

CHAPTER 2

Deep Ecology of Arne Naess

Deep ecology, in its broad meaning, is used by Naess to refer to the broad ecocentric grass-root effort as contrasted with an anthropocentric approach to achieve an ecologically balanced future. In this sense, it is a worldwide grass-root social and political movement. It is long-ranged ecocentric view. It is a long view for there is an urge of responsibilities not merely for first or second or third generations but all the future generations. Deep ecology is presented here decidedly opposing the valuing of nature purely in instrumental terms. On the other hand, in its narrow meaning, deep ecology is used to refer to Naess' own self-realization thesis. It is known as "ecosophy" or "ecosophy T" for referring to his own specific ecological philosophy of ultimate premises centered on self realization achieved through wider identification of one's ecological context.

The phrases "Deep Ecology Movement", used in the broad sense and "Deep Ecology", used for Naess's self-realization thesis to refer to his deep ecology philosophy are theoretically intertwined to such an extent that it is impossible to distinguish the two. Deep Ecology takes a holistic view of nature. The basic norms of deep ecology is that every life form in principle has right to live and blossom. Its image of the natural world is that of a field-like whole of which one is just a part. With maturity one experiences joy and sorrow when there is the joy and sorrow of other living beings. It encourages one to seek one's true identity by identifying with wider and wider circles of nature, presenting the natural world as an extension of oneself.

The essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper questions. Deep ecology principles are the result of deep questioning of conventional values, beliefs, and practices. It tries to clarify the fundamental presuppositions underlying our economic approach in terms of value priorities, philosophy and religion. It is to be noted that Naess coined the term “deep ecology” in the spirit of religion. During a climbing expedition in Nepal, Naess discovered with surprise that the Sherpa people would not venture on to certain mountains they considered holy or sacred. Naess and two of his Norwegian friends took inspiration from this reverence for mountains to formulate a new philosophy that would extend the same regard to all of the nature.

For Naess, offering a definition of deep ecology movement is the task of dictionary editors. He himself acknowledges the difficulty of defining deep ecology. In order to make other understand what deep ecology is, Naess proposes a tentative formulation of views that most supporters of this movement have in common. According to him, “there is no reason why supporters of movements should adhere exactly to the same definition, or to any definition, for that matter” (“The Deep...” 67). Though Naess’s coinage of the term “Deep Ecology” appeared in 1973, its meaning can be understood by taking his “Platform Principles” prepared with George Sessions in 1984. It is pertinent to mention that the platform principles are some tentative formulations of deep ecology’s action plan and philosophy. It is the characterization of deep ecology in miniature. Naess writes, “It [Platform Principles] is the same with characterizations, criteria, or a set of proposed necessary conditions for application of the term or phrase. In what follows, a platform or key terms and phrases, agreed upon by George Sessions and myself, are tentatively proposed as basic to deep ecology” (67).

But before discussing his platform principles and other facets of the meaning of Deep Ecology, it would be helpful to have a clear understanding of the distinction between deep and shallow ecology as mentioned by Naess in his 1973 paper. This paper shows the meaning of Deep Ecology by distinguishing it from Shallow Ecology.

2.1 Deep versus Shallow Ecology:

In 1972 Naess delivered a lecture at the Third World Future Research Conference in Bucharest and the following year published it as “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary” in the journal *Inquiry*. In this paper, deep ecology has been described as a worldwide eco-centric movement that contrasts an anthropocentric or human-centric value approach.

With the coinage of the term “deep ecology” Naess offers a broad, long-term and skeptical position towards environmental policies of any agency. For instance, Naess points out to the strategies adopted by the agencies like International Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN) in cooperation with the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) for the conservation of nature. Naess tags the policies of these agencies as standard view of conservationists which are individualistic. Naess says that “the argument in this important document is thoroughly anthropocentric in the sense that all its recommendations are justified exclusively in terms of their effects upon human health and basic well-being” (*The Deep Ecological* 12). In other words, deep ecology doubts about the technological optimism and scientific management of ecological crisis considering it as shallow ecology. At the same time, it is critical to materialistic,

consumer-oriented and limitless economic growth. Alan Drengson, one of the supporters of deep ecology briefs up the deep versus shallow ecology in this way:

Both historically and in the contemporary movement Naess saw two different forms of environmentalism, not necessarily incompatible with one another. One he called the "long-range deep ecology movement" and the other, the "shallow ecology movement." The word "deep" in part referred to the level of questioning of our purposes and values when arguing in environmental conflicts. The "deep" movement involves deep questioning, right down to fundamentals. The shallow stops before the ultimate level. ("Ecophilosophy..." Web)

The briefing of Drengson says that shallow and deep ecology are not two incompatible philosophies. Deep ecology is deep because of some deep questionings related to the fundamental problems of the relationship between human and non-human world. It is the questioning to the dualistic philosophy of western culture. It is a target to the age-old human-centered worldview on which policies of diverse sorts are prepared by individuals, organizations, and state machinery. Naess starts this original paper of this grass-roots movement with the lines, "Ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion. There are deeper concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness" ("The shallow..." 95). In other words, Naess tries to develop an ethics of responsibility which is deeper than ecologically responsible policies prevalent in the nation-states. In its initial conception developed in 1973, the tag "deep ecology" of Naess referred to a movement as characterized by the following seven points.

1. Rejection of the person-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field image;
2. In-principle support of biospheric egalitarianism;
3. An embrace of the principles of diversity and symbiosis both within human populations and in the natural world;
4. An anti-class posture;
5. Active opposition to pollution and resource depletion;
6. Stress on complexity, not complication;
7. Support for local autonomy and decentralization.

But Naess acknowledges the difficulty of formulating a general view among the supporters of deep ecologists in 1970's by which the tag "deep ecology" can be characterized. Therefore, in the later phase of its development in 1984, with some modification Naess, along with George Sessions formulated eight points as a proposal of deep ecology. These eight points are in fact, the replacement of Naess's above mentioned seven-point characteristics of deep ecology and "offered as a minimum description of the general features of the deep ecology movement" (Drengson and Yuichi xx). In this replacing amendment, Naess and Sessions have not preferred the word "characteristic" for formulating the guidelines of deep ecology. Instead, they have used the phrase "deep ecology platform," so that one can find the distinction of two approaches of "shallow" vs. "deep" ecology and to some extent can identify oneself with the latter.

Naess in his paper, "Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects," analyses the shallow-deep distinction under different heads of pollution, resources,

population, cultural diversity and appropriate technology and land and sea ethics. In this paper, Naess says that “shallow ecology” is an ecological movement to fight against pollution and resource depletion. The central objective of shallow ecology is health and affluence of people in the developed countries. In this system, importance is given only on minor reform of the system of industrial nations. Thereby, in shallow ecology, no fundamental changes occurred in the values and practices of the industrialized nations. Naess observes that ecological policies of nation-states may reduce pollution but increase problems of various sorts. Shallow ecology does not address these “other points” that may arise in the fight against pollution. He says that in adopting an anti-pollution device for the life necessities, there may be some other points which are left unaddressed. For example, in adopting some so called modern way of the eco-friendly device there may be the price increase that may cost an increase of class differences between rich and poor, have and have-nots. But very often it is seen that the state machinery ignores side-effects of any fight against pollution and resource depletion. These other points are overlooked in shallow approach. Therefore, it fails to address the philosophical, social and political roots of the environmental crisis.

Naess says that it is the shallow approach in which technology seeks to purify the air and water only to spread pollution more evenly. Laws limit permissible pollution. Pollution industries are preferably exported to developing countries. He says that in a shallow approach importance is given to resources for humans, particularly for the present generation in affluent societies. He explains that the resources of the earth are considered to belong to the section who own technological mean to use them. There is a conviction that resources will not be depleted. It is considered that as the resources get rarer, a favorable market value will protect them and alternative will be discovered

through technological or another mean. In other words, shallow ecology gives attention to humans, and it is nothing but an extension of anthropocentrism.

Shallow ecology is also known as reform environmentalism. The reason for conserving wilderness and preserving the biodiversity of reform environmentalism is only tied to human welfare. The relationship between human and non-human nature is not grounded on any ultimate premise. As there is the instrumental value of non-human nature, in shallow ecology, a human being takes care of the non-human nature. In contrast to shallow ecology, deep ecology evaluates pollution from a biospheric point of view, not focusing exclusively on its effects on human health, but rather on life as a whole, including the life conditions of every species and system. Naess writes:

To the ecological field-worker, *the equal right to live and blossom* is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. (“The Shallow...” 96)

According to Naess, in deep ecology, the impact of pollution is not looked in the context of human interest. Rather, deep ecology is concerned with the impact of pollution on life as such. Any form of exporting pollution is not only a crime against humanity, but it is a crime against life in general. A natural object is not to be treated as a resource. Therefore, Naess raises his voice against the “human modes of production and consumption.” Naess prefers the standard of production and consumption regarding ultimate human values. For meeting the ultimate human values, Naess advocates a change of economic, legal and educational institutions to counteract any destructive increases. Naess emphasizes on the ‘quality of life’ by the use of resources. He

considers that economic standard of living which is promoted by the human modes of consumption is only a shallow approach. This is not ecosystem approach. It encourages only isolated life-forms. The shallow approach, therefore, advocates only a man-in-environment image. It goes against deep ecology's long-range total field image.

Naess believes that overpopulation is a threat. Shallow ecology overlooks this problem. Instead, population increase is considered as beneficial for fulfilling short-sighted economic, military or other goals. Over-population is discussed concerning its effect on human lives only without any reference to non-human life forms. As the social relations of animals are ignored in the shallow approach, decreasing wild habitat areas is economically acceptable. In a shallow approach, Naess writes, "A long-term substantial reduction of the global human population is not seen to be desirable goal. In addition, the right is claimed to defend one's borders against 'illegal aliens' regardless of what the population pressures are elsewhere" ("The Deep..." 73). On the other hand, according to deep ecology excessive population is environmentally unwanted as it will bring human population explosion. The very first sentence of the first chapter of Naess's magnum opus *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* speaks on the issue of limiting human population. It is read as, "Humankind is the first species on earth with the intellectual capacity to limit its numbers consciously and live in an enduring, dynamic equilibrium with other forms of life" (*Ecology* 23).

Naess gives importance on finding out the roots of the environmental crisis and coevolving causes of it. Naess observes that man has a special capacity of reason and that he also possesses moral consciousness. With this capacity of reason and moral consciousness, a man inheres with him some special responsibilities. These

responsibilities include his concern about the flourishing of all types of life forms and the eco-cultural sustainability of the planet. According to Naess, proper biotic society can only be sustained by population reduction. Population reduction is an antecedent of the principle of diversity. Naess favors “Live and lets live” as a more powerful ecological principle than “either you or me.” According to Naess, the principle, “Live and let live,” enhances diversity. Diversity supports potentialities of survival and richness of forms (“The Shallow...” 96).

According to Naess, the different entities of nature like landscapes, ecosystems, rivers, etc. are conceptually cut into fragments in a shallow approach. The various agencies of states, organizations, and individuals consider these fragmented natural entities as properties and resources. Naess says that conservation in reform environmentalism is argued regarding diverse use and cost-benefit analysis. Naess writes, shallow ecology if taken to its logical extreme, is like a computerized cost-benefit analysis designed to benefit only humans (73). Moreover, Naess adds that the other points like the social and deep-ranged global ecological costs of resource extraction and use are usually not included in this analysis. Wildlife Management is used in a very narrow sense. It considers wildlife management as conserving nature for future generations of humans only. Naess cites the example that soil erosion and deterioration of the quality of ground water etc. are understood regarding the loss of human context. At the same time, it is believed that there is some way out of these problems for technology is progressing. As such, the necessity of a deep change is not felt in a shallow approach to ecology.

