CHAPTER 5
RUSSIA AND NUCLEAR DIMENSION IN SOUTH ASIA

Introduction

The proliferation of nuclear weapons had been posing one of the greatest threats to world peace. The global community had yet to fully succeed in capping the spread of such weapons. Therefore, one of the important priority of the international community in the post Cold-War era had been to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to aspiring non-nuclear states and terrorist groups. After terrorist attack on America in 2001, the danger of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons falling into terrorist groups and bringing catastrophic harm to the international community had increased manifold. Hence, there was a consistent effort by the international community led by United Nations to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

South Asia was considered as one of the most volatile regions in the world in terms of the spread of nuclear weapon. India-Pakistan tensions since 1947 had not been conducive to a peaceful situation. In the last fifty-years of South Asian history, major external powers had involved in different security alliance. This alliance brought the Cold War into the sub-continent. The Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 made the region more complicated. A new dimension to the security scenario in South Asia was added when China exploded its first nuclear device in October 1964. The Chinese test set off a chain reaction in South Asia with India conducting its own nuclear explosion for peaceful purpose in May
1974. Thereafter, a new momentum was imparted to the process of gradual and inexorable nuclearization of South Asia which had culminated in the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The nuclear tests by both the countries made this region even more dangerous. The nuclear explosion prompted American President Bill Clinton famously to dub the region “the most dangerous place in the world” (S. Paul Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian, Security”, Security Studies, Vol. 13, no. 1, Autumn 2003. pp.1)

The pursuit of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the important Russian Foreign Policy goals. Earlier the Soviet Union vigorously pursued efforts to eliminate the spread of nuclear weapons. Some of these measures would be discussed later. After the end of the Cold War, Russia perceived regional conflicts as the main sources of security threat. These conflicts arose out of non-military factors such as religious extremism, aggressive nationalism and forces of separatism. What makes these conflicts highly dangerous for peace was the likely the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. Russia had reaffirmed its unswerving course towards participating jointly with other countries in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and their delivery, as well as relevant materials and technologies. The Russian Federation was an ardent supporter of strengthening and developing relevant international regimes, including the creation of a global system of control over non proliferation of missile and missile technology. The Russian Federation firmly adheres to its
commitment ban on nuclear tests, and urges all countries of the world to join it (The Foreign Policy Concept of The Russian Federation, Approved by the President of the Russian Federation, 2000 [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/concept.htm]).

Russia had important security interests in South Asia. These include preventing another Indo-Pakistan war for in Russian such a conflict had the potential to escalate into a nuclear war and hence enhancing regional stability and stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since, Russia was founding member of the Non Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it is against the nuclear proliferation. This chapter makes an attempt had been made to study Russian position on nuclear non-proliferation measures in general and India, Pakistan position on these issues. It also analyses recent Indo-Pakistan nuclear test and its impact on nuclear proliferation in South Asia and Russian response.

Emergence of Non-Proliferation Measures

The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction posed the gravest threat to mankind. Unlike the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons which had been outlawed by international treaties remained instruments primarily as deterrents. Whether nuclear weapons enhance a country is security is a debatable point. The possession of nuclear weapons, nevertheless, on a selective basis had been sought to be legitimized through permanent extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 1995. Nuclear weapon states had asserted that they would continue
to rely on nuclear weapons, with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear context. This had been a serious setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish weapons of mass destruction.

The first atomic device was tested by United States in 1945. Three weeks later United States dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima, and three days later another similar bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The unprecedented destruction caused by the two bombs forced Japan's unconditional surrender. The Soviet Union took the US action as a challenge and started to develop its own missiles programme. This was the beginning of the Cold-War. The United States monopoly was ended when the USSR exploded an atomic device in 1949. By mid 1960s, other countries like Britain (1952), France (1960) and China (1964) also exploded nuclear devices and joined the exclusive nuclear club.

The roots of Comprehensive Test Ban can be traced back to April 1954 when Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru called for a total stoppage of nuclear tests as he was the first statesman from the world who gave a clarion call against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In his address to the Indian Parliament he proposed an immediate stand still agreement between the two super powers until United Nation would make a comprehensive disarmament agreement (Ziba Moshaver, 1991). The proposal was made against the backdrop of an American nuclear test.

In 1955, Soviet Union proposed a disarmament plan. The first stage of which included the cessation of tests. In 1956, Soviet Union Prime
Minister Bulganian formally proposed the cessation of nuclear testing but dismissed any need for verification. The Americans rejected the proposal and in turn proposed alternative five point plan in January 1951, which focused on the cessation of production of nuclear weapons. After the first thermo nuclear device was tested by Britain in May 1957, it opposed the test ban on the ground that it had very small stockpile of hydrogen bombs and it wanted to further develop the weapon. The proposal was later modified to prior advance notice of tests. The same attitude was seen in the UN-sub committee on disarmament.

The Test Ban negotiations were held on and off without any positive results. But the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962 brought the US and the USSR on the brink of a nuclear war. It was against this background that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), took over the disarmament negotiations from the Ten-Nation sub-committee in 1962. The Committee included both Nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). India as a non-nuclear weapon states participated in this Committee. The result of this Committee's negotiation led to the conclusion of the Partial test Ban Treaty (PTBT).

**Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) 1963**

The Partial Test Ban Treaty was regarded as a first major step towards controlling nuclear proliferation. It was signed by Foreign Minister of UK, USA and the USSR in Moscow on 5 June 1963. It came
into force on October 1963. According to the Treaty, nuclear weapons tests were banned in three environments; the atmosphere, underwater and outer space. Only underground tests could be permitted (T.T. Poulase, 1996). The Treaty prohibited tests for Peaceful Nuclear Explosives (PNEs). High seas were specifically mentioned to ensure that no country used them for nuclear testing on the pretext that these seas are not within the jurisdiction of any state. All states were invited to join the Treaty, which was of unlimited duration. In extraordinary circumstances a state which had signed the Treaty could withdraw. It paved the way for negotiations for more effective arms control measures.

India was among the first countries to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty when it was presented for signature in Moscow on 8 August 1963. India’s support for the PTBT was such that it aroused criticism as well as suspicion. For example, Nehru was criticized in the Lok Sabha for supporting a partial arms control agreement instead of insisting on a comprehensive Treaty. Nehru defended his position saying: A partial agreement does not rule out a comprehensive agreement; it was a step towards that; it produced an atmosphere of confidence to go further (P.K. Lyengar, 2000). Pakistan’s approach to PTBT was similar to that of India in backing all efforts in that direction. During the negotiations for PTBT Pakistan supported a comprehensive and total ban of nuclear tests in all environments. But this did not prevent Pakistan from welcoming PTBT.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968

The Partial Test Ban Treaty sought to solve the most urgent environmental problem. But the problem of qualitative and quantitative arms race and the danger of nuclear proliferation remained untouched by PTBT. The growing worldwide interest to acquire nuclear weapons increased the danger of nuclear proliferation. Public pressure was built for a ban on nuclear proliferation. Therefore, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated a Treaty for cessation of nuclear proliferation. This was known as Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed by UK, USA, and USSR and over 50 other countries in 1968 which came into force in 1970. Russia fully abides by the NPT obligation. The Russian Federation is committed to the final goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. During the NPT review meeting in 1995, it proposed that all the nuclear weapon states should proceed towards that goal, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear potential, and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments. That objective could be achieved under the Treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the Forty – Ninth Session of UN general assembly (Anand Mathur, 2003).

In recent deliberation on NPT, Russia took a firm stand on preventing the arms race in outer space. Such moves clearly depicted Russia’s concern about abolition of Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia believed that keeping outer space free of weapons of any kind was
an important guarantee of sustained international stability. It believed that placement of weapons in outer space would not only mean expansion of spheres of military competition, but also its qualitative thrust forward with unpredictable consequences for the process of arms control, strategic stability and international security as a whole (Anand Mathur, 2003). Russia does not agree with the argument that placed weapons in outer space were unavoidable.

The Non Proliferation Treaty divided its parties into two categories: Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). The Treaty was trying to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons; it used a special, legal definition of nuclear weapons states. Under the Treaty, non-nuclear weapons states had to agree not to manufacture or otherwise possess or acquire nuclear explosives. They also agreed to accept inspection on all their peaceful nuclear activities by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The nuclear weapon states are not subjected to these conditions. They are permitted to retain their nuclear weapons and not required to accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear facilities, including those used for the production of nuclear arms (Leonard Spector, 2005). The nuclear weapons states agreed not to transfer nuclear explosive to non-nuclear weapon states or assist those states in the manufacture of such explosive. Under the Treaty, all parties are also required to ensure that any exports to non-nuclear weapon states of nuclear materials and equipment especially designed or prepared for the processing or production of nuclear materials would be placed under
IAEA safeguards by the importing country. Treaty was biased against those countries which were not nuclear states.

The NPT currently had 187 parties, including nuclear weapon states. India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba were the significant non parties. On May 1995, the members of the treaty agreed to extend its initial 25 year term to indefinitely (Leonard Spector, 2005). India believed that NPT was seriously flawed and did not really aim to bring about non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It refused to sign the Treaty on the ground that it was discriminatory in nature. NPT denies the freedom to non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons, but at the same time it does not ask nuclear weapons states to destroy their armaments. Explaining India's stand, the Indian ambassador Azim Hussain made the following points at the 1567 meeting of the first committee of United Nations on May 14, 1968. The Treaty did not do away with the special status of superiority associated with power and prestige conferred on those powers which possessed nuclear weapons.

The Treaty did not prohibit one nuclear weapon state from assisting another nuclear weapon state by providing technical assistance and Article VI did not create any surgical obligation in regard to the cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date. It was discriminatory in regard to the peaceful benefits of nuclear explosion (K. Subramaniyam, et al, 1985). Like India, Pakistan too voted in favour of the draft resolution on non-proliferation Treaty while refusing to join NPT in 1968.
Regarding the draft of NPT, Pakistan did not voice any major objection and in effect endorsed the main point of the Treaty, especially those over which India had expressed strong views. The only reservation Pakistan voiced about the proposed NPT draft was that the Treaty fell short of being a step towards general and complete nuclear disarmament as envisaged in resolution 2028 (XX). While welcoming the inclusion of article VI in the draft Treaty-in which NWS undertook to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament, Pakistan still found it less than a definite commitment. In order to strengthen that undertaking, Pakistan recommended a complementary measure to ban underground nuclear weapon tests as well as the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes. Pakistan remained adamant all along in its original stance on the NPT that: Non-Proliferation Treaty was unlike any other Treaty; the universality of its scope was its very essence. If all countries do not adhere to it, or if some do with reservations its entire purpose would be defeated (Ziba Moshaver, 1991).

