

CHAPTER 4

Naess' Response to the Critics

Deep ecology is an evolving and revolutionary philosophy with regard to the natural environment developed in diverse phases of time before and after the coinage of the term. Though it is formally articulated in 1973, and thereafter by Naess, there are many others who have contributed to the construction of the philosophy of deep ecology. The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed the practice of deep ecology particularly in America and the western part of the world in general. As a movement, there are many who directly or indirectly involved with it. Deep ecological literature receives wide acclamation both from its supporters as well as from the critics across the world. George Sessions, Warwick Fox, Alan Drengson, Bill Devall, Dave Foreman, Michael Zimmerman etc. contribute immensely to extending deep ecological repertoire in support of Naess. Their works include the exposition of Naess in particular and explicating the philosophy of deep ecology by incorporating their viewpoints in general.

Naess himself takes the support of quite a few of them in articulating what's about of this ecological movement. The "Platform Principles", for example, is a joint formulation with George Sessions. With Iver Mysterud, a bear- and wolf- specialist of international standing, Naess proposes "wolf policies" for the protection of wolves in Norway. He also wrote articles in favour of protecting cultures of indigenous communities. Again, there are many who acknowledge themselves as deep ecologists and reformulate the ideas of deep ecology. For example, Warwick Fox tries to defend

the Naessian philosophy and reformulates it with a new name “Transpersonal Ecology.” Again, on the basis of the philosophy of Naess, Bill Devall articulates his deep ecology that advocates practising of deep ecology lifestyle, “a process of rediscovering what is essential, and what is meaningful in our lives.” Advocating the principle of “simple in means and rich in ends,” Devall speaks about a simple elegant means that can express rich experiences.

These processes invite positive responses as well as criticisms from different quarters. Consequently, these deep ecologists try to defend their position along with the clarification of Naessian perspectives. This chapter basically focuses on the attempts at defending the deep ecology position in response to the criticisms from various corners. In certain positions, they have to undertake the counter-reacting standpoint to nullify the conceptual framework of these critics. In other words, the critical position is tried to be appeased by a counter-attack pointing out the misinterpretation of the critics. In other words, this chapter is the clarification of certain problems of deep ecology as enumerated in Chapter III. At the same time, since clarifying the queries of the critics is concerned, it is also an extension of the exposition of the ideas of deep ecology as explained in Chapter II. Moreover, this chapter paves a way for the concluding chapter with an attempt to find a compatible dialogue, if any, among the discussed schools of environmentalism.

4.1 Critiquing the Critics:

In the last three decades, criticisms of Green Philosophy have been published almost in all parts of the globe. Along with the development of the deep ecology, attacks and counter-attacks have become the lifeblood of green literature in the

academic sphere of philosophy. The critics of the social justice schools have brought forth many allegations against deep ecology. They allege that the most important issue of establishing a society which is free of class distinctions has not been discussed by Naess. Such a society of human beings, the critics point out, establishes social justice which is antecedent to ecological justice. The critics of diverse background have labelled Naess and his supporters as fascists, sexists, racists, misanthropes and advocates of white elites etc.

Critiquing the critics, Devall, in his article “Deep Ecology and Its Critics,”¹ says that he is unhappy that the most of the criticisms of social ecologists, ecofeminists and the third world critics are the reflection of “verbal assaults” and “personal attacks” on Naess and other deep ecologists. According to him, most of these critics have failed to show any sense of humour in their target of deep ecology. Naess himself in a letter to Bookchin writes,

The language you use when referring to deep ecology movement has surprised me. You do not seem to attack the point of view characteristic of that movement, and I am glad you don't. But outsiders have reason to believe you are attacking the international movement that I, and many others, call the “deep ecology movement.” (“Unanswered Letter...” 306)

Similarly, Eileen Crist, an environmental critic, writes that Bookchin's criticisms might have inspired a dialogue between Deep Ecology and Social Ecology. But his criticisms are proved to be more polarising than constructive. The tendentious tone that Bookchin set can be seen in a deep-ecological backlash that finds little if

¹ “Deep Ecology and Its Critics,” published in the *Earth First!* December 22, 1987. It is to be noted that *Earth First!* is bulletin of the environmental activist group with the same name. Dave Foreman, the founder of this group is the editor of this bulletin. In the history of deep ecology it has a lot of contribution with many academic publications.

anything to learn from his ideas (257). An expression of similar observation is maintained by Fox regarding ecofeminists' criticism of deep ecology. According to him, the ecofeminists' criticisms of deep ecology are not directed at deep ecology's positive or constructive task. It is not encouraging to an egalitarian attitude on the part of humans toward all entities in the ecosphere. Fox charges that these criticisms are "rather directed at deep ecology's negative or critical task of dismantling anthropocentrism" ("The Deep ..." 275). Similarly, Naess says that Guha has distorted the main features of deep ecology. According to Naess, Guha in his critique has misinterpreted the underlying thought of deep ecology ("Comments on Guha's ..." 325).

4.2.1 Response to Social Ecology:

Social ecology is "perhaps the most committed and principled critic" of deep ecology (Dobson 46). Naess in his article, "Note Concerning Murray Bookchin's Article: Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology,"² published in 1987, responds to Bookchin's criticism of deep ecology. In this article, he maintains that deep ecology movement is characterised as a social movement. The participants of this movement are non-academic people. Naess writes:

The inspiration for the deep/shallow distinction came especially from participation in direct nonviolent actions where there is time to speak with many peoples who are emotionally strongly engaged, but who have little access to the means of mass communication. The deep ecology theorists make up a tiny minority. If Bookchin is right, I have, as a theorist, misunderstood the people I wish to serve. ("Note Concerning ..." 302)

² This article is originally published in *Green Perspective Newsletter of the Green Program Project* 4/5, 1987:1. The reference is taken from *Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy*, edited by Nina Witoszek and Andrew Brennan. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 302-4, published in 1999.