In contrast, deep ecology conceives that the earth does not belong to humans alone. Humans only inhabit the lands. With the same tone with Leopold, Naess says that humans belong to the land. Land does not belong to them. The concept of fragments of natural entities that belong to diverse agencies like individual, organization, state, etc. is a narrow concept from the perspective of deep ecology. Naess cites the example of his birthplace Norway. He says that the landscapes, rivers, flora and fauna of Norway are not the property of Norwegians only (74). Any natural entity does not belong to a particular state or a particular community or humanity alone. Humans use natural resources to meet their vital needs only. Though the term 'vital needs' is used to considerable differences in its meaning, in a very plain language it means minimum essentials for the sustenance of all. According to Naess, vital needs are seen as the needs of the ecosystem. At the same time, it is meant considering the needs of other species as the needs of humankind. In this process of comprehending the needs of nonhuman nature, there is no conflict of interest. It is long-ranged and a deep approach. Naess says that the identification of vital needs is the course of realization. This is the distinctive property of man that authorizes him to lead the globe. If humankind is not bothered with the pattern of production and consumption, then the ecological crisis is not going to be stopped. Identification of vital needs can only interfere in the present pace of consumption pattern. It is also the requirement of present human generation. Deep ecology suggests meeting the vital needs only.

According to the shallow approach of ecology, the degradation of the environment and resource depletion can be checked by adopting some measures that will combine economic growth with a healthy environment. Regarding scientific enterprise, shallow ecology desires a more dominated and manipulated technology to

manage the planet. On the other hand, deep ecology seeks better ecological policies and education. This demands our sensitivity to even “non-consumptive goods” which are of equal worth with the ones that are useful to human beings. Deep ecology urges for a shift from hard to soft science and gives importance on the local and global cultures. Moreover, it gives importance on activating mental energy and strengthening motivation.

The ethic of shallow ecology, according to Naess, deals with individual organisms. It calls upon us the human treatment of sentient beings. Shallow ecology, therefore, is humanistic. But deep ecology cannot be considered as humanistic in this sense. Rather it is eco-centric. The main thesis of deep ecology is the “rejection of the man-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field image” (95). Deep ecology calls upon us to respect the integrity of insentient ecosystems. Its ethic deals with the ecosystem as a whole.

The shallow-deep difference of Naess opens a new light of debate in environmentalism. Deep ecology, according to Naess, is deep because it is concerned with deep questioning. Deep ecology questions the logic of short-term environment protection policies. It questions man’s role in viewing pollution and other aspects of ecological crisis by ordinary viewing without a total world view. Naess writes,

The limitation of the shallow movement is not due to a weak or unethical philosophy, but due to a lack of explicit concern with ultimate aims, goals, and norms. So a considerable part of the work of the philosophically articulate supporters of the deep movement is to question narrowly utilitarian decisions: how do they relate to the ultimate? (*Ecology* 33)

Naess is optimistic that there are many common people across the world as well as a sizable section in power that believe in the wider norms and values characteristic of the Deep Ecology movement. As such he believes that there are political potentials in the deep ecology movement which have little to do with pollution and resource depletion. For that, the governments have to adopt deep policies. In such case, there will be no shallow environmental movement. Increasingly adopted deep policies will also do away with the necessity for special deep ecological, social movements. Naess is also very concerned about the success of deep ecology. For its success, Naess says that 'deep ecology movement must cooperate with various movements, including what we call narrow or shallow environmental organizations.' As such it can be said that deep ecology contrasts shallow ecology, but for its success, it is also dependent on shallow ecology.

2.2 Intrinsic Value of Nature:

Attributing intrinsic value of organisms is considered as one of the central tenets of deep ecology. There is a great deal of philosophical debate on the concept of intrinsic value.

In its basic sense 'intrinsic value' is used in contrast with the concept of 'instrumental value.' Therefore, in one sense, intrinsic value can be said to be a synonym for 'non-instrumental value.' On the other hand, if certain things are ends in themselves, they have intrinsic value. Intrinsically valuable things are usually held to be those things that have value regardless of any benefits they bring to other objects.

Sometimes, '*intrinsic value*' is also used as a synonym for '*objective value*.' Objective value is that value which an object possesses independently of its being

valued by any agent. In this context, intrinsicness is contrasted with subjectivity. The subjectivist holds that human consciousness or attitude is the source of all value. But this context of intrinsic value implies only partial nature of the term.

Naess characterizes deep ecology as based on the idea that humans are a part of nature rather than merely being in external nature. According to him, organisms are in bonds of intrinsic relations in the web of the biosphere. “An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things” (“The Shallow...’ 95). According to him, the total field image does not completely dissolve in the man-in-environment concept. As relation is intrinsic, there is nothing in isolation as well as nothing is in itself.

Naess coins the term “deep ecology” to distinguish a moral relation to the natural world from simply an instrumental one. To put it in simple terms, deep ecology is used to express the idea that nature has *intrinsic value*. The advocates of anthropocentrism believe that as humans are only self-conscious beings, humans are only moral beings. They believe that only moral beings possess intrinsic value. Thereby, it is said that humans have only intrinsic value.

Naess in his early work on deep ecology seemed to regard all living things as having equal value. But by the 1980s he dropped the equality constraint. Most importantly, the first platform principle of Naess, prepared with George Sessions in 1984, says that “the well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves.” The deep ecology platform principles offer a suggestion to deal with the human and non-human life forms. Naess and George Sessions formulate

eight platform principles or the common viewpoint that the supporters of deep ecological activist may have irrespective of their philosophical and religious positions.

In the first platform principle, Naess synonymously uses the phrases “intrinsic value”, “inherent value” and “values-in-themselves.” In other words, Naess revises the claim that the flourishing of all life – human and non-human alike – has value in its right. The word “equal” is used concerning living and blossom only in this context and not with the equal value of different life forms. It is based on the idea that non-human parts of the environment deserve to be preserved for their sake regardless of their utility to human beings. In other words, all lives and even ecosystems themselves have inherent or intrinsic value.

Naess uses the phrase “intrinsic value” in diverse occasions. Jon Wetlesen, a Professor at the university of Oslo and a disciple of Naess, critically argues that Naess ascribes value only to the well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on earth. In other words, deep ecology of Naess says about the value of certain states of living beings. Wetlesen writes, “Things are valued on account of their states or achievements, that is, on account of what they have, rather than on account of what they are. This way of ascribing value seems to favor one kind of normative ethical theory to the exclusion of other kinds; in briefs, it favors teleological rather than deontological ethics” (Wetlesen 405).

Wetlesen’s interpretation of deep ecology maintains that Naess-Sessions’ formulation of the 1st platform principle excludes deontological ethics in that the concept “flourishing of all life” implies a purpose to be realized and thus excludes the concept of in-itself-value of life irrespective of any norm or purpose to be realized.

Intrinsic value understood in the Naessian sense of ‘value in itself’ indicates a holistic teleological ethics. Wetlesen further adds:

It would surely have been much more lucid if the term “value in itself” had been used as a generic term, and “intrinsic value” and “inherent value” were employed as two of its specifications. In that case, “intrinsic value” could refer to certain states or achievements of living beings as understood within teleological ethics, and “inherent value” could be applied to these beings themselves as understood within deontological ethics. (Wetlesen 406)

In reply to Wetlesen suggestion Naess responds positively and says, “What Jon Wetlesen has to say about deontological and teleological ethics I agree with” (*Response to Jon* 419). Naess clarifies that his first versions to refer to the intrinsic value of anything are taken from the Germanic term, *Eigenwert* and *egenverdi* in Norwegian. David Rothenberg in the “Introduction” of Naess’s *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* writes that “to translate *egenverdi* as ‘intrinsic value’ makes the term sound somehow unnatural: it is ‘own value’ that is meant, value in itself” (12). Naess’s intention was to assure that common people acquaint with these popular terms. Naess’ aim to simplify the meaning led him to reduce the three phrases ‘intrinsic value’, ‘inherent value’ and ‘values in themselves’ to use synonymously. But Naess gives a positive response to Jon Wetlesen suggestion. Particularly Naess prefers Wetlesen’s suggestion to use the phrase ‘values in themselves.’ In the words of Naess, “When Jon Wetlesen introduces a philosophically excellent proposal for the consistent heteronomy of “inherent value” and “intrinsic value,” he disturbs the cloud. Better use ‘value in themselves’ and live the proposal of the distinction in the comments” (Wetlesen 418).

In his paper, “Equality, Sameness, and Rights,” he prefers the word “inherent value” to express the intrinsicness of the value of all life-forms in the wide sense of the

term. Living beings, Naess says, have in common a same sort of value. It is inherent value, the equal right of individuals to live and blossom. Naess is the view that when a value is accented as a means in a given systematization, this does not imply that it lacks intrinsic value. In this connection, Naess is a bit precise to show what intrinsic and what instrumental value are. He explains it concerning norms that may be an instrumental norm for attaining a basic goal. Naess says that “to accept a particular norm as a fundamental or basic norm does not imply an assertion of infallibility nor claim that the acceptance of a norm is independent of its concrete consequences in practical situations” (*Ecology* 69). According to Naess, a norm which is valid only as a means to the fulfillment of another more basic norm is called a purely instrumental norm. Naess writes:

A genuine norm is one which has validity independent of means/goal relations. Its realization has intrinsic value over and above any possible means value. Being a genuine norm does not preclude its having, in addition, means value. Honesty can be thought to have both intrinsic value and in addition means value in the realization of the many norms in our social existence. (*Ecology* 75)

Naess is for some possible instrumental norms for the success of an ecological movement. Here lies the basic motive of environmental ethics. Naess cites an example of encouraging bicycle riding as a mode of transportation. It is a norm against pollution. As such, this norm stands instrumental for removing pollution. But in riding a bicycle one obtains some intrinsic value also, namely, the innocent joy which is involved in pushing a bicycle pedal as well as being one’s experience of being closer to the outdoor life. Though there is an instrumental value working as a primary motive, intrinsic value is realized as an experience of joy. In 1969 Naess took early retirement at the age of

fifty-seven. In his farewell address to colleagues and students, Naess said that he wished to live rather than mere function. The farewell speech was titled "Joy." It signifies the qualitative aspect of living a life recognizing the intrinsic value of everything.

2.3 Bio-spherical Egalitarianism:

In principle, deep ecology posits *bio-spherical egalitarianism*. But *bio-spherical egalitarianism*, according to Naess, is an “abstract and somewhat grandiose term.” Naess says that his intention is not to suggest a major doctrine of any sort by this term. It, according to him, is an intuition that resides in its capacity to counteract towards those beings which may seem to some people to be less developed, less complex, less beautiful or less miraculous. As such, Deep Ecology encourages an egalitarian attitude not only towards all members of the ecosphere but also to all identifiable entities in the ecosphere. It is the claim that all living things have equal moral worth. They are of equal intrinsic value. At a fundamental level, all organisms are intrinsically related in a bio-spherical net or field. Naess outlines the concept of biocentric egalitarianism in the following way:

The ecological field worker acquires a deep-seated respect, even veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow men and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker, the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. The quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself. (*Ecology* 28)

Eco-centrism or biocentrism, as contrasted with anthropocentrism, attributes equal intrinsic moral worth to non-human life-forms and ecosystems as with a human. There are certain thinkers who distinguish between biocentrism and ecocentrism (Rolston, Wenz). Biocentrism attributes value to individuals of nonhuman species. On the other hand, ecocentrism attributes value to collective or composite entities such as species. The term bio-centrism has the prefix *bio*, which etymologically refers to living organisms. In this sense, it is narrower than the connotation of the term Ecocentrism. But the term “living” or “life” is used in a broad sense. It has developed an extremely broad sense of the term life. According to Naess, it refers to individuals, species, populations, habitats as well as human and non-human cultures. As such it incorporates watersheds, landscapes, and ecosystem as a whole. This view underlies the central idea that humans are in nature and in no way above or outside of nature. To distinguish man from his environment is to think at a superficial and artificial level. Biocentrism and Ecocentrism are interchangeably used to connote the biosphere and ecosphere respectively. Naess prefers to use the term Ecocentrism, for, it is more inclusive.

