa that for the Maratha force at Arnala island, approximately 1600 Khandi grain stock (in which the share of rice was of 600 Khandi) would be required and which was not available to the Maratha troops owing to its unavailability in the Vasai Region. Phadke says that from Bhiwandi, approximately 40 to 42 Khandi wheat was obtained and he hopes to get more supply of wheat. Phadke requests Chimaji Appa to send approximately 300 Khandi grain stock. As Chimaji Appa informed Phadke of arranging 1,000 Khandi rice from Rajashree Barwaji Tapkir and others, Phadke says that the grain stock is necessary for the summer season and Chimaji Appa should keep on the regular basis two of his officials with those landlords and merchants who would supply grain stock to the Maratha army as it would make its procurement and supply to the Maratha troops engaged in Vasai campaign.

2. Phadke says that a great quantity of clothes would be required if he supplies them to his force directly and suggests that if Chimaji Appa provides the same then even a smaller quantity would be sufficient. He says that if Chimaji Appa desires then he would supply
the clothes but asks Chimaji Appa for the final decision. Phadke informs Chimaji Appa that he has provided clothes to his troops and suggests Chimaji Appa that if Appa awards clothes to the distinguished persons and praise them for their works then his force would feel proud and would do the work assigned by the patron (Chimaji Appa) happily.

3. Chimaji Appa wrote to Shankaraji Keshav Phadke for his decision to come at the camp of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to which Phadke responded by saying that Chimaji Appa should come but should not stay for a long. Even if Appa stays for eight days and go from his camp then also it would be sufficient. Phadke says that Chimaji Appa should visit his camp and should suggest any measures beneficial for the Maratha encirclement of Vasai according to which he would behave. Even if Chimaji Appa leaves from his camp, Phadke says that the latter should stay in Konkan up to the Vaishakh month (April-May in English Calendar) as there was pressure of Chimaji Appa on the enemy camp. He suggest that as there would be less chance in the monsoon season for Portuguese in Vasai for procuring aid from Goa, Chimaji Appa then could leave the North Konkan. Phadke says that Chimaji Appa should order him on this issue.

4. Chimaji Appa inquired Shankaraji Keshav Phadke for the quantity of cannons available at the Hanumant bastion in the Arnala Fort and the quantity of cannons required for the bastion.

5. Phadke suggests Chimaji Appa that Maratha force should raid Daman province for a once and request Chimaji Appa that latter should write to Manaji Aangrey for the supply of ten to twelve cannons.

6. Chimaji Appa informed Phadke that for paying daily wages to soldiers, he would be sending twenty five thousand rupees on Dwadashi or Trayodashi and after Paurnima, he would be sending sixty thousand rupees.

7. When the letter was being written, the construction work of Arnala Fort and Vajragad Fort was in progress and for the construction related works; Phadke was in the need of a carpenter. It could had been suggested by Chimaji Appa that an expert carpenter could be called from Surat but Phadke updates Chimaji Appa of the situation and informs him that employing a carpenter from Surat would take a considerable time and in view of the approaching monsoon season, the ongoing construction work in the Arnala Fort and Vajragad Fort should be completed. He says that though he has employed twenty five to
thirty carpenters for constructing vessels, their engagement for fort’s construction work would affect the vessel project thus, he requests Chimaji Appa that twenty carpenters should be sent from Pune and Junnar from whom he would get the work of rooms and auditorium construction done at Arnala and Vajragad.

8. Phadke informs Chimaji Appa that Rajashree Khandoji Mankar with his one thousand men had excellently got a temporary defense construction work done at Ghodbandar and suggests to fortify the place called Sambhudev which existed at a distance of 3 Kos East of Ghodbandar and 3 Kos West of Owale near Thane due to its location near the creek. Phadke suggests that the place should be temporarily fortified with lime and stone as there was a chance of Portuguese armada attacking the place in the summer season. The major work should be done in the monsoon season, he says in the letter and requests for Chimaji Appa’s opinion on the issue.

9. Phadke suggests Chimaji Appa that necessary things should be done to supply grain stock from Kalyan province and from Rajashree Narayan Joshi to Kambe (at present in Taluka – Bhiwandi, District – Thane) and from where it should be taken to Arnala via Kohoj and Gorhe (Sardesai 1931: 35 – 38).

Even though the presence of Chimaji Appa had energized the Maratha troops, the humid climate of North Konkan was not suitable for Chimaji Appa and for the well being of him, he was advised by many leading Maratha commanders to not stay in the North Konkan for a long as it would be harmful for his weak health. In the first of such letters, Pilaji Jadhavrao by this letter dated 4th April, 1738 A.D. (छ१४िजञेज) advises Chimaji Appa to not stay in Konkan due to his ill health. Pilaji Jadhavrao who at the time of writing the letter was camping at Budha Dongar (?), was replying to the letter of Chimaji Appa in which he had updated Pilaji Jadhavrao about the regional geopolitical issues and the purpose for his entry in Firangan. He requests Chimaji Appa to not stay in Konkan as its weather was not good for the weak health of Chimaji Appa. He says that water in Konkan is not good for Chimaji Appa and the physical uncomfortability which Chimaji Appa would get in his stay in Konkan would not be easily cured. Thus, he suggests Chimaji Appa to give the command of the offensive to his able commanders as all of them had their employment attached to Chimaji Appa (Sardesai 1933: 131 – 132). Sidoji Raut by this letter dated 5th April, 1738 A.D. (ता. चैत्र वट प्रतिपद्द) requested Chimaji Appa to not stay in Konkan for a long. Sidoji Raut who was camping in Navisarai (Navsari ?) and was informed by Chimaji
Appa of his arrival in the North Konkan and other developments in the region, replies to Chimaji Appa that due to the weak health of Chimaji Appa and the unsuitable climate in the Konkan, Chimaji Appa should not stay. He says that many able commanders of Chimaji Appa are in the field with their forces so Chimaji Appa should not stay in Konkan as the good health of him is of high importance (Sardesai 1933: 144 – 145). Despite such advices, Chimaji Appa continued to stay and guide the Maratha operations in the North Konkan.

Along with the activities on the land front, Maratha operations on the sea were too expanding and the same can be seen from these two letters of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to Chimaji Appa wherein he informs the latter about capturing vessels. In the first letter which is undated, Chimaji Appa is informed of how a Maratha armada's raid in the Tarapur sea resulted in seizing six Mahagiri type of vessels and how Marathas imprisoned forty seven Koli persons (Fishermen community) with their families. Phadke says that captured persons were chained and were being used to carry stones. He suggests Chimaji Appa that they should be kept in Arnala with their families as servants and they should also be used for the Navy related projects (Ibid 50 - 51). In the second letter dated 11th April, 1738 A.D. (ता छ २१ जिल्हेज) he informs Chimaji Appa about the progress of construction of Fort on the Arnala island which he visited on 10th April, 1738 A.D. (छ २० जिल्हेज). He writes to Chimaji Appa that Marathas captured two vessels where on the first vessel they recovered dates, ghee and impure carbonate of soda and on the second which belonged to the seafarers from Ghodbandar who kept the vessels in Mumbai, Marathas got large quantity of canes which was destined to Dahanu. Phadke says that he had to free the second vessel due to the request of English from Mumbai. He informs Chimaji Appa about one more ship which Marathas captured and where they had found sixteen Khandi rice and metal cargo (Sardesai 1933: 47 - 48). It is already mentioned earlier that Marathas had established a gun foundry in Malad and where Portuguese gun casters were employed. The activities in this gun foundry by this time are known from the letter dated 4th April, 1738 A.D. (ता छ १४ जिल्हेज) of Krishnaji Naik Anjurkar and Ramaji Mahadev to Chimaji Appa in which they update the status of gun foundry to the latter. The duo confirm the receipt of iron and related material and fifty five workers from Atgaon (at present in Taluka – Shahapur, District – Thane, Maharashtra) and they request to send a Portuguese gun caster to their workshop. After the arrival of a new Portuguese gun caster, total three Portuguese Gun Casters would be available in the gun foundry, they write. Due to commotion made by Rajashree Gopalrao Kanada’s force over the non-
payment of wages, they request Chimaji Appa to send wages (Ibid 84 – 85). Shankaraji Keshav Phadke by his letter dated 15th April, 1738 A.D. (ता २५ जित्तेज) informs Chimaji Appa that he would need to produce cannon balls for the monsoon season and requests Chimaji Appa to permit him to purchase iron from English (Ibid 90 – 91). Back in Vasai and the surroundings, especially after Portuguese victories, Chimaji Appa was leaving no stone unturned for the proper defense of Maratha camps and positions which they had earlier captured from Portuguese and thus, he was regularly alerting his commanders. How the Maratha command in Vasai responded to their commander-in-chief’s direction on this issue is known from this undated letter of Shankaraji Keshav to Chimaji Appa wherein he informs about his preparedness to fight Portuguese. On being informed about the possible Portuguese attack on the Maratha camp in Bahadarpura and Arnala island and the possibility of success which Portuguese may achieve there, Shankaraji Keshav writes in the letter that he was too receiving the similar updates and says that he is on the alert mode all the time. He opines that even if Portuguese come to attack the Maratha camp at Bahadarpura, then instead of success, the enemy would invite trouble as the enemy would not be able to expand their activities due to lack space in the market area and at the most, could occupy only the fortified residence of Martin Silveira where Marathas had based themselves. He expresses the similar possibility of Portuguese expansion in Dharavi and says that to counter such possibility, his troops are regularly guarding their positions around the under construction stockade (Ibid 136). The exact situation of the Maratha frontline in Vasai is known from the letter dated 15th April, 1738 A.D. (छ २५ जित्तेज) of Chimaji Appa to an unknown addressee (Balaji Baji Rao?). In the letter, Chimaji Appa writes that the Maratha stockade at Vasai was at distance of eight hundred Hath (0.731 Meters) from the Vasai Fort and it was under the fire range of Portuguese cannons fired from the Vasai Fort by which on the regular basis two to three Maratha soldiers were being killed. As there was not much chance of capturing Vasai Fort just by keeping this stockade, Chimaji Appa informs the addressee that Marathas had started to construct a second stockade around the fortified mansion of Martin Silveira which situated at distance of eight hundred Hath (0.731 Meters) from the first Maratha stockade. Despite the total distance of one thousand and six hundred Hath (1.46 KM) of the fortified mansion of Martin Silveira from the Vasai Fort, it was still under the fire range of Portuguese cannons deployed at Vasai Fort, Chimaji Appa writes. He informs the addressee that after the second stockade becomes serviceable, the first one would be dismantled and the Portuguese would have to come
forward up to the distance of one thousand and six hundred Hath to attack the Maratha positions at Vasai. The stockade constructed around the fortified house of Martin Silveira was protected from behind by the under construction Maratha fortification at Vajragad, Chimaji Appa writes in the letter. Besides the Military situation in Vasai, Chimaji Appa informs the addressee that Marathas captured three vessels near Arnala, out of which two belonged to English and thus had to be returned. He informs the addressee that Durjan Singh was given permission to go to Ramnagar with ten musketeers for his marriage (Sardesai 1931: 119). From this one more letter dated 15th April, 1738 A.D. (ता छ २५ जिल्हेज), Chimaji Appa’s own observation about the Maratha activities in the North Konkan is known in better way. He writes in the letter that Marathas were being routinely targeted by Portuguese in Firangan but he hopes that till his stay, the enemy would not dare for direct attack. But he thinks that once he leaves the area then the enemy may attack Marathas from Ghodbandar or Papadi. He says that by the time he leaves the place, at least four hundred horsemen should stay in Vasai and the other four hundred in Thane but writes that even after much persuasion out of the expected eight hundred horsemen, in the actuality, only four hundred horsemen would stay in Vasai and Thane respectively. He says that if his force leaves the region then infantry men may feel burdened due to the rapid Portuguese advances, especially in Dharavi. He laments the loss of Dharavi and says that if Portuguese are defeated in future engagements then only Maratha force would gain the lost morale or even after heavy persuasion it would be difficult to convince them. He estimates the number of enemy to four thousand and hopes that due to pious deeds of the Peshwa, the place would be guarded (Sardesai 1933: 91 – 92). While the Maratha military activities in and around Vasai were not yielding favorable results against Portuguese, Chimaji Appa desired that a party of Maratha soldiers should raid the Daman province as it was the region apart from Goa which was supplying aid to Portuguese. The Maratha activities in the region North of Dahanu till now was mostly comprised of sporadic raids in which, according to directions of the Maratha command, the raiding party sought the assistance of the ruler of Jawhar State. What in the actuality the leading Maratha commanders thought of the assistance of the ruler of Jawhar State can be known from this letter dated 12th April, 1738 A.D. (छ २२ माहे जिल्हेज) of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke wherein he informs Chimaji Appa about the treacherous conduct of the ruler of Jawhar State with the Maratha force in the Portuguese controlled region situated on the North of Dahanu. He writes that Rajashree Dhondopanth who was on a mission to capture a Portuguese village named
Solusumba which had a fortified residence. He says that the village was located in a remote place and according to information given by Ganjadkar Trimbakji Prabhu, an official of Jawhar State, Dhondopant went ahead to attack the place but Trimbakaji instead tried to trap the Maratha force by holding a narrow pass. In a skirmish which ensued there, Shankaraji writes, two men and two to three horses were killed and five persons were injured. Expressing his anguish over the incident which could have turned more harmful for the Maratha force, he informs Chimaji Appa that the officials of Jawhar State in Ganjad provide help and aid to the besieged Portuguese Fort of Asheri and thus, Asheri Fort becomes stronger. Thus, he suggests that till the Jawhar State is punished for such treachery, supplies to Asheri would not be stopped. About the incident in Solsumba village, he says that he had enclosed letter of Rajashree Dhondopant with his letter. He suggests Chimaji Appa that Ganjadkar Trimbakji Prabhu should be punished severely for his hostile act and he should be permitted by Chimaji Appa to act accordingly so that Trimbakaji Prabhu would not dare to repeat the same act in the future. He also informs Chimaji Appa that many families from the Portuguese controlled region had sought refuge in Ganjad and Jawhar provinces and they should be brought in Manor province so that they could be punished. He says that he should be allowed to arrest Trimbakaji Prabhu and if Prabhu is not found then he should be called in by Chimaji Appa on some pretext after sending a message to the ruler of Jawhar State and should be caught and punished after reminding him of his conduct in Solasumba village. Shankaraji Keshav calls the ruler of Jawhar State a “fraud” and suggests Chimaji Appa to annex Paradi and Pahunbare province. He requests Chimaji Appa to order him to burn the province of Ganjad and if the ruler of Jawhar and his officials continue such acts then his entire region should be burnt, he further suggests in the letter (Ibid 26 – 27). It seems that despite such complaint, Chimaji Appa thought to take assistance of the ruler of Jawhar State for the Maratha operations in the Daman region by sending a party of soldiers under the command of Rajashree Chimanaji Bapuji to raid the region and for the purpose, had asked Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to prepare a force of five hundred soldiers from Vasai who would be united with a force of five hundred soldiers deputed by Chimaji Appa and four hundred soldiers from the command of the ruler of Jawhar to complete the task. Expressing his opinion over the issue, Shankaraji Keshav Phadke by his letter dated 15th April, 1738 A.D. (छ २५ माहे जिल्हेज) writes that he had opined to send a force comprising three thousand soldiers to Daman province in the rainy season of 1737 A.D. but it would not possible for him to send five hundred soldiers under the command of
Rajashree Chimanaji Bapuji at the time desired by Chimaji Appa due to freshly arrived Portuguese reinforcement and armada in Vasai. He also informs Chimaji Appa that as the work of stockade in Bahadarpura was progressing and thus, it would not be possible for him to free his men from the ongoing works on Vasai front. Shankaraji Keshav suggests Chimaji Appa to send to a force of two thousand and five hundred soldiers in Daman province on or after 4th May, 1738 A.D. (पौिण वैशाखी) for fifteen days to raid the area (Sardesai 1933: 32 – 33). Even though the larger Maratha raid was not made immediately due to the intensive Maratha construction works in and around Vasai and Sashti island, a party of Maratha soldiers did raid the area of Dahanu and the same can be known from the letter dated 24th April, 1738 A.D. (छ माहे मोहरम) of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to Chimaji Appa in which he reports about the Maratha expedition in Mahim-Tarapur region. He writes in the letter that Rajashree Dhondopant and Honaji Balkawade were regularly raiding the region and had gone up to Dahanu where they fought against five to seven hundred persons deployed there by the Portuguese authorities in Daman. He says that in the skirmish, both made to cut noses of five persons who were later released. He writes in the letter that the Portuguese command after coming to know about the situation then asked the local residents in Kelve to leave the region after taking into custody their grain stock. He says the local residents riding on ten to twelve carts then came to the Maratha occupied territory. Portuguese were dictating the same terms for the local residents in Dahanu region, Shankaraji says in the letter. He says that by continuing the similar offensives, he would force Portuguese in Dahanu, Tarapur, Kelve-Mahim region to flee to Daman and says that if Chimaji Appa provides him with a force of two thousand soldiers for the task then he would take proper measures to defeat Portuguese in the region. He informs Chimaji Appa that as communicated to him by the Maratha commanders posted in Tandulwadi, Portuguese had assembled a force of seven hundred to three hundred persons in Asheri but says that Maratha commanders don’t care for that (Sardesai 1933: 100 – 101).