Naess cites the example of few supporters of deep ecology movement who are known for direct actions in the social and political field. These supporters work for the cause of protection of nature involving the local communities. According to Naess, these activists consider nature as part of oneself. In this process, one can see a combination of the “spiritual” and “material” factors. Naess suggests that phrases like “political ecology” and “social ecology” have some weaknesses. The phrase “deep ecology” suits the objectives and action plan of these activists. Preferring his own coinage of the term over other names, Naess writes:

In the great direct actions, it was clear that only a small minority of the strong supporters of deep ecology or eco-political movement were academics eager to debate (important) theoretical points of view. Personally, I have (nearly) consistently favoured the term "the deep ecology movement." I still do that, and for similar reasons, I would not shift in favour of term "social ecology." This in spite of my conviction the deep changes of "economic, technological, and ideological structures" of the rich countries are required to radically change policies towards nature. (“Unanswered Letter...” 305-06)

Pointing out social ecology’s criticism of deep ecology in his widely published paper, “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology,” Devall alleges that Bookchin, the founder of this school, writes such “long”, “pedestrian” articles that it is hard to know where to begin in order to respond their challenging queries. He particularly mentions Bookchin’s way of targeting deep ecology and terms it as “nonsense” and “rubbish.” Devall opines that responding these critics is like “looking for pearls of wisdom among the trash”. In his own words: “Murray Bookchin in some of his recent articles includes such a long list of politically incorrect sinners that it is unclear if he wants to put everyone else on the defence or wants environmentalists to respond his agenda rather

than the agenda of deep ecology” (“Its Critics” 18). Thereby, social ecology is alleged to have tried to distract the agenda of deep ecology.

In the same tone, commenting on Bookchin’s controversial paper, Clark condemns it as a “notorious article.” According to him, Bookchin’s criticism of deep ecology is “one of the more analytically weak and theoretically inept efforts in the literature of environmental philosophy” (“A Dialogue ...” 20). From this comments of Devall and Clark, it can be observed that the harsh language of Bookchin used to nullify the deep ecological thesis, invites similar treatment from the supporters of Naess and his allies.

The ontological view of social ecology is problematic. Against the deep ecological view, Bookchin emphasises the qualitative difference of humans. But Bookchin does not provide a satisfactory answer as to how this *qualitative* difference occurred without a sudden emergence. Another controversial aspect of Bookchin’s ontology is that while he sees positive human capacities as a derivative of the first nature he restricts hierarchy as exclusive to second nature. Understandably, he does this for ideological reasons; however, it is still a double-standard.

Deep Ecology criticises the social ecologists’ preoccupation with human uniqueness. It condemns the latter as an expression of human chauvinism or anthropocentrism. In numerous occasions, social ecology draws sharp lines between human nature and non-human living beings. Deep ecology believes that keeping humankind in another layer for being its distinctive rationalistic nature generates a dualistic framework. Empirically, this type of dualism is problematic. Deep ecologists believe that it ignores advances in “behavioural ecology” and “cognitive ethology”

(comparative cognition or viewing the mental abilities of other species) that reveal the complexities of animal life. Again, this dualism is ethically problematic because it underwrites a human supremacist argument. In this connection, David Johns, an environmental critic, writes:

Deep ecology does not deny or seek to end human cultural evolution, but to see that human cultural evolution does not end or impoverish biological evolution. Deep ecology calls for human cultures that are respectful of the biosphere, for cultural evolution within a broader biospheric evolution, an evolution in which humans are a part, not would-be directors. We are not wise enough to be directors; true wisdom is the recognition of place and process. So it is not human cultural evolution that deep ecologists see as the problem, but the particular paths taken over the last several thousand years. (Johns 62)

Fox believes that the dissolution of these structures need not necessarily go hand in hand with the cessation of nature destruction. Fox is of the view that deep ecologists' ecocentrism logically and necessarily involves an egalitarian attitude toward all beings. In this way, deep ecology subsumes under its theoretical framework the egalitarian concerns of the various social movements including social ecology. For Fox, it is possible to imagine a society that has realised social, racial and gender equality but is still ecologically exploitative. It is quite conceivable that a non-hierarchically organised society might collectively decide to adopt a wholly instrumental approach to nature. Therefore, if the social hierarchy is singled out as the root cause of the environmental crisis, then it will be considered as overly simplistic social and political analysis. Moreover, if social ecologists tend to remain anthropocentric in practice, they continue to focus on their respective human social and political agendas. But practical strategies and activism needed to ameliorate the ecological crisis. In this connection, Keulartz

points out that “by focusing exclusively on social structures, Bookchin subordinated the concern for nature to the well-being of human beings and thereby revealed that he, too, had been infected by the anthropocentrist virus” (Keulartz 117).

According to Fox, social ecologists misinterpret deep ecology’s critique of anthropocentrism. He maintains, “the target of the deep ecologists’ critique is not humans *per se* (i.e., a general class of social actors) but rather *human-centeredness* (i.e., a legitimising ideology)” (“The Deep ...” 19). Fox refers to this tendency of the critics as *the fallacy of misplaced misanthropy*. Anthropocentrism has been the main legitimating ideology throughout the history of the domination of nature. Therefore, deep ecology is justified in focusing upon anthropocentrism as a major cause of environmental degradation.

Eckersley states that social ecology’s elevation of humans over non-human nature betrays an ecological non-anthropocentrism. Besides, Bookchin’s preoccupation with inter-human affairs reinforces anthropocentrism as a legitimating principle of all kinds of oppression. Fox and Eckersley question the validity of Bookchin’s claim that human domination of human precedes human domination of nature. According to her, his attribution of priority to human domination of human is inadequate to deal with the domination of nature since theoretically it is still possible that a free society dominates nature.

Bookchin says that in man teleology of evolutionary process culminates and man as the second nature plays an important place to control the environmental crisis. But in deep ecology, Mathews observes, privileged attributes, such as mind, could thus not be regarded as the exclusive province of particular individuals, such as human

beings, but must rather be seen as suffusing nature at large. In this way, by making the system itself the locus of all attributes, the justification for ranking some individuals over others, on account of their higher attributes, is eliminated within the relational paradigm. Relationality is thus an antidote both to the dualistic organisation of attributes such as mentality and materiality and to the construction of moral hierarchies of higher and lower order of being (Mathews 219).