According to Warwick Fox, the ecocentric egalitarianism of deep ecology is a constructive mission of encouraging an egalitarian orientation among humans toward all identifiable entities or forms in the ecosphere. Fox writes: “The kind of egalitarian attitude they advocate is simply meant to indicate an attitude that within obvious kinds of practical limits, allows all entities (including humans) the freedom to unfold in their own way unhindered by the various forms of human domination” (“The Deep Ecology...” 270).

Ecocentric egalitarianism does not prescribe a specific set of guidelines for action but promotes a general orientation, which according to Eckersley, is “the freedom [of life-forms] to unfold in their way unhindered by the various forms of human dominance” (*Environmentalism* 156). Naess, therefore, says that eco-centric egalitarianism should not be taken as deep ecology's primary norm. Ecocentric egalitarianism along with Self-realization is “two distinctive and central affirmation of deep ecology” (French 41). These two are difficult terms, and they are differently interpreted. Richness and diversity of human cultures on earth, according to Naess, require different articulation of ultimate views. As a “celebrant of diversity,” Naess tries to establish that there is validity to the intuition that all life is in some sense intrinsically valuable. This is a basic intuition rooted in its holistic view of interconnections among all living beings.

Naess says that ecological activists are dedicated to protecting nature against all sort of destruction. They spend much of their life and energy to save the planet with all its life forms. Naess's formulation of the view is that the diverse life forms of inherent worth are the result of his way of nourishment in a natural environment.

Naess got involved with the idea of deep ecology at the age of four or five years. In his early childhood, he explored the shoreline of the fjord of Norway, his native land. Naess was very much intrigued by the incredible diversity of life forms there. Exploring mountains was one of his main hobbies. In fact, his mother had a cottage in the high mountains. It developed a sense of his belongingness to mountains. Naess states that he used to treat the mountain as his father as his father died when he was very young. In the “Series Editors Introduction” of SWAN, Harold Glasser gives an inspirational

background of Naess's articulation of egalitarianism attitude towards all creatures on earth. Glasser writes:

Much of Arne's early childhood was spent at the seashore, and this is the period in which his interest in nature and experimentation began to flourish. Feeling somewhat distanced in his relations with people, he identified with nature, especially little sea creatures. He waded in shallow water for hours, inventing experiments to test nascent hypotheses about the behavior of small sole, tiny translucent shrimp, and crabs. He describes these experiments as engendering an early enthusiasm for diversity and a tendency to suspend judgment on the nobility or status of different beings. He loved these creatures for their unique qualities and their amusing adaptations and limitations. They inspired a certain egalitarianism, which took hold and later influenced his philosophical approach in profound ways. (xxvii)

Naess advocates the universal right of all life-forms. According to him right to live is one and same for all individuals, all species. Naess thereby rejects any view that attributes one more right to live and blossom than that of another of a particular species. "Plants and animals also have a right to unfolding and self-realization. They have the right to live" (*Ecology* 165). Naess says that the right of living beings to live is a universal right. This right cannot be quantified. The biospherical egalitarian principle contradicts any quantification status. Naess writes, "living beings have a right (or intrinsic or inherent value, or value in themselves) to live and blossom that is the same for all. If we speak of differences in rights or value we do not speak of the rights or value I have in mind. It is not meaningful to speak of degrees of intrinsic or inherent value when speaking of the right of individuals to live and blossom" ("Equality..." 223).

To clarify the concept of quantification status of value, Naess speaks about same value without any rank or grade of nonhuman nature. Naess says that intrinsic or inherent value has no degree. As such, the inherent value of species cannot be graded. According to Naess, grading or ranking is not at all an ethical affair. As ranking involves an act of comparing, it does not have the same sort intuitive evidence. It is a very complex affair. As such, diverse living beings cannot be ranked. Species cannot be ranked as inferior or superior. It is pertinent to refer here to William C. French's use of the phrase "species ranking"¹ to give a critical analysis of Naess's radical position regarding the equal rank of all species regarding inherent value. Species ranking is a view that opposes biospherical egalitarianism for its advocacy of equal moral standing to all species. Naess discards any sort of species ranking in his interpretation of the equal intrinsic value of all species.

The idea of relative intrinsic value is rejected by Naess because it leads to species ranking. To say that a particular species has more intrinsic value than another is misleading. Species ranking is a threat to all life forms in living and blossoming with equal right. Species ranking leads one to believe that one that is higher in rank has the right to kill and injure one in the lower rank. It leads one to behave differently to different life forms depending on the quantity of inherent value.

But while refuting the species ranking concept Naess, goes to justify, with apparent inconsistency, one's act of killing or hunting by elaborating the circumstance

¹ William C. French, in his paper, "Against Biospherical Egalitarianism" published in the *Environmental Ethics*, 1995, Spring, (pp. 39-57), criticizes Naess and Paul Taylor's position in the book *Respect for Nature*. Like Naess, Taylor also says that all species "possess a degree or amount of inherent worth equal to that of humans." French criticizes both Naess and Taylor and remarks that Lawrence Johnson's Species Ranking Scheme elaborated in the book *A Morally Deep World* which is anti-anthropocentric as well as gives moral priority "to defend those who have the greatest range of potential vulnerability." While Naess says that species ranking is unethical, French views that it is inevitable.

under which it is done. Naess considers this sort of justification as *realistic egalitarian attitude*. One's act is to be morally guided by realistic egalitarian attitude. Naess is very much aware that "any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression" (*Ecology* 28). Thereby it is a tough job to maintain the principle of "strict egalitarianism." According to him, strict egalitarianism remains as an 'abstract ideal' because, in practice, killing and suppression must occur. In a realistic practice, there remains some obligation to someone who is nearer to the agent. This obligation leads the agent to behave in a way that discriminates one species from another; it may also lead to killing or injuring of some species. Naess cites the example of one's obligations towards one's children. In many cases killing animals to feed one's starving child is considered simply as one's obligations. Naess further says that "the obligations towards individuals that have been members of our communities for long periods of time are greater than toward accidental visitors" ("Intuition..." 170). But Naess believes that this obligation does not show the violation of the norm of equality of nature's construction. To substantiate his claim, Naess cites an example of an interaction of man and wild animals. In this context, it is pertinent to mention that "Naess has written articles on resolving social conflicts between human beings and wild animals such as whales, bears, and wolves" (Devall and Drengson lxx). Naess writes:

This egalitarian attitude is manifested when the hunter has a long discussion with the spirit of the bear, and explains apologetically that the larder is bare and that he must now kill the bear to nourish his family. In return, the hunter can remind the bear's spirit that both he and his family will die one day, and turn to dust, and so to vegetation, sustenance for the descendents of the bear. In other words, this is a *realistic* egalitarian attitude, an acknowledgement of the cycles of life and their interconnection in nature. (*Ecology* 176)

In other words, one is to conduct the killing with reverence and regret for the act. Naess points out to the animistic culture where the killing of animals for food and clothing were allowed. He says that in such cultures killings were conducted with *reverence to the animals and regret for the act*. Naess's view that there were reverence and regret for the act of killing in the animistic culture invites some disagreement from the historical perspective. But Naess's vision is clear for he tends to say that if one is to kill or suppress a life form that is not because of less intrinsic value but for meeting some end from the part of the agent. Naess writes:

We might agree upon rules such as will imply different behavior towards different kinds of living beings without negating that there is a value inherent in living beings which is *the same value* for all. But it is against my intuition of unity to say 'I can kill you because I am more valuable' but not against the intuition to say 'I will kill you because I am hungry'. In the latter case, there would be an implicit regret: 'Sorry, I am now going to kill you because I am hungry.' In short, I find obviously right, but often difficult to justify, different sorts of behavior with different sorts of living beings. But this does not imply that we classify some as intrinsically more valuable than others. (*Ecology* 168)

It can be observed that reverence to animals and regret for killing cannot go with the act of voluntary killing unless in *exceptional cases*. For example, if a wild animal enters into a populous residential area and creates a havoc like situation killing and injuring people, then there may not be any choice for the residents other than killing the animal. In such circumstance killing of the animal becomes inevitable, and thus justified. This may be considered as an exceptional case for which one may be apologetic to the animal when it is to be killed. But killing an animal for food or ones day to day livelihood is a voluntary case of killing. In such case, it is of least possibility

that the agent would regret his action. Again, it can be observed here that there lies a gap between one's natural instinct of survival and what Naess calls his "realistic egalitarian attitude." The natural instinct of survival is a basic instinct of both human and non-human life forms. Once one ensures one's comfort zone in living and sustenance, one may aspire for a deep ecologists' considered approach of benevolence towards the rest of the beings. As such, the natural instinct of survival supported by fight or flight is preceded by ecocentric egalitarian attitude. Naessian approach thereby reckons some inconsistent views in bringing forth the hunter's egalitarian attitude towards its prey. Moreover, in a concrete practice, there is the least possibility of being remorseful and analyzing the spirit of a kill when taken for sustenance by any agent.

From the above discussion, it can be observed that species ranking is inevitable in one's practical life. The reason may be fulfilling the vital needs or out of one's obligation or necessity. As it is inevitable, it cannot be considered as unjustified. In defense of fulfilling one's interest over nonhuman life forms Naess says that it is done not by the consideration of the greater intrinsic value of human but of necessity and self-defense. As such, although in a concrete situation some killing and suppression are inevitable, Naess is not ready to deduce that the principle of biocentric egalitarianism can be rejected. Naess says that all life forms have equal right to live and blossom.

What Naess says is that the inherent value of all the members of the whole ecosphere is same. Only in a concrete practice value priority takes place depending on vitalness or condition. Naess himself acknowledges a kind of ranking which he feels is "compatible with a moderate latitudinarian attitude as opposed to a rigorist one." It seems that Naess believes in some species ranking, for he speaks about the greater

obligation to that which is nearer. In such case, humans are closer to us than animals. But Naess believes that there cannot be any general ranking. But for the continual existence of certain mixed communities, it may be of vital concern. The meaning of the phrase *mixed-communities* needs to be clarified. Naess's 1987 paper "Philosophy of Wolf Policies (I): General Principles and Preliminary Exploration of Selected Norms" written with Ivar Mysterud in *Conservation Biology*, (23-34) writes about rank consideration in mixed communities. It may be mentioned that Ivar Mysterud is a wolf and bear specialist and a popular name in Norway for writing on the conflicts of humans with other animals. Naess and Mysterud consider mixed communities as a sub-concept of 'life-community' as a whole in which humans and limited groups of animals are included as members. These members play some part in interacting day to day human affairs. The sociological limitation of the word "community" regarding only human-membership is abandoned here. Thereby Naess removes the "organizational cleavage between social and natural sciences" and tries to include some animals like dogs, cats, cows, pigs and others which have long been companions of human family life. Naess cites the example of rank consideration in mixed communities of sheep, sheep-owner, bears and wolves. He writes:

A sheep owner cried out to his children "come and see through the window!" A big brown Mysterud bear was coming straight up to the farm, but the sheep were out of reach of the bear. Marvelous sight! Full respect for the bear –its inherent value, its right to eat the sheep. But also the right of the sheep-owner to chase the bear away if it, against expectation, tried to break down the door protecting the sheep. ("An Answer..." 148)

Naess says that a sheep-owner is an agriculturist, forester, hunter, and gatherer. Naess posits him as an ecological aristocrat. The sheep-owner, Naess believes, is not

going to kill the bear if it does not attack him. It is a kind of non-violent-direct-action on the part of the human being towards the rest of the living beings. Unlike the works of academic philosophers, this analysis shows Naess' attempt of "integrating cultural and biological diversity." It suggests the supporters of deep ecology resolve social conflicts between human and non-human life forms of sheep, bears and other wild animals. He cites an example for this.