In his address on 6 June 1968, Agha Shali, Pakistan's Ambassador to UN warned about the prospect of not joining the Treaty. He stressed Pakistan's geopolitical situation as being the predominant factor influencing the country's position on the NPT saying that the final analysis the position of Pakistan with regard to signing the Treaty would turn on considerations of its enlightened national security in the geopolitical context of the region in which Pakistan is situated (Ziba Moshaver, 1991). This reference to geopolitical context and the importance given to the adherence of near-nuclear countries reconfirms that Pakistan had made its own support for NPT conditional upon that of India's.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The second multilateral Treaty that sought to constrain proliferation was Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This Treaty was treated by the world's non-nuclear weapon states as a means for restricting the ability of nuclear powers to develop more advanced nuclear armaments. The CTBT was also a mechanism for constraining the capabilities of emerging nuclear states, because testing was important for the development of thermonuclear weapons and to provide confidence in the performance of smaller nuclear weapons used for missile warheads. After lengthy negotiations CTBT was opened for signature at United Nations in 1996. Russia approved it and committed to all the CTBT provisions. It considers this Treaty very important measure to control nuclear proliferation and urging all the countries to sign and ratify it.

The CTBT prohibits any nuclear tests explosion in any environment by banning all nuclear explosions. The CTBT makes it impossible for states to develop new types of nuclear weapons, thereby inhibiting a renewed nuclear arms race (Strobe Talbott, 1999). The Treaty also established the extensive international monitoring system of seismic and other sensors to detect prohibited detonations. The CTBT would come into effect after ratification by 44 nations those possessed research or power reactors capacity by 1996. Country's which were included in this group were those which had been suspected of possessing nuclear weapons and all of today's nuclear weapons aspirants, including Iran and
Iraq (Anand Mathur, 2003). Of this group, the most important states that had not ratified the Treaty were China, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and United States.

In October 1999, US senate voted against giving its advice and consent to ratification of CTBT. Although President Clinton’s administration strongly supported CTBT, believing that treaty would successfully address all the concern related to non-proliferation. But the George W. Bush administration firmly opposed the Pact (Ajey Lele, 2005). Similarly, US also gave a major jolt to the non-proliferation regime when it scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), one of the pillars of the international non-proliferation regime, in order to free itself from the Treaty’s restraints on the construction of a National Missile Defence.

India had not signed CTBT till today. India’s 1996 decision to oppose CTBT –was based on its discriminatory nature. Earlier India refused to sign the document that emerged from NPT negotiations in 1998-arguing that it did not fulfill the original mandate. Thereafter, India consistently opposed regional Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (NWFZ) and other non-proliferation proposals for South Asia, calling instead for global nuclear disarmament. India had long championed the development of a Global Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and contributed positively to early drafts of CTBT (Government of India, Ministry of Defense, Annual Report 1996-97).
Pakistan also had not signed CTBT. This is due to intense domestic opposition in Pakistan not to accept any nuclear restraints that India is not bound by. Pakistan indicated that it would become a party to CTBT only if India joined too (Ajey Lele, 2005). Pakistan’s arms control diplomacy since the beginning focused primarily on measures that would prevent India from going nuclear. Therefore, Pakistan had not signed NPT and CTBT. In fact, Pakistan made very clear to the world that it would sign the Treaty provided India also signs the Treaty.

The US unilateral withdrawal from ABM Treaty and U.S. Senate’s refusal to approve CTBT had significantly damaged its future as well as that of the NPT. The ABM Treaty was considered by Russians as the cornerstone of strategic stability and one of the major strategic documents in relations between Moscow and Washington. This Treaty protected the central paradigm behind nuclear deterrence for Russia, as it assured unavoidable punishment for a nuclear first strike by rendering the opponent vulnerable to unacceptable damage from a retaliatory response. Russia also considered US refusal to ratify CTBT as one of the major failure of nuclear regimes in recent times. It hoped that the few countries which still remained outside the Treaty would soon find it possible to join. Russia called upon all states parties to make every effort to strength the Treaty. The Treaty should remain one of the key pillars of the security system in the modern world.
The basic premise underlying Russia's Non-Proliferation was that it's military and political interests were best served by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other states. This perspective is shaped first and foremost by the fear that the states wants to acquire nuclear weapons were hostile to Russia. Russia's support for Non-Proliferation also stems from concern that the development of additional nuclear weapons state would increase the risk of local conflict. This was very dangerous from the Russian security point of view.

In its approach to nuclear proliferation Russia was guided by its national interest, and was primarily focused on its immediate neighbourhood, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Its principal military security concerns were also located on the country's Southern periphery. While nuclear proliferation was not the immediate concern, the fact was that most of the new and aspiring members of the nuclear club are Russia's neighbours. In the report prepared by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow analysis the dangers for Russia, on its border by new possessors of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (Vladimir Moskalenko and Taliana Shaumian, 1999). It was in this context that Russia has been persuading all the countries to sign NPT and CTBT, including India and Pakistan. All recent documents and statement on national security, mention WMD, nuclear proliferation and international terrorism at the top of the list of Russia's security concerns.
In Russia’s 2000 National Security Concept, arms control continues to occupy an important place, especially non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as of the means of their delivery. Proliferation was included as a separate plank in the list of threats to national security, which was hardly surprising because many potential proliferators were located close to Russia and also because proliferation of nuclear weapons was likely to undercut Russia’s special status in the international system as one of only five officially recognized nuclear powers. The Concept also lists among priorities “measures to ensure international control over the export of military and dual-use products, technologies, and services” (Russia’s 2000 National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle, http://www.nti.org/e-research/e3-55a.html).