Despite such military plans, as evident from the letter of Vyankatrao Narayan Ghorpade, it seems that the Maratha camps in Firangan were facing severe shortage of grain. Vyankatrao Narayan by his letter dated 25th April, 1738 A.D. (ता वैशाख शुद्ध शारी भृगुवार) informs Chimaji Appa about the scarcity of grain and provisions in the Maratha camp in Firangan and requests for the latter’s immediate intervention. He says that he appraised the issue to Shankaraji Keshav, who he says that responded by taking the reference of his correspondence with Rajashree Barwaji Tapkir
in which he was informed that no more grain stock could be made available due to large amount of purchase already made in the market. He says that he requested Shankaraji Keshav to make a request on the issue to Chimaji Appa but says that Shankaraji Keshav refused to do so by saying that earlier he had requested to Chimaji Appa for the supply of grain stock to the Maratha troops but many had found the request improper. He says that Shankaraji Phadke informed him that he would not make any new request to Chimaji Appa on the issue and the troop had to adjust in the quantity which they received. Vyankatrao informs Chimaji Appa that no more grain stock was available and the situation was so acute that some were receiving the grain stock while the others were not. He says if such critical situation started in the beginning of summer season then what would be the condition in the monsoon period? He requests Chimaji Appa to make provision of grain stock to the troops engaged in the Vasai campaign (Sardesai 1933: 95 – 96). Ghorpade took one more occasion to raise the issue with Chimaji Appa by this undated letter (received by Chimaji Appa on 27th April, 1738 A.D. छ७ मोहरम) in which he informs Chimaji Appa of the scarcity of the grain stock in the region which led to inflation of its prices. He writes that if in the month of summer such scarcity of grain stock was being faced then what would be situation in the monsoon season? Thus, he requests Chimaji Appa to arrange the supply of grain stock to the Maratha camp at Vasai (Sardesai 1931: 97). The factors like the fierce Portuguese bombing, poor supply of provisions and irregular payment of wages were affecting the psychic of Maratha soldiers who responded by desertion. How much the Maratha command in the *Firangan* was annoyed due to large scale desertion of Maratha soldiers is known from this letter dated 29th April, 1738 A.D. (ता छ७ माहे मोहरम) of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to Chimaji Appa wherein he brings to the notice of Chimaji Appa the issue of deserters from the Maratha Army deployed in *Firangan* and suggests measures to check it. He begins with one Raghoji from Kachara Vasti in Mauje Khandala (at present in District – Pune, Maharashtra) who was employed in Rajashree Karnaji Shinde’s force but later fled from his position. Raghoji was sanctioned with wage of twenty five rupees by Chimaji Appa but despite summoning him twice along with other deserters, namely Balnak family, they did not return, Shankaraji Keshav informs Chimaji Appa. Shankaraji Keshav says that after receiving the orders from Chimaji Appa, he would suspend them from their duties and would fix wages for the other deserters who were willing to return to their duties. He further cites the example like Kanoji Rane, a Patil from Mauje Khadasi in Nanemaval Taluka (at present in District – Pune, Maharashtra) whose two generations had
served in the force of Rajashree Karnaji Shinde but who had fled from his duty from the last three months and did not join his duties despite being issued repeated summons by the Maratha command. He informs Chimaji Appa that more than hundred to hundred and twenty five soldiers had fled from their postings which included twenty to twenty five men from the group of Rajashree Karnaji Shinde which had made Shinde very sad. He says that many servants and soldiers from the Maval region (at present in District – Pune, Maharashtra) had fled to their native places. He says that most of the deserters had fled due to the fear of fierce Portuguese bombardment and thus suggests strict punishment for deserters to set up discipline in the force. He also suggests that the practice of issuing letters to the deserters by the influential persons (local landlord, officials etc.) to pardon the deserters should be stopped as it would encourage more the trend of desertion by seeing that no one gets punished for such wrongdoing. He says that he has decided to punish those deserters who fled from Vasai to Sashti and Belapur ("आपले कदीम लोक पंत्रे आपूर जाऊ लागतियाबरी जमाव कशाचा राहिला? येखाने जाणा कामकाज मोडला तेथ्या काम कैसे होईल? एक वेळ माणूस पलोन गेले आणि त्यास सिक्षा जाहतियाबरी माणसासास धास्त पडोन माणूसे गेले ते फिरोन येते, बंद व कैद चालते. एक गेले त्यास सिक्षा न जाहली म्हणजे दुसरा म्हणतो की येकाचे काय केले ते माझे काय करणार?") (Sardesai 1933: 38 – 39). Besides the issue of deserters, one more problem which was faced the Maratha command in Vasai was of turncoats who despite serving in the Maratha army were caught providing information to Portuguese. How the Maratha command in Vasai dealt with them can be seen from this letter dated 1st May, 1738 A.D. (छ १९ माहे मोहरम) of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to Chimaji Appa in which he expresses his concern about the Arab troops in the Maratha camp at Vasai and communicates his apprehensions for them ("रोज उठोन अस्तनीत आंग बालगावीसी नाही") (Sardesai 1933: 38 – 39). Phadke informs Chimaji Appa about one Arab soldier from the company of Siddi Jauhar Arab who went twice near an unnamed bastion of the Vasai Fort, the latest on the evening of 30th March, 1739 A.D. (छ १० मोहरमी संध्याकाळी) and how he was caught by his fellow soldiers when he tried to return to his post by entering through a gun window. Phadke says that on being enquired of his suspicious activities and the reason behind it after severe beating, the soldier first spoke about Shankaraji Keshav and then about Rajashree Khandoba and later changed his statement by saying that the he had gone near the bastion of Vasai Fort as he was called by Portuguese soldiers placed on the Bastion. Phadke informs Chimaji Appa that the Arab soldier was promptly beheaded for his suspicious activities...
and due to such action ordered by him, prominent Arab commanders – Mahammad Khan Jamadar, Gopinath and Siddi Johar called all Muslim soldiers and had left their positions displeased. Phadke suggests Chimaji Appa that Arabs should not be kept in Maratha camp at Vasai due to their treacherous conduct and cites one more example of one unnamed artilleryman of Haji Beg who fled his company and supposed to have gone inside the Vasai Fort after eating Tadi (Sardesai 1933: 43 – 45). It should be recalled here that Shankaraji Keshav Phadke was keeping grudge against Arabs serving in the Maratha army after the Maratha defeat in Mahim where his elder brother was killed which according to Phadke’s submission, happened solely due to treachery of Arabs. It seems that Chimaji Appa sent the funds required by the Maratha command in Vasai in the first week of May, 1738 A.D. and the same is evident from the letter dated 5th May, 1738 A.D. (ता I छ १५ माहे मोहरम) of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to Chimaji Appa in which he acknowledged the receipt of wages received through Rajashree Barwaji Patil. He writes in the letter that he received rupees thirteen thousands through Barwaji Patil while Rajashree Vyankatrao received rupees seven thousand and Rajashree Sanbhaji Shinde received rupees six thousand. He says that on the previous day, he had sent to Chimaji Appa the account of funds while Rajashree Vyankatrao and Rajashree Sambhaji Shinde would be sending the account to Chimaji Appa through Rajashree Barwaji Tapkir (Sardesai 1933: 99). The situation in the Portuguese camp in Vasai was not different either and it was too facing shortage of grain stock and basic supplies due to Maratha blockade. This letter dated 8th May, 1738 A.D. (छ १८ मोहरम) written by an unknown author to an unknown addressee in which information received from four Christians who came from the island near Vasai with their families is shared, gives us glimpse of the situation. Basing on the information received from the Christian persons, the author states that Antonio Cardim Frois had left Vasai with two to three hundred persons. Martin Silveira and his family also went with the retinue of Frois, the author adds. About the situation in besieged Vasai, the author says that there is scarcity of grain stock and money and many people were ill and dying too. He says that from the information he received from a merchant who came from Mumbai, financial aid to Portuguese in Vasai had come from Goa. The people from an island in Vasai were ready to come out but due restrictions of movement in the Vasai creek, they are unable to come out, the author says in the letter. He writes that those four Christian families who had managed to escape were able to do so due to the help of a fisherman (Sardesai 1933: 145). The aid in question was the fund of one hundred and fifty thousand sherafins sent by the
Viceroy to Vasai onboard the ship Nazareth which was commanded by Muguel Henriques Gorjao, the Captain of Sea and War which reached to Vasai on 18th May, 1738 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1975: 226). Meanwhile, the Maratha command was also informed by the Peshwa Bajirao I about the incoming aid to Portuguese after receiving the news from a clerk deputed by him to Goa. Shankaraji Keshav after being instructed by Peshwa Bajirao I to keep alert in view of the arrival of Portuguese armada consisting of twenty five to thirty ships from Goa to Daman and the possibility of arrival of more Portuguese armada to the North Konkan coast from, by his letter dated 21st May, 1738 A.D. (छ २ सफर) informs Chimaji Appa how he had taken precaution for defense of the region controlled by Marathas and how he had busted a Portuguese spy ring in Vasai. He writes that he sent his clerks to all places with a message to regional commanders to remain alert and has kept provisions of war material ready in the all Maratha fortified positions. About Portuguese spies, he informs Chimaji Appa that he assigned Rajashree Khando Chimanaji and Rajashree Shankaraji Moreshvar the task to expose the spy racket with an instruction to use the language favorable for the task. He says that for the purpose, a person was sent to Mumbai thrice to meet a Portuguese person and with whom a Christian person named Galavao from Vasai Aagar and Duma Koli from Aagashi Aagar were involved. On being asked about whether their authority vests with the Portuguese Vicerois in Goa or the Portuguese in Mumbai, Galavao replied that he has direct connection with the Portuguese in Goa and said that he would be back from Goa with a favorable response and accordingly left Vasai for Mumbai. In Mumbai, he collected a letter from the unnamed Portuguese person and went to Goa where he lived for one and half month and conveyed the plan of Marathas in Vasai to the former and the new Vicerois. He returned from Goa and told Marathas that the Viceroy replied that he would think of talking to Marathas in the future. Phadke writes that once confirmed of Galavao’s Goa link, Marathas brought Galavao Christivao from Vasai Aagar and Duma Koli from Aagar Agashi to their camp and started interrogating them. After severe beating during interrogation, Marathas asked both of them to reveal the name of Christians, Koli and Bhandaris from the region who were involved in the spying racket to which one of them replied that Kolis from Sashti were involved in the plot but later stopped providing details. A Portuguese Padre on whom Marathas had suspicion of having links with the detained persons was deported to Mumbai and after authenticating details provided by Galavao Christivao and Duma Koli, both were beheaded, Phadke informs Chimaji Appa. He writes that a Portuguese person was posted in Mumbai for spying purpose but was
removed thereafter and a new person was appointed in his place. To prove how he was keen on gathering every possible details from the enemy side, Phadke informs movements of Portuguese vessels around the coast of Arnala near the Hanumant bastion, near the coast of Shirgaon and the journey of Portuguese Captain of Daman and says that he is taking all precautions to keep a tab on Portuguese but sometime there is difficulty in getting news from the coast and the sea (Sardesai 1933: 50 – 52). It seems by the month of May, 1738 A.D. Chimaji Appa was exploring all options to launch larger scale offensive on the Daman region and had asked for Shankaraji Keshav Phadke’s opinion over the issue. Phadke by this undated letter (from the content of the letter, it seems that it belongs to the month of May or June, 1738 A.D.) replies to Chimaji Appa’s plan to raid Daman region as communicated through Rajashree Govindpant. According to three options suggested by Chimaji which included –

1. To send a contingent of horsemen to raid and plunder the area.
2. To send a contingent of thousand horsemen and thousand foot soldiers to the region. First horsemen would stay in the region for a month and foot soldier would stay thereafter for a month.
3. To send men from the camp of Shankaraji Keshav from Vasai.

Shankaraji Keshav gives his opinion for the all three plans in the letter. For the first plan, he says that the horsemen would only plunder and burn the area up to wherever they would go and would also confiscate cattle. For the second plan, he says that the force would not do beyond plundering the local population and it would not help in suppressing the entire area. For the third plan, he says that it would not be possible to send men from his camp as it would disturb his ongoing works in the region. He says that only plundering and destroying the area would not be sufficient but taking the local population in confidence like they did in the coastal area of Vasai would be the effective strategy. He says that those residents who would cheat Maratha forces would be frightened and would be convinced. But preparation for such offensive with two thousand and five hundred persons would take some time and it should be launched either in July-August (श्रवण) or August-September (भाद्रपद), he says in the letter. He says that the force should be equipped with provisions useful for one month and the commander of the offensive should be brave so that his dreadness should be felt from time to time. If the offensive is launched by the time of crops become ready for harvest then it would be useful to extract tribute and collect grain and it would benefit the force also, he opines in the letter. He writes that if
Chimaji Appa agrees then he would personally command the force to Daman to raid the area. He says that if the work of stockade measuring fourteen Hath high and twelve Hath broad is completed, furnished with cannons at the top and given under the command of a commander like Rajashree Moraji Shinde then he says he no need to worry and he could free himself for the offensive in Daman. He says that Chimaji Appa should take decision accordingly on the issue (Sardesai 1933: 156 – 157).

After the arrival of Chimaji Appa, Shankaraji Keshav always wished that the commander-in-chief should visit the main camp of Maratha operations in Firangan located in Vasai and should guide his commanders and soldiers. But due to multiple reasons, the same did not happen. From this undated letter of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke to Chimaji Appa, he expressed his sentiments after hearing the public talk about cancellation of Chimaji Appa’s visit to his camp in Vasai. In the letter (from the content of the letter, it seems that it could be written in the month of May, 1738 A.D.), Phadke requests Chimaji to visit his camp. Shankaraji Keshav says that Chimaji Appa visited the area twice earlier and had seen places in Sashti but did not see the Maratha camp in Vasai. Shankaraji Keshav says that at least for one time, Chimaji Appa should visit and stay in the camp for ten to twelve days to see the camp and to know the extent of Maratha activities. He writes that Chimaji Appa’s presence would energize Maratha troops and would encourage them to stay in the camp for the Vasai offensive. In the last, he writes that he would be obeying Chimaji Appa’s decision on this issue (Sardesai 1933: 158 – 159). From the available Maratha records, it seems that despite having a strong urge of Chimaji Appa to visit the Maratha camp in Vasai and to see the Maratha construction activities in Vajragad and Arnala, due to weak health and unsuitable climate of the North Konkan, he had to leave the Maratha camp in Firangan in the month of June, 1738 A.D. (Kelkar 2008: 189).

4.10. The Situation in the Province of the North and in Goa After Chimaji Appa’s Departure (July to December, 1738 A.D.) -

Chimaji Appa after departing from the North Konkan went to Pune where by that time Peshwa Bajirao I had also arrived. In the Province of the North, General Pedro de Mello who had firstly reduced the size of his army by retaining only efficient soldiers was observing closely the situation in the Maratha camp at Bahadarpura. Marathas had restrained themselves to fortifying
themselves at Bahadarpura in the preparation of the monsoon season and had avoided launching a straight way attack on the Vasai Fort. Pedro de Mello, on observing this tactic of the Maratha command felt to induce Maratha troops into an ambush which could have further affected their psyche. He ordered his force to go out of the Fort to challenge the Maratha troop in Bahadarpura and then to make a strategic retreat to entice Marathas to follow them and then to force them to come within the effective fire range of lethal Portuguese artillery. Accordingly, Portuguese troops went outside the Fort and teased Maratha troop camped at Bahadarpura to attack them and then made a strategic retreat. Marathas, who followed the retreating Portuguese force, were immediately bombed by the Portuguese artillery from the Vasai Fort once they came into its fire range. According to Portuguese records, Marathas lost eighty four soldiers and had many injured while in the Portuguese ranks, fifteen soldiers were wounded. Pedro de Mello repeated this experiment for the second time with success which forced the Maratha command thereafter to not hastily react against any such Portuguese move in the future. By adopting such tactic, Pedro de Mello was successful in confining Marathas to their camp at Bahadarpura. The dates of these attacks are not mentioned in the available Portuguese records but from the letter dated 25\textsuperscript{th} July, 1738 A.D. (छ ७ रबिलाखर) of Chimaji Appa to Rajashree Babaji Rao Marane which he wrote by basing himself on the information he received from Shankaraji Keshav Phadke, we come to know that such confrontation did happen between Portuguese and Marathas in Vasai on 13\textsuperscript{th} July, 1738 A.D. (छ २५ रबिलोवल) (more information is given in the next Section).

In the same month, Marathas started to reconstruct the Fortress at Manor which they had earlier deserted in the wake of Pedro de Mello’s attack on Asheri in January, 1738 A.D. On receiving this information, Captain Manoel Pereira attacked the site with one hundred and twenty five soldiers which comprised of forty five native soldiers to obstruct the construction work. The fight which started in Manor in the early morning resulted in Marathas once again deserting the under construction Fortress in Manor with a loss of thirty soldiers. Portuguese despite gaining success in halting Maratha construction work at Manor had nothing to rejoice as the commander of the operation, Captain Manoel Pereira himself died in the battle but his position was soon taken up by his assistant who was holding the post of Sub-Lieutenant. At the end of the battle, Portuguese captured two horses and few more things from Marathas. Marathas also occupied in the beginning of July, 1738 A.D. the village of Danda – Khatali opposite Kelve (at present in Taluka – Palghar, District – Palghar) and started to construct a Fortress on a hill near the village
Khatali. The construction work continued till the end of monsoon. The Fortress had seven bastions and was used by the Maratha command to intensify its operations in the North of Kelve-Mahim. In one of such military operation which Marathas launched in the region of Tarapur, the former Portuguese Captain of Manor Bernando Mesquita Pimental was lured into an ambush by Marathas along with his fifty soldiers and in which ultimately Pimental was killed (Pissurlekar 1975: 227).

The Portuguese command, despite the less frequency of Maratha military operations in the Province of the North in the season of monsoon, was still highly concerned over the possibility of united Maratha forces descending in the North Konkan which till then were separeated due to multiple fronts on which Marathas were involved in, most particularly in the Northern part of India. The probability of engagement of Peshwa Bajirao I in the expedition against Nadir Shah in the North India on which the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil had hoped upon and which he had thought of a decisive factor in division of Maratha forces which could had lessened the Maratha pressure on the Province of the North also proved futile as Nadir Shah had returned to Persia with his army. Thus, the possibility of a larger Maratha attack not only the Province of the North but also on its two supply wings – Goa and Daman was looming. The Portuguese had neither such huge resources and means to confront Marathas on the simulatenous three war fronts. The assumption of Portuguese was not wrong as the same was thought by Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa during their stay in Pune in September, 1738 A.D. according to which they preferred to send a larger force to the Province of the North to deal with Portuguese for once and final instead of prolonging military operations therein by relying on comparatively smaller force and fragmented operations which was turning costly for them (Kelkar 2008: 190). How Marathas and Portuguese were trying to gather combatants from their respective armies in the North Konkan and how the combatants themselves felt of this war can be known from this undated letter (the Peshwa received the letter on 10th September, 1738 A.D. पौंछ रूँ जमा दिलावल) of an unknown official posted in Surat who reports to Peshwa Bajirao I about whether Mughal officials from Surat and Bharuch (at present in Gujarat State) were supplying menforce to Portuguese in Vasai. The writer says that as per the information he received, Tegbakhtkhan (a Mughal official in Surat) did not send any menforce to Vasai but writes that a merchant did try to send some persons to Vasai along with provisions by employing them with the wages of eight rupees per month but says that they were denied permission by the Mughal official. He writes
that out of four to five hundred persons went to Vasai, two hundred returned to Surat. He says that few persons went to Mumbai for the purpose but were told to leave as reinforcement of two thousand persons reached Mumbai to assist Portuguese operations in Vasai. He writes that some persons who came back from Mumbai met him and told him that many persons had died in Vasai and it was being constantly harassed by the enemy force (Marathas). The writer informs the Peshwa that few ships had reached but whether they were carrying Arabs meant to be sent to Vasai, he does not know and assures the Peshwa that he would be sending him the verified information soon. As Peshwa had also asked the writer to get Arabs for the Maratha operations in Vasai, the writer says that he had already sent a letter for the purpose to Ahemadabad and once he gets a reply, he would be going there. He says that it may take time and he would do as per the directions of the Peshwa. He also says that similar request which were made to the Mughal officials in Bharuch and Mominkhan would be considered by them. He writes that once he gets material required by the Peshwa, he would dispatch it immediately and request the Peshwa to direct Pantajipant to deliver the material to its destination (Sardesai 1933: 102 – 103).

Despite such critical situation, the Viceroy did not lose hope and waited for the aid from Portugal to assist Portuguese operations in the Province of the North. He had earlier written a series of request letters to the King of Portugal requesting help for defense of Vasai. On 3rd and 4th October, 1738 A.D. after much wait, Portuguese received aid through two ships named – Nassa Senhora de Victoria (Our Lady of Victory) commanded by Dom Jose de Mello Manoel and Nossa Senhora de Bom Sucesso (Our Lady of Good Success) commanded by Captain of Sea and War Bernardo Antonio Ribeiro e Fonseca. Portuguese received large quantities of arms, ammunition and other war materials through this aid along with men force of seven hundred and thirty soldiers. As it was imminent for the Viceroy to dispatch the aid required by the Province of the North while also looking for the defense of Goa, he referred the issue to the Council of the State (Ibid 227 – 229). The poor situation in the Province of the North in comparison to much larger resources and menpower of Marathas can be seen from the information which was presented by the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil in the meeting of Councillors called on to discuss the issue on 17th October, 1738 A.D. According to information he presented, there were only nine hundred men in the Province of the North to battle against Marathas among which one hundred and ninety were present on the Vasai coast, four hundred and eleven were at Dongari, one hundred and forty four were at Kelve-Mahim and seventy eight were at Karanja-Uran. In the
vicinity of Vasai, there were only eight hundred and ninety seven soldiers among whom five hundred and twenty five were Portuguese and three hundred and seventy six were natives. Among them excluding one hundred and forty two sick soldiers, only seven hundred and fifty five soldiers could be utilized for the active service. In contrast to such tiny number of Portuguese combatants in the Province of the North, according to the own submission of the Viceroy, Marathas had three thousand soldiers camped in Vasai alone and with Pilaji Jadhavrao, additional seven thousand soldiers and seven horsemen were ready join the Maratha force engaged in the Vasai campaign (Pissurlekar 1983: 136). It was agreed in the meeting to send the available aid to the Province of the North with a specific aim to capture the Fort (Bastion) of Reis which was situated at the mouth of Thane creek and which controlled the sea traffic to and from Thane. It was one of the bastions built by Portuguese which secured the Thane creek. If the Bastion of Reis is captured then it would be easy to conquer Thane with its Fort, the attendees in the meeting resolved who were unaware of the ground situation of the place after Maratha takeover of the city and the Fort. It was decided in the meeting to convey the decision to General Pedro de Mello to put the plan into action and for which a special armada consisting of two frigates, three pilot boats and three galleys equipped with war material and troops was dispatched to the Province of the North on 1st November, 1738 A.D. The armada was commanded by able and experienced Portuguese commanders like Captain of Sea and War Antonio Brito Freyre, Captain Chrispiano Geraldes, Luis Henrique de Motta e Mello, Antonio da Cunha de Sa, Manoel Lemos, Thomas Geraldes, Jose de Mattos and Joao de Silva (Pissurlekar 1975: 229).

Though the Viceroy dispatched aid to the Province of the North, he remained in constant worry due the possibility of Marathas attacking Goa and about which he was receiving news from many corners. The situation in Goa was already critical due to unavaibility of troops that could guard the Portuguese controlled regions of Salsette (Shasti island), Bardez and islands of Goa in a case of possible Maratha attack. The island of Salsette which was most exposed to attack had less number of Portuguese troops in the Forts of Margaon and Kunkali in comparison to native soldiers, mostly Hindus which were regardednster untrustworthy by the Portuguese authorities. The Fort of Rachol was opened at several places in its long enclosure wall and similar was the situation of Fort of Mormugaon. The province of Bardez was relatively safe due to its proximity to sea and rivers but was lacking in security due to less number of troops which could guard the Forts of Reys, Shapora and Aguada. The province of Bardez had for its protection only a
company of granediers and light infantry. Similar was the situation of the islands of Goa which was too largely defenseless except the island of Sao Estevao (Juven) which had for its defense a company of the Master of the Field comprising only forty soldiers among whom the most were medically unfit and thus were spared from joining the force which sent to the Province of the North. On the island of Goa, there were only forty horsemen and few marines which earlier had come from Goa to take care of the large area which had Forts of Sao Tiago and Sao Braz. In such condition, the Viceroy decided to deploy the six auxiliary regiments of natives which he had formed earlier to deal any emergency security issues and thus deployed two regiments each to the provinces of Salsette, Bardez and the islands of Goa. He ordered the General Dom Luis Caetano de Almeida, the security in-charge of the province of Salsette, the region which was most exposed to any possible Maratha attacks to deploy the two regiments of native soldiers to the Forts in the region. He advised the General Luis Caetano de Almeida and General Francisco de Mello, the security in-charge of the Bardez province to instruct the local population to leave their houses in a case of alarm raised by Portuguese warning them of attack and to burn the grassy fields to deprive the enemies from having access to fodder for their cattle. They were also advised to not burn the hay which they had stocked to feed their cattle. It is in this way that the Viceroy arranged the makeshift defense of Goa and the surrounding territory which was facing the imminent Maratha attack (Ibid 229 - 230).