Bookchin alleges deep ecology as a whole and Naess in particular of taking an anti-humanist stand. But, Naess does not consider humans as “malignant product to devour the planet” as alleged by Bookchin. Naess in contrast, says that “humankind is the first species on earth with the intellectual capacity” (*Ecology* 23). Naess believes that a man, being the rational part of evolution, can “limit its numbers consciously and live in an enduring, dynamic equilibrium with other forms of life” (23). According to Naess, a man has the capacity of preserving the diversity of his surroundings. Man, although he is having the same intrinsic value with the rest of the life forms on this planet, is privileged to have the “biological heritage” over the rest of the beings. Naess is convinced that human interest is in full harmony with the norms of deep ecology. Naess writes:

There is at present a sorry underestimation of the potentialities of the human species. Our species is not destined to be the scourge of the earth. If it is bound to be anything, perhaps it is to be the conscious joyful appreciator of this planet as an even greater whole in its immense richness. This may be its ‘evolutionary potential’ or an ineradicable part of it. (“The Arrogance ...” 9)

Naess does not believe that today’s large-scale deforestation is natural for humans. At the same time, Naess says that it is natural for a species to show preference

of its own interest over the interests of any other species. But Naess believes that the “mature member” is a friend of the earth and his deepest interests are not destructive. Here, one can see the shadow of Gandhi’s view of the nature of man who believes that man at the core is not selfish. Needless to say that Naess acknowledges the influence of Gandhi on many occasions.

4.2.2 Response to Ecofeminism:

The origin of deep ecology and ecofeminism is contemporary. Critiquing deep ecology has been started with Salleh and thereafter a large part of the development of ecofeminism has been in reaction to deep ecology. According to Sessions, most ecofeminists have been in “deadly competition with deep ecology.” He observes that “with few exceptions, ecofeminists have uniformly misunderstood the deep ecology movement” (“Wildness ...”147).

According to Fox, ecofeminism commits a mistake by “overemphasizing” the domination of women as well as its link to the domination of nature. According to Fox, the logic of human-centeredness can be used to justify domination of anything or anyone deemed lacking the magic essence. Therefore he asks why ecofeminists do not give equal weight to the domination people like black, non-westerners, or poor. In reply to the ecofeminists’ critique, Fox is of the view that ecofeminists engage in simplistic socio-political analyses when they either overlook the complicity of women in the ecological destruction or target all men, capitalists, whites, and Westerners to an equal degree. Moreover, why do the ecofeminists not criticise deep ecology for being neutral with respect to issues concerning such significant variables as socioeconomic class, race and westernisation? Fox tries to find out the reasons for this:

There appears to be two reasons for this. First, to do so would detract from the priority that ecofeminists wish to give to their own concern with androcentrism. Second, and more significantly, these charges could also be applied with equal force to the ecofeminist focus on androcentrism itself. (“The Deep ...” 275)

Deep ecology criticises ecofeminism for oversimplified or idealised accounts of “matrilineal and matrifocal societies” (Fox, Eckersley). Fox says that for deep ecologists, it is simplistic on both empirical and logical grounds to think that one particular perspective on human society identifies the real root of ecological destruction. Fox considers that empirically such thinking is simplistic and thus descriptively poor. Fox believes that the reason is its failure to give due consideration to the multitude of interacting factors at work in any given situation. In the words of Fox:

Logically such thinking is simplistic and thus facile because it implies that the solution to our ecological problem is close at hand – all we have to do is remove the real root of the problem – when it is actually perfectly possible to conceive of a society that is non-androcentric, socioeconomically egalitarian, nonracist and non-imperialistic with respect to other human societies, but whose members nevertheless remain aggressively anthropocentric in collectively agreeing to exploit their environment for their collective benefit in ways that non-anthropocentrists would find thoroughly objectionable. (275-76)

Fox also says that ecofeminism shows their lack of depth by criticising androcentrism as the root of environmental destruction rather than anthropocentrism. He also argues that as long as ecofeminists see androcentrism as the real root of the problem, they will remain anthropocentric in the passive sense of reinforcing the continued preoccupation with inter-human affairs. Eckersley also points out that the attempt of oversimplifying the problem of environmental crisis may limit the scope of

ecofeminism in meeting its objective. To say that patriarchy lies at the root of domination of women and nature is considered as a reductionist tendency by Eckersley. Eckersley says that patriarchy is not the root cause of environmental degradation which is claimed by the many ecofeminists. She says that patriarchy and domination of nonhuman nature may be the product of different conceptual and historical developments.

Deep ecology criticises ecofeminists' objective of establishing a balanced natural environment by overcoming the problem of androcentrism (Fox, Zimmerman, Naess, and Eckersley). According to Fox, socially egalitarian society does not necessarily imply an ecologically benign society. Similarly, Zimmerman says that if patriarchal categories are abandoned and there is the end up of the domination of woman and nature, then also there is no assurance that new forms of domination and power will not arise in the process. Naess also points out that ecofeminism wrongly tends to make patriarchy responsible for any sort of domination and destructive agendas. Naess writes, "For me, it is difficult to believe that the elimination of patriarchy would have such heterogeneous consequences, but I certainly do wish such elimination. And such wish leads me and others to support every attempt to get rid of patriarchy" ("The Ecofeminism versus ..." 273). Eckersley does also reasonably raise a similar question. She asks the ecofeminists what about the existence of patriarchy in traditional societies which have lived in harmony with the natural world. Eckersley, therefore, says that emancipation of women need not necessarily lead to the emancipation of the non-human world and vice versa (68).

In support of deep ecology, Eckersley brings a critical exposition of this thesis of ecofeminist. She simplifies the ecofeminists' arguments that posit women in a better place than men as well as identify women with nonhuman beings. She maintains that there is the "body based argument" which is about the uniqueness of women's bodies. For example, ovulation, menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, suckling the young etc are unique to women bodies. Again there is the "oppression argument" which maintains that there is a separate social reality of women. It is created by patriarchal societies. Women try to identify themselves with the rest of nature as they are oppressed by the separate social reality. Eckersley says that there is no doubt regarding the male and female bodily experiences. But ecofeminists give rise to a hierarchical dualism. Patriarchy, she believes, is rather a subset of a more general problem of philosophical dualism. In her own words:

....it is problematic to suggest that the particular bodily experiences that are unique to women confer on women a superior (as merely special) insight into our relatedness with life. Such an argument effectively introduces a new hierarchical dualism that subtly condemns men to an inferior status (of Otherness) on the ground that men bodily differences render them to incapable of participating in the particular kind of body-based consciousness that is believed to confer on women a keener psychological awareness of ecological connectedness. (Eckersley 66)

Zimmerman suggests that feminist critique of patriarchy must engage in searching self-criticism. He explains that feminists have loosened their stand of attack on domination of patriarchal character following deep ecologists' counter-attack. Particularly, many feminists acknowledge that individual men turn out depending on the way they are brought up and socialised. Zimmerman cites an example:

In medieval China, mothers were responsible for enforcing upon their daughters the terrible practice of foot binding. It is wrong to conclude, however, that women were responsible for this practice since they were part of patriarchal culture which expected them to behave in this way. (“Feminism...” 189)