The concept confirmed Russia’s intention to implement arms control agreement, but the attitude towards new agreement had changed. The 1997 concept simply postulated that Russia would participate in the process of negotiations on reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, as well as control over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. The amended version of the concept modified this goal quite considerably. Russia believed that despite all the changes taking place in the world, NPT and CTBT remains a major pillar of the International security system. In the changed context, Russian authorities feared that the world had to counter different, although no less important, dangers – terrorism being the greatest. Russia was committed to the goal of preventing terrorists and those that harbour them from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction and relate
technologies. Special attention should be given to the problem of the 'black WMD markets' (Ajey Lele, 2005). Russia had a view that all the countries who had signed the Treaty must engage in a joint search for ways and means of bringing the states remaining outside of the Treaty scope into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. There was a need to expand the IAEA verification activity in those states territories, strengthening national legislation in the field of accounting, verification and physical protection of the nuclear materials, as well as export control measures.

**Nuclear Explosion by India and Pakistan and Russia's concern**

The nuclear test conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had aggravated security scenario in South Asia. There was a growing international perception that tension between India and Pakistan might lead to nuclear war and create instability in South Asia. The tests spurred immediate global condemnation. All the nations, especially permanent members of Security Council voiced their opposition. They all saw the tests as a double setback: for peace in South Asia and threat for international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology to other countries.

The Security Council of the United Nations condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. It demanded that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and urged them to sign NPT and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without delay and
without conditions. Endorsing the joint Communiqué issued by Foreign Minister of France, China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States at their Meeting in Geneva on 4 June, Security Council adopted unanimous resolution 1178 (1998), expressed its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and consolidated. It said that in accordance with NPT India and Pakistan cannot have the status of nuclear-weapon states.


Expressing serious concern at the negative effect of those nuclear tests on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond, the council urged India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements. They were also urged to resume their dialogue on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them. They were encouraged to find mutually acceptable solutions that could address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir. The Security Council reaffirmed its full commitment and crucial importance of NPT and CTBT as the cornerstone of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
India's sudden nuclear explosions caught Russia, like other countries unaware. During Soviet period, Moscow tried to reconcile apparently contradictory aspects of its policy by making a general appeal in favour of universal adherence to 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but refraining from overtly criticizing India for not signing it. The Soviet leadership did take note of India's compulsions, refrained from criticizing India for its peaceful nuclear tests in 1974 and consistently showed understanding for India's nuclear stance. The Soviet Union's multi-dimensional relations with India were largely responsible for the formers understanding position. Soviet Union locked in a ideological stand-off with China, which had not signed the NPT at that time and with which it had an unresolved border dispute, Soviet Union repeatedly expressed its serious concern at the report of secret Chinese assistance.

The Delhi Declaration on a Non-Violent and Nuclear-free world, signed in 1986 by the then Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, could be seen as an embodiment of this understanding as well as clear support for the Indian stand of seeking global, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament within a given time-frame (Devendra Kaushik et al, 1997). Soviet Union consistently showed cordial understanding of India's nuclear position.

The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 put Russian policy makers in dilemma. The Russian Government faced other compulsions such as its relations with the West and its own commitment to nuclear-proliferation
regime. On 12th May President Boris Yeltsin publicly expressed his anguish and declared that “India had of course let us down over their nuclear explosion” (Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), BBC, 1998 Su/3225 B/1). The same day the Foreign Ministry issued a statement that the “The three nuclear tests carried out in India on 11th May pushed the world towards proliferation of nuclear weapons and created some other additional difficulties for further reduction of nuclear weapons, and it expressed the hope that such a policy by which India would not cause a chain reaction in South Asia and beyond. The statement concluded that “this action caused very deep regret in Russia, a very close friend of India (Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), BBC, 1998 Su/3225 B/1).

Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov remarked that India’s decision to carry out nuclear explosion was “short sighted” and “unacceptable” as far as Russia was concerned. He felt that there was a serious risk of India-Pakistan conflict and added that especially Russian would not want Pakistan to follow India’s footsteps” (Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), BBC, 1998 Su/3225 B/4) Russia was not ready to recognize India as well as Pakistan as nuclear weapons states. It was urging both countries to reverse its nuclear Policy and sign NPT and CTBT. Russia also joined with G-8 leaders in condemning India’s nuclear test at their Birmingham Summit and called upon Pakistan to show maximum restraint. But at the same time Moscow made it clear from the very outset in contrast to US policy – that it was opposed to imposing sanctions against India. Russia preferred diplomacy to coercion to try to bring about a change in India’s nuclear policy. It
also announced that Russia's cooperation with India in the civilian nuclear sector would continue.

Within Russian opinion was divided on the question of supporting India on the nuclear issue. The leaders of some opposition parties in Russia took a different stand from that of the government. The General Secretary of Community Party of Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov and the leader of Ultra-Nationalist Liberal Democratic party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, welcomed Indian nuclear tests. The high profile speaker of Russian state Duma and a prominent communist leader, Gennadly Seleznev lauded India's determination in continuing its nuclear weapons programme despite US pressure. He also took favorable note of the readiness of the India government to join international non-proliferation efforts following its tests (Jyotsna Bakshi, 1999).