It may be vital interest to a family of poisonous snakes to remain in a place where they have lived for hundreds of generations but where small children now play, but it is also of vital interest to the children and their parents that there be no accidents. The priority rule of nearness (and a sense of responsibility) makes it justifiable for the parents to relocate the snakes. But the priority of the vital interests of the snakes is important in deciding where to establish the playgrounds in the first place. ("Equality..." 222-23)

The felt nearness of a subject toward some other individual makes one identify oneself with the other. This attitude makes the subject suffer when the other suffers. But Naess makes it clear that one's personal feeling of nearness and the limit of capacity cannot play any role in formulating an ethical code of conduct. However, felt-nearness determines one's motive to deal with one's surroundings. Naess says that there may be different motives acceptable to people of diverse background for the reason of hesitation to injure or kill a particular life form. He cites an example in support of this. In his words,

It [felt-nearness] determines largely our capacity to identify ourselves with a sort of being, to suffer when they suffer. One cannot put forth ethical rules of conduct without taking such feelings and our limited capacities seriously. If it is difficult to avoid killing A because of its smallness, whereas killing B is easily avoided, we tend to protect B rather than A. ("Intuition..." 169)

The realistic egalitarian attitude is based on the interaction with the diverse life forms one interface in one's day to day life. Naess believes that in a realistic interaction one cannot ignore the fact that vital interests of one's nearest one have priority. The vital interest of humans may be legitimately overriding the vital interests of nonhumans. Human interest must not in every case be privileged. The realistic egalitarianism of Naess considers that vital human needs are privileged. Thereby, Naess adds that if human interests are at risk, one can override the interests of human life over non-human life-forms. According to French, Naess does not give the moral basis to justify such privileging. Thus it can be said that Naess invites many inconsistencies in his attempt to address realistic egalitarianism on the theoretical foundation of biocentric egalitarianism.

It is to be mentioned here that Naess speaks about intuition of the unity of all life. One's sense of identification with the greater whole embarks such intuition. This intuition leads one to reject that one species is more valuable than other. Even the human needs, according to Naess, should never have priority over nonhuman needs. Naess adds, "Our own benefit must then mean 'that which serves the great Self, not merely the individual ego or human societies. One can desire well-being for an animal or a plant just as naturally as one can for a person. For some dog owners, their dog's well-being is more important to them than that of their neighbor'" (*Ecology* 168).

Naess is very much cautious about the verbalization of intuition which he believes may be misleading. The reason is very clear. There are other intuitions and different attitudes. They reflect different valuations of diverse sorts. As such, *biospheric egalitarianism*, according to Naess, is the abstract and somewhat pretentious term.

Naess has given a personal testimony. This he acknowledges as his attempt to verbalize an intuition. In this personal testimony, Naess cites an example to clarify the conflict of choice. If there is a choice concerning whether to step on a *Salix herbacea*, rather than on the small, more overwhelmingly beautiful and rarer *Gentiana nivalis*, Naess himself would unhesitatingly and deliberately step on the former. He writes that he has injured thousands of individuals of the tiny arctic plant, *Salix herbacea*, during his ten-year period of staying in the high mountains of Norway. He is convinced that as long as he stays over there, he is forced to continue stepping on them. But one does not need to justify such behavior by thinking that they have less of a right to live and blossom. It is not that they have less intrinsic value as living beings than other living beings, including Naess himself. Naess writes, “When I behave as I do, I can at the same time admire these plants and acknowledge their equal right to live and blossom with my right. At least not less and not more. Perhaps it is a better formulation to say that living beings have a right, or an intrinsic or inherent value, or value in themselves, that is the same for all of them” (“Intuition...” 169).

Naess is a critic of conformism. He argues that only a diversity of views will prove to be sufficiently rich to have the desired outcome of allowing for the greatest possible flourishing of life on earth. As like as he celebrates diversity in the natural world, David Zimmerman, in his paper “Arne Naess, Celebrant of Diversity,” opines, he also celebrates diversity within the world of culture, and especially within the deep ecology movement.

When the word intuition is used in respect of *biospheric egalitarianism*, it does not imply the absence of rational basis. It can be observed that his articulation of

intuition is not like that of S. Radhakrishnan, wherein the stage of intuition one transcends the world of reason. Deep ecology of Naess criticizes reason. Alternatively, it prescribes intuition as an equal or even superior form of cognition. The continuity between human self and cosmic one, as Naess observes, may be apprehended by intuition only. In Naess' context of intuition other factors also operate. As such, intuition operates with reason in choosing the fundamentals. Naess believes that although not verifiable and there is the terminological and conceptual difference, the kind of intuition he speaks about is common among the supporters of Deep Ecology Movement. The broad stream of nature poetry speaks about the same right of all beings to live and blossom. This is one sort of confirmation of the Naess' kind of intuition.

2.4 Self-Realization:

Naess gives a wide elaboration of the phrase 'Self-realization' in his paper, "Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World." This paper, published in the summer volume of 1987 in *The Trumpeter*, (35-42), a journal of ecophilosophy, is, in fact, the 4th Keith Roby Memorial Trust Lecture in Community Science, delivered on 12 March 1986, at Murdoch University of Western Australia. Along with the main theme of the paper 'Self-realization,' Naess explains a brief account of the sub-title of this paper, 'An Ecological Approach to Being in the World.' Here Naess says little about 'Nature with all the qualities we spontaneously experience, as identical with the reality we live in' ("Self-Realization..." 41). As such the identification thesis of Naess gets prominence in this paper. In this paper, Naess elaborates about a shift from being in the world to being in Nature. In other words, along with the concept of self-realization, Naess explains the purpose of being in the world.

Naess in this paper says that the humankind has been struggling with the basic questions like who we are, where exactly are we heading to and what kind of reality we are part of. Naess does not say anything new in enquiring these age-old questions but claims to have looked at the things from a different angle. He observes that man's anthropocentric behavior is rooted in his failure to view the world for what is. He considers it as the main cause of the ecological crisis. Through the concept of self-realization, one can have the view of the world for what it is. In this paper, Naess suggests a few steps as main points of self-realization. These steps, in fact, are meant to suggest that normally people underestimate themselves. They cannot see themselves who exactly they are. And through these steps of self-realization, one can realize that one is connected with the rest of nature and *all-sided-maturity* is reached. This maturity leads to the rejection of person-in-environment image and thereby relational, the total-field image is established.

Naess believes that through self-realization one can understand that human beings are not separate from any part of the non-human world. As such, this concept functions as a tool that can assist one to see the world with a total view where one is just a part of it. At the same time self-realization enables one to see one's place in the natural environment. In other words, self-realization can change one to view the natural world from the way one normally views it. This viewing determines one's ethics and the morals to be followed towards the natural environment. Naess insists that this change is important to reduce the rapidly growing ecological crisis as well as 'to indicate a kind of perfection.' This perfection leads one to see how things are interconnected. Thereby, 'self-realization' stands as a key term for an ultimate goal of total ecological view. Naess writes, "It is conceived as a process, but also as an ultimate goal, in a rather

special usage of 'ultimate'. It is logically ultimate in a systematic exposition of Ecosophy T. The term includes personal and community self-realization, but is conceived also to refer to an unfolding of reality as a totality" (*Ecology* 84).

The concept of Self-realization means to realize oneself. Self-realization implies realizing one's true nature of the self through an intuition and clear ecological knowledge. Deep ecological knowledge goes with the assertion that each one is embedded in and supported by a network of relationship, not only to the human community but also to animals and plants, to the world as a whole. For Naess, an abiding concern for the environment can emerge from a deepened and expanded-sense of self. For him, we only underestimate ourselves if we tend to confuse the sense of self with the narrow ego. Naess says that the concept of ego-selves separate human beings from the rest of nature. Through self-realization, one can discover one's true nature that reveals the truth about oneself. This process cannot help but feel connected with the biosphere where one is a part of that. This process also leads one to act and behave accordingly. It gives the experience that hurting any part of nature hurts oneself. An increased awareness of this experience leads a change to live in harmony with the rest of the non-human beings.

Naess introduces the distinction between ego-self, the narrow ego and ecological self to illuminate his concept of Self-realization. Naess explains what is meant by "self" with a small-s to indicate ego-self. He also explains "Self" with a capital-S to mean the ecological self. Naess advocates the attainment of 'the ecological self' by an agent. Einar Strumse gives a simple articulation of ecological self.

The ecological self may be contrasted with a more common three-partite understanding of the self, going back to Freud, and consisting of the ‘desiring impulsive self’ (id), the ‘rationalizing- decision-making self’ (ego) and the ‘normative-judgmental’ self (superego). ...The ecological self is here to be conceived of as broad, field-like or expansive, in fact, it is assumed to be as expansive as our identifications. The self is simply defined as *whatever the person identifies with*. In principle, there are no limitations to the comprehensiveness of identifications; the approach thus suggests the potential of a sense of self characterized by an identification with "the larger collective of all living things." (Strumse 13-14)

By the ecological self (Self) Naess wants to mean “extension of identification” to larger entities. This extension is, in fact, an expansion of the isolated narrow ego to a larger biospheric whole. It is an expansion to include even a microcellular life form though they are separate life forms from each other. It is a kind of realistic appreciation of intimate connection with all life forms around a person. It is a process of transcending the isolated, narrow and competing for individual egos to merge with the biosphere as a whole. With the increase of self-realization one starts seeing oneself in others. According to Naess, one is in fact connected with the rest of nature. One is not an ego-self that one thinks to be. Ego-self separates one from the rest of the beings and thereby from the viewing the world as it is. Self-realization helps one understanding one’s true nature. In such situation, one feels connected with the entire biosphere where one is a part of. As a result of this one acts and behaves accordingly with the rest of nature.

Ecological self is considered by Naess as the awakened part of a man who can comprehend the connection with the natural world. Thereby, an ecological-self chooses

to live in harmony with human as well as non-human part of nature. Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty gives a simple interpretation of Naessian view of self-realization:

Self-realization is treated as the ultimate value by Arne Naess in his environmental thinking. Self-realization is the realization of the unity of the individual self with the whole world. It leads to the feeling that all beings are one, but this does not imply negation of plurality, rather a feeling of unity of different parts that are non-different from one's own self. For Naess, non-duality does not imply rejecting plurality, rather it lets all beings flourish in their natural environment. In Self-realization one expands one's self to others. (92)

Naess explains the status of one's empirical self. The empirical-self aspires for greatness and equability. The process of identification is the prerequisite of one's feeling of the lack of greatness and equability. The empirical-self aspires to see oneself in the other. When one sees oneself in the other the empirical self no longer remains as the empirical self, but the level of ecological-self that one would attempt to realize. That whoever has realized himself as the ecological self moves more or less away from society's modern and technological lifestyle.

According to Naess, human-nature with *all-sided maturity* is bound to identify itself with all sorts of living beings. These living beings may be beautiful or ugly, big or small, sentient or non-sentient. Thus the process of acquiring the deepened and expanded self is called by Naess as self-realization. The phrase *all-sided maturity* is used by Naess to include the maturity in all major relations. All major relations include deep identity with the nearest one to the total ecosphere. According to Naess, society and human relations are important. One's circles of friends, one's community, the local tribes, the fellow neighbor, races, humanity, etc. have values in their respective places.