General Pedro de Mello on receiving the aid, despite knowing the complexity of operation determinedly went ahead to implement the decision made in Goa for the capture of Reis Bastion located in Thane creek which ultimately could had lead Portuguese attack on Thane. Marathas after seizing Thane from Portuguese control had taken enough precautions to thwart any possible Portuguese attack and as mentioned earlier, had demolished Portuguese residential and religious structures (ex. Convent of St. Augustinian, Casa da Mizericordia etc.) around the Fort and had even shortened the height of fortification to make their artillery fire more effective to target hostile objects in the creek and on the firm land. They had even constructed a protective fencing around the Fort to resist any possible Portuguese attack. It is in this situation that on 4th December, 1738 A.D. General Pedro de Mello ordered an armada comprising of five pilot boats and thirty galleys manned with four hundred Portuguese soldiers and six hundred other soldiers and loaded with inflammable missiles to sail to Thane to accomplish the task. To deceive enemies, he first sailed to Mumbai as pretending to travelling to Uran - Karanja and thereafter
suddenly turned towards Thane and on 6th December, 1738 A.D. appeared at the mouth of Thane creek where the Reis Bastion was located. Upon reaching the creek, he closely observed the situation in and around Reis Bastion and found that Marathas had constructed a protective fencing around the Bastion and had troops placed on the either sides of the creek. He wanted to take a position in the creek where he could safely anchor his armada in the low tide and from where he could bomb the Fort. To his misfortune, he could not locate such safe place and due to protective fence constructed by Marathas around Bastion even could not land his men on the Bastion by placing ladders against it from the ships in the high tide. Thus, he decided to bomb the Fort with a thought that due to smaller size of the Fort, Marathas may find it difficult to stand the Portuguese shelling and thus could leave the place to protect themselves. He consulted his officials who were experienced with the Thane creek and anchored his armada at a safe distance from the Bastion in order to begin the shelling. Even in such condition, one of the ships in his armada stranded in the creek with the start of low tide and was immediately attacked by Marathas who were occupying positions on the either sides of the creek. Marathas tried to burn the ship but they could not achieve success as a Portuguese Lieutenant Colonel Joao Barboza Barros rushed with a company of grenediers to rescue the situation. On 7th December, 1738 A.D. Portuguese started shelling the Bastion with mortar and cannons but could not achive much success. The shelling was stopped in the night and was resumed on the next day (8th December, 1738 A.D.). It is on 8th December, 1738 A.D. that a bomb aimed by Portuguese struck the Bastion as Portuguese noticed large smoke coming from the Bastion. General Pedro de Mello on noticing the large smoke coming out from the Bastion desired to have a closer look of the damage caused by the shelling and thus, came out of ship to land a boat to reach the ship of mortars which was firing on the Bastion. But before he could board the ship of mortars, while on a boat, he was struck by a bullet of artillery which according to eyewitnesses of the incident broke twice through the water and ultimately pierced his abdomen which resulted in his death at the spot. To the surprise of Portuguese officials, the bullet of artillery did not cause any damage to Lieutenant Colonel Joao Barboza e Barros who and other officials who accompanied Pedro de Mello on the boat. The sudden death of General Pedro de Mello shocked the Portuguese commanders present at the battle field as Captain of Sea and War Antonio de Cunha de Sa, Lieutenant Colonel Joao Barboza e Barros of Infantry and Lieutenant Colonel Dom Andriano Gavillo of the Engineers fiercely discussed the next move of the armada which remained
leaderless due to unexpected death of Pedro de Mello. From the discussion, it was decided by the Portuguese commander to temporarily give the charge of the armada to Captain of Sea and War Antonio de Cunha de Sa and to halt the Portuguese operation that was undergoing in Thane creek against the Reis Bastion. In the honor of the dead General Pedro de Mello, the flags were lowered to half mast and the armada returned to Vasai. This is how Portuguese lost their capable General on the battle field against Marathas on 8th December, 1738 A.D. The armada reached Vasai Fort on 12th December, 1738 A.D. which was then commanded Captain Joao Xavier Pereira Pinto. The dead body of Pedro de Mello was brought to the College of St. Paul operated by Jesuits with due honor and where Portuguese commanders, officials and nobles paid their respect to their departed General. The dead body of Pedro de Mello was thereafter buried in the Convent of St. Francis. On the same day, Pinto dispatched the news of Pedro de Mello's death to Goa. Pinto in his letter dated 6th January, 1739 A.D. to the Viceroy accused the English in Mumbai as the culprits behind the death of General Pedro de Mello as he said to have obtained a reliable news of East India Company's General from Mumbai supplying three gunners to Marathas in Thane when Portuguese attacked the Bastion of Reis under the command of Pedro de Mello. According to him, it was one of the three gunners which English in Mumbai provided to Marathas who claimed the life of Pedro de Mello (Pissurlekar 1983: 135 - 136).

The death of General Pedro de Mello was gravely felt by Portuguese authorities in Goa and now they had to find a suitable choice for the post of General of the Province of the North at such critical juncture. The Viceroy Conde da Sandomil this time appointed Martinho da Silveira de Menzes as the General of the Province of the North and the same he informed to Menzes who at the time of his posting was in Diu, by his letter dated 27th December, 1738 A.D. It was the Menzes's fortified residence in Bahadarpura village near Vasai Fort which Marathas had earlier occupied and constructed a stockade around it. The Viceroy also provided financial aid of two hundred thousand sherafins to the newly appointed General for the defense of the Province of the North in addition to one hundred thousand sherafins which was to be sent from Diu where Menzes was posted at the time of his appointment. The Viceroy raised the amount of two hundred thousand sherafins as a loan from the crew of Portuguese ships which had arrived in Goa from Portugal and had not left the place due to complexity of the situation (Pissurlekar 1975: 233 - 234).
Back in the Province of the North, Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa had decided to cut twin supply centres of Vasai - Daman and Goa to isolate the Portuguese controlled territory in the North Konkan. It is already mentioned earlier that how the Maratha command engaged in the Vasai campaign was planning and preparing for raiding the region North of Dahanu up to Daman. Accordingly, on the orders of Peshwa Bajirao I, Shankaraji Keshav Phadke with the force of ten thousand foot soldiers and one thousand horsemen started his raid in the Daman province in November, 1738 A.D. Not many details are available in the Maratha documents about this raid but from Portuguese records, we get some information of the places raided by Phadke. The sole aim of the raid, according to Portuguese records was to obstruct the supply of grain stock and provisions from Daman province to Vasai and to plunder the grain stock stored and unstored therein. The principal Portuguese strongholds in the region at Dahanu, Umbergaon (at present in Taluka - Umbergaon, District - Valsad, Gujarat), Nargol (at present in Taluka - Umbergaon, District - Valsad, Gujarat) and Khattalwad (at present in Taluka – Umbergaon, District – Valsad, Gujarat) had no strong fortifications and those which were present were constructed by the regional landlords to whom these places were leased by the Estado da India on the payment of quint-rent. These smaller fortifications which were originally meant to protect the place from smaller raids by pirates or thieves could not withstand such massive Maratha attack and were ultimately captured by Phadke. The army commanded by Phadke plundered a large quantity of crops from the Daman province except the crop farmed in the fields of Little Daman which was timely removed by Portuguese to grain stores to the Fort of Daman (Ibid 234).

4.11. The King of Portugal John V (Joao V) Dispatches Aid to Vasai from Lisbon (October, 1738 A.D.) -

According to Portuguese documents, after receiving the first hand updates on the affairs of Estado da India and the Maratha invasion of the Province of the North through a person named Antonio Jose who was sent by the Viceroy along with request letters to the Royal Court of Lisbon, the then King of Portugal - King John V (Joao V) immediately sent aid to Vasai onboard two frigates, named, Nossa Senhora da Arrabida and Nossa Senhora Oliveira. These two ships, fitted with sixty pieces of artillery on each, were commanded by Captain of War Antonio de Saldanha and Lieutenant Colonel Joao Malhao de Brito. The frigates were manned by three
hundred and sixty soldiers divided in six companies which were captained by Lieutenants and Sergeants appointed by the War Council. The officials and soldiers of these two frigates were assured of retaining the same rank on their return to Portugal after completion of six years of service. The frigates were carrying three thousand muskets, ammunition of various types and sixty thousand cruzados (a silver coin of nine-tenth of a rupee) in cash. The frigates started their journey for Vasai from the port of Lisbon (Ibid 354 - 355).

4.12. Chimaji Appa arrives in the North Konkan for the renewed Maratha Offensive and the situation thereafter (January - May, 1739 A.D.) -

On 8th January, 1739 A.D. Martinho da Silveira de Menzes after being appointed as the General of the Province of the North took the charge of his duty from Captain Joao Xavier Pereira Pinto who in the meanwhile was acting as the provisional Captain of the Vasai Fort after the death General Pedro de Mello (Pissurlekar 1983: 136). Menzes had tough time to deal with as a large Maratha army under the command of Chimaji Appa himself had entered in the North Konkan to start a conclusive offensive against Portuguese. At the same time, Marathas had launched a parallel offensive on Goa and Peshwa Bajirao I had deputed Vyankatrao Ghorpade with a large force to attack Goa which according to Portuguese estimate were comprised of four thousand horsemen, six thousand infantry and two thousand *Pindaris*. Vyankatrao Ghorpade was assisted in this mission by Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar (Pissurlekar 1975: 245). Back in the Province of the North, from the letter available of Shankaraji Keshav Phadke, we come to know that immediately after raiding the Daman province he came back to the Maratha camp in Vasai on the orders of Chimaji Appa who had informed Phadke about his arrival in the North Konkan and the start of renewed Maratha offensive in the Province of the North. From this letter, we get valuable information of how the Maratha command in Vasai had managed the defense of the region in view of the coming Maratha offensive in Kelve-Mahim, Shirgaon, Tarapur and Asheri which had remained uncoquered till then. In this letter dated 9th January, 1739 A.D. (ताली च० २८ रमजान) addressed to Chimaji Appa, Phadke informs the latter about the mobilization of forces in Vasai and surroundings in the view of latter’s direction to Shankaraji Keshav for the Maratha offensive in Mahim. The letter of Chimaji Appa dated 2nd January, 1739 A.D. (च० २१ रमजान) written from Saygaon village (at present in Taluka – Javali, District – Satara, Maharashtra) containing
directions for Shankaraji Keshav was received by the latter on 9th January, 1739 A.D. Responding to the letter, Shankaraji Keshav who by that time was camping at Aagashi, informs Chimaji Appa that he posted Rajashree Karnaji Shinde and Gangaji Naik Anjurkar with a force of one thousand and seven hundred soldiers at Bahadarpura and had posted Rajashree Khando Chimanaji with one thousand and seven hundred soldiers which consisted of Maratha commanders such as Ranojirao Khanvilkar, Aappajirao Khanvilkar, Trimbak Vishwanath and Hari Ram. He says that he deployed three thousand and four hundred infantry and cavalry men that consisted of Maratha commanders such as Rajashree Sujan Singh, Budhasingh Raut, Vitthalrao Dhabade, Jivaji Dhamdhere, Vyankatrao Vinaji Krushna, Siva Khanderao and Vibhutrao Satkar. He writes to Chimaji Appa that in his absence in Vasai, he had made such mobilization of troops that all had taken responsibility on themselves for the success of mission. He further informs Chimaji Appa that he deployed three hundred and fifty persons to Vajragad, one hundred and seventy five to Gokhvire and two thousand and seven hundred persons to Arnala island. He says that additional six hundred men would join the force in Arnala island which at that time comprised of one thousand workers. He writes that he would be joining the force of Chimaji Appa for Mahim offensive with two thousand and two hundred soldiers and would be carrying three cannons, ammunition, explosives and provisions from Bhawangad. He informs Chimaji Appa that Rajashree Honaji Balkawade’s men had reached near the Asheri Fort (Sardesai 1933: 115 – 116). From the Portuguese records, it seems that Chimaji Appa arrived with his army in Mahim on 8th January, 1739 A.D. and later Shankaraji Keshav Phadke joined him. Chimaji Appa by selecting Mahim as the first place of the renewed Maratha offensive was making soldiers experienced of the tactics and intricacies of warfare which they would be facing in greater proportion in Vasai. By doing this, he was also trying to boost the morale of his men who had earlier faced humiliating defeat in Mahim. After settling themselves in the camp at Mahim, Marathas dug trenches and encircled the Fort from the land side and by deploying armada on the sea and creek side. Shankaraji Keshav Phadke who had lost his elder brother in earlier Maratha attack on the small Mahim Fort did not want to take any chance this time and to make mission successful, personally cheered up his troops in the war camp. According to the Portuguese estimates, the Maratha force in Mahim at the time of attack on 9th January, 1738 A.D. was comprised of sixteen thousand horsemen, twenty four thousand infantrymen twenty thousand sappers, forty elephants and two thousand camels of baggage, while the defenders in
the Mahim Fort were just four inadequate companies of the natives who were encouraged by few Portuguese residents. The Mahim Fort was commanded by Captain Antonio de Melo Pereira de Sousa who immediately requested General Menzes to send aid to him after the Maratha attack started (more details are given in the next Section). Marathas furiously started to bombard the fort first with five cannons and later on according to Portuguese records, thirty cannons were deployed against the Fort which caused considerable damage to the Fort. So furious was the Maratha firing that it took three days for Portuguese aid comprising of a company of Portuguese soldiers and ninety native soldiers and war material which was sent by General Martinho da Silveira da Menzes under the command of Leonardo de Siqueira to enter the Mahim Fort. The Portuguese armada which arrived on the coast of Mahim on 15th January, 1739 A.D. was dispatched with much difficulty inside the Fort by Captains of the Sea and War Luis Henrique da Motta e Mello and Francisco Coelho de Mello on 18th January, 1738 A.D. The ammunition and explosives delivered to the Fort was consumed just within two days by the defenders of the Fort who also noticed that Marathas had successful in placing mine beneath the fortification wall from the bastion of Cavaleiro de Reis Magos to the bastion of Sao Sebastiao. According to admission of Captain Antonio de Melo Pereira, Marathas had excellent foreign gunners in their artillery section which was throwing big stones inside the Fort and showering the Fort with fire through out the day and night which caused several breaches in the fortification of Mahim Fort. In such situation, Captain Antonio de Melo Pereira de Sousa after consulting other Portuguese officials decided to start negotiations with Marathas and deputed Captain Leonardo de Sequiera and Captain Joao de Lima for having talks with Marathas. In a treaty which was concluded on 20th January, 1739 A.D. it was agreed by the Maratha command to allow Portuguese officials and residents of Mahim Fort to leave the place with their belongings either to Vasai Fort or to any other place of their choice. But after takeover of the Fort, according to Portuguese documents, Marathas inspite of honoring the terms of treaty, obstructed the passage of soldiers to Vasai and allowed only officials and their families to move to Arnala island from where they went to Mumbai island. From the Maratha documents, we come to know that Marathas had made a large number of people from Mahim prisoners and had kept them in their custody. The same was informed by General Menzes who through his letter dated 18th February, 1739 A.D. writes that Marathas had kept Portuguese from Mahim in captivity at Kalyan (Pissurlekar 1983: 136 – 137). In the battle of Mahim, Marathas lost three hundred soldiers and Portuguese had twenty of
their men killed in action (Pissurlekar 1975: 237). After Mahim, the next to place to have gone under the Maratha control was Kelve where Portuguese defenders of two bastions fought resolutely against Marathas but without success (more information is given in the next Section). By 21\textsuperscript{st} January, 1739 A.D. Kelve was under Maratha control. Marathas now turned their attention to Shirgaon which was then commanded by Captain Luis Serrao who was advised by the Portuguese authorities to surrender the Fort to avoid repetition of activities which took place earlier in Kelve (more information is given in the next Section). Serrao who was in the process to conclude an agreement with Marathas tried to delay it by making a plea to finalize it on the next day as it was already night when both parties had reached an agreement. Luis Serrao, however, instead of honoring the promise he made, tried to flee the place with his garrison in the cover of night but was apprehended by Marathas near the creek while he and his men were trying to board the boats. Along with prisoners made in Mahim, the people captured from Shirgaon were sent to custody in Kalyan by Marathas and this is how on 22\textsuperscript{nd} January, 1739 A.D. Shirgaon fell to Marathas (Ibid 137). After Shirgaon, Marathas laid siege to Tarapur Fort which was then commanded by Lieutenant Captain Luis Vellazo Machado. After a long siege and determined resistance offered by Portuguese defenders of the Fort, it was ultimately captured by Marathas on 3\textsuperscript{rd} February, 1739 A.D. It is in this battle that a prominent Maratha commander Baji Bhivrao Retharekar and the Portuguese Captain of the Fort Luis Vellazo Machado (more details are given in the next Section) (Kelkar 2008: 201 – 204). The next target of Marathas after the fall of Tarapur Fort was the hill Fort of Asheri where the native soldiers refused to take arms against Marathas after believing in rumours of Maratha attack on Mahim and Tarapur (more details are given in the next Section). In such situation the Portuguese Captain of the Fort Joao de Lemos Frageso had no option but to surrender the Fort to Marathas on the condition of safe passage to Portuguese officials and garrison of the Fort. But Marathas, for preventing the garrison of Asheri Fort to join the Portuguese force in Vasai did not allow them to leave the Fort and like they did earlier in Mahim, Shirgaon and Tarapur, took the garrison in their custody. This is how on 14\textsuperscript{th} February, 1739 A.D. Marathas took the control of Asheri Fort. Though Marathas had imprisoned a large number of Portuguese officials and soldiers and their family members from Mahim, Shirgaon, Tarapur and Asheri and had sent them to Kalyan, how some leading Maratha commanders thought of the detention policy of Marathas in the Province of the North at the height of their offensive in the region can be known from this undated letter
of Vasudev Joshi, who was the Maratha Governor of Kalyan at that time. In this undated supplement (the letter seems to have been written in the month of January-February, 1739 A.D.) to Chimaji Appa, Vasudev Joshi gives his suggestion for Portuguese prisoners of war captured during Maratha offensive on Mahim and Shirgaon in January, 1739 A.D. Shankaraji Keshav sent Portuguese prisoners of war from Mahim and Shirgaon to Joshi (in Kalyan) with directions to take care of them and to feed them till they are under detention. Upon this, Joshi informs Chimaji Appa that a large quantity of rice is needed on daily basis (one and quarter Khandi of Rice) to feed three to three hundred and seventy five Portuguese war prisoners and also a space is needed to accommodate them. He says that Portuguese have too in their custody Maratha prisoners of war and suggests Chimaji Appa that the Portuguese prisoners of war could be exchanged with Maratha prisoners of war while important Portuguese officials like Captain, Clergy should be kept in the Maratha custody. On this issue, he says that he would act according to directions of Chimaji Appa (Sardesai 1933: 122 – 123). Chimaji Appa, after achieving success in the aforementioned places where his army gained considerable experience, camped in Vajrayogini (presently Vajreshvari, Taluka – Bhiwandi, District – Thane) and deputed his commanders Govind Hari and Tubaji Pant to Sashti island. From Vajrayogini, he entered in the Vasai region and camped in Bahadarpura with his army (Kelkar 2008: 208). According to Portuguese estimate, the army of Chimaji Appa was comprised of twenty five thousand horsemen, forty thousand infantrymen, four thousand miners and helpers and other workers, six thousand camels, fifty elephants, many Pindaris and sellers of drinks and eatables. With the arrival of Chimaji Appa, the next phase of renewed Maratha offensive on Vasai Fort started on 17th February, 1739 A.D. (Pissurlekar 1975: 241) (more information is given in the next Section).