Russia was concerned that these tests could disturb current fragile balance among the nuclear powers and open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation. The emergence of new nuclear power would destabilize the situation and lead to a new arms race in Asia. It was clear that the nuclear arms race in South Asia would not stop and nuclear tests in Pakistan two weeks after Indian tested confirmed these apprehensions. The chain of reaction might continue and involve other potential nuclear weapons states, such as Iran, Iraq, Israel and Libya, which were dangerously close to the border of the CIS member states. This had a direct impact on the Russian security (Jyotsna Bakshi, 1999).
Russia’s apprehension about Pakistan proved right finally when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests on May 28, 1998. Sergey Lavrov of Russian Federation while making comment on nuclear tests recalled that Foreign Minister of five permanent members of the council had their meeting in Geneva called on India and Pakistan not to carry out further nuclear tests and adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-test-Ban Treaty. He stressed the readiness of his country to help India and Pakistan in their search for dialogue.

(United Nations Security Council Condemns Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan press Release, SC/6528, http://www.un.org/news/press/doses/1998/se6528.doc.htm). Russia’s Foreign Minister expressed his “deepest concern” at the Pakistan nuclear tests. Hope was expressed that Pakistan’ as well as India would show foresight and wisdom and refrain from taking actions that would escalate tension in the region. Foreign Minister Primakov stressed that in the existing circumstances the international community must take radical steps to make India and Pakistan to sign treaties of non-proliferation and termination of nuclear tests. At the same time, Primakov opposed Sanctions and embargo against Pakistan as in the case of India earlier. He also said that the “new nuclear powers” should not be excluded from international dialogue (Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), Su/3240, B/9, May 30, 1998).

When India and Pakistan conducted their series of nuclear tests, Russia reacted calmly. It made no accusation and threatened no sanctions. Yet, from Russia’s perspective, India and Pakistan represent two very different cases. India, Asia’s rising great power, was considered a trusted
friend, a non-problematic strategic partner and a valued client in the arms trade. Therefore, difference over NPT and CTBT would not be allowed to come in the way of their multifaceted cooperation.

It soon became evident that nuclear tests would not come in the way of indo-Russian cooperation. It was announced that Russia’s cooperation with India in the civil nuclear sector would continue. On 14 May, just a day after the second test, the annual conference of the Joint Indo-Russian Council, which oversees the integrated long-term programme of the technical and scientific collaboration between the two countries, opened in Moscow in an atmosphere of goodwill and friendship. In June 1998, Russia’s Atomic Energy Minister, Yevgeny Adamov, visited India to sign a supplement to the agreement of 1988 on the construction of an atomic power plant in Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu.

Pakistan, on the contrary, with its long history of tense relations with Russia during Cold war, and especially during the war in Afghanistan, was given a very different treatment. Russia’s recent concern included Pakistan’s links with Taliban; the country’s political instability, strength and influence of the radical Islamists; and the potential for further downstream proliferation from Pakistan. When General Musharraf came to power, his government was unceremoniously branded in Russia as “a military junta with nukes” (Dmitri Tremin, Russia’s nuclear Policy in the 21st century Environment, Proliferation Papers, Autumn 2005, http://www.ifri.org/files/security-defence/profit-12-Tremin.pdf). Since the
fall of Taliban’s control over Afghanistan had improved, but Russia remains wary of Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Russia feels exonerated by the evidence of Pakistan’s connection in the Iranian nuclear program.

On the issue of imposing sanctions, Russia was opposed to it right from the outset. Sanctions were seen as not useful as they could prove counter productive. Russian experience with sanctions against Libya had proved to be counter productive. In the case of India, they were likely to hurt Russia’s national interest. On May 29, a day after Pakistan’s tests Izvestia published critical remarks about India as well as Pakistan. Grave doubts were expressed about the ability of Indian and Pakistan government to show the necessary maturity, responsibility and restraint in handling nuclear weapons and ensuring that nuclear war does not break out in the subcontinent. India may claim to be the largest democracy in the world; but abject poverty, religious strife and unstable government were the bane of the country. In such situation, super power ambition meshed with nationalism could be dangerous. Situation in Pakistan was no better. The army was absolutely independent and powerful. The problems of poverty, corruption Intra-religious conflicts compounded by the existence of a large number of Islamic extremists of all shades added to the concern, according to Izvestia (Jyotshna Bakshi, 1998). The Izvestia article urged the Western countries and Russia to work together to ensure that both countries should sign NPT and CTBT.
Kargil Conflict

India and Pakistan's conflict at Kargil in May 1999, in the disputed territory of Kashmir gave an opportunity to evaluate the proliferation and its actual impact on the region. Kargil was the first Indo-Pakistan war in the last Twenty Eight years, and occurred one year after 1998 nuclear tests. In early May 1999, India detected an intrusion terrorist in the Kargil sector of Line of Control (LoC). India subsequently found that troops from the Pakistan Army's Northern Light Infantry, supported by civilian insurgents, had occupied a 150-kilometer segment of LoC (Nathan E. Busch, 2005). The incursion caught India completely unaware, given the difficulty of occupying such harsh terrain and Indo-Pakistan relation prevailing at that time.

India initially attempted to dislodge the intruders with the help of ground forces. By mid-1999, the Vajpayee government considered crossing LOC into Pakistan Kashmir, if Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from India-controlled Kashmir (Nathan E. Busch, 2005). Ultimately India decided not to cross LOC and restricted its military operation to Indian Kashmir.

Pakistan behaved in a highly provocative manner at Kargil, deliberately breaching the line of control and triggering a shooting war with a nuclear India. A primary motive of Pakistan in Kargil conflict appears to draw international attention to its dispute with India over Kashmir and get third party mediation to resolve conflict. Nawaz Sharif
stated in a nationally televised speech on 12 July 1999, "In my opinion the basic objective of the Mujaheedins capture of Kargil was to draw the attention of international community towards Kashmir issue" (S.Paul Kapoor, 2003). Pakistan was willing to take risk in Kargil because it believed that its new nuclear status would prevent India from launching an all out conventional war in relation.