When one is not matured, one underestimates oneself with these major relations alone. On the other hand, when one has all-sided maturity, one sees oneself in others. Naess believes that one's self is richer in its constitutive relations. In this context, he says that human nature with sufficient all-sided maturity cannot avoid identifying one's self with all living beings. It transcends one social and human relation to identifying oneself with all. Regarding all-sided maturity, Naess criticizes his predecessors like Descartes, Schopenhauer, and Heidegger who, he believes, failed to transcend the level of ego-self which is essential for identification with the extended self. Naess remarks,

Descartes seemed to be rather immature in his relation to animals, Schopenhauer was not much advanced in his relation to family Heidegger was amateurish – to say the least – in his political behavior. Weak identification with non-humans is compatible with maturity in some major sets of relations, such as those towards family or friends. I use the qualification 'all-sided,' that is, 'in all major relations.' ("Self-Realization..." 35)

This identification is possible only through the power of intuition. In deep intuition, one can realize that parts of nature are parts of oneself. Naess says with the extended self; one will naturally think for the protection of all in the universe. In other words, *one identifies oneself not merely with one's family, one's community, one's culture or with humanity as a whole, but also with one's immediate environment, the place where one is born or to which one belongs to one's land, to one's earth.* Thus it can be said that Naess visualizes self-realization as involving a shift from ego to social self and also from social self to ecological Self.

The ecological self, thus, consists of extending of one's selfhood so as to cover one's environment, even the all life-forms. It is a kind of actualization of the greatest potentiality of the self. Naess reasonably states that 'a couple of thousand years of

philosophical, psychological and social-psychological thinking has not brought us to any stable conception of the I, ego or the self (35). Naess argues that we should care for the extended or ecological-Self since each of us is larger than his or her body. Naess clarifies that one cannot identify 'one's body' with 'one's self' or even with 'one's ego.' According to him 'my body' cannot be substituted for "I". Therefore, Naess introduces the concept of ecological self. He says that "the ecological self of a person is that with which this person identifies" (35). Thereby Naess makes a shift to identification of 'I' with nature from the clarification of the term 'self.'

Naess' introduction of the concept of Self-realization is an attempt to connect the general statement that 'all life is fundamentally one' with our individual needs and desires. Naess is a bit interpretative in this connection. Are self-realization by identification of one's self with the greater environment on the one hand, and fulfilling one's individual needs and desires on the other conflicting concepts? It is, in fact, a great challenge today to save the planet from further deterioration of ecological scenario. For, apparently the conserving the ecology and fulfilling one's personal needs come in direct conflict. And, so love for nature is sure to decrease the potential for good living, in Naess terms, "joyful existence" for all. But Naess observes that giving up one's self-interest in favor of protecting the nature cannot be called ethical as this sacrifice in all possibilities would be deceitful, and in the long run, it will not work. Instead, identification of oneself with nature can serve the purpose of both conservation of nature and live a joyous life. Naess' deep ecology is therefore not an ecological principle but all about living the life itself. In his words:

We need environmental ethics, but when people feel that they unselfishly give up, or even sacrifice, their self-interests to show love for nature, this is probably, in the long run, a treacherous basis for conservation. Through identification, they may come to see that their own interests are served by conservation, through genuine self-love, the love of a widened and deepened self. At this point, the notion of a being's interests furnishes a bridge from self-love to self-realization. (36)

As such one can say that Self-realizing is an active condition, not a goal one has to reach. Because living life by identifying oneself with the greater ecological self is an active condition. No one ever reaches Self-realization, for complete Self-realization would require the realization of all. It is only a process, a way to live one's life. Self-realization is a direction, starting from the 'self,' moving towards the "Self." It is, in fact, a joyous living directed towards greater identification. No destiny is to be reached but to live a good life with self-realization.

Self-realization is not self-centered. Naess says that as we are all interconnected, therefore, our own self-realization gives support to other beings in their self-realization. One cannot simply split into units, pursuing one's own goals only. This is why Naess introduces the concept of a greater Self. If one really expands oneself to include other people and species and nature itself, the larger world becomes part of one's own interests. It is seen as a world of *potentials* to increase our own Self-realization, as we are part of the increase of others'. Naess in this connection warns one to be cautious of ignorance and misunderstanding about the potentialities upon which one depend for self-realization. To remove this difficulty the ecological maxims like, "everything hangs together", "the place is part of myself" etc are used by Naess. Naess suggests that when one identifies oneself with the rest of the environment, protection of nature spontaneously follows since it has become a part of one's greater 'Self'. Naess

explains, “Care flows naturally if the ‘self’ is widened and deepened so that protection of free Nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves ... just as we do not need morals to make us breathe ... [so] if your ‘self ’ in the wide sense embraces another being, you need no moral exhortation to show care” (39). Naess maintains that one needs to spend time in nature for engaging oneself in the process of self-realization. So, the nature itself is the igniting force in the process of self-realization. Naess feels that joy of life and the meaning of life are increased through increased self-realization. This is possible by fulfilling one’s potentials. Realizing inherent potentialities is one of the good clarifications of “self-realization”.

It can be observed that Naess’ Self-realization is a continuous process. In this process, one’s identification with the rest of nature is widened, and alienation is narrowed. Self-realization as such is 'totality of our identification.' Self-realization can be instrumentally understood when implicit in the sense of ecological harmony and thereby the protection of oneself. It fulfills the much-cherished goal living a happy life in a balanced ecological world.

2.4.1 Identification:

Naess, like many philosophers of occidental and oriental world, speaks about human salvation in this world. There are numerous theses that speak about human salvation through self-realization. Naess says that self-realization is possible in a variety of ways. But Naess remarkably diverts from many others with regard to the concept of human salvation for he offers his concept of ‘wide-identification’. Through the concept of identification, Naess expands the concern to both mankind’s relationship to life in

general and the self-realization of all life-forms for their own sake. Harold Glasser summarises Naess's notion of identification in the following way:

This *wide-identification* is characterized by the perception that all life is interdependent; common goals bind all living beings to the life process. In Naess's view one can arrive at wide-identification by drawing on a broad diversity of philosophical or religious ultimate premises, with roots ranging from Christian Stewardship to the Gaia Hypothesis to Naess's own ontologically inspired "Self-realization!" In its most expansive form, wide-identification is the intuition that nature's interests and our own coincide, as with Naess's "Self-realization!" (SWAN xliii)

Identification with other non-human parts of nature, according to Naess, is discovered through the process of self-realization. Naess believes that, like him, all living beings are striving somehow to realize their own potential of realizing the identification with all sort of living beings. In the words of Naess:

From when I was about four years old until puberty I could stand or sit for hours, days, weeks, in shallow water on the coast, inspecting and marveling at the overwhelming diversity and richness of life in the sea. The tiny beautiful forms which 'nobody' cared for, or were even unable to see, was part of a seemingly infinite world, but nevertheless my world. Feeling apart in many human relations, I identified with 'nature'. ("How My Philosophy..." 210)

Naess advocates an approach of Self-realization through extending one's sense of identification to a larger sense of Self. In fact he is very much confident in asserting his view of self-realization in the sense of identification. Naess is of the view that "philosophically, the concepts ego, self, and Self (the deep, comprehensive and ecological self) are braided into dissimilar systems which originally were closely associated to the world religions. Because of the reduced influence of these religions in

our industrial societies, the philosophies of identification have become almost inaccessible” (*Ecology* 175). Naess advocates the eco-centric view. Therefore, he views nature as the end in and of itself. One has the capacity to connect with a much larger sense of self, transcending ego, by extending one’s sense of identification beyond the usual narrow focus on ego to a wider sphere of relationships. It is not difficult for one to identify oneself with other living beings. One can actually practice or cultivate this capacity. Naess himself enquires if there is any paradigm situation of identification. According to Naess, in a situation of identification one obtains intense empathy towards the rest of the being or beings. He cites an example of a situation of the agony of a flea in one of his personal experiences which he met in certain phase of his life. In his own words:

My standard example has to do with a non-human being I met 40 years ago. I looked through an old-fashioned microscope at the dramatic meeting of two drops of different chemicals. A flea jumped from a lemming strolling along the table and landed in the middle of the acid chemicals. To save it was impossible. It took many minutes for the flea to die. Its movement was dreadfully expressive. What I felt was naturally, a painful compassion and empathy. But the empathy was not basic; it was the process of identification, that “I see myself in the flea.” It was alienated from the flea, not seeing intuitively anything even resembling myself, the death struggle would have left me indifferent. (“Self-Realization...” 36)

The flea fell on the chemicals and started reacting to its intolerable pain. Naess feels the pain of this nonhuman being. As such, identification is not limited to beings which can reciprocate. One’s identification may be an animal, plant, mountain or ocean. Naess in this example advocates the lifting of empathy with other beings from a basic level to the level of an identifying one. Naess empathized with the suffering of a flea, a

non-human microscopic being. Naess shows that suffering is its most potent source. He identifies himself with this tiny creature, and thereby shows the feeling of connection with the rest of the living world. Naess also exemplifies his feeling for the laboratory rats in their discomfort and apprehension shown by their frequent defecations and urinations. In this process one identifies with the rest of the beings and thereby realizes that less is more in identification. A matured consciousness showing modesty in one's way of living is reflected in this empathy. Therefore, Naess claims that there must be identification in order there to be compassion and solidarity. Naess writes, "The relationship between identification and the narrower process of *solidarity* is such that every deep and lasting state of solidarity presupposes wide identification... The same applies to *loyalty*. When solidarity and loyalty are solidly anchored in identification, they are not experienced as moral demands; they come of themselves" (*Ecology* 172).

Naess tries to show that the concept of identification is mingled with the adjectives like love, empathy, solidarity etc. In other words, with love and empathy one identifies oneself with other life forms, with all living beings. Rothenberg, in the translator's introductory note of *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* writes that identification is the widest interpretation of love in the Naessian sense of the term. According to him, "In love one loses part of one's identity by gaining a greater identity, something that in its truest sense cannot be spoken of. So at the same time we do not intend to make everything part of ourselves and see ourselves as nonexistent otherwise. We can identify with these parts in nature precisely because they are of an equal status to us; they possess a certain independence from us and our valuing" (11).

According to Naess, identification is an inescapable process. For identification one is to be matured. Maturity generally consists in widening of one's circles of identification. Naess says that self-realization is nothing but the final stage of maturity. The single sentence used by Naess resembling the definition of ecological self is that the ecological self of a person is that with which this person identifies. Naess writes,

Because of an inescapable process of identification with others, with increasing maturity, the self is widened and deepened. We "see ourselves in others." Our self-realization is hindered if the self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered. Our love of our self will fight this hindering process by assisting in the self-realization of others according to the formula "Live and let live!" Thus, everything that can be achieved by altruism—the dutiful, moral consideration for others—can be achieved, and much more, by the process of widening and deepening ourselves. ("Self-Realization..." 35)

In other words, increased Self realization is increased identification with others. The more one expands the self to identify others, the more one realizes oneself. In fact no human being can easily ignore this concept of identification. In every human being there is a desire to be united with things. One does not want to be tied up merely in one's bodies.