The advances of Maratha army under the command of Chimaji Appa in the Province of the North worried Portuguese authorities in Goa who were also facing parallel Maratha attack on Goa from 23rd January, 1739 A.D. As mentioned earlier, the sole aim of the Maratha attack on Goa waged under the command of Vyankatrao Ghorpade, a commander and brother-in-law of of Peshwa Bajirao I and Dadaji Bhave Nargundkar, a commander of Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur was to stop supplies which was being made from Goa to Vasai (the brief details of Maratha invasion of Goa and its outcome is provided in a separate section below). Such perilous situation made the Portuguese command in Goa helpless which leave alone aiding the Province of the North, could not even arrange sufficient security measures for the defense of Goa and the
same can be seen from the letter of the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil dated 31st January, 1739 A.D. to General of the Province of the North Martinho da Silveira de Menzes in which he informs the latter about the steps he had taken to initiate dialogue with Chhatrapati Shahu in Satara and asks Menzes to initiate similar talks with Chimaji Appa and Peshwa Bajirao I to end hostilities with Marathas in the North Konkan. In the letter, the Viceroy acknowledges the fact that he is unable to send any help to Vasai and the other besieged places in the Province of the North due to Maratha invasion of Goa under the command of Vyankatrao Ghorpade who had entered Sashti (Salsette) with his army on 23rd January, 1739 A.D. Appraising Menzes of the difficult situation which he found himself and the decision arrived in the meeting of Councillors, the Viceroy asks Menzes to abandon all Portuguese controlled forts in the Province of the North except Diu, Daman and Karanja. For preseverving the forts of Diu, Daman and Karanja, the Viceroys says that the first is important to Estado da India and was not attacked by Marathas, the second fort he says that had sufficient grain stock and the third fort he says due to its strategic location could be utilised for offering resistance. He says in the letter that by abandoning the unrequired forts which even included Vasai and Revdanda, the garrisson and war material of those respective forces could be utilised for the effective defense of Goa which was the capital of the Estado da India. He asks Menzes to maintain confidentiality of such measures adopted by the Estado da India to make pretention before Marathas of surrendering the forts under treaties which would ensure the safetey of the forts which the Portuguese authorities had decided to maintain. He informs Menzes that he had offered the Fort and Port of Chaul to Chhatrapati Shahu as the fort was causing unnecessary expenditure to the Portuguese state and he found it useful to conclude a treaty with Marathas to free the region which they had occupied in the Daman region. He further writes that if Chhatrapati Shahu is unsatisfied over the transfer of Chaul Fort then he may even offer the Fort of Korlai (Morro de Chaul) to Marathas till the situation becomes favorable to Portuguese to retake these places in the future. He asks Menzes to initiate talks with Chimaji Appa and Peshwa Bajirao I to request them to end hostilities in Vasai and Daman regions and for the purpose, he asks Menzes to show them a copy of letter which he had sent to Chhatrapati Shahu. In a supplement to the same letter, he writes to Menzes in which he says that the port of Chaul is better than the port of Vasai. He asks Menzes to secure some land in the Province of the North like the fertile island of Sashti (Salsette) and the region around Vasai or at least some portion of the districts of Saivan, Anjur, Belapur etc. while concluding
talks with Chimaji Appa (Pissurlekar 1975: 261 - 263). Acting on the direction of the Viceroy, Menzes ordered the abandonment of the forts of Pardi (at present Badla-Pardi in Taluka Valsad, District - Valsad, Gujarat), Versova, Vanare and Dongari while he retained Vasai which he had decided to defend till his last breath. The Fort of Paradi was then commanded by Captain Domingo de Souza who after receiving the order left the fort with his soldiers to Daman. While leaving the fort, he took along with him ammunition and left behind only damaged artillery places. Though the fort at Paradi was deserted by Portuguese, at the remaining places even while abandoning the forts, Portuguese gave tough fight to Marathas. The Fort of Versova was next to be abandoned by Portuguese where they resisted inroads of Marathas with all strength and where Marathas had to make four attempts in the two years to capture it. Finally on 20th February, 1739 A.D. Marathas were able to take control of Versova (more information is given in the next Section). The next place which was abandoned by Portuguese on the advice of East India Company of Mumbai was Vanare which was then commanded by Joao de Souza Ferrao. On 5th April, 1739 A.D. Portuguese demolished the fortification of Vanare on the insistence of English of Mumbai who were assisting Portuguese from the beginning of Maratha offensive in the Province of the North for their defense of Vanare and other places of importance despite being warned by Marathas not to do so (more information is given in the next Section). Dongari was to follow the suit and which finally captured by Marathas on 25th April, 1739 A.D. (more information is given in the next Section). Meanwhile, in the month of March, 1739 A.D. Manaji Aangrey, taking the benefit of cornered situation of Portuguese in the Province of the North attacked the Fort of Karanja at Uran with the help of local cultivators, fishermen and seamen. The Fort at the time of attack was captained by Senior Captain Jose Luis da Silva who had hundred soldiers for the defense of Karanja Fort. Aangrey attacked the fort on 15th March, 1739 A.D. with a fleet of forty war ships having two thousand soldiers and besieged the place. Despite the adverse situation, Jose Luis da Silva resisted the siege for five days and after finding no help coming either from Vasai or the neighbouring Portuguese strongholds, decided to enter into negotiations with Manaji Aangrey who agreed to allow the Portuguese officials, soldiers and families of garrison to leave the place. It is by this way Manaji Aangrey conquered Karanja on 21st March, 1739 A.D. (more information is given in the next Section). Peshwa Bajirao I was concerned with such act of Manaji Aangrey after being informed by Chimaji Appa about Aangrey’s attack on Uran. In an undated reply (from the content in the letter, it appears to have
belonged to the month of March, 1739 A.D.), the Peshwa had asked Chimaji Appa to take appropriate measures to get the fort under his control if Manaji Aangrey succeeds in capturing the place (Sardesai 1933: 141).

4.13. Manaji Aangrey Attacks Revdanda and Korlai Forts (March, 1739 A.D.) -

After capturing Uran, Manaji Aangrey turned his attention to the Forts of Chaul and Korlai which were located near to his stronghold at Colaba (at present in Alibag, District - Raigad, Maharashtra). Observing the success of Chimaji Appa at Vasai, Aangrey was hurrying to capture Chaul and Revdanda as he did not wanted them to go under the control of Peshwa Bajirao I. In between, according to Maratha documents, Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa had planned to capture Korlai Fort secretively and for this purpose, Chimaji Appa had ordered the Constable (Havaladar) of Tala Fort Subhanaji Mankar to secretly conquer the Korlai Fort with the help of force comprising five to six hundred soldiers. Accordingly, Mankar had employed informers through whom he was planning to capture the fort. But due to some internal squabbles, the informers did not cooperate with Mankar for the project and Mankar had too make much efforts in winning them over to his side as he had received information of the plan of Sanbhaji Aangrey for capture of Korlai and Revdanda Forts. Thus to not give Sambhaji Aangrey any chance of conquering the fort, he started preparation for the offensive from 17th March, 1739 A.D. and requested Chimaji Appa to provide him one thousand soldiers, bullets and ammunition for the mission. Peshwa Bajirao I hoped of getting assistance of Manaji Aangrey in his effort to capture Korlai but the latter did not provide any assistance to Subhanaji Mankar. Mankar reported the non-cooperation of Manaji Aangrey to Chimaji Appa and requested the latter to send him force and war material by which he could capture the forts of Korlai and Revdanda (Kelkar 2008: 215 - 216). What happened next, is not available in the published Maratha records. But according to Portuguese documents, Manaji Aangrey attacked Chaul on 27th March, 1739 A.D. The Fort of Revdanda was under the command Dom Francisco, Baron of Galanfel, a German national who had a force of two hundred trained soldiers along with some officials and native soldiers for defence of Revdanda Fort. Initially, he along with his army attacked a place called the Camp of Revdanda Fort which had two bastions and fortification manned by two companies of the natives and one hundred and fifty Bhandaris (Hindu cultivators of Coconut plantation) under the
command of Captain Perseval Machado. Aangrey directed his eight hundred soldiers to attack the camp who responded by first aiming the fortification wall with three cannons. The weak fortification wall could not bear bombardment and was destroyed which forced the Portuguese garrison to desert their position for safety. After observing advance of enemies, General Dom Francisco, ordered Captain Perseval Machado to attack the army of Aangrey from the side of seashore and Captain Miguel Pereira de Sao Paio from the land side. On 1st April, 1739 A.D. Captain Perseval Machado with a company of Bhandari soldiers and Captain Miguel Pereira de Sao Paio with two hundred trained soldiers launched successful attack on the army of Manaji Aangrey and captured the camp occupied by Aangrey's force. The artillery pieces of Aangrey's which were captured by Portuguese were immediately nailed. Aangrey, though retreated, did not give up and again attacked the area of camp for the second time which forced the Governor of Revdanda Fort Dom Francisco to order the local residents to take shelter inside the fort. Aangrey started shelling the Revdanda Fort with thirty eight cannons and mortars but found the attack equally resisted by Portuguese. On finding this, Aangrey decided to attack the Korlai Fort with a thought to blockade the Revdanda Fort. The capture of Korlai Fort would ease military operation in Revdanda Fort, Aangrey thought. Thus, his army crossed the creek and entrenched themselves at the plain which was situated at the foot of the hill and started to bombard the fort with their cannons. The cannons, however, could not damage the fortification significantly which prompted Aangrey to lay mines under the fortification wall (Pissurlekar 1975: 343 - 344). According to Maratha documents, Subhanaji Mankar was too involved in the attack of Korlai Fort but he was acting as an independent commander on behalf of Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa and not under the command of Manaji Aangrey. Manaji Aangrey irked over insubordination of Subhanaji Mankar threatened the latter to fall in line or face consequences. Infighting between Aangrey and Mankar weakened the Maratha siege of Korlai Fort though it was continued till the end of May, 1739 A.D. (Kelkar 2008: 216). Both Aangrey and Mankar were unable to capture Korlai Fort even after the fall of Vasai on 16th May, 1739 A.D. The Maratha siege of Korlai Fort was lifted forcefully by General Dom Francisco who aided by reinforcement sent by Caetano de Souza Pereira from Mumbai after the fall of Vasai, attacked Maratha positions with three companies of Bhandari soldiers and the garrison of Korlai Fort which comprised of fifty soldiers. Before the attack, he divided his army in two parts, the first attack party was put under the command of Captain Joao Mourao and the second he kept under his command. On 6th June,
1739 A.D. the first attack party battled Marathas in their camp at the Church which was situated at the foot of hill while the second attack party headed by General Dom Francisco attacked Maratha fortified positions. Both attack parties were successful in pushing Marathas away from their positions who thereafter camped near Revdanda Fort and started encircling it. Portuguese captured sixteen cannons and seventeen Maratha combatants in the attack. In the above mentioned action at Korlai Fort, Portuguese had seven dead and nineteen injured in their ranks while Marathas suffered a great loss of life (Pissurlekar 1975: 345). Manaji Aangrey continued the siege of Revdanda Fort without any success for the next five months until he lifted the siege after the entry of a Portuguese force under the command of Caetano de Souza Pereira in Revdanda Fort. Pereira who was on the way to Goa from Mumbai halted at Revdanda for few days and it was on 18th October, 1739 A.D. that Manaji Aangrey lifted the siege of Revdanda Fort without capturing the place from Portuguese control (Ibid 357).


It is already mentioned above that to isolate Vasai more effectively, Peshwa Bajirao I sent a force under the command of Vyankatrao Ghorpade and Dadaji Bhave Nargundkar to attack Goa which entered Sashti island on 23rd January, 1739 A.D. Needless to mention, considering the geopolitical rivalaries between the Bhonsale family which had separate courts in the Satara and Kolhapur, the Peshwa Bajirao I had to take permission from both of them to attack Goa which was nearer to the region under the control of Chhatrapati Shahu of Kolhapur (Kelkar 2008: 245). Dadajirao Bhave was the brother of Ramrao Bhave who on the earlier occasion had attacked Goa and plundered the region by taking away with him five lakh Asurpi from Sashti island on 25th April 1717 A.D. and thus the family of Bhave had already struck terror in the hearts of Portuguese. Among the Maratha commanders and officials who were a part of this important campaign, the leading one were Govind Ram Thakur who originally hailed from Sawantwadi and had first hand information of regional geopolitics and Pantaji Pant. Govind Ram Thakur was the Secretary to the General of the Maratha force, Vyankatrao Ghorpade who too originally belonged to the village Mhapar in Sawantwadi State (Ibid 242). The Viceroy had no force and sufficient financial resources to resist such large force of Marathas and had managed to make arrangement of Goa’s defense with manpower and finance available with him. For the defense of
the Sashti, Bardez and Goa, he had to take services of all which even included of civilians, natives and clergy (Pissurlekar 1975). The contemporary geopolitical situation around Goa was precarious with constantly changing sides. Earlier the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil was informed from the various quarters which included the Captain Inchbird of East India Company from Mumbai, Narsinghrao, the commandant of Mardangad Fort and an unnamed noble from the court of Bhonsale of Sawantwadi (at present in Taluka – Sawantwadi, District – Sindhudurg) of the imminent Maratha attack on Goa. From the court of Bhonsale of Sawantwadi, he was also informed that the Peshwa Bajirao I was taking the help of Bhonsale of Sawantwadi and Sambhaji Aangrey for his mission in Goa (Pissurlekar 1983: 148). It is already well know that the above mentioned regional powers had already locked horns with each other for achieving regional supremacy and thus, how could have they acted together was a question. Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur was much opposed to Peshwa Bajirao I who by that time had emerged as the undisputed leader of Maratha cofedercy in the court of Chhatrapati Shahu of Satara. Similar was the situation of two contending factions of Aangrey family who were aiming to emerge as an independent power on the Western coast and who were too opposed to the Peshwa Bajirao I except of entering in temporary alliance with the latter for the short term geopolitical gains. The ruling house of Bhonsale of Sawantwadi who bore the title of Raja Sardesai was too attempting to be the centre of power in the South Konkan and had divided loyalties among themselves. The rulers of Sawantwadi and Portuguese in Goa had continuous fights over the territorial rights, the latest in which Portuguese captured Khorjuve and Panali islands from the control of Sawantwadi State and forced them to pay a hefty amount as a tribute to Estado da India. While the rulers of Sawantwadi State considered the said islands as a part of their territory, Portuguese maintained that these two islands were donated to Estado da India by the Mughal Emperor after a Portuguese Ambassador Father Frey Luis da Piedade went to the Mughal Court. The said islands, according to Portuguese, were forcefully kept by the Sawantwadi State until they were recaptured by the Viceroy Caetano de Mello e Castro (1702 – 1707 A.D.) (Pissurlekar 1975: 291). The special territorial interest of the Sawantwadi State was over the Portuguese controlled Province of Bardez. The then ruler of Sawantwadi State, Phond Sawant (b. 1667 A.D. – d. 1738 A.D.) died in 1738 A.D. and the affairs of the state were looked after by the grandchildren of Phond Sawant named Ramchandra Sawant-Bhonsale (b. 1712 A.D. – d. 1755 A.D.) and his son Jairam Sawant-Bhonsale (d. 1753 A.D.). One of the sons of Phond Sawant was Nagoba Sawant who was
ambitious and had developed enmity with his nephew Ramchandra Sawant and his brother Jairam Sawant after the death of his father, Phond Sawant. To get the throne of Sawantwadi State, he sought the alliance of Portuguese (Ibid 360). It is in this situation that the so-called alliance between the Peshwa and the Sawantwadi State was made. Though the Peshwa Bajirao I was pressuring Ramchandra and his regent Jairam Sawant, the duo were using the opportunity to force Portuguese to accept their demands which principally included of handing over Khorjuve and Panali islands to them and to exempt them from paying tribute of one thousand asurpis to Portuguese. The details of events and diplomacy which took place in Goa after the Maratha invasion are not sufficiently available in the published Maratha records but its details are present in the Portuguese documents, based on which, the stages of the events and negotiations are presented below.

After entering in Sashti, Marathas immediately captured Margaon on 25th January, 1739 A.D. camped near the town. Thereafter, Marathas in no time had occupied the entire Sashti (Salsette island) except the two forts Raitur (Rachol) and Mormugao. The Fort of Raitur was attacked by Marathas on 1st February, 1739 A.D. and to capture the place, Marathas first dug trenches at a place called Bori near the river Zuari with the sole aim to disrupt the aid coming to Rachol Fort through the river route. These positions at Bori were manned by the soldiers of Dadajirao Bhave. On the 7th February, 1739 A.D. Marathas shifted their camp to the place called Raia near Rachol located in Sashti island which thereafter remained a place where lengthy negotiations between Marathas and Portuguese took place over the fate of Goa and the Province of the North. While Marathas were engaged in their operation at Rachol, on 14th February, 1739 A.D. the contingent of soldiers posted at Bori managed to defeat a Portuguese fleet which was on the way back after dispatching aid to Rachol Fort. The General of the said fleet Dom Luis Caetano de Almeida, flouting the instructions of the Viceroy to not engage with Marathas and to loss any Portuguese soldier, decided to attack the Maratha positions at Bori. In the attack which Portuguese launched in which a significant number of Portuguese commanders and soldiers along with native soldiers were involved, Marathas first withdrew from their positions and thereafter waited for an opportune moment to retaliate. After finding such moment, Marathas attacked Portuguese who retreated in disorderly manner resulting in huge casualties (seventy six Portuguese soldiers and fifteen native soldiers were killed in the fight) which even included a commander and noble from Vasai named Captain Jose Pereira Pinto who happened to be in Goa.
at the time of Maratha attack on Rachol. Marathas were successful in capturing six Portuguese as prisoners during the said fight. To inflict fear in the camp of Portuguese of Rachol, Marathas promptly beheaded three captured persons and cut the noses of remaining three and sent them in such condition to the Portuguese camp in Rachol Fort. The Viceroy listened to this major uncalled defeat of Portuguese at Bori with patience and uneasiness as narrated to him by a survivor Portuguese commander Manoel Soares Velho. The former General of the Province of the North, Antonio Cardim Froes who was too involved in the defense of Goa, wrote a complaint letter to Maratha General Dadajirao Bhave accusing the latter of violating the code of war conduct due to brutalities committed by Maratha soldiers on the captured Portuguese soldiers near Rachol. Dadajirao Bhave tersely reminded Froes of atrocities committed by the Portuguese Captain of Mahim Fort on the imprisoned Maratha soldiers in the previous year when Froes himself was the General of the Province of the North. Bhave informed Froes that the main intention of Maratha attack on Goa was to retake the region which according to him belonged to Chhatrapati Shahu and from where Shahu did not receive yearly tribute from Portuguese. He warned Froes that Maratha army would not go back till they achieve the goal of their mission and asked Froes to surrender the Fort of Rachol to Marathas. On 16th February, 1739 A.D. Marathas besieged Rachol Fort (Ibid 245 - 259).

The next target of Marathas was Ponda which was under the King of Saunda dynasty Marathas did not face any resistance in Ponda due to help of local people and thus, Govind Ram Thakur who marched on the Fort of Phonda, Mardangad with his army comprising of five hundred cavalrymen found himself welcomed by the Commandant of the Fort named Narsingrao who opened the gate of fort for the Maratha army. Next fort which Marathas occupied in the similar fashion was the Fort of Usgaon. Thus, by 1st March, 1739 A.D. Phonda fell to Marathas which gave them access to the islands of Goa. On the day Marathas besieged Rachol Fort i.e. on 16th February, 1739 A.D. the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil had thanked Ramchandra and Jairam Sawant for not coordinating with Marathas in their war operation against Portuguese in Goa. But taking the advantage of the situation, Bhonsale-Sawant of Sawantwadi State who were waiting for ripe moment to get their demands accepted by Portuguese, on finding that Portuguese were reluctant to yield to their demands, occupied Bardez on 6th March, 1739 A.D. despite the wishes of Peshwa Bajirao I. Information about the imminent occupation of Bardez by Sawantwadikars, including its timing was already supplied by the sons of the Chief Courtier of Sawantwadi State.
named Deoba Vishram Sabnis through their relative Minoo Shenvi, an influential Hindu merchant resident of Devadi in Goa to Portuguese. Portuguese decided to guard only the Forts of Aguada and Reis Magos in Bardez as they had no capacity to defend the entire region (Pissurlekar 1983: 149 - 150).

In such emergency situation, with enemies of various camps at the next door of Goa, the officials of Estado da India and the inhabitants of the region recalled the days of Chhatrapati Sambhaji’s invasion on Goa in 1683 A.D. where they had faced the similar circumstances. After the Maratha occupation of Sashti and Sawantwadikar's occupation of Bardez, many Portuguese residents of those regions had flooded in Goa for the safe stay. Fearing the safety of residents and influential families in the wake of Maratha attack, the Viceroy had asked them to take refuge in the Fort of Mormugaon and the Fort of Aguada with their valuable belongings. On 8th March, 1739 A.D. all women, children in Goa and the nuns in St. Monica Monastery were moved to the Fort of Mormugaon. In such pressing situation, the Viceroy found himself a little bit relieved on receiving the news of arrival of Dutch armada comprising of eight warships and some light crafts at the shore of Auguada which was on the way to confront Sambhaji Aangrey who had captured two Dutch ships despite having an agreement of peace with the Dutch East India Company. The Viceroy thought to take assistance of Dutch armada for repelling the Maratha attack on Goa despite animosity which existed between Estado da India and Dutch East India Company due to their geopolitical rivalry. To persuade the Dutch fleet, he even offered the Fort of Chaul as the place where Dutch could establish their trading factory and sent a high powered delegation led by the former General of the Province of the North Dom Luis Bottelho. In spite of such strong representation, the Dutch armada did not even meet the Portuguese delegation which comprised of many Portuguese priests by citing the absence of authority for concluding such talks from their General of Batavia (the headquarter of Dutch East India Company in the present day Jakarta in Indonesia) and sailed along the Western coast in their chase of Sambhaji Aangrey. With no immediate sign of incoming help, Portuguese had to fight at their own against the large force of Marathas. The islands of Goa became the centre of fear psychosis of Portuguese who were chiefly at the receiving hand of many rumors and misinformation which were circulating in the region aftermath of Maratha invasion. One of the principal rumors was that of native Hindus, mainly the rich Hindu merchants helping Marathas in their conquest of Goa. Marathas did receive help from locals but there were many influential Hindu feudal landlords and rich
merchants who were loyal to Estado da India due to their trade operation in the Portuguese colonies located at different corners of the world such as in Brazil in the South America, Mozambique in Africa, Macau in the South Coast of China from where they earned huge profits. Orthodox Portuguese clergy and Inquisitor, jealous of success of Hindu merchants, on many occasions did instigate the local mass and higher ups in the Portuguese administration of Estado da India to banish them from public life after confiscating their properties but had never achieved desired success. One such familiar demand was raised by the Chief of the Inquisition by moving a resolution in the meeting of State Council held on 11th March, 1739 A.D. On the earlier occasions, due to such rabid fanaticism which multiplied further due rumors of local Hindus helping Marathas in the latter's conquest of Goa, a number of riots and pillaging against Hindus, especially targeting rich Hindu merchants did take place. One such incident of Christian mob attacking the home of a prominent Hindu merchant named Phondu Kamat who lived in Paneli near Goa on suspicion of him sheltering four hundred armed Maratha soldiers took place on 8th March, 1739 A.D. in which even the Viceroy who himself was much orthodox Catholic Christian was not spared by the local Portuguese clergy and residents who accused him of being soft-cornered for Hindus after he came to the spot on sensing the criticality of the moment. Due to such prevalent situation and fear of persecution by Christian padres, the Viceroy had to detain many Hindu merchants for safety in the Fort of Marmugaon on 10th March, 1739 A.D. But it were the rich Hindu merchants in Goa who ultimately came to rescue of the Viceroy be it for playing a major role in holding and concluding negotiations with Marathas or contributing a major share in the finance which Portuguese paid to Marathas either as a tribute or as a bribe to Maratha Generals. The Hindu merchants cum influential persons who are mentioned in the Portuguese documents who played an important role in the contemporary Maratha-Portuguese diplomacy were - Vyankat Kamat, Upiya Kamat, Babulya Sinai (Shenvi) Sukhthankar, Babu Rao Desai of Narva (in Dicholi), Santu Sinai (Shenvi) Dangi, Vithoda Senai (Shenvi) Dhume, Bhagavan Kamat Vagh to mention a few (Pissurlekar 1975: 263, 276 - 281).