Ecofeminism tends to privilege white women’s experience of the world and fails to see forces in addition to patriarchy that contribute to unjustified dominations of human groups and nature. According to many deep ecologists, ecofeminism falsely essentializes women as better nurturers and closer to nature than men (Naess, Fox, and Zimmerman). Both Naess and Fox allege that ecofeminism reinforces harmful and apolitical gender stereotypes of “mother earth”. For example, Indian ecofeminist Shiva has employed feminised images of the earth (*Staying Alive*). This sort of tendency has “the danger of reinforcing rather than challenging the patriarchal visions of the all-forgiving mother” (Hallen 277). Similarly, Zimmerman suggests not falling prey to the sex-based stereotyping. He believes that both men and women are capable of becoming more open to and harmony with the environment. Even ecofeminists like, Hallen and Warren also admit that the early form of ecofeminism has a tendency of essentializing women as better nurturer.

Zimmerman criticises Salleh’s view as only partly accurate. He classifies Salleh as a radical feminist. Zimmerman says that the accusatory tone of Salleh “may limit her audience as much as the misogyny of a great deal of systematic thinking diminishes its applicability” (“Feminism ...” 185). Moreover, he says that Salleh’s style of argumentation is not radically different from that of Naess. Zimmerman in this context cites the example of the different sense of the same thing for a male or a female speaker.

For example, something may appear as clumsy to women. But for a male speaker that something may be a genuine sense of kinship with nature.

Zimmerman asks quite a few questions that invite the ecofeminists to introspect their theorising of man-nature relation as well as reconsider their criticism of deep ecology. For example, Zimmerman asks, can the positive characteristics attributed to women like peaceful, charitable, compassionate, emotional, in harmony with nature, loving, thoughtful etc belong to one sex only? Do these not belong to the first sex? Zimmerman accuses of the feminists by saying that they have not acknowledged their own dark side in search of their own voice. They only easily projected them onto men. Even men are also the victim of patriarchy which is not acknowledged by the ecofeminists. There is a similar voice like that of Zimmerman found in Kamla Bhasin's writing. According to Kamla Bhasin, an ecofeminist from India, the concern towards woman is found everywhere. How one involves with the feministic concern is dependent on the individual irrespective of being male or female. In an interview with Hannah Pool of *New Internationalist* magazine, Bhasin writes, "I know enough women who are totally patriarchal, who are totally anti-women; who do nasty things to other women, and I have known men who have worked for women's rights their whole life. Feminism is not biological: feminism is an ideology. Men who are against patriarchy and who fight patriarchy are also feminists" (Pool Web). Bhasin's approach answers the ecofeminists' criticism that deep ecologists are male without having any concern about the feminine problems.

The ecofeminist criticism that deep ecology is sexist is criticised by deep ecology. Ecofeminists criticise development as to be masculinist science and

technology. Zimmerman says that women are also benefiting from the material well-being and technological progress. In the similar tone, Kamla Bhasin says that sexism is all-pervading and it is a global issue. According to her, everything is gendered. She writes, "Umbrellas are gendered, watches are gendered, handkerchiefs are gendered, every damn thing" (Pool Web). Therefore Zimmerman convincingly asks: "Do women rid themselves for responsibility for the negative side effects of such progress by attributing them to rapacious male behaviour?" ("Feminism ..." 185)

Robert Sessions says the most serious challenge deep ecologists raise to ecofeminism is that it is shallow ecology. Deep ecology targets anthropocentrism as the root cause of environmental degradation. Sessions elaborates that Naess's philosophy says about deepness with reference to ultimate premises. From ultimate premises, there is the flow of a system of belief and action. But ecofeminism does not go with this system and target only androcentrism. They lack depth because their arguments reside inside an objective of social equality. The ecofeminist loses its focus on the natural world in its preoccupation with social justice issues.

Naess has given an account of the self as indistinguishable from other. This notion of the indistinguishability of self has been criticised by Cheney and Plumwood. By quoting Cheney, Christian Diehm, an environmental critic, says that the identification thesis of Naess does not seem to call up the notion of Self-realization as the expansion of the atomistic self so as to include the other. Diehm suggests that Cheney's criticism of identification as a move towards fusion from an implied or assumed atomistic starting point is not applicable to Naess. Diehm inscribes:

...although Naess's ontology breaks significantly with Western patriarchal models and the atomistic thinking that accompanies them, he still remains tied to a more patriarchal mode of thinking about the basis of relationships and how they flourish. Hence, although Naess has rejected the notion that the self is an atom that must fuse with others, he still imports a certain residue of this notion - and the problems it involves - into his thinking about constitutive relationality. (37)

Again, regarding Plumwood's criticism of Naess, Diehm remarks that it is not appropriate. The reason is that Naess's notion of ecological subjectivity answers questions regarding the status of the personal, the egoism of the human subject, and the place of individuals in relation to wholes and to other individuals. Need to be mentioned here that Plumwood has criticised the various versions of indistinguishability of self offered by deep ecologists including Naess. Defending Naess's version, Diehm explicates:

At this point I would like to suggest that what is called for is not an outright rejection of Naess's ecosophy but a careful supplementation of it, one that takes seriously feminist insights on the way towards a more responsive, more responsible deep ecology in which identification is regarded as a mode of response, rooted in responsibility. (33)

Again, Pasty Hallen believes that "truth depends for its coherent integrity upon a series of incomplete and initially incompatible claims" (Hallen 279). Therefore, she suggests for a "responsive revisioning" of deep ecology and ecofeminism. She writes:

... if the theorists of deep ecology do seriously take up the numerous challenges offered by ecofeminists ..., I am confident that the theory of deep ecology will be enriched. Likewise if ecofeminism, in response to its criticism, views patriarchy as a part of a larger and more complex structure, recognised the link between women and other sub-dominant

peoples, perpetually problematizes its standpoint and foregrounds wild nature, then it, too, will be theoretically stronger. (Hallen 279)

Similarly, Naess also remarks that “there is no incompatibility between the goals of feminism and those of deep ecology. Of course, this kind of compatibility and even cooperation does not imply the agreement of every deep ecology supporter with every feminist” (“The Ecofeminism versus ...” 270). Naess says that feminism belongs within the deep ecology movement. But the differences lie in the conceptual framework in developing their theme. Naess opines that he is a supporter of this feministic endeavour. Thereby he considers himself as an ecofeminist. He particularly writes about the positive note in terms of the caring attitudes of women.