Naess believes unity to be of a gestalt character. Gestalt character implies that the world is not a mass of things. At the same time, the world is not a mass of qualities. In contrast, it is the interconnection and mutual relationship of all entities, small or big. Naess says that gestalts are separate but together they make up the whole. So nothing can be comprehended in isolation. Naess cites the example of listening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony by someone who knows the symphony well ("Creativity..." 193). The experience of a subordinate tonal gestalt of the fifth symphony showers the content of

the spontaneous experience of the whole symphony. Naess says that one's spontaneous experience is of gestalt character. It acquaints one with the real. Naess believes that a spontaneous experience transcends any specification. The specifications may be of personal, social or cultural. Naess' suggestion is that one can make creative use of one's access to the real, the wide-identification through one's spontaneous experience. Moreover, Naess adds that as unity stems from the identification process, therefore the wholeness which is realized in identification is attained. As such, the concept of identification offers an outline for a total view. Naess writes:

...our *egos* are fragments - not isolatable parts. We, as egos, have an extremely limited power and position within the whole, but it is sufficient for the unfolding of our potential, something vastly more comprehensive than the potential of our egos. So we are more than our egos, and are not fragments, hardly small and powerless. By identifying with greater wholes, we partake in the creation and maintenance of this whole. *We thereby share in its greatness. (Ecology 173)*

According to Naess, the strength of identification with the different life forms depends upon the variety of surroundings, culture and other life sustaining capacities. Naess claims that the ecosophical viewpoint is developed through identification. According to him, the identification is so deep that "one's *own self* is no longer adequately delimited by the personal ego or the organism" (174). Naess insists that in this process of identification, one earns an experience that makes oneself realize as to be an indisputable part of all life. Through identification, one discovers that every part of nature is a part of oneself. No one can remain to be existent as separate from the rest of the ecosystem.

Naess says that identification is essential to stop the rapidly growing ecological crisis. If there is no identification, then it may lead to indifference. Naess elaborates that if there is any remote entity or happening that seems to be of no concern to one, then it may be relegated to an indifferent milieu. Naess writes, “Our ignorance now and in the near future about the consequences of intervention is appreciably greater than was initially assumed. Our indifference to the environment of life has meant that it is ordinarily experienced merely as a grey background. With identification, all this changes” (175).

About identity, Naess says that the more one understands the togetherness with the rest of the entities, the more the identification will there be. It will lead thereby to the better care for all non-human beings. It leads a holistic process of joy and well-being of all. It also leads empathy and sorrow when any part is in crisis. Naess writes, “We seek what is best for ourselves, but through the extension of the self, our 'own' best is also that of others. The own, not-own distinction survives only in grammar, not in feeling” (175). Moreover, Naess adds that each living being is understood as a goal in itself. There is no conflict of interest among the living beings. It happens only when one goes with one’s vital needs and the needs of other species are considered as one’s needs. It becomes easy when there is the process of identification. Naess tags it as furthering of own realization and considers it as the completeness of life. This is the central intuition of deep ecology. Warwick Fox says:

The central intuition of deep ecology . . . is the idea that there is no firm ontological divide in the field of existence. In other words, the world is simply not divided up into independently existing subjects and objects, nor is there any bifurcation in reality between the human and nonhuman realms. Rather all entities are constituted by their relationships. To the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological consciousness. (“Deep Ecology...” 157)

And this is the philosophical thesis of Naess's deep ecology that outright rejects any sort ontological division among different entities. Naess thereby says that any ontological boundary between two living entities is nothing but an illusion. This realization is a realization of the ecological Self. Naess's says that it is the identification that everyone should strive for. As such more than ethics, how one experiences the world and realizes oneness, receives prominence in Naess's philosophy.

2.5 Platform Principles of Deep Ecology:

In collaboration with George Sessions (1938-2016), "the most stalwart defender of deep ecology's core principles" (Glasser 3), Naess formulated deep ecology platform in *Ecophilosophy Newsletter*, Volume 6 (1984) "to promote and encourage a sense of commonality, clarity and consensus on the core principles of philosophy, while still recognizing and allowing for difference among supporters of movement" (Henning 73). It was intended as a replacement for the characteristics spelt out in 1973. These principles, formulated in eight points, were articulated during a camping trip in Death Valley, California making this place special and great in the history of deep ecology and environmentalism in general. The platform principle "suggests key policy and lifestyle implications that flow from embracing this principle (reduction of human impacts, decreasing human population, emphasizing quality of life over standard of living, etc.), and puts forward an argument that embracing the prior seven platform elements commits its supporters to take action to effect the necessary changes"(Glasser 2). The objectives behind articulating these 'Deep Ecology Platform' were:

- To summarize the fifteen years of thinking on the principles of the deep ecology movement.

- To make people of different philosophical and religious positions understand and accept them.
- To encourage the readers to elaborate their versions of deep ecology, clarify the key concepts and think through the consequences of acting from these platform principles.

“Deep Ecology Platform” and “Deep Ecology Principles” are two phrases used by Naess in two different contexts to mean the same thing. Naess, of course, is a bit interpretative regarding the use of the word “principles” or expression of a “platform.” These two are different words. Naess says that if it is considered as a principle, people may misunderstand it as the ultimate premises. In the premise-conclusion systematization, Naess says, self-realization is designated as the one ultimate premise. Therefore, Naess prefers the term “platform.” He feels that a longer name for the eight points is indispensable and suggests for the same as “a set of fairly general and abstract statements that seem to be accepted by nearly all supporters of the Deep Ecology movement” (“Equality...” 214). These statements are not meant for defining Deep Ecology. Naess writes, “The Eight Points are of course not intended to function as a definition of the Deep Ecology movement: neither as a rule given definition of the term, nor as a plain description of how the expression “Deep Ecology movement” is actually used, nor as an expression of the essence of the Deep Ecology movement” (214).

The supporters of the platform principles of deep ecology come from all walks of life. People have come to adopt these principles from diverse directions and for differing reasons. Therefore, their courses of practical action also follow from diverse fields, be it various cultural background, religious belief, and philosophical root. They

don't need any kind of philosophical or religious premise of a basic kind in common. They may have such premises. But they would not all be of the same kind because of cultural differences. For Naess, the realization of the eight points requires significant changes in both the rich and poor countries and affects social, economic, technical, and lifestyle factors. The main objective of the points is to protect the planet and its richness and diversity for its sake.

Whoever is a supporter of deep ecology, tries to apply deep ecological principles in governing his laws and policies. Therefore, "the application of the principles articulated in the Platform occurs at the levels of local households and communities, nation-states, and global agreements. It involves actions, policies, laws, and other forms of agreement" (Drengson, Devall & Schroll 106). Naess says that in certain environmental situations the supporters of deep ecology will prefer to choose to be on the same side. But it does not imply that platform principles are the list of common views of some definite concrete situations taken by its supporters. It only implies the expression of the most general basic views that may have in common among its followers. Naess says, "The views are not basic in an absolute sense, but basic among the views that supporters have in common" (*Ecology* 28-29). A common platform of deep ecology is different from the fundamental features of philosophies and religions. A common platform is derived from the fundamental features of philosophies and religions. A platform of deep ecology is formulated as a norm and hypothesis. Naess' formulation of platform may be charged to be dogmatic. But Naess himself acknowledges that what he formulated is only proposals for people who have views similar to that of Naess'. Naess writes, "Supporters of deep ecology may have great difficulties in understanding each other's

ultimate views, but not sets of penultimate ones as formulated as a kind of platform they have largely in common” (“The Basics...” 62).

Naess believes that there are different religious, metaphysical and philosophical trends among diverse class of people. The different thoughts and cultural backgrounds may directly or indirectly color the ultimate premises in systematizations from which the decisive elements of one’s environmental ethics are derived. Naess exemplifies some Christian groups who suggest using some normative statements, for instance, that whatever is directly created by God has intrinsic value. But there are some other groups who do not make use of such final and penultimate norm. Naess finds this diversity encouraging. He remarks that these sorts of substantial differences are not going to be ceased. The platform principles of deep ecology, therefore, are tentatively formulated as a set of norms and hypotheses or factual assumptions. Platform principles, therefore, are not any final suggestion from anybody’s part. They may vary depending on one’s activism based on situations of a particular time although there may be direct or indirect motivations from one’s religious or philosophical ultimate premises in forming that activism. Naess writes, “In order to facilitate discussion about the deep ecology movement among philosophers, it may be helpful to distinguish a common platform of deep ecology from the fundamental features of philosophies and religions from which that platform is derived, provided it is tentatively formulated as a set of norms and hypotheses (factual assumptions)” (“*The Basics...*” 61).

The messages of deep ecology movement can be understood from the platform principles. But there underlies disagreement regarding the necessity and sufficiency of these points. Both Naess’ 1973 seven-point characterization of the deep ecology

movement and the 1984 Deep Ecology Platform are articulations of perceived pre-existing features of the movement. They are not intended to be prescriptive. If one accepts the platform principles of the deep ecology movement, this involves commitment to respect the intrinsic values of richness and diversity of the eco-system. This in turn leads one to critique industrial culture and anthropocentric discussion of different schools of thought. This critique of industrial culture is wide, and cuts across cultural boundaries. Naess and Sessions, in their paper “Platform Principles of the Deep Ecology Movement”, have offered the following principles.

- 1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.**

Naess and Sessions have offered comments for each of the basic principles. The first platform principle refers to the biosphere or the ecosphere as a whole. This formulation includes individuals, species, populations, habitat as well as human and non-human cultures. The word ‘life’ is used by Naess and Sessions in a more comprehensive nontechnical way. As such, rivers, landscapes, ecosystems, etc. which are considered as ‘nonliving’ by biologists are also included in the broader perspective of the deep ecological life. All these have inherent value independent of any awareness, interest or appreciation for any conscious being. Essentially, everything has an “own” to it, and therefore has its irreducible right to live, to blossom, to reach its fullness in existing and reproducing.

2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.

The second principle is all about the diversity and complexity. Through the explanation of interconnectedness, Naess and Sessions try to address why everything should be seen as having its own value. They have the conviction that complexity and symbiosis are conditions for maximizing diversity. The plants and animals which are considered as lower or of primitive species do also contribute to the richness and diversity of life. In other words, the second principle reinforces the importance of biodiversity in the world – that everything is connected to everything else. There is no hierarchy that exists of living things.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.

Naess gives a strong formulation of the third principle. In this platform, Naess shows his concern to the growing consumption pattern of human beings. In his point, Naess insists on fulfilling one's vital needs only. He acknowledges that the term "vital need" is vague to allow for considerable latitude in judgment. Vital needs may vary with differences in climate and other related factors. In determining one's vital needs the differences in the structures of societies are also to be considered. The difference between a means to the satisfaction and the need must also be considered along with this. In this connection, Naess and Sessions have cited examples. If a whaler in an industrial country quits whaling, he may risk unemployment under the present economic conditions. Whaling is for him an important means. The condition always is relative because in a rich country with a high standard of living whaling is not a vital need. Again, for some Eskimos, snowmobiles are necessary today to satisfy vital needs.

4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.

The fourth principle speaks about the advantage of population reduction. Naess believes that the growing population at a high rate is diminishing the quality of life for many non-human life species. This results in tremendous growth in the rate of consumption and consequent dumping of huge waste that poses great threats to the biosphere. Hence, a substantial decrease of population is expected to lead to an atmosphere congenial for the flourishing of non-human life forms. In other words, population control is a strategy to be adopted to save and to flourish the richness of the nonhuman life.

5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.

The authors here admit that one cannot expect the reduction of man's interference in the natural environment overnight. It will surely take time. However, upgrading interim strategies may be beneficial. What is important is realizing the extreme seriousness of the deteriorating situation. To meet the challenge what is important is to preserve and extend areas of wilderness. The focus should be on the general ecological functions of these areas. They suggest that large wilderness areas are required in the biosphere to allow for continued evolutionary speciation of biological creatures.