Nuclearization of South Asia did not prevent conflict in Kargil. Indeed, "Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons functioned as the critical permissive condition that made contemplating Kargil possible. Pakistani elite’s opinions of Kargil in the wake of the conflict suggest that nuclear weapons may continue to have such an emboldening effect on Pakistan’s behaviour in the future. In their views, Kargil reinforced the notion that “Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities have become the key to its political strategies at multiple levels. Nuclear weapons not only enabled Islamabad to pressurize strategic diversions and immunize the country from a violent India counter response they also serve to catalyze the attention of international community. Consequently, they had acquired centrality in Pakistan’s national strategy (S. Paul Kapoor, 2003).

**Nuclear Doctrines**

Soon after the nuclear tests in South Asia in May 1998, certain irresponsible statements were made by the leaders in both countries since the tests caused a political delirium in both India and Pakistan. But the fact of the matter was that despite the Kargil episode, peace continued to
hold in South Asia. Here, the nuclear weapons played a role in stabilizing a highly inflammable and dangers standoff between the two neighbors. In the meantime both countries declared their nuclear doctrine and policies to assure the outside world that the governments are fully conscious of their responsibilities as nuclear powers.

The nuclear doctrine of India was perhaps the first of its kind among the known nuclear weapon states of the world. The draft was presented to Prime Minister and cabinet in August 1999 and released later for public debate by National Security Advisory Board. In the objective of the doctrine it says that, in the absence of global nuclear disarmaments India’s strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This was consistent with UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-Defence. Further it was stated that India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. The central principles of the draft nuclear doctrine were “credible minimum nuclear deterrence” and “no first-use” of nuclear weapons. “Credible minimum nuclear deterrence” was seen as a policy based on “retaliation only,” in which great emphasis was placed on survivability of nuclear forces (Draft Report of National Security advisory board on India Nuclear Doctrine, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/990817-indnueid.htm.3/7/2006). The doctrine stated that purpose of India’s nuclear weapons was the “deterrence of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” by other states, and declared that India “will not initiate any nuclear attacks (Draft Report of National Security advisory board on India Nuclear Doctrine, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/990817-indnueid.htm.3/7/2006).
Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use, resides in the person of Prime Minister of India, or the designated successors.

Pakistan’s nuclear policy was premised on the following rules:

- Deterrence against all forms of external aggression which could otherwise jeopardizes Pakistan’s national interests.
- Pakistan as a matter of policy would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS)
- Pakistan would continue to refrain from entering into any arms race.
- Pakistan would not transfer nuclear weapons or weapons related materials or technology to any other entities or states, which of course also include the Muslim states as well.
- Pakistan would constantly support the international arms control and disarmament initiatives, if they were universal and non-discriminatory in character (Sipri Year Book-2002).

With regard to its nuclear strategy, Pakistan’s formulation of its own strategy is a reflection of its inferiority in conventional military capability. A typical example of this can be seen in Pakistan’s decision to decline India’s proposal of “no first-use” of nuclear weapons, which resulted in Pakistan retaining the option of nuclear “first use”. Still, Pakistan’s “first use” policy does not mean that it would arbitrarily use its nuclear weapons in which the survival of the state is at stake, and follows similar lines as the nuclear doctrine by NATO in 1991.

As far as authority to control the nuclear forces is concerned, Pakistan differs that it is not absolutely apprehended that which
organizations possess the authority to take decisions. For instance, at the time of civilian government when Nawaz Sharif was Prime Minister, it was thought that as Chairman of Cabinet Defence Committee Prime Minister had the authority to take decision on nuclear use, but looking back at the events of Kargil conflict when Sharif had inadequate control, whether military respected the authority of Cabinet Defence committee centered on Sharif himself (Farah Zhara, 1999). In fact, in Pakistan, there is no reliable civilian control, when civil servants run the administration it is said that the authority to launch nuclear weapons is shared between the military and Prime Minister (Farah Zhara, 1999). Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan today, was the chief of the Pakistan army, and it can be seen that President Musharraf has the authority to take a decision on nuclear weapons. The civil-military relations are highly complex and undefined in Pakistan because the intervention of military power is so entrenched in all the aspects of its national security.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on United States on September 11, 2001, Bush administration lifted all the sanctions that had imposed on Pakistan by Clinton administration on account of Pakistan’s nuclear tests. This action was taken because United States, which regarded Taliban Government of Afghanistan and Al-Qaida, which was under its protection, as terrorist organizations, deemed Pakistan’s cooperation as essential for carrying out anti-terrorist action inside Afghanistan. As United States proceeded with its anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, a concern arose that Pakistan’s nuclear explosive devices
might fall into the hands of the United States. Russia also expressed same concerns. This concern arose because religious extremist groups close to the Taliban and member of al-Qaida live in Pakistan and they had also close connection with terrorist groups fighting in Chechnya.

Indo-Russian Nuclear Cooperation

Nuclear energy cooperation for civilian use is likely to play an increasingly bigger role in Indo-Russian relations. Russia involved in India’s nuclear energy programme for civilian use, it has set up two nuclear reactors at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu. International restrictions on technology transfer to India are bound to be lifted shortly with reference to U.S. Russia could be the immediate beneficiary of the lifting of nuclear technology restriction for India.