It is already mentioned before that with no sufficient means to take on Marathas on the battle field, the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil resorted to diplomacy from the first day of Maratha invasion of Goa and was favoring negotiations with the head of Maratha confederecy Chhatrapati Shahu. For this purpose, he took the help of a Hindu landlord and resident of Narve in Goa named Baburao Desai who was a relative of Naro Ram, the Prime-Advisor of Chhatrapati
Shahu in the Royal Court of Satara. But soon, he came to realise that till he reaches an agreement with the Peshwa Bajirao I, none of his overtures for peace with Marathas could succeed. So, he concentrated on the Maratha Generals - Vyankatrao Ghorpade and Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar to initiate talks to halt the Maratha military operation in Goa and surroundings. The Viceroy this time resorted to widely used trick in such conditions to offer bribe and gifts to enemy generals to get his purpose achieved on the diplomatic table and found the weak link in the Maratha command of Goa in the form of Dadajirao Bhave who was the second-in-command of Maratha operations in Goa and was an official of Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur. In the initial stage of holding negotiations with the Maratha command, the Viceroy deputed Vyankat Kamat to the Maratha camp with gifts for the Maratha Generals and their secretaries and other important Maratha officials. Soon, it was revealed to Portuguese that the Maratha command was too favorable for holdings talks and spotted Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar as the agency through which they could achieve their aim more satisfactorily. Bhave’s Secretary, Mahadaji Vitthal who is also referred as Mahadaji Shenvi in the Portuguese documents was a relative of Babulya Shenvi Sukhathankar who was the resident of Goa. Portuguese employed Sukhthankar to contact Mahadaji Vitthal and thereafter, Vyankat Kamat approached Dadajirao through his Secretary Devan Mahadaji Vitthal and succeeded in concluding an agreement with Bhave to help Portuguese in deivering aid to Rachol Fort by delaying and relaxing Maratha operations in Rachol till both sides reach favorable conclusion. For this purpose, Bhave was promised to be paid seventy thousand *asurpis* by Portuguese out of which the first installment of twelve thousand *asurpis* was paid immediately by Vyankat Kamat. From the first installment, ten thousand *asurpis* were meant for Dadajirao Bhave while the remaining two thousand *asurpis* were for his Secretary Mahadaji Vitthal (Pissurlekar 1983: 151 - 152). Thus after buying the time for introducing aid to Rachol Fort and for the defense of Goa, the Viceroy sent a fleet to procure grain stock and other provisions from the ports and territory under the control of King of Canara who despite being warned by Marathas, agreed to supply the provisions to Portuguese in Goa. After these initial round of talks, both Ghorpade and Bhave asked Portuguese to send envoys of distinction to continue the talks and which they scheduled in the island of Kelshi located on the bank of river Zuari. Ghorpade in his letter to the Viceroy wrote that Portuguese had stopped paying tribute to the Chhtrapati Shahu of Satara from the several years in the past and were ruling the area which originally belonged to the Chhatrapati Shahu. Thus, to punish Portuguese
for such vexatious act, Ghorpade informed the Viceroy through the letter that Chhatrapati sent the army to Goa. Portuguese found the letter much insulting but had no option but to nominate envoys to conduct talks with the Maratha command in Goa. Accordingly, in the meeting of State Council, Antonio Carneiro de Alcanssova, the Auditor General of Revenue and Jose Pedro Emauz, a Judge of the High Court were selected for the task. Accordingly, on 11th March, 1739 A.D. the above mentioned Portuguese envoys accompanied by the State Translators - Bhagoon Kumar Kamat, Vyankat Kamat, Upya Kamat and Jose Chrizostano, Captain of the Naval Staff and few servants onboard a war ship reached Kelshi where they were received by a Maratha delegation comprising Dhondiba Rao (a cousin of Dadajirao Bhave), Govind Ram Thakur and Mahadaji Shenvi (Pissurlekar 1975: 276, 282). From there, they were taken to the main camp of Marathas at Raia where they were received as per the protocol by Vyankatrao Ghorpade and other Maratha commanders who came out of their respective tents to receive the Portuguese delegation. Necessary seating arrangement was made in the tent of Vyankatrao Ghorpade for the meeting. In the meeting apart from Vyankatrao Ghorpade, from the Maratha side Dadajirao Bhave, Sambhaji Shinde, Sayaji Gujar, Manaji Paigude, Govindpant Thakur and Mahadaji Shenvi were present while from the Portuguese side, apart from the above mentioned two envoys, Vyankat Kamat, Upya Kamat were present (Pissurlekar 1983: 153). Antonio Carneiro de Alcanssova handed over the reply of the Viceroy to Ghorpade after which Ghorpade asked the Portuguese delegation to take rest as it was night. On which Alcanssova, acting in accordance to instructions of the Viceroy, requested for an armstice to which after much consideration, Vyankatrao Ghorpade agreed to order armstice for a day to respect the request made by Alcanssova. Thereafter, the Portuguese delegation was taken to the residents reserved to them in the village of Raia away from the Maratha camp where, according to the Portuguese records, they were kept under surveillance in the pretext of hospitality. No call was made to the delegation for the next three days from the Maratha command and thus, on the fourth day, Alcanssova requested Ghorpade for an audience. In between, the other Portuguese envoy Jose Pedro Emauz had fallen ill and had to return to Goa for treatment which compelled Alcanssova to be the sole Portuguese representative pleading the case on behalf of the Viceroy before the Maratha command in Goa. Responding to the request of Alcanssova for a meeting, Ghorpade replied by saying that other engagements kept him busy and deputed his sub-ordinates Govind Ram Thakur and Mahadaji Shenvi for having talks with the Portuguese delegation. In the next
round of talk between Marathas and Portuguese which started in the presence of Dadajirao Bhave, the Secretary of Vyankatrao Ghorpade put strictest clauses before the Portuguese delegation which was mainly centered on handing over Goa to Marathas, to enter and to take possession of the city on behalf of Peshwa Bajirao I and to hoist their flags over the city. Thakur even offered Portuguese delegation the choice to choose between either staying in Maratha controlled Goa or to go back to Portugal with assurance that those Portuguese who would choose to stay in Goa after Marathas take control of the region, would be allowed to continue with their properties and houses. Alcanssova replied that he is not a position to decide over the issue which Thakur had raised to which Thakur replied that he had put before the Portuguese delegation the terms of peace about which he was asked to do. Thakur wanted Alcanssova to put in writing his reply and left the meeting. Thereafter, Alcanssova had to put his stand before Dadajirao Bhave who asked the former put on paper his commitments as it was Govind Ram Thakur who had chaired the meeting and had decided the terms of peace. The next day, Alcanssova received a letter of demands from Govind Ram Thakur which consisted of following terms -

1. Sashti and Bardez which Marathas had occupied could be ceded to Portuguese if they agree to pay sixty percent of annual revenue of the region to Marathas.
2. The Hindus would have liberty to build any number of temples wherever they wish to in the Portuguese controlled territory.
3. The Tribunal of Inquisition would be totally extinguished.
4. The Hindus would be allowed to construct a temple in the city of Goa and could perform their rites and ceremonies anywhere.
5. Shendi-tax would not be recovered from the Hindus anymore and if the tax continues then the Marathas would recover that tax from Portuguese and other Christians.
6. For the release of Goa, Portuguese would have to pay twenty five lakhs of rupees (equivalent to five million sherafins).
7. Portuguese would hand over the Forts of Daman and Vasai along with the lands under their jurisdiction including the island of Karanja and in return, Marathas would offer Portuguese twenty five villages in the Province of the North with an income of twenty five thousand rupees.

On receiving the demand letter, Alcanssova informed Dadajirao Bhave that he needs to take directions of his Viceroy on this issue. The Viceroy after being informed by Alcanssova over the terms of peace asked the latter to be moderate in all possibility in the issues of diplomacy and
annual tribute of the two provinces which Marathas demanded from Portuguese. Alcansssova took the issue negotiating the amount of tribute with Dadajirao Bhave who at most reduced the amount to twelve lakh rupees from the earlier demanded amount of twenty five lakhs rupees. Dadajirao Bhave provided reasoning for his calculation by informing Alcansssova of the estimate of income framed by Vyankatrao Ghorpade and his subordinates who were promised by the gaonkars (Masters of the Village) to pay two hundred sherafins for the freedom of their four villages. Thus, according to Bhave, Ghorpade estimated a great amount from the sixty villages which were in the region. Also he took into account a great source of wealth from the Rachol which if captured by Marathas would have provided them with a good amount of booty as many influential Portuguese residents and natives had deposited their valuables in the Fort. In such adverse situation, where Maratha generals were of full confidence of their success, Alcansssova, on the instructions of the Viceroy, delayed the matter for seventeen days to buy some more time and in meanwhile, to get an estimate of Maratha plans in the region, offered gifts to some Maratha commanders. In advice given by some Maratha commanders, he was told that if Portuguese able to introduce aid to the besieged Fort of Rachol then their side could become strong on the table of negotiations and he was told to take advantage of the situation since the force which garrisoned the strategic point of Bori was under the command of Dadajirao Bhave who had already offered to remove a significant portion of soldiers from the point on some pretext or other. With such information in hand, and assurance from Bhave to moderate terms proposed by Thakur, Alcansssova returned to Goa.

Meanwhile, a part of the the fleet which the Viceroy had sent to Canara to procure grain stock and other provisions returned to Goa with an aid of thirty thousand bundles of rice onboard the frigate Nossa Senhora da Victoria (Our Lady of Victory) which it obtained from the ports of Manglore and Basarur. The fleet on its return was attacked by the fleet of Sambhaji Aangrey who acting on the direction of Marathas sent an armada comprising seven pilot boats and eleven galleys from Vijaydurg to oppose the arrival of aid to Goa. Skirmish did take place between the both armadas in which the Portuguese frigate was able to repulse the attack of Aangrey’s armada with a loss of eleven soldiers and injuries to many onboard the ship. The frigate commanded by Antonio de Brito Freyre returned to the port of Aguada on 23rd March, 1739 A.D. and won praise of the Viceroy for its fitting service to the Estado da India in such critical timing. At the same time, the remaining Portuguese crafts were waiting at various places on the coast of Canara for
an escort to return back to Goa with procured material. The frigate Nossa Senhora da Victoria was not in condition to sail back and thus, the Viceroy had to order the frigate Nossa Senhora do Bom Successo (Our Lady of Good Success) and the lugger Sao Pedro de Alcantara to sail to the Southern coast to escort the Portuguese fleet loaded with grain stock and other necessary provision which was dearly required by Goa. While the ship Our Lady of Good Success was to be manned by the crew of the ship Our Lady of Victory, for the second ship, due to unavailability of manpower, the Viceroy had to took out officials and soldiers from their defense duty at the various places in Goa and surroundings and had to put them on the ship Sao Pedro de Alcantara. In such situation, when the fall of Rachol was seen imminent and with this, the Portuguese existence in Goa was felt endangered, the Viceroy arranged a meeting of the State Council in which he appraised the current situation to the Councilors and told them that since many posts were left unmanned and defenseless due to the voyage which the Portuguese fleet had to undertake to escort the Portuguese fleet from the Southern coast back to Goa, it was necessary to continue talks with Marathas who nevertheless would have tightened their grip on Goa, had they come to know of the situation of Portuguese in Goa. The Portuguese official, Justice Jose Pedro Emauz who had fallen ill, had recovered and thus, on 28th March, 1739 A.D. the Portuguese delegation returned to the Maratha camp for continuing talks.

The Maratha command in Goa was instructed by Chimaji Appa who had by that time tightened his grip on the Vasai Fort to not conclude the agreement with Portuguese until the clause of Vasai’s surrender is included therein. The delaying of talks were favorable to Portuguese who were waiting for aid from the Kingdom of Portugal and from the other parts on the Southern coast and were trying to supply provisions to the besieged Fort of Rachol which could had strengthened their position on the negotiating table. Marathas both in the Province of the North and in Goa were in haste to conclude the agreement in their favor as the approaching season of monsoon would have affected their operations and costing very significantly. The situation in Goa as reported by Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar who had accepted bribes from Portuguese to favor them is known from his letter dated 26th March, 1739 A.D. (ता छ १६ माहे जिल्है) to Chimaji Appa wherein he informs the latter about the outcome of negotiations between Portuguese and Marathas. He wrote the letter from his camp at Raitur (Rachol) where Marathas were assaulting the Fort of Rachol and had sieged the place from 16th February, 1739 A.D. Bhave informs Chimaji Appa that the rulers of Sawantwadi State (Ramchandra Sawant and
Jairam Sawant) had attacked and captured several places in Portuguese controlled Bardez and influential merchants in Goa - Rajashree Vyankat Kamat and Upe Kamat had promised the Maratha command of bringing to the negotiation table the high ranking Portuguese officials. Accordingly, he writes that Portuguese deputed two envoys - Antonio Carneiro da Alcacio and Juiz Pedro Camoes who came to Maratha camp for conducting negotiations. He writes that Vyankatrao Ghorpade and he deputed Rajashree Dhondobarao, Rajashree Govindpant and Rajashree Mahadaji Vitthal to receive the Portuguese envoys at Kelshi and to take them to the Maratha camp. About negotiations, Bhave informs Chimaji Appa that the Portuguese envoys stayed for ten days in the Maratha camp where after hectic discussions, the Maratha Generals (Ghorpade and Bhave) asked the Portuguese to hand over the forty percent revenue portion of Sashti (Salsette) and Bardez to Marathas, to allow Hindus to practice their religion freely, to return the villages of Kharjuve and Panale to the rulers of Sawantwadi State, to hand over Vasai, Dharavi, Uran to Peshwa Bajirao I, to hand over the twin Forts of Daman to Marathas and to allow Portuguese to keep Chaul and Revdanda on the terms of paying an amount of fifty thousands to Marathas. Bhave writes that on receiving the demands of Marathas, Portuguese envoys communicated them to the Portuguese Viceroy who responded by offering Chaul, Revdanda, Vasai to Marathas except Daman. He says that Ghorpade and he straightly refused the offer by saying that there would not be any treaty if Daman is not given to Marathas. He writes that Ghorpade and he asked the Portuguese envoys to send their reply after consulting the Portuguese Viceroy who agreed to respond after four days. Bhave informs Chimaji Appa that the future action in Goa would be taken after proper consultation among the four Maratha commanders (Ghorpade, Dhondobarao, Govindpant and Mahadaji Vitthal) and he would communicate the same to Chimaji Appa. He says that Marathas would soon conquer Raitura Fort where the Maratha fronts had reached nearby the Fort and assures Chimaji Appa that he would do all necessary things to fulfill the task of his Master (Chimaji Appa). He calls Portuguese as of "wicked souls"("फिरंगी महणजे पापात्मे. स्वात्मा नाश होणे हे अपूर्व नाही") and says that the god has tasked Chimaji Appa to destroy them as others have failed to defeat them. Bhave hopes that Chimaji Appa has captured Vasai by that time and informs that the Maratha force had also surrounded Goa for the purpose of capturing Vasai. After the two and half month stay of the Maratha force in the Goa Region, Bhave informs Chimaji Appa that the Maratha commanders do
all hard work necessary for the mission despite the region being hot in climate and expensive for purchase of articles (Sardesai 1931: 114 - 116).

The second round of talks between Portuguese and Marathas started. It was declared by the Maratha command that clauses about Vasai and the Province of the North would require sanction of Chimaji Appa while the rest would be settled between the Portuguese and Maratha envoys. While negotiation progressed, Marathas neither speeded up their operation against the Fort of Rachol nor did they intensify their military operation against Goa. It is the same situation which was required by the Portuguese authorities who utilized the time, as mentioned above in securing provisions for Goa. The mostly argued issue between the Portuguese and Maratha envoys was of the amount of tribute which according to original Maratha demand was of twenty five lakhs rupees for freeing the Provinces of Sashti and Bardez. The demand of religious freedom to Hindus in Goa was raised once again by the Maratha emissaries to whom Portuguese envoys replied that the Viceroy had no authority to intervene in the State religious policies and practices. About the most prime issue of tribute, Dadajirao Bhave readied to lower the amount to eleven lakhs rupees at the most to which Portuguese Emissary Bhagavan Kamat Vagh replied of being high in amount. At the last, Portuguese Emissaries Vyankat Kamat, Upya Kamat, Babulya Shenvi and the Emissary representing the Maratha side Mahadaji Shenvi, the Secretary of Dadajirao Bhave discussed the issue and settled on the amount of eight lakhs rupees. In this amount, seven lakhs meant for the tribute purpose while the rest of one lakhs rupees served the purpose of bribe to the Maratha commanders for concluding the agreement. The sum of seven lakhs was to be paid by Portuguese in three installments to Marathas and had to keep two Portuguese persons as the security during the term of implementation of the schedule of the payment. The Municipalities in Sashti and Bardez were to pay forty percent of their revenue to Marathas. The agreement had no reference of Chhatrapati Shahu, the chief of the Maratha Confederacy in Satara and was being concluded by Vyankatrao Ghorpade and Dadajirao Bhave on behalf of Peshwa Bajirao I. Marathas gave the option of acceptance or rejection of the agreement to Portuguese envoys (Pissurlekar 1975: 289 – 294). While the agreement between Marathas and Portuguese was being finalized, responding to the request of the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil, Chhatrapati Shahu sent his envoy named Shivaji Desai Pant from Satara with instructions to Vyankatrao Ghorpade and Dadajirao Bhave to halt Maratha operations in Goa as the terms of treaty between Portuguese and Marathas was under consideration in the royal court.
of Satara. Deoji was instructed by Chhatrapati Shahu to return immediately to Satara with a favorable reply after having meeting with the Viceroy. Two different dates of the arrival of Shivaji Desai Pant who is also referred as Shivaji Deoji in the Portuguese documents are provided in the Portuguese records. The first one mentions of him arriving in Goa on 27th March, 1739 A.D. after which he was sent by the Viceroy after the necessary protocol formalities to the Maratha camp (Pissurlekar 1983: 155) and the second mentions 8th April, 1739 A.D. as the date on which the said envoy of Chhatrapati Shahu reached Paneli in Goa where he met the Viceroy who after completing necessary formalities, sent him to the Maratha camp on 10th April, 1739 A.D. Despite the high expectations of the Viceroy who was relieved on the arrival of Shivaji Deoji thinking that Chhatrapati Shahu would moderate the terms in the treaty, he soon had to face the reality then prevalent in the Maratha Confederacy in which it was not Chhatrapati Shahu who was the reigning power but Peshwa Bajirao I. Neither Maratha operations in Goa were halted by the Maratha generals nor Shivaji Deoji was given proper reception in the Maratha camp. The signal was clear to the Portuguese Viceroy who till then hoped high for the intervention of Chhatrapati Shahu. To the amazement of Viceroy, the agreement even did not mention Peshwa Bajirao I as the subordinate of Chhatrapati Shahu. When the Portuguese envoys enquired with the Maratha emissaries about whether Ghorpade or Chhatrapati Shahu had power to enter into an agreement with Portuguese, Govind Pant Thakur replied by saying that the power to enter into agreement lies with a person who has army and weapons and who is powerful in the battle. The direction of answer was clearly made to Peshwa Bajirao I. The Viceroy had no option but to continue his negotiations with Vyankatrao Ghorpade and Dadajirao Bhave while he kept Shivaji Deoji on wait. Shivaji Deoji, annoyed over the non-response of the Viceroy, finally wrote a letter dated 17th April, 1739 A.D. to Antonio Fransisco de Andreade, the Secretary of the State wherein he mentioned that it was twenty five days since he left Satara and eleven days since he in Goa but without any favorable response of the Viceroy. He wrote that he was instructed by Chhatrapati Shahu to return immediately to Satara to report him the development in the Portuguese court but he was not able to leave Goa due to non-reply of the Viceroy. The Secretary of State wrote a reply dated 17th April, 1739 A.D. to Chhatrapati Shahu in which he mentioned how the Maratha generals in Goa refused to accept the authority of Shahu and how the Portuguese authorities were forced to discuss the agreement of peace with Ghorpade and Bhave who were acting on the behalf of Peshwa Bajirao I. He writes to Chhatrapati Shahu that he would
be sending a copy of the agreement to Chhatrapati Shahu for signature as the sovereign Maratha ruler and requested him to moderate the terms of agreement. The Viceroy sent Santu Shenvi Dangi, a Goan disciple of Brahmendra Swami (the spiritual mentor to many Maratha rulers and Generals including Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimanaji Ballal) to the court of Chhatrapati Shahu along with Shivaji Deoji (Pissurlekar 1975: 292 – 293).