Naess takes the criticism of Warren positively. Particularly he notes Warren’s point of deep ecologists’ “masculinist ways of thinking or talking, to which they may themselves be blind”. Of course, Naess does not think that any supporter of deep ecology would wish to perpetuate male privileges and ways of domination. According to Naess, from the critics of ecofeminists, he could learn that deep ecology needs more care. The supporters of deep ecology need extended care for nonhumans and deepened care for human beings (“The Ecofeminism versus ...” 273).

4.2.3 Response to the Third World Critics:

Guha is of the view that no ecological society is a sustainable ecological society if there is a dualism of oppressor and oppressed as well as the division of rich and the poor people. Naess tries to respond Guha by clarifying that deep ecology agenda is concerned with the problem of the third worlds. He claims that deep ecological principles underlie the concern of poor and non-industrial cultures. He is also aware that

in terms of the responsibility of protection of human and non-human nature as well as the environmental concern of humankind, there is little difference between First World and Third World. He believes that the challenge of protecting the non-human nature is a global issue irrespective of any division between rich and poor countries. What is important is the realisation of the need of wide ecological sustainability in which both the affluent people and poor people of Third World have a lot of roles to play.

Naess is influenced by the transcendental thinkers of America like Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir. Therefore, there is a continuity of American transcendentalism in deep ecology. For instance, the wilderness preservation is one of the main theses of American environmentalism present in all these thinkers. In many ways, they have inspired particular elements in the rich plurality that characterise the deep ecology movement. But Guha is unhappy with the alleged American lifestyle of affluent consumerism and thereby he tends to rename deep ecology as “Radical American Environmentalism.” In reply to Guha’s allegation that deep ecology is another name of “Radical American Environmentalism,” Naess says, “... theoreticians of the deep ecology movement in the United States have become significantly more aware of the variety of ecological relevant attitudes among non-industrial cultures, including some whose attitudes are narrowly utilitarian” (“*Comments on Guha ...*” 325). According to Naess, Guha has ignored this part of the development of deep ecology in his critique. Deep ecology has the international basis in its beliefs and practices. Therefore, deep ecological principles are applicable in the whole world irrespective of whether it is a rich nation or third world poor country. The people of the third world also equally concerned with the protection of free nature. They are also having the respects for the nonhuman living beings. Naess writes,

Desperate people (including desperately poor, hungry people) will naturally have a narrow utilitarian attitude towards their environment. But overall, the people of the Third World, apart from the desperate minority, manifest a positive concern for the protection of free nature, and a respect for nonhuman living beings. At least this has been my experience while living among poor people in India, Pakistan and Nepal (and others in the Third World agree with me on this point). Without those experiences, I would have talked about the international basis of Deep Ecology movement. (“The Third World ...” 400)

As they are poor, therefore, temporarily pressing problems of material need may have dominated their attention. But same is also the case with the affluent people of west. Naess, therefore, finds a sound basis for global cooperation between the supporters of deep ecology and the ecologically concerned people in the Third World. This global cooperation, at the same time, can also be a highly effective in lessening poverty in those regions. There are some ways to work against poverty under the umbrella of deep ecology and people can cooperate to stop large-scale deforestation. As such, there is no tendency to support animals, as the Third World critics have alleged, at the expense of human within the framework of this cooperation as Naess has formulated in his Deep Ecology thesis.

Naess condemns that Guha makes a “sweeping generalisation” to interpret deep ecology. This generalisation has missed out many important points. Naess is conscious that one “cannot deploy the same rhetorics, set of slogans and priorities of environmentalism in all cultures” (“Comments on Guha’s ...” 325). He writes,

In my opinion calculation in terms of cost/benefit analysis will not improve human attitudes towards ecological systems or the earth as a whole. Neither will narrow utilitarian consideration solve the ecological

crisis or satisfy human needs. There must be widespread respect for the earth with all its life forms ---for their own sake. (332)

Naess points out another generalisation of Guha. For instance, Guha opines that “deep ecology was practised both by major religious traditions and at a more popular level primal people in non-western settings” (“Radical...” 73). Naess holds that this sort of generalisation is misleading because it misinterprets one of the main characteristics of deep ecology. It is to be noted that Naess in formulating deep ecological principles is suggestive of adhering diverse philosophies and religions by its supporters. It is never suggested to be glued to any definite beliefs or traditions. In order to shape his ecosophy, Naess takes the inspiration of certain eastern beliefs as well as modern ecological wisdom whichever he feels suits the formulation of deep ecology. He clarifies that this motivation is not to be interpreted as a doctrinal acceptance of definite eastern philosophy or religion. Naess emphasises that he tends to refrain from interference with others’ ultimate beliefs. At the same time, he criticises Guha for taking deep ecology’s source of inspiration as a concern of third world critics.

Naess questions the environmental concern of certain sections of people regarding their attitude of protecting nature. Particularly he speaks about the “cultural difference” of “attitudes towards nature” between the eastern and western people. Naess believes that the claim of Guha, Shiva, Plumwood etc. regarding the poor peasants and women’s concern of nature is misleading as far as the attitude of the protection of the environment is concerned. Naess believes that the environmental concern of the poor third world communities is not “environment per se.” Naess, from his practical experience, cites an example of the environmental concern of one of the Third World communities, namely the Buddhist community of Beding in the Rolwaling Himalaya,

Nepal. Some of the supporters of Deep Ecology on their course of mountaineering to Himalaya, enquired those residents whether they wished to enjoy the profits they would get from expeditions by Westerners and Japanese on trying to conquer the mountain or would prefer to protect the mountain itself from being trodden upon by humans without having any respect to their cultural status. All members of those poor communities came together and unanimously kept their views in favour of protection throwing aside their possible gain from the said tourist potentials of the mountain. In contrast to this, Naess' request to the king of Nepal to protect the environment by prohibiting the climbing of those culturally and ecologically rich Gauri Shankar Mountain, the rich and commercially interested the king allegedly, showed no favour to his request. Naess sums up the conclusion of this experience,

Was the Beding a case of environmental concern? For the villagers of Beding the cleavage between humans and their environment is certainly less pronounced than in the West. For them, however, Gauri Shankar has been both a mountain in our sense and a God, or better, a Deva, and also a Princess. In short, their cultural tradition includes a mythology of a specific kind, which makes it misleading to say that the protection of Gauri Shankar is an instance of *protecting the environment per se*. (“Comments on Guha ...” 326)

In this instance, Naess distinguishes between two senses of preserving nature, namely, out of religiosity and awareness of protection in the realm of growing environmental degradation. In another occasion, in support of the second sense of preserving nature, Naess points out that even the third world countries are also working for the cause of environment. In this connection, Naess cites the example of Chipko movement. According to him, “Chipko movement in India is widely known and influential in counteracting the misconception that groups of poor people are doing

nothing to protect their environment for economic reasons, or have an indifferent attitude towards where they belong” (331). Thereby Naess asserts that environment protection is not the issue of the elite westerners only but also of the poor of third worlds as well. Deep ecology theorization is set on this conviction.