Russian-Indian nuclear energy cooperation has a long history. The cooperation began in 1979 when Soviet Union and India signed their first science and technological cooperation agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Alexander Rumyanstev, NOVOSTI, December, 2004). In 1988, Soviet Union and India signed a cooperation agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in India. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 had delayed the implementation of the agreement. It was also delayed due to American objections after the Gulf War in 1992. The 1988 agreement remained in force for 10 years. Therefore, on June 21, 1998 a supplementary agreement was signed by Russian Minister for Atomic Energy and Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission.

Under the original agreement Koodankulam was to be a turnkey bases project with Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) providing the site. The then USSR
was to provide the design of the VVER 1000 type Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR). It would also bring the fuel, equipment, components and spares to build reactors. Under the supplementary agreement, is technical one, Russia had given the NPC design and bring most of the equipment, while NPC had to build the two reactors. Russia will also supply enriched Uranium fuel for life of the reactors. India and Russia had thus entered into a new phase of nuclear cooperation. The construction of the Koodankulam reactors with the help of Russian Federation would improve electricity generation and availability in India.

This joint project would require US $2.6 billion to complete. On this project Russia is providing a $ 1.5 billion state loan. The Indian side is doing all the construction work, while Russian companies are supplying the high tech equipments. The project is regarded as one of utmost importance for the Federal Nuclear Energy Agency (Rostom) and the agency will try hard to ensure the successful implementation of the project. Russia is ready to expand such cooperation by constructing nuclear power plants in other parts of the world, Russia can assert itself on the global high tech market.

India’s former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, R.Chidambaram has sought to portray Indo-Russian cooperation in the nuclear realm as far reaching and part of an Indian plan to give significant impetus to the nuclear program. India’s target is to generate 20,000 MW of nuclear-- generated electricity by 2020. R.Chidambaram stated that although India had a self-reliant nuclear power program based on indigenized Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), but Russian help India to develop Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) and thorium utilization
in a closed unclear fuel cycle as well as modern Light Water Reactors (LWR) (Deepa Ollapalli et al, 2003). Russia's role in the nuclear field becomes critical for India in the context of sanctions and other international restrictions. So far, Russia had been able to circumvent some of the most restrictive clauses of relevant treaties of which Russia was a member. At the moment, India does not appear to have much choice but to bank on Russia's stated and implied intentions. Moreover, given the close and friendly ties between Russia and India, Russian approach had always been in favour of the latter.

The Russian Federation, the successor state of the Soviet Union continues to be a member of the NPT as also member of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). The NSG is concerned with nations that export nuclear technology to countries outside the NPT framework also. India as a non-signatory to the NPT had resisted all attempts to impose "full scope" safeguards on its nuclear activities. In spite of all these technical problems Russia was able to pursue Koodankulum Agreement without insisting on full scope safeguards, since NSG guidelines allowed for limited safeguards that applied to the plant transferred alone (R.R.Subramaniam, 2001).

In 1996 Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia's commitment to NSG guidelines. However, President Vladimir Putin distanced the country's policy from NSG by amending Russia's export control legislation. In May 2000, decree No 312 was modified to allow nuclear supplies to non-nuclear weapon states whose activities were not under full scope safeguards in exceptional circumstances (Deepa Ollapalli et al, 2003). The position of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy was that the new
decree significantly expanded Russia’s nuclear export capability and that it was linked to Russia’s intent to assist the Indian program. Indeed, Putin said as much when he noted in New Delhi that two more reactors in addition to Koodankulam were distinct possibilities. A major feature of President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in October 2004 was his trip to Baba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) at Trombay Mumbai. A rare honour for the President, he was the first Russian leader in fact the foreign leader to visit the Indian nuclear reactor site. Indeed, this was very significant development in their nuclear cooperation and in the relationship as a whole.

Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation would seem to have support at the highest levels of Russian leadership. For instance, Minister for Atomic Energy Rumyantsev noted India as a strategic partner and ensured that there are no rapproaches (from the international community) in this regard (Deepa Ollapalli et al, 2003). He stated that Russia intends to build a nuclear power station in India despite international concern. Russian and Indian nuclear energy industry is based on the closed loop nuclear fuel cycle. The closed loop nuclear fuel cycle requires fast plutonium reactors and Russia is a leader in this field (Alexander Rumyanstev, NOVOSTI, December, 2004).

Russia’s current cooperation with India in the nuclear sphere is based on the construction of the Koodankulam nuclear power plant which will have two 1000 MW water – cooled and water moderated reactor. The project had begun on March 31, 2002 and both reactors are planned to be put into operation in 2007 and 2008. The construction of Koodankulam power plant highlights the mutually
advantageous and long-term cooperation between Russian and Indian organizations. Participating in the project is important for Russia because the project will increase Russia’s high tech exports. Long term cooperation would be facilitated by these power units uninterrupted fuel cycle.

At a joint press conference with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Russian President expressed his confidence that the moment for broadening the scope of the nuclear relationship with India would soon be at hand. President Vladimir Putin said Russia considered India as its long term strategic partner, adding, “And we will actively work to be sure that India would cope with all its problems and tasks that it was addressing, including in the peaceful use of nuclear energy” (India Russia Inching Towards Fresh Nuclear Cooperation, The Hindu, December 7, 2005.) The broadening of collaboration between Russia and India in the field of peaceful nuclear energy confirm to the strategic interests of Russia. At the highest level, India has stated repeatedly its readiness to significantly expand the exiting framework of cooperation between two countries in this highly technological sphere indicating the mutual interest. The agreement between U.S. and India on nuclear deal would remove the hesitation on the part of the Russian business community and open avenues for Russian-Indian collaboration in all fields of energy production, advanced energy technologies and safeguarding the environment.