It is already mentioned the Sawantwadikars had occupied Bardez in the first week of March, 1739 A.D. Though initial alliance between Peshwa Bajirao I and the rulers of Sawantwadi – Ramchandra and Jairam Sawant-Bhonsale was apparent as the Maratha generals had included the clauses favorable to Sawantwadikars in the draft agreement it seems that by the end of March, 1739 A.D. the rulers of Sawantwadi had started to move in independent direction and the same can be seen from their independent representation dated 31st March, 1739 A.D. to the Viceroy in which they raised their demands for handing over the region of Bardez to Portuguese. Sawantwadikars made this proposal to the Viceroy through Deoba Vishram Shenvi, the Desai of Dicholi. In a fresh letter dated 13th April, 1739 A.D. to Antonio Freire de Andade, the Secretary of the State, Jairam Sawant-Bhonsale assured the Secretary of the State of the friendly relations between the Portuguese State and Sawantwadi State and informed him that he occupied Bardez in defense of the Portuguese state after Marathas had captured the territory of Saundekar dynasty in Ponda. Sawant says that he would hand over the region to Portuguese after Vyankatrao Ghorpade concludes treaty with Portuguese and leaves the region with his army. In return, he demanded expenditure incurred on deployment of his force for the occupation of Bardez which he claimed that was of his own without any participation from the side of Marathas. In the letter, he also noted down his demands which are reproduced below.

1. The islands of Khorjuve and Paneli should be handed over to him.
2. Bullets, cannons and gun powder should be supplied to him at the rate agreed at the time of Shiva Bhat.
3. The paper containing the terms of peace, concluded by Shiva Bhat should be restored to him.
4. The Hindus should be permitted to follow their religion in Bardez. This condition can be deleted if already included in the treaty of peace concluded with Vyankat Rao.
5. The expenditure should be paid to him in cash.
6. The fleets and war ships of the State shall, finally, conclude the treaty of peace.
It is clear that schism between Ghorpade and Sawant-Bhonsale had emerged and the same was sensed by Portuguese envoys who wrote a letter to Dadajirao Bhave on 21st April, 1739 A.D. wherein they informed the latter about receiving separate terms of peace from Sawant-Bhonsale and doubted whether Sawant-Bhonsale would honor the implementation of treaty concluded with Ghorpade and Bhave. Facing such situation, the Viceroy called the meeting of State Council and briefed the attendees about the situation and outcome of negotiations with the Maratha command in Goa according to which Portuguese had to pay a large sum of money as tribute to Marathas. The attendees raised a point of whether Marathas are in real position to conquer Goa or not in view of the groupism within the Maratha camp and discord between the generals of Peshwa Bajirao I and the Sawantwadikars. Most in the meeting did not favor for paying tribute to Marathas and instead pressed for the defense of Goa. Inspite of such opinions expressed in the meeting, the Viceroy Conde de Sandomil was of the opinion to continue negotiations with Marathas and ordered his envoys to go to the Maratha camp to conclude the treaty. For arranging payment of tribute to Marathas, he ordered the Municipalities in Bardez, Sashti and the islands of Goa, the Churches, Hindu merchants held in the Portuguese custody in Fort of Mormugaon, and private individuals to contribute money failing of which the defaulter would be booked for punishment for disturbing the public peace. Accordingly, between 2nd May to 6th May, 1739 A.D. a series of treaties were signed and sealed between Portuguese and Marathas in the Maratha camp at Raia after the approval of Viceroy and the Maratha generals. From the Portuguese side, Antonio Carneiro de Alcancova (also spelled as Alcanssova) and Joseph Pedro Emaus signed the treaty documents. The content of these treaties is reproduced below as provided in the Portuguese documents (Ibid 295 – 309).

The First Treaty:

“Terms of peace agreed to by Great Baji Rao Pradhan and the Portuguese State in the presence of Senhores Venkat Rao and Dadaji Rao, generals of aforesaid Great Baji Rao and in the presence of Antonio Carneiro de Alcancova and Jose Pedro Emaus, Plenipotentaries of the said Portuguese State, on the 24th of the Month of Moharram of the year called Sursan Tissan Sallasin Moyan Alaf, corresponding to 2nd May, 1739 in Portuguese.
1. That the provinces of Salsette and Bardez, with their forts belongs to the Portuguese State and that they will be freed by the troops that occupy them, so that the State may avail itself of the fruit thereof and that this evacuation will be made on the grounds of the declaration that the State will pay to Great Baji Rao Pradhan forty percent of the revenue collected by the State from its villages every year.

2. That the provinces of Bardez and Salsette are damaged by the entry of the aforesaid army. The security and rehabilitation work introduced in the villages by the State will be respected by said Great Baji Rao and his commandants.

3. That the islands of Korjuvem and Panalem will be handed over to Bhonsale who will be discharged from payment of the tribute of one thousand sherafins, annually, which he had agreed to pay to the State under the terms of peace concluded during the time of Shiva Bhat. And that a discharge certificate will be issued to said Bhonsale to that effect by the State.

4. That the prisoners from Salsette, Bardez, Goa and the North will be freed by either party without any consideration. The Africans will, also be freed under the same condition. The personal liabilities of the prisoners, if any, will be reported to the State.

5. That the merchants and residents of Goa will trade freely in the territory of Phonda that, at present, belongs to aforesaid Great Rao Pradhan, the charges that they have been paying so far will alone be collected from them, they will be permitted the transport through the river and avail themselves of the usual freedom of trade with no charge thereon.

6. That the Portuguese State will not have evil eye on the lands of Great Baji Rao and the latter will not have an evil eye on the Portuguese lands.

That under these six conditions a firm peace is established between Great Baji Rao Pradhan and the Portuguese State and these conditions will be observed by either party with effect from the day, month and year cited before”.

“That under the conditions referred herein there establishes a firm peace between the Portuguese State and Great Baji Rao. Under the same conditions there establishes a firm peace, also, between the Portuguese State and Ramchandra Sawant and Jairam Sawant,
Bhonsales and Sardesais of Kudal, whose Brahmin official, Narba Sinai, son of Jiwaji Sinai, remains present in this camp while the clauses are formulated. He participates in the conference by the virtue of protection of Great Baji Rao” (The last text as it appeared in the Portuguese version of the Treaty).

**The Second Treaty:**

“Conditions of adjustment effected in presence of Senhores Venkata Rao Pradhan and Dadaji Rao, generals of great Baji Rao Pradhan and Dadaji Rao, generals of Great Baji Rao Pradhan by Senhores Antonio Carneiro Alcassova and Jose Pedro Emaus, Plenipotentiaries of the Portuguese State, on twenty fourth day of the month Moharram of the year called Sursan Jassan Sallacin Moyan Alaf, corresponding in Portuguese to 2\textsuperscript{nd} May, 1739.

1. The Portuguese State will contribute as the expenditure for removal of the troops that actually occupy the lands of the State, seven lakhs of rupees at the rate of two sherafins per rupee, with the following mode of payment.

2. As soon as the two signatories sing the conditions of the adjustment two respectable Portuguese will go to the Maratha camp with two lakhs of rupees as payment of the first installment upon which the forces will move out of provinces of Bardez and Salcette and will leave the agricultural products and forts occupied by them (the Marathas). They, will, also, leave the lands for being occupied and cultivated by the residents thereof. The entire troops will walk out of the Portuguese limits leaving one commandant and few soldiers behind, outside the Portuguese limits, with the two Portuguese for eight days within which the second installment is to be paid.

3. The second installment is to be paid within eight days in cash or gold or coral or scarlet cloth. After payment of the second installment the Portuguese State will keep two responsible persons as hostages until the third installment is paid up. After arrival of these hostages the two Portuguese referred to above may go back to Goa”.
The Third Treaty (With Dadaji Rao Bhave Nargundkar) :

“Testimony sealed and issued by me, Dadaji Rao, regarding the appropriation of money cited in the conditions of the peace separately concluded with the Portuguese. To make the said conditions of the peace steady the Portuguese will undertake to pay rupees one lakh to the commandants of the army. This amount will be brought by the two Portuguese who are expected to arrive. The payment will satisfy the said commandants.

This day of 24th of the month of Moharram of the year called Sur San Tissan Sallain Moyam Alaf which, in Portuguese corresponds to 3rd May, 1739”.

The Fourth Treaty (With Vyankatrao Ghorpade) :

“Agreement of peace, concluded between Great Baji Rao Pradhan and the Portuguese State, in presence of Senhores Venkat Rao and Dadaji Rao, generals of the said Baji Rao, and Senhores Antonio Carneiro de Alcancova and Jose Pedro Emaus, Plenipotentiaries of the Portuguese State, on 27th of the Month Mohrram corresponding to 6th May in Portuguese.

The war situation in the North is settled by passing over the fort of Bassain to Great Baji Rao Pradhan together with all the jurisdiction and other forts thereunder. Great Baji Rao Pradhan will hand over to the Portuguese State the lands of Daman and the forts and fortresses under that jurisdiction, removing forces that may be there. Whatever the war position in the North be, favorable to either one or the other party and whether great Rao or his commandants, or the Portuguese State or its generals are in favor of this agreement or not, it has been accepted by the two parties. The residents of Bassain, Hindoos as well as Christians, will walk out of it with their belongings, wealth and movables. The cannons, arms, ammunitions, food grains and other articles that may be in the said fort will be allowed to be carried away while handing over the said fort to Great Baji Rao who will allow the said residents to leave the fort and will help, favor and supply them the ships well protected to sail to any port. A copy of this agreement will be dispatched by either party to the North, immediately, with letters to say that the treaty of peace concluded in Goa will remain firm. Raya, the same day of the month of Moharam of the year called Sur San Tissan Sallacin Moyan Alaf. This year corresponds 1739 in Portuguese”.

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Though Portuguese made treaties with Marathas and with much difficulty paid the first installment of tribute to the Maratha command on 15th May, 1739 A.D. they feared whether the terms of treaties would be honored from the Maratha side. For paying the first installment of tribute, the Viceroy took services of Vyankat Kamat and Upya Kamat to whom he assured of acknowledging the service they rendered to the Crown of Portugal by his letter cum order dated 15th May, 1739 A.D. Accordingly, Marathas withdrew the siege of Rachol on 21st May, 1739 A.D. but took time in evacuation of Sashti. The Maratha command asked the Bhonsale-Sawant to hand over the province of Bardez to Portuguese to which he denied and asked for an independent treaty with Portuguese which further complicated the matter. They refused to entertain Dadajirao Bhave who personally went to the Court of Sawantwadikars to persuade them to give up the province of Bardez to Portuguese. Bhave even claimed expenditure incurred on his journey to Dicholi to meet Sawantwadikars from Portuguese by saying that he had undertaken the journey for the wellbeing of the Portuguese State (Pissurlekar 1975: 346). It is only after Portuguese concluded a fresh treaty with Sawantwadikars on 28th February, 1740 A.D. at Bicholim that in March, 1740 A.D. the Bardez province was handed over to Portuguese. Vyankatrao Ghorpade who had shifted his camp to Sanguem post-treaty, left Goa with his army after he received the letter of Chimaji Appa communicating Maratha victory in Vasai. Before leaving Goa, he made arrangement of Maratha occupied Phonda. Dadajirao Bhave camped in the village Cuncolim and on 19th July, 1739 A.D. Marathas handed over the Fort of Margaon to Portuguese who immediately demolished the fort after taking its control. Even though Marathas handed over Sashti region, on the orders of Peshwa Bajirao I, they continued to occupy Cuncolim village and Fort and Assalona village till September, 1740 A.D. Portuguese, on seeing the non-implementation of terms of treaties from the Maratha side refused to make second installment of tribute. In such situation, question over the safety of two Portuguese hostages in the custody of Marathas arose in the Portuguese camp. Dadajirao Bhave on seeing the collapse of treaty due to non-compliance from the side of Bhonsale-Sawant tried to encash the opportunity and it is only after accepting the bribe of forty eight thousand sherafins (forty two thousand sherafins as the charge for freeing the hostages and six thousand sherafins as the farewell gift) from Portuguese that he freed the hostages (Ibid 348). It is only after Portuguese concluded another treaty on 18th September, 1740 A.D. with Nanasaheb Peshwa after the death of Peshwa Bajirao I in Pune that Marathas handed over Cuncolim and Assalona villages to Portuguese in
return of Chaul and Revdanda Forts. English officials of East India Company’s Mumbai office mediated the treaty between Portuguese and Marathas. Since the subject matter of this treaty is beyond the scope of the present topic, so only a brief reference of it is made here (Ibid 158 – 163).

4.15. The Maratha-Portuguese Battle in Vasai and its Outcome (February – May, 1739 A.D.) –

It is already mentioned that Chimaji Appa had started the renewed Maratha offensive against Vasai from 17th February, 1739 A.D. Marathas had dug their trenches and made their positions against the Northern side of Vasai Fort. In the intial phase of encirclement of Vasai Fort, in the evening of 17th February, 1739 A.D. inspite of heavy artillery and gun fire from the Vasai Fort, a company of Maratha soldiers started and continued operation of setting up their front line in which they suffered heavy casualties which even the Portuguese officials engaged in the defense of Vasai such as Dom Andriano de Gavila, holding the charge of Engineer described as an act of barbarity. They deployed four cannons against the fortification wall and aimed at the bastions of St. Sebastian and St. Paul and against the narrow creek situated on the South-Western side of the fort which lead the incoming vessels to the Vasai Fort (Pissurlekar 1975: 241 – 242). Attempts were made by Chimaji Appa to stop help reaching to Vasai Fort through the Vasai creek by placing artillery at strategic places along the shore. How the Maratha command was trying to isolate Vasai can be seen from these two letters wherein the plan of posting artillery against Portuguese armada sailing through the Vasai creek is discussed. Chimaji Appa instructed Maratha commanders posted at Dharavi to find a place on the coast of Murdhe village to target Portuguese armada sailing in the Vasai creek by cannons. When such order reached Tubaji Anant who by then had ordered a majority part of his force to go back and was camping with only hundred soldiers at Dharavi, he immediately responded to Chimaji Appa by his letter dated 20th March, 1739 A.D. (ता छ १० जित्नें) wherein he describes in detail the action taken by Maratha commanders at Dharavi to fulfill Chimaji Appa’s order. He writes that as per the direction of Chimaji Appa, to find a suitable place to establish a position for cannons to target Portuguese armada in the Vasai creek, he and other Maratha commanders then present at Dharavi – Rajashree Khandoji Mankar, Naroji Kadu, Khandopant, Subhanaji Shelar had
inspected the area of creek on the east side of Dharavi to locate the dry place sufficient to deploy cannons for targeting the Portuguese armada in the Vasai creek. But after the inspection, they found that the only dry place which was available to them was near Tubaji Anant’s former position at Dharavi but from there, the cannons could not target the armada and the Vasai Fort, as it was far in distance. According to Anant, if to place cannons near the Dharavi creek, then it was also not possible due to slushy area near the creek which was mostly unsuitable for the task. So as instructed by Chimaji Appa to deploy cannons in the forest of Murdhe village near the creek, the Maratha commanders visited and inspected the entire creek area of Bhayndar and Murdhe in the company of a village headman of Bhayndar village but there too, they could not locate any proper dry place to keep the cannons and found the area marshy. But near the formerly Portuguese controlled fortified mansion in Murdhe village, they found a place where a well was available and where a force of five hundred to seven hundred soldiers could establish a base. Anant informs Chimaji Appa that if he receives the order to establish a base there then he would act accordingly. He also informs Chimaji Appa of citing Portuguese armada and two Pal type of ships which were on the way to Ghodbandar and to locate them, Anant writes that he sat with men near the creek a day before writing the letter but says that he could conclude the destination of the armada but thought that they could had come to collect wood (Sardesai 1931: 112 – 113). Chimaji Appa deployed thirty eight cannons against the Fort which had one hundred and ten cannons for its defense. Marathas were able to form two lines of their attack parties which had the Maratha camp at Bahadarpura at its back, ensuring continuous supply of provisions and war material. Portuguese on the other hand only sea route through which they could receive supplies. No help was coming from Goa which itself was facing Maratha attack while the only sources of aid were Diu, Daman and Mumbai. The region of Daman was too attacked and plundered by Marathas in order to stop supplies reaching to Vasai. The fleet which dispatched by the King of Portugal in month of October, 1738 A.D. to Vasai had to take shelter in Rio de Janeiro (a port in Brazil) due to unexpected circumstances and sickness developed in the crew of frigates. They could leave Rio de Janeiro on 3rd April, 1739 A.D. So the arrival of these frigates was too nowhere in sight which could had brought much awaited relief for the defenders of the Vasai Fort (Pissurlekar 1975: 355). Maratha soldiers were targeting the Vasai Fort with their artillery and guns which mostly were indigenously made. Through constant bombardment, they were able to inflict damages to the fortification wall on the several points
which however, in the equal zeal was repaired by Portuguese under the guidance of Engineer Dom Andriano de Gavila. No head on attack was made against the fort and the both sides were targeting themselves with artillery and gun fire. Perturbed over the Maratha invasion and occupation of Goa, the Viceroy had asked the General of the Province of the North – Martinho da Silveira to either abandon the fort after due precaution or to surrender the fort to Marathas under a treaty. Silveira plainly refused to comply with the order of the Viceroy and instead adopted a stand to defend Vasai till his last breath (Ibid 301).

By the month of March-April, 1739 A.D. Marathas were successful in constructing two large wooden platforms in front of the North-Western side fortification from where they could directly bomb the fort. These platforms, called “wooden fortresses” by Portuguese officials defending the Vasai were constructed by Marathas opposite the bastion Nossa Senhora dos Remedios (Our Lady of Remedies Bastion) and the second was located opposite the the fortification wall covering the bastion of St. Sebastian and St. Cavaleiro bastion. These platforms were so strong and heighted that they could match the height of North-Western side fortification wall of the Vasai Fort and from where Marathas could bomb the fort more effectively. According to Portuguese officials, the first platform was situated at distance of pistol shot and the second one was within the range of a rifle shot. Simultaneously, Marathas had also started to mine the fort with at its height was mined at fourteen places despite strong resistance from the defenders of the Vasai Fort. As the land around the Vasai Fort was sandy, so it was doubted by the Portuguese Engineer Lieutenant Colonel Dom Adriano Gavilla whether Marathas would succeed in mining the fort and even if they were succeeded then whether the blast would seriously affect the strong fortification wall of the fort. The Maratha attempts to mine the fort can be known by this undated letter (received by Chimaji Appa on 28\textsuperscript{th} March, 1739 A.D. छ १८ जिल्हेज) written by an unknown Maratha commander to Chimaji Appa wherein the author provides to Chimaji Appa information useful for mining the Vasai Fort as obtained from one unnamed old Christian man from Bhayndar. The Christian old man, the author writes that is ninety years old and has a plenty of information about Vasai Fort's structural built up. According to the old man, the foundation of Vasai Fort was fifteen Hath wide (seven and half feet wide on the outer side including the plinth and the other wide area of seven and half feet), the author writes. As Marathas were planting mines under the Fort, with the update received from the old man about the width of Fort's foundation, the author cautions Chimaji Appa to pay proper attention for plantation of mines as it
would reach only up to the outer side of Fort, leaving the inner portion untouched. He suggests Chimaji Appa that the latter should check the distance between the Maratha posts and the fortification and accordingly mines should be planted (Sardesai 1931: 116). Apart from artillery fire and mining the fort, the Maratha snipers were also wreaking havoc on Portuguese personnel engaged in the defense of Vasai who had raised palisades to protect themselves from Maratha firing. Such was the accurate aim of Maratha snipers that they could shoot a target visible through the loopholes in the fortification with their country made guns. This is how the Captain of the Vasai Fort Joao Xavier Pereira Pinto was killed by Maratha snipers after spotting him through a loophole in the fortification. It should be recalled here that after the death of General Pedro de Mello, it was Joao Xavier Pinto who led Portuguese defense of Vasai Fort until the appointment of Martinho de Silveira as the General of the Province of the North. After the death of Pinto, Caetano de Souza Pereira was appointed as the Captain of the Vasai Fort (Pissurlekar 1975: 318). The intensification of Maratha siege of Vasai resulted in death of many Portuguese soldiers either due to injury or due to sickness. With no sight of reinforcement except of the forces coming to Vasai Fort after surrendering the respective places under the jurisdiction of the Province of the North to Marathas after a prolonged battle, the number of active defenders of Vasai Fort was decreasing by time. Whereas the Maratha command had in its stock sufficient reserve forces and was superior to Portuguese force in numerical strength. As explained before, the Maratha action was intense on the side of land facing fortification of the Vasai Fort and the bastions which were specifically targeted were (from East to South-West) – Reis Magos, Nossa Senhora dos Remedios, St. Cavaleiro bastion, St. Sebastian bastion, St. Paul bastion and Sao Pedro bastion. The another great loss which Portuguese defense of Vasai suffered was of General Martinho da Silveira e Menzes who succumbed to a bullet shot of Marathas while patrolling the bastion of Nossa Senhora dos Remedios in the night of 15th April, 1739 A.D. With his death, he became the second serving general of the Province of the North who was killed in action during Maratha-Portuguese War (1737 – 1739 A.D.). As promised, he defended the Vasai Fort till the last breath of his life. After the death of Menzes, Captain of the Vasai Fort Caetano de Souza Pereira took charge of the defense of Vasai Fort as the Governor/Commandant of Arms. After taking charge of his new appointment, he took a stock of the war and food material which was available in the Vasai Fort and found that it was nowhere near to the requirement which was basically needed by Portuguese in defense of the Vasai Fort. As there were constraints in
obtaining financial aid, he called a meeting of ecclesiastics and scholars and appealed them for financial help. It was unanimously accepted by all to contribute whatever available for procuring war and food material from Mumbai and Daman. Even in the tight siege that Vasai Fort was facing from the land and sea side, with the finance available in his hand, he was able to procure food stock from Daman and war material from Mumbai. At the time of his appointment, there were one thousand and twelve hundred Hindus inside the Vasai Fort. Suspecting their loyalty and considering the scarcity of grain stock in the Vasai Fort, he ordered one thousand persons among them to leave the fort after obtaining permission of the Viceroy on the issue (Pissurlekar 1983: 139).