Deep ecology campaigns for wilderness, a place removed from human uses. Naess is very much concerned about the common opinion that the rich western people tend to support wild animals and wilderness rather than poor people. All critics criticise Naess for advocating the concept of wilderness instead of giving stress on social issues. Naess stresses the importance of fighting to preserve and extend areas of wilderness and near-wilderness (‘free Nature’). According to Naess the rationale for such preservation is that the large wilderness areas are required in the biosphere for the continued evolutionary speciation of the entire biotic community (“The Deep ...” 69). Naess says that we must defend these areas of intensive and extensive wildness because they are a privileged field for the emergence of the sacred, of great value, and of great good. Clark opines,

We might also say that we must defend these areas of intensive and extensive wildness because they are a privileged field for the emergence of the sacred, of great value, and of great good. We might also say that they are exceptional sites that exhibit great creative force and inspire great wonder and awe, in a world threatened by both biotic reduction and a reductive rationality. (“What is Living ... ” 163)

Wilderness has value in itself. “By respecting the intrinsic value of wilderness we perpetuate its many instrumental values –its contribution to biodiversity, to the surrounding ecosystems, and all who are downstream from its beneficence” (Scruton 197).

Naess says that a species has a greater chance of survival in a larger natural area or nature reserve. He is aware that the sudden considerable growth 'outbursts' of the population of one species can destroy other species. The unusually high population densities that often occur in nature reserves can also increase the rate of disease transmission, frequently leading to epidemics that may affect every individual. Again, Naess observes, a normal lifestyle in industrial countries is incompatible with living in the wilderness. It is not an easy task to live in the industrial countries without interfering with the natural processes. Yet, a sizeable amount of care by those well offs not to damage the ecosystems can make a lot of difference. According to Naess, bad habits are difficult to change, but not impossible. The third world critics are justified to the extent that it is impossible to avoid the antagonism between human settlement and wilderness. But enjoying the high quality of life without destroying the wilderness or wildness by the people living in those and nearby areas at the same time is also not impossible.

Naess explicates that when one advocates wilderness, it may mean the intention of different level of non-interference by a human being on the non-human natural environment. The objective of wilderness advocacy is keeping some areas as free as possible from human interference. Non-interference of human beings implies only certain prohibitions in those areas. Naess suggests that for tourism purpose also certain rules can be ascribed in those areas in terms of camping, strolling outside definite areas or path etc. Naess suggests that one can use the term "free-nature" instead of "wilderness." According to Naess, the term "free-nature" is compatible to the habitation of human beings that is in no way dominant.

Naess says that “nature reservation” or “a project to preserve what is left of free nature” is a complex affair. This project, he believes, is a “gift to the world.” Guha makes only an ordinary reason against this project. Along with this, Naess suggests that one is to find some way out to support the poor people in a sustainable way. This sustainable way implies a complimentary process of the welfare of poor people and preserving nature. Naess writes,

One of the main motives of people supporting the deep ecology movement is extended compassion, reaching out beyond the human species. But the concern for the exploited and dominated, including the concern for the less powerful nonindustrial cultures is equally important. It is absurd to think that deep ecology supporters would continue the old paternalistic trends compatible with the outlook of the rich power elites in the third world. (“Comment on Guha ...” 332)

In this connection Naess has his personal opinion, that, there should be a close cooperation between supporters of deep ecology and the ecologically concerned people in the poor countries. For this, the people from poor countries have to trust the deep ecologist’s concern of the economic progress for the poor. But, Naess admits, the number of poor people in the third world is so large that it is not possible to dwell non-destructively in the tropical forest. The tropical forest areas are under the huge invasion of these people. The day by day increase of subsistence agriculture in these areas is standing as a China wall to disrupt the sustainable development. As a result of these practices, the third world poor, firstly, are not reaching their long-term economic progress. And secondly, environmental sustainability is also decreased. The third world critics of deep ecology must note this true story at the time of reasoning boldly in support of the poor people of the third worlds. The state machinery's implementation of

the law in favour of green-zone and attempt to evacuate reserved areas from the illegal settlers are ample evidence for this. Naess suggests in this connection,

The present ecological world situation requires a focusing of attention upon urban settlements; changing them in ways so that they will be appropriate and habitable places for the thousands of millions of people who now, and in the next century, will need a place to live. This gigantic effort will require mutual help between rich and poor countries. Significant economic progress for the poor is not possible through the extensive use of less fertile lands for agriculture. There is no way out except through urbanisation, together with the willingness of the rich to buy products from the poor. ("The Third World ..." 399)

Thereby, Naess brings forth the population issue where third world countries are most affected. Not only Guha's "affluent deep ecologists" have to theorise over it, but also the sufferer poor of the third worlds also fight for that. The slogan of "Think globally and work globally" is for all people and all purpose irrespective of rich or poor people of underdeveloped countries. Elaborating this slogan, Naess says that ecological problem is not local but global in nature. Everyone will unanimously agree to the point that global concerns get priority over the less-than-global. Therefore, the slogan, *Think globally, act locally*, is being replaced by the new one, *Think globally, act globally*. Naess, therefore, admits that if a person, irrespective of whether he comes from the background of elite class or from the third world, belongs to a particular geographical location and his actions will definitely influence the Earth positively or negatively depending on their nature. Naess, therefore, says that actions are global in whatever locality one acts. He further adds that many fierce local or regional conflicts have a global character, crossing every border and level of standard of living. Naess observes that "the supporters of Deep Ecology movement in the rich countries are not in conflict

with Deep Ecology supporters in the Third and Fourth Worlds. Such behaviour would be strange indeed because the global perspective reveals the basic similarity of the situation among poor and rich” (404).