6. Policies must, therefore, be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.

Naess and Sessions are of the view that there is the relevance of technological implication. In the sixth platform, Naess and Sessions maintain that growth of any sort without having any sound moral principle, without sustainability, without having any measure of protecting natural communities would no longer be considered desirable. Such growth would further damage the richness of biodiversity. It is a fact that the present growth system is not deep and is lacking in sound moral foundation. Development is required, but it should be sustainable development. It is, therefore, clear that one needs to sustain the very conditions for the diversity of the myriad forms of life, including the cultural diversity of human life. Naess and Sessions are of the opinion that, “Whereas self-determination, local community and “think globally, act locally,” will remain key terms in the ecology of human societies.

7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating *life quality* (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.

Naess and Sessions have given argument in favor of quality of life. In the terminology of economics, the phrase ‘quality of life’ is lacking a definite meaning. But in the platform principles, this phrase is used to focus on quality where people can see that existing patterns of labour and consumption are not satisfying. People conceive the quality of life in terms of cultural development. One needs the appreciation of life quality rather than adhering to an increased higher standard of life. This principle says that moving towards an appreciation of the quality of life, instead of quantities of things, leads to an increase in happiness. This is fundamental, since people are more apt to change when they experience change as an improvement, rather than a grudging submission to necessity. The quality of life is a deep concept, and it is a matter of

realization where everything is measured not regarding per capita income or GDP or economic wealth but regarding safety of the nature as such.

8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

There may be disagreement regarding what is the most urgent or the primary need of the hour. There are many ways to achieve the desired changes. In the light of the value of diversity, such diversities should be respected because the aim of these principles is to change the attitude of man towards nature. There may be diverse view based on one's religious and philosophical basis. But this change is anti-dimensional which is contrary to shallow ecology. If this obligation is not felt then protecting the mother earth and living an all-identified life would not be materialized.

Anyone who endorses these eight principles is called by Naess and others, a supporter of the deep ecology movement. Naess stresses that the supporter of these principles can do so from a wide range of different ultimate views. There are a big number of supporters across the world like the believers of Buddhism, Christian, Neo-Pagans, and Taoism etc. This platform was adopted by radical environmental groups such as *Earth First!*² as their guiding philosophy. In many academic as well as legal discussions to shape the future of the planet earth, these platforms are repeatedly used across the world.

² Earth First! is a North American environmental advocacy group formed in 1980. It is considered as deep ecology's political action wing, an activist group that distinguishes itself by utilizing direct action, nonviolent civil disobedience. Whereas political environmental groups attempt to preserve biodiversity through legislation, Earth First! prefers techniques of "direct action". Earth First! seeks to physically obstruct development. Dave Foreman, the chief pioneer of Earth First!, is of the view that biodiversity is the summum bonum.

Naess, in his essay, “The Deep Ecology: ‘Eight Points’ Revisited,” has offered some modifications of words and positions of eight points considering the suggestions of quite a few academic environmentalists he admired. In fact, it is a revision of the platform principles of deep ecology movement proposed with George Sessions in 1984. In this “revisit” of the eight points, Naess particularly suggests that there should be a reference to non-violence in the eight points. Naess believes that nonviolence works as a means of direct action for meeting the environmental crisis. Moreover, Naess refers to his experience about many supporters of peace movement before they become environmental activists.

Naess seeks minor revision regarding logical order of the points. Particularly, he recommends that the population issue should be discussed in point 4, rather than 5. At the same time, he advocates softening this point so that it can be accepted by all supporters of deep ecology movement without any hesitation. Naess suggests that this platform should be formulated as, “It would be better for humans to be fewer and much better for non-humans” (*Revisited* 218). In other words, by advocating the removal of the term ‘decrease’ for maintaining the strategy of reduction in human population, Naess favors a decent ethics.

Naess is not prepared to go with certain suggestions of revision of eight points. Particularly he mentions that there are some suggestions that try to analyze deep ecology platform as a kind of nature mysticism or the ultimate unity of all living beings. Naess cites the example of a suggestion that asks him to include with eight points the theme ‘all things hang together.’ Naess writes, “... to ‘hang together’ as a kind of interdependence may be taken by some as a kind of threat. One hears such warnings:

‘remember humans are *unfortunately* dependent upon the health of the ecosystems. *Therefore*, respect nature or you invite disaster!’ (“Equality...” 215)

In other words, Naess expresses the logic of the non-acceptability of certain suggestions that he believes rob the deepness of deep ecology. Moreover, Naess does not approve the suggestion which tells him to ‘enter professional philosophical debate about what exactly might be meant by terms used in deep ecology platform. Naess declares that ‘the level of vagueness and ambiguity must be within tolerable limits, but professionalism would undermine the aim of the eight points’ (216-17).

2.6 Ecosophy:

Deep ecology is understood in different kinds of literature as “ecological resistance movement,” “new natural-philosophy,” “sustainable earth-ethics,” “ecosophy” or “eco-philosophy.” These phrases to refer to deep ecology have their justification used by the supporters in their respective places. In the philosophy of Naess, the terms “ecosophy” and “eco-philosophy” occupy a place of prominence. These terminologies have earned a great significance for a comprehensive understanding of what deep ecology is all about. Naess distinguishes between deep and shallow ecology and says that shallow ecology is concerned with the science of ecology. Deep ecology asks deeper questions and transcends the science of ecology. If there is a conflict between environmental convictions and scientific claims, it can be presumed that the supporters of deep ecology would question the authenticity of science. Naess gives priority to first person experience over science. He believes that through the first person experience only one comes to identify concrete contents as well as their normative significance. It is to point out that the concrete contents are actual contents of

relational field where there cannot be any completely separable objects. Naess claims that “there is an isomorphism between the concrete and the abstract” (*Ecology* 57).

Ecosophy is the ecological wisdom and transcends ecology as a science. As such in the concept of ecosophy, one can see “shift from science to wisdom.” Naess’s ecosophy is his personal philosophy of life. The aim of ecosophy is to earn ecological wisdom and harmony with the ecosphere. Besides, Naess’s personal ecosophy which is referred to as “ecosophy-T” takes a shift from ethics to metaphysics. It should be mentioned here that, in the narrow sense of the term, deep ecology is Naess’s personal philosophy of ecological wisdom.

Ecosophy, ecophilosophy, etc. are defined in the literature of environmental philosophy by different philosophers. For example, deep ecologist Bill Devall uses the terms “ecosophy” and “ecophilosophy” synonymously and defines it as the “search for a new metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology, and environmental ethics for person/planet” (“The Deep Ecology...” 194). But Naess is very much solid in the use of the working definition of the terms like ecology, eco-philosophy, and Ecosophy, etc. At the same time, he says that others may disagree regarding his use of these words for their specific purposes. Naess has his definite objective of using these terms in respective places. He writes, “...transcending ecology as a science, looking for wisdom through the study known as ecophilosophy, striving for an *ecosophy* - a total view inspired in part by the science of ecology and the activities of the deep ecological movement” (*Ecology* 32).

Naess cites the example of the meaning of giving importance to economic growth in ecosophical thought. In ecophilosophy, importance is given on asking

questions whether a society fulfills basic human needs like love, security and at the same time access to nature. In other words, in such philosophy, it is important to enquire whether one is living a good life by accessing all the basic needs one requires to live. After such inquiry it may be found that there are some lapses in fulfilling the basic human needs like love and security in some part of society. After analysis it may be found that certain changes are required in that part of the society to achieve the criteria of fulfilling the said basic needs. Therefore, in ecophilosophical thinking one seeks necessary changes that may demand after such analysis. But in the conventional study, economic growth is analyzed regarding a scientific approach related to its consequence when there is no economic growth. Naess is not for confining anything only to a limited scientific approach. His view is that one has an obligation to articulate a total view, a view akin to worldview. According to Naess, everyone has a total view, a personal integrated view that provides life's philosophy irrespective of one's awareness of it. It is a particular vision of reality which is formed on the basis of one's overall concepts based on ethos, perceptions and practices. One's total view may be inspired by one's religion. Adopting a world religion or a philosophical system, for example, may be one's total view. Naess cites an example some Christian supporters of deep ecology who repudiate the term ecosopher. The reason is their belief that they find their total view as primarily inspired by Bible.

Naess is of the view that the possibility of complete, explicit total views is absurd. At the same time, he makes the argument that to question on a total view without the presumption of one total view is also equally absurd. (SWAN xxi) Naess believes that ecophilosophical thinking cognizes one to verbalize a total view. Naess says that one's judgment to deal a particular context of society and the natural

environment is based on one's total views. Therefore, Naess is of the view that one should give the effort to articulate them.

Total views may differ from man to man depending on one's setup for society where one lives, religion, nationality and other factors. Naess's version of ecosophy, namely ecosophy-T is an example of a total view. Besides, he mentions that Buddhism provides a background of deep ecology. Again there are some Christian groups that support in formulating some preliminaries of deep ecology actions. These are different total views. These are, in other words, some differing ecosophies. They function as a motivating force of one's attempt to save the planet by regulating one's activity to do beautifully and sustainably of human and non-human nature alike. In this connection Glasser remarks:

Rather than calling for a new environmental ethic or a radical change in fundamental values, Naess's approach to ecophilosophy centers on transforming practice and policy by challenging us to develop more thoroughly reasoned, consistent, and ecologically inspired total views. This work represents a culmination of his effort to integrate reason and emotion. He has created the foundation for a new and promising human/nature relationship that positions humans as plain citizens with special abilities and unique responsibilities and nature as mentor, measure, and partner rather than servant (*SWAN* xlv).

Ecophilosophical thinking proceeds regarding nature and humanity's relation to nature. It is the study of the problems common to ecology and philosophy. Naess calls it a descriptive study. The word 'philosophy' is used by Naess to mean two things firstly, a field of study, an approach to knowledge and secondly, one's personal code of values and a view of the world which guides one's decisions that one's believes wholeheartedly.

According to Naess, “when, applied to questions involving ourselves and nature, we call the second meaning of the word ‘philosophy’ *ecosophy*” (*Ecology* 36).

The Ecosophy of Naess is the essence of his deep thought towards ecology. “Ecosophy” means “eco-wisdom,” an inner realization of nature as such. It is an ontological approach to reject the man-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total field image. Naess elaborates:

By an *ecosophy*, I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy as a kind of *sofia* wisdom, is openly normative, it contains *both* norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements *and* hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and prediction. The details of an ecosophy will show many variations due to significant differences concerning not only the ‘facts’ of pollution, resources, population, etc. but also value priorities (“Deep ecology...” 124).