The determined actions of offense and defense continued from both sides. In the end of April, 1739 A.D. soldiers surviving the Maratha military operation in Dongari joined the Portuguese forces defending the Vasai Fort. Marathas were persistently laying mines under the Vasai Fort and while doing so, were facing a shower of fire, bullets and bombs from the Vasai Fort. Both sides were till now unaware of the pacts of peace sealed between Portuguese and Marathas in Goa from 2nd May to 6th May, 1739 A.D. resulting in continuation of hostilities. By 10th May, 1739 A.D. according to intelligence gathered by Pereira, the Maratha operation of mining the fort was nearing completion and thus, he ordered his commanders and soldiers to be on constant attention to resist any Maratha attack. Leading Maratha commanders and their subordinates like Pilaji Jadhav, Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, Ranoji Shitole, Ganpatrao Mehendale, Ramchandra Hari Patwardhan, Bapuji Bhivrao, Kanthaji Bande, Vibhutrao Satkar, Shankaraji Phadke, Karnaji Shinde, Khando Chimanaji, Rayaji Shankar, Appajirao Khanvilkar, Rudraji Shinde, Vithoji Kadam, Jivajirao Vichare, Subhanaji Naik, Gangaji Naik, Ganeshji Naik, Namaji Desai, Bhanji Desai, Gangaji Desai, Babanji Prabhu, Ganeshji Prabhu etc. were the participants in the last phase of Maratha attack on Vasai and Chimaji Appa was personally supervising the Maratha military operations in Vasai (Kelkar 2008: 246 - 247). On 13th May, 1739 A.D. Marathas started exploding the mines and moved close to the fort to attack it. The direct attack on Vasai Fort started immediately after the first mine exploded at the bastion of Nossa Senhora dos Remedios at 7 A.M. in the morning. Throughout the day, Marathas exploded approximately nine mines under the fortification covering the bastions of Nossa Senhora dos Remedios, St. Cavaleiro and St. Sebastian which made several breaches in the fortification. Due to premature explosion of some mines and the hasty action plan, many Maratha soldiers were also killed. Till
three o’clock in the afternoon, to make entry through the breaches in the fortification, Marathas attacked Remedios bastion for six times and St. Sebastian bastion for eleven times but without any success. All Maratha attacks were repelled by Portuguese in which significant casualty was reported from the both sides. Thereafter, Marathas attempted to scale the bastions of St. Pedro, St. Paul and Reis Magos but this time too, they were driven back by Portuguese. For the rest of evening, both sides exchanged light fire of muskets and artillery and by the night, the fight ceased. Portuguese took precaution to guard the breaches in the fortification and deployed personnel for its defense for the period of night. In the morning of 14\textsuperscript{th} May, 1739 A.D. a mine exploded under the St. Sebastian bastion and which destroyed the entire front of the bastion and demolished the wall up to the portion of breach created in the wall due to earlier mine blasts. On noticing the large opening created in the St. Sebastian bastion, a large group of Maratha soldiers advanced and tried to enter the fort but in hand to hand combat ensued thereafter, was again repelled by Portuguese defenders. Marathas made another attack with large number of soldiers to take the possession of large opening in the St. Sebastian bastion and while doing so, they were resisted by Portuguese soldiers deployed for defense of the breach. Maratha forces were showered with artillery fire, bullets, grenades and firebombs by Portuguese from the bastions of St. Cavaleiro and St. Paul. In the second attempt, after a hard fought battle, Marathas could gain the control of breach and were managed keep hold of it till 3 o’clock in the afternoon. On taking possession of the breach, they asked to Portuguese personnel present in the surroundings to surrender the fort or more three mines would be exploded. Portuguese did not make any reply to Marathas. Caetano de Souza Pereira, on sensing the emergency situation, made inspection of available war material and grain stock in the stores of Vasai Fort and found them largely exhausted. Out of the war stock obtained from East India Company's Mumbai island, six thousand hand grenades, large number of bags full of missiles, bombs, firebombs etc. were utilized by Portuguese on the previous days in defense of fort from Maratha attacks and had only thirty hand grenades and few firebombs available in their ammunition depot. The grain stock was largely exhausted and the ships which he had sent under the command of Captain Brito da Silva to Daman for procuring food material had not yet returned to Vasai. The condition of defense personnel was too worse. Out of the force numbering three hundred and fifty Portuguese officials and soldiers, one hundred and sixty five natives and three hundred soldiers, a large number of Portuguese officials and soldiers were killed in the battles fought till the night of 14\textsuperscript{th} May, 1739
A.D. and had one hundred and thirty wounded in action. The small Portuguese defense force was
tired and exhausted of resisting repeated attacks made by the relatively larger Maratha army.
General Dom Adriano Gavilla acting in the capacity of the Engineer and Assistant to Master of
the Field and Governor of Arms Caetano de Souza Pereira, also presented his remarks to the
latter saying that further defense of Vasai Fort was impossible. In such difficult situation,
Pereira, summoned a meeting of officials, clergy and residents of Vasai to discuss the situation in
which it was resolved to approach the Maratha command for negotiations. The responsibility to
represent Portuguese side to the Maratha command headed by Chimaji Appa was given to Pedro
de Rego Berreto de Gama e Castro.
Accordingly, when in the morning of 15th May, 1739 A.D. Marathas were moving a cannon to
place it in the breach and were preparing to launch a full-scale attack to conquer the fort,
Portuguese signaled for negotiations with a show of white flag to which the Maratha command
responded and both sides halted their war operations. Pedro de Rego Barreto de Gama e Casto
went to the Maratha camp and presented the terms of agreement prepared by Caetano de Souza
Pereira to Chimaji Appa. The original terms of agreement for surrendering the Vasai Fort in
exchange of peace and the end of war in Vasai as originally framed from the Portuguese side
bearing the name of Caetano de Souza Pereira and dated to 16th May, 1739 A.D. are give below.

"Terms of peace made by Caetano de Souza Pereira, Captain of the fort of Bassain, with Chimaji
Appa, Senior Commandant of Shahu Raja, who is present along with the former at said fort of
Bassain which is to be handed over to him under the following terms and conditions:

1. Chimaji Appa will allow the troops, trained and auxiliary, to leave the fort with loaded guns
and stores. He will, also, allow them to carry open flags, four cannons and two mortars.
2. He will permit all the very important families, the Christian, Hindoo and Muslims residents of
the fort to leave with their bag and baggage, and wealth if they desire to abandon the said fort.
3. He will allow the fleet, anchored in the port there and equipped with the necessities of the
good and major defence to go. He will grant leave to sail away to those vessels the owners of
which may desire to discontinue with the subjection of the said fort.
4. He will arrange vessels of transport on payment for the very important families and other
common people who may intend to walk out of the fort with their wealth and other effects for
Chaul, Bombay and Daman as per their desire. These transport vessels will have his protection against any possible piratical assault of Aangria, till the port of destination.

5. He will equally permit the priests and sacerdotes who may intend to discontinue their residence in the fort to go away. He will permit them to carry their belongings which they may not wish to sell off.

6. He will allow loading of all the ammunitions belonging to the residents or the defendants in the crafts to sail off. He will, also, allow to transport in the same crafts the wealth in gold and silver, movables and provisions of life that each one may possess. Further he will allow the property of any kind belonging to the Churches to be taken away.

7. The Christianity (Followers of) that may continue to stay in the fort of own accord will freely follow the law of God that they profess. This will, also, apply to other Christians having their abode in the jurisdiction of the said fort. They will not be robbed or be relieved of their possessions. This is also to be observed in respect of Hindoos and Muslims who may choose to stay on in thr fort or within the jurisdiction thereof. Thus, every one will live in peace as a good follower of faith and master of own possessions, with due regards to the possessions and faith of others.

8. The prisoners in his possession will be immediately put at liberty and will be handed over to me so that they leave in my company and I may settle with them in my own way. The prisoners under my command will be passed on to General Chimaji Appa who may settle with them as he finds fit.

9. On the day that will be Saturday the twenty third of our month of May, when our troops will leave the fort, all his forces will retire to Bhadrapur. This will help me amd my troops to come down the fort for boarding the ships fearlessly.

10. Said Chimaji Appa will not enter the said fort with his troops until I vacate it with my forces and other individuals that may choose to leave with me. I board the ships and sail away beyond the distance of artillery from the fort.

11. All the movables, food grains or items of provisions that the residents or any other persons may decide to sell off will be purchased by Chimaji Appa through persons of his confidence. For this purpose, he will immediately send thirty of such persons or Banias (merchants) to estimate the value of all such property. The amount fetched by the actual sale will go to the purchasers aforesaid.
12. Chimaji Appa, as long as he be the master of the fort, will preserve the three churches - one within the fort, second in the locality of Bassain and the third in the island of Salcette - for the local Christians to perform freely the acts of Christianity. The Parish-priests of these churches will be under subordination of the most Illustrious and the most Reverend Primate of India who will confer on them the right to preach Christianity. There are images, ornaments and other necessities of these churches. It will be my choice to take them away or keep them back for their adornment.

13. In the interest of security and firm implementation of these terms of peace, Chimaji Appa will sign them in his own style and with his own seal and with seal of Baji Rao, General of the fighting forces of Shahu Raja. On completion of these processes Chimaji Appa will send one of his main commandants who may be a person grata to me. He will remain in a war ship without artillery in it, at the barrage of the fort. As a security of this commandant I will send one of mine who will be in his camp until all the assurances all fully implemented. Soon after the said implementation I will relieve his commandant and will have mine back to me.

14. Immediately on confirmation of the terms of peace he will remove his troops from the fort of the fortification. He may keep twenty persons at each of these breaches of the fortifications. Either side will not change in these undertakings. Neither side will supply motive for new controversies.

16\textsuperscript{th} May, 1739 A.D. Caetano de Souza Pereira”.

Chimaji Appa, unaware of the agreement concluded between Marathas and Portuguese in Goa on 6\textsuperscript{th} May, 1739 A.D. about the Portuguese surrender of Vasai Fort to Marathas, on perusing the terms of agreement, gave consent to it except to the article number six and ninth. About the article number six, he remarked that he would purchase the ammunition possessed by the residents and defenders in Vasai Fort. About the article number nine, he remarked that he would not take responsibility of it. He signed the paper of agreement under his seal on 16\textsuperscript{th} May, 1739 A.D. and returned it to Pedro Barreto who informed the response of Chimaji Appa to Caetano de Souza Pereira. Pereira, in turn, on the same day again called a meeting of officials, clergy and residents of Vasai in the Church and Convent of Saint Antonio to discuss the small changes made by Chimaji Appa in the terms of agreement and to confirm the terms of treaty after
obtaining approval of all concerned parties. This paper of assent is of high importance as it gives us information of the series of events which took place from 17th February, 1739 A.D. to the date of surrender i.e. 15th May, 1739 A.D. and the issues which compelled the Portuguese command of Vasai to surrender the fort to Marathas. The paper of assent is reproduced below.

"On the sixteenth day of the month of May of the year one thousand seven hundred and thirty nine in this city of Bassain, in the Church of the Convent of Santo Antonio of the said city, where the Master of the Field and the Governor of Arms Caetano de Souza Pereira is present along with all the civilian officials, military ranks, prelates, ouvidor (similar to Public Relations Officer) of the City, Auditor of the Military Staff and residents of the city, named ahead, the following is proposed to me - Manuel Euzebio, Notary Public of the said city of Bassain - by the said Governor of Arms with the concurrence of Ouvidor Domingo Antonio Ribeiro. All this noble audience has been the eye witness to and faithful participant of the toil and danger that during the course of last three months have been experienced in the fort on account of the attacks by the Maratha enemy. There has been no instant, day and night, without work of the honorable defence in which many, including Captain of the fort and general of the Province himself perished. Among the victims there are many officials of different ranks, soldiers, men, women and children of either sex and various ages. Out of the survivors many are wounded and all are weary of the job of repairs to all the parapets, to the breaches opened to the walls facing the enemies, trenches of the platforms that were made to countermine the bulwark of Sao Paulo and repairs to the cannons coupled with the constant job of pouring water on the mines of the enemies. The entire city suffered destruction while opposing the enemies in their work of mines. Even the church-yards, grave-yards, the doors, portals of the private houses, coconut trees, other trees of timber and firewood which were either original from the city or the species brought from out of it, did not escape. The bombs, bullets and stones discharged by Marathas did not spare houses of the nobles, chawls (large houses of various residential suites), churches or convents in the fort which has no place fit to accommodate the people during the winter because there is no edifice that is not pulled down. The worst hit are the warehouses and godowns alongside the walls. There is no material nor officers to repair the ruins. There is no food for our subsistence. The pilot-boats have, yet, not arrived with the crafts of food grain load from Daman as expected. Nor was money for administration received. Money for expenditure on the various factories was
not, also, received. The last resources of funds have been gold, silver and copper taken violently from Churches and private houses in consequence of a decision arrived at by the Senate of the city. But these funds are disproportionate to the needs, inconveniences and attainments to be accomplished that were constantly and simultaneously faced. Even so we are resolute to defend the city as long as the means and strength correspond to the bravery of the honorable defendants. I now inform every one of the audience here of the grave ruins the mines of enemies caused on the 13th and 14th of the current month, to the bulwarks Nossa Senhora dos Remedios and Sao Sebastiao. The fronts and angles of these bulwarks are fully demolished. The enemies without ladders and unopposed took position at the breaches even though they were in the past repelled fourteen times from the breach of Sao Sebastiao and six times from that of Remedios, on 13th and 14th of the same month, by dint of an extraordinary vigorous struggle of either belligerent side, which ultimately became a hand to hand to fight in which defendants snatched two flags from the adversaries. This stubborn battle consumed five thousand hand grenades, bombs and other incendiaries. There was no firewood to keep the fire burning the breach of Remedios. For this very reason coupled with its windward location a fire-place was not maintained at the breach of Sao Sebastiao where instead of fire a parapet was raised during the night of the 13th and 14th. But the mines, bursting violently, destroyed it totally. Hence the emerging and advancing defendants of the breach of Sao Sebastiao were exposed, by the backs and chests, to the barriers made by the enemies, in the camp and from the wooden tower, erected at the distance of a pistol-shot, at the curtain between bulwark Cavaleiro and that of Sao Sebastiao. They emerged to assault from the said barriers effectively not only the defendants who climbed the breach but, also, those who defended the trenches, breaks of that bulwark, the curtains of Sao Sebastiao, Sao Paulo, Cavaleiro, Remedios, Ferreiro de Sao Francisco and entrances of the roads to those curtains. They, equally, assaulted the defendants from another tower erected at a short distance from the bulwark of Remedios. These offensive assaults were so effective that not a single person from the three bulwarks in front of the enemy camp could come down or could fight back against the two enemy towers or their batteries from where forty cannons were incessantly operating, some of them being of large calibre with sure aim, that dismounted and destroyed many of ours, and compelled to withdraw those who came out to attack their towers. They even stopped our bombardment on their posts that were engaged in offensive activities killing particularly those whom they could sight from their positions.
Every portable parapet that was placed on the walls to notice the situation at the outer foot of these walls was damaged and pulled down by the gun shots. Until the time of cease-fire which was accomplished yesterday the enemies, contiously conducted sticks, large planks of wood to make new trenches for protection of their troops posted at the two breaches. It is known that four mines are kept in readiness to blaze out. Just for resistance of Sao Sebastiao and Remedios we had to exhaust five thousand hand incendiaries in two days as mentioned before. The balance on hand of these incendiaries is not enough to pull on the fight even for half an hour. For long time the factory has had no stock of even a grain of gun-powder. The administration possesses only twenty barrels of the gun-powder and a small stock of cartridges. All this stock wil not be sufficient for a fight of even two days, considering the heavy fire that it needs. Ammunition is required to protect the bulwark of Sao Paulo and the godown of armament from where the soldiers and officers have been removed almost all. Ammunition is also needed to protect all the warships. Many faithful sepoys are necessary to retain, above all, the breach of Sao Sebastiao where we lost brave officials and soldiers of various ranks to the tune of forty in addition to many private persons. the number of the injured reached as high as one hundred and thirty. Those who survived are either tired or crippled not remaining even twenty out of them, fit to repel the assailants from the breach. In the last effort made on the adversaries at Sao Sebastiao all the four corporals were scorched by fire and injured. Yet they successfully repelled the enemy from that breach. But soon the Marathas recaptured it. To support my narration, I produce here the certificates of the Commandants of the bulwarks, Chief gunner of the fort and a letter of Lieutenant Master of the Field, General Dom Andriano Gavella, holding the powers of an engineer. This evidence indicates how difficult the defence of the fort has become. The present condition was duly considered in a meeting held yesterday, the 15th instant, and attended to by the officers of different ranks, principal residents and me wherein it was decided, in the interest of the real service, to raise a white flag and to request for a momentary cease-fire. The Marathas, fully reinforced, had prepared for more vigorous attacks. But they suspended the activities and ceased the use of arms at the show of the white flag. They, immediately, asked us to send a person who could tell them whatever we wanted to say, Pedro Berreto da Gama Castro, chosen by all, left for the enemy camp. He was fully instructed on the points to be discussed with Chimaji Appa, the Generalissimo of that force of Shahu Raja, to arrive at a reasonable adjustment in his and our interest. Our representative achieved what the proposed treaty
contained. Under the proposed treaty of peace Chimaji Appa required us to give up the fort in his favor. In return Chimaji Appa offered us all the military honor, liberty to the residents for carrying away their movable property, ships for the transport of those who desired to leave the fort, three churches In Salcette, Bassain (fort) and Cassaba (city). I put up these terms before this noble audience that, with the interest of the service to god and to the King of Portugal and with due regard to our prevailing condition, may opine whether we shall choose to repel the enemies for the second time and to continue the defence if possible or to enter into an agreement of peace accepting the aforesaid terms. The audience may, also, opine whether the terms can be accepted with or without amendments. The members of the audience are, equally requested to declare whether they will implement the terms of peace that may be finally agreed to, even at the cost of their life and that their aim and desire nothing more than the fulfillment of the regal service. I present this proposition after having made the last efforts and employing the last means and devices in the defence of the fort. Is there any one in this congress who will suggest some other means and devices or will accept those employed as appropriate enough. We assure the said Master of the Field our faithfulness to him till the last drop of blood flows in our veins. In the fashion the Master of the Field presented the proposition to the audience, it was accepted by all, unanimously, remarking that that was the most convenient one in the interest of the service to God and to the honour of the King. They all agreed to accept the terms offered by Chimaji Appa and to give up the fort as it was no longer possible to retain it with the advanced season and with no expectation of help from the kingdom. If the offer of Chimaji Appa is not accepted we shall lose in vain life, honour and liberty by one single stroke. To save that we may, without any delay, inform the subjects and Catholics of the resolution, taken in consideration of our condition. The proposal is accepted unanimously. I, the aforesaid notary-public, therefore, note the assent which is signed by the Master of Field and Governor of Arms, Caetano de Souza Pereira, by the civil and military officials, religious priests, Officer-in-charge of the welfare of military staff and finally by the residents who were present. They are: Manoel Francisco Collaco, Chief Sergeant of the fort, Dom Andrino de Gavilla, Lieutenant to the Master General of the Field, holding the post of an Engineer; Luis de Seixas Castello Branco, captain of the Grenadiers and Commandant of Infantry; Joao da Costa, Complaints Attendant of the city and the military staff; Rodrigo Xavier Telles, Captain of Grenadiers; Antonio de Mourao de Miranda, Lieutenant of Grenadiers of the Company of Cataeno Jose de Andrade Lourenco Roiz, Captain of Infantry;
Jose Antonio de Seixas Castel Branco, Captain of a regiment; Calistro Pereira, Captain of Infantry of a floating company; Ignacio Brandao de Souza, Captain of Infantry of the guards of this fort; Carlos de Silveira Menzes, Captain of Infantry; Jose Roiz Ventura, Captain of a Company of Saibana; Joao Teixeira Mulheiro, Captain of one of the Companies of Saibana; Francisco Palermo de Souza, Captain of a Regiment; Raymundo Pinto da Fonseca, Captain of a company of Saibana; Francisco Alzoma Coelho, Captain of a Regiment; Joao de Lima de Lacerda, Captain of Camp of Mahim Kelme; Francisco da Sao Paio, Captain of mines; Antonio Caetano de Andrade Freyre, Captain of Sea and War, Manoel Caetano da Camara Coutinho, Chief Captain of Subajo; Francisco Xavier, Factor and head alcalde of this City; Reverend Prior-priest and Vicar of baton of this City; Manuel Vicente Freio, Reverend prior-priest of Sao Domingo de Mestre de Deus; Reverend Rector-priest of the seminary and father of Christians, Manoel Barradas of the Company of Jesus, Reverend priest-vicear of the house of Convent of Sao Francisco; Father Cristovao de Sao Mingel, priest-curate of the village "Senhora da Vida"; Aleixo Fernandes Pedro de Rego Barreto da Gama e Castro; Dom Agostinho Henriques; Dom Joao Luis Henriques; Dom Antonio Henriques; Luis Soares de Costa; Dom Jose de Souza; George Pereira Coutinho; Manoel Abreu e Lima; Dom Manoel de Castro; Manoel Duarte; Jose Brandao de Souza; Manoel Ferreira da Sylva; Domingo Gomes da Sylva, Sergeant of Sea of Auxiliaries; Salvador de Silva, Joao de Proenca de Brito, Francisco Correia de Brito, Procurator of the city and by me, the aforesaid notary public - to the best of my knowledge, all that I have written down in the solemn faith is nothing but truth".