Pakistan’s role in the global nuclear proliferation and Russian concerns

International efforts to stem nuclear proliferation did not begin until the late 1960s, after five nations had acquired nuclear weapons. Since then, the primary
focus of non-proliferation efforts was to maintain control over the specialized materials necessary to build such device because this was the most difficult and expensive part of a nuclear weapons program. Recent revelation by Pakistan nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's involvement in the transfer of nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea shocked the entire international community. During visit to Islamabad in October 2003, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage personally presented evidence against Khan to Musharraf and threatened that Pakistan could be reported to United Nations Security Council and suffer sanctions if it failed to put an end to Khan's nuclear entrepreneurship permanently (Gaurav Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Sales from Pakistan, http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm).

Russia also felt exonerated by the evidence of the Pakistan connection in Iranian nuclear program. These developments caused concerns for Russia very much and proliferation from threshold countries would affect the nuclear deterrence. This threat was mentioned in Russia's nuclear policy. *It says that a number of threshold countries like Iran, Iraq and Israel are situated in the close proximity to the southern border and this has a direct impact on Russian security* (Russian National Security Concept, January 10, 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/dec00/docdecoo.html)

Russian attitude towards nuclear proliferation remains complex. There was no doubt that the Russian government had been watching the spread of nuclear weapons as a serious threat to Russia itself, as well as to the world's strategic stability and to international security. Such concern was understandable given the
fact that a major portion of Russia lies in Eurasia especially around its periphery and the nuclear issue adding to the complexities. Hence, it fully supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and cooperates with U.S., European Union and the IAEA in joint and parallel efforts to curb and reverse dangerous trends. However, Russia's specific attitude towards concrete cases of proliferation, only partially coincide with those of its Western partners. They reflect a plethora of strategic, political and economic considerations.

When India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in UNSC that economic sanctions imposed on the two countries in the wake of nuclear tests were unjustified on humanitarian and other grounds, he said, noting that the resolution before the council did not contain such a provision. He also drew attention to the dangers posed by the nuclear tests carried out by the two countries. There was an urgent need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Russia would continue to do everything it could to strengthen that regime and prevent its being undermined (United Nations Security Council Condemns Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan, Press Release SC/6528, http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/1998/se6528.doc.htm).

Russia considers Iran and North Korean cases separately. Russia essentially sees Iran as a regional player and a trading partner whose policies continue to evolve away from revolutionary pattern of late 1970s and early 1980s. Russia’s experience with Iran, whether in Tajikistan and elsewhere in the former Soviet space, or with respect to

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Chechen separatism, had been largely positive. It needs to be added here that after China and India, Iran is a major importer of Russian arms. Russia, of course, did not wish to see a nuclear-and missile-armed Iran, but it was believed that a step-by-step approach would ultimately allow Iran to come clean on its nuclear program, which would subsequently be recognized as non-military (Dmitri Trenin 2005). Russia, which had worked to complete the Busher light-water nuclear reactor and views Iran as a lucrative market for its civilian nuclear industry, had a vested interest in Iranian cooperation with the international community. In February 2005, Russia managed to finally conclude an agreement with Tehran under which spent nuclear fuel would be shipped to Russia. Russian cooperation with Iran in the nuclear civilian energy programme is under international safeguards.

North Korea, on the other hand, had been perceived as an isolated and historically doomed regime which would give way, in due course, to Korea’s reunification. Russia takes part in six-party talk and had been trying to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions and return to NPT. At the same time, alongside with China and South Korea, Russia had been calling on U.S. to be more flexible and less threatening in its dealing with North Korea. Russia’s attitude to the North Korean nuclear problem also influenced by the experience it had in 1994 when the U.S. cut its civilian nuclear energy project with Pyongyang, although the original North Korean nuclear reactors had been built with Soviet assistance. The Russian government broadly shares its national
atomic energy agency’s view that the U.S. aims to take Russia out of nuclear energy cooperation with North Korea and Iran, so as to undercut Russia’s position on the world civilian nuclear technology market.

While Russia opposes both Iran and North Korea going nuclear for explicit strategic reasons, it does not see either one as hostile to itself for the present. In fact, Russia mainly fears Iranian and North Korean nuclear weaponisation. As a matter of practical policy, Russia support International efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.

In contrast to Soviet Union, Russian Federation is not particularly worried about Israel’s nuclear capability, as it is considered a means of last resort and a stabilizing factor in the region. Its concern, however, that other nation in the Greater Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) may follow Israel’s lead and build their own weapons or acquire components from the black market. Similarly, it was worried about long-term stability in East Asia, should the North Korean example be followed by others (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan).

Due to these developments, the growing concern is that the technologies, hardware and the known-how might had diffused further then the presently identified three countries. Even more important was that this knowledge could have permeated further to terrorist groups both inside and outside Pakistan that are constantly on the lookout for such weapons. Weapon of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist groups could play havoc with international security. Therefore, international
community through its global agencies and institutions should bring all the countries to pursue the security concerns. Since Russia is a member of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and Global Partnership Programs, and of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), had a major role to control the nuclear proliferation to protect its own interests in the South Asian region.

In conclusion it can be said that Russia condemned nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan and urged both the countries to sign the NPT and CTBT. It had not taken harsh measures compared to other nuclear powers and followed different policy towards India and Pakistan due to its own economic and political factors. But in the case of nuclear proliferation, Russia is more worried about Pakistan. This worry is mainly due to the fact that there is no established strict control over nuclear technology and this technology might reach other countries and especially terrorist groups. These developments are not good from Russian security point of view.