Naess says that the word 'ecosophy' is a compound of the prefix 'eco-' found in economy and ecology, and the suffix '-sophy' found in philosophy. Etymologically, therefore, the word “ecosophy” combines *oikos* and *sophia*, 'household' and 'wisdom'. As in “ecology”, eco- has an appreciably broader meaning than the immediate family, household, and community. “Earth household” is closer to the mark. Naess summarizes, Ecosophy is “a philosophical world-view or system inspired by the conditions of life in the ecosphere” (*Ecology* 38). Drengson clarifies that just as the aim of traditional philosophy is Sophia (Wisdom), the aim of ecophilosophy is ecosophy or ecological wisdom. In addition to this, Drengson points out that the aim of ecophilosophy is to search a diversity of human-nature interrelationships. In his words:

The mission of ecophilosophy is to explore a diversity of perspectives on human-Nature contexts and interrelationships. It fosters deeper and more harmonious relationships between place, self, community and the natural world. This aim is furthered by comparing the diversity of ecosophies from which people support the platform principles of the global, long range, deep ecology movement. (“Ecophilosophy...” web)

Drengson is of the view that Naess uses the term “Ecosophy” to refer to any articulated philosophy of life in harmony with ecocentric values. Drengson believes that pursuing an ecosophy is searching for ecologically wise and harmonious living. As such there are multitudes of diverse ecosophies. It is to be mentioned that Naess repeatedly affirms the importance of a pluralist metaphysics and by means of it he conceives ecosophical system. Naess’s ecosophy emphasizes that everything in the world has the right to live. It seeks to develop the human relationship with the natural environment and reminds us that human cannot destroy nature without destroying himself. The maxim of ecology is that *everything hangs together*. It is a popular slogan in deep ecology. Everything is interrelated, for, things form complex and vast dimensions. Naess is explanatory to clarify the meaning of this slogan. Naess describes,

In our spontaneous experiencing of reality *what* we experience is more or less comprehensive and complex. When we hear the first tones of a very well-known complex piece of music, the experience of those few tones is very different from how they would be experienced if we had never heard the piece. In the first case, the tones are said to fit into a *gestalt*, into our understanding of the piece *as a whole*. The basic character of the whole influences *decisively* our experience of each of the tones. (*Ecology* 57)

Naess is cautious that people may question about the problem of complexity. It is believed that there would have been a better world if it was simpler, a world of easily separated things. Naess says that the vast complex of interrelationships which makes up

the world is a characteristic of one's existence. An ecosphere joyfully acknowledges this interrelationship. It is a matter of contemplation for him. In this connection he distinguishes between internal and external relations and says that the relationship between self and body is an internal one. Naess is not ready to believe the view of some philosophers that self is caged in the body and is externally related. In the widest sense, Naess's view is that all things are internally related. It is a spontaneous human experience of reality. And Naess prefers to use the word "spontaneous" unlike many intuitionists who use the phrase "immediate experience".

Naess in his concept of Ecosophy uses the term "Gestalt" to explain his ontology. Thus gestalt ontology, according to Naess, is a conceptual framework. It is adapted to humans and other conscious beings. The world we live is not subjective. It is a real world of experience. One of the maxims of Gestalt psychology is that "*the whole is greater than the sum of its parts*". Naess is clear in his position to analyze this statement with its limitations. According to him, "it is a good slogan against mechanical models, but it does not allude to the infusion of the character of the whole into each single part" (*Ecology* 58). Moreover, he adds, "this sentence is instructive in so far as it suggests that you cannot have the whole as something or something that can be shown except through subordinate wholes" (58). Naess exemplifies a demonstration of putting three dots in three places on a blackboard. If not placed too erratically there is a spontaneous experience of a triangle although a triangle consists of more than three dots. Naess explains:

'If a person hears parts of a well-known melody, the spontaneous experience that person has is colored by their attitudes towards the melody as a whole as well as by many circumstances, past and present. These all

go to make up that particular occurrence of the melody. The spontaneous experience had by this person constitutes a closed unity, or gestalt.’
 (“Ecosophy...” 135)

Naess introduces the difference between concrete contents and abstract structures to make this concept clear. For him, spontaneous experience is concrete content. Again, the interrelationship between experiences is an abstract structure. Naess says that when one reflects upon and analyzes the gestalt experience, one is clarifying the abstract relations between spontaneous experiences (135). According to him, concrete contents *and* abstract structures make up reality as it is in fact. There is an isomorphism between the concrete and the abstract. Concrete contents have a one-to-one correlation with constellations. When we say that the sea is now grey, the water of the sea is only one part of the constellation. The colors of the sea are part of innumerable gestalts.

Naess rejects the fact-value dichotomy. He says that if one asks deeper question then one finds that there is no distinction between descriptive and normative claims. In one’s deep experience descriptive and normative claims gloss over each other. The role of spontaneous experience is to be mentioned here. In one’s spontaneous experience concrete contents strike one that may give a good or bad experience of anything. Naess cites the example of the experience of a disruptive sound of a constructive zone in forest on ones visit to a serene forest path-way. On one’s visit through the forest one experiences the unity of the various plants and animals. One experiences the coexistence and integrity of different life forms. The admiring of this unity in a forest’s normal position is a natural process. Same is the natural process to have a bad experience of the sound of constructive zone in such a serene and deep atmosphere. One

can easily grasp that setting construction zone in forest areas is bad for ecological balance. It is in Naess's language a first person experience of concrete contents in a relational field which is of great significance.

2.6.1 Ecosophy T

In practical dimensions there may be different ecosophies. Development of ecosophy may be different. Drengson, Devall, & Schroll maintain that "each person's ecosophy can be given a unique name, possibly for the place they live, or for something to which they feel strongly connected" ("The Deep..." 107). There are a large quantity of individuals, languages, cultures, and religions all over the world. Therefore, there may be numerous ecosophies. The ecosophy of Naess is named as Ecosophy T. With his personal ecosophy, Naess tries to formulate a distinctive individual way of life that aims for ecological harmony. One may not agree with other in values and paths of derivation. But it may be guiding the learning of the system to development of any ecosophy.

Deep ecology was based on Naess' philosophical perspective termed as Ecosophy T. Ecosophy T is the articulation of his personal worldview. Naess's Ecosophy T is the result of his intense sense of belonging and connection with the natural world around him. Naess had the opportunity of living in the natural settings from his very childhood. He was impressed by the diversity, complexity found in the world. As a result of this, he could develop his Ecosophy. Letter 'T' in Naess's 'Ecosophy T' refers to Tvergastein – the name of his wood and stone hut in the mountain of Norway, where he dwelt seasonally for almost seventy years. It was his spiritual home where he had done much of his ecosophy and other creative writings. He developed a deep spiritual kinship with this Tvergastein hut over the years of his

dwelling there. Ecosophy T is a philosophical system composed of norms and hypothesis. Here “self-realization” is the ultimate norm. Regarding an ultimate norm Naess says, “The term “ultimate norm” is used mainly in two senses, “norm not derived from any other norm” and “norm of highest priority” (or “of absolute, unconditioned priority”). In normative systems of the kind envisaged only the first sense is used” (“Notes on...” 25).

This ultimate norm is his basis for supporting deep ecology movement. This norm can be reached by deep questioning. Naess never intended that the key features of his personal view should form the basis of a branch of ecophilosophy. As an ardent supporter of pluralism he encouraged people to develop their own worldviews and ultimate norms. Therefore, he encouraged to form one’s own ecosophy, like, ecosophy A, ecosophy B, ecosophy C etc. The foundational premise of this ecosophy of Naess is that reality is fundamentally relational in structure. Naess says that being warm and cold at the same time does not lead to inconsistency. The same thing may behave differently in relational status. Naess says that a thing may be warm thing in one relation and the same thing may be cold one in another relation of a thing. Naess clarifies,

All statements 'about the thing' are relational statements: statements like 'thing A is B' are in Ecosophy T abandoned in favor of 'thing A is B in relation to C or 'the relational thing AC has the quality B'. For example, 'water A is warm in relation to hand B', 'the relational thing "B-hand-W-water" has the quality warmth. (*Ecology* 55)

His personal ultimate norm of Self-realization, it has been already mentioned above, became a central feature of deep ecology. Naess postulates a notion of selfhood that is based on active identification with wider and wider circles of being. The

justification for this postulate is that, according to Naess, the self is neither identical with the body, nor with the mind, nor with a mere conjunction of body and mind. One can realize it by shaping one's own ecosophy.

2.7 The Apron Diagram:

The relationship between Naess' two senses of the term namely, 'deep ecology' and 'deep ecology movement' can be understood by his Apron Diagram. Deep ecology is considered as being derived from a plurality of different cosmologies, rather than as attempting to establish a new one. It does not appear that a shift to eco-centrism requires any new cosmologies. Naess, in his paper "The Apron Diagram," anthologized by Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, in *The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology*, has cautioned that "one must avoid looking for one definite philosophy or religion among supporters of the deep ecology movement" (11). Moreover, from the Apron Diagram of Naess we can see that the platform principles of the deep ecology movement are grounded in religion or philosophy. We may have a rich plurality of philosophies. This plurality allows us for a much richer matrix of derivational options. These derivational options develop deep ecological principles which in turn cultivate a maximum number of vernacular practices. Drengson and Inoue opine:

The Apron Diagram helps to clarify the whole spectrum of activity within the deep ecology movement, ranging from philosophical inquiries to concrete judgements and daily actions. It helps us to understand the relationship of a particular effort to the total framework of the movement. This understanding, then, lets us concentrate on any particular level without thereby losing the larger context and solidarity of the movement. (Xxii)

The Apron is a premise/conclusion diagram. The Apron Diagram is composed of four levels: in Level 1 is the Ultimate Premises of Naess' deep ecology. This level is the

verbalized fundamental philosophical and religious ideas and intuitions. Level 2 of the Apron Diagram is the Platform Principles of Deep ecology movement. Level 3 of the Apron Diagram is the general views. This level of the Apron Diagram is more or less derived from the platform, lifestyles and general policies of every kind. Level 4 of the Apron Diagram is the practical or concrete decisions, presented in order of logical derivation. In this level concrete situations and practical decisions are made.

According to Naess, platform principles are derived from a plurality of mutually inconsistent premises. For example, these inconsistent premises may be like A-set and B-set. The premise A-set can be Buddhism and premise B-set can be Christianity. Or, premise A-set may be Spinoza's philosophy and premise B-set may be Ecosophy-T. In an Apron Diagram it is illustrated in the upper part of the diagram. In the same way, the lower part of the Apron Diagram illustrates how of one or more of the eight principles as a part of set of premises, mutually inconsistent conclusions may logically be derived which leads to the C-set and D-set of concrete decisions. Like set-A and set-B, C-set may be inspired by a sort of Christianity, and D-set by a sort of Buddhism. Or, C-set may be inspired by Spinoza and D-set may be inspired by certain ecological philosophy. Naess writes:

The Apron Diagram furnishes only a static model. A supporter of the deep ecology movement will normally modify the sentences at the different levels from time to time. New information may change any hypotheses and therefore also change norms which, in part, have been justified on the basis of the hypotheses being changed. ("The Basics..." 65)

Naess is of the view that the supporters of deep ecology movement have their own ultimate views for deriving the acceptance of the platform. These views differ from

person to person and from group to group. Similarly, they may disagree about what follows from the platform principles. This may be for their different interpretation of the eight points. Their interpretations differ because their premises to interpret them are different. Therefore, Naess says that deep ecology movement can manifest both plurality and unity. The unity is seen at the level 2, that is, at the Platform Principles of Deep ecology movement. On the other hand, plurality is found at the other levels. In other words, Naess advocates unity of deep ecology movement at the level of platform principles and allows plurality and diversity in the other levels. Thus, in the Apron Diagram of Naess, according to Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, the Self-realization thesis is primarily a philosophical undertaking and support of the platform principles is a political and social undertaking.

In the conclusion it can be stated that the Naessian deep ecology is all about a converging of diverse ideas towards a metaphysical position regarding one's place in the cosmos. In view of growing ecological crisis, it is a conscious effort to show one's place in an interconnected web of relation along with the rest of the beings. Naess suggests one to develop ecological wisdom that can make one realize one's place in the midst of natural environment and act accordingly. In order to articulate this metaphysical position he cites the example of his own ecosophy and brings forth the ideas like intrinsic value of nature, biocentric egalitarianism etc. However, for the supporter of this thought, he offers the action plan of deep ecology in the form of platform principles distinguishing deep ecology from shallow ecology. Deep ecology philosophy as such manifests itself as an ecological movement among its supporters not only in North America and Europe but also in the other parts of the globe.

At the same time, there arose diverse group of thinkers who tried to point out the low-fault of deep ecology. The next chapter of the thesis makes an effort to bring forth the criticism of deep ecology from select schools of thought which are considered as prominent critics in environmental philosophy. These schools are not merely formed to undermine deep ecology but to develop their own green thought.

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