Thus, after obtaining the authority to sign on the agreement of such crucial decision of handing over the Vasai Fort - the famed capital of the Province of the North, the opulent territorial colonial possession of Estado da India which it enjoyed for a period of two hundred and five years, Caetano de Souza Pereira signed on the agreement paper and dispatched it to Chimaji Appa through Pedro de Rego Berreto on 16th May, 1739 A.D. Chimaji Appa duly signed the agreement under his seal and returned the copy to the Portuguese camp. It is in this way, after an arduous struggle of two years, one month and ten days (5th April, 1737 A.D. - 16th May, 1739 A.D.) which saw many ups and downs that Marathas were finally able to conquer the Province of the North (except Daman, Chaul and Korlai) with its famous capital - Vasai called as "a Corte do Norte"(Pissurlekar 1975: 324 - 339). In the battle of Vasai, Portuguese had five hundred Portuguese and three hundred fifty native soldiers and officials in the list of killed and according
to an estimate framed by Antonio Cardim Froes and Caetano de Souza Pereira, twenty-two thousand Marathas were killed in action in Vasai. According to Pereira, in the battles which were fought on 13th and 14th May, 1739 A.D. in Vasai, approximately ten thousand Maratha officials and soldiers were killed (Pissurlekar 1983: 139 – 140). According to Chimaji Appa, more than five thousand Maratha officials and soldiers were either killed wounded during the siege and battle of Vasai which he described as unparalleled in the history of Maratha warfare ("यामागे युद्धाचे बहुत जली. परंतु या लढाईस जोडाच नाहीं") (Pissurlekar 1975: 340). After the Maratha success in Vasai, Chimaji Appa through his undated letter communicated the wellbeing of Maratha commanders such as - Rajashree Pilaji Jadhavrao, Rajashree Malharba (Malharrao Holkar), Ranba (Ranoji Shinde), Yashwantrao Pawar, Tukoji Pawar, Govind Hari and their respective companies of soldiers who participated in final Maratha assault on Vasai to Peshwa Bajirao I (Sardesai 1931: 132 - 133). Chimaji Appa praised the persistence of Maratha army which despite being showered with artillery, bullet and fire bombs by Portuguese, resolutely fought against the enemy like never before in the history and ultimately gained success ("इतकी आग पिऊन मराठी फौजेने दम धरला असे कर्दी झाले नाहीं. सीमा केली"). He also praised the bravery and steadfastness of Portuguese defenders of Vasai Fort who fought and resisted with all their strength ("फिरंगी यांनी हिमत धरून शिपाईगिरी म्हणावी तथी केली, की ज्याचे नांव शिपाईगिरी") (Kelkar 2008: 259).

According to the Portuguese records, for implementation of the treaty which was concluded, the both parties exchanged prisoners from the either sides (Pissurlekar 1975: 338). But according to some letters of Pilaji Jadhavrao, the prominent Maratha commander who had left the battle camp in Vasai immediately after the Maratha success, we come to know that Marathas had some Portuguese war prisoners who were still detained in the Maratha custoddy even after the conclusion of agreement. In the first undated letter (from the content of this letter, it appears that the letter belongs to the month of May, 1739 A.D.) written to the mother of Chimaji Appa – Radhabai on this issue, Pilaji Jadhavrao requested the latter to ask Chimaji Appa to release the Portuguese war prisoners of Firangan (Province of the North) and to discuss the issue in detail. Jadhavrao writes that by the blessings of god, Rajashree Chimaji Appa could conquer the region from Surat to Vasai and at the same time, the Maratha camp in North Konkan was having Portuguese war prisoners in its custody. He says that he was about to request Chimaji Appa to free them but he had to hurriedly leave the camp as the Maratha commanders and chieftains

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thronged him after the Maratha success in Vasai to get their demands for reward accepted by the Maratha command. He writes that the Portuguese war prisoners comprised of a lady from Tarapur, Portuguese from Chinchani and Mahim. If they are kept in the region or elsewhere, it would be inviting an unnecessary expenditure and thus, there was no point to retain them. He suggests that except the Portuguese Padres, all should be freed and padres should be kept in a fort. The imprisoned padres, he opines that could be used in the prisoners exchange plan with Portuguese authorities in Goa and could get Maratha war prisoners freed from the Portuguese captivity. Jadhavrao requests Radhabai to direct Chimaji Appa to release the Portuguese war prisoners on the priority basis as by freeing them, the god would bless Chimaji Appa with more success (Sardesai 1931: 130 - 131). In the second undated letter (received the letter on 18th May, 1739 A.D. (पौ छ १० सफर), Pilaji Jadhavrao requests Chimaji Appa to free the Portuguese war prisoners held in the Maratha custody from Firangan. Jadhavrao writes that he was to request over the issue to Chimaji Appa but he had to take the leave of Chimaji Appa in a hurried manner due to commotion of the Maratha commanders and chieftains after the success of Marathas in Vasai. Jadhavrao opines that keeping the Portuguese war prisoners in the Maratha custody for a long would entail unnecessary expenditure and thus Chimaji Appa should order to release Portuguese women prisoners from Tarapur and Portuguese war prisoners from Chinchani. Jadhavrao says that the freed Christians would be living in the region only and except the Portuguese padres', all should be freed as the imprisoned Portuguese padres could be used for the prisoners exchange plan to get the Maratha war prisoners released from the Portuguese custody in Goa. He suggests Chimaji Appa to keep the imprisoned Portuguese padres in a fort and even suggests Chimaji Appa to release those Portuguese padres to whom Chimaji Appa finds fit to release as keeping them in custody would bring their fatality. He requests Chimaji Appa to free the Portuguese war prisoners as due to the blessing of the god, Chimaji Appa could taste victory from Surat to Vasai and by freeing them, Chimaji Appa would be blessed by the god with more victories. Jadhavrao also writes that as the mother of Chimaji Appa would also be writing to Chimaji Appa to release the Portuguese war prisoners, Chimaji Appa should consider the request and should act accordingly (Ibid 128 - 129). No information at present is available in the published Maratha documents about the action taken by Chimaji Appa on the request made by Pilaji Jadhavrao who due to infection caused to his eyes by cannon smoke in the battle field of Vasai, had left the Maratha camp in Vasai for his native village Vaghali (at present in District –
Pune, Maharashtra. Pilaji Jadhavrao by his letter dated 26\textsuperscript{th} May, 1739 A.D. (तारीखे छ १८ सफर) informs Chimaji Appa of reaching to Vagholi Village on 23\textsuperscript{rd} May, 1739 A.D. (छ १५ सफर) from Vasai. As his eyes were infected due to cannon smoke during the Maratha’s final assault on the Vasai Fort, he informs Chimaji Appa that his eyes have suffered much due to the cannon smoke and he wishes that by the blessings of his master (Chimaji Appa), they would be cured soon (Ibid 131). Acting on the other principal terms of agreement, Chimaji Appa ordered his soldiers to move away from the fort and kept twenty soldiers each at the breaches created in the fortification due to mines blasted by Marathas. For evacuation of Portuguese and their subjects, as promised in the agreement, Chimaji Appa made arrangement of vessels for transportation at the cost of three hundred rupees on 19th May, one hundred and fifty five rupees on 20th May and ninety rupees on 21\textsuperscript{st} May, 1739 A.D. and of which entries are recorded in the daily diary of Peshwa (Kelkar 2008: 258 - 259). Portuguese also managed to arrange vessels of transportation through Stephen Law, the Governor of Mumbai who sent one hundred and forty sybares (luxurious boats). With this preparation, in the early morning of 23\textsuperscript{rd} May, 1739 A.D. Portuguese troops came out of the fort in an orderly march and evacuated the fort and handed it over to Marathas who immediately took its possession. Portuguese, after evacuating the fort went to Mumbai where they reached on the same day. According to contemporary customs, Marathas performed holy rituals after taking possession of the fort and there is an entry (“छ. १९ सफर गुजारत कृष्णाजी पांडुरंग होमशाति व पूणाहुती खर्च ३७ रूपये साडेचार आणे”) in the Maratha documents which shows that an amount of rupees of thirty seven was spent on the holy ritual on 27\textsuperscript{th} May, 1737 A.D. (छ. १९ सफर) and on 2\textsuperscript{nd} June, 1739 A.D. (सफर २५) an amount of twenty seven rupees were spent on mounting the flag and associated holy rituals (“सफर २५ रवासुदगी जमा निष्कासणी शंकराजी केशव बसई फटे जातियावरी निष्कासण चढले त्यास खर्च रूपये”.

$27 \text{Rs.} = 31\text{ III} \text{ Rs.} 25 \text{सफरच्या पूजेस सामान वगैरे (२३ मे)}$

$15 \text{Rs.} = \text{बकरी सहा दर २ II}$

$7\text{III} = \text{कणिक}$

$4\text{III} \text{किरकाचे नार बेंबर पावे अबीर बुक्का}$

$2.1 = \sigma \sigma \text{ र.} १७ \text{रोज झेंडा करावयासी खाद्या दहा रंगाईबदल खर्च}$

$2. \text{गैरु वजन पक्के} \sigma \sigma ५$
The victory over Portuguese gained Marathas the famed, rich and fertile Portuguese Province of the North which according to Portuguese documents “stretched to twenty two leagues in length (122.23 KM), on contiguous cast from Versova to Daman with four important posts (ports?) and three hundred villages”. In the battle which was fought for the period of two years, one month and ten days, besides the Vasai Fort, Marathas captured from Portuguese control eight fortresses such as – Thane, Belapur, Karanja, Saivan, Manor, Mahim, Asheri and Tarapur, twenty forts such as – Sao Jeronimo, Sao Pedro, Sao Paulo, Reis, Sao Mingel, Parsik, Firangipada, Bandora, Versova, Dongari, island of Arnala, Kelve, Shirgaon, Dahanu, Nargol, Umbargaon, Khattalwada, Pardi etc. and two hill forts such as – Santa Cruz and Santa Maria and the fertile island of Sashti. Portuguese suffered heavy losses in this two year long Maratha offensive on the Province of the North and Goa in which not only their territorial possession was snatched away but also their sea supremacy was challenged as many of their ships loaded with merchandise were confiscated by their enemies. Portuguese documents treated this episode as a disgrace which they never faced in their existence in India till then. A large quantity of war materials was utilized for the defence of forts, fortresses and armada to the tune of two million crusades. In the war campaign, Portuguese lost five hundred and ninety three cannons of high calibre. The expenditure which Estado da India had to bear with during the war campaign was of three million four hundred and forty thousand sherafins which even contained a large portion of royal revenue which according to Portuguese estimate could had covered the entire expenditure of the state during the period of peace and stability. The brief detail of expenditure incurred by the Estado da India in the period of war and how it met the continuous demands of financial aid is reproduced below as it appeared in the Portuguese records (Pissurlekar 1975: 350 – 353) –

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>The Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>On Madre de Deus – Obtained from the Merchants</td>
<td>200 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>On Lugger – Obtained from the Merchants</td>
<td>200 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>On Victoria Bom Successo (Victory and Good Success) – Obtained from the Merchants</td>
<td>100 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>On Conceicao – Obtained from the Merchants</td>
<td>50 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Of tobacco belonging to His Majesty</td>
<td>120 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Of tobacco, belonging to the Queen, Our Lady</td>
<td>30 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>From the House of Branca</td>
<td>30 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>From the War Contributions</td>
<td>20 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>From the legacy of Luis de Andrade</td>
<td>15 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>From the legacy of Dom Francisco Soto Moyor</td>
<td>30 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>On Frigates Arrabida and Oliveira</td>
<td>300 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Out of Silver of the Church (first time)</td>
<td>100 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Out of the silver of the Church (same Churches for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} time)</td>
<td>250 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>From the Churches of North (first time)</td>
<td>200 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>From the Churches of North (2\textsuperscript{nd} time, taken under orders of Caetano de Souza)</td>
<td>60 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>The first donation by the three Camaras (Municipal Bodies)</td>
<td>190 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Second donation as a loan</td>
<td>350 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>From the Hindoo merchants (first time)</td>
<td>80 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>From the Hindoo merchants, second time, for adjustment of peace</td>
<td>430 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>From private individuals (First donation)</td>
<td>30 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. From private individuals, Second donation towards adjustment of peace</td>
<td>35 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. From treasury of accounts</td>
<td>50 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. From Civil Treasury</td>
<td>40 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. From treasury of orphans</td>
<td>20 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25. From the treasury of deceased and absentees</td>
<td>20 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26. From Misericordia</td>
<td>25 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27. Taken from treasury of Mahajans</td>
<td>30 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28. Taxes imposed on Kanarins</td>
<td>150 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29. Captures effected by Miguel Henriques at Surat</td>
<td>200 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Captures effected at Diu</td>
<td>130 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>From Pilot Boat seized by Luis Henriques</td>
<td>50 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3350 thousand Sherafins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.16. The Reaction in the Maratha and Portuguese Camps on the Maratha Victory over Vasai –

The Maratha victory over Vasai under the command of Chimaji Appa is celebrated in the history of Marathas as a remarkable and outstanding feat and the same can be seen from the various contemporary congratulatory letters addressed to Chimaji Appa on the issue. Some of them are mentioned below to know the kind of sentiments felt by and expressed from the various stratas of the society.

Mor Sheth Karanje by his letter dated 27th May, 1739 A.D. (ता छ १९ सफर) congratulated Chimaji Appa on Vasai's victory after receiving the letter from the latter over the issue. From his letter we come to know that as written by Chimaji Appa to Karanje, Chimaji Appa entered the fort on Saturday (23rd May, 1739 A.D.) after Portuguese handovered the fort to Marathas (Sardesai 1931: 134). Malhar Ram congratulated Chimaji Appa by his letter dated 28th May, 1739 A.D. (ता छ २० सफर) on the latter's victory in Vasai and writes that after receiving the news of Maratha victory in Vasai from the letters received to Peshwa Bajirao I, everyone felt joyous and sugar was distributed in the camp to celebrate the success. Malhar Ram writes that Chimaji Appa is victorious and is an incarnation of the god to establish the order of god and Brahmins ("देवब्रह्माणांची संस्थापना करावयासाठीच स्वामीचा अवतार आहे"). He also says that whichever is decided by Chimaji Appa, the same is achieved due to the blessings of the god (Ibid
135). After receiving the news of Maratha victory in Vasai from Chimaji Appa, Ramechandrabhatta Pauranik congratulated Chimaji Appa by his letter dated 3rd June, 1739 A.D. (वैशाख बहुल द्वादशी) and wrote that there is no equivalence to the meritorious deeds and valor of Chimaji Appa who was blessed by the gods and brahmins to accomplish such tasks (Ibid 135 - 136). Amrutrao Shankar Dinkarrao congratulated Chimaji Appa for the latter’s victory over Vasai by his letter dated 4th June, 1739 A.D. (ता छ २७ सफर) after receiving the letter on the issue from Chimaji Appa. Dinkarrao writes that by capturing Vasai, the task of establishing the Hindu State would be achieved ("वसई फते जाहली! याजपेक्षा श्रीकृपण महत्कार्य होऊन हिंदू राज्याचे संस्थापन स्वामीचे हातून होतील"). He says that no one believed of capturing Vasai but due to the persistence of Chimaji Appa it could be conquered and by accomplishing the task, Chimaji Appa proved the prophecy of god and brahmins (Ibid 136). Trimbak Hari by his letter dated 11th June, 1739 A.D. (ज्येष्ठ शुद्ध पंचमी) congratulated Chimaji Appa for the latter’s victory over Vasai after receiving the letter over the issue from Chimaji Appa. Hari says that the deed was not possible to accomplish to anyone in the present age and it was achieved by Chimaji Appa and thus, the valor and pious deeds of Chimaji Appa had no parallels (Ibid 134). The unknown author extols the victorious achievements of Chimaji Appa and Peshwa Bajirao I by this undated letter (from the content of letter, it appears to have belonged to the second half of June, 1739 A.D.) wherein he primarily informs the good rainfall which his region received in the Mruga (the first half of June) season and the good sowing season which the farmers could avail due to the sufficient rainfall. The author informs Chimaji Appa that all peasants and landlords became happy due to good rainfall, return of Nadir Shah due to Peshwa Bajirao I and Chimaji Appa's success in Vasai and Goa which the author says, are the three great events which happened in a single year. For Chimaji Appa's extraordinary success in Vasai and Goa, the author calls him the incarnation of Purna Brahma in the age of Kaliyug and equates the deeds of Chimaji Appa to the lord Krishna (Ibid 133). Chimaji Appa stayed in Vasai till the month of September, 1739 A.D. and after making necessary arrangements of administration of Vasai and the region, left for Pune. When Chimaji Appa reached Pune from Vasai on 14th September, 1739 A.D. (भाद्रपद शु २२ सोमवार) he was personally welcomed by Peshwa Bajirao I who came to Aundh (presently a suburb of Pune city in Maharashtra) to receive Chimaji Appa along with Deshpande and Deshmukh (the Revenue Officials and Magistrates) of Pune.
Caetano de Souza Pereira, after the fall of Vasai stayed in Mumbai island along with his officials, soldiers and families. Stephen Law, the Governor of Mumbai, acting on the request made earlier by Pereira, made necessary arrangement for the stay of military personnel, families and individuals coming from Vasai. The Portuguese troops were kept outside the Bombay Fort while the families took shelter in the hamlets. Stephen Law also helped financially to needy families and provided financial assistance of one thousand and five hundred rupees to Portuguese troops. He agreed to request made by Portuguese to sanction them a loan for subsistence of the military staff (Pissurlekar 1975: 339). The news of fall of Vasai reached Goa through the transport crafts sailing from Daman to Goa. The news was received with much sadness by the Portuguese authorities, nobles and residents alike. An English boat carrying the letters of Caetanó de Souza Pereira addressed to the Viceroy describing the battle of Vasai, circumstances in which he had to surrender the fort to Chimaji Appa and his stay in Mumbai reached Goa on 23rd August, 1739 A.D. Caetao de Souza Pereira thereafter moved to the Revdanda Fort with his force in October, 1739 A.D. when the fort was besieged by the force of Manaji Aangrey. In one more letter addressed to the Viceroy from Revdanda, he described the siege of Manaji Aangrey to the Revdanda Fort, the defence of fort by its Governor Dom Francisco and Portuguese success against Manaji Aangrey at Korlai Fort. The Sawant-Bhonsale of Sawantwadi was still occupying the province of Bardez and the Viceroy was contemplating to attack Sawantwadikars to get the area freed. For this purpose, he was relying on the surviving Portuguese force of Vasai which was then camped in Revdanda Fort under the command of Caetano de Souza Pereira and the aid which he was expecting from the Kingdom of Portugal. On 1st September, 1739 A.D. he sent an order to Pereira onboard a ship in which he directed the latter to reach to Goa along with his troops from Revdanda without making any delay. Accordingly, Pereira reached Aguada in the end of October, 1739 A.D. with his troops which comprised of six companies of grenadiers from Vasai. Caetano de Souza Pereira, upon landing, immediately requested appointment with the Viceroy but the latter straightly refused to meet him due to the former’s failure in Vasai. The Viceroy had similar approach for the other Portuguese officials whom he thought as the participants in the act of Pereira for surrendering Vasai to Marathas. This attitude of Viceroy Pedro de Mascarenhas, Conde de Sandomil towards the surviving Portuguese officials of Vasai is described by the Portuguese Chroniclers as “unjust and unreasonable” due to the “noted performance and justification of act” of the surviving Portuguese officials from Vasai. Portuguese
Historian J. A. Esmael Gracias has mentioned that Caetano de Souza Pereira had returned from Mumbai to Goa in October, 1739 A.D. as a destitute and feeble person due to numerous injuries he suffered during the conclusive siege and battle of Vasai (Ibid 357 – 358).