4.3 Moving towards the defensive position:

Much before the most of the allegations made against deep ecology, Naess in his paper “The Arrogance of Anti-humanism,” published in 1984, has spoken about a favourable society for living a deep ecological way of life. This paper meets most of the objectives of the social justice school of environmentalism. The difference lies in the fact that Naess gives more importance to ecological movement. His deep ecology movement gives a new benchmark in the history of ecological movement.

What makes deep ecology attractive is exactly what makes an attribution of intrinsic values to nonhuman entities appealing: it seems to provide a better safeguard for biodiversity and for environmental health in general, than our usual anthropocentric attitudes. It demands respect for nature and imposes obligations on us to treat it in a way that is consistent with that respect. (Sarkar 71)

It is pertinent to mention that Naess speaks about three movements, namely peace movement, ecological movement and social justice movement. He says that the goals of these movements overlap. These three are interrelated. For instance, bloodshed and war are unable to coexist with environmental responsibility. Again, ecological damage raises issues of social integrity. Emancipation and egalitarianism of any sort cannot be protected in the situation of violence and warfare. One requires mutual respect in terms of the background of one’s religious, cultural, ethnic as well as civil relationships that can best be figured out through peace.

Naess insists that the objective of one movement cannot be reached without meeting the objectives of the other two movements. For example, Naess says that the ecological movement cannot avoid social justice and politics. According to him, “All is politically relevant, but not all is politics” (*Ecology* 130). Though social justice and ecological movements are interdependent, there are significant differences among them. Naess believes that a man with his limited capacity cannot be an activist in all of them. One is to choose one’s area. Naess believes that depending on one’s interest and individual maturity and responsibility one involves in any one of them. One is to support the other areas but to work mainly in one. Although Naess is concerned to the social justice issues like social equality, gender equality and economic equality, he chooses the area of ecological movement. He believes that his involvement for the cause of environment necessarily includes the objectives of the social justice schools. Thereby it implies that involving with deep ecological movement does not ignore the importance social justice movement or peace movement. In fact, deep ecology movement in some or other way tries to incorporate with the other two movements by showing an active concern for all three areas of environmental sustainability, peace and non-hierarchical social equality.

He never isolates humankind and human society for the sake of deep egalitarian concept of all life forms on the planet. According to him, “we need types of societies and communities in which one delights in the value-creative aspects of equilibrium rather than the glorification of value-neutral growth; in which being together with other living beings is more important than exploiting or killing them” (*Ecology* 24). Naess in his paper, “Politics and the Ecological Crisis: An Introductory Note” says that the proponents of the ideas of Green society substantially agree with themselves regarding

their goals. Along with ecological sustainability, peace and social justice are two goals. Naess uses the term 'social justice' in its wider meaning that includes the elimination of large-scale human starvation and subjugation. Naess finds it acceptable to continue fighting ecological unsustainability irrespective of the state of other two goals of Green societies.

According to Naess, deep ecology is consistent with the fundamental attitudes of the philosophical, religious and mythological basis for these economies. In support of this justification, Naess has cited the example of the economies of some traditional North American native cultures which are ecological in long-range perspective and superbly sustainable in a broad sense. Naess suggests that conflicts between humans and other species can be resolved by balancing the competing interests based upon how "near and vital" the interests are to the species involved.

Naess is of the view that humans have sufficient natural endowment such that they can perceive and enjoy their kinship with living beings of the most diverse kinds and care for them. In order to realise their total potentialities, mature humans need communities which permit them to live out their full capacities for identification with other life forms. Moreover, Naess adds that "under unfavourable social conditions, human capacities for identification do not manifest themselves" ("The Arrogance...8"). It is implicative of Bookchin's social hierarchical society that leads ecological crisis. Naess uses the term 'social conditions' for one's identification with the greater Self. Naess' version of deep ecology is not an alien concept for the advocates of social theorists. Naess asserts that there is sufficient empirical evidence to show that people in industrial societies who are raised and educated under appropriate conditions do

develop attitudes of the kind expressed in deep ecology. This, according to Naess, occurs with their being necessarily deficient or immature in other human ways.

Naess also gives a due response to Bookchin's 1982 magnum opus, *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy*, where importance is given on ending of the hierarchical society. Naess says that if we focus our attention unduly on the crudest behaviour of humans, we are tempted to form an unfavourable image of human nature. Naess writes that this focus tends to lead some authors to postulate that domination and exploitation of nature is inherent in the nature of humans. These authors, according to Naess, consider the primacy of human interests in the subjugation of the interests of other beings. Naess writes:

On this planet, only humans formulate general norms about equal rights and perhaps only humans have nature which calls for identification with all life forms. This makes it awkward to use the term 'humanism' to refer to attitudes that go against human nature in a philosophical sense. Present day anthropocentrism is inhuman in my view. It is specifically human both to see and to formulate the limitations for the role of humans in the ecosphere and to experience their identification with the whole. ("The Arrogance..." 8)

Naess acknowledges the importance of diverse cultural traditions in informing one's values and responses to nature. The deep ecology of Naess does not argue for a universally applicable axiological system that can enable to decree that certain species or natural features are morally considerable and others not. Naess clarifies that humans have no less right than any other life forms to change the world. But unlike social ecologists, deep ecology does not feel the needs of a general norm against human efforts to change ecological conditions on earth. The observation of Naess is that if humans in some remote future could avert a glacial age or the impact of a comet then no norm

should be used against interference of the magnitude in the natural system. As like as other life forms on the planet, egalitarianism is applied to humans. All humans have the right to live and blossom. According to Naess, this right is in principle the same and does not admit of degrees. It is pertinent to note that Naess in one occasion writes that “total egalitarianism is impossible.”Salleh criticises Naess for this negative remark. Naess has given a response to Salleh’s query regarding whether total egalitarianism is possible or not. Naess writes:

Firstly, I regret having used the term “egalitarianism.” Secondly, I regret that I did not make it sufficiently clear that I meant the relation of humans to non-humans. I do not see the elimination of human exploitation as an impossible task. But clearly (and here Salleh will probably agree), there is a long way to go. (“The Ecofeminism versus ...” 271)

In a series of papers and books, Naess has set out and defended his own deep ecological "ecosophy". Moreover, the fact that Naess refers to his philosophy as Ecosophy-T is specifically motivated by a wish to show that there are, and must be other perspectives requiring their own ecosophies. This ecosophy may be ecosophy-A, or ecosophy-B, or ecosophy-C depending on individuals referring to it.

Salleh, in her paper, “In Defense of Deep Ecology: An Ecofeminist Response to a Liberal Critique,” published in 2000, has become bit lenient and says that ecophilosophy is a step in the right direction. Despite many harsh and critical notes in the 1984 paper “Deeper than Deep Ecology”, Salleh defends and reinterprets deep ecology thesis with many positive notes. She views that deep ecology succeeds in removing the traditional split of humanity and nature. Salleh says that her objective in the writings of articles on ecofeminism is to focus on an “embodied materialism”. She

suggests that deep ecology might benefit from using an embodied materialism. An embodied materialism, she writes, gives ethical and epistemological adequacy. It is based on the dialectic between practical actions in the world and the form that our thought process takes. It is a way of material engagement with nature. It reflects our embodiment in nature setting aside idealistic terms. Salleh believes that Naess in his ecophilosophical writing is found to have moved toward materialism. It is a positive direction of deep ecology. In her own words:

Naess and other deep ecologists have moved significantly toward materialism by making sensory experience of habitat and “self-realization” based on rootedness in place prerequisite to right ecological action. In this philosophy, an expansive identification with nature breaks down the divide between I and not-I, creating an intuitive sense of rightness that some call “beautiful action”. (“In Defense ...” 109)

According to Salleh, desire for the embodiment in deep ecological reason is easily visible in Naess’s philosophy. Salleh praises the Naessian philosophy that considers eco-defense as self-defense. She praises Naess’s ontology which is a relational net and considers deep ecology as implicitly normative. It rejects the fact-value dichotomy as an artefact of abstract thinking. She writes: “identification of Human self with Natural milieu provides an axiomatic or self-evident basis for actions that are environmentally moral” (109). Moreover, she is not lagging behind to show her expectation for the possibility of reaching a compatible position of these two schools of environmentalism. She adds, “What is hopeful for a future symbiosis of deep ecology and ecofeminism is their shared theory of internal relations” (121).

Regarding the identification thesis of deep ecology, Eckersley is of the view that ecofeminists have overlooked the fact that deep ecologists’ approach to identification

encompasses the personal by including both the whole and the parts. What Eckersley tries to establish is that deep ecologist' identification thesis is impartial, all-inclusive. This is cosmologically based and represents a more egalitarian approach to identification than ecofeminists' personally based approach. She particularly refers Fox's description of an "outside-in" in the place of "inside-out" (*Environmentalism* 65). Fox writes,

The problem with this is that, while extending love, care, and friendship to one's nearest and dearest is laudable in and of itself, the other side of emphasizing a purely personal basis for identification is that its practical upshot (myself first, my family and friends next, my cultural or ethnic grouping next, my species next, and so on) would seem to have far more to do with the cause of possessiveness, greed, war, and ecological destruction than with the solution to these seemingly intractable problems. (*Toward a Transpersonal* 262)

It is worth mentioning here that Fox emphasises on the cosmologically based form of identification. His argument is that personally based identification of ecofeminists and others refers to experiences of commonality with other entities that are brought about through personal involvement with these entities. It implies that this form of identification certainly leads one to identify most with those entities with which one is most involved.

One of the critics' main points of targeting Naess is his population issue as mentioned in one of the platform principles. Here, Naess defends the proposition that "the flourishing of human life and cultures requires that human population is substantially smaller than at the present time." Naess, in his paper "The Deep Ecology Movement", distinguishes between the shallow and deep approach of the population in

the planet. According to him in a shallow approach, a long-term substantial reduction of the global human population is not seen to be a desirable goal. For Naess, in the shallow approach of ecology, the right is claimed to defend one's borders against “illegal aliens”, regardless of what the population pressures are elsewhere. On the other hand, in deep ecology, it is recognised that the pressure stemming from the industrial societies is a major factor, and population reduction must have the highest priority in those societies (“The Deep...” 73). Of course, Naess prefers the use of “what is better population” than the use of “population reduction” (“Comments on Guha...”328). Better population implies a sustainable demography without population explosion in a geographical area. Naess believes that “better population” seems positive in comparison to the phrase “population reduction.”

According to Clark, Naess’ deep ecology approach of the population is very crucial because “an ecological approach requires that problems be addressed contextually and holistically and that imaginary political boundaries not be used ideologically to obscure real ecological continuities” (“What is Living...”177). Again, Devall maintains that richness and flourishing of human life and culture mean richness in compassion, richness in human relationships, richness in art, music, literature, science, and richness in experiencing natural landscapes. Bill Devall continues:

When sociologists and anthropologists review human life in small communities in contrast to human life within constraints of hierarchical, large-scale bureaucracies, they almost universally conclude that vital human needs—for individuation, intimate human relationships, developing a sense of moral responsibility, and attaining psychological maturity--are most achievable and fulfilling in the freer context. Achieving a sense of happiness, pleasure, meaningful work, and spiritual growth does not require a large population. (Overpopulation Web)

Defending the view of Naess, Devall suggests that a few humans may help the healing process with reforestation projects in any region. All people are called upon to reduce their rate of reproduction while other species have a chance to reproduce without pollution or killing humans. Devall advocates conservation biology in this connection which provides us with some tools for making estimates of populations of various species and their interactions in complex ecosystems. Moreover, Devall suggests that this emerging field of study should be the basis for establishing some parameters for human population based on the needs of populations of non-human species. Naess also has a much-esteemed opinion on conservation biology. He says that it is a new science “which combines insights from ecology with normative and generalist aspects to move towards this substantial reorientation. For Naess, conservation biology is the spearhead of scientifically based environmentalism” (*Ecology* 45).

In the conclusion, it can be said that the aim of the critics to criticise the philosophy of deep ecology can be helpful in seeking some compatible dialogues between deep ecology and the other schools of environmentalism. The common objective is to find some solution to meet the growing environmental crisis. The difference of these schools of environmentalism lies in their convictional set-up whether there is a threat to nature as a whole or to a part of nature in the form of inter-human disparities. The key insights of social ecology that social and ecological problems are inseparable continue to command attention among the theorists of environmental philosophy. Similarly, ecofeminism and third world critics play a role to reawaken the deep ecologist to consider the issues of feminism and poor people of third worlds without which deep thinking will no longer be deep. A compatible point can be found by linking up deep ecologists’ acknowledgement to all forms of inter-human dominations as suggested by these critics. At the same time, deep ecologists make the critics think on their resolution of equity issues and the end of domination among human beings which may not put an end to the destruction of the environment